WO2008098520A1 - Procédé de découverte sécurisée des voisins, dispositif de réseau et station mobile - Google Patents

Procédé de découverte sécurisée des voisins, dispositif de réseau et station mobile Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008098520A1
WO2008098520A1 PCT/CN2008/070306 CN2008070306W WO2008098520A1 WO 2008098520 A1 WO2008098520 A1 WO 2008098520A1 CN 2008070306 W CN2008070306 W CN 2008070306W WO 2008098520 A1 WO2008098520 A1 WO 2008098520A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
mobile station
key
neighbor
message
network device
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2008/070306
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Wenliang Liang
Liang Gu
Yong Xie
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Publication of WO2008098520A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008098520A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/005—Discovery of network devices, e.g. terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a secure neighbor discovery method, a network device, and a mobile station.
  • ND detection including duplicate address detection is usually considered in the network.
  • the existing security ND implementation process requires network devices to interact with multiple mobile stations, the existing methods have excessive network transmission resources and low neighbor discovery efficiency; especially in wireless networks. Wasted valuable air resources.
  • the embodiments of the present invention provide a secure neighbor discovery method, a network device, and a mobile station to ensure the security of neighbor discovery.
  • the network device receives a neighbor request message sent by the mobile station to the network device it trusts;
  • the network device performs neighbor discovery according to the received neighbor request message, and responds to the neighbor broadcast message according to the neighbor discovery result, so that the mobile station obtains the neighbor discovery result according to the received neighbor broadcast message;
  • the network device performs message verification on the neighbor request message received by the network device, performs neighbor discovery and returns a neighbor broadcast message according to the neighbor transmission result; and/or the mobile station receives the message
  • the neighbor broadcast message is used to verify the message, and after the verification succeeds, the neighbor discovery result information is obtained from the neighbor broadcast message.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a network device, where the network device includes:
  • Message Verification Module 1 For message verification of the neighbor request message sent by the mobile station to the network device
  • the notification is output
  • Neighbor Discovery Module configured to perform neighbor discovery processing according to a neighbor request message sent by the mobile station to the network device after receiving the notification of the message verification module 1;
  • Proxy Module Used to reply to neighbor broadcast messages based on the result of neighbor discovery processing by the neighbor discovery module.
  • An embodiment of the present invention further provides a mobile station, where the mobile station includes:
  • proxy permission module a network side network device for determining the trust of the mobile station, and storing information of the network side network device trusted by the mobile station;
  • sending module configured to send a neighbor request message to the network device trusted by the mobile station according to the information stored by the proxy permission module;
  • the message verification module 2 is configured to perform message verification on the neighbor broadcast message replied to the mobile station by the network device proxy, and output a notification after the verification succeeds;
  • the neighbor discovery result information is obtained from the neighbor broadcast message received by the mobile station.
  • the network device on the network side such as the access router AR
  • replies to the NA message through the proxy thereby avoiding the process of the information exchange between the access router AR and multiple mobile stations, that is, access After performing neighbor discovery on a certain mobile station
  • the router AR does not need to exchange information with other mobile stations, thereby reducing the transmission of high-level signaling on the air interface, saving valuable air interface resources in the network, and improving the efficiency of neighbor discovery.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a secure neighbor discovery method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a secure neighbor discovery method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a secure neighbor discovery method according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • Embodiment 4 is a flowchart of a secure neighbor discovery method according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • a mobile station (MS) and a network performing message exchange based on neighbor discovery There is a mutual trust relationship between the network devices on the network side.
  • the network device here may be an access router (AR), or an access network gateway provided with an access router AR, and the like.
  • the network device in the embodiment of the present invention may also be other network devices if the security neighbors in the network are found to be performed by the mobile station and the access router AR or other network devices other than the access network gateway. Regardless of which network device the mobile station performs security neighbor discovery, the implementation process of the technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention does not change, and only the main body of the technical solution is changed.
  • the mobile station can determine whether the access router can trust by performing proxy permission detection on the access router. If the operator configures the access router of the mobile station according to a predetermined policy, the mobile station may determine that the access router is always trusted without performing proxy access detection.
  • the mobile station can perform message verification on the message sent by the access router AR, and the access router can also perform message verification on the message sent by the mobile station.
  • the message verification here may be one-way or two-way, that is, only the mobile station performs message verification on the message it receives, or only the access router performs message verification on the message it receives, or the mobile station and the access router. They all perform message verification on their respective received messages.
  • the mobile station can construct a neighbor solicitation message using its key for secure neighbor discovery.
  • the neighbor request message may carry the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery, or may not carry the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery.
  • the key carried in the neighbor request message may be a public key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery.
  • the access router can use the key sent by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery, such as a public key, to perform message verification on the neighbor request message.
  • the access router may also obtain a key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery, such as a shared key, according to the access network gateway and the mobile station's Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) process, and then the access router receives the mobile. After the neighbor request message sent by the station, the neighbor request message is verified according to the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery; the access network gateway where the access router is located can actively generate the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery If the key is shared, then the generated key is sent to the mobile station, and then the access router verifies the received neighbor request message by using the key generated by the access network gateway.
  • a key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery such as a shared key
  • EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • the mobile station may transmit its key for secure neighbor discovery in the neighbor request message to the access router, or may transmit the key used for secure neighbor discovery to the other through other messages.
  • the embodiment of the present invention does not limit the downtime of the mobile station transmitting its key to the access router.
  • the mobile station may transmit the key used for secure neighbor discovery to the access router after determining that its address has no conflict;
  • the mobile station can also transmit its key for secure neighbor discovery to the access router before determining if its address conflicts.
  • the mobile station can encrypt the key after transmitting it to the access router for its key for secure neighbor discovery.
  • the access network gateway where the access router is located may send the generated key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery to the mobile station, and may also encrypt the key.
  • the access network gateway may detect the key used to generate the address in the key information, and detect whether the key used to generate the address is Repeat with the keys used by other mobile stations to generate addresses. After detecting the duplicate of the key, the access network gateway notifies the mobile station with which the EAP procedure is performed. The mobile station that receives the notification needs to update its key used to generate the address.
  • the mobile station sends its key for secure neighbor discovery to the access router through encryption, or the access network gateway sends the generated key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery to the mobile station through encryption. ⁇ , the mobile station and the access network gateway can obtain a key for encrypting the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery through the EAP procedure.
  • the access router detects other mobile stations according to the neighbor request message sent by the mobile station, and the access router can utilize itself.
  • the key to construct a neighbor broadcast message may carry the indication information of the access router security agent reply.
  • the mobile station uses the key of the access router to verify the neighbor broadcast message; the mobile station can also utilize the key of the access router and the neighbor broadcast message with other mobile stations.
  • Related parameters verify neighbor broadcast messages.
  • the mobile station may use the authentication process in the existing Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) by using the parameters related to other mobile stations in the neighbor broadcast message to verify the neighbor broadcast message.
  • SEND Secure Neighbor Discovery
  • the indication information of the access router security agent reply here may also be sent to the mobile station through other messages.
  • the access router may also not send the above indication information, and the access router may use the detected router to detect the information.
  • the other mobile station's key for secure neighbor discovery sets the neighbor broadcast message, and the mobile station should use the key of the other mobile station to perform message verification on the neighbor broadcast message, or the mobile station can utilize the key of the other mobile station.
  • the parameters related to other mobile stations in the neighbor broadcast message are used to verify the message of the neighbor broadcast message.
  • the mobile station can obtain the key used by other mobile stations for secure neighbor discovery from the message transmitted by the access router, and the mobile station can also transmit from the access network gateway where the access router is located.
  • the message obtains the key used by other mobile stations for secure neighbor discovery.
  • the access router may obtain the key used by other mobile stations for secure neighbor discovery by actively reporting the secret neighbor discovery key by other mobile stations; the access router may also obtain other mobile stations from the access network gateway where the access router is located.
  • the key used for secure neighbor discovery can obtain keys used by other mobile stations for secure neighbor discovery through the EAP procedure of other mobile stations; the access network gateway can also generate keys for other mobile stations to use for secure neighbor discovery.
  • Embodiment 1 The access router AR replies to the NA message by using its own private key proxy, and the specific implementation process is as shown in FIG.
  • step 1 The access router AR sends an RA (Router Broadcast) message, and the RA message carries an indication message that the access router AR security agent replies to the NA message.
  • RA Radio Broadcast
  • the RA message in step 1 can be based on the request comment (Request For
  • the RA message needs to be extended so that the RA message carries the access router A.
  • the R security agent replies with an indication of the NA message.
  • the RA message sent by the access router AR may not carry the above indication information.
  • the AR may carry the above indication information in subsequent messages, and the RA message may be constructed according to the description of the RFC.
  • ADD Advanced Driver Assistance Function
  • MS1 can also use other methods to detect whether the access router is an access router it trusts.
  • the ADD process of the MS1 to the access router AR may also be performed before the MS1 receives the RA message, and if the MS1 always considers that the access router AR is trusted according to the operator's configuration policy, The ADD process of MS 1 can also be omitted.
  • the above ADD procedure can also be replaced by other processes that can prove that the access router is trusted.
  • Step 3 After the ADD verification of the access router AR is passed, the MS1 processes the RA message sent by the access router AR. The MS1 learns that the access router A R supports the security agent to reply to the NA message function according to the foregoing indication information carried in the RA message. The processing procedure of the remaining information carried in the RA message by the MS1 can refer to the processing procedure specified in the RFC.
  • the MS1 sends an NS message to the access router AR as needed.
  • the MS1 sends an NS message carrying the IPv6 address of the MS1 to the access router AR in the DAD process or the neighbor unreachable detection (NUD) process.
  • the MS1 sets the related parameters in the NS message according to the public key of the MS1.
  • the NS message carries the public key of the MS1.
  • the NS message can be an NS message described by the RFC. If the NS message is not constructed according to the description of the existing RFC, an authentication extension needs to be added to the NS message, and the authentication extension may be: a message digest calculated by using the NS message itself and the private key of the MS 1.
  • Step 4 After receiving the NS message, the access router AR obtains the public key of the MS1 from the NS message, and the access router AR confirms that the NS message is indeed from the claimed NS message according to the public key of the MS1.
  • the IPv6 address is processed according to the bearer information in the NS message, for example, DAD processing is performed according to the DAD information carried in the NS message, and NUD processing is performed according to the NUD information in the NS message.
  • the access router determines whether the NA message needs to be sent by the proxy according to the processing result of DAD processing or NUD processing. If it is determined that the proxy needs to send the NA message, the access router constructs the NA message.
  • the NA message here can be constructed according to the description of the RFC.
  • the CGA parameter of the NA message carries the CGA parameters of other mobile stations such as MS2.
  • the difference from the NA message described by the RFC is:
  • the access router AR sets the RSA signature in the NA message with its own key instead of using the private key of the MS2 to set the NA message. RSA signature.
  • the access router AR may also carry the indication information in the NA message and send it to the mobile station, and the mobile station obtains the finger from the NA message. After the information is displayed, it is known that the NA message is replied by the access router agent, and the mobile station processes the NA message according to the message replied by the security agent.
  • the access router AR when the neighbor discovery result of the access router AR is that the neighbor relationship is detected, it indicates that the detected neighbor has performed the neighbor discovery process, for example, the access router AR detects the IPv6 address of the MS1 and the MS2. IPv6 address conflict, and AR have been described MS2 been DAD process, therefore, NS message may be sent to the access router AR acquire and retain from MS2 MS2 public steel. In this way, the access router
  • the AR After sending the NA message to the MS1, the AR can use the public key of the MS2 to set the CGA parameter of the MS2 in the NA message.
  • step 4 if the access router AR does not discover a neighbor, it may use a processing manner such as not transmitting an NA message; for example, when the neighbor discovery process of the access router AR is a DAD process, when the access router AR If the IPv6 address of the MS 1 has no address conflict, the NA message may not be sent. For example, when the neighbor discovery process of the access router AR detects that the neighbor MS2 is reachable, the access router AR detects that the MS2 is not in the link. Up, you can not send NA messages.
  • a processing manner such as not transmitting an NA message; for example, when the neighbor discovery process of the access router AR is a DAD process, when the access router AR If the IPv6 address of the MS 1 has no address conflict, the NA message may not be sent. For example, when the neighbor discovery process of the access router AR detects that the neighbor MS2 is reachable, the access router AR detects that the MS2 is not in the link. Up, you can not send NA messages.
  • the access router AR can also send the NA message, and explicitly give the neighbor discovery result in the NA message, and then, the NA message structure and The NA messages described in the foregoing embodiments are constructed in the same manner.
  • step 5 MS1 receives the NA message.
  • the MS1 can learn, according to the foregoing indication information in the router broadcast RA message or the NA message, that the NA message is replied by the access router AR proxy, and the MS1 verifies the NA message according to the key of the access router AR and the CGA parameter carried by the NA message. Thereby completing a secure neighbor detection process. After verifying the NA message, MS1 obtains the neighbor discovery result information from the NA message.
  • Embodiment 2 the access router AR sends the NA message by using the public key and the private key of the other mobile station, and the MS verifies the NA message by using the public key of the other mobile station carried in the NA message, and the specific implementation process is as shown in FIG. 2
  • step 1 when MS1 accesses the network, an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) process is required.
  • EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • both MS1 and the access network gateway can obtain MS1 for secure neighbor discovery (SEN).
  • SEN secure neighbor discovery
  • D The public and private keys.
  • SEND-PuK the public key for MS1 for SEND
  • SEND-PrK the private key for MSI for SEND
  • step 1 there are various methods for obtaining the public and private keys of the MSI described above by the MSI and the access network gateway. The following briefly describes two methods for obtaining the public and private keys of the MS 1.
  • MS 1 obtains the shared key MSK or EMSK with the AAA (Authentication, Accounting, Authentication) server through the EAP process. MS1 derives the key according to MSK or EMSK. SEND-RK
  • MS1 derives SEND-PuK and SEND-PrK based on SEND-RK.
  • Access Service Network Gateway Access Service Network
  • ASN-GW Receives the SEND-RK sent by AAA.
  • the ASN-GW derives SEND-PuK/PrK according to SEND-RK.
  • Method 2 the MSI obtains its shared key MSK or EMSK with the AAA through the EAP process, and the MSI derives the key SEND-RK according to the MSK or EMSK. Then, the MS 1 derives the SEND-PuK according to the SEND-RK. And SEND-PrK.
  • the AAA server derives the key SEND-RK according to the shared key MSK or EMSK. Then, the AAA server derives the keys SEND-PuK and SEND-PrK according to the key SEND-RK.
  • the AAA server directly uses the SEND-PuK. And SEND-PrK is sent to the access network gateway ASN-GW.
  • Access Network Gateway After the ASN-GW obtains the SEND-PuK and SEN D-PrK of the MSI through the above method 1 or method 2, the AR can also learn the SEND-PuK/PrK of the MSI from the access network gateway.
  • the operations performed by the access network gateway may be replaced by other network devices on the access router side, such as by an access router.
  • the access router AR can determine whether the IPv6 address of the MS 1 conflicts with the IPv6 address of other mobile stations by comparing whether the key of the MS 1 and the other mobile station keys are the same, if the access router AR determines by the key comparison.
  • the key of MS 1 is the same as the key of other mobile stations, and it can be determined that the IPv6 address of MS 1 conflicts with the IPv6 address of other mobile stations.
  • the access router AR can directly notify the MS1 of the information that the address of the MS1 generating address conflicts with the key of the other mobile station generating the address, such as the information that the access router conflicts by extending the RA message.
  • the bearer is sent in the RA message.
  • the MS1 After receiving the RA message sent by the access router AR, the MS1 updates its public key and key according to the conflicting information of the key in the RA message, and the ASN-GW should also update the public key of the MS1 with the same algorithm. Private key, and go to step 3.
  • the algorithm used by the MS1 and the algorithm used by the ASN-GW may be pre-agreed by both parties, or may be sent by the network side to the ASN-GW and the MS 1 respectively.
  • step 1 the access router AR does not judge whether the key of the MSI is the same as the key of the other mobile station, or whether the key of the access router AR is MS1 and the key of the other mobile station After the same judgment, it is determined that the key of the MS1 is different from the key of the other mobile station, and step 2 is performed.
  • step 2 the access router AR sends an RA message, which can be constructed according to the description of the RFC.
  • this ADD verification process can be performed as described in the existing RFC.
  • the ADD process performed by the MS1 and the MS1 receiving the RA message may have no sequence requirement in the inter-turn, that is, the ADD process may be performed after the MS1 receives the RA message, or after the MS1 receives the RA message, and If the access router AR is always considered to be trusted according to the operator's configuration policy, the ADD procedure of the MS 1 may also be omitted.
  • the above ADD process can also be replaced by other processes that can prove that the access router is trusted.
  • Step 4 After the ADD verification of the access router AR is passed, the MS1 processes the RA message sent by the access router AR.
  • the processing procedure of the remaining information carried in the RA message by the MS1 can refer to the processing procedure specified in the RFC.
  • the MS 1 sends an NS message to the access router AR as needed.
  • the MS 1 sends an NS message carrying the IPv6 address of the MS1 to the access router AR in the DAD process or the NUD process.
  • the MS1 sets the related parameters in the NS message according to the public key of the MS1.
  • the NS message carries the public key of the MS1.
  • the NS message can be an NS message described by the existing RFC. If the NS message is not constructed according to the description of the existing RFC, an authentication extension needs to be added to the NS message, and the authentication extension may be: a message digest calculated by using the NS message itself and the private key of MS1.
  • the access router AR obtains the public key of MS1 after receiving the NS message.
  • the access router A R can obtain the public key of MS1 from the EAP process, or obtain the public key of MS1 from the information carried in the NS message.
  • the access router AR confirms that the NS message is indeed from the IPv6 address claimed in the NS message according to the public key of the MS1, and performs corresponding processing according to the information carried in the NS message, for example, performing DAD processing or NUD processing.
  • the access router AR determines that the agent needs to send the NA message according to the processing result, and the access router constructs NA message, and send NA message.
  • the access router AR uses the private key of the MS2 to set the RSA signature in the NA message, and the CGA parameter of the MS2 in the NA message includes the public key information of the MS2.
  • MS1 receives the NA message.
  • the MS1 authenticates the NA message by using the public key of the MS2 carried in the NA message, and obtains the neighbor discovery result information from the NA message after the verification is passed.
  • Embodiment 3 After the MS performs the security neighbor discovery, the MS sends its public key and private key to the access router AR.
  • the access router AR obtains the public key and the private key of each MS.
  • the NA message is sent by using the public key and the private key of the corresponding mobile station, and the MS utilizes Its public key verifies the NA message.
  • the specific implementation process is shown in Figure 3.
  • step 1 the AR sends an RA message, which can be constructed according to the description of RFC3971.
  • step 2 After receiving the RA message, MS1 performs ADD verification.
  • the ADD verification process can be performed according to the description of the RFC.
  • Step 3 After the ADD verification of the access router AR is passed, the MS1 processes the RA message sent by the access router AR.
  • the processing procedure of the remaining information carried in the RA message by the MS1 can refer to the processing procedure specified in the RFC.
  • the MS1 sends an NS message to the access router AR as needed.
  • the MS 1 sends an NS message carrying the IPv6 address of the MS1 to the access router AR in the DAD process or the NUD process.
  • MS1 sets the CGA parameter in the NS message according to the public key of MS1, and sets the RSA signature in the NA message according to the private key of MS1.
  • MS1 can calculate its public and private keys in the existing way.
  • the NS message may be an existing NS message describing the RFC description of the security neighbor discovery. If the NS message is not constructed according to the description of the existing RFC, an authentication extension needs to be added to the NS message, and the authentication extension may be: a message digest calculated by using the NS message itself and the private key of M S 1.
  • the access router AR obtains the public key of MS1 after receiving the NS message.
  • the access router A R confirms that the NS message is indeed from the IPv6 address claimed in the NS message according to the public key of the MSI, and performs corresponding processing according to the information carried in the NS message, such as performing DAD processing or NUD processing.
  • the access router AR determines that the agent needs to send the NA message according to the processing result, and the access router constructs NA message, and send NA message.
  • the access router AR uses the private key of the MS2 to set the RSA signature in the NA message, and the CGA parameter of the MS2 in the NA message includes the public key information of the MS2.
  • the access router AR does not construct an NA message after determining that the agent does not need to send the NA message according to the processing result. If the access router AR performs DAD processing, the MS1 determines that its IPv6 address has no address conflict. Send its public key and private key to the access router AR, and the access router AR records the public and private keys of M S1. MS1 can send its public and private keys to the AR in an encrypted manner.
  • the encryption method here may be 2 layers such as MAC layer encryption, or 3 layers such as IP layer encryption.
  • the access router AR can decrypt the public key and the private key of the MS1, and store the decrypted public key and private key; the access router AR can also directly store the undecrypted public key and the private key, and then decrypt it after use. deal with.
  • the access router AR After the access router AR stores the public key and the private key of the MS1, in the subsequent neighbor discovery process, if the public key and the private key of the MS1 are used to set the parameters in the NA message, the access router AR may Obtain the public and private keys of MS1 from the information it stores.
  • both the MS1 and the access router AR need to obtain a key for encrypting the public key and the private key of the MS1.
  • MS1 and access router AR there are various ways for MS1 and access router AR to obtain the encryption key. The following two methods for obtaining the encryption key are briefly introduced. For the convenience of the following description, the key for encrypting the public and private keys of MS1 is denoted as SEND-EK.
  • MS1 obtains the shared key MSK or EMSK between it and the AAA server in the EAP process, MS1 derives SEND-EK according to MSK or EMSK; AAA server derives by calculation according to MSK or E MSK The key SEND-RK, the AAA server sends the key SEND-RK to the access network gateway ASN-GW where the access router is located, and the ASN-GW derives the key SEND-EK according to the key SEND-RK to access The router AR obtains the SEND-EK from the access network gateway.
  • MS1 obtains the shared key MSK or EMSK between it and the AAA server in the EAP process, MS 1 derives the key SEND-EK according to MSK or EMSK; AAA server calculates according to MSK or EMSK Deriving the key SEND-RK, and deriving the key SEND-EK according to the key SEND-RK, the AAA sends the SEND-EK directly to the access network gateway A SN-GW where the access router AR is located, accessing The router AR obtains the SEND-EK from the access network gateway.
  • the access router AR obtains the public and private keys of the MS2 through the above steps, if the access router The sending of the NA message to the MSI requires the use of the public and private keys of the MS2.
  • the access router AR can use the public and private keys of the Ms2 to set the CGA parameters and the RSA signature of the MS2 in the NA message.
  • MS1 receives the NA message.
  • the MS1 authenticates the NA message by using its public key, and obtains the neighbor discovery result information from the NA message after the verification is passed.
  • Embodiment 4 The ASN-GW sends the public key and the private key of the MS to the MS and the access router AR.
  • the access router AR obtains the public key and the private key of each MS.
  • the NA message is sent by using the public key and the private key of the corresponding mobile station, and the MS utilizes Its public key verifies the NA message.
  • the specific implementation process is shown in Figure 4.
  • the process of sending the public key and the private key to the MS by the ASN-GW may be performed before the ADD is performed by the MS or after the ADD is performed by the MS. However, regardless of the process of issuing the public key and the private key, the MS can use the public key and the private key delivered by the ASN-GW only after successfully verifying by ADD. Embodiment 4 will not be described in detail herein.
  • the AR replies to the NA message through the proxy, thereby avoiding the process of information interaction between the AR and the MS1 and the MS2, that is, After the neighbor discovery of the MS1, the AR does not need to exchange information with the MS2, thereby reducing the transmission of the high-layer signaling on the air interface and improving the efficiency of neighbor discovery.
  • the technical solution of the neighbor discovery method of the above embodiment can be applied to a WiMax network. When the technical solution of the neighbor discovery method is applied to the WiMax network, the blank of the security ND in the WiMax network is filled, and the valuable air interface resources in the Wi Max network are saved.
  • the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention is applicable to a multi-hosts multi-host scenario, and is also applicable to a scenario in which a mobile station and an ASN-GW are directly connected.
  • the network device provided by the embodiment of the present invention is provided with a neighbor discovery module and a proxy module.
  • the network device When the network device needs to verify the neighbor request message sent by the mobile station, the network device also has a cancellation Information verification module one.
  • the network device here may be an access router or an access network gateway provided with an access router.
  • the mobile station provided by the embodiment of the present invention is provided with a proxy permission module, a sending module and an obtaining module. When the mobile station needs to verify the neighbor broadcast message sent by the network side, the mobile station also has a message verification module 2.
  • the proxy privilege module can be located in the access router.
  • the proxy permission module sets the information of the network side network device trusted by the mobile station, and the proxy permission module can determine whether the access router can trust by performing proxy authority detection such as the ADD process on the access router, and determine that the access router can trust. ⁇ , store the information of the access router. If the operator configures the access router of the mobile station according to the predetermined policy, the proxy permission module may not perform proxy permission detection. Thereafter, the proxy permission module may obtain and store the mobile station by receiving configuration information transmitted by the network side. Trusted access router
  • the sending module obtains the access router information trusted by the mobile station from the proxy permission module, and obtains the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery, and then constructs the neighbor request message according to the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery. Send the neighbor request message to the access router trusted by the mobile station.
  • the sending module obtains and sends the neighbor request message to the network device trusted by the mobile station according to the information stored by the proxy permission module.
  • the manner in which the sending module obtains the key used by the mobile station for the security neighbor discovery may be: calculated according to the existing method, or obtained by using the ⁇ process, or distributed by the access network gateway. This is specifically as described in the above method embodiments.
  • the sending module may carry the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery, such as a public key, in the neighbor request message and send it to the access router. Of course, the sending module may also use the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery through other messages. The key is sent to the access router. The sending module may also not send the key used by the mobile station for the secure neighbor discovery to the access router. There may be multiple types of downtimes for the transmitting module to transmit its key to the access router, as described in the above method. The sending module can encrypt the key after sending it a key for secure neighbor discovery to the access router. The specific process by which the transmitting module obtains a key for encrypting a key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery is as described in the above method embodiment.
  • the access verification module After receiving the neighbor request message sent by the sending module, the access verification module performs a message verification on the neighbor request message.
  • the message verification module 1 can verify the neighbor request message by using the key used by the mobile station in the neighbor request message for secure neighbor discovery.
  • the message verification module needs to obtain the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery by other means.
  • the message verification module 1 includes: a access sub-module located at the access network gateway and a verification sub-module 1 located at the access router.
  • the acquisition key sub-module is mainly used to obtain a key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery by performing an EAP process or a negotiation process with the sending module, and transmits the acquired key to the verification sub-module 1.
  • the key sub-module is obtained.
  • the sending module reports the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery to the acquiring key submodule, and then For example, the key sub-module generates and sends a key to the mobile station for the secure neighbor discovery by the mobile station; the process of obtaining the key used by the mobile station for secure neighbor discovery is not described in detail herein.
  • the verification sub-module receives the key used by the mobile station for obtaining the security neighbor discovery by the obtained key sub-module, and uses the key to verify the neighbor request message sent by the sending module, after the message verification is passed. , notify the neighbor discovery module.
  • the neighbor discovery module performs neighbor discovery processing according to the neighbor request message transmitted by the sending module after receiving the notification of the message verification module 1, where the neighbor discovery processing such as DAD, NUD, and the like.
  • the agent module detects that the neighbor discovery result of the neighbor discovery module is that other neighbors are detected, and the proxy replies to the neighbor broadcast message.
  • the proxy module may also find that no other neighbors are detected in the neighbor, and the proxy replies to the neighbor broadcast.
  • the message is specifically as described in the above method implementation.
  • the proxy module can use the key of the access router to construct a neighbor broadcast message. In this case, the proxy module needs to send the indication information of the access router security proxy reply to the mobile station.
  • the proxy module may send the indication information to the mobile station by using a neighbor broadcast message, or may send the indication information to the mobile station by using another message, and the proxy module may send the indication information to the mobile station before sending the neighbor broadcast message. . Specifically, it is as described in the above method embodiment.
  • the proxy module may also construct a neighbor broadcast message replied by the proxy by using the key of the other mobile station for secure neighbor discovery, and broadcast the neighbor.
  • the information is sent to the mobile station.
  • the proxy module may carry the keys of other mobile stations, such as public keys, in the neighbor broadcast message and send them to the mobile station.
  • the key used by the other mobile stations used by the proxy module for secure neighbor discovery may be reported by other mobile stations, or may be generated by the access network gateway itself, or may be obtained by using the sub-module of the access key through other mobile stations. Obtained by the EAP process. The specific process is as described in the above method embodiments.
  • the message verification module 2 After the mobile station receives the neighbor broadcast message sent by the proxy module, the message verification module 2 performs message verification on the neighbor broadcast message.
  • the message verification process of the message verification module 2 is implemented by the acquisition key sub-module 2 and the verification sub-module 2.
  • the acquisition key sub-module 2 acquires the key of the access router, such as a public key, and transmits the key of the access router to the authenticator. Module two. In the case that the mobile station does not receive the indication information of the access router security agent reply, the acquisition key sub-module 2 acquires the key of the other mobile station, and transmits the acquired key of the other mobile station to the verification sub-module 2.
  • the acquisition key sub-module 2 can obtain the key used by other mobile stations for secure neighbor discovery from the message transmitted by the access router, and the access key sub-module 2 can also be accessed from the access network gateway where the access router is located.
  • the transmitted message obtains the key used by other mobile stations for secure neighbor discovery. The specific process is as described in the above method embodiment.
  • the verification sub-module 2 After receiving the key transmitted by the acquisition key sub-module 2, the verification sub-module 2 uses the key to perform message verification on the neighbor broadcast message replied by the access router proxy, or uses the key and the neighbor to broadcast the message. The parameters related to other mobile stations perform message verification on the neighbor broadcast message replied by the access router agent. The verification submodule notifies the acquisition module after the message verification is passed. The specific verification process is as described in the above method embodiments.
  • the acquisition module After receiving the notification of the verification sub-module 2, the acquisition module acquires the neighbor discovery result information from the neighbor broadcast message, and outputs the information.
  • the mobile station and the network device in the above embodiment may be a mobile station and a network device in a WiMax network.
  • It can also be a mobile station and a network device in other networks.

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Description

说明书 安全邻居发现方法、 网络设备和移动台
[I] 技术领域
[2] 本发明涉及通讯技术领域， 具体涉及一种安全邻居发现方法、 网络设备和移动 台。
[3] 发明背景
[4] 在网络中通常需要考虑安全的邻居发现 （ND) ， ND检测， 包括重复地址检测
(Duplicate Address
Detection, DAD) 、 邻居不可达检测等等。 当网络中实现 IPv6后， 由于 IP地址是 无状态生成的、 移动台的 IP地址不是集中统一分配的， 所以， DAD等安全的 ND 就变得十分重要了。 现有的重复地址检测等 ND实现过程需要网络设备与两端移 动台分别进行信息交互。
[5] 由于现有的安全 ND实现过程中需要网络设备与多个移动台进行信息交互， 因 此， 现有方法存在过多占用网络传输资源、 邻居发现效率低等问题； 尤其在无 线网络中， 浪费了宝贵的空口资源。
[6] 发明内容
[7] 本发明实施方式提供一种安全邻居发现方法、 网络设备和移动台， 以保证了邻 居发现的安全性。
[8] 本发明实施方式提供的安全邻居发现方法， 包括：
[9] 网络设备接收移动台向其信任的网络设备发送的邻居请求消息；
[10] 所述网络设备根据接收的所述邻居请求消息进行邻居发现， 并根据邻居发现结 果代理回复邻居广播消息， 使移动台根据接收的邻居广播消息获取邻居发现结 果 ί曰息；
[I I] 在上述消息传输过程中， 所述网络设备对其接收的邻居请求消息进行消息验证 通过后， 进行邻居发现并根据邻居发送结果代理回复邻居广播消息； 和 /或者移 动台对其接收的邻居广播消息进行消息验证， 并在验证成功后， 从邻居广播消 息中获取邻居发现结果信息。 [12] 本发明实施方式还提供一种网络设备， 该网络设备包括：
[13] 消息验证模块一： 用于对移动台发送给网络设备的邻居请求消息进行消息验证
， 在消息验证通过吋， 输出通知；
[14] 邻居发现模块： 用于在接收到消息验证模块一的通知吋， 根据移动台发送给网 络设备的邻居请求消息进行邻居发现处理；
[15] 代理模块： 用于根据邻居发现模块的邻居发现处理的结果代理回复邻居广播消 息。
[16] 本发明实施方式还提供一种移动台， 所述移动台包括：
[17] 代理权限模块： 用于确定移动台信任的网络侧网络设备， 并存储移动台信任的 网络侧网络设备的信息；
[18] 发送模块： 用于根据代理权限模块存储的信息向移动台信任的网络设备发送邻 居请求消息；
[19] 消息验证模块二： 用于对网络设备代理回复给移动台的邻居广播消息进行消息 验证， 并在验证成功后， 输出通知；
[20] 获取模块： 在接收到消息验证模块二的通知后， 从移动台接收到的邻居广播消 息中获取邻居发现结果信息。
[21] 通过上述技术方案的描述可知， 网络侧的网络设备如接入路由器 AR通过代理 回复 NA消息， 避免了接入路由器 AR与多个移动台进行信息交互的过程， 也就是 说， 接入路由器 AR在对某一个移动台进行邻居发现吋， 不需要与其他移动台进 行信息交互， 从而减少了高层信令在空口上的传输， 节约了网络中宝贵的空口 资源， 提高了邻居发现的效率。
[22] 附图简要说明
[23] 图 1是本发明实施方式一的安全的邻居发现方法流程图；
[24] 图 2是本发明实施方式二的安全的邻居发现方法流程图；
[25] 图 3是本发明实施方式三的安全的邻居发现方法流程图；
[26] 图 4是本发明实施方式四的安全的邻居发现方法流程图。
[27] 实施本发明的方式
[28] 在本发明的实施方式中， 进行基于邻居发现的消息交互的移动台 （MS) 和网 络侧网络设备之间存在相互信任关系。 这里的网络设备可以为接入路由器 （AR ) 、 或者设置有接入路由器 AR的接入网网关等等。 如果网络中安全邻居发现由 移动台与接入路由器 AR或者接入网网关之外的其他网络设备进行， 则本发明实 施方式中的网络设备也可以为其他网络设备。 不论移动台具体与哪个网络设备 进行安全邻居发现， 本发明实施方式技术方案的实现过程不会发生改变， 发生 改变的仅仅是执行技术方案的主体而已。
[29] 在本申请下面的实施方式中， 以移动台与接入路由器之间、 以及移动台与设置 有接入路由器 AR的接入网网关之间进行安全邻居发现为例进行说明。
[30] 移动台可以通过对接入路由器进行代理权限检测来确定接入路由器是否可以信 任。 如果运营商根据预定策略来配置移动台的接入路由器， 则移动台不进行代 理权限检测也可以确定接入路由器始终是可信任的。
[31] 为确保邻居发现的安全性， 移动台可以对接入路由器 AR发送来的消息进行消 息验证， 接入路由器也可以对移动台发送来的消息进行消息验证。 这里的消息 验证可以是单向的， 也可以是双向的， 即仅移动台对其接收的消息进行消息验 证， 或者仅接入路由器对其接收的消息进行消息验证， 或者移动台和接入路由 器都对其各自接收的消息进行消息验证。
[32] 在接入路由器需要对移动台发送来的消息进行消息验证的情况下， 移动台可以 利用其用于安全邻居发现的密钥来构造邻居请求消息。 邻居请求消息中可以携 带移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 也可以不携带移动台用于安全邻居发现的 密钥。 邻居请求消息中携带的密钥可以为移动台用于安全邻居发现的公钥等。 接入路由器可以利用移动台发送来的用于安全邻居发现的密钥如公钥对邻居请 求消息进行消息验证。 接入路由器也可以根据其所在的接入网网关与移动台的 可扩展认证协议 （EAP) 过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥如共享密钥， 然后， 接入路由器在接收到移动台发送来的邻居请求消息吋， 根据移动台用于 安全邻居发现的密钥对该邻居请求消息进行验证； 接入路由器所在的接入网网 关可以主动产生移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥如共享密钥， 然后， 将其产生 的密钥发送给移动台， 然后， 接入路由器利用接入网网关产生的密钥对其接收 的邻居请求消息进行验证。 [33] 在上述描述中， 移动台可以将其用于安全邻居发现的密钥承载于邻居请求消息 中传输至接入路由器， 也可以通过其他消息将用于安全邻居发现的密钥传输至 接入路由器。 本发明实施方式不限制移动台向接入路由器传输其密钥的吋机， 如移动台可以在确定其地址没有冲突吋， 将其用于安全邻居发现的密钥传输至 接入路由器； 再如移动台也可以在确定其地址是否冲突前， 将其用于安全邻居 发现的密钥传输至接入路由器。 移动台在向接入路由器发送其用于安全邻居发 现的密钥吋， 可以对该密钥进行加密。 同理， 接入路由器所在的接入网网关在 向移动台发送所述产生的移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥吋， 也可以对该密钥 进行加密。
[34] 接入网网关在根据 EAP过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥后， 可以对该 密钥信息中用于产生地址的密钥进行检测， 检测用于产生地址的密钥是否与其 他移动台的用于产生地址的密钥重复。 接入网网关在检测到密钥重复后， 通知 与其进行 EAP过程的移动台。 接收到通知的移动台需要更新其用于产生地址的密 钥。
[35] 当移动台将其用于安全邻居发现的密钥通过加密方式发送给接入路由器、 或者 接入网网关将产生的移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥通过加密方式发送给移动 台吋， 移动台和接入网网关可以通过 EAP过程来获取对移动台用于安全邻居发现 的密钥进行加密的密钥。
[36] 在移动台需要对接入路由器发送来的邻居广播消息进行消息验证的情况下， 接 入路由器根据移动台发送来的邻居请求消息检测到其他移动台， 则接入路由器 可以利用其自身的密钥来构造邻居广播消息。 邻居广播消息中可以携带接入路 由器安全代理回复的指示信息。 移动台在获得了接入路由器安全代理回复的指 示信息后， 利用接入路由器的密钥对邻居广播消息进行验证； 移动台也可以利 用接入路由器的密钥和邻居广播消息中与其他移动台相关的参数对邻居广播消 息进行验证。 移动台釆用邻居广播消息中与其他移动台相关的参数对邻居广播 消息进行验证的过程可以釆用现有的安全邻居发现 （SEND) 中的验证过程。 这 里的接入路由器安全代理回复的指示信息也可以通过其他消息发送给移动台。 接入路由器也可以不下发上述指示信息， 此吋， 接入路由器可以利用其检测到 的其他移动台的用于安全邻居发现的密钥来设置邻居广播消息， 而且， 移动台 应使用其他移动台的密钥对邻居广播消息进行消息验证， 或者移动台可以利用 其他移动台的密钥和邻居广播消息中与其他移动台相关的参数对邻居广播消息 进行消息验证。
[37] 在上述描述中， 移动台可以从接入路由器传输来的消息中获取其他移动台用于 安全邻居发现的密钥， 移动台也可以从接入路由器所在的接入网网关传输来的 消息中获取其他移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥。 接入路由器可以通过其他移 动台主动上报用于安全邻居发现密钥的方式获得其他移动台用于安全邻居发现 的密钥； 接入路由器也可以从其所在的接入网网关处获得其他移动台用于安全 邻居发现的密钥。 接入网网关可以通过其他移动台的 EAP过程获取其他移动台用 于安全邻居发现的密钥； 接入网网关也可以自己产生其他移动台用于安全邻居 发现的密钥。
[38] 下面结合附图、 以四种具体的实施方式为例对本发明实施方式的技术方案进行 详细说明。
[39] 实施方式 1、 接入路由器 AR利用自身的私钥代理回复 NA消息， 具体实现过程 如附图 1所示。
[40] 在图 1中， 步骤 1、 接入路由器 AR发送 RA (路由器广播） 消息， 该 RA消息中携 带有接入路由器 AR安全代理回复 NA消息的指示信息。
[41] 步骤 1中的 RA消息可以依据请求评论 （Request For
Comments , RFC) 的描述来构造， 当然也可以釆用其他协议来构造。 在构造 RF
C描述的 RA消息吋， 需要对 RA消息进行扩展， 使 RA消息中承载有接入路由器 A
R安全代理回复 NA消息的指示信息。
[42] 接入路由器 AR发送的 RA消息中也可以不携带上述指示信息， AR可以将上述指 示信息携带于后续的其他消息中发送， 此吋， RA消息可以完全按照 RFC的描述 来构造。
[43] 到步骤 2、 MS1在接收到 RA消息后， 进行授权代理发现 （Authorization
Delegation
Discovery, ADD) 验证， 以确认发送 RA消息的接入路由器 AR是其信任的接入 路由器。 该 ADD验证过程可以按照 RFC的描述进行。 MS1也可以釆用其他方式 来检测接入路由器是否为其信任的接入路由器。
[44] 上述步骤 2中， MS1对接入路由器 AR的 ADD过程也可以在 MS1接收到 RA消息 之前进行， 而且， 如果根据运营商的配置策略 MS1始终认为接入路由器 AR是可 信任的， 则 MS 1的 ADD过程也可以省略。 上述 ADD过程也可以由其他能够证明 接入路由器可信任的过程取代。
[45] 到步骤 3、 MS1在其对接入路由器 AR的 ADD验证通过后， 处理接入路由器 AR 发送来的 RA消息。 MS1根据 RA消息中携带的上述指示信息获知该接入路由器 A R支持安全代理回复 NA消息功能。 MS1对 RA消息中携带的其余信息的处理过程 可以参照 RFC中规定的处理过程。
[46] MS1根据需要向接入路由器 AR发送 NS消息， 如 MS1在 DAD过程或者邻居不可 达检测 （NUD) 过程中， 向接入路由器 AR发送承载有 MS1的 IPv6地址的 NS消息 。 MS1根据 MS1的公钥设置 NS消息中的相关参数， 该 NS消息中承载有 MS1的公 钥。 该 NS消息可以为 RFC描述的 NS消息。 如果不按照现有 RFC的描述来构造 NS 消息， 则需要在 NS消息中增加一个认证扩展， 该认证扩展可以是： 用 NS消息本 身和 MS 1的私钥进行计算出的消息摘要。
[47] 到步骤 4、 接入路由器 AR在接收到 NS消息后， 从 NS消息中获取 MS1的公钥， 接入路由器 AR根据 MS1的公钥确认该 NS消息确实来自于 NS消息中所声称的那个 IPv6地址， 并根据 NS消息中承载信息进行相应的处理， 如根据 NS消息中承载的 DAD信息进行 DAD处理， 再如根据 NS消息中的 NUD信息进行 NUD处理。
[48] 接入路由器 AR根据 DAD处理或者 NUD处理等处理结果确定是否需要代理发送 NA消息， 如果确定需要代理发送 NA消息， 则接入路由器构造 NA消息。 这里的 NA消息可以按照 RFC的描述构造， 如 NA消息的 CGA参数中携带的是其他移动台 如 MS2的 CGA参数。 与 RFC描述的 NA消息的不同之处在于： 在该实施方式中， 接入路由器 AR是用其本身的密钥设置 NA消息中的 RSA签名， 而不是使用 MS2的 私钥来设置 NA消息中的 RSA签名。
[49] 当步骤 1中的 RA消息没有携带安全代理回复的指示信息吋， 接入路由器 AR也 可以将该指示信息承载于 NA消息中发送给移动台， 移动台从 NA消息中获得了指 示信息后， 得知该 NA消息是接入路由器代理回复的， 移动台将该 NA消息按照安 全代理回复的消息进行处理。
[50] 在上述描述中， 当接入路由器 AR的邻居发现结果为检测到邻居吋， 则说明检 测到的邻居已经进行过邻居发现过程了， 如接入路由器 AR检测到 MS1的 IPv6地 址和 MS2的 IPv6地址冲突， 说明 MS2已经和 AR进行了 DAD过程， 因此， 接入路 由器 AR可以从 MS2发送的 NS消息中获取并保留 MS2的公钢。 这样， 接入路由器
AR在向 MS1发送 NA消息吋， 就可以利用 MS2的公钥设置该 NA消息中的 MS2的 C GA参数。
[51] 在步骤 4中， 如果接入路由器 AR没有发现邻居， 则可以釆用不发送 NA消息等 处理方式； 如当接入路由器 AR的邻居发现过程为 DAD处理过程吋， 当接入路由 器 AR检测到 MS 1的 IPv6地址没有地址冲突， 则可以不发送 NA消息， 再如， 当接 入路由器 AR的邻居发现过程为检测邻居 MS2是否可达吋， 当接入路由器 AR检测 到 MS2不在链路上， 则可以不发送 NA消息。
[52] 当然在上述没有地址冲突、 MS2不在链路上的情况下， 接入路由器 AR也可以 发送 NA消息， 并在 NA消息中明确给出邻居发现结果， 此吋， NA的消息构造方 式和前述实施方式中描述的 NA消息的构造方式相同。
[53] 在步骤 5、 MS1接收 NA消息。 MS1可以根据路由器广播 RA消息或者 NA消息中 的上述指示信息获知该 NA消息是接入路由器 AR代理回复的， MS1根据接入路由 器 AR的密钥以及 NA消息携带的 CGA参数对 NA消息进行验证， 从而完成安全的 邻居检测过程。 MS1在对 NA消息验证通过后， 从 NA消息中获得邻居发现结果信 息。
[54] 实施方式 2、 接入路由器 AR利用其他移动台的公钥和私钥发送 NA消息， MS利 用 NA消息中携带的其他移动台的公钥验证 NA消息， 具体实现过程如附图 2所示 图 2中， 在步骤 1、 MS1接入网络的吋候， 需要进行可扩展认证协议 （EAP) 过 程， 在 EAP过程中， MS1和接入网网关均可以获得 MS1用于安全邻居发现 （SEN D) 的公钥和私钥。 为了方便描述， 将 MS1用于 SEND的公钥记为 SEND-PuK， 将 MSI用于 SEND的私钥记为 SEND-PrK。 [56] 在步骤 1中， MSI和接入网网关获得上述 MSI的公钥和私钥的方法有多种， 下 面简单介绍两种获得 MS 1的公钥和私钥的方法。
[57] 方法 1、 MS 1通过 EAP过程获得其和 AAA (鉴权、 计费、 认证） 服务器的共享 密钥 MSK或者 EMSK, MS1根据 MSK或者 EMSK通过计算派生出密钥 SEND-RK
， 然后， MS1依据 SEND-RK派生出 SEND-PuK和 SEND-PrK。 接入服务网络网关 (Access Service Network
GateWay, ASN-GW) 接收 AAA发送来的 SEND-RK, ASN-GW依据 SEND-RK派 生出 SEND-PuK/PrK。
[58] 方法 2、 MSI通过 EAP过程获得其和 AAA的共享密钥 MSK或者 EMSK, MSI根 据 MSK或者 EMSK通过计算派生出密钥 SEND-RK, 然后， MS 1依据 SEND-RK派 生出 SEND-PuK和 SEND-PrK。 AAA服务器根据共享密钥 MSK或者 EMSK通过计 算派生出密钥 SEND-RK, 然后， AAA服务器依据密钥 SEND-RK通过计算派生出 密钥 SEND-PuK和 SEND-PrK， AAA服务器直接将 SEND-PuK和 SEND-PrK发送给 接入网网关 ASN-GW。
[59] 接入网网关 ASN-GW在通过上述方法 1或者方法 2获得 MSI的 SEND-PuK和 SEN D-PrK后， AR也就可以从接入网网关处获知 MSI的 SEND-PuK/PrK。 当然， 上述 接入网网关执行的操作也可以由接入路由器侧的其他网络设备替代， 如由接入 路由器替代等。
[60] 接入路由器 AR可以通过比较 MS 1的密钥和其他移动台密钥是否相同， 获知 MS 1的 IPv6地址是否与其他移动台的 IPv6地址冲突， 如果接入路由器 AR通过密钥比 较确定 MS 1的密钥与其他移动台的密钥相同， 则可以确定 MS 1的 IPv6地址与其他 移动台的 IPv6地址存在冲突。 此吋， 接入路由器 AR可以将 MS1的产生地址的密 钥与其他移动台产生地址的密钥相冲突的信息直接通知给 MS1， 如接入路由器通 过扩展 RA消息， 将密钥相冲突的信息承载于 RA消息中发送。 MS1在接收到接入 路由器 AR发送的 RA消息后， 根据 RA消息中密钥相冲突的信息更新其公钥和密 钥， ASN-GW也应该同吋釆用同样的算法更新 MS1的公钥和私钥， 并执行步骤 3 。 这里 MS1釆用的算法和 ASN-GW釆用的算法可以是双方预先约定好的， 也可以 是网络侧分别向 ASN-GW和 MS 1下发的。 [61] 如果在步骤 1中， 接入路由器 AR不进行 MSI的密钥与其他移动台的密钥是否相 同的判断， 或者接入路由器 AR在进行 MS1的密钥与其他移动台的密钥是否相同 的判断吋， 确定 MS1的密钥与其他移动台的密钥不相同， 则执行步骤 2。
[62] 在步骤 2、 接入路由器 AR发送 RA消息， 该 RA消息可以依据 RFC的描述来构造
[63] 到步骤 3、 MS1在接收到 RA消息后， 进行 ADD (Authorization Delegation
Discovery, 授权代理发现） 验证， 该 ADD验证过程可以按照现有 RFC的描述进 行。
[64] 上述描述中， MS1进行的 ADD过程和 MS1接收 RA消息在吋间上可以没有顺序 的要求， 即 ADD过程可以在 MS1接收到 RA消息之前， 也可以在 MS1接收到 RA消 息之后， 而且， 如果根据运营商的配置策略 MS1始终认为接入路由器 AR是可信 任的， 则 MS 1的 ADD过程也可以省略。 上述 ADD过程也可以由其他能够证明接 入路由器可信任的过程取代。
[65] 到步骤 4、 MS1在对接入路由器 AR的 ADD验证通过后， 处理接入路由器 AR发 送来的 RA消息。 MS1对 RA消息中携带的其余信息的处理过程可以参照 RFC中规 定的处理过程。
[66] MS 1根据需要向接入路由器 AR发送 NS消息， 如 MS 1在 DAD过程或者 NUD过程 中， 向接入路由器 AR发送承载有 MS1的 IPv6地址的 NS消息。 MS1根据 MS1的公 钥设置 NS消息中的相关参数， 该 NS消息中承载有 MS1的公钥。 该 NS消息可以为 现有的 RFC描述的 NS消息。 如果不按照现有 RFC的描述来构造 NS消息， 则需要 在 NS消息中增加一个认证扩展， 该认证扩展可以是： 用 NS消息本身和 MS1的私 钥进行计算出的消息摘要。
[67] 到步骤 5、 接入路由器 AR在接收到 NS消息后， 获取 MS1的公钥。 接入路由器 A R可以从 EAP过程中获取 MS1的公钥， 也可以从 NS消息携带的信息中获取 MS1的 公钥。 接入路由器 AR根据 MS1的公钥确认该 NS消息确实来自于 NS消息中所声称 的那个 IPv6地址， 并根据 NS消息中承载的信息进行相应的处理， 如进行 DAD处 理或者 NUD处理等。
[68] 接入路由器 AR根据处理结果在确定需要代理发送 NA消息吋， 接入路由器构造 NA消息， 并发送 NA消息。 在该实施方式中， 接入路由器 AR是用 MS2的私钥来 设置 NA消息中的 RSA签名的， NA消息中的 MS2的 CGA参数包含了 MS2的公钥信 息。
[69] 在步骤 6、 MS1接收 NA消息。 MS1利用 NA消息中携带的 MS2的公钥对 NA消息 进行验证， 并在验证通过后， 从 NA消息中获得邻居发现结果信息。
[70] 实施方式 3、 MS在进行安全邻居发现后， MS将其公钥和私钥发送给接入路由 器 AR。 接入路由器 AR获得各 MS的公钥和私钥， 在对某个 MS进行安全邻居发现 过程中， 如果需要发送 NA消息， 则利用相应的移动台的公钥和私钥发送 NA消息 ， MS利用其公钥验证 NA消息。 具体实现过程如附图 3所示。
[71] 图 3中， 在步骤 1、 AR发送 RA消息， 该 RA消息可以依据 RFC3971的描述来构造
[72] 到步骤 2、 MS1在接收到 RA消息后， 进行 ADD验证， 该 ADD验证过程可以按照 RFC的描述进行。
[73] 到步骤 3、 MS1在对接入路由器 AR的 ADD验证通过后， 处理接入路由器 AR发 送来的 RA消息。 MS1对 RA消息中携带的其余信息的处理过程可以参照 RFC中规 定的处理过程。
[74] MS1根据需要向接入路由器 AR发送 NS消息， 如 MS 1在 DAD过程或者 NUD过程 中， 向接入路由器 AR发送承载有 MS1的 IPv6地址的 NS消息。 MS1根据 MS1的公 钥设置 NS消息中的 CGA参数、 并根据 MS1的私钥来设置 NA消息中的 RSA签名。 MS1可以通过现有的方式计算出其公钥和私钥。 该 NS消息可以为现有的描述安 全邻居发现的 RFC描述的 NS消息。 如果不按照现有 RFC的描述来构造 NS消息， 则需要在 NS消息中增加一个认证扩展， 该认证扩展可以是： 用 NS消息本身和 M S 1的私钥进行计算出的消息摘要。
[75] 到步骤 4、 接入路由器 AR在接收到 NS消息后， 获取 MS1的公钥。 接入路由器 A R根据 MSI的公钥确认该 NS消息确实来自于 NS消息中所声称的那个 IPv6地址， 并根据 NS消息中承载的信息进行相应的处理， 如进行 DAD处理或者 NUD处理等
[76] 接入路由器 AR根据处理结果在确定需要代理发送 NA消息吋， 接入路由器构造 NA消息， 并发送 NA消息。 在该实施方式中， 接入路由器 AR是用 MS2的私钥来 设置 NA消息中的 RSA签名的， NA消息中的 MS2的 CGA参数包含了 MS2的公钥信 息。
[77] 接入路由器 AR根据处理结果在确定不需要代理发送 NA消息吋， 接入路由器不 构造 NA消息， 如果接入路由器 AR进行的是 DAD处理， 则 MS1在确定其 Ipv6地址 没有地址冲突后， 将其公钥和私钥发送给接入路由器 AR, 接入路由器 AR记录 M S1的公钥和私钥。 MS1可以釆用加密的方式将其公钥和私钥发送给 AR。 这里的 加密的方式可以是 2层如 MAC层加密方式， 也可以是 3层如 IP层加密方式。 接入 路由器 AR可以对 MS1的公钥和私钥进行解密， 并存储解密后的公钥和私钥； 接 入路由器 AR也可以直接存储未解密的公钥和私钥， 在使用吋再进行解密处理。
[78] 接入路由器 AR存储了 MS1的公钥和私钥后， 在后续邻居发现处理过程中， 如 果需要使用 MS1的公钥和私钥来设置 NA消息中的参数， 则接入路由器 AR可以从 其存储的信息中获取 MS1的公钥和私钥。
[79] 在本实施方式中， MS1和接入路由器 AR均需要获得对 MS1的公钥和私钥进行 加密的密钥。 MS1和接入路由器 AR获得该加密密钥的方式有多种， 下面简单介 绍两种获得加密密钥的方法。 为方便下面的描述， 将对 MS1的公钥和私钥进行加 密的密钥记为 SEND-EK。
[80] 方法 1、 MS1在 EAP过程中获得其与 AAA服务器之间的共享密钥 MSK或 EMSK ， MS1根据 MSK或 EMSK通过计算派生出 SEND-EK; AAA服务器根据 MSK或 E MSK通过计算派生出密钥 SEND-RK, AAA服务器将密钥 SEND-RK发送给接入 路由器所在的接入网网关 ASN-GW, ASN-GW根据密钥 SEND-RK通过计算派生 出密钥 SEND-EK, 接入路由器 AR从接入网网关处获取 SEND-EK。
[81] 方法 2、 MS1在 EAP过程中获得其与 AAA服务器之间的共享密钥 MSK或 EMSK ， MS 1根据 MSK或 EMSK通过计算派生出密钥 SEND-EK; AAA服务器根据 MSK 或 EMSK通过计算派生出密钥 SEND-RK， 并根据密钥 SEND-RK通过计算派生出 密钥 SEND-EK, AAA将 SEND-EK直接发送给接入路由器 AR所在的接入网网关 A SN-GW， 接入路由器 AR从接入网网关处获取 SEND-EK。
[82] 当接入路由器 AR通过上述步骤获得了 MS2的公钥和私钥后， 如果接入路由器 在向 MSI发送 NA消息需要使用 MS2的公钥和私钥吋， 接入路由器 AR可以利用 M S2的公钥和私钥来设置 NA消息中的 MS2的 CGA参数以及 RSA签名。
[83] 到步骤 5、 MS1接收 NA消息。 MS1利用其公钥对 NA消息进行验证， 并在验证 通过后， 从 NA消息中获得邻居发现结果信息。
[84] 实施方式 4、 ASN-GW将 MS的公钥和私钥发送给 MS和接入路由器 AR。 接入路 由器 AR获得各 MS的公钥和私钥， 在对某个 MS进行安全邻居发现过程中， 如果 需要发送 NA消息， 则利用相应的移动台的公钥和私钥发送 NA消息， MS利用其 公钥验证 NA消息。 具体实现过程如附图 4所示。
[85] 对比图 3和图 4可以知道， 实施方式 4的实现过程与实施方式 3的实现过程基本相 同， 即实施方式 4的步骤 1至步骤 5与实施方式 3的步骤 1到步骤 5基本相同， 只是 M S用于 SEND的公钥和私钥是由 ASN-GW下发的， 而不是由 MS按照已有的方式计 算出来的。
[86] ASN-GW向 MS下发公钥和私钥的过程可以在 MS进行 ADD之前， 也可以在 MS 进行 ADD之后。 但是不论下发公钥和私钥的过程在什么吋间执行， MS只有在成 功通过 ADD验证后， 才能够使用 ASN-GW下发的公钥和私钥。 在此不再对实施 方式 4进行详细描述。
[87] 从上述四种实施方式的描述可以看出， 在本发明实施方式的邻居发现方法中， AR通过代理回复 NA消息， 避免了 AR与 MS1和 MS2都进行信息交互的过程， 也 就是说， AR在对 MS1进行邻居发现吋， 不需要与 MS2进行信息交互， 从而减少 了高层信令在空口上的传输， 提高了邻居发现的效率。 上述实施方式的邻居发 现方法的技术方案可以适用于 WiMax网络中。 当上述邻居发现方法的技术方案 适用于 WiMax网络中吋， 填补了 WiMax网络中安全 ND的空白， 而且， 节约了 Wi Max网络中宝贵的空口资源。
[88] 本发明实施方式提供的技术方案适用于 multi-hosts多主机场景， 也适用于一个 移动台和一个 ASN-GW直接相连的场景。
[89] 下面对本发明实施方式提供的网络设备和移动台进行说明。
[90] 本发明实施方式提供的网络设备中设置有邻居发现模块和代理模块， 当网络设 备需要对移动台发送来的邻居请求消息进行验证吋， 该网络设备中还设置有消 息验证模块一。 这里的网络设备可以为接入路由器， 也可以为设置有接入路由 器的接入网网关。 本发明实施方式提供的移动台中设置有代理权限模块、 发送 模块和获取模块， 当移动台需要对网络侧发送来的邻居广播消息进行验证吋， 移动台中还设置有消息验证模块二。
[91] 代理权限模块可以位于接入路由器中。 代理权限模块中设置有移动台信任的网 络侧网络设备的信息， 代理权限模块可以通过对接入路由器进行代理权限检测 如 ADD过程来确定接入路由器是否可以信任， 并在确定接入路由器可以信任吋 ， 存储该接入路由器的信息。 如果运营商根据预定策略来配置移动台的接入路 由器， 则代理权限模块可以不进行代理权限检测， 此吋， 代理权限模块可以通 过接收网络侧传输来的配置信息等方法来获得并存储移动台信任的接入路由器
Ι π Λ∑！、。
[92] 发送模块从代理权限模块中获取移动台信任的接入路由器信息， 并获取移动台 用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 然后， 根据移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥构造邻 居请求消息， 将邻居请求消息发送给移动台信任的接入路由器。 发送模块获取 并根据代理权限模块存储的信息向移动台信任的网络设备发送所述邻居请求消 息。 发送模块获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥的方式可以为： 根据现有的 方法自己计算产生， 或者利用 ΕΑΡ过程获得， 或者由接入网网关分配下发。 具体 如上述方法实施方式中的描述。
[93] 发送模块可以将移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥如公钥携带在邻居请求消息中 发送给接入路由器， 当然， 发送模块也可以通过其他消息将移动台用于安全邻 居发现的密钥发送给接入路由器。 发送模块也可以不将移动台用于安全邻居发 现的密钥发送给接入路由器。 发送模块向接入路由器传输其密钥的吋机可以为 多种， 具体如上述方法中的描述。 发送模块在向接入路由器发送其用于安全邻 居发现的密钥吋， 可以对该密钥进行加密。 发送模块获取对移动台用于安全邻 居发现的密钥进行加密的密钥的具体过程如上述方法实施方式中的描述。
[94] 接入路由器在接收到发送模块发送来的邻居请求消息后， 消息验证模块一对该 邻居请求消息进行消息验证。 消息验证模块一可以利用邻居请求消息中携带的 移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥对该邻居请求消息进行验证。 当发送模块没有 将移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥发送给接入路由器吋， 消息验证模块一需要 通过其他方式来获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥。 此吋， 消息验证模块一 包括： 位于接入网网关获取密钥子模块一和位于接入路由器的验证子模块一。
[95] 获取密钥子模块一主要用于通过与发送模块进行 EAP过程或者协商过程获取移 动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 并将获取的密钥传输至验证子模块一。 获取密 钥子模块一和发送模块之间通过 EAP过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥的 方式有多种， 在上述方法的实施方式二中例举了两种； 获取密钥子模块一和发 送模块之间通过协商过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥的方式同样也有 多种， 如发送模块向获取密钥子模块一上报移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 再如获取密钥子模块产生并向移动台下发移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥； 这 里不在对获取密钥子模块一获得移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥的过程进行详 细说明。
[96] 验证子模块一接收获取密钥子模块一传输来的移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥 ， 并利用该密钥对发送模块发送来的邻居请求消息进行验证， 在消息验证通过 后， 通知邻居发现模块。
[97] 邻居发现模块在接收到消息验证模块一的通知后根据发送模块传输来的邻居请 求消息进行邻居发现处理， 这里的邻居发现处理如 DAD、 NUD等。
[98] 代理模块在检测到邻居发现模块的邻居发现结果为检测到其他邻居吋， 代理回 复邻居广播消息， 当然， 代理模块也可以在邻居发现结果为没有检测到其他邻 居吋， 代理回复邻居广播消息， 具体如上述方法实施方式中的描述。
[99] 代理模块在代理回复邻居广播消息吋， 可以利用接入路由器的密钥来构造邻居 广播消息， 在这种情况下， 代理模块需要将接入路由器安全代理回复的指示信 息发送给移动台， 代理模块可以将该指示信息通过邻居广播消息发送给移动台 ， 也可以将该指示信息通过其他消息发送给移动台， 而且， 代理模块可以在发 送邻居广播消息之前将该指示信息发送给移动台。 具体如上述方法实施方式中 的描述。
[100] 在邻居发现结果为检测到其他邻居吋， 代理模块也可以利用所述其他移动台的 用于安全邻居发现的密钥构造代理回复的邻居广播消息， 并将所述邻居广播消 息发送给移动台。 代理模块可以将其他移动台的密钥如公钥携带于邻居广播消 息中发送给移动台。 代理模块使用的其他移动台的用于安全邻居发现的密钥可 以是其他移动台上报的， 也可以是接入网网关自己产生的， 还可以是获取密钥 子模块一通过与其他移动台进行 EAP过程获得的。 具体过程如上述方法实施方式 中的描述。
[101] 移动台接收到代理模块发送来的邻居广播消息后， 消息验证模块二对该邻居广 播消息进行消息验证。 消息验证模块二的消息验证过程由获取密钥子模块二和 验证子模块二实现。
[102] 在移动台接收到接入路由器安全代理回复的指示信息的情况下， 获取密钥子模 块二获取接入路由器的密钥如公钥， 并将接入路由器的密钥传输至验证子模块 二。 在移动台没有接收到接入路由器安全代理回复的指示信息的情况下， 获取 密钥子模块二获取其他移动台的密钥， 并将获取的其他移动台的密钥传输至验 证子模块二。
[103] 获取密钥子模块二可以从接入路由器传输来的消息中获取其他移动台用于安全 邻居发现的密钥， 获取密钥子模块二也可以从接入路由器所在的接入网网关传 输来的消息中获取其他移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥。 具体过程如上述方法 实施方式中的描述。
[104] 验证子模块二在接收到获取密钥子模块二传输来的密钥后， 利用该密钥对接入 路由器代理回复的邻居广播消息进行消息验证， 或者利用该密钥和邻居广播消 息中与其他移动台相关的参数对接入路由器代理回复的邻居广播消息进行消息 验证。 验证子模块在消息验证通过后， 通知获取模块。 具体的验证过程如上述 方法实施方式中的描述。
[105] 获取模块在接收到验证子模块二的通知后， 从邻居广播消息中获取邻居发现结 果信息， 并输出。
[106] 上述实施方式中的移动台和网络设备可以为 WiMax网络中的移动台和网络设备
， 也可以为其它网络中的移动台和网络设备。
[107] 虽然通过实施例描绘了本发明实施方式， 本领域普通技术人员知道， 本发明有 许多变形和变化而不脱离本发明的精神， 本发明的申请文件的权利要求包括这 些变形和变化。

Claims

权利要求书
[1] 1、 一种安全邻居发现方法， 其特征在于， 包括：
网络设备接收移动台向其信任的网络设备发送的邻居请求消息； 所述网络设备根据接收的所述邻居请求消息进行邻居发现， 并根据邻居发 现结果代理回复邻居广播消息， 使移动台根据接收的邻居广播消息获取邻 居发现结果信息；
在上述消息传输过程中， 所述网络设备对其接收的邻居请求消息进行消息 验证通过后， 进行邻居发现并根据邻居发送结果代理回复邻居广播消息； 和 /或者移动台对其接收的邻居广播消息进行消息验证， 并在验证成功后， 从邻居广播消息中获取邻居发现结果信息。
[2] 2、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述信任的网络设备是移动台 通过对网络设备进行代理权限检测来确定的。
[3] 3、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移动台发送邻居请求消息
、 所述网络设备对其接收的邻居请求消息进行消息验证包括： 移动台利用用于安全邻居发现的密钥构造并且发送邻居请求消息， 并在邻 居请求消息中携带所述密钥， 所述网络设备从邻居请求消息中获取所述密 钥， 并根据该密钥对邻居请求消息进行验证； 或者
网络设备和移动台分别根据可扩展认证协议 EAP过程获取移动台用于安全 邻居发现的密钥， 移动台利用所述用于安全邻居发现的密钥发送邻居请求 消息， 所述网络设备根据所述移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥对邻居请求 消息进行验证。
[4] 4、 如权利要求 3所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述网络设备和移动台分别通 过 EAP过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥包括：
移动台通过 EAP过程获取其与认证授权计费 AAA服务器的共享密钥， 根据 所述共享密钥派生出密钥 SEND-RK, 并根据密钥 SEND-RK派生出用于安 全邻居发现的共享密钥；
AAA服务器根据其与移动台的共享密钥派生出密钥 SEND-RK, 并将密钥 S END-RK发送给所述网络设备， 所述网络设备根据密钥 SEND-RK派生出移 动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥； 或者
AAA服务器根据其与移动台的共享密钥派生出密钥 SEND-RK， 根据密钥 S END-RK派生出移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 并将移动台用于安全邻 居发现的密钥发送给所述网络设备；
或者所述网络设备和移动台分别通过 EAP过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发 现的密钥包括：
移动台通过 EAP过程获取其与 AAA服务器的共享密钥， 根据所述共享密钥 派生出密钥 SEND-EK;
AAA服务器根据其与移动台的共享密钥派生出密钥 SEND-RK, 并将密钥 S END-RK发送给所述网络设备， 所述网络设备根据密钥 SEND-RK派生出密 钥 SEND-EK; 或者 AAA服务器根据其与移动台的共享密钥派生出密钥 SEN D-EK, 并将密钥 SEND-EK发送给所述网络设备；
所述网络设备和移动台之间协商移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 协商过 程通过密钥 SEND-EK加密。
[5] 5、 如权利要求 4所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述网络设备和移动台之间协 商移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥包括：
移动台确定没有与其地址冲突的邻居吋， 将其用于安全邻居发现的密钥传 输至接入路由器； 或者
所述网络设备产生移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 并且将不会导致地址 冲突的移动台用于安全邻居发现的共享密钥分发至相应的移动台。
[6] 6、 如权利要求 3所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述方法还包括： 所述网络设 备根据 EAP过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥信息后， 检测该密钥 信息中用于产生地址的密钥是否与其他移动台的用于产生地址的密钥重复 ， 在检测到密钥重复后， 通知所述移动台， 接收到通知的移动台更新其用 于产生地址的密钥。
[7] 7、 如权利要求 1至 6中任一项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述网络设备根据 邻居发现结果代理回复邻居广播消息包括： 网络设备利用其自身的密钥设 置邻居广播消息； 且所述移动台对其接收的邻居广播消息进行消息验证包括： 移动台利用所述网络设备的密钥进行邻居广播消息验证， 或者移动台利用 所述网络设备的密钥和邻居广播消息中与其他移动台相关的参数进行邻居 广播消息验证。
[8] 8、 如权利要求 7所述的方法， 其特征在于：
移动台根据所述网络设备传输来的指示信息获知所述网络设备安全代理回 复邻居广播消息；
所述移动台利用所述网络设备的密钥进行邻居广播消息验证， 或者移动台 利用所述网络设备的密钥和邻居广播消息中与所述其他移动台相关的参数 进行邻居广播消息验证。
[9] 9、 如权利要求 1至 6中任一项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述网络设备根据 邻居发现结果代理回复邻居广播消息包括： 所述网络设备获取所述其他移 动台对应的密钥， 并利用所述其他移动台的密钥设置邻居广播消息中与所 述其他移动台相关的参数；
且所述移动台对其接收的邻居广播消息进行消息验证包括： 移动台从邻居广播消息中获取其他移动台的密钥信息， 并根据所述其他移 动台的密钥信息进行邻居广播消息验证； 或者
接收到邻居广播消息的移动台利用其自身的密钥、 或者利用所述自身的密 钥和邻居广播消息中与所述其他移动台相关的参数进行邻居广播消息验证
[10] 10、 一种网络设备， 位于网络侧， 其特征在于， 所述网络设备包括：
消息验证模块一： 用于对移动台发送给网络设备的邻居请求消息进行消息 验证， 在消息验证通过吋， 输出通知；
邻居发现模块： 用于在接收到消息验证模块一的通知吋， 根据移动台发送 给网络设备的邻居请求消息进行邻居发现处理；
代理模块： 用于根据邻居发现模块的邻居发现处理的结果代理回复邻居广 播消息。
[11] 11、 如权利要求 10所述的网络设备， 其特征在于， 所述消息验证模块一包 括：
获取密钥子模块一： 用于根据 EAP过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密 钥， 或者通过与移动台的协商过程获取移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥， 并输出所述获取的密钥；
验证子模块一： 用于根据接收到的移动台用于安全邻居发现的密钥对所述 邻居请求消息进行验证， 在消息验证通过后， 通知邻居发现模块， 邻居发 现模块在接收到消息验证模块一的通知后进行邻居发现处理。
[12] 12、 如权利要求 10所述的网络设备， 其特征在于：
代理模块向移动台发送安全代理回复的指示信息， 代理模块根据邻居发现 模块的邻居发现结果以及其所在网络设备的密钥构造代理回复的邻居广播 消息， 并发送给移动台； 或者
代理模块根据邻居发现模块的邻居发现结果利用其他移动台的用于安全邻 居发现的密钥构造代理回复的邻居广播消息， 并发送给移动台。
[13] 13、 一种移动台， 其特征在于， 所述移动台包括：
代理权限模块： 用于确定移动台信任的网络侧网络设备， 并存储移动台信 任的网络侧网络设备的信息；
发送模块： 用于根据代理权限模块存储的信息向移动台信任的网络设备发 送邻居请求消息；
消息验证模块二： 用于对网络设备代理回复给移动台的邻居广播消息进行 消息验证， 并在验证成功后， 输出通知；
获取模块： 在接收到消息验证模块二的通知后， 从移动台接收到的邻居广 播消息中获取邻居发现结果信息。
[14] 14、 如权利要求 13所述的移动台， 其特征在于， 发送模块获取移动台用于 安全邻居发现的密钥， 根据该密钥构造邻居请求消息， 并根据代理权限模 块存储的信息向移动台信任的网络设备发送所述邻居请求消息。
[15] 15、 如权利要求 13所述的移动台， 其特征在于， 所述消息验证模块二包括 获取密钥子模块二： 用于在接收到网络设备传输来的安全代理回复的指示 信息情况下， 获取网络设备的密钥， 并输出网络设备的密钥；
或者获取密钥子模块二： 用于获取其他移动台的密钥， 并输出获取的密钥 验证子模块二： 用于根据接收到的密钥对网络设备代理回复的邻居广播消 息进行验证； 或者用于根据其接收到的密钥和邻居广播消息中与其他移动 台相关的参数对所述邻居广播消息进行验证。
PCT/CN2008/070306 2007-02-14 2008-02-14 Procédé de découverte sécurisée des voisins, dispositif de réseau et station mobile WO2008098520A1 (fr)

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