WO2007072796A1

WO2007072796A1 - Card capable of performing authentication by radio-active material chip

Info

Publication number: WO2007072796A1
Application number: PCT/JP2006/325227
Authority: WO
Inventors: Nobuaki Komatsu; Shin-Ichiro Nanjo
Original assignee: International Frontier Technology Laboratory, Inc.
Priority date: 2005-12-19
Filing date: 2006-12-19
Publication date: 2007-06-28
Also published as: JPWO2007072796A1; TW200734968A

Abstract

Authentication of a card is performed. A radio-active substance is mixed in a card and arrangement of the mixed radio-active substance is detected indirectly by detecting a scintillator or directly by a radiation detection element, thereby performing authentication of the card. Authentication of the card is performed upon entry of the card or after entry of the card by reading information in the authentication chip arranged on the card. Read may be performed in a planar form but read in linear form reduces the processing load. The read line shape may be an arbitrary straight line or a curved line by modifying the read position correlated with movement of the card when the card is inputted. When the card inputted into a terminal device is judged to be an appropriate one such as a forged one, the card is ejected or the inputted inside and an alarm is issued.

Description

Specification

A card that can be identified by a radioactive substance chip

Technical field

[0001] The invention according to this application relates to a structure of an object that requires forgery and authentication immediately, such as a card, a banknote, and a securities, and a method for determining the authenticity of the object. Background art

[0002] There are a large number of cards in circulation today called the card society, and cards related to the property of the bank's cash card, credit card's credit card etc., prepaid card and driver's license, which are securities, health Security cards, passports and other forms of identification are used.

[0003] Many of cards relating to property and cards, which are securities, write necessary information on magnetic stripes provided on the front or back side, and use an automatic machine such as ATM (Automatic Teller's Machine) or a manual reader. It reads magnetic stripe force magnetic information and executes various processes.

[0004] FIG. 1 shows an example of the current cash card processing flow.

(1) When the card holder inserts a cash card into the card insertion slot of a terminal such as ATM, a sensor at the card entrance detects that and takes the card into the apparatus.

(2) When the card is taken in, the terminal reads the magnetic recording unit power card information of the card. In the case of a cash card, it reads card information such as bank code, branch code, account type and account number. In the case of a credit card, a card identification number, an expiration date, an account type, and an account number are recorded as card information in the magnetic recording unit. In addition, personal identification numbers may be recorded on cash cards or credit cards. In such cases, personal identification numbers are also read.

(3) The terminal device determines whether the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal device.

(4) If no information indicating that the card can be handled is confirmed from the read card information, or if the card is a legitimate card, the card information may be damaged or corrupted. If the information can not be read, the terminal device ejects the card as an incorrect card that can not be handled.

(5) If the card is legitimate and the information in the magnetic recording unit is read correctly, communication with the host computer is started.

(6) The host computer requests input of the password.

(7) In response to a request from the host computer, the card user enters a personal identification number

(8) When the card user inputs a PIN in response to a request from the host computer, the host computer reads the input PIN stored in the host computer. Compare with the corresponding PIN.

(9) If the force is not matched, the fact is recorded in the magnetic recording section of the card, and the user is again required to input the security number, and the password entered is valid again. When you do the procedure after that, if you do not agree, in the same way ask for the input of the password again, and if the total number of incorrect password input is 3 times, the card is invalidated and taken into the terminal device Perform ineffective disposal etc.

(10) If they match, the host computer determines that the card user is the correct card holder, and requests input of the withdrawal amount.

(11) The user inputs a withdrawal request amount.

(12) If the withdrawal request amount is appropriate, the amount is withdrawn, the cash card is discharged from the terminal device, the entry into the passbook or the issuance of the statement of account is performed, and the transaction is terminated. .

Note that if the password is recorded on the cash card, the transaction is performed as if the password is correct, but then the password is erased from the magnetic recording unit.

[0016] FIG. 2 (a) shows an example of a cash card used in the current cash card processing flow shown in FIG. In this figure, reference numeral 1 denotes a cash card body which is also plastic, and on the front side thereof, a magnetic stripe 2 in which information is recorded and an arrow 3 indicating the insertion direction of the cache card are formed. Although illustration is omitted, the required items are posted as embossed letters. [0017] The information written on the magnetic stripe can be easily read using a device called a skimmer, so counterfeit cards are created, which often results in the use of counterfeit cards.

As a countermeasure, an IC card with a built-in semiconductor memory has been used, and banks are trying to spread as a substitute for a magnetic card.

Even with this IC card, it is possible to read the information stored in the memory, and it is absolutely safe if there is a forgery that takes time and effort. Can not. Furthermore, IC cards are very expensive compared to magnetic cards, and rapid spread can not be expected.

[0020] In the case of a bank's cash card, it can be used only in one country, but in the case of a credit card, it needs to be usable in foreign countries, and all of the used in the world. It is virtually impossible to replace a credit card that is a magnetic card with an IC card that conforms to the standard.

Further, since the cash card and the credit card are provided with information such as the name of the holder by embossing, and such information is also used for the magnetic information, the embossed information is forged. It has become a key to card creation.

If the magnetic card or IC card is lost or stolen, the owner is likely to be aware of the fact, but if he or she comes back after the theft, he or she does not particularly notice the theft. In the case, damage caused by the use of counterfeit cards is likely to occur!

[0023] A security code consisting of four digits has been used as a means for determining the propriety of a card user, which is not a means of preventing unauthorized use by preventing card forgery. This secret code is often based on analogical numbers and has caused a lot of damage so far. Recently, not only analogical reasoning but also stealing of PINs by means such as voyeurism has been carried out, and unauthorized use prevention by PINs has become extremely difficult.

In order to prevent damage due to counterfeit cards, biometrics (biometrics) technology using pattern recognition technology is adopted in part. Representative examples of biometric identification techniques include iris discrimination, fingerprint discrimination, palm print discrimination, finger vein discrimination, palm vein discrimination and hand-back vein discrimination, and there are contact type and non-contact type in discrimination other than this inner iris discrimination. But all patterns in advance Because it takes time and effort to register patterns, and it takes time to make decisions, the operation cost increases.

In the case of the contact type, there is a problem of hygienic or physiological aversion because it is necessary to directly touch the detection device. Also, if the discrimination part is injured, or in the worst case, the discrimination part is lost and otherwise it is impossible to discriminate the living body. In addition, in the discrimination process, only partial discrimination is performed.

[0026] In addition, biometric identification systems that can not use cardholders themselves can not be used even if they try to ask an agent to handle the card because the time to use the card or the card processing device is not familiar. This point is also inconvenient for the user.

[0027] As a means of preventing forgery, embossed holograms in which irregularities are formed on plastic are attached to credit cards, prepaid cards, bills, securities and the like. Because this Enboss hologram is so difficult to duplicate, it is virtually impossible to forge cards with embossed holograms, but in the current usage it is not It is possible to forge a card or the like using a similar embossed hologram because it is read at a glance.

[0028] Fig. 2 (b) shows an example of a credit card with a hologram on which card authentication of authenticity is performed by a sensory function. In the figure, 1 is a credit card main body made of plastic or the like, and on the front side thereof, an arrow 3 indicating the insertion direction of a magnetic stripe 2 and a cash card in which information is recorded is formed. Although illustration is omitted, the required items are described as embossed letters.

The cash card 1 is inserted into the terminal device with the portion marked with the arrow 3 first, but an authentication verifying chip 4 composed of, for example, an embossed hologram is attached near its tip. There is.

In the case of a credit card, unlike a cash card, the magnetic stripe has the same insertion direction to the terminal device of the power card provided on the back of the card, and as a result, the magnetic information of the credit card is read. The direction is opposite to that of a cash card.

The authentication verifying chip 4 has a pattern “A” exemplified by the operator who inserts the card into the terminal device, which is visually or sensibly confirmed by the function and read by the card terminal device. There is nothing to do.

[0032] Sensory authentication is considered to be a major factor for primary screening due to variations in the ability of the individual making the determination, and variations due to the determination environment, mental state, physical condition, etc., even for the same individual. Effective but less reliable.

[0033] The authentication of authentication by auxiliary equipment may be performed by using a magnifying tool such as a fine line, a special drawing, a micro character, a special shape screen, a loupe or the like, or using a special filter that generates optical interference. To authenticate the authenticity.

Specifically, materials exhibiting special optical properties such as a light-emitting substrate, a light-emitting laminate film, a light-emitting ink, a thermochromic ink, a photochromic ink, etc. are mixed into the substrate 'laminate film' ink etc. There are some that use auxiliary tools such as UV lamps, but these are also unreliable because the final discrimination relies on human sensuality.

The authentication by mechanical processing is performed by mechanically detecting the characteristics of the material to perform authentication, and detection targets include detection of magnetic and optical characteristics.

Specifically, a light emitting material, a magnetic material, and the like are mixed in a substrate 'laminate film' ink, etc., and a detection device is used, and specific information coded by an OCR character or magnetic bar code is magnetically detected. Alternatively, there is one that is optically applied and uses a magnetic / optical detection device.

[0037] As an authentication technology by machine processing, an artifact-metric system (artifact-metric system) using an artifact, which is randomly placed in a medium instead of information unique to living body, Business and Artifacts Meritas, "Bank of Japan Financial Research Institute (http: 〃丽 .imes.bo j.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdl) and the 6th Information Security · Symposium It is shown in the "pattern of artifact meritatus in the financial field" (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kiny u / 2004 / kk23-2-6.pdl)!

[0038] In the artifact metric, light reflection patterns of particles, transmitted light patterns of optical fibers, parallax image patterns of optical fibers, image patterns of optical fibers, magnetic patterns of magnetic fibers, randomly recorded magnetic patterns, Random magnetic patterns of magnetic stripes, random charge patterns of memory cells, resonant patterns of conductive fibers, resonant patterns of vibrating seals, etc.

[0039] Matters subject to fraudulent use or forgery of the card include when the card is issued to the user "Card description information" given to the "card body information given in the manufacturing process of the card"

There is ". (Refer to "Linkage IC card ticket side forgery prevention technology note book" Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (http: 〃 w ww. Npo. Go. Jp / en / info / lcnb. Pdl))

The card entry information is information which is given to the card body at the time of issuance of the card, and corresponds to information on issue such as holder information, expiration date and the like.

Tampering, which is a typical form of unauthorized use, is the act of rewriting all or part of the card-listed information, and is performed by deleting the legitimate information and adding up the illegal information.

The card body information is information which the card itself has by removing the card description information from the issued card, and the physical shape of the card, mainly the background pattern given in the pre-printing step, the printing of the background Information associated with the card substrate, such as layers and protective laminate layers.

Forgery is an illicit act performed on the card body, and is performed by copying or imitating a pattern, a pattern, etc., which is information attached to the card body, to produce a card having an appearance similar to that of the card body. Specifically, the pattern, pattern, etc. given to the genuine card note is read by a scanner, etc., processed, corrected, etc., and carried out using a printer, etc.

[0044] There are many counterfeit-proof techniques for the card body, even in the case of printing technology, depending on the combination of printing method, ink, and print pattern, there is no definitive one yet.

[0045] The authentication method for discriminating forgery can be roughly divided into a sensory test, an auxiliary tool, and a mechanical processing.

[0046] Authentication of authenticity by sensuality is to discriminate authenticity with human sensuality such as visual sense and tactile sense, and for visual sense, the color, the watermark of the main body, the pattern or the color imparted by changing the viewing angle There are holograms etc. that change etc., and the ones by touch include detection of given concave / convex shape, detection of texture of card body etc. Specifically, logo marks, special fonts, anticopying lines, special color inks, holograms, optically variable materials, latent image patterns, etc., reproduction, etc. • It is difficult to copy, and it is possible to perform authentication with ease visually. There are products that perform authentication authentication such as finger touching and visual inspection such as embossing, embossing, and perforation.

[0047] FIG. 3 shows a conventional example of a card having an artificial material metric-chip attached with metal particles disclosed in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 10-44650. In this figure, (a) is an overall view, b) Is a sectional view, and (c) is an enlarged view of the authentication verifying chip. This card 1 is a thin plate-like artificial metricus' chip, which is a light transmitting resin in which metal particles 5 are mixed on a card base 7 which is light impermeable, in which an opening 8 for an authentication verifying chip is formed. An opaque card surface plate 6 is formed by laminating the magnetic layer 4 and forming an opening at the same position as the opening formed in the card base 7 and forming the magnetic stripe 2 and the arrow 3 thereon.

[0048] Since the metal particles 5 are three-dimensionally mixed in the light transmitting resin without any regularity, the arrangement pattern of the metal particles 5 observed via the opening is artifact metrics 'Tip 4 is unique to each. Using this, the arrangement pattern of metal particles 5 is observed by photographing the light passing through the artifact metric 'chip 4 through the opening, and the individual artifact metrics' chip 4, ie, the card, is identified. Do.

[0049] FIG. 4 shows another conventional example of a card having a fiber-based artifact metric 'chip disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2003-29636. In this figure, (a) is a general view, (b) is a cross-sectional view, and (c) is an enlarged view of an artifact metrics' chip.

[0050] In this card, there is an artifact-metrics chip 8 in which the mesh member 9 and the short small fibers 10 are three-dimensionally mixed in the transparent resin in the opening of the card base 1 which is light impermeable. The magnetic stripe 2 and the arrow 3 are formed on the surface of the card base 1 inserted. An interference pattern is generated in the artifact metric chip 8 due to the pattern of the mesh member 9 and the short and small fibers 10.

[0051] This interference pattern is unique to the artifact metrics * chip 8, ie, each card, and this is used to transmit the identification pattern of the artifact metric chip '8 of the authentication verifying chip. Alternatively, take a picture with reflected light to identify the card.

[0052] Machine reading of patterns such as psychometrics or artifact metrics is generally read by an imaging device and determined by pattern recognition technology. Therefore, there is a possibility of forgery by copying technology.

Although Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 63-214651 discloses an invention for discriminating the authenticity of a card by radioactive isotopes, the radioactive isotopes used are isotopes that emit highly penetrating radiation called gamma rays. It is dangerous for the body to be contained in something that is carried close to the human body, such as a card. As described above, the technology for authenticating the authenticity of the card itself has not been established, and it can not be forged! The / ヽ card is realized! An ugly wolf.

In addition, technology that makes it impossible to use counterfeit cards has also been realized.

Patent Document 1: Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 10-44650

Patent Document 2: Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2003-29636

Patent Document 3: Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 63-214651

Non Patent Literature 1: "Financial Services and Artifacts", Bank of Japan, Research Institute for Finance (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdl)

Non-Patent Document 2: "The Sixth Information Security 'Symposium: Patterns of Artifacts in the Financial Field" (http: //www•imes.boi.or.jp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23- 2 — 6. pdf) Non-Patent Document 3: “Handling Technology for Preventing Counterfeit of IC Card Cards”, Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (http:

//www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb.pdi)

Disclosure of the invention

Problem that invention tries to solve

[0055] The metal powder shown in JP-A-10-44650 and the short and small fibers shown in JP-A-2003-29636 are both visible and read at two different inclined angles to obtain a three-dimensional arrangement. It is possible to read, and the pattern of the authentication verification chip is copied, and the possibility of being forged can not be denied.

Further, in order to detect a three-dimensional configuration pattern, detection from one direction is not possible, and at least two different directional forces must also be detected. Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2003-29636 does not show a specific configuration for the force shown to read at an inclined angle. Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 10-44650 does not disclose reading at an inclined angle.

Furthermore, since the patterns of the authentication verifying chip of the invention described in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 10-44650 and the inventions described in the invention described in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2003-29636 are all different individually, As it becomes more patterns to compare, it becomes extremely difficult to authenticate a large number of cards.

[0058] In view of these circumstances, in the present application, a card that has a non-copyable pattern is used. The first task is to provide an authentication chip.

[0059] Moreover, in the present application, it is a second object to provide a method for producing an authentication verifying chip having a non-copyable pattern.

[0060] Moreover, in the present application, it is a third object to provide means for reading an uncopyable pattern.

[0061] Furthermore, in the present application, it is a fourth object to provide a response method when an authentication verifying chip having an inappropriate pattern is detected.

Means to solve the problem

[0062] In order to solve the first problem, the present application provides an authentication verifying chip in which radioactive material particles emitting a small amount of radiation are mixed in a resin.

Some radioactive substance particles emit an a-line, which is a helium nucleus, some emit high-speed electrons that emit β-rays, and some emit short-wave electromagnetic waves that emit γ-rays. To provide a structure of an authentication chip that can handle these radiation safely

[0064] As natural radioactive isotopes to be used for a radiation source, 232Τ h, 235U and 238U as alpha ray radioactive isotopes, and 40K and 210Pb as j8 ray radioactive isotopes. In addition, 241Am and 244Cm as artificial α-ray radioactive isotopes, 60Co, 90Sr and 137Cs as j8-ray radioactive isotopes, and 22Na, 51C r, 54Mn as γ-ray radioactive isotopes as artificial radioisotopes. 57Co, 60Co, 133Ba, 241Am power.

In order to solve the second problem, the present application provides a method of manufacturing a card attached with an authentication verifying chip mixed with radioactive substance particles.

[0066] In order to solve the third problem, the present application provides an apparatus for detecting the arrangement pattern of radioactive substance particles.

[0067] One of the radiation detection devices converts radiation into light by a scintillation detector, and indirectly detects the scintillation light by detecting the scintillation light with a light detector.

As a scintillator used in the scintillation detector, an inorganic scintillator which is a crystal such as Nal (Tl), Csl (Tl), Bi4Ge 3012 or the like, and a plastic scintillator obtained by mixing an inorganic scintillator with plastic are used. [0069] As a light detection device used for scintillation light detection, photodiodes such as PN junction type · PIN junction type Schottky barrier type · avalanche type, and bipolar type · field effect type phototransistors can be used. is there.

As a scintillation detector (scintillator), planar, linear or dot-like ones can be used, and detection of scintillation light by the planar scintillator is performed by an imaging device such as a television or an imaging device such as a television. The detection of scintillation light by the linear scintillator is performed by the light detection device in which the light detection elements are arrayed in a plane shape. The scintillation light by the point scintillator is formed by the light detection element array in which the light detection elements are arrayed linearly. In the detection of light, the scintillation light, that is, the arrangement of radioactive substance particles is detected by a spot-like light detection element.

[0071] The other one of the radiation detection devices directly detects the radiation by the semiconductor radiation detection device. As the semiconductor radiation detection element, photodiodes such as PN junction type, PIN junction type 'Schottky barrier type, avalanche type, etc., and bipolar type / field effect type phototransistors can be used.

The semiconductor radiation detection apparatus is formed of a planar arrangement, a linear arrangement, or a single unit of small-sized semiconductor radiation detection elements, and the semiconductor radiation detection elements arranged in a plane, and the semiconductor radiation detection elements arranged in a linear arrangement. Alternatively, the radiation state of the radiation, that is, the arrangement of radioactive substance particles is detected by the semiconductor radiation detection element alone.

[0073] In order to solve the fourth problem, in the present application, when a card identification information medium having an inappropriate identification pattern is detected, the corresponding method for ejecting the card and refusing the use or the same Provide a method to take the card into the reader and make it unusable.

Effect of the invention

[0074] The radioactive substance particles can not be identified visually, the radiation detection requires some means of radiation detection, and furthermore, it is difficult to obtain the radioactive substance itself, so copying can be performed. It is also extremely difficult to forge.

[0075] If unauthorized use is attempted, use can be denied to prevent damage or allow unauthorized card use to some extent and finally secure the unauthorized card. This makes it easier to identify unauthorized users. Prevention of fraudulent card use or easy identification of fraudulent card users deters fraudulent use. Brief description of the drawings

[Figure 1] Current cash card processing flow diagram.

[FIG. 2] An explanatory view of a conventional cash card.

[Fig. 3] An example of a conventional card using artifact metric.

[Fig. 4] Another example of a conventional card using artifact metric.

圆 5) Example 1 of the card attached with the authentication verifying chip of the present invention.

圆 6) Example 2 of the card attached with the authentication verifying chip of the present invention.

圆 7] Example 3 of the card attached with the authentication verifying chip of the present invention.

圆 8) Example 4 of the card attached with the authentication verifying chip of the present invention.

圆 9) Example of authentication chip mounting position.

[10] An example of the authentication verifying chip mounting position of the present invention.

[Figure 11] An example of an authentication chip that is created based on random numbers.

[Fig. 12] Example of random numbers used for authentication chip.

[Fig. 13] An example of the arrangement of random numbers used for the authentication chip.

[Fig. 14] An example in which the random number used for the authentication chip is binary.

[Fig. 15] An example of arranging random numbers to be used for an authentication chip as binary numbers.

[Fig. 16] Example of obtaining another authenticity verification chip from the authenticity verification chip created based on random numbers

[FIG. 17] A reader by an imaging device.

[Fig. 18] A reader using a scintillator and a light detection element matrix.

[Fig. 19] Reader using a radiation detection element matrix.

[Fig. 20] A reader using a scintillator and a photo detector array.

[21] A reader using a radiation detection element array.

圆 22] Configuration example of reading element array.

[Figure 23] Reader with parabolic mirror and polygon mirror.

[Fig. 24] A reader using a scintillator and a light detection element. 圆 25] Reader with radiation detection element.

[Figure 26] Reading path by multiple reading elements.

[27] A reader using a plurality of scintillators and light detection elements.

[Figure 28] A reader that uses multiple radiation detection elements.

[Fig. 29] Reading path example.

[Fig. 30] The reading path of the authentication chip based on random numbers.

[Fig. 31] Reading by feature point extraction of an authentication verifying chip based on random numbers.

[Figure 32] Analog reading of authentication chip based on random number.

[Fig. 33] Description of alignment marks.

[FIG. 34] A method of producing the authentication card of FIG.

圆 35] A method of manufacturing the authentication card of FIG.

圆 36] A method of manufacturing the authentication card of FIG.

圆 37] A method of manufacturing the authentication card of FIG.

FIG. 38 is a flowchart of cash card processing of the present invention.

[FIG. 39] Another cash card processing flow diagram of the present invention.

FIG. 40 is a flowchart of still another cash card processing of the present invention.

Explanation of sign

1, 20, 41, 26, 30 cards

2 Magnetic stripe

3 arrow

4, 8, 23, 32, 42, 46 Makoto authentication chip

5 Metal particles

6, 24, 27, 33, 45 face plate

7, 21, 44 substrates

9 Mesh member

10 short fiber

43 radioactive substance particles

47 IC chip 48 Alignment mark

49 Movement direction reading start line

50 Movement direction reading end line

51, 52 end indication line

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

Hereinafter, the best mode for carrying out the invention according to the present application will be described.

First, an embodiment of the card will be described.

[Card Embodiment 1]

FIG. 5 shows a first embodiment of the card. In this figure, (a) is a view of the card when viewed from above, (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the cross-sectional view. In these figures, reference numeral 41 denotes a card body having a magnetic stripe 2, and an authentication verifying chip 42 and a face plate 45 are stacked on a substrate 44. It is also possible to stack another surface plate on the authentication verifying chip 42 and the surface plate 45.

The card substrate 44 is a synthetic resin thin plate used for cash cards and the like, which is conventionally used frequently, and a synthetic resin thin plate used for a prepaid card and the like. The face plate 45 is made of a synthetic resin, and an opening is formed in the central portion for inserting the authentication verifying chip 42. The material of the face plate 45 may be either a radiolucent material or a radiation shielding material. A radiation transmitting material is used for the surface plate laminated on the authentication verifying chip 42 and the surface plate 45 made of synthetic resin.

The authentication verifying chip 42 has an area and a thickness to fit in the opening of the face plate 45, and the radioactive substance particles 43 are mixed therein. The radioactive substance particles include natural radioactive substance particles such as α-ray emitting substances such as 232Th, 235U and 238U, and j8 ray emitting substances such as 40K and 210Pb, and artificial radioactive substance particles such as 241Am and 244Cm etc. Line-emitting substance force 60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, etc. j8-line emitting substance power 22Na, 51Cr, 54Mn, 57Co, 60Co, 133Ba, 241 Am, etc. γ-ray emitting substances can be used.

[0081] Given the radiation exposure problem, it is desirable to avoid the use of γ-ray radiation because shielding with long reach is difficult. In addition, if particles of non-radioactive substances, which are isotopes of radioactive substances, are also mixed, the mixing state of radioactive substance particles is not limited by radiation detection means, It can not be confirmed. In addition, the synthetic resin in which radioactive substance particles are mixed is preferably a material that does not change by radiation.

[Card Embodiment 2]

FIG. 6 shows a second embodiment of the card.

In this figure, (a) is a top view of the card, (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the cross-sectional view. In these figures, reference numeral 20 denotes a card body having a magnetic stripe 2. An authentication verifying chip 23 is stacked on a substrate 21, and a surface plate 24 is further stacked on the authentication verifying chip 23.

The substrate 21 is a synthetic resin thin plate of a thick plate used conventionally for a cash card or the like, or a thin plate synthetic resin thin plate used for a prepaid card or the like, which has been widely used conventionally. The surface plate 24 is preferably a synthetic resin highly transparent to radiation, and further preferably opaque to visible light. By making it opaque to visible light, it is not possible to know the contamination state of radioactive substance particles by visual observation.

The authentication verifying chip 23 is made of a synthetic resin, and radioactive particles 22 are mixed in the synthetic resin.

[Card Embodiment 3]

FIG. 7 shows a third embodiment of the card.

In this figure, (a) is a top view of the card, (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the cross-sectional view. In these figures, the reference numeral 26 denotes a card body having a magnetic stripe 2, an authentication verifying chip 23 is stacked on a substrate 21, and a surface plate 27 is further stacked on the authentication verifying chip 23.

Since the substrate 21 and the authentication verifying chip 23 are different from the card shown in FIG. 5, the description will be omitted so as not to be complicated. An opening 28 is formed at the center of the surface plate 27 made of synthetic resin, and a lid plate 29 is fitted in the opening 28. The face plate 27 is preferably made of a material which is not transparent to radiation, that is, a radiation shielding material, and it is desirable that the screen be opaque to visible light. The lid plate 29 is a material highly transparent to radiation, and preferably opaque to visible light. The use of such openings and lids reduces the problem of radiation exposure. [Card Embodiment 4]

FIG. 8 shows a fourth embodiment of the card.

In this figure, (a) is a top view of the card, (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the cross-sectional view. In these figures, the reference numeral 30 denotes a card body having the magnetic stripe 2. The authentication verifying chip 32 is stacked on the substrate 21 and the surface plate 33 is further stacked on the authentication verifying chip 32.

The substrate 21 is a synthetic resin thick plate used for a cash card or the like, or a synthetic resin thin plate used for a prepaid card or the like, which has been widely used conventionally. The face plate 33 has an opening 34 formed at its central portion, similar to the face plate 27 of the card shown in FIG. The material of the surface plate 33 may be either a radiolucent material or a radiation shielding material.

The authentication verifying chip 32 is provided with a convex portion 31 formed to have a thickness fitted to the opening 34 of the face plate 33, and radioactive substance particles 22 are mixed only in the convex portion 31. The materials used in the authentication verifying chip 32 are not different from the cards described so far, so the explanation will be omitted so as not to be complicated.

It is also possible to uniformly mix the radioactive substance particles 22 into the whole of the authentication chip 32 instead of mixing only with the convex portions 31. In that case, it is desirable that the surface plate 33 be a radiation shielding material to reduce radiation exposure! / 被.

[Card Embodiment 5]

The authentication chip shown in Figs. 5 to 8 is an artifact metritus composed of radioactive substance particles mixed in a synthetic resin. Artifacts can not be copied, but they can not be controlled during production.

Next, as a fifth embodiment of the card, an authentication verifying chip in which copying is difficult while being able to control a pattern at the time of manufacturing will be described with reference to FIG. 11 to FIG.

FIG. 11 shows a pattern example of an authentication verifying chip. In this authentication chip, 1,024 binary data are arranged in a 32 × 32 matrix. In other words, this authentication chip has a 1024-bit authentication key. In this figure, the "*" part is binary data "1", and the blank part is binary data "0". In addition, binary data “1” The radioactive substance is disposed in the part, and the radioactive substance is disposed in the part of “0”. /. In addition, you may arrange | position nonradioactive substances, such as an isotope of a radioactive substance, in the part of "0".

A method of obtaining this binary data will be described. Figure 12 shows an example of a true 256-digit hexadecimal real number obtained by detecting radiation emitted by nuclear decay of radioactive material, and the random numbers used for encryption keys etc. are usually It is supplied as such a hexadecimal number.

FIG. 13 shows an arrangement of the hexadecimal random numbers shown in FIG. 12 in a matrix of 8 columns and 32 rows. This hexadecimal number can be expressed by replacing it with a 4-digit binary number. That is, hexadecimal "0" is binary "0000", "1" is "0001", "2" is "0010", "3" is "001 1", "4". Is “0100”, “5” is “0101”, “6” is “0110”, “7” is “0111”, “8” is “1000”, “9” is “1001” , “A” is “1010”, “B” is “1011”, “C” is “1100”, “D” is “1101”, “E” is “1110”, “F” Are respectively represented by "1111".

Based on this, what is obtained by replacing the 256-digit hexadecimal random number shown in FIG. 12 with a binary random number is as shown in FIG. A single-digit hexadecimal number is replaced by a 4-digit binary number, so a 256-digit hexadecimal number is 256 digits x 4 digits = 1024 digits binary number. Since these binary numbers are obtained directly by the random number generator, this replacement operation is not necessary in that case.

This is arranged in a matrix of 8 columns and 32 rows shown in FIG. 13, and further arranged in a matrix of 32 columns and 32 rows for each binary digit unit is shown in FIG.

Finally, the portion corresponding to binary 0 in the matrix in FIG. 15 is left as it is without writing data, and “*” corresponding to 1 is displayed! By placing the radioactive substance by any means, the authentication chip shown in Figure 12 can be obtained. The authentication chip thus formed has 32 columns × 32 rows × 1 bit = 1024 bits of authentication data, ie, a 1024-bit authentication authentication key.

FIG. 16 illustrates a method of obtaining one random number sequence power and a plurality of authentication verifying chips. In this figure, (a), (b), (c) and (d) are respectively obtained by obtaining a 16 × 16 matrix pattern based on the 32 × 32 matrix pattern shown in FIG. ) Uses coordinates (0, 0) as the origin, (a) as coordinates (0, 0) as the origin, (b) as coordinates (1, 0) as the origin, and (c) as coordinates (0, 1) ) Is the origin, and (d) is the origin of coordinates (1, 1). Thus, one matrix pattern force obtained from the random number sequence shown in FIG. 12 can also obtain a plurality of matrix patterns.

One random number sequence force In order to obtain a plurality of matrix patterns, in addition, the use start position of the random number sequence shown in FIG. 12 is changed, or the creation of the matrix pattern shown in FIG. 13 is changed. Various methods are available.

By doing this, it becomes possible for the card issuer to keep one random number sequence in secret as a master random number sequence, and to obtain a plurality of matrix patterns based on the master random number sequence. Also, multiple matrix patterns can be automatically managed by origin information.

[Authentication authentication chip mounting position example 1]

FIG. 9 shows Example 1 of the authentication verifying chip mounting position. In addition to the positions other than the approximate center of the card main body shown in FIG. 5 and others, the mounting position of the authentication verifying chip 46 is the middle top position shown in FIG. 9A and the middle position shown in FIG. The middle stage rear position shown in (c), the lower head position shown in (d), the lower center position shown in (e), and the lower rear position shown in (f) are possible. Although the upper position is also possible, it is desirable to avoid placing it at the upper position if there is a possibility that the magnetic stripe force may also affect the information reading.

[Authentication authentication chip mounting position example 2]

The use of IC chips as information storage media has also been promoted in order to strengthen card security, and in some ways, to enhance convenience. The IC chip has a semiconductor memory inside, and the semiconductor memory may be rewritten when it is irradiated with radiation, particularly a line which is an electron beam.

Among the radiation, since the alpha ray can be shielded even with a single sheet of paper, the influence on the semiconductor memory needs to be hardly considered. However, for shielding of the | 8 wire, an aluminum plate of 1 mm thickness or an acrylic plate of 10 mm thickness is required. Therefore, when radioactive particles emitting the j8 line are used, as shown in FIGS. 10 (a), (c), (d) and (f), the authentication chip 46 and the IC chip 47 are used. By placing at a distance of 10 mm or more, the influence of beta rays can be avoided.

[Authentication authentication chip reader] An embodiment of an authentication verifying chip reader will be described.

In order to read an authentication chip on which radioactive substance particles are placed, the arrangement pattern of radioactive substance particles is detected by radiation detection. For detection of radiation, a method of indirectly detecting radiation by converting radiation into light by a scintillator and detecting scintillation light by a light detection device, and a method of directly detecting radiation by a semiconductor radiation detection device There is.

[0106] For the scintillator, a material that is a scintillator that emits visible light by radiation such as Nal (Tl), Csl (Tl), Bi4Ge3012, or the like, or a plastic in which the scintillator is dispersed in a synthetic resin It is common to use a scintillator. Besides this, there is also a liquid scintillator in which the scintillator is dispersed in the liquid.

[0107] In addition, as a light detection device that detects scintillation light emitted when the scintillator is irradiated with radiation, PN junction type, PIN junction type, Schottky barrier type, avalanche type photo diode, bipolar type, etc. Field effect phototransistors can be used

A semiconductor radiation detection element can be used as a radiation detection means for directly detecting radiation. Semiconductor elements that detect radiation include PN junction type photodiodes, PIN junction type photodiodes, Schottky barrier type photodiodes, photodiodes such as avalanche type and other bipolar type phototransistors, and field effect type phototransistors.

The semiconductor radiation detection apparatus for detecting radiation directly comprises small semiconductor radiation detection elements arranged in a plane, arranged in a line, or a single unit, and configured in this manner. A semiconductor radiation detection device detects the radiation emission condition, that is, the arrangement of radioactive material particles.

The reading method includes a method of reading an authentication verifying chip as a surface as it is, a method of reading a surface as a collection of lines, and a method of reading a surface as a collection of points.

FIG. 17 to FIG. 19 show a reader that reads an authentication verifying chip as a surface.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 1]

In FIG. 17, (a) shows a schematic configuration of a detection unit of the card identification reader, and (b) shows a card and a surface. The corresponding relationship with the plastic 'scintillator' is shown.

The card shown in this figure is a card having an authentication verifying chip shown in FIG. 5, and the card having an authentication verifying chip shown in the other figures may be, needless to say,. In this figure, 41 is a card body, 44 is a substrate, 45 is a card top plate, 42 is an authentication verifying chip, and 43 is a radioactive substance particle. Reference numeral 301 denotes a sheet-like plastic scintillator of a size that covers the authentication verifying chip 42, and reference numeral 300 denotes an imaging device.

When the card 41 is taken into the reader and stopped, the authentication verifying chip 42 is positioned below the planar plastic scintillator 301. In this state, the scintillator in the planar plastic 'scintillator 301 emits scintillation light by the radiation emitted from the radioactive substance particles 43 disposed in the authentication verifying chip 42.

The scintillation light is photographed by the imaging device 300, and the authenticity verification information of the authenticity verification chip 42 is obtained from the photographed image. Since the pattern of the obtained information depends on the arrangement of the radioactive substance particles 43, the information of the authentication verifying chip 42 can be read by this information pattern. The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the radioactive substance particles 42 in the authentication verifying chip 42 depends on the resolution of the imaging device 300.

If the radiation to be detected is alpha radiation, the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the plastic 'scintillator 301 needs to be as narrow as possible because the reach distance is short. The force to be detected is beta radiation Since the reach distance is relatively long, the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the plastic 'scintillator 301 may not be narrow.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 2]

FIG. 18 shows a second embodiment of the card reader. In this figure, (a) shows a schematic configuration of a detection unit of the reader, and (b) shows a correspondence between a card and a planar radiation detector.

Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted. Reference numeral 301 denotes a planar plastic 'scintillator having a size that covers the authentication verifying chip 42, and 302 denotes a light detection matrix incorporating a plurality of light detection elements 303 arranged in a matrix in the same size as the authentication verifying chip 42. It is. The light detection element 303 also includes a photodiode, a phototransistor, a CCD, and a CMOS. Photodetector matrix is there.

When the card 41 is taken into the reader and stopped, the authentication verifying chip 42 is located under the plastic 'scintillator 301. In such a state, the scintillator in the sheet-like plastic 'scintillator 301 emits scintillation light by radiation emitted from radioactive substance particles 43 disposed in the authentication verifying chip 42.

The scintillation light is detected by the light detection element 303 constituting the light detection element matrix 302, and the location of the radioactive substance 43 is extracted as an electric signal. Since the pattern of the obtained electric signal depends on the arrangement of the radioactive substance particles 43, the information of the authentication verifying chip 43 is read by the pattern of the electric signal. The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the radioactive substance particles 43 in the authentication verifying chip 42 depends on the resolution of the light detection element matrix 303 arranged in a plane.

[0120] When the radiation to be detected is alpha radiation, the distance to reach is short, so the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the plastic 'scintillator 301 needs to be as narrow as possible. The force to be detected is beta radiation Since the reach distance is relatively long, the distance between the authentication verifying chip 302 and the plastic 'scintillator 301 may not be narrow.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 3]

FIG. 19 shows a third embodiment of the reader for directly detecting the arrangement state of radioactive substance particles in a plane. In this figure, (a) shows a schematic configuration of a detection unit of the card identification reader, and (b) shows a correspondence between the card and the planar radiation detector.

Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted. Reference numeral 304 denotes a radiation detection element matrix in which the semiconductor radiation detection elements 305 are arranged in a plane so as to cover the authentication verifying chip 42.

When the card 41 is taken into the reading device and stopped, the authentication verifying chip 42 is positioned below the planar semiconductor radiation detecting element matrix 304. In such a state, the radiation detection element 305 constituting the radiation detection element matrix 304 disposed in a plane detects radiation emitted from the radioactive substance particles 43 disposed in the authentication verifying chip 42, and the presence of the radiation is detected. The position is taken out as an electrical signal. Since the pattern of the obtained electric signal depends on the arrangement of the radioactive substance particles 43, the information of the authentication verifying chip 42 is read by this pattern. To be taken. The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the radioactive substance particles 43 in the authentication verifying chip 42 depends on the resolution of the radiation detection element matrix 304 arranged in a plane.

If the radiation to be detected is alpha rays, the distance between them is short, so the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the planar radiation detection element matrix 304 needs to be as narrow as possible. In the case of beta rays, the distance between them is relatively long, so the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the planar radiation detection element matrix 304 may not be narrow.

FIGS. 20 to 23 illustrate a reader for reading a surface as a set of lines.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 4]

FIG. 20 shows a fourth embodiment of the reading card identification device. In this figure, (a) shows a schematic configuration of a detection unit of the card identification reader, and (b) shows a correspondence between the card and a linear plastic 'scintillator.

Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted. In this figure, 306 is a linear plastic 'scintillator having a length slightly longer than the movement direction width of the authentication verifying chip 42, and 307 is a plurality of light detections arranged in an array in the same traveling direction width as the authentication verifying chip 42. It is a light detection array incorporating the element 303. The light detection element 303 is formed of a photodiode, a phototransistor, a CCD, a CMOS or the like.

Unlike the reader shown in FIG. 17 to FIG. 19, in this reader, the card 41 is taken into the reader, and after being stopped, the authentication chip 42 is taken in during the taking-in operation to be taken into the reader. The arrangement of radioactive material particles 43 is read.

The card 41 passes under the linear plastic scintillator 306 while moving as it is taken into the card reader. At this time, the linear plastic scintillator 306 emits scintillation light by the radiation emitted from the radioactive substance particles 43 disposed in the authentication verifying chip 42.

The scintillation light is detected by the linearly arranged light detection element array 303, and an electrical signal generated as the authentication chip moves is continuously transmitted in an analog manner for each of the light detection elements. Alternatively, each individual light detection element is digitally discontinuously scanned, or scanned in a light detection array like a facsimile or scanner into a single image, and the authentication verification chip is generated. Read the information in

Since the pattern of the obtained information depends on the arrangement of the radioactive substance particles 43, the information of the authentication verifying chip 42 can be read by this information. The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the radioactive substance particles 22 in the authentication verifying chip 36 depends on the resolution of the light detection element array.

[0131] When the radiation to be detected is alpha radiation, the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the linear plastic 'scintillator 306 needs to be as small as possible because the reach distance is short. In this case, since the reach distance is relatively long, the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the linear plastic 'scintillator 306 may not be narrow.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 5]

FIG. 21 shows a fifth embodiment of the reader for linearly detecting the arrangement of radioactive substance particles linearly. In this figure, (a) shows a schematic configuration of a detection unit of the reader, and (b) shows a correspondence between a card and a linear radiation detector.

Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted. In this figure, reference numeral 308 denotes a radiation detection element having a length slightly longer than the movement direction width of the authentication verifying chip 42, in which a plurality of radiation detection elements 305 are arranged in an array.

Similar to the reader shown in FIG. 20, in the reader of this embodiment, the card 41 receives the radioactive substance particles 43 in the authentication verifying chip 42 during the loading operation to be loaded into the reader. . When the card 41 is taken into the reader, it passes under the radiation detection element analyzer 308.

At this time, the radiation detection elements 305 arranged in an array detect the radiation emitted from the radioactive substance particles 43 arranged in the authentication verifying chip 42, and the electric signal generated along with the movement of the authentication verifying chip 42 is Each of the individual radiation detection elements may be continuously scanned in an analog fashion, or may be digitally discontinuous for each individual radiation detection element, or scanned like a facsimile or scanner into a single image, as shown in FIG. Read the information of authentication chip 42.

Since the pattern of the obtained information depends on the arrangement of the radioactive substance particles 43, the information of the authentication verifying chip 42 can be read by this information. Radioactive material in the Makoto authentication chip 42 The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the granular material 43 depends on the resolution of the radiation detection element array 308.

When the radiation to be detected is alpha radiation, the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the semiconductor radiation detection element array 308 needs to be as small as possible because the reach distance is short. In this case, since the reach distance is relatively long, the distance between the authentication verifying chip 42 and the semiconductor radiation detecting element array 308 may not be narrow.

FIG. 22 shows an arrangement example of the light detection elements used in the reader of FIG. 20 and FIG. Representative examples of the light detection element array include those used for facsimile and those used for image scanners. The facsimile apparatus optically reads a moving monochrome original at a density of 8 Z mm (corresponding to 200 dpi) or 16 Z mm (corresponding to 400 dpi) by an optical reading array fixed to the apparatus. The image scanner device optically reads a color original fixed on the device at a density of 600 dpi (corresponding to 24 Zmm) or 4800 dpi (corresponding to 192 Zmm) by a moving optical reading array.

FIG. 22 (a) shows an example of a light detection element array in which 32 light detection elements are provided. In the light detection element array, 32 light detection elements “DOO” to “D31” are provided in one row on a base. As shown in (b) as the arrangement, it is possible to arrange the light detection elements in a staggered arrangement. By selecting the light detection elements arranged in this light detection array, an arbitrary reading path can be set in addition to the reading path described later.

[Reading Apparatus Embodiment 6]

A detection device with a novel configuration will be described with reference to FIG.

A light scanning means used by reflecting a laser beam by a rotating polygonal columnar mirror (polygon mirror) is used in a laser beam printer or the like. This scanning means can perform light scanning only by polygon mirror rotational movement.

[0141] As a means of obtaining parallel beams, paraboloids are used in reflection telescopes and parabola antennas. Figure 23 (a) shows the relationship between the paraboloid and parallel rays. In this figure, X is the X axis, Y is the Y axis orthogonal to the X axis, and O is the origin. P is a parabola expressed as Y = -X2. This parabola has focal point F at the position of Χ = 0, Υ =-1 Ζ 4 If a straight line parallel to the Y-axis is folded back at a parabola P, it all focuses on the focal point F. Conversely, a straight line starting from the focal point F is parallel to the Y axis when it is folded back at the parabola P.

FIG. 23 (b) shows the basic configuration of a reader to which this principle is applied.

In this figure, reference numeral 120 denotes a reflector having a paraboloid, which is formed in a semi-cylindrical shape having a length in the direction perpendicular to the paper surface. Further, a light passing hole 121 for passing light is formed at a position corresponding to the origin of FIG. 23 (a). Furthermore, a polygon mirror (polygon mirror) having a polygonal reflecting surface, having a rotation axis parallel to the extension direction axis of the semicylindrical parabolic reflector 120 at the focal point of the semicylindrical parabolic reflector 120 (polygon mirror) 122 are arranged. Reference numeral 124 is a plastic 'scintillator.

The light indicated by the solid line emitted parallel to the Y-axis in FIG. 23 (a) from the plastic 'scintillator 124 is reflected by the semi-cylindrical parabolic reflector 120 and enters the polygon mirror 122 disposed at the focal point. Do. The light incident on the polygon mirror is reflected and passes through the light passage hole 121 to be incident on the light receiving element 123. On the other hand, light emitted in a direction different from the Y axis indicated by a broken line does not enter the polygon mirror even if it is reflected by the semicylindrical parabolic reflector 120.

Among the light emitted from the plastic 'scintillator 124, only light parallel to the Y axis is incident on the polygon mirror 122 so that this explanatory power can be understood, so that the incident light is incident on the light receiving element by rotating the polygon mirror. You can select the light to know the light emission status of the plastic 'scintillator 124.

The reading device shown in FIG. 23 (b) can not read the light emitted from the plastic scintillating part of the portion that strikes the back side of the polygon mirror 122 when viewed from the light receiving element 123! Although necessary information may not be written to this portion or unnecessary information may be written, according to the configuration shown in FIGS. 23 (c) and 23 (d), the portion on the back side of the polygon mirror 122 It is lost and all written information can be read.

[0146] FIG. 24 (c) shows the basic configuration for that, which uses half of a semi-cylindrical parabolic reflector. In this figure, reference numeral 125 denotes a reflecting mirror having a paraboloid, which is formed in a semi-cylindrical shape having a length in the direction perpendicular to the paper surface only by the portion where X is negative in FIG. . In this case, the light passage hole 121 formed in FIG. 24 (b) is not formed because it is unnecessary. Furthermore, a semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic surface at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic reflector 125 A polygon mirror (polygon mirror) 122 having a rotation axis parallel to the extension direction axis of the reflecting mirror 125 and having a polygon reflecting surface is disposed. Note that 126 is a plastic 'scintillator.

The light emitted parallel to the Y-axis in FIG. 23 (a) from the plastic 'scintillator 124 is reflected by the semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic reflector 125 and is incident on the polygon mirror 122 disposed at the focal point. The light incident on the polygon mirror is reflected to be incident on the light receiving element 123.

In this reading device, the portion of the plastic scintillator 126 that strikes the back side of the polygon mirror 122 from the light receiving element 123 is only the end, so it can not be read, and the influence of the portion is small.

Further, as shown in FIG. 24 (d), by adopting an offset configuration by reducing the central part of the semi-cylindrical partial paraboloid reflector 127, the polygon mirror 122 can not read the part completely. It is then possible to read the information written on all parts of the plastic 'scintillator 126.

[0150] Figure 24 to Figure 29 illustrate a reader that reads a face as a collection of points.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 7]

FIG. 24 shows a seventh embodiment of the reader. Unlike the planar reader shown in FIGS. 17 to 19 or the linear reader shown in FIGS. 20 to 23, the reader shown in FIG. 24 performs reading by a point reader.

In this figure, (a) is a schematic configuration of a relation between a card and a card identification reader, and (b) is an explanatory view of a card identification method. Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted. Also, 310 is a small-area plastic 'scintillator, 303 is a light detection element such as a photodiode, phototransistor, CCD, CMOS or the like, and 311 is a housing for housing the plastic scintillator 310 and the light detection element 303.

Unlike the case where the reader shown in FIGS. 17 to 23 is fixed, the reader shown in FIG. 24 is movable in the direction orthogonal to the card 41 taking-in direction. The movement of the card 4 in the direction orthogonal to the loading direction is simulated linear motion by rotational motion with one point as a rotation center, linear motion by conversion to rotational motion force linear motion, or linear motion An appropriate one such as linear motion by a motor or the like can be used.

(B) shows a typical example of the moving path of the card identification reader, but in this example, it moves in the direction shown by the arrow in (b) at a uniform speed, and as a result, it is combined with the moving direction It will move along the straight line path 312, and the information obtained will be points distributed on the straight line 312.

The radiation from the radioactive substance particles on the path 312 causes the plastic 'scintillator 310 to emit light, which is detected by the light detection element 303. Since the pattern of the detection signal obtained depends on the arrangement of radioactive substance particles, the individual authentication verifying chips 42 are read by comparing the electric signals.

The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of radioactive substance particles in the authentication verifying chip 42 depends on the size of the light detecting element 303. The card identification reader can be moved to any position in the direction orthogonal to the taking-in direction of the card 41 and fixed for use without necessarily moving. It is also possible to use the linear plastic 'scintillator 306 shown in FIG. 20 as the plastic' scintillator and to combine it with the light detecting element 303 shown in FIG.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 8]

FIG. 25 shows Embodiment 8 of the reader. In this figure, (a) is a schematic configuration of a relation between a card and a card identification reader, and (b) is an explanatory view of a card identification method. Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted. In this figure, reference numeral 313 denotes a housing, in which the radiation detection element 305 is disposed. The other descriptions are the same as in FIG.

Further, since the operation of this reading device is basically the same as the operation of the reading device shown in FIG. 24, further description will be omitted.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 9]

The reader shown in FIGS. 24 and 25 uses a single detection element. By using a plurality of detection elements, reading can be performed by a plurality of paths, and reading reliability can be improved. However, the information to be processed is linear information which is a set of points. , The burden of processing will not increase. [0159] FIG. 27 shows a ninth embodiment of the reader. In this figure, (a) is a schematic configuration of the relationship between the card and the card identification reader, (b) is an explanatory view of the card identification method, and (c) and (d) are output signals of the power identification reader power. It is an example. Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted.

This embodiment is similar to the configuration of the first card identification reader of the embodiment shown in FIG. 24, and comprises a plastic 'scintillator 316, a light detection element 315, and a housing 317 for containing them. And a second card identification reader.

The second card identification reader comprising the plastic 'scintillator 316, the light detection element 315 and the housing 317 shown in this figure is the same as the plastic' scintillator 310, the light detection element 303 and the housing 313. Move in the direction opposite to the direction of movement of the first card identification reader configured. The moving directions may be the same.

Although a representative example of the route is shown in (b), in this example, the first card identification reader and the second card identification reader move in the direction indicated by the arrows in (b) at uniform speed. , Travel along the path 312, 318 combined with the direction of movement of the card itself. The resulting identification information is distributed on straight line 312 and straight line 318.

[0163] Since the pattern of the obtained electrical signal depends on the arrangement of radioactive material particles, the authentication chip 42, ie, the card 41, is identified by comparing these electrical signals.

[Reading apparatus embodiment 10]

FIG. 28 shows an embodiment 10 of the reader. In this figure, (a) is a schematic configuration of the relationship between the card and the reader, and (b) is an explanatory view of a reading method. Since the card 41 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 17, the description of the card is omitted.

The reading apparatus of this embodiment is a semiconductor radiation detecting element in addition to the configuration of the first card identification reading apparatus including the radiation detecting element 305 and the housing 3 13 of the embodiment shown in FIG. It further comprises a second card identification reader consisting of 320 and a housing 319.

The operation of this reader is basically the same as the operation of the reader shown in FIG. 27, so further description is omitted.

[Reading Path] If there is a possibility that a reading error may occur due to a path error or a defect in the reading device, as shown at 314 in FIG. 26, reading is simultaneously performed by a plurality of reading devices, and the final read data is determined by the average value or majority decision. decide.

[Reading method 1]

FIG. 29 shows an example of the path of the reading device shown in FIG. Among these, (a), (b), (c) and (d) are an example in which there is one reading path, and (e), (f), (g), (h), reading path Here is an example in which there are two. Needless to say, it is possible to increase the number of routes to three or more.

In this figure, (a) and (e) are straight paths parallel to the loading direction of the force guide obtained by fixing the reading device. In addition, the position is arbitrary. (b) and (f) are curvilinear paths obtained by moving the reader at non-uniform speed. (C) and (d) are V-shaped paths obtained by a single reciprocating motion of the reader at uniform speed. (D) and (h) are W-shaped paths obtained by the reader performing two reciprocating movements at a uniform speed.

Examples of these paths are the forces realized by the reading device shown in FIGS. 24 to 28. Besides, the sensing element matrices shown in FIGS. 18 to 19 or the forces shown in FIGS. This can also be realized by switching the detection elements to the detection element array.

[Method 2 of Reading]

An example of applying this reading method to the authentication verifying chip pattern shown in FIG. 15 is shown in FIG. In FIG. 30, from the coordinates (0, 0) to (31, 31), the authentication data on the straight line detection route becomes 11000101001001101010101101111! In addition, the authentication data on the linear detection path toward the coordinates (0, 31) to (31, 0) is 111001 01010010000000110000010011!

[Method 3 for Reading]

In metrology, feature points of a pattern are extracted and determined. Application of this feature point extraction to the authentication verifying chip shown in FIG. 15 will be described with reference to FIG.

In FIG. 31, four or more consecutive “0s” are black and white inverted characters, and four or more consecutive “0s” are indicated by enclosed characters “/”. For example, "0000" has 13 starting with the coordinates (16, 1) · · '.

There are seven "00000" starting with the coordinates (15, 5) · · '.

There is one "000000" starting from the coordinates (13, 31).

There are three "0000000" starting from coordinates (24, 2).

"000000000000" 、, coordinates (6, 12) Force 1 start S There is one couple S.

"0000000000000000" 、, coordinates (7, 15) force start 1 couple S.

[0174] "1111" has 12 pieces starting from the coordinates (14, 4) · · ·.

There are eight "11111" starting with coordinates (0, 7) · · '.

There is one “111 111” which starts from the coordinates (19, 1).

There is one “1111111”, which also starts the coordinate (12, 19) force.

There are two "11111111" starting with the coordinates (17, 6) · · '.

There is one “1111111111” starting from the coordinates (14, 3).

The authenticity of the authentication chip can be determined by detecting each of these feature points and detecting their start position coordinates.

[0176] As the feature points to be extracted, in addition to the same data arranged in one horizontal row, the same data arranged in one vertical row, the same data arranged in a key type can be used, and furthermore, different ones such as "010101" It is also possible to use specific sequences by data.

[0177] [Reading method 4]

The authentication method described so far processes digitally-processed authentication authentication information digitally, but in FIG. 32, it is configured to analog-process authentication authentication information digitally recorded in FIG. Indicates

[0178] By scanning the authentication authentication pattern shown in (a) in this figure, for example, in the path shown in 312 and 318 using the reader shown in FIG. 27 or 28, (b) and (c) The electrical signal shown in) is obtained. By comparing these electric signal patterns with the stored normal electric signal patterns in an analog manner, the authenticity of the authentication verifying chip and the card can be determined.

[Authentication authentication chip reading position]

Physical standards for cash cards and credit cards are versatile and strict. As a matter of course, what is provided on top of that is of course the physical standard is strict. However, it can not be denied that severe use may cause deformation.

In order to prepare for such a case, it is desirable to form alignment marks 48 shown in FIG. 33 on the authentication verifying chip. Although the number of alignment marks may be one in the simplest way, a plurality of alignment marks may be provided for more accurate alignment.

[0181] In order to perform reading more reliably, some marks are also used on the reading start position and reading end position of the authentication verifying chip, for example, as shown in FIG. 10, movement direction reading start line 49 and movement direction. A reading end line 50, and further, end instruction lines 51 and 52 are provided.

[0182] Since reading of information on the card identifier is performed by relative movement of the card identifier and the reader, it is necessary to synchronize the movements of the card identifier and the reader to perform reliable reading. For this purpose, by forming a mark 87 for synchronization signal on the card identification body, it is possible to synchronize the movement of the reader with the reading on the mark.

[0183] The read start 'end line and mark for Z or synchronization signal can also be used for signal integrity in signal processing. These alignment marks, reading start and ending lines, and marks for Z or synchronization signals are all made of phosphors and can be formed by an appropriate printing means such as an ink jet printer.

Next, the manufacturing method will be described.

[Manufacturing Method Example 1]

FIG. 35 shows a method of manufacturing the card 41 shown in FIG.

This card manufacturing method is based on the following steps.

(1) Prepare a mold 321 having a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication verifying chip 42.

(2) The synthetic resin monomer mixed with radioactive substance particles 43 is injected into a mold 321.

(3) The injected monomer is cured by a means such as heating to form a polymer, to obtain an authentication verifying chip 42 in which radioactive substance particles 43 are mixed.

(4) Remove the authentication verifying chip 42 from the mold 321.

(5) The lower surface of the authentication verifying chip 42 is attached to the substrate 44, and the top plate 45 is attached to the upper surface to obtain a card 41. [Manufacturing Method Example 2]

FIG. 35 shows a method of manufacturing the card 21 shown in FIG.

This card manufacturing method is based on the following steps.

(1) Prepare a mold 322 having a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication verifying chip 23.

(2) The synthetic resin monomer mixed with radioactive substance particles 22 is injected into a mold 322.

(3) The injected monomers are cured by a means such as heating to form a polymer, to obtain an authentication verifying chip 23 in which radioactive substance particles 22 are mixed.

(4) Take out the authentication chip 23 from the mold 3220.

(5) The lower surface of the authentication verifying chip 23 is attached to the substrate 21 and the top plate 24 is attached to the upper surface to obtain a card 20.

[Manufacturing Method Example 3]

FIG. 36 shows a method of manufacturing the card 26 shown in FIG.

This card manufacturing method is based on the following steps.

(1) Prepare a mold 322 having an area and a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication verifying chip 23.

(2) The synthetic resin monomer mixed with radioactive substance particles 22 is injected into a mold 43.

(4) Take out the authentication chip 23 from the mold 43.

(5) The authentication verifying chip 23 is attached on the substrate 21 and the surface plate 27 having the opening 28 formed thereon is attached.

(6) Insert the lid plate 29 into the opening 23 to obtain the card 26.

[Manufacturing Method Example 4]

FIG. 37 shows a method of manufacturing the card 30 shown in FIG.

This card manufacturing method is based on the following steps.

(1) Prepare a die 323 having a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication verifying chip 32 and having a recess 42 corresponding to the protrusion 31 at the center.

(2) The synthetic resin monomer in which the radioactive substance particle 22 is mixed is injected into the recess 42, and the radioactive substance particle 22 is mixed in the other part of the mold 423, and the synthetic resin monomer is injected. (3) The injected monomer is cured by a method such as heating to form a polymer, and the authentication verifying chip 32 in which the radioactive substance particles 22 are mixed only in the convex portion is obtained.

(4) Remove the authentication verifying chip 32 from the mold 323.

(5) The lower surface of the authentication verifying chip 32 is attached to the substrate 21 and the surface plate 27 having the opening 28 formed on the upper surface is attached to obtain the card 30.

The authentication processing flow will be described.

[Processing flow example 1].

Example 1 of the authentication process flow will be described with reference to FIG.

(1) When the card user inserts a cache card into the card insertion slot of a terminal device such as ATM with the arrow part at the top, a sensor at the entrance of the card senses that and takes the card into the device.

(2) When loading a card, the terminal reads the magnetic recording unit power card information of the card.

(3) The terminal determines whether the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal.

(4) If no information indicating that the card can be handled is confirmed from the read card information, or even if the card is a legitimate card, if the card information can not be read due to damage or staining. In addition, the terminal device ejects the card as an improper card which can not be handled.

(5) The terminal device performs mechanical scanning using the movement of the card at the time of loading the card, or reads the authentication information of the authentication chip when the card is stopped.

(6) The terminal device determines whether the read-in authentication information is positive or not.

(7) When the terminal determines that the authentication information is not correct, it is determined that the inserted card is not legitimate, the card is discharged, and the processing is terminated.

(8) When the terminal device determines that the authentication information is legitimate, it requests the user to perform further input operation such as withdrawal amount.

(9) The user performs the input operation of the withdrawal amount and the like according to the request. (10) The host computer determines whether or not the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is appropriate.

(11) If the host computer determines that the contents of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount are not appropriate due to a lack of balance or the like, the card is discharged from the terminal device, and the processing is terminated.

(12) When the host computer determines that the contents of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount are appropriate, the host computer outputs it by withdrawal, discharges the card from the terminal device, and ends the processing.

[Process Flow Example 2]

Embodiment 2 of the authentication process flow will be described with reference to FIG.

In this authentication process flow example 2, in the authentication process flow example 1, when the authentication information is not correct, the card is ejected while the card identification information is not correct, the card is processed. Load the device and issue an alarm. This makes it easier to detect fraudulent cards.

(1) When the card user inserts a cache card into the card insertion slot of a terminal device such as ATM with the arrow part at the top, a sensor at the entrance of the card senses that and takes the card into the device. .

(6) The terminal device determines whether the read authentication information is positive or not.

(7) When the terminal device determines that the authentication information is not correct, the inserted card It determines that the card is not legitimate, stores the card in the terminal and issues an alarm.

[0208] If this alarm is issued only at a place where the terminal is far apart, and a failure is displayed on the terminal, securing of the card card card by unauthorized card is facilitated.

(9) The user performs an input operation such as a withdrawal amount according to the request.

(10) The host computer determines whether or not the content of the input operation such as the amount of withdrawal is appropriate.

(12) When the host computer determines that the contents of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount are appropriate, the host computer outputs it by withdrawal and the like, discharges the card from the terminal device, and ends the processing.

[Processing flow example 3]

A third embodiment of the authentication process flow will be described with reference to FIG.

In this authentication authentication process flow embodiment 3, in the authentication authentication process flow embodiment 2, when the authentication authentication information is not correct, the card is immediately taken into the terminal device and only an alarm is issued, and the operation is performed to the card user. Let

By doing this, it is possible to secure fraudulent cards.

(1) When the card user inserts a cache card into the card insertion slot of a terminal device such as ATM with the arrow portion at the top, a sensor at the entrance of the card senses that and takes the card into the device. .

(4) If the information indicating that the card can be handled is not confirmed from the read card information, or even if the card is a legitimate card, the card information due to damage or staining, etc. If the card can not be read, the terminal device ejects it as an incorrect card that the card can not handle.

(7) When the terminal device determines that the authentication information is not correct, the user is requested to perform further input operation such as withdrawal amount.

(8) The user performs an input operation such as withdrawal amount according to the request.

(9) The card is stored in the terminal device and an alarm is issued.

[0224] If this alarm is issued only at a place where the terminal is far apart and a failure is indicated on the terminal, it is easy to secure an irregular card user.

(10) When the terminal device determines that the authentication information is legitimate, it requests the user to perform further input operation such as withdrawal amount.

(11) The user performs an input operation such as withdrawal amount according to the request.

(12) The host computer determines whether or not the content of the input operation such as the amount of withdrawal is appropriate.

(14) If the host computer determines that the contents of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount are not appropriate due to a lack of balance, etc., the card is discharged from the terminal device, and the processing is terminated.

[0229] With such a configuration, it is possible for the irregular card user to use the terminal device for a long time and only to increase the time for securing the personal pattern, thereby performing an operation such as fingerprint proof. Can be collected.

At that time, if a contact type touch switch is employed, fingerprints can be more surely taken.

Industrial applicability

[0230] The card having the authentication verifying chip and the authentication verifying chip described above can be adopted as a bank cash card, a credit card, a prepaid card, a point card, a stock, an ID card, an entrance certificate, a certificate, and the like.

Claims

The scope of the claims

[1] A substrate, an authentication verifying chip, and a face plate cover; the authentication verifying chip is stacked on the substrate, and the face plate is further stacked on the authentication verifying chip; the surface plate is The authentication chip is made of a synthetic resin; and the authentication chip contains radioactive substance particles.

[2] The card of claim 1, further wherein the face plate is opaque to visible light.

[3] The card according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the radioactive substance particles which are isotopes of the radioactive substance are further mixed with the radioactive substance particles in the authentication verifying chip.

[4] A substrate, an authentication verifying chip, and a face plate cover; the authentication verifying chip is stacked on the substrate, and the surface plate is further stacked on the authentication verifying chip; the surface plate is An opening formed in the face plate; a cover plate fitted in the opening; the cover plate being made of a synthetic resin highly transparent to radiation; The card according to the present invention, wherein the authentication chip is made of synthetic resin; radioactive particles are mixed in the authentication chip.

[5] The card according to claim 4, wherein the cover plate is opaque to visible light.

[6] The card according to [4] or [5], wherein non-radioactive material particles which are isotopes of the radioactive material are further mixed with the radioactive material particles in the authentication verifying chip.

[7] A substrate, an authentication verifying chip, and a face plate cover; the authentication verifying chip is stacked on the substrate, and the face plate is further stacked on the authentication verifying chip; An opening is formed; the authentication verifying chip is made of a synthetic resin; and the authentication verifying chip is formed with a convex portion fitted to the opening; radioactive particles are mixed in the convex portion Was a card.

[8] The card according to [7], wherein the non-radioactive substance particle which is an isotope of the radioactive substance is further mixed with the radioactive substance particle in the authentication verifying chip.

[9] a substrate, an authentication verifying chip and a surface plate force; the surface plate is stacked on the substrate; an opening is formed in the surface plate; and the authentication verifying chip is fitted in the opening. The authentication verifying chip is made of a synthetic resin; the authentication verifying chip In the cup, radioactive substance particles were mixed, curd.

[10] The card according to [9], wherein the non-radioactive substance particle which is an isotope of the radioactive substance is further mixed with the radioactive substance particle in the authentication verifying chip.

[11] A card comprising a substrate and an authentication verifying chip, wherein the authentication verifying chip is stacked on the substrate, and radioactive material particles are mixed in the authentication verifying chip.

[12] The card according to [11], wherein the non-radioactive substance particle which is an isotope of the radioactive substance is further mixed with the radioactive substance particle in the authentication verifying chip.

[13] The card according to claim 11 or 12, wherein a face plate which is a radiation transmitting material is laminated on the authentication verifying chip.

[14] The radioactive substance particles are mixed only in the central portion of the authentication chip.

The card of claim 12 or claim 13.

[15] A card comprising a substrate and an authentication verifying chip, wherein the authentication verifying chip is stacked on the substrate, and a pattern for authenticating authentication is drawn on the authentication verifying chip by radioactive substance particles.

[16] The card according to [15], wherein the non-radioactive substance particle which is an isotope of the radioactive substance is further mixed with the radioactive substance particle in the authentication verifying chip.

[17] The card according to claim 15 or 16, wherein a face plate which is a radiation transmitting material is laminated on the authentication verifying chip.

[18] A card comprising a substrate and an authentication verifying chip, wherein the authentication verifying chip is stacked on the substrate, and radioactive substance particles are arranged in a matrix on the authentication verifying chip.

[19] The card according to claim 15, wherein the non-radioactive substance particle which is an isotope of the radioactive substance is further mixed with the radioactive substance particle in the authentication verifying chip.

[20] The card according to claim 18 or 19, wherein a face plate which is a radiation transmitting material is laminated on the authentication verifying chip.

[21] A card on which an authentication verifying chip in which authentication verifying information by radioactive substance is described is attached on a substrate, wherein the authentication verifying information is digital data arranged in a matrix, and the digital data is 2 A card, which is arranged based on a random number.

[22] The authentication information is a part of digital data arranged in a larger matrix. 22. The card of claim 21.

[23] Injecting a synthetic resin monomer containing radioactive substance particles into a mold having a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication chip, curing the injected monomer to form a polymer to authenticate the authentication chip The method for producing a card according to claim 1, wherein a substrate is attached to the lower surface of the authentication verifying chip, and a front plate is adhered to the upper surface of the authentication verifying chip.

[24] Injecting a synthetic resin monomer mixed with radioactive substance particles into a mold having a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication verifying chip. Curing the injected monomer to form a polymer to obtain an authentication verifying chip. Obtaining a step of attaching a substrate to the lower surface of the authentication verifying chip; affixing a surface plate having an opening on the upper surface of the authentication verifying chip; a card manufacturing method comprising a step of fitting a lid plate in the opening.

[25] A step of injecting a synthetic resin monomer having a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication verifying chip and having a recess formed therein, and curing the injected monomer into a polymer. Obtaining an authentication verifying chip, inverting the authentication verifying chip upside down, attaching a substrate to a lower surface of the authentication verifying chip inverted upside down, an opening corresponding to the recess is formed on the upper surface of the authentication verifying chip. A step-by-step card manufacturing method to attach a face plate.

[26] Injecting a synthetic resin monomer mixed with radioactive substance particles into a mold having an area and a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication verifying chip The cured monomer is hardened into a polymer, and the authentication verifying chip is Obtaining a step of attaching a face plate having an opening formed on the upper surface of the substrate, and fitting the authentication verifying chip into the opening.

[27] Loading the substrate into a mold having an area corresponding to the substrate and a depth corresponding to the thickness of the authentication authentication chip in addition to the thickness of the substrate The radioactive substance particles are dispersed onto the loaded substrate. In the step of injecting a synthetic resin monomer onto the substrate on which the radioactive substance particles are dispersed, a step of manufacturing a card by curing the injected monomer into a polymer.

[28] A reading device for reading information of an authentication verifying chip containing radioactive material: the reading device comprises a scintillator of the area of the authentication verifying chip and an imaging device; the imaging device is the radiation emitting device The reader which photographs the scintillation light of the said scintillator by the radiation of substance power.

[29] A reader for reading information of an authentication verifying chip containing radioactive material: the reading device includes a scintillator of the area of the authentication verifying chip and an area of the authentication verifying chip arranged on the scintillator. A reading device comprising a light detection element matrix; wherein the light detection element detects scintillation light of the scintillator due to the radiation of the radioactive substance power.

[30] A reading device for reading information of an authentication verifying chip containing radioactive material: the reading device includes a linear scintillator having a width of the authentication verifying chip and the scintillator, and the authentication verifying chip is disposed Reading the detection of scintillation light of the scintillator by radiation from the radioactive material of the authentication verifying chip in movement of the light detection element of the light detection element array; apparatus.

[31] A reading device for reading information of an authentication verifying chip containing radioactive material: the reading device comprises a scintillator and a light detecting element disposed on the scintillator, and the scintillator and the light detecting element are one body. The scintillator and the light detecting element are movable in the width direction of the authentication verifying chip; and the scintillator of the authentication verifying chip on which the light detecting element is moving; Reader to detect.

[32] The reading device according to claim 31, further comprising a scintillator and a light detection element configured in one set of another body.

[33] A reading device for reading information of an authentication verifying chip containing a radioactive substance: the reading device comprises a radiation detection element matrix of the area of the authentication verifying chip, and the light detecting element is the power of the radioactive substance Reader that detects radiation.

[34] A reading device for reading information of an authentication verifying chip containing radioactive material: the reading device comprises a radiation detecting element array having a width of the authentication verifying chip, and the radiation of the radiation detecting element array A reader for detecting radiation from the radioactive substance of an authentication verifying chip on which a detection element is moving.

[35] A reader for reading information of an authentication verifying chip containing a radioactive substance: the reading device comprises a radiation detecting element, and the radiation detecting element is movable in the width direction of the authentication verifying chip, the radiation The release of the authentication verifying chip in which the detection element is moving A reader that detects radiation from projectiles.

[36] In addition, it has one more radiation detection element:

36. The reader of claim 35.

[37] A parabolic cylindrical reflector, a polygon mirror, a scintillator, and a light detection element are provided, the rotation axis of the polygon mirror is disposed at the focal point of the reflection mirror, and the light detection element is behind the reflection mirror. Placed reader.

[38] The paraboloid is a whole paraboloid, and a light passing hole is formed at the center of the reflecting mirror, and the light detecting element is disposed behind the light reflecting hole behind the light passing hole. The reader according to claim 37.

[39] The reader according to claim 37, wherein the paraboloid is a semi-paraboloid.

[40] The reading device according to claim 37, wherein the paraboloid is a paraboloid smaller than a semiparaboloid, and the polygon mirror is offset.