WO2008019970A1 - Method and apparatus for handover to a wlan connection involving a trigger for mobility at packet data gateway (pdg) - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for handover to a wlan connection involving a trigger for mobility at packet data gateway (pdg) Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2008019970A1 WO2008019970A1 PCT/EP2007/058152 EP2007058152W WO2008019970A1 WO 2008019970 A1 WO2008019970 A1 WO 2008019970A1 EP 2007058152 W EP2007058152 W EP 2007058152W WO 2008019970 A1 WO2008019970 A1 WO 2008019970A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- mip
- pdg
- packet data
- data gateway
- ike
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
- H04W8/08—Mobility data transfer
- H04W8/14—Mobility data transfer between corresponding nodes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
- H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
- H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
- H04W36/0019—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection adapted for mobile IP [MIP]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/164—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the network layer
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections
- H04W76/22—Manipulation of transport tunnels
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
- H04W80/04—Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
- H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/18—Service support devices; Network management devices
- H04W88/182—Network node acting on behalf of an other network entity, e.g. proxy
Definitions
- the invention concerns a method for handover of a cellular mobile network connection.
- 3GPP has developed specifications to integrate WLAN access networks into their global mobile network infrastructure (Interworked WLAN / I-WLAN) [1] , [2] , [3] , [7] . Till now this covers only scenarios up to 3, excluding service continuity and seamless service (across mobility events) .
- the defined architecture is depicted in Fig. 1 for the non-roaming case of WLAN 3GPP IP Access.
- the interworking consists in an IPSec/ESP tunnel (thick dashed line) between the UE (User Equipment) and the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) for the user plane (see [5]).
- the corresponding signaling is done between UE and PDG (thick dotted line) and contains an IKEv2 exchange [4] . This cares for the untrusted nature of the WLAN access network.
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- SAE System Architecture Evolution
- eRAN Evolved Radio Access Network
- AGW Access Gateway
- HA Home Agent
- the triggers for MIP registrations are then exclusively with the UE, and they are separate from the tunnel setup procedures.
- the resulting tunnel setup is shown in fig. 3a.
- the other alternative is a modified proxy MIP, on which we concentrate here.
- the resulting tunnel configuration is shown in Fig. 3b.
- triggers for proxy MIP registrations are needed at PDG.
- the successful setup of an IPSec tunnel could be used as a trigger for proxy MIP registrations, but without further information about the mobility state this would not be a unique criterion. It is therefore proposed to overload the IKE protocol messages within the IPSec tunnel setup with mobility related information. It is an object of the invention to improve handover handling in mobile networks. The object is achieved by the invention respectively defined in the patent claims.
- Figure 1 shows: a reference architecture for 3GPP' s
- Figure 2 shows: a SAE Architecture Integrating I-WLANs via IPSec and MIP,
- Figure 3 shows: a Tunnel Configuration for (a) MIP in IPSec and (b) MIP chained to an IPSec Tunnel
- Figure 4 shows: an IPSec tunnel establishment (message flow ace. to section 6.1.5.1 in [1] with modified message 1 and additional action
- the technical solution modifies the parameters in the message flow for IPSec tunnel establishment according to section 6.1.5.1 of [7], as shown in the Fig. 4.
- the solution can comprise using the private range of e.g. values 240-255 for the parameter "Exchange Type" in the IKE header. If the value was 34 (for setting "IKE_SA_INIT", see [4]) in the original behaviour, it could be defined e.g. to the value 240. The meaning is then still "IKE_SA_INIT” (creation of an IPSec tunnel) , but also that after successful completion a proxy MIP registration shall be done towards the HA.
- the IP address can be extracted from the IP packet containing the IKEv2 message.
- a private payload type within IKEv2 can be defined.
- the Proxy MIP registration response can use the analogous prescription and may be mapped to the "IKE_SA_AUTH" with response bit set and with a private value of "Exchange Type" in the header (e.g. 241 instead of 35) .
- the meaning is then still "IKE_SA_AUTH” (authentication response of an IPSec tunnel) , but it indicates also that the Proxy-MIP registration has been done before.
- private payload types within IKEv2 can be defined to transport mobility/Proxy-MIP related information to the UE (as response from HA via PDG) .
- MIP tunnel maintenance can be made directly dependent on the existence of the IPSec tunnel: as long as it exists, the
- Proxy MIP functionality in PDG should refresh MIP bindings.
- MIP deregistration can occur in two forms: 1. if another IPSec tunnel e.g. to another PDG is created with the same mobility indications (UE requests MIP registration via the above described special "IKE_SA_INIT” message) , or 2. the UE comes back "home” (moves into LTE/SAE access); in this case the AGW may delete the cache entry based on information from the LTE/SAE internal mobility handling.
- the additional MIP tunnel inside the IPSec tunnel can be avoided; instead, IPSec and MIP tunnels are chained one after the other.
- tunnel overhead is saved between UE and PDG, which includes the critical radio interface leg.
- the extra MIP signaling from the client (UE) is saved - the IPSec tunnel has to be established anyway.
- ⁇ within UE o support of two private parameters in IKEv2 header o support of one private IKEv2 payload type, based on mobility events (corresponding to a MIP de/registration) .
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention concerns a method for handover of a WLAN connection or a cellular mobile network connection between a Home Agent (HA) and a mobile station (UE) to a WLAN connection between a Home Agent (HA) and the mobile station (UE), wherein an IPSec Tunnel (Fig. 3b: IPSec) between the mobile station (UE) and a Packet Data Gateway (PDG) is serially connected to a Mobile Internet Protocol tunnel (Fig. 3b: MIP) between the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) and the Home Agent (Fig. 3b: HA).
Description
METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR HANDOVER TO A WLAN CONNECTION INVOLVING A TRIGGER FOR MOBILITY AT PACKET DATA GATEWAY (PDG)
The invention concerns a method for handover of a cellular mobile network connection.
3GPP has developed specifications to integrate WLAN access networks into their global mobile network infrastructure (Interworked WLAN / I-WLAN) [1] , [2] , [3] , [7] . Till now this covers only scenarios up to 3, excluding service continuity and seamless service (across mobility events) . The defined architecture is depicted in Fig. 1 for the non-roaming case of WLAN 3GPP IP Access.
The interworking consists in an IPSec/ESP tunnel (thick dashed line) between the UE (User Equipment) and the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) for the user plane (see [5]). The corresponding signaling is done between UE and PDG (thick dotted line) and contains an IKEv2 exchange [4] . This cares for the untrusted nature of the WLAN access network.
With 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE, of RAN) and System Architecture Evolution (SAE) the target is to enable also seamless handovers to non-3GPP access networks, in particular to I-WLANs. The situation is sketched in Fig. 2 for two I- WLANs connected to two different PDGs. The possible mobility events (1 to 3) are listed. The LTE/SAE consists of the Evolved Radio Access Network (eRAN) and the Access Gateway (AGW, which may be split further into more entities) , and it has its own mobility scheme. For integration of the I-WLANs Mobile IP (MIP) is envisaged, where the AGW acts as a Home Agent (HA) . This could be fully client based (in this case the UE performs the MIP signaling and packet encapsulation
within the IPSec tunnel) . The triggers for MIP registrations are then exclusively with the UE, and they are separate from the tunnel setup procedures. The resulting tunnel setup is shown in fig. 3a.
The other alternative is a modified proxy MIP, on which we concentrate here. The resulting tunnel configuration is shown in Fig. 3b. In this case triggers for proxy MIP registrations are needed at PDG. The successful setup of an IPSec tunnel could be used as a trigger for proxy MIP registrations, but without further information about the mobility state this would not be a unique criterion. It is therefore proposed to overload the IKE protocol messages within the IPSec tunnel setup with mobility related information. It is an object of the invention to improve handover handling in mobile networks. The object is achieved by the invention respectively defined in the patent claims.
Further details and advantages of the invention are set forth in the following description, wherein in the enclosed drawing : Figure 1 shows: a reference architecture for 3GPP' s
I-WLAN(non roaming case)
Figure 2 shows: a SAE Architecture Integrating I-WLANs via IPSec and MIP,
Figure 3 shows: a Tunnel Configuration for (a) MIP in IPSec and (b) MIP chained to an IPSec Tunnel, Figure 4 shows: an IPSec tunnel establishment (message flow ace. to section 6.1.5.1 in [1] with modified message 1 and additional action
The technical solution modifies the parameters in the message flow for IPSec tunnel establishment according to section 6.1.5.1 of [7], as shown in the Fig. 4.
The solution can comprise using the private range of e.g. values 240-255 for the parameter "Exchange Type" in the IKE header. If the value was 34 (for setting "IKE_SA_INIT", see [4]) in the original behaviour, it could be defined e.g. to the value 240. The meaning is then still "IKE_SA_INIT" (creation of an IPSec tunnel) , but also that after successful completion a proxy MIP registration shall be done towards the HA. The IP address can be extracted from the IP packet containing the IKEv2 message. To communicate further mobility/MIP related information to the PDG (to be used for the subsequent Proxy-MIP message) , a private payload type within IKEv2 can be defined.
The Proxy MIP registration response can use the analogous prescription and may be mapped to the "IKE_SA_AUTH" with response bit set and with a private value of "Exchange Type" in the header (e.g. 241 instead of 35) . The meaning is then still "IKE_SA_AUTH" (authentication response of an IPSec tunnel) , but it indicates also that the Proxy-MIP registration has been done before. Again, private payload types within IKEv2 can be defined to transport mobility/Proxy-MIP related information to the UE (as response from HA via PDG) .
MIP tunnel maintenance can be made directly dependent on the existence of the IPSec tunnel: as long as it exists, the
Proxy MIP functionality in PDG should refresh MIP bindings.
MIP deregistration can occur in two forms:
1. if another IPSec tunnel e.g. to another PDG is created with the same mobility indications (UE requests MIP registration via the above described special "IKE_SA_INIT" message) , or 2. the UE comes back "home" (moves into LTE/SAE access); in this case the AGW may delete the cache entry based on information from the LTE/SAE internal mobility handling.
Advantages and Implications:
The additional MIP tunnel inside the IPSec tunnel can be avoided; instead, IPSec and MIP tunnels are chained one after the other. Thus, tunnel overhead is saved between UE and PDG, which includes the critical radio interface leg. Also the extra MIP signaling from the client (UE) is saved - the IPSec tunnel has to be established anyway.
The security complications, normally present with MIP, are avoided, as IPSec security features can be reused for MIP.
The necessary changes are
■ within UE: o support of two private parameters in IKEv2 header o support of one private IKEv2 payload type, based on mobility events (corresponding to a MIP de/registration) .
■ within PDG: o support of two private parameters in IKEv2 header o support of one private IKEv2 payload type o mapping of special "IKE_SA_INIT" message onto Proxy-MIP registration and mapping of Proxy-MIP
registration response onto "IKE_SA_AUTH" response message maintaining the MIP binding by registration refreshes, as long as the IPSec tunnel is established
Abbreviations
AGW Access Gateway eRAN Evolved Radio Access Network
ESP Encapsulated Security Payload
HA Home Agent
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange Version 2
IPSec IP Security (defined in [6])
I-WLAN Interworked WLAN (of 3GPP)
LTE Long Term Evolution (of RAN)
MIP Mobile IP
PDG Packet Data Gateway
(e)RAN (Evolved) Radio Access Network
SAE System Architecture Evolution
UE User Equipment
IPSec A Secure Internet Protocol
References
[1] 3GPP TS 33.234 V6.5.1 (2005-06), 3G Security;
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking Security [2] 3GPP TS 23.234 V6.5.0 (2005-06), 3GPP System to
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; System description [3] 3GPP TS 29.234 V6.3.0 (2005-06), 3GPP system to
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; Stage 3 [4] C. Kaufman (ed.), Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-
17.txt, September 2004 (Note: meanwhile this protocol is already specified in the form of an RFC: C. Kaufmann (ed.), "Internet Key Exchange Protocol IKEv2", RFC
4306, December 2005)
[5] S. Kent, R. Atkinson, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 2406, November 1998
[6] S. Kent, R. Atkinson, Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol, RFC 2401, November 1998 [7] 3GPP TR 22.934 V6.2.0 (2003-09), Feasibility study on 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking
Claims
1. Method for handover of a WLAN connection or a cellular mobile network connection between a Home Agent (HA) and a mobile station (UE) to a WLAN connection between a Home Agent (HA) and the mobile station (UE) , wherein an IPSec Tunnel (Fig. 3b: IPSec) between the mobile station (UE) and a Packet Data Gateway (PDG) is serially connected to a Mobile Internet Protocol tunnel (Fig. 3b: MIP) between the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) and the Home Agent (HA) .
2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that a range, especially a private range, of values for the parameter "Exchange Type" in an IKE header is used to induce creation of an IPSec tunnel ("IKE_SA_INIT") .
3. Method according to claim 2, characterized in that successful completion of creation of an IPSec tunnel triggers a proxy MIP registration towards the Home Agent (HA) .
4. Method according to claim 2 or 3, characterized in that the private range is a range of values 240-255 for the parameter "Exchange Type" in the IKE header.
5. Method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that the IP address of the Home Agent (HA) and/or a mobile station (UE) is extracted from an IP packet containing a "IKEv2" message.
6. Method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that to communicate Mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) options to the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) , a private payload type within "IKEv2" is used.
7. Method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that the MIP registration response uses the same prescription as the "Exchange Type" in the IKE header and it is mapped to the "IKE_SA_AUTH" with a response bit set .
8. Method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that Mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) tunnel maintenance is made directly dependent on the existence of the IPSec tunnel.
9. Method according claim 8, characterized in that as long as the IPSec tunnel exists, the proxy Mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) functionality in the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) refreshes MIP bindings.
10. Method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that a Mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) deregistration is carried out
-if another IPSec tunnel to another PDG is created with the same mobility indications, the UE requesting MIP registration via the special "IKE_SA_INIT" message,
-or if the UE moves back into its cellular mobile network (LTE/SAE access) .
11. Method according to claim 10, characterized in that in this case the access gateway (AGW) deletes the cache entry based on information from the LTE/SAE internal mobility handling.
12. Method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that to communicate further Mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) options to the Packet Data Gateway (PDG), a private payload type within the IKEv2 parameter is defined.
13. Mobile network for carrying out a method according to any of the preceding claims.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP20060017303 EP1890455A1 (en) | 2006-08-18 | 2006-08-18 | Method and apparatus for handover to a WLAN connection involving a trigger for mobility at Packet Data Gateway (PDG) |
| EP06017303.6 | 2006-08-18 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2008019970A1 true WO2008019970A1 (en) | 2008-02-21 |
Family
ID=37685619
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/EP2007/058152 Ceased WO2008019970A1 (en) | 2006-08-18 | 2007-08-06 | Method and apparatus for handover to a wlan connection involving a trigger for mobility at packet data gateway (pdg) |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP1890455A1 (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2008019970A1 (en) |
Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2010067351A2 (en) | 2008-12-11 | 2010-06-17 | Eci Telecom Ltd. | Technique for providing secured tunnels in a public network for telecommunication subscribers |
| CN102480782A (en) * | 2010-11-25 | 2012-05-30 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Gateway relocation method and source shunt gateway |
| CN102546154A (en) * | 2011-12-19 | 2012-07-04 | 上海顶竹通讯技术有限公司 | Mobile communication network and switching method of terminal |
| US20130104207A1 (en) * | 2010-06-01 | 2013-04-25 | Nokia Siemens Networks Oy | Method of Connecting a Mobile Station to a Communcations Network |
| CN103609154A (en) * | 2012-06-08 | 2014-02-26 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method, apparatus and system for WLAN access authentication |
| US8749866B2 (en) | 2011-12-15 | 2014-06-10 | Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation | Plasmonic modulator incorporating a solid-state phase change material |
-
2006
- 2006-08-18 EP EP20060017303 patent/EP1890455A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2007
- 2007-08-06 WO PCT/EP2007/058152 patent/WO2008019970A1/en not_active Ceased
Non-Patent Citations (3)
| Title |
|---|
| "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security (3GPP TS 33.234 version 6.8.0 Release 6)", ETSI STANDARDS, EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTITUTE, SOPHIA-ANTIPO, FR, vol. 3-SA3, no. V680, March 2006 (2006-03-01), pages 1 - 87, XP014033965, ISSN: 0000-0001 * |
| 3GPP SA WG1: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Feasibility study on 3GPP system to Wireles Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking (3GPP TR 22.934 version 6.2.0 Release 6)", ETSI STANDARDS, EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTITUTE, SOPHIA-ANTIPO, FR, vol. 3-SA1, no. V620, September 2003 (2003-09-01), pages 1 - 32, XP014015699, ISSN: 0000-0001 * |
| 3GPP SA WG2: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3GPP System Architecture Evolution: Report on Technical Options and Conclusions (Release 7) Version 1.2.3.", 3GPP STANDARDS, June 2006 (2006-06-01), pages 1 - 127, XP002418664, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG2_Arch/TSGS2_53_Lisbon/Docs/S2-062271.zip> [retrieved on 20070206] * |
Cited By (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2010067351A2 (en) | 2008-12-11 | 2010-06-17 | Eci Telecom Ltd. | Technique for providing secured tunnels in a public network for telecommunication subscribers |
| US20130104207A1 (en) * | 2010-06-01 | 2013-04-25 | Nokia Siemens Networks Oy | Method of Connecting a Mobile Station to a Communcations Network |
| CN102480782A (en) * | 2010-11-25 | 2012-05-30 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Gateway relocation method and source shunt gateway |
| US8749866B2 (en) | 2011-12-15 | 2014-06-10 | Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation | Plasmonic modulator incorporating a solid-state phase change material |
| CN102546154A (en) * | 2011-12-19 | 2012-07-04 | 上海顶竹通讯技术有限公司 | Mobile communication network and switching method of terminal |
| CN103609154A (en) * | 2012-06-08 | 2014-02-26 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method, apparatus and system for WLAN access authentication |
| CN103609154B (en) * | 2012-06-08 | 2017-08-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | A kind of WLAN access authentication method, equipment and system |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| EP1890455A1 (en) | 2008-02-20 |
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