WO2008147171A2 - Error eliminating for communicating parties - Google Patents

Error eliminating for communicating parties Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2008147171A2
WO2008147171A2 PCT/MY2008/000041 MY2008000041W WO2008147171A2 WO 2008147171 A2 WO2008147171 A2 WO 2008147171A2 MY 2008000041 W MY2008000041 W MY 2008000041W WO 2008147171 A2 WO2008147171 A2 WO 2008147171A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
receiver
sender
partition
communicating parties
hash
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/MY2008/000041
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2008147171A3 (en
Inventor
Soeheila Mohamad Moesfa
Jamil Norziana
Bin Shamsul Shaari Jesni
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Mimos Bhd
Original Assignee
Mimos Bhd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Mimos Bhd filed Critical Mimos Bhd
Publication of WO2008147171A2 publication Critical patent/WO2008147171A2/en
Publication of WO2008147171A3 publication Critical patent/WO2008147171A3/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a reconciliation of protocol in a digital communication.
  • Field of cryptography is all about communicating in secrets or privately.
  • the said secrets are protected during transmission by a key.
  • the secret is safe. Therefore, the problem of protecting secrets is reduced to the problem of encryption key distribution.
  • a key agreement protocol which is based on an intractable discrete group logarithm problem.
  • the sender and receiver do not share any information prior to the key agreement.
  • the second solution is a key distribution wherein key distribution is done by encrypting the key using a public key encryption.
  • the sender has to have access to the receiver's public key.
  • the third and final solution is to create a secret key from an initially shared correlated binary sequence.
  • the present invention relates to a method for an error eliminating protocol for communicating parties characterized in that wherein the method comprises of at least one sender and one receiver and wherein the steps of :-
  • Sender, Receiver Partition binary sequence into subsequences of an agreed length b.
  • Sender to Receiver: E 1 -, i 1, , nil d.
  • Sender, Receiver: Combines S; for/ 1, ...Jc, wherein it is a number of successful matches.
  • Both the sender and receiver are with binary sequences A and B respectively in such that A and B are correlated.
  • the sender and receiver would partition their respective sequences into blocks of an agreed length and wherein the sender would compute an equation and the result is sent to the receiver.
  • the receiver receives the results and the receiver would compute an equation and thereafter conduct a comparison and thereafter the receiver reports to the sender the results.
  • both the sender and receiver would independently select the partition pairs which, matches successfully an each pair, the sender and receiver would only select the hashed partition. The selected partition are combined and thereafter the sender's and receiver's binary sequences being identical.
  • Figure 1 shows a flow diagram of the present invention for error detecting and omitting process for one partition pair which covers Steps 2 to 8 of the method disclosed.
  • Figure 2 show a diagram of the sender and receiver partition their respective initial binary sequences into agreed block size, k.
  • Figure 3 shows a diagram when the sender hashes the A 21-1 blocks and then exclusive- or the hash value with A 21 . The result, Ei are then sent to the receiver.
  • Figure 4 shows a diagram when the receiver receives Ei from the sender.
  • Figure S shows a diagram wherein the sender performs the selection step after receiving the comparison resuts from the receiver.
  • Figure 6 is a flow diagram for one example as described in the present invention.
  • the purpose of the present invention is to eliminate the bottleneck in quantum key distribution performance by eliminating the need of error correction.
  • the errors are omitted instead of corrected.
  • the method used therein must be designed as such that the information that is available to an eavesdropper does not allow the eavesdropper to reconstruct the shared binary sequence.
  • the protocol comprises of 9 steps characterized as shown below:
  • Sender Receiver Partition binary sequence into subsequences of an agreed length 2.
  • Receiver hash(B 2(- /)
  • Sender, Receiver Define S,- to be A 2 ,.; or B 2/ ./ for successful comparisons
  • the sender and receiver negotiate and agree on a block size.
  • the block size by k.
  • n is the number of blocks.
  • a ⁇ ak+iak+2-..a2k-ia2k
  • A3 a2k + ia2k + 2-•.a3k-ia3k while the receiver has
  • Bi bib2...bk.ib k
  • B2 bk+ibk + 2...b2k-ib2k
  • B3 b2k+lb2k + 2- • .b3k.ib3k
  • B n b (n- l)k+lb(n-l)k+2. • -bnk-lbnk.
  • the sender hashes the first block and then mask the hash value with the second block using exclusive-or operation.
  • the result is denoted Ei,
  • the inverse process is performed to detect errors in B, so that erroneous blocks can be identified and omitted from the final key.
  • the receiver unmask Ei using his second block B 2 . Name the result hi,
  • the receiver hashes his first block Bi and compares the hash to hi.
  • T equals hi and the result T 1 is communicated to the sender. Then both the sender and receiver make the selection independently,
  • the final key is S 1 S 2 S 3
  • Hash function is a function that takes input of an arbitrary binary sequence to output another binary sequence of some fixed length with the main property being if two hashes are different length in some way.
  • a hash function H is:
  • Hash function is commonly used for data integrity. XOR or also known as "exclusive or” a bitwise function defined by the following truth Table 1: -

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Detection And Prevention Of Errors In Transmission (AREA)

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method of error elimination protocol by creating a secret key from an initially shared correlated binary sequence. Furthermore, it is a method to reconcile correlated but not identical binary sequences to establish an identical binary sequence without allowing any information to be gained by an eavesdropper about the identical binary sequence. It is yet the objective of the present invention to eliminate the bottleneck in Quantum Key Distribution performance by eliminating the need of an error correction protocol. The problems in the prior art is eliminated by omitting the error rather than correcting it.

Description

ERROR ELIMINATING FOR COMMUNICATING PARTIES
FTELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a reconciliation of protocol in a digital communication.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Field of cryptography is all about communicating in secrets or privately. The said secrets are protected during transmission by a key. In the prior art, it is known that as long as the key is unknown to adversaries, then the secret is safe. Therefore, the problem of protecting secrets is reduced to the problem of encryption key distribution.
Three different solutions can be found. Firstly, is a key agreement protocol, which is based on an intractable discrete group logarithm problem. In this solution, the sender and receiver do not share any information prior to the key agreement. The second solution is a key distribution wherein key distribution is done by encrypting the key using a public key encryption. The sender has to have access to the receiver's public key. The third and final solution is to create a secret key from an initially shared correlated binary sequence.
The problem in the prior art is that in a key agreement protocol, two parties, sender and receiver, aims to agree on a binary sequence to be used as an encryption key. However, in reality the binary sequence received by the receiver cannot be identical to what was sent by the sender. Therefore, the sender and receiver need to perform an error correction protocol. At present, suitable error correction protocols requires the sender and receiver to exchange some data to detect and correct any errors.
Therefore, it is the objective of the present invention to introduce a method of error elimination by creating a secret key from an initially shared correlated binary sequence. Furthermore, it is a method to reconcile correlated but not identical binary sequences to establish an identical binary sequence without allowing any information to be gained by an eavesdropper about the identical binary sequence.
It is yet the objective of the present invention to eliminate the bottleneck in Quantum Key Distribution performance by eliminating the need of an error correction.
The problems in the prior art is eliminated by omitting the error rather than correcting it.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a method for an error eliminating protocol for communicating parties characterized in that wherein the method comprises of at least one sender and one receiver and wherein the steps of :-
a. Sender, Receiver: Partition binary sequence into subsequences of an agreed length b. Sender: E1 = hash(A2,.;) XOR A2, for i = 0, 1 , ,nl2 c. Sender to Receiver: E1-, i = 1, , nil d. Receiver, h, = E21+/ XOR B2, for i = 1 nil e. Receiver hash(B2,.;) f. Receiver compares hash(B2l-.;) to h, for i = 1, ,«/2 g. Receiver to Sender: Result comparison h. Sender, Receiver: Define S/ to be A2/.; or B2/.; for successful comparisons l. Sender, Receiver: Combines S; for/ = 1, ...Jc, wherein it is a number of successful matches.
Both the sender and receiver are with binary sequences A and B respectively in such that A and B are correlated. The sender and receiver would partition their respective sequences into blocks of an agreed length and wherein the sender would compute an equation and the result is sent to the receiver. The receiver receives the results and the receiver would compute an equation and thereafter conduct a comparison and thereafter the receiver reports to the sender the results. Based on the results received by the sender, both the sender and receiver would independently select the partition pairs which, matches successfully an each pair, the sender and receiver would only select the hashed partition. The selected partition are combined and thereafter the sender's and receiver's binary sequences being identical.
BRBEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURE
Figure 1 shows a flow diagram of the present invention for error detecting and omitting process for one partition pair which covers Steps 2 to 8 of the method disclosed.
Figure 2 show a diagram of the sender and receiver partition their respective initial binary sequences into agreed block size, k.
Figure 3 shows a diagram when the sender hashes the A21-1 blocks and then exclusive- or the hash value with A21. The result, Ei are then sent to the receiver.
Figure 4 shows a diagram when the receiver receives Ei from the sender.
Figure S shows a diagram wherein the sender performs the selection step after receiving the comparison resuts from the receiver.
Figure 6 is a flow diagram for one example as described in the present invention
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT INVENTION
The present invention would be now be described with references made to the accompanied drawings but not limited thereto.
For ease of describing the present invention, it is assumed that there are 2 parties involved. Wherein one is a sender and the other is the receiver. Both the sender and receiver are with binary sequences A and B respectively in such that A and B is correlated. The method of error eliminating will now be described. Firstly, the sender and receiver would partition their respective sequences into blocks of an agreed length. Assuming that the number of partition to be, n. Therefore, the sender's sequence partition as Ai, A2, ....An and the receiver's sequence partition as Bi, B2, ....Bn. Then, the sender computes the following equation:-
E, = hash (A2*.;) XOR A2/ for i = 1 ,ra/2
The result E,- is men sent to the receiver. As the receiver receives E1, the receiver computes the following equation: -
h, = E, XOR B2, for I = .,nJ2
and thereafter compares hash(B2,.y; to h,. Then, the receiver reports to the sender the results. Based on the results received by the sender, both the sender and receiver would independently select the partition pairs which, matches successfully. Further to this, from each pair, the sender and receiver would only select the hashed partition.
Lastly the selected partition are combined and would thereafter result in the sender's and receiver's binary sequences being identical because E, XOR B2,- equals to hash (B2,.;;, if and only if A2,-/ and B2,-./ are identical.
To further explain the present invention, some of the description described above would be repeated herein on purpose and further simplified.
The purpose of the present invention is to eliminate the bottleneck in quantum key distribution performance by eliminating the need of error correction. The errors are omitted instead of corrected. However, the method used therein must be designed as such that the information that is available to an eavesdropper does not allow the eavesdropper to reconstruct the shared binary sequence. The protocol comprises of 9 steps characterized as shown below:
1. Sender, Receiver Partition binary sequence into subsequences of an agreed length 2. Sender E1 = hash(A2,./) XOR A2, for i = 1, ,n/2
3. Sender to Receiver E1, i = 1 , n/2
4. Receiver h, = E2,./ XOR B2, for i = 1 , ,nl2
5. Receiver: hash(B2(-/)
6. Receiver: compares hash(B2l-./) to h,- for i = 1, ,n/2 7. Receiver to Sender Result comparison
8. Sender, Receiver: Define S,- to be A2,.; or B2/./ for successful comparisons
9. Sender, Receiver Combines S/ fory = 1, m, wherein m is a number of successful matches.
Reference is now made to Figures 1 to 6 wherein. Initially, the sender and receiver have binary sequences A and B respectively, where A and B are correlated but not identical. Let the length of the sequence be L, and write
A = aia2S3. -anai,
B = bil>2b3...bnbL where each aj and bj is either 0 or l, i = 1,2,...JL.
To begin the protocol, the sender and receiver negotiate and agree on a block size. Denote the block size by k. Then they partition their respective sequences into blocks of length k. Assume that k divides L, which means there exists n such that L = n x k. Here, n is the number of blocks.
So, the sender will have blocks
Ai = aia2...ak-iak
A∑ = ak+iak+2-..a2k-ia2k A3 = a2k+ia2k+2-•.a3k-ia3k while the receiver has
Bi = bib2...bk.ibk
B2 = bk+ibk+2...b2k-ib2k B3 = b2k+lb2k+2- • .b3k.ib3k
Bn = b(n-l)k+lb(n-l)k+2. • -bnk-lbnk.
Next, the sender hashes the first block and then mask the hash value with the second block using exclusive-or operation. The result is denoted Ei,
E1 =IIaSh(A1) XOR Az The sender would than performs the task to all her blocks,
E2 = IIaSh(A3) XOR A4,
E3 = IIaSh(A5) XORA6I
Figure imgf000007_0001
An
In general form, write, Ei = hash( A21-O XOR A2, where i = l,2,...,n/2. All E,*s are sent to the receiver.
At the receiver's side, the inverse process is performed to detect errors in B, so that erroneous blocks can be identified and omitted from the final key. First, the receiver unmask Ei using his second block B2. Name the result hi,
hi = Ei XOR B2
Then the receiver hashes his first block Bi and compares the hash to hi. The
1 comparison result, true or false, is communicated p the sender. If the result is true, block Bi is taken as part of the final key. Otherwise, no contribution is made towards the final key.
These steps by the receiver ; ire done to all Ej , i = 1 ,2, ... ,n/2 he receives from the sender. Based on the hash compari >on result both the sender and receiver select blocks to be included in the final key. OnI y when the comparison is successful, the first block of the pair is selected.
In general form, for i = l,2,...,n/2, ijhe receiver computes
hi = ^XOR B21
T,
Figure imgf000008_0001
equals hi and the result T1 is communicated to the sender. Then both the sender and receiver make the selection independently, |
Figure imgf000008_0002
then Sj = Aa-i , for the sender if Cj=true then Sj = B^-i , for the receiver
Finally, the selected blocks, Sj are concatenated, by the sender and the receiver independently, in order to form the final key. The final key is S1S2S3
To ease the understanding of the terms used in the description, the terms would now be defined briefly.
Hash function is a function that takes input of an arbitrary binary sequence to output another binary sequence of some fixed length with the main property being if two hashes are different length in some way. In other words, a hash function H is:
H: {0,l}r → {0,l }n
Such that for any x,y E {0,1 }r, if h(x) =/= h(y) then x=^=y; where r and n are integers. Hash function is commonly used for data integrity. XOR or also known as "exclusive or" a bitwise function defined by the following truth Table 1: -
Figure imgf000009_0001
Table l
Properties of XOR includes:-
1. aXOR a = 0 2. aXOR 0 = a

Claims

1 A method for an error eliminating for communicating parties characterized in that wherein the method comprises of at least one sender and one receiver and wherein the steps of over a network: -
a. Sender, Receiver: Partition binary sequence into subsequences of an agreed length b. Sender: E/ = hash(A2,./) XOR A2, for i = 1, nil c. Sender to Receiver: E,-, i = 1, , n/2 d. Receiver: h, = E2,./ XOR B2, for i = 1 nil e. Receiver hash(B2l-/) f. Receiver: compares hash(B2l-/) to h; for i = 1, ,n/2 g. Receiver to Sender Result comparison h. Sender, Receiver Define S,- to be A2/./ or B2/./ for successful comparisons i. Sender, Receiver Combines S/ fory" = 1, ,m, wherein m is a number of successful matches.
2. A method for an error eliminating protocol for communicating parties as claimed in Claim 1 wherein both the sender and receiver are with binary sequences A and B respectively in such that A and B is correlated.
3. A method for an error eliminating protocol for communicating parties as claimed in Claim 1 wherein the sender and receiver would partition their respective sequences into blocks of an agreed length and wherein the sender would compute thereafter and the result is sent to the receiver.
4. A method for an error eliminating protocol for communicating parties as claimed in Claim 1 wherein the receiver receives the date and the receiver would compute thereon and thereafter conducts a comparison and thereafter the receiver reports to the sender the results.
5. A method for an error eliminating protocol for communicating parties as claimed in Claim 1 wherein based on the results, both the sender and receiver would independently select the partition pairs which, matches successfully an each pair, the sender and receiver would only select the hashed partition.
6. A method for an error eliminating protocol for communicating parties as claimed in Claim 1 wherein the selected partition are combined and thereafter the sender's and receiver's binary sequences being identical.
PCT/MY2008/000041 2007-05-31 2008-05-09 Error eliminating for communicating parties Ceased WO2008147171A2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
MYPI20070853 2007-05-31
MYPI20070853 MY143143A (en) 2007-05-31 2007-05-31 Error eliminating for communicating parties

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2008147171A2 true WO2008147171A2 (en) 2008-12-04
WO2008147171A3 WO2008147171A3 (en) 2009-03-05

Family

ID=40316858

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/MY2008/000041 Ceased WO2008147171A2 (en) 2007-05-31 2008-05-09 Error eliminating for communicating parties

Country Status (2)

Country Link
MY (1) MY143143A (en)
WO (1) WO2008147171A2 (en)

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7227955B2 (en) * 2003-02-07 2007-06-05 Magiq Technologies, Inc. Single-photon watch dog detector for folded quantum key distribution system
KR100596404B1 (en) * 2004-04-13 2006-07-03 한국전자통신연구원 Quantum key distribution method between multiparty or multigroup
KR20060127333A (en) * 2005-06-07 2006-12-12 엘지전자 주식회사 Data encryption method transmitted through mobile communication network
GB0512229D0 (en) * 2005-06-16 2005-07-27 Hewlett Packard Development Co Quantum key distribution apparatus & method

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2008147171A3 (en) 2009-03-05
MY143143A (en) 2011-03-15

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US5796830A (en) Interoperable cryptographic key recovery system
US7649992B2 (en) Apparatuses for encoding, decoding, and authenticating data in cipher block chaining messaging authentication code
US20170353302A1 (en) Data conversion systems and methods
EP2286540B1 (en) Shared secret verification method and system
EP3704830A1 (en) Multi-party threshold authenticated encryption
CN111049650A (en) SM2 algorithm-based collaborative decryption method, device, system and medium
CN113972981B (en) SM2 cryptographic algorithm-based efficient threshold signature method
WO2020058806A1 (en) Computer implemented system and method for sharing a common secret
CN107666491A (en) The data transmission method of air-ground integrated network based on symmetric cryptography
WO2024228005A1 (en) Lattice-based threshold signature method and threshold decryption method
CN116455904B (en) Block chain consensus method and system based on asynchronous network decentralization
GB2574076A (en) Distributed data storage
CN112804365B (en) A privacy data distribution method for secure multi-party computation
Schultz Mobile proactive secret sharing
Fujiwara et al. Information theoretically secure data relay using QKD network
WO2008147171A2 (en) Error eliminating for communicating parties
CN118233078A (en) Cluster security communication method and cluster communication system based on blockchain
CN113726507B (en) Data transmission method, system, device and storage medium
US20130058483A1 (en) Public key cryptosystem and technique
JP2004179889A (en) Quantum key distribution method and communication device
CN113691513A (en) Network security encryption method and system based on artificial intelligence
CN120639522B (en) Communication methods, systems, devices, and media based on quantum-resistant multi-layer concatenation keys.
CN119135365B (en) Method and device for collaborative covert communication between multiple single blockchain networks
CN118972041B (en) A data encryption method, product, device and medium
EP4485847A1 (en) A method for deriving a cryptographic key for performing digital signatures

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 08766690

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 08766690

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2