WO2009030155A1 - Method, system and apparatus for negotiating the security ability when a terminal is moving - Google Patents

Method, system and apparatus for negotiating the security ability when a terminal is moving Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009030155A1
WO2009030155A1 PCT/CN2008/072165 CN2008072165W WO2009030155A1 WO 2009030155 A1 WO2009030155 A1 WO 2009030155A1 CN 2008072165 W CN2008072165 W CN 2008072165W WO 2009030155 A1 WO2009030155 A1 WO 2009030155A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
nas
mme
authentication vector
vector related
Prior art date
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PCT/CN2008/072165
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Chengdong He
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Family has litigation
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=40421872&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=WO2009030155(A1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Priority to PL08784154T priority Critical patent/PL2139175T6/pl
Priority to JP2010513633A priority patent/JP4976548B2/ja
Priority to ES08784154.0T priority patent/ES2401039T7/es
Priority to EP08784154.0A priority patent/EP2139175B3/en
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Publication of WO2009030155A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009030155A1/zh
Priority to US12/633,948 priority patent/US8656169B2/en
Priority to US14/147,179 priority patent/US8812848B2/en
Priority to US14/303,146 priority patent/US9241261B2/en
Priority to US14/873,504 priority patent/US9538373B2/en
Priority to US14/957,338 priority patent/US9497625B2/en
Priority to US15/372,093 priority patent/US10015669B2/en
Priority to US16/023,324 priority patent/US10595198B2/en

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/24—Negotiation of communication capabilities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a wireless communication technology, and in particular, to a method, system, and mobility management entity and user equipment for negotiating security capabilities when a terminal moves.
  • the wireless network includes a wireless access network and a core network.
  • the future evolution of the wireless network core network includes a Mobile Management Entity (MME), which functions as a GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) Support Node (SGSN) for 2G/3G networks. Similarly, it mainly completes mobility management, user authentication, and so on.
  • MME Mobile Management Entity
  • SGSN General Packet Radio Service Support Node
  • NAS non-access signaling
  • Security capabilities include NAS signaling encryption algorithm, corresponding NAS integrity protection key Knas-int, NAS integrity protection algorithm and corresponding NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc, used by UE and system to transmit signaling To ensure the normal reception of UE signaling and the security of the communication system.
  • GERAN Global Mobile Telecommunications Edge Access Network
  • UTRAN 3G Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • GERAN Global Mobile Telecommunications Edge Access Network
  • UTRAN 3G Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • GERAN Global Mobile Telecommunications Edge Access Network
  • UTRAN 3G Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • GERAN Global Mobile Telecommunications Edge Access Network
  • UTRAN 3G Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • GERAN Global Mobile Telecommunications Edge Access Network
  • UTRAN 3G Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • the security capability negotiation process needs to be re-executed to ensure subsequent Security during the interaction between the UE and the network in the process.
  • the security capability negotiation here includes for the LTE network: NAS confidentiality protection algorithm and NAS integrity protection algorithm, and radio resource control (RRC, Radio Resource Control) confidentiality protection algorithm and RRC integrity protection algorithm, user plane (UP, User Plane) confidentiality protection algorithm.
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • UP User Plane
  • the NAS confidentiality protection algorithm For the TAU process initiated by the UE in the idle state, the NAS confidentiality protection algorithm, the NAS integrity protection algorithm negotiation, and the negotiation of the corresponding NAS protection key need to be solved.
  • the embodiments of the present invention provide a method for negotiating security capability when a terminal moves, so that a UE in an idle state can perform security capability negotiation when moving from a 2G/3G network to an LTE network.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for negotiating a security capability of a terminal, so that when an idle UE moves from a 2G/3G network to an LTE network, security capability negotiation can be performed.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides an MME device, which enables security capability negotiation when a UE in an idle state moves from a 2G/3G network to an LTE network.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a UE apparatus, so that a UE in an idle state can perform security capability negotiation when moving from a 2G/3G network to an LTE network.
  • a method for negotiating security capabilities when a terminal moves includes:
  • the mobility management entity MME receives the tracking area update request message sent by the user equipment UE, acquires the non-access signaling NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, and the authentication vector related key or the root key derived from the authentication vector related key. ;
  • the MME selects a NAS security algorithm according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE; derives a NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key or the root key; and sends the selected NAS security to the UE Algorithmic message;
  • the UE derives the NAS protection key according to its own authentication vector related key.
  • a system for negotiating security capability when a terminal moves including a user equipment UE and a mobility management entity MME,
  • the UE is configured to send a tracking area update request message to the MME, receive a message that is sent by the MME and carry the selected non-access signaling NAS security algorithm, and derive a NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key;
  • the MME is configured to receive a tracking area update request message sent by the UE, obtain an authentication vector related key or a root key derived according to the authentication vector related key, and a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, according to the UE
  • the supported NAS security algorithm selects the NAS security algorithm, generates and sends a message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm to the UE, and derives the NAS protection key according to the obtained authentication vector related key or the root key.
  • a mobility management entity MME including an obtaining module, a selecting module, and a key deriving module, where the acquiring module is configured to receive a tracking area update request message sent by the user equipment UE, obtain an authentication vector related key or according to an authentication vector The root key derived by the relevant key, and the non-access signaling NAS security algorithm supported by the UE;
  • the selecting module is configured to: according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE acquired by the acquiring module, select a NAS security algorithm, generate a message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm, and send the message to the UE;
  • the key derivation module is configured to obtain, according to an authentication vector related key acquired by the acquiring module or a root key derived according to an authentication vector related key, and a NAS security algorithm selected by the selecting module, NAS protection key.
  • a user equipment including an update module, a key derivation module, a storage module, and an inspection module, where the update module is configured to send a tracking area update request message to the mobility management entity MME, where the UE supports the security supported by the storage module. Capability information; receiving a message sent by the MME that carries the selected non-access signaling NAS security algorithm;
  • the key derivation module is configured to derive a NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key and the NAS security algorithm received by the update module;
  • the storage module is configured to save security capability information supported by the UE
  • the checking module is configured to check, according to security capability information supported by the UE received from the MME When the information related to the security capabilities supported by the storage module is inconsistent, it is determined that there is a degraded attack.
  • the MME receives the tracking area update request message sent by the UE, obtains an authentication vector related key or a root key derived according to the authentication vector related key, and a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE. Then, according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, the NAS security algorithm is selected; and a message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm is generated and sent to the UE, so as to achieve the purpose of sharing the NAS security algorithm between the UE and the MME.
  • the MME derives the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key or the root key derived from the authentication vector related key
  • the UE derives the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key to implement the shared NAS protection.
  • the purpose of the key when the UE moves from the 2G/3G network to the LTE network, the NAS security algorithm and the NAS protection key can be negotiated with the MME, so as to implement the security capability negotiation process in the TAU process between the heterogeneous networks, and ensure that the subsequent UE interacts with the network. Safety.
  • the embodiment of the present invention can also be applied to the security capability negotiation process when the UE moves inside the LTE network.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for negotiating security capability when a terminal moves according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for negotiating security capability of a terminal when moving according to a second embodiment of the present invention
  • Method flow chart of capability negotiation
  • FIG. 4 is a system structural diagram of security capability negotiation when a terminal moves in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the MME receives the tracking area update request message sent by the UE, acquires the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, and authenticates the method. a vector correlation key or a root key derived from an authentication vector related key; and then selecting a NAS security algorithm according to a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE; the MME is related according to the authentication vector related key or according to an authentication vector.
  • the root key derived by the key derives the NAS protection key; sends a message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm to the UE; and the UE derives the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key.
  • the UE has accessed the network through UTRAN/GERAN when in the idle state, and when moving to the tracking area of LTE, the UE initiates a TAU procedure.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for negotiating security capability when a terminal moves according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in Figure 1, the method includes the following steps:
  • Step 100 The UE sends a TAU request to the MME.
  • the UE sends a tracking area update request to the new MME through an evolved Node B (eNB) of the evolved radio access network.
  • eNB evolved Node B
  • the following description simplifies communication between the UE and the MME through the eNB to communicate between the UE and the MME.
  • the TAU request sent by the UE to the MME may carry some parameters that are known to those skilled in the art, such as Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI), and may also carry the security capability information supported by the UE.
  • TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
  • NAS security algorithm NAS integrity protection algorithm and / or NAS confidentiality protection algorithm
  • RRC security algorithm RRC integrity protection algorithm and / or RRC confidentiality protection algorithm
  • UP security algorithm UP confidentiality
  • Step 101 to Step 102 The MME acquires a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, and sends a mobility management context request (context request) message to the SGSN. After receiving the SGSN, the SGSN sends a mobility management context carrying the authentication vector related key to the MME. Response (message response) message.
  • the SGSN queries the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE after receiving the mobility management context request message, and sends the mobility to the MME.
  • the NAS management algorithm supports the NAS security algorithm supported by the query.
  • the NAS security algorithm is a NAS integrity protection algorithm and/or a NAS confidentiality protection algorithm.
  • the SGSN in the process is the SGSN of the 2G network, where the authentication vector related key includes at least the encryption key Kc, or the value Kc obtained by unidirectional transformation of Kc.
  • the SGSN is an SGSN of a 3G network, where the authentication vector related key includes at least an integrity key IK and an encryption key CK, or values IK' and CK' obtained by unidirectional transformation of IK and CK.
  • Unidirectional transformation refers to the transformation of the original parameters by an algorithm to obtain the target parameters, but the transformation of the original parameters cannot be derived from the destination parameters.
  • Kc is obtained by the algorithm f ( Kc ), but Kc cannot be derived backward from Kc by any inverse algorithm, this transformation is a one-way transformation.
  • Step 103 The MME selects a new NAS security algorithm according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, the NAS security algorithm supported by the NAS, and the NAS security algorithm supported by the system; derives the root key Kasme according to the authentication vector related key; and then according to Kasme
  • the NAS protection key is derived, including the NAS integrity protection key Knas-int and/or the NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc.
  • Step 104 The MME generates a Tracking Area Update Accept (TAU accept) message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm.
  • TAU accept Tracking Area Update Accept
  • the MME may also perform NAS integrity protection on the TAU accept message, for example, using the information of the NAS integrity protection key Knas-int, TAU accept derived in step 103, and the NAS in the selected NAS security algorithm.
  • the integrity protection algorithm derives the NAS integrity-protected message authentication code (NAS-MAC) value, and then attaches the value to the TAU accept message for transmission to the UE.
  • NAS-MAC NAS integrity-protected message authentication code
  • the TAU accept message in this step may also carry the security capability information supported by the UE.
  • Step 105 The UE receives the TAU accept message carrying the NAS security algorithm selected by the MME, and obtains the negotiated NAS security algorithm; and then according to its current authentication vector related key (for example, the source network is IK and CK at 3G or according to IK and CK derived by IK and CK, or Kc when the source network is 2G or Kc' derived from Kc) derive the root key Kasme, and then derive the NAS protection key from the root key, including NAS. Integrity protection key Knas-int and/or NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc.
  • the current authentication vector related key for example, the source network is IK and CK at 3G or according to IK and CK derived by IK and CK, or Kc when the source network is 2G or Kc' derived from Kc
  • the step may further include the UE checking whether the integrity protection of the TAU accept message is correct. If the discovery is incorrect, it is determined that the security capability negotiation fails, and the security capability negotiation may be re-initiated. Process. For example, the UE derives the NAS-MAC according to the derived NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc, the information in the TAU accept, and the NAS integrity protection algorithm carried in the TAU accept message, and then the UE compares the derived NAS-MAC with Whether the NAS-MAC carried in the TAU accept message is the same, indicating that the message has not been changed during the transmission process, otherwise the message is considered to be changed during the transmission process, thereby determining that the security capability negotiation fails.
  • the UE derives the NAS-MAC according to the derived NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc, the information in the TAU accept, and the NAS integrity protection algorithm carried in the TAU accept message, and then the UE compares the derived NAS-MAC with Whether the NAS-
  • the step further includes the UE comparing the security capability information supported by the UE carried in the TAU accept message with the security capability information supported by the UE. If they are consistent, it is determined that there is no degraded attack. If the inconsistency is determined, it is determined that there is a degraded attack. If the security capability negotiation fails, the security capability negotiation process may be re-initiated, so that the purpose of preventing the degraded attack can be achieved.
  • the degraded attack refers to: Assume that the UE supports two security algorithms at the same time: the high-intensity algorithm A1 and the low-intensity algorithm A2, and the MME also supports both algorithms. In this way, the high-strength algorithm A1 should be negotiated between the UE and the MME. However, if the UE sends the security capability information supported by the UE to the path of the MME, the attacker modifies the security capability information of the UE, for example, only the low-intensity algorithm A2 is retained. The MME will only select the low-intensity algorithm A2 and send the UE to the UE.
  • the low-strength algorithm A2 is negotiated between the UE and the MME, instead of the high-intensity algorithm A1, so that the attacker is more likely to break, that is, the so-called degraded attack is achieved.
  • the MME sends the security capability information supported by the UE to the UE, so that the UE checks whether it is consistent with the security capability information supported by the UE, thereby achieving the purpose of detecting and preventing the degradation attack.
  • the process in which the MME finally derives the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key and the execution of the step 104 and the step 105 in the step 103 does not limit the time sequence.
  • the process may be performed before step 104, or may be performed in step 104 and step 105. Execution may also be performed after step 105.
  • the MME and the UE may directly derive the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key, without first deriving the root key, and then deriving the NAS protection according to the root key. Key.
  • the derivation method of the NAS protection key derived by the UE according to the authentication vector related key and the derivation of the NAS protection key by the network side based on the authentication vector related key are derived.
  • the method is the same.
  • the UE can share the NAS security algorithm and the NAS protection key with the MME, thereby implementing negotiation of the NAS security capability.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for negotiating security capability of a terminal when moving according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention. As shown in Figure 2, the method includes the following steps:
  • Step 200 is the same as step 100, and details are not described herein again.
  • Step 201 to step 203 The MME obtains the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, and sends a context request message to the SGSN. After receiving the SGSN, the SGSN derives the root key according to the authentication key of the authentication vector, and then sends the root key to the MME. The context response message of the key.
  • the SGSN queries the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE after receiving the mobility management context request message. And carrying the NAS security algorithm supported by the queried UE in the mobility management context response message sent to the MME.
  • the NAS security algorithm is a NAS integrity protection algorithm and/or a NAS confidentiality protection algorithm.
  • the SGSN in the process is the SGSN of the 2G network, and the root key is the Kc' obtained by the SGSN after one-way transformation according to Kc or Kc, and the derived root key.
  • Kasme When the UE moves from the 3G network to the tracking area of the LTE network, the SGSN in this process is the SGSN of the 3G network, and the root key is the IK' obtained by the SGSN according to IK and CK, or IK and CK after one-way transformation. And CK', derived from Kasme.
  • Step 204 The MME selects a new NAS security algorithm according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, the NAS security algorithm supported by the NAS, and the NAS security algorithm supported by the system.
  • the NAS protection key is derived according to the root key, including the NAS integrity protection key.
  • Step 205 The MME generates a TAU accept message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm.
  • the MME may also perform NAS integrity protection on the TAU accept message.
  • the TAU accept message in this step may also carry the security capability information supported by the UE.
  • Step 206 The UE receives the TAU accept message carrying the NAS security algorithm selected by the MME, and obtains the negotiated NAS security algorithm. Then, according to its current authentication vector related key (for example, the source network is IK and CK at 3G or according to IK and CK derived by IK and CK, or Kc when the source network is 2G or Kc' derived from Kc) derive the root key Kasme, and then derive the NAS protection key from the root key, including NAS. Integrity protection key Knas-int and/or NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc.
  • the current authentication vector related key for example, the source network is IK and CK at 3G or according to IK and CK derived by IK and CK, or Kc when the source network is 2G or Kc' derived from Kc
  • the step may further include the UE checking whether the integrity protection of the TAU accept message is correct. If the discovery is incorrect, it is determined that the security capability negotiation fails, and the security capability negotiation process may be re-initiated.
  • the step 205 may further include: the UE supports the security capability information supported by the UE carried in the TAU accept message and the self-supported If the security capability information is compared, if it is consistent, it is determined that there is no degraded attack. If the inconsistency is determined, it is determined that there is a degraded attack. If the security capability negotiation fails, the security capability negotiation process may be re-initiated, so as to prevent the degraded attack. purpose.
  • the process in which the MME derives the NAS protection key according to the root key and the execution of the steps 205 and 206 in the step 204 does not limit the time sequence.
  • the process may be performed before step 205, or may be performed in step 205. Executing with step 206 may also be performed after step 206.
  • step 206 may also be performed after step 206.
  • the UE can share the NAS security algorithm and the NAS protection key with the MME, thereby implementing negotiation of the NAS security capability.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a method for negotiating security capability of a terminal when moving according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in Figure 3, the method includes the following steps:
  • Step 300 is the same as step 100 and will not be described in detail herein.
  • Step 301 to step 302 The MME acquires a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE from the SGSN by using a mobility management context request and response message.
  • the SGSN queries the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE after receiving the mobility management context request message. And carrying the NAS security algorithm supported by the queried UE in the mobility management context response message sent to the MME.
  • the NAS security algorithm is a NAS integrity protection algorithm and/or a NAS confidentiality protection algorithm.
  • Step 303 The MME obtains a root key Kasme derived from the authentication vector related key from the HSS through an authentication and key agreement (AKA) process.
  • AKA authentication and key agreement
  • Step 304 The MME selects a new NAS security algorithm according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, the NAS security algorithm supported by the NAS, and the NAS security algorithm supported by the system. According to Kasme, other NAS protection keys, including the NAS integrity protection key, are derived. Knas-int and NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc.
  • Step 305 The MME generates a NAS Security Mode Command (SMC) request message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm, and sends the message to the UE.
  • SMC NAS Security Mode Command
  • the SMC request message may be included in the TAU accept message.
  • the MME may perform NAS integrity protection on the SMC request message, for example, using the NAS integrity protection key Knas-int and SMC request message derived in step 304.
  • the information and the NAS integrity protection algorithm in the selected NAS security algorithm derive the message integrity code (NAS-MAC) value of the NAS integrity protection, and then attach the value to the SMC request message and send it to the UE.
  • NAS-MAC message integrity code
  • the SMC request message in this step may also carry the security capability information supported by the UE.
  • Step 306 The UE receives the SMC request message carrying the NAS security algorithm selected by the MME, and obtains the NAS security algorithm selected by the MME that is supported by the MME. Then, the UE obtains the root security according to the current authentication vector related key obtained in the AKA process. The key is derived from the root key to obtain the NAS protection key, including the NAS integrity protection key Knas-int and the NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc.
  • the step may further include the UE checking whether the integrity protection of the TAU accept message is correct. If the fault is found to be incorrect, it is determined that the security capability negotiation fails, and the security capability negotiation process may be restarted.
  • the UE derives the NAS-MAC according to the derived NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc, the information in the TAU accept and the NAS integrity protection algorithm carried in the TAU accept message, and then the UE compares the derived NAS-MAC with Whether the NAS-MAC carried in the TAU accept message is the same, indicating that the message has not been changed during the transmission process, otherwise the message is considered to be changed during the transmission process, thereby determining that the security capability negotiation fails.
  • the step 305 further includes the security capability information supported by the UE in the SMC request message
  • the step may further include: the UE supports the security capability information supported by the UE carried in the SMC request message, and the self-supported If the security capability information is the same, if it is the same, it is determined that there is no degraded attack. If it is not the same, it is determined that there is a degraded attack. If the security capability negotiation fails, the security capability negotiation process may be re-initiated, so that the anti-degradation attack can be prevented. the goal of.
  • Step 307 The UE sends an SMC completion response message to the MME.
  • the SMC completion response message may be included in the TAU completion (complete) message.
  • Step 308 The MME replies to the TAU accept message.
  • the SMC request message is included in the TAU in step 305.
  • this step and step 305 are merged.
  • Step 309 The UE replies to the TAU complete message.
  • step 307 when the SMC Completion Response message is included in the TAU complete message in step 307, this step and step 307 are merged.
  • FIG. 4 is a structural diagram of a system for negotiating security capabilities when a terminal moves according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 4, the system includes a UE and an MME.
  • the UE is configured to send a tracking area update request message to the MME, receive a message that is sent by the MME and carry the selected NAS security algorithm, and derive the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key.
  • the MME is configured to receive a tracking area update request message sent by the UE, obtain an authentication vector related key or a root key derived according to the authentication vector related key, and a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE. Selecting a NAS security algorithm, generating and transmitting a message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm to the UE; deriving the NAS protection key according to the obtained authentication vector related key or the root key derived from the authentication vector related key key.
  • the MME further obtains the security capability information supported by the UE, and further carries the security capability information supported by the UE in the message that is sent to the UE and carries the selected NAS security algorithm.
  • the UE further performs the security capability information supported by the UE according to the MME. Check whether the security capability information supported by itself is consistent and determine whether there is a degraded attack.
  • the MME includes an obtaining module, a selecting module, and a key deriving module.
  • the acquiring module is configured to receive a tracking area update request message sent by the UE, obtain an authentication vector related key or a root key derived according to the authentication vector related key, and a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE.
  • a selection module configured to acquire a NAS security algorithm supported by the UE according to the obtaining module, The NAS security algorithm is selected to generate a message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm and sent to the UE.
  • the key derivation module is configured to derive the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key obtained by the obtaining module or the root key derived according to the authentication vector related key, and the selected NAS security algorithm.
  • the acquiring module further obtains the security capability information supported by the UE, and the selection module further carries the security capability information supported by the UE obtained by the acquiring module in the message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm.
  • the UE includes an update module, a key derivation module, a storage module, and an inspection module.
  • the update module is configured to send a tracking area update request message to the mobility management entity MME, where the security capability information supported by the UE saved by the storage module is carried, and the message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm sent by the MME is received; the key derivation module, And a method for deriving a NAS protection key according to the selected vector security key received by the update module and the selected NAS security algorithm; the storage module is configured to save security capability information supported by the UE; and the checking module is configured to check, receive, receive from the MME When the security capability information supported by the UE is inconsistent with the security capability information saved by the storage module, it is determined that there is a degraded attack.
  • the update module further carries the security capability information supported by the UE in the message that is sent by the MME and carries the selected non-access signaling NAS security algorithm.
  • the MME receives the tracking area update request message sent by the UE, acquires the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, and the authentication vector related key or the confidentiality according to the authentication vector. Key derived from the key; then, according to the NAS security algorithm supported by the UE, the NAS security algorithm is selected; and a message carrying the selected NAS security algorithm is generated and sent to the UE, so as to achieve the purpose of sharing the NAS security algorithm between the UE and the MME. Then, the UE and the MME derive the NAS protection key according to the authentication vector related key or the root key derived from the authentication vector related key, thereby realizing the purpose of NAS protection key sharing.
  • the NAS security algorithm and the NAS protection key can be negotiated with the MME, so as to implement the security capability negotiation process in the TAU process between the heterogeneous networks, and ensure that the subsequent UE interacts with the network. Safety.
  • the embodiment of the present invention can further prevent the degradation attack: the MME passes the TAU accept message.
  • the security capability information supported by the UE is also returned for the UE to check whether it is consistent with the security capability information currently supported by the UE. If the security capability negotiation is successful, the negotiated NAS security algorithm and the NAS protection key can be used. It is determined that a degraded attack has occurred. This security capability negotiation fails, and security capability negotiation may need to be re-established.
  • the foregoing solution can be used to detect whether the security capability information supported by the UE has been attacked before the MME obtains the security capability information supported by the UE, thereby preventing the degradation attack and ensuring the security of the subsequent UE when interacting with the network.

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Description

终端移动时安全能力协商的方法、 系统及装置 技术领域
本发明涉及无线通信技术， 具体涉及一种终端移动时安全能力协商的方 法、 系统及移动管理实体和用户设备。
背景技术
无线网络包括无线接入网和核心网两部分。 未来演进的无线网络核心网 包括移动管理实体 ( MME, Mobile Management Entity ), 其功能与 2G/3G网 络的服务通用分组无线业务（ GPRS, General Packet Radio Service )支持节点 ( SGSN, Service GPRS Support Node )类似， 主要完成移动性管理、 用户鉴 权等。 当用户设备（UE, User Equipment )在 2G/3G或未来演进的无线网络 中处于空闲态时， 需要分别与 SGSN或 MME之间进行非接入信令（NAS, Non- Access Signaling )安全能力的协商， 安全能力包括 NAS信令加密算法、 对应的 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int、 NAS完整性保护算法及对应的 NAS 机密性保护密钥 Knas-enc, 供 UE与系统传输信令时使用， 以保证 UE信令的 正常接收及通信系统的安全。
当通过 2G的全球移动通信边缘无线接入网 （GERAN, GSM Edge Radio Access Network )或 3G的通用陆地无线接入网 （UTRAN, UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network )接入网络的 UE在空闲态移动时， 可能会移动到未来 演进无线接入网 （LTE, Long Term Evolution ) 的跟踪区域中， 从而可能重新 通过 LTE接入网络， 此时会发生跟踪区域更新（ TAU , Tracking Area Update ) 过程， 即发生了异种网络之间的 TAU过程。 由于此过程中， 为该 UE执行安 全能力协商的实体了发生了变化， 例如由 SGSN变为 ΜΜΕ, 而且这些实体的 安全能力不一定是一致的， 因此需要重新执行安全能力协商过程， 以保证后 续过程中 UE和网络交互时的安全。 注意这里的安全能力协商对 LTE网络来 说包括： NAS机密性保护算法和 NAS完整性保护算法、无线资源控制（RRC, Radio Resource Control )机密性保护算法和 RRC完整性保护算法、用户面（ UP, User Plane )机密性保护算法。
对于空闲态的 UE发起的 TAU过程而言，需要解决 NAS机密性保护算法、 NAS完整性保护算法协商， 以及相应的 NAS保护密钥的协商。
在实现本发明的过程中， 发明人发现， 现有技术不存在这样的异种网络 之间 TAU过程中安全能力协商的方法， 因此在 UE从 2G/3G网络移动到 LTE 网络时，无法进行安全能力协商，从而无法保证后续 UE与网络交互时的安全。 发明内容
本发明实施例提供一种终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 使得处于空闲 态的 UE从 2G/3G网络移动到 LTE网络时， 能够进行安全能力协商。
本发明实施例还提供一种终端移动时安全能力协商的系统， 使得处于空 闲态的 UE从 2G/3G网络移动到 LTE网络时， 能够进行安全能力协商。
本发明实施例还提供一种 MME装置，使得处于空闲态的 UE从 2G/3G网 络移动到 LTE网络时， 能够进行安全能力协商。
本发明实施例还提供一种 UE装置，使得处于空闲态的 UE从 2G/3G网络 移动到 LTE网络时， 能够进行安全能力协商。
为达到上述目的， 本发明实施例的技术方案是这样实现的：
一种终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 包括：
移动管理实体 MME接收用户设备 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息，获 取 UE支持的非接入信令 NAS安全算法， 及鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢 量相关密钥推导出的根密钥；
MME根据所述 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法； 根据所 述鉴权矢量相关密钥或所述根密钥， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥； 向所述 UE发 送携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息；
UE根据自身的鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥。
一种终端移动时安全能力协商的系统，包括用户设备 UE和移动管理实体 MME,
所述 UE , 用于向 MME发送跟踪区域更新请求消息； 接收 MME发送的 携带所选择非接入信令 NAS安全算法的消息； 根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得 到 NAS保护密钥；
所述 MME, 用于接收 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息； 获取鉴权矢量 相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 以及 UE支持的 NAS安 全算法， 根据所述 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法， 生成并向 UE发送携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息； 根据获取的鉴权矢量相关密钥 或所述根密钥， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥。
一种移动管理实体 MME, 包括获取模块、 选择模块和密钥推导模块， 所述获取模块， 用于接收用户设备 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息， 获 取鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥，以及 UE支持 的非接入信令 NAS安全算法；
所述选择模块，用于根据所述获取模块获取的 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法，生成携带所述选择的 NAS安全算法的消息，发送到 UE;
所述密钥推导模块， 用于根据所述获取模块获取的鉴权矢量相关密钥或 根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 及所述选择模块选择的 NAS安全算 法， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥。
一种用户设备 UE, 包括更新模块、 密钥推导模块、存储模块和检查模块， 所述更新模块， 用于向移动管理实体 MME发送跟踪区域更新请求消息， 其中携带存储模块保存的 UE支持的安全能力信息；接收 MME发送的携带所 选择非接入信令 NAS安全算法的消息；
所述密钥推导模块， 用于根据鉴权矢量相关密钥， 及所述更新模块接收 到的 NAS安全算法， 推导 NAS保护密钥；
所述存储模块， 用于保存 UE支持的安全能力信息；
所述检查模块， 用于根据从 MME接收到的 UE支持的安全能力信息， 检 查与存储模块保存的自身支持的安全能力信息不一致时， 确定存在降质攻击。 本发明实施例所提供的技术方案， MME接收 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请 求消息， 获取鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 及 UE支持的 NAS安全算法； 然后根据 UE支持的 NAS安全算法，选择 NAS 安全算法； 并生成携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息， 发送到 UE, 从而实 现 UE与 MME共享 NAS安全算法的目的。并且， MME根据鉴权矢量相关密 钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥， UE根 据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥， 实现共享 NAS保护密钥的目 的。 最终使得 UE从 2G/3G网络移动到 LTE网络时， 可以与 MME协商 NAS 安全算法及 NAS保护密钥， 从而实现异种网络之间 TAU过程中的安全能力 协商过程， 保证后续 UE与网络交互时的安全。
同时， 本发明实施例也可以应用于 UE在 LTE网络内部移动时的安全能 力协商过程。
附图说明
图 1为本发明实施例一终端移动时安全能力协商的方法流程图； 图 2为本发明实施例二终端移动时安全能力协商的方法流程图； 图 3为本发明实施例三终端移动时安全能力协商的方法流程图； 图 4为本发明实施例中终端移动时安全能力协商的系统结构图。
具体实施方式
本发明实施例提供的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 当 UE从 2G/ 3G 网络移动到 LTE网络时， MME接收 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息， 获取 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 及鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推 导出的根密钥； 然后根据 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法； MME根据所述鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥； 向 UE发送携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息； UE根据鉴权矢量相关密钥， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥。 下面结合附图及具体实施例对本发明实施例进行详细说明。
假设 UE在空闲态时已经通过 UTRAN/GERAN接入网络， 当移动到 LTE 的跟踪区域时， UE发起 TAU过程。
图 1 为本发明实施例一终端移动时安全能力协商的方法流程图。 如图 1 所示， 该方法包括以下步骤：
步骤 100: UE向 MME发送 TAU请求。
本步骤中， UE通过未来演进的无线接入网的演进基站（eNB, evolution Node B ) 向新 MME发送跟踪区域更新请求。 为了描述方便， 以下描述都将 UE与 MME之间通过 eNB进行通信简化为 UE与 MME之间进行通信。
本步骤 UE向 MME发送的 TAU请求中， 除携带本领域技术人员均知的 一些参数， 例如临时移动用户识别号码（TMSI, Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity )之夕卜，还可以携带 UE支持的安全能力信息，包括 NAS安全算法（NAS 完整性保护算法和 /或 NAS机密性保护算法）,还可以包括 RRC安全算法（ RRC 完整性保护算法和 /或 RRC机密性保护算法） /UP安全算法（UP机密性保护 算法）。
步骤 101〜步骤 102: MME获取 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 并向 SGSN 发送移动性管理上下文请求（context request )消息； SGSN收到后， 向 MME 发送携带鉴权矢量相关密钥的移动性管理上下文响应（ context response )消息。
如果步骤 100中 UE在向 MME发送的 TAU请求中没有携带 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 则 SGSN在接收到移动性管理上下文请求消息后， 查询 UE 支持的 NAS安全算法， 并在发送给 MME的移动性管理上下文响应消息中携 带该查询到的 UE支持的 NAS安全算法。 其中， NAS安全算法为 NAS完整 性保护算法和 /或 NAS机密性保护算法。
当 UE从 2G网络移动到 LTE网络的跟踪区域时， 本流程中 SGSN为 2G 网络的 SGSN,其中的鉴权矢量相关密钥至少包括加密密钥 Kc,或者 Kc经单 向变换后得到的值 Kc，； 当 UE从 3G网络移动到 LTE网络的跟踪区域时， 本 流程中 SGSN为 3G网络的 SGSN, 其中的鉴权矢量相关密钥至少包括完整性 密钥 IK和加密密钥 CK, 或 IK和 CK经单向变换后得到的值 IK'和 CK'。
单向变换是指通过某种算法将原参数变换后得到目的参数， 但是无法从 目的参数返推得到原参数的变换过程。 以 Kc为例， 如果通过算法 f ( Kc )可 以得到 Kc，， 但是无法从 Kc，通过任何逆算法反向推导出 Kc, 这种变换就是 单向变换。
步骤 103: MME根据 UE支持的 NAS安全算法、 自身支持的 NAS安全 算法及系统允许的 NAS安全算法， 选择新的 NAS安全算法； 根据鉴权矢量 相关密钥推导出根密钥 Kasme; 然后根据 Kasme推导出 NAS保护密钥， 包括 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int和 /或 NAS机密性保护密钥 Knas-enc。
步骤 104: MME生成携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的跟踪区域更新接受 ( TAU accept ) 消息。
本步骤中 MME还可以对该 TAU accept消息进行 NAS完整性保护，例如， 利用步骤 103中推导得到的 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int、 TAU accept中的 信息及所选择 NAS安全算法中的 NAS完整性保护算法， 推导得到 NAS完整 性保护的消息认证码（NAS-MAC )值， 然后将该值附在 TAU accept消息中， 发送至 UE。
本步骤的 TAU accept消息中还可以携带 UE支持的安全能力信息。
步骤 105: UE接收携带 MME选择的 NAS安全算法的 TAU accept消息， 获得协商好的 NAS安全算法； 然后根据自身当前的鉴权矢量相关密钥 (例如， 源网络是 3G时的 IK和 CK或根据 IK和 CK推导出的 IK'和 CK' , 或者源网 络是 2G时的 Kc或根据 Kc推导出的 Kc' )推导得到根密钥 Kasme,再从根密 钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥，包括 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int和 /或 NAS机 密性保护密钥 Knas-enc。
本步骤还可以包括 UE检查 TAU accept消息的完整性保护是否正确， 如 果发现不正确， 则确定本次安全能力协商失败， 可能重新发起安全能力协商 过程。 例如， UE根据推导得到的 NAS机密性保护密钥 Knas-enc、 TAU accept 中的信息及 TAU accept 消息中携带的 NAS 完整性保护算法推导得到 NAS-MAC,然后 UE比较推导得到的 NAS-MAC与 TAU accept消息中携带的 NAS-MAC是否相同，是则表明该消息在传输过程没有被更改， 否则认为该消 息在传输过程中被更改， 从而确定本次安全能力协商失败。
如果在步骤 104中， TAU accept消息中还携带 UE支持的安全能力信息， 则本步骤还可以进一步包括 UE根据 TAU accept消息中携带的 UE支持的安 全能力信息与自身支持的安全能力信息相比较， 如果一致， 则确定不存在降 质攻击， 如果不一致则确定存在降质攻击， 确定本次安全能力协商失败， 可 能重新发起安全能力协商过程， 从而可以达到防止降质攻击的目的。
其中， 降质攻击是指： 假设 UE 同时支持两种安全性算法： 高强度算法 A1和低强度算法 A2, MME也同时支持这两种算法。 这样， UE和 MME之 间协商的应该是高强度算法 A1 , 但是如果 UE在发送自身支持的安全能力信 息到 MME的路径中， 攻击者修改了 UE的安全能力信息， 例如只保留低强度 算法 A2, 或者在 MME选择 NAS安全算法时， UE支持的安全能力信息被攻 击者修改过， 只保留低强度算法 A2, 那么 MME将只能选择低强度算法 A2, 并发给 UE。 即 UE和 MME之间协商得到的是低强度算法 A2, 而不是高强度 算法 A1 , 从而使得攻击者更容易攻破， 即达到所谓的降质攻击。 而本发明实 施例通过 MME将 UE支持的安全能力信息发送到 UE, 供 UE检查是否与自 身支持的安全能力信息一致， 从而达到检测进而防止降质攻击的目的。
步骤 103中 MME根据鉴权矢量相关密钥最终推导得到 NAS保护密钥的 过程与步骤 104及步骤 105的执行不限定时间顺序， 该过程可以步骤 104之 前执行， 也可以在步骤 104与步骤 105之间执行， 也可以在步骤 105之后执 行。
以上所述的流程中， MME和 UE也可以根据鉴权矢量相关密钥直接推导 得到 NAS保护密钥， 而不必首先推导根密钥， 再根据根密钥推导 NAS保护 密钥。
本领域技术人员应该清楚： 以上所述的流程中， UE根据鉴权矢量相关密 钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥的推导方法须与网络侧根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导 得到 NAS保护密钥的推导方法相同。该推导方法可以釆用任意一种单向变换， 例如， Kasme=f ( IK, CK, 其他参数）， Knas-enc=f ( Kasme , NAS机密性保 护算法， 其他参数）， Knas-int=f ( Kasme, NAS完整性保护算法， 其他参数）。
另外， 为突出说明本发明实施例， 上述流程中步骤 102和 104之间忽略 了与安全无关的流程。
通过以上所述的流程 UE可以与 MME共享 NAS安全算法及 NAS保护密 钥， 从而实现 NAS安全能力的协商。
图 2 为本发明实施例二终端移动时安全能力协商的方法流程图。 如图 2 所示， 该方法包括以下步骤：
步骤 200与步骤 100相同， 在此不再赘述。
步骤 201〜步骤 203: MME获取 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 并向 SGSN 发送 context request消息； SGSN收到后， 根据自身的鉴权矢量相关密钥推导 得到根密钥， 然后向 MME发送携带根密钥的 context response消息。
在本发明其它实施例中， 如果步骤 200中 UE在向 MME发送的 TAU请 求中没有携带 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 则 SGSN在接收到移动性管理上下 文请求消息后， 查询 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 并在发送给 MME的移动性 管理上下文响应消息中携带该查询到的 UE支持的 NAS安全算法。其中， NAS 安全算法为 NAS完整性保护算法和 /或 NAS机密性保护算法。
当 UE从 2G网络移动到 LTE网络的跟踪区域时， 本流程中 SGSN为 2G 网络的 SGSN, 根密钥是由 SGSN根据 Kc或者 Kc经单向变换后得到的 Kc' , 推导出的根密钥 Kasme; 当 UE从 3G网络移动到 LTE网络的跟踪区域时，本 流程中 SGSN为 3G网络的 SGSN, 根密钥是由 SGSN根据 IK和 CK, 或者 IK和 CK经单向变换后得到的 IK'和 CK' , 推导出的 Kasme。 步骤 204: MME根据 UE支持的 NAS安全算法、 自身支持的 NAS安全 算法及系统允许的 NAS安全算法， 选择新的 NAS安全算法； 根据根密钥推 导出 NAS保护密钥，包括 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int和 /或 NAS机密性保 护密钥 Knas-enc„
步骤 205: MME生成携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的 TAU accept消息。 本步骤中 MME还可以对该 TAU accept消息进行 NAS完整性保护。 本步 骤的 TAU accept消息中还可以携带 UE支持的安全能力信息。
步骤 206: UE接收携带 MME选择的 NAS安全算法的 TAU accept消息， 获得协商好的 NAS安全算法； 然后根据自身当前的鉴权矢量相关密钥 (例如， 源网络是 3G时的 IK和 CK或根据 IK和 CK推导出的 IK'和 CK' , 或者源网 络是 2G时的 Kc或根据 Kc推导出的 Kc' )推导得到根密钥 Kasme,再从根密 钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥，包括 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int和 /或 NAS机 密性保护密钥 Knas-enc。
本步骤还可以包括 UE检查 TAU accept消息的完整性保护是否正确， 如 果发现不正确， 则确定本次安全能力协商失败， 可能重新发起安全能力协商 过程。
在本发明其它实施例中， 如果步骤 205在 TAU accept消息中还携带 UE 支持的安全能力信息， 则本步骤还可以进一步包括 UE根据 TAU accept消息 中携带的 UE支持的安全能力信息与自身支持的安全能力信息相比较，如果一 致， 则确定不存在降质攻击， 如果不一致则确定存在降质攻击， 确定本次安 全能力协商失败， 可能重新发起安全能力协商过程， 从而可以达到防止降质 攻击的目的。
在本发明其它实施例中， 步骤 204中 MME根据根密钥推导得到 NAS保 护密钥的过程与步骤 205及步骤 206的执行不限定时间顺序， 该过程可以步 骤 205之前执行， 也可以在步骤 205与步骤 206之间执行， 也可以在步骤 206 之后执行。 本领域技术人员应该清楚： 以上所述的流程中， UE根据鉴权矢量相关密 钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥的推导方法须与网络侧根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导 得到 NAS保护密钥的推导方法相同。
通过以上所述的流程 UE可以与 MME共享 NAS安全算法及 NAS保护密 钥， 从而实现 NAS安全能力的协商。
图 3 为本发明实施例三终端移动时安全能力协商的方法流程图。 如图 3 所示， 该方法包括以下步骤：
步骤 300与步骤 100相同， 在此不再详述。
步骤 301〜步骤 302: MME通过移动性管理上下文请求和响应消息从 SGSN 获取 UE支持的 NAS安全算法。
在本发明其它实施例中， 如果步骤 300中 UE在向 MME发送的 TAU请 求中没有携带 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 则 SGSN在接收到移动性管理上下 文请求消息后， 查询 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 并在发送给 MME的移动性 管理上下文响应消息中携带该查询到的 UE支持的 NAS安全算法。其中， NAS 安全算法为 NAS完整性保护算法和 /或 NAS机密性保护算法。
步骤 303: MME通过认证与密钥协商 （AKA, Authentication and Key Agreement )过程，从 HSS获取根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥 Kasme。
步骤 304: MME根据 UE支持的 NAS安全算法、 自身支持的 NAS安全 算法及系统允许的 NAS安全算法， 选择新的 NAS安全算法； 根据 Kasme推 导出其他 NAS保护密钥， 包括 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int和 NAS机密性 保护密钥 Knas-enc。
步骤 305: MME生成携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的 NAS安全模式命令 ( SMC, Security Mode Command )请求消息， 发送到 UE。 该 SMC请求消息 可能包含在 TAU accept消息中。
本步骤中 MME还可以对该 SMC请求消息进行 NAS完整性保护， 例如， 利用步骤 304中推导得到的 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int、 SMC请求消息中 的信息及所选择 NAS安全算法中的 NAS完整性保护算法， 推导得到 NAS完 整性保护的消息认证码（NAS-MAC )值， 然后将该值附在 SMC请求消息中， 发送至 UE。
本步骤的 SMC请求消息中还可以携带 UE支持的安全能力信息。
步骤 306: UE接收携带 MME选择的 NAS安全算法的 SMC请求消息， 获得其自身支持的由 MME选择的 NAS安全算法； 然后根据自身 AKA过程 中获取的当前的鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到根密钥， 再从根密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥， 包括 NAS完整性保护密钥 Knas-int和 NAS机密性保护密钥 Knas-enc。
在本实施例中， 本步骤还可以包括 UE检查 TAU accept消息的完整性保 护是否正确， 如果发现不正确， 则确定本次安全能力协商失败， 可能重新发 起安全能力协商过程。 例如， UE 根据推导得到的 NAS 机密性保护密钥 Knas-enc, TAU accept中的信息及 TAU accept消息中携带的 NAS完整性保护 算法推导得到 NAS-MAC,然后 UE比较推导得到的 NAS-MAC与 TAU accept 消息中携带的 NAS-MAC是否相同，是则表明该消息在传输过程没有被更改， 否则认为该消息在传输过程中被更改， 从而确定本次安全能力协商失败。
在本发明其它实施例中， 如果步骤 305在 SMC请求消息中还携带 UE支 持的安全能力信息， 则本步骤还可以进一步包括 UE根据 SMC请求消息中携 带的 UE支持的安全能力信息与自身支持的安全能力信息相比较， 如果相同， 则确定不存在降质攻击， 如果不相同则确定存在降质攻击， 确定本次安全能 力协商失败， 可能重新发起安全能力协商过程， 从而可以达到防止降质攻击 的目的。
步骤 307: UE向 MME发送 SMC完成响应消息。 该 SMC完成响应消息 可能包含在 TAU完成（ complete ) 消息中。
步骤 308: MME回复 TAU accept消息。
在本发明其它实施例中， 当在步骤 305 中将 SMC请求消息包含在 TAU accept中发送给 UE时， 本步骤和步骤 305合并。
步骤 309: UE回复 TAU complete消息。
在本发明其它实施例中， 当在步骤 307 中将 SMC 完成响应消息包含在 TAU complete消息中时， 本步骤和步骤 307合并。
通过上述流程实现 NAS安全能力的协商。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解实现上述实施例方法中的全部或部分步 骤， 是可以通过程序指令相关硬件完成的。 实施例对应的软件可以存储在一 个计算机可存储读取的介质中， 如 R0M/RAM、 磁碟、 光盘等。
图 4 为本发明实施例中终端移动时安全能力协商的系统结构图。 如图 4 所示， 该系统包括 UE和 MME。
其中， UE用于向 MME发送跟踪区域更新请求消息； 接收 MME发送的 携带所选择 NAS安全算法的消息； 根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到 NAS保 护密钥。
MME用于接收 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息； 获取鉴权矢量相关密 钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥，以及 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 根据 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法， 生成并向 UE发送携带 所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息； 根据获取的鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢 量相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥。
该系统中 MME进一步获取 UE支持的安全能力信息， 在向 UE发送的携 带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息中进一步携带 UE支持的安全能力信息； UE 进一步根据 MME发送的 UE支持的安全能力信息，检查与自身支持的安全能 力信息是否一致， 判断是否存在降质攻击。
具体来说， 该 MME包括获取模块、 选择模块和密钥推导模块。
其中， 获取模块， 用于接收 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息， 获取鉴权 矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥，以及 UE支持的 NAS 安全算法。 选择模块， 用于根据获取模块获取的 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法， 生成携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息， 发送到 UE。 密钥推导模块， 用于根据获取模块获取的鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量 相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 及所选择的 NAS安全算法， 推导得到 NAS保护 密钥。
获取模块进一步获取 UE支持的安全能力信息，选择模块在携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息中进一步携带获取模块获取的 UE支持的安全能力信息。
该 UE包括更新模块、 密钥推导模块、 存储模块和检查模块。
其中，更新模块，用于向移动管理实体 MME发送跟踪区域更新请求消息； 其中携带存储模块保存的 UE支持的安全能力信息；接收 MME发送的携带所 选择 NAS安全算法的消息； 密钥推导模块， 用于根据鉴权矢量相关密钥， 及 更新模块接收到的所选择的 NAS安全算法， 推导 NAS保护密钥； 存储模块 用于保存 UE支持的安全能力信息； 检查模块， 用于检查从 MME接收到的 UE 支持的安全能力信息与存储模块保存的自身支持的安全能力信息不一致 时，确定存在降质攻击。所述更新模块在接收 MME发送的携带所选择非接入 信令 NAS安全算法的消息中进一步携带 UE支持的安全能力信息。
以上所述可以看出， 本发明实施例所提供的技术方案， MME接收 UE发 送的跟踪区域更新请求消息， 获取 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 以及鉴权矢量 相关密钥或者根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥； 然后根据 UE 支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法； 并生成携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的 消息， 发送到 UE, 从而实现 UE与 MME共享 NAS安全算法的目的。 然后， UE和 MME根据鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥 推导得到 NAS保护密钥， 实现 NAS保护密钥共享的目的。 最终使得 UE从 2G/3G网络移动到 LTE网络时， 可以与 MME协商 NAS安全算法及 NAS保 护密钥， 从而实现异种网络之间 TAU过程中的安全能力协商过程， 保证后续 UE与网络交互时的安全。
本发明实施例还可以进一步防止降质攻击： MME通过 TAU accept消息的 同时也返回 UE支持的安全能力信息，供 UE检查是否与当前自身支持的安全 能力信息一致， 一致时本次安全能力协商成功， 协商得到的 NAS安全算法和 NAS保护密钥可以使用； 如果不一致则确定发生了降质攻击， 本次安全能力 协商失败， 可能需要重新进行安全能力协商。 通过上述方案可以检测 MME 在获取到 UE支持的安全能力信息之前， UE支持的安全能力信息是否已经受 到了攻击， 从而防止降质攻击， 保证后续 UE与网络交互时的安全。
以上所述仅为本发明的较佳实施例而已， 并非用于限定本发明的保护范 围。 凡在本发明的精神和原则之内， 所作的任何修改、 等同替换、 改进等， 均应包含在本发明的保护范围之内。

Claims

权 利 要求 书
1、 一种终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 其特征在于， 当用户设备 UE从 2G/3G网络移动到长期演进 LTE网络时， 该方法包括：
移动管理实体 MME接收 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息， 获取 UE支持 的非接入信令 NAS安全算法， 及鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推 导出的才艮密钥；
MME根据所述 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法； 根据所述 鉴权矢量相关密钥或所述根密钥， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥； 向所述 UE发送携 带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息；
UE根据自身的鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥。
2、 如权利要求 1所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 其特征在于， 所 述 MME获取 UE支持的 NAS安全算法的步骤为：
MME从 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息中， 获取 UE支持的安全能力信 息， 其中跟踪区域更新请求消息包括 UE支持的 NAS安全算法。
3、如权利要求 1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述 MME获取 UE支持的 NAS 安全算法的步骤为：
MME从来自服务通用分组无线业务支持节点 SGSN的移动管理上下文响应 消息中获取 UE支持的安全能力信息，其中跟踪区域更新请求消息包括 UE支持 的 NAS安全算法。
4、 如权利要求 1所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 其特征在于， 所 述 MME获取鉴权矢量相关密钥的步骤为： MME从来自 SGSN的移动管理上下 文响应消息中获取鉴权矢量相关密钥；
所述 MME获取根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥的步骤为：
MME从来自 SGSN的移动管理上下文响应消息中获取根据鉴权矢量相关密 钥推导出的根密钥。
5、 如权利要求 4所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 其特征在于， 当 所述 SGSN为 2G网络的 SGSN时， 所述鉴权矢量相关密钥至少包括加密密钥 Kc或 Kc经单向变换后得到的值；
或者当所述 SGSN为 3G网络的 SGSN时，所述鉴权矢量相关密钥至少包括 完整性密钥 IK和加密密钥 CK, 或者 IK和 CK经单向变换后得到的值。
6、 如权利要求 4所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 其特征在于， 当 所述 SGSN为 2G网络的 SGSN时，所述根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥 由 SGSN根据 Kc或 Kc经单向变换后得到的值推导得到， 然后发送给 MME;
或者当所述 SGSN为第三代移动通信网络的 SGSN时， 所述根据鉴权矢量 相关密钥推导出的根密钥由 SGSN根据 IK和 CK,或者 IK和 CK经单向变换后 得到的值推导得到， 然后发送给 MME。
7、 如权利要求 1所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 其特征在于， 所 述 MME获取根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥为： MME通过认证与密钥 协商 AKA过程直接获取根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥。
8、如权利要求 1所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法，其特征在于， MME 和 UE根据所述鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥包括：
MME和 UE根据所述鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到根密钥， 然后再根据所述 推导的根密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥。
9、 如权利要求 1所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法， 其特征在于， 所 述 MME向所述 UE发送携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息之前， 该方法进一 步包括：
MME对所述携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息进行完整性保护；
UE接收到所述携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息后，根据推导得到的 NAS 保护密钥， 检查所述携带所选择 NAS安全算法的消息的完整性保护的正确性。
10、如权利要求 2或 3所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的方法，其特征在于， 所述携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息中进一步携带所述 UE支持的安全能力 信息，
该方法进一步包括： UE根据接收到的所述 UE支持的安全能力信息与自身 支持的安全能力信息是否一致， 判断是否存在降质攻击。
11、 一种终端移动时安全能力协商的系统， 其特征在于， 该系统包括用户设 备 UE和移动管理实体 MME,
所述 UE, 用于向 MME发送跟踪区域更新请求消息； 接收 MME发送的携 带所选择非接入信令 NAS 安全算法的消息； 根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导得到 NAS保护密钥；
所述 MME, 用于接收 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息； 获取鉴权矢量相 关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 以及 UE支持的 NAS安全算 法； 根据所述 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法， 生成并向 UE发 送携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的消息； 根据获取的鉴权矢量相关密钥或所述根 密钥， 推导得到 NAS保护密钥。
12、 如权利要求 11所述的终端移动时安全能力协商的系统， 其特征在于， 所述 MME进一步获取 UE支持的安全能力信息， 在所述向 UE发送的携带所选 NAS安全算法的消息中进一步携带所述 UE支持的安全能力信息；
所述 UE进一步根据所述 MME发送的 UE支持的安全能力信息与自身支持 的安全能力信息是否一致， 判断是否存在降质攻击。
13、 一种移动管理实体 MME , 其特征在于， 该 MME包括获取模块、 选择 模块和密钥推导模块，
所述获取模块， 用于接收用户设备 UE发送的跟踪区域更新请求消息， 获取 鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥，以及 UE支持的非 接入信令 NAS安全算法；
所述选择模块， 用于根据所述获取模块获取的 UE支持的 NAS安全算法， 选择 NAS安全算法， 生成携带所述选择的 NAS安全算法的消息， 发送到 UE; 所述密钥推导模块，用于根据所述获取模块获取的鉴权矢量相关密钥或根据 鉴权矢量相关密钥推导出的根密钥， 及所述选择模块选择的 NAS安全算法， 推 导得到 NAS保护密钥。
14、 如权利要求 13所述的 MME, 其特征在于， 所述获取模块进一步获取 UE支持的安全能力信息， 所述选择模块在所述携带所选择的 NAS安全算法的 消息中进一步携带所述获取模块获取的 UE支持的安全能力信息。
15、 一种用户设备 UE, 其特征在于， 该 UE包括更新模块、 密钥推导模块、 存储模块和检查模块，
所述更新模块， 用于向移动管理实体 MME发送跟踪区域更新请求消息， 其 中所述跟踪区域更新请求消息携带存储模块保存的 UE支持的安全能力信息；接 收 MME发送的携带所选择非接入信令 NAS安全算法的消息；
所述密钥推导模块，用于根据鉴权矢量相关密钥，及所述更新模块接收到的 NAS安全算法， 推导 NAS保护密钥；
所述存储模块， 用于保存 UE支持的安全能力信息；
所述检查模块， 用于根据从 MME接收到的 UE支持的安全能力信息， 检查 与存储模块保存的自身支持的安全能力信息不一致时， 确定存在降质攻击。
16、 根据权利要求 15所述的 UE, 其特征在于， 所述更新模块在接收 MME 发送的携带所选择非接入信令 NAS安全算法的消息中进一步携带 UE支持的安 全能力信息。
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EP2139175B1 (en) 2012-12-26
CN101378591A (zh) 2009-03-04
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US20160088472A1 (en) 2016-03-24
US9497625B2 (en) 2016-11-15
US10595198B2 (en) 2020-03-17
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US9538373B2 (en) 2017-01-03
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US20180310170A1 (en) 2018-10-25
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US8656169B2 (en) 2014-02-18
US20140295800A1 (en) 2014-10-02
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