WO2006066397A1 - Partial revocation list - Google Patents
Partial revocation list Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2006066397A1 WO2006066397A1 PCT/CA2005/001903 CA2005001903W WO2006066397A1 WO 2006066397 A1 WO2006066397 A1 WO 2006066397A1 CA 2005001903 W CA2005001903 W CA 2005001903W WO 2006066397 A1 WO2006066397 A1 WO 2006066397A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- list
- partial
- identifiers
- new portion
- master
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- D—TEXTILES; PAPER
- D04—BRAIDING; LACE-MAKING; KNITTING; TRIMMINGS; NON-WOVEN FABRICS
- D04H—MAKING TEXTILE FABRICS, e.g. FROM FIBRES OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL; FABRICS MADE BY SUCH PROCESSES OR APPARATUS, e.g. FELTS, NON-WOVEN FABRICS; COTTON-WOOL; WADDING ; NON-WOVEN FABRICS FROM STAPLE FIBRES, FILAMENTS OR YARNS, BONDED WITH AT LEAST ONE WEB-LIKE MATERIAL DURING THEIR CONSOLIDATION
- D04H13/00—Other non-woven fabrics
- D04H13/001—Making non-woven fabrics from staple fibres, filaments or yarns, bonded to at least one web-like material, e.g. woven, knitted non-woven fabric, paper, leather, during consolidation
- D04H13/003—Making non-woven fabrics from staple fibres, filaments or yarns, bonded to at least one web-like material, e.g. woven, knitted non-woven fabric, paper, leather, during consolidation strengthened or consolidated by mechanical methods
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
- G06F21/84—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices output devices, e.g. displays or monitors
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2101—Auditing as a secondary aspect
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2129—Authenticate client device independently of the user
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
- G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
- G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
- G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
Definitions
- a method for monitoring replaceable portions of a device, the replaceable portions each having a unique identifier associated therewith.
- the method comprises the steps of storing on a new portion, a partial list of the identifiers, the partial list being chosen from a master list of the identifiers; upon installation of the new portion, the device using the contents of the partial list to update a locally stored list of identifiers; and the device comparing the identifier associated with the new portion with the locally stored list, and rejecting the installation if the identifier associated with the new portion is found.
- a system for monitoring replaceable portions of a device, the replaceable portions each having a unique identifier associated therewith.
- the system comprises a master list of the identifiers; and a partial list of the identifiers to be stored on a new portion, the partial list being chosen from the master list; wherein the contents of the partial list is used by the device upon installation of the new portion to update a locally stored list of identifiers and to compare the identifier associated with the new portion with the locally stored list, whereby the installation is rejected if the identifier associated with the new portion is found.
- Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a system incorporating a partial revocation list.
- the revocation pool 18 may be generated from serial numbers, and can act as a memory device for storing information related to cartridges 16 that are known to be actively cloned by an outside manufacturer.
- the list may also include serial numbers from cartridges 16 manufactured prior to a past date representing the typical shelf life of the original product. In this way, the revocation list may contain identifiers of cartridges that are most likely to be cloned or recycled.
- the communication channel 28 connects the devices 16 to the manufacturer 12.
- the communication channel 28 is a trusted channel, and may be referred to as a "trusted back-channel". Such a trusted channel allows the devices to securely communicate used cartridge 16 data back to the manufacturer 12.
- the term "trusted” indicates that means have been employed by the system 10 to prevent an outside manufacturer (e.g. cloning operation) from hijacking the channel for the purposes of filtering used cartridge information, and thus hide a cloning operation.
- the communication channel 28 may be implemented manually using physical collection and delivery of the data but may also be done electronically with trusted hardware using an untrusted communication channel.
- a distribution and updating procedure 200 is shown in Figure 2.
- a cartridge 16 is produced by the manufacturer 12 at step 202.
- a PRL 20 is created at step 204.
- the PRL 20 is created by selecting a set of serial numbers from the revocation pool 18. The choice of which serial numbers are placed in the PRL 20 is preferably based on random selection, with weighting.
- a manufacturer 12 is able to weight a particular selection, to improve the probability that the selection will be included in the PRL 20.
- a selection can represent any individual used cartridge 16 or a range of used cartridges, identified by a wild card or logic statement.
- a manufacturer 12 has complete control of what cartridge identifiers, if any, are present in the revocation pool 18 at any given time.
- a "selection" may be defined to be the tuple (serial number, weight) or (serial number range, weight), where the weight is a value between 1 and 10.
- a random selection of 100 PRLs from this particular pool would produce a PRL 20 consisting of the serial number 1 with a 25% probability, the serial number 2 with a 25% probability and the range of serial numbers from 3 to 10 with a 50% probability.
- Any device 14 incorporating a replaceable cartridge 16 which can be readily cloned by an outside manufacturer is suitable for integrating a PRL 20 into the memory of the cartridge 16.
- a replacement cartridge 16 is sold to the owner of the device 14 and inserted into the device 14 at step 210.
- the device 14 At the time of installation it would be preferable for the device 14 to validate the PRL 20 of the cartridge 16 using the public key 26 embedded in the device 14 as indicated in step 212.
- the use of the public key 26 is an optional step depending on whether or not a digital signature is used and may be done at anytime during the procedure 200 once the cartridge 16 has been installed. It is then preferable that the device 14 recognize that a new cartridge 16 has been inserted and reads the new cartridge's PRL 20 as indicated in step 214. The device will then update its list of revoked serial numbers 216 stored in its database 30 with the list of revoked serial numbers on the PRL 20.
- the device 14 will then copy the serial number of the cartridge 16 being installed into its locally stored list of used serial numbers contained in its database 30 as indicated in step 218. This number is checked against both the used and revoked cartridge lists in the database 30 to ensure that the cartridge 16 being installed does not have a serial number that has been revoked or previously used at step 220. It is the device's responsibility to perform these checks and to not accept a cartridge having a previously used or revoked serial number. Thus, the operation of the device is inhibited.
- the goal is to distribute enough revocation information to the devices 14 using the replacement cartridges 16 to statistically impair the cartridge yield of an outside manufacturer who may try to clone the cartridges 16. Therefore a cloning operation may fail to deliver a working cartridge to a customer some percentage of the time.
- An intelligent selection process for choosing the members of the PRL 20 from the revocation pool 18 based on, e.g., a weighted selection process as outlined above, increases the likelihood that cloned cartridges will be rejected.
- a PRL 20 is intended to be used when a forward channel from the manufacturer 12 to the device 14 does not exist or is unreliable.
- the manufacture 12 can only guarantee to get revocation data to a device 14 if it is sent with the cartridges 16 that are required for continued operation. This will occur for example when genuine cartridges are inter mingled with cloned or recycled cartridges in the supply chain so there is a reasonable likelihood that a cartridge with an updated PRL will be installed on the device 14.
- the PRL 20 is preferably bound with the important data on the cartridge 16 using a digital signature so that the customer may be forced to accept and forward to the device 14, both the data and the PRL 20 on the cartridge 16.
- Mass-produced cartridges 16 will most likely have an upper bound on memory, therefore sending a complete list, while preferable from a security perspective, is not possible as the list grows in size. If the entire list cannot be sent, pieces of the list can be sent to different customers so that an outside manufacturer can not be sure what cloned cartridges will work for which customers. As a result, the outside manufacture will generally have reduced yields, a less reliable product, and higher distribution costs than the manufacturer 12.
- the device 14 will preferably send back an updated list of the cartridge serial numbers used by the device 14 through the communication channel 28 upon successful installation of the new cartridge 16 to the manufacturer 12 as indicated in step 222.
- This will enable the processor 20 to continually update the revocation pool 18 for the future generations of PRLs.
- step 222 as exemplified is only a preferable mechanism to determine when a cartridge 16 is used.
- the cartridges 16 may instead employ an expiry date.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP05820860A EP1831831A4 (en) | 2004-12-22 | 2005-12-16 | Partial revocation list |
CA2590065A CA2590065C (en) | 2004-12-22 | 2005-12-16 | Partial revocation list |
JP2007547120A JP4897701B2 (en) | 2004-12-22 | 2005-12-16 | Partial revocation list |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US63775604P | 2004-12-22 | 2004-12-22 | |
US60/637,756 | 2004-12-22 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2006066397A1 true WO2006066397A1 (en) | 2006-06-29 |
Family
ID=36601316
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CA2005/001903 WO2006066397A1 (en) | 2004-12-22 | 2005-12-16 | Partial revocation list |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (2) | US7801869B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1831831A4 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4897701B2 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2590065C (en) |
WO (1) | WO2006066397A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US8621212B2 (en) * | 2009-12-22 | 2013-12-31 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for cryptographically enhanced automatic blacklist management and enforcement |
US8630411B2 (en) | 2011-02-17 | 2014-01-14 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for device and data authentication |
US20130006878A1 (en) * | 2011-06-30 | 2013-01-03 | International Business Machines Corporation | Nanostructure tracking of product data signatures |
US9599945B2 (en) | 2013-07-31 | 2017-03-21 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Methods and systems for determining authenticity of a consumable product |
US11651063B2 (en) | 2017-08-30 | 2023-05-16 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Component verification and revocation |
US10540298B2 (en) | 2017-09-28 | 2020-01-21 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp | Protected datasets on tape cartridges |
CN110497696B (en) * | 2019-08-19 | 2021-09-28 | 前海联大(深圳)技术有限公司 | Wireless communication module, printing consumables and printer |
Citations (5)
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EP0930556A2 (en) * | 1998-01-12 | 1999-07-21 | Sony Corporation | Information processing apparatus, methods and systems and providing media |
US5949877A (en) * | 1997-01-30 | 1999-09-07 | Intel Corporation | Content protection for transmission systems |
WO2001011819A1 (en) * | 1999-08-09 | 2001-02-15 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Updating a revocation list to foil an adversary |
US20020169971A1 (en) * | 2000-01-21 | 2002-11-14 | Tomoyuki Asano | Data authentication system |
WO2004097606A1 (en) * | 2003-04-28 | 2004-11-11 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Method of updating revocation list |
Family Cites Families (26)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US6097811A (en) * | 1995-11-02 | 2000-08-01 | Micali; Silvio | Tree-based certificate revocation system |
US5687235A (en) * | 1995-10-26 | 1997-11-11 | Novell, Inc. | Certificate revocation performance optimization |
US5812662A (en) * | 1995-12-18 | 1998-09-22 | United Microelectronics Corporation | Method and apparatus to protect computer software |
US6850914B1 (en) * | 1999-11-08 | 2005-02-01 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Revocation information updating method, revocation informaton updating apparatus and storage medium |
US7260715B1 (en) * | 1999-12-09 | 2007-08-21 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Method and apparatus for revocation list management |
US7225164B1 (en) * | 2000-02-15 | 2007-05-29 | Sony Corporation | Method and apparatus for implementing revocation in broadcast networks |
JP2001256113A (en) * | 2000-03-13 | 2001-09-21 | Toshiba Corp | Contents processing system and contents protection method |
US6748531B1 (en) * | 2000-03-28 | 2004-06-08 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V | Method and apparatus for confirming and revoking trust in a multi-level content distribution system |
US7085929B1 (en) * | 2000-10-11 | 2006-08-01 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Method and apparatus for revocation list management using a contact list having a contact count field |
JP2003050745A (en) * | 2001-08-07 | 2003-02-21 | Sony Corp | Information processor, information processing method and computer program |
EP1446741A2 (en) * | 2001-08-28 | 2004-08-18 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Consumer and revocation of their equipment |
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JP3654244B2 (en) * | 2001-12-28 | 2005-06-02 | 村田機械株式会社 | Image forming apparatus and management system thereof |
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US7543140B2 (en) * | 2003-02-26 | 2009-06-02 | Microsoft Corporation | Revocation of a certificate and exclusion of other principals in a digital rights management (DRM) system based on a revocation list from a delegated revocation authority |
JP4043388B2 (en) * | 2003-03-20 | 2008-02-06 | ソニー株式会社 | Playback apparatus and playback method |
US20040205345A1 (en) * | 2003-04-11 | 2004-10-14 | Ripley Michael S. | System for identification and revocation of audiovisual titles and replicators |
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JP2006524860A (en) * | 2003-04-28 | 2006-11-02 | コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ | How to store revocation lists |
US7409569B2 (en) * | 2004-06-08 | 2008-08-05 | Dartdevices Corporation | System and method for application driven power management among intermittently coupled interoperable electronic devices |
EP1877947A4 (en) * | 2005-05-05 | 2009-11-25 | Certicom Corp | Retrofitting authentication onto firmware |
-
2005
- 2005-12-16 WO PCT/CA2005/001903 patent/WO2006066397A1/en active Application Filing
- 2005-12-16 US US11/304,825 patent/US7801869B2/en active Active
- 2005-12-16 EP EP05820860A patent/EP1831831A4/en not_active Ceased
- 2005-12-16 JP JP2007547120A patent/JP4897701B2/en active Active
- 2005-12-16 CA CA2590065A patent/CA2590065C/en active Active
-
2010
- 2010-08-18 US US12/859,032 patent/US9121119B2/en active Active
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5949877A (en) * | 1997-01-30 | 1999-09-07 | Intel Corporation | Content protection for transmission systems |
EP0930556A2 (en) * | 1998-01-12 | 1999-07-21 | Sony Corporation | Information processing apparatus, methods and systems and providing media |
WO2001011819A1 (en) * | 1999-08-09 | 2001-02-15 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Updating a revocation list to foil an adversary |
US20020169971A1 (en) * | 2000-01-21 | 2002-11-14 | Tomoyuki Asano | Data authentication system |
WO2004097606A1 (en) * | 2003-04-28 | 2004-11-11 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Method of updating revocation list |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See also references of EP1831831A4 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP4897701B2 (en) | 2012-03-14 |
JP2008524939A (en) | 2008-07-10 |
US20060161571A1 (en) | 2006-07-20 |
EP1831831A4 (en) | 2009-04-01 |
CA2590065A1 (en) | 2006-06-29 |
CA2590065C (en) | 2014-12-09 |
US9121119B2 (en) | 2015-09-01 |
US20100312791A1 (en) | 2010-12-09 |
EP1831831A1 (en) | 2007-09-12 |
US7801869B2 (en) | 2010-09-21 |
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