WO2006044697A1 - Method, apparatus and computer software for controlling receipt of undesired electronic mail by limiting the number of connections and messages - Google Patents

Method, apparatus and computer software for controlling receipt of undesired electronic mail by limiting the number of connections and messages Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2006044697A1
WO2006044697A1 PCT/US2005/037080 US2005037080W WO2006044697A1 WO 2006044697 A1 WO2006044697 A1 WO 2006044697A1 US 2005037080 W US2005037080 W US 2005037080W WO 2006044697 A1 WO2006044697 A1 WO 2006044697A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
given
messages
transfer agent
given number
message transfer
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2005/037080
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Don Meyers
Robert Johnson
Hong Li
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Intel Corp
Original Assignee
Intel Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Intel Corp filed Critical Intel Corp
Priority to DE112005002429.6T priority Critical patent/DE112005002429B4/en
Priority to JP2007536956A priority patent/JP4904278B2/en
Priority to GB0705906A priority patent/GB2432762B/en
Publication of WO2006044697A1 publication Critical patent/WO2006044697A1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/104—Grouping of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L51/00—User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
    • H04L51/21—Monitoring or handling of messages
    • H04L51/212—Monitoring or handling of messages using filtering or selective blocking
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H04L63/1425—Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection

Definitions

  • This invention relates generally to systems for electronic mail delivery.
  • Message transfer agents are programs responsible for delivering electronic mail messages. Upon receiving a message, a message transfer agent stores the message locally, analyzes its recipients, and either delivers the message locally or routes it to another message transfer agent. In either case, the message transfer agent may add or edit the message header.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic depiction of a transfer of an electronic mail message
  • Figure 2 is a flow chart for software in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a system depiction of an electronic mail transmitter or receiver in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Description
  • an external message transfer agent (MTA) 10 may attempt to transmit an electronic mail message to a receiver having an internal message transfer agent (MTA) 12.
  • the internal message transfer agent 12 also communicates with a database 14.
  • the external MTA 10 uses a particular Internet protocol address to request a connection to the internal MTA 12 as indicated at 11.
  • the internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for the external MTA 10 using the fully qualified domain name of the external MTA 10, the Internet protocol address of the MTA 10, and the domain that it is using to make the connection.
  • This trust value check is indicated by the arrow 20 as a communication from the internal MTA 12 to the database 14.
  • the database 14 indicates (in this specific example) that a trust value does or does not exist as indicated by arrow 13. If there is no connection history then a default value may be used.
  • a connection history entry may be logged to keep track of the number of times that a given external MTA, using a particular Internet protocol address and domain, has attempted to access the internal MTA 12.
  • the internal MTA 12 then sends a communication back to the database 14, as indicated by arrow 19, to see if the message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10.
  • Each external MTA 10 is assigned a dynamic message delivery threshold which indicates the number of times for a given trust value, that accesses can be made to the internal MTA 12. The better the experience with a particular external MTA, the progressively higher is its assigned trust value and the greater the message delivery threshold that must be exceeded before connection limitations are imposed.
  • the message delivery threshold in this case, may or may not be exceeded and is communicated from the database 14 to the internal MTA 12. If the threshold has not been exceeded, the internal MTA 12 accepts the connection and if it has been exceeded, other action may be taken. Thus, as indicated by arrow 16, the connection acceptance (or rejection) is communicated to the external MTA 10.
  • the external MTA 10 if the connection is accepted, begins transmitting messages, as indicated by arrow 17, to the internal MTA 12.
  • the internal MTA 12 continues to track the messages received over time from the MTA 10. Then, as indicated by arrow 18, the internal MTA 12 determines that the message delivery threshold has been exceeded and, for example, drops the connection to the external MTA 10 with a temporary error code indicating to retry at a later time.
  • a dialog may occur in which the external MTA 10 attempts to retry a connection after a threshold has been exceeded and the connection was refused.
  • the external MTA 10 uses its same Internet protocol address to request another connection to the internal MTA 12, again, using the same domain name.
  • the internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for that external MTA 10. Again, a trust value exists and a connection history entry is logged.
  • the internal MTA 12 checks to see if the message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10. Of course, the message delivery threshold has already been exceeded, so the internal MTA drops the connection to the external MTA 10 with a temporary error code, again, indicating to retry at a sufficiently later time.
  • a communication dialog may occur when the external MTA 10 retries a connection after the threshold has been exceeded, and the connection is accepted again, but eventually the message delivery threshold is exceeded again.
  • the external MTA 10 uses the same Internet protocol address and domain name to again request a connection to the internal MTA 12.
  • the internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for the external
  • the MTA 10 uses the fully qualified domain name of the external MTA 10, its Internet protocol address, and the domain it is connecting as. Again, a trust value exists and a connection history entry is logged. The internal MTA 10 checks to see if the message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10 and determines that sufficient time has now elapsed since the last rejected connection, that the threshold has not been exceeded. Then, the connection is accepted and messages are received from the external MTA 10. Those messages are tracked as received over time.
  • the internal MTA 12 determines that the message delivery threshold has been exceeded and drops the connection to the external MTA 10 with the corresponding error code.
  • the trust level may change over time and have an effect on mail delivery. In this case, a time interval has passed with a particular external MTA 10 successfully communicating with the internal MTA 12, allowing the trust level to increase for the external MTA 10, using a given IP address and domain name. Thus, sufficient time has gone by without any problems occurring so that a new, higher level of trust has been reached and a new trust level is assigned. This new trust level allows more messages to be delivered during an allotted time interval.
  • the external MTA 10 again requests a connection.
  • the internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for the external MTA using its domain name and Internet protocol address and its connecting domain.
  • the new trust value is used to assign a higher message delivery- threshold and a connection history entry is logged.
  • the internal MTA 12 checks to see if the new message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10. Since it has not been exceeded, the internal MTA 12 accepts the connection. Messages are transmitted from the external MTA 10 to the internal MTA 12 and those messages are tracked as received over a time. An increased message delivery rate may be allowed based on the new trust level.
  • the internal MTA 12 determines that the message delivery threshold has been exceeded, drops the connection, and issues a temporary error code indicating to retry at a later time.
  • the trust level may be influenced by a so-called outside trust influencer.
  • outside trust influencers may be ratings assigned by rating agencies, white lists, or information received from others about the trust value of a given external MTA 10.
  • an outside trust influencer may use spam history or other data to determine that the trust value for a given MTA should be changed.
  • the outside trust influencer may determine that the external MTA 10 is a known spamer. This would lower its trust value. New inquiries for the trust value for the external MTA 10 return the new trust value.
  • the database 14 may be loaded with new data from external sources other than the actual history of transactions between the external MTA 10 and the internal MTA 12.
  • the MTA 12 limits the number and frequency with which the MTA 10 may make connections.
  • the internal MTA 12 uses a form of trust based on past history and potentially outside influencers to assume a degree of trust. Any time a new domain attempts an inbound communication, it must pay a price of message delay by incurring a limit on the number and rate at which the new domain can send messages to the internal MTA 12. New external MTAs for a known domain may also incur a penalty message delay by having a limit on the rate at which they can send messages to the MTA 12.
  • the internal MTA software 12 begins by receiving a connection request as indicated at diamond 22.
  • the internal MTA 12 checks to determine what is the trust value of the connecting external MTA as indicated at diamond 24. If there is a trust value, a message delivery threshold is set as indicated at block 26. Then, in the course of communications with the external MTA, the internal MTA checks to determine whether the message delivery threshold has been exceeded at diamond 28. As long as it is not exceeded, new connections may be accepted, as indicated in block 30, but those connections and the messages transmitted are logged, as indicated at 32, and counted. This count of connections and messages is used to determine when the number of connections and/or the rate of connection and message threshold is exceeded in diamond 28. When the threshold is exceeded, the connection may be dropped and an error code is issued as indicated in block 34.
  • a check may be made to determine whether outside trust influencer data exists as indicated at diamond 36. If so, the threshold may be set on that data and that data may be further stored in the database 14 as indicated in block 38. If there is no outside influencer data then a default value may be set as indicated at block 40. Presumably, the default value will allow a relatively limited number of connections or messages over time, but the value may be increased based on performance and time.
  • a check at diamond 42 determines whether the trust value should be increased based on the connection history. If a sufficient number of connections have been made by a given external MTA using the same Internet protocol address and the same domain name without any problems, then the trust value may be increased, allowing a higher number of messages to be transmitted before the message delivery threshold is reached. The new threshold value may then be stored as indicated in block 44.
  • a receiving processor-based system 50 may include a processor 52 coupled by a bus 54 to conventional components, such as a network interface 58 such as a wireless interface, and an input/output (I/O) interface 60.
  • a storage 56 such as a hard disk drive, semiconductor memory, or other memory, may store the internal MTA software 12. In one embodiment of the present invention, the storage 56 may be a flash memory.
  • Some embodiments of the present invention may be effective against hit and run tactics because they use time and past success to establish a basic form of trust. Some embodiments may not need any other infrastructure support. In addition, some embodiments may develop a list of records that is dynamic and, therefore, contains less waste records. Legitimate message transfer agents are not severely punished because the algorithm allows decaying levels of punishment over time.
  • a receiving MTA may count each recipient as a separate message delivery and the count of messages allowed within a given time period. In some embodiments, to prevent very large unwanted messages from loading the system, a receiving MTA may count the size of the delivered messages and limit the amount of data received within a given time period.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)

Abstract

Spam and other unwanted electronic-mail may be controlled by a system in which a given external message transfer agent (10) using a given Internet protocol address and a given domain name is limited in the number of connections that it may make and the number of messages it may deliver over a given time period. Based on the performance of that external message transfer agent (10) the passage of time and the number of connections, its assigned connection limit may be increased so that progressively trust is increased and more message connections and a higher number of messages delivered may be permitted.

Description

METHOD, APPARATUS AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE FOR CONTROLLING RECEIPT OF UNDESIRED ELECTRONIC MAIL BY LIMITING THE NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS AND MESSAGES
Background
This invention relates generally to systems for electronic mail delivery."
Message transfer agents are programs responsible for delivering electronic mail messages. Upon receiving a message, a message transfer agent stores the message locally, analyzes its recipients, and either delivers the message locally or routes it to another message transfer agent. In either case, the message transfer agent may add or edit the message header.
The prevalence of undesired electronic mail messages or spam has hindered the entire system of electronic messaging. Many users find that they receive so much undesired electronic mail that it is difficult to sort through and find the desired mail. Systems are available that check for certain key words and quarantine messages with those key words. However, despite the existing techniques for controlling spam, spam continues to be a major problem in electronic mail systems. Thus, there is a need for better ways for controlling undesired electronic mail.
Brief Description of the Drawings
Figure 1 is a schematic depiction of a transfer of an electronic mail message; Figure 2 is a flow chart for software in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; and
Figure 3 is a system depiction of an electronic mail transmitter or receiver in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Description
Referring to Figure 1, an external message transfer agent (MTA) 10 may attempt to transmit an electronic mail message to a receiver having an internal message transfer agent (MTA) 12. The internal message transfer agent 12 also communicates with a database 14.
Thus, initially, the external MTA 10 uses a particular Internet protocol address to request a connection to the internal MTA 12 as indicated at 11. The internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for the external MTA 10 using the fully qualified domain name of the external MTA 10, the Internet protocol address of the MTA 10, and the domain that it is using to make the connection. This trust value check is indicated by the arrow 20 as a communication from the internal MTA 12 to the database 14. The database 14 then indicates (in this specific example) that a trust value does or does not exist as indicated by arrow 13. If there is no connection history then a default value may be used. A connection history entry may be logged to keep track of the number of times that a given external MTA, using a particular Internet protocol address and domain, has attempted to access the internal MTA 12.
The internal MTA 12 then sends a communication back to the database 14, as indicated by arrow 19, to see if the message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10. Each external MTA 10 is assigned a dynamic message delivery threshold which indicates the number of times for a given trust value, that accesses can be made to the internal MTA 12. The better the experience with a particular external MTA, the progressively higher is its assigned trust value and the greater the message delivery threshold that must be exceeded before connection limitations are imposed. The message delivery threshold, in this case, may or may not be exceeded and is communicated from the database 14 to the internal MTA 12. If the threshold has not been exceeded, the internal MTA 12 accepts the connection and if it has been exceeded, other action may be taken. Thus, as indicated by arrow 16, the connection acceptance (or rejection) is communicated to the external MTA 10. The external MTA 10, if the connection is accepted, begins transmitting messages, as indicated by arrow 17, to the internal MTA 12.
The internal MTA 12 continues to track the messages received over time from the MTA 10. Then, as indicated by arrow 18, the internal MTA 12 determines that the message delivery threshold has been exceeded and, for example, drops the connection to the external MTA 10 with a temporary error code indicating to retry at a later time.
As another example, a dialog may occur in which the external MTA 10 attempts to retry a connection after a threshold has been exceeded and the connection was refused. The external MTA 10 uses its same Internet protocol address to request another connection to the internal MTA 12, again, using the same domain name. The internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for that external MTA 10. Again, a trust value exists and a connection history entry is logged. The internal MTA 12 checks to see if the message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10. Of course, the message delivery threshold has already been exceeded, so the internal MTA drops the connection to the external MTA 10 with a temporary error code, again, indicating to retry at a sufficiently later time.
As still another example, a communication dialog may occur when the external MTA 10 retries a connection after the threshold has been exceeded, and the connection is accepted again, but eventually the message delivery threshold is exceeded again. In this case, the external MTA 10 uses the same Internet protocol address and domain name to again request a connection to the internal MTA 12. The internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for the external
MTA 10 using the fully qualified domain name of the external MTA 10, its Internet protocol address, and the domain it is connecting as. Again, a trust value exists and a connection history entry is logged. The internal MTA 10 checks to see if the message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10 and determines that sufficient time has now elapsed since the last rejected connection, that the threshold has not been exceeded. Then, the connection is accepted and messages are received from the external MTA 10. Those messages are tracked as received over time.
Eventually, the internal MTA 12 determines that the message delivery threshold has been exceeded and drops the connection to the external MTA 10 with the corresponding error code. As another example, the trust level may change over time and have an effect on mail delivery. In this case, a time interval has passed with a particular external MTA 10 successfully communicating with the internal MTA 12, allowing the trust level to increase for the external MTA 10, using a given IP address and domain name. Thus, sufficient time has gone by without any problems occurring so that a new, higher level of trust has been reached and a new trust level is assigned. This new trust level allows more messages to be delivered during an allotted time interval.
To implement this new level, the external MTA 10 again requests a connection. The internal MTA 12 looks up the trust value for the external MTA using its domain name and Internet protocol address and its connecting domain. The new trust value is used to assign a higher message delivery- threshold and a connection history entry is logged. The internal MTA 12 checks to see if the new message delivery threshold has been exceeded for the external MTA 10. Since it has not been exceeded, the internal MTA 12 accepts the connection. Messages are transmitted from the external MTA 10 to the internal MTA 12 and those messages are tracked as received over a time. An increased message delivery rate may be allowed based on the new trust level. Eventually, the internal MTA 12 determines that the message delivery threshold has been exceeded, drops the connection, and issues a temporary error code indicating to retry at a later time. As yet another example, the trust level may be influenced by a so-called outside trust influencer. Examples of outside trust influencers may be ratings assigned by rating agencies, white lists, or information received from others about the trust value of a given external MTA 10. In this case, an outside trust influencer may use spam history or other data to determine that the trust value for a given MTA should be changed. For example, the outside trust influencer may determine that the external MTA 10 is a known spamer. This would lower its trust value. New inquiries for the trust value for the external MTA 10 return the new trust value. In other words, the database 14 may be loaded with new data from external sources other than the actual history of transactions between the external MTA 10 and the internal MTA 12. Thus, it can be appreciated that generally until the internal MTA 12 gets to "know" an external MTA 10, the MTA 12 limits the number and frequency with which the MTA 10 may make connections. The internal MTA 12 uses a form of trust based on past history and potentially outside influencers to assume a degree of trust. Any time a new domain attempts an inbound communication, it must pay a price of message delay by incurring a limit on the number and rate at which the new domain can send messages to the internal MTA 12. New external MTAs for a known domain may also incur a penalty message delay by having a limit on the rate at which they can send messages to the MTA 12.
Over time, the longer the domain exists and the longer the external MTA retains the same name and address, the more it is trusted. Therefore, the receiving system will be willing to accept more mail from a given external MTA.
Thus, referring to Figure 2, the internal MTA software 12 begins by receiving a connection request as indicated at diamond 22. The internal MTA 12 checks to determine what is the trust value of the connecting external MTA as indicated at diamond 24. If there is a trust value, a message delivery threshold is set as indicated at block 26. Then, in the course of communications with the external MTA, the internal MTA checks to determine whether the message delivery threshold has been exceeded at diamond 28. As long as it is not exceeded, new connections may be accepted, as indicated in block 30, but those connections and the messages transmitted are logged, as indicated at 32, and counted. This count of connections and messages is used to determine when the number of connections and/or the rate of connection and message threshold is exceeded in diamond 28. When the threshold is exceeded, the connection may be dropped and an error code is issued as indicated in block 34.
If there is no trust value, a check may be made to determine whether outside trust influencer data exists as indicated at diamond 36. If so, the threshold may be set on that data and that data may be further stored in the database 14 as indicated in block 38. If there is no outside influencer data then a default value may be set as indicated at block 40. Presumably, the default value will allow a relatively limited number of connections or messages over time, but the value may be increased based on performance and time.
After the connection is logged, a check at diamond 42 determines whether the trust value should be increased based on the connection history. If a sufficient number of connections have been made by a given external MTA using the same Internet protocol address and the same domain name without any problems, then the trust value may be increased, allowing a higher number of messages to be transmitted before the message delivery threshold is reached. The new threshold value may then be stored as indicated in block 44.
Referring to Figure 3, a receiving processor-based system 50 may include a processor 52 coupled by a bus 54 to conventional components, such as a network interface 58 such as a wireless interface, and an input/output (I/O) interface 60. A storage 56, such as a hard disk drive, semiconductor memory, or other memory, may store the internal MTA software 12. In one embodiment of the present invention, the storage 56 may be a flash memory. Some embodiments of the present invention may be effective against hit and run tactics because they use time and past success to establish a basic form of trust. Some embodiments may not need any other infrastructure support. In addition, some embodiments may develop a list of records that is dynamic and, therefore, contains less waste records. Legitimate message transfer agents are not severely punished because the algorithm allows decaying levels of punishment over time. Once the MTA becomes trusted, all senders using the MTA may benefit from that trust. Some embodiments may reward stability. If an MTA exists for a certain long time with a consistent name and Internet protocol address, it continues to get consistently higher levels of trust without penalty. Some embodiments of the present invention may work with other outside influencers to accelerate decision making. In some embodiments, to prevent a small number of spam messages from being delivered to a very large distribution list, a receiving MTA may count each recipient as a separate message delivery and the count of messages allowed within a given time period. In some embodiments, to prevent very large unwanted messages from loading the system, a receiving MTA may count the size of the delivered messages and limit the amount of data received within a given time period.
While the present invention has been described with respect to a limited number of embodiments, those skilled in the art will appreciate numerous modifications and variations therefrom. It is intended that the appended claims cover all such modifications and variations as fall within the true spirit and scope of this present invention. What is claimed is:
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION BARCODE SHEET
Figure imgf000010_0001
Figure imgf000010_0002
Figure imgf000010_0003
Figure imgf000010_0004
Index 1.1.5.2 Version 1.0 Rev 12/06/01
Figure imgf000010_0005

Claims

1 . A method comprising : authorizing a given message transfer agent to connect a given number of times and deliver a given number of messages within a time period; determining when the given number of connections has been completed and the given number of messages delivered; and controlling further connections after the given number of connections has been completed and messages delivered.
2. The method of claim 1 including authorizing the message transfer agent to deliver a given number of messages within a time period.
3. The method of claim 2 including determining when said given number of messages has been delivered and controlling further connections after the given number of messages has been delivered.
4. The method of claim 1 including receiving information from a trust influencer to adjust the given number of times within a time period that a given message transfer agent is able to connect.
5. The method of claim 1 including authorizing a given message transfer agent to complete a given rate of connections over a given period of time.
6. The method of claim 1 including logging each connection from the given message transfer agent.
7. The method of claim 1 including increasing the given number of times within a time period that a given message transfer agent may connect based on the connection history of that message transfer agent.
8. The method of claim 1 wherein controlling further connections includes dropping the connection and issuing an error code.
9. The method of claim 1 including blocking messages of a given size from said message transfer agent.
10. The method of claim 1 including counting a message directed to a plurality of recipients as a separate message to each recipient and using said count to determine whether a message threshold has been reached.
11. An article comprising a medium storing instructions that, if executed, enable a processor-based device to: authorize a given message transfer agent to connect a given number of times and deliver a given number of messages within a time period; determine when the given number of connections has been completed and the given number of messages delivered; and control further connections after the given number of connections has been completed and messages delivered.
12. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to authorize the message transfer agent to deliver a given number of messages within a time period.
10
13. The article of claim 12 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to determine when the given number of messages have been delivered and control further connections after the given number of messages has been delivered.
14. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to receive information from a trust influencer to adjust the given number of times within a time period that a given message transfer agent is able to connect.
15. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to authorize a given message transfer agent to complete a given rate of connections over a given period of time.
16. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to log each connection from the given message transfer agent.
17. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to increase the given number of times within a time period that a given message transfer agent may connect based on the connection history of that message transfer agent.
11
18. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to drop a connection and issue an error code when the given number of connections has been exceeded.
19. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to block messages of a given size from said message transfer agent.
20. The article of claim 11 further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to count a message directed to a plurality of recipients as a separate message to each such recipient and use said count to determine whether a message threshold has been reached.
21. A processor-based device comprising: a controller; a storage, coupled to said controller, storing instructions that, if executed, enable the processor-based device to authorize a given message transfer agent to connect a given number of times and deliver a given number of messages within a time period, determine when the given number of connections has been completed and the given number of messages delivered, and control further connections after the given number of connections has been completed and messages delivered; and a wireless interface coupled to said controller.
22. The system of claim 21, said storage storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to
12 authorize the message transfer agent to deliver a given number of messages within a time period.
23. The system of claim 22, said storage storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to determine when the given number of messages have been delivered and control further connections after the given number of messages have been delivered.
24. The system of claim 22, said storage storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to receive information from a trust influencer to adjust the given number of times within a time period that a given message transfer agent is able to connect.
25. The system of claim 21, said storage further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to authorize a given message transfer agent to complete a given rate of connections over a given period of time.
26. The system of claim 21, said storage storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to log each connection from the given message transfer agent.
27. The system of claim 21, said storage storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to increase the given number of times within a time period that a given message transfer agent may connect based on the connection history of that message transfer agent.
28. The system of claim 21, said storage storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to drop a
13 connection and issue an error code when the given number of connections has been exceeded.
29. The system of claim 21, said storage further storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to block messages of a given size from said message transfer agent.
30. The system of claim 21, said storage storing instructions that, if executed, enable the system to count a message directed to a plurality of recipients as a separate message to each recipient and use said count to determine whether a message threshold as been reached.
14
PCT/US2005/037080 2004-10-14 2005-10-13 Method, apparatus and computer software for controlling receipt of undesired electronic mail by limiting the number of connections and messages Ceased WO2006044697A1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE112005002429.6T DE112005002429B4 (en) 2004-10-14 2005-10-13 A method, apparatus and computer software for controlling the reception of unsolicited electronic mail by restricting the number of connections and messages
JP2007536956A JP4904278B2 (en) 2004-10-14 2005-10-13 Method, apparatus, and computer software for restricting reception of unnecessary e-mail by limiting the number of connections and the number of messages
GB0705906A GB2432762B (en) 2004-10-14 2005-10-13 Method,apparatus and computer software for controlling receipt of undesired electronic mail by limiting the number of connections and messages

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10/965,170 US8495145B2 (en) 2004-10-14 2004-10-14 Controlling receipt of undesired electronic mail
US10/965,170 2004-10-14

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2006044697A1 true WO2006044697A1 (en) 2006-04-27

Family

ID=35677561

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2005/037080 Ceased WO2006044697A1 (en) 2004-10-14 2005-10-13 Method, apparatus and computer software for controlling receipt of undesired electronic mail by limiting the number of connections and messages

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US8495145B2 (en)
JP (1) JP4904278B2 (en)
CN (1) CN101040494A (en)
DE (1) DE112005002429B4 (en)
GB (1) GB2432762B (en)
WO (1) WO2006044697A1 (en)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103546449A (en) * 2012-12-24 2014-01-29 哈尔滨安天科技股份有限公司 E-mail virus detection method and device based on attachment formats

Families Citing this family (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10043008B2 (en) * 2004-10-29 2018-08-07 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Efficient white listing of user-modifiable files
US7577984B2 (en) * 2004-12-09 2009-08-18 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for a sending domain to establish a trust that its senders communications are not unwanted
US7653812B2 (en) * 2004-12-09 2010-01-26 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for evaluating confidence in a sending domain to accurately assign a trust that a communication is not unwanted
US8341226B2 (en) * 2006-03-15 2012-12-25 Intel Corporation Techniques to control electronic mail delivery
US8453235B1 (en) * 2006-12-15 2013-05-28 Oracle America, Inc. Controlling access to mail transfer agents by clients
US10110530B2 (en) 2007-02-02 2018-10-23 Iconix, Inc. Authenticating and confidence marking e-mail messages
GB0709527D0 (en) * 2007-05-18 2007-06-27 Surfcontrol Plc Electronic messaging system, message processing apparatus and message processing method
JP4977069B2 (en) * 2008-03-19 2012-07-18 株式会社野村総合研究所 Mail delivery speed adjustment system and program
US7801961B2 (en) 2008-05-09 2010-09-21 Iconix, Inc. E-mail message authentication and marking extending standards complaint techniques
JP5384606B2 (en) * 2011-12-06 2014-01-08 楽天株式会社 Mail management apparatus, mail management method, mail management program, and computer-readable recording medium for recording the program
US9014352B1 (en) * 2013-12-13 2015-04-21 West Corporation Reduction in network congestion
GB2605028A (en) 2019-10-29 2022-09-21 Leapxpert Ltd Internal message routing system and method

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001016695A1 (en) * 1999-09-01 2001-03-08 Katsikas Peter L System for eliminating unauthorized electronic mail
US20030050988A1 (en) * 2001-08-31 2003-03-13 Murray Kucherawy E-mail system providing filtering methodology on a per-domain basis
WO2003071390A2 (en) * 2002-02-19 2003-08-28 Postini Corporation E-mail management services
US20030187996A1 (en) * 2001-11-16 2003-10-02 Cardina Donald M. Methods and systems for routing messages through a communications network based on message content
US20040199585A1 (en) * 2001-06-29 2004-10-07 Bing Wang Apparatus and method for handling electronic mail

Family Cites Families (28)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6581092B1 (en) * 1999-09-29 2003-06-17 Ricoh Co., Ltd. Method and system for remote diagnostic, control and information collection based on various communication modes for sending messages to users
US5659544A (en) * 1994-10-17 1997-08-19 Lucent Technologies Inc. Method and system for distributed control in wireless cellular and personal communication systems
US5774689A (en) * 1995-09-22 1998-06-30 Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. Network configuration management system for digital communication networks
US5983278A (en) * 1996-04-19 1999-11-09 Lucent Technologies Inc. Low-loss, fair bandwidth allocation flow control in a packet switch
US5918017A (en) * 1996-08-23 1999-06-29 Internatioinal Business Machines Corp. System and method for providing dynamically alterable computer clusters for message routing
US6163808A (en) * 1997-03-20 2000-12-19 Nokia Telecommunications, Oy Network adjusts cell transfer capacity in response to a change in the actual bit rate relative to the nominal bit rate
US6047326A (en) * 1997-03-20 2000-04-04 Nokia Telecommunications, Oy Accounting system and method for a nominal bit rate network service
US6760848B1 (en) * 1998-03-20 2004-07-06 Moeller Gmbh Externally supplied interface adapter
JP2000163341A (en) 1998-11-30 2000-06-16 Nec Corp Mail server and method for automatically disposing of electronic spam mail
US6657954B1 (en) * 1999-03-31 2003-12-02 International Business Machines Corporation Adapting receiver thresholds to improve rate-based flow control
US6799276B1 (en) * 2000-06-26 2004-09-28 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Method and apparatus for restraining connection request stream associated with high volume burst client in a distributed network
JP3590936B2 (en) * 2001-10-06 2004-11-17 テラス テクノロジーズ，インコーポレイテッド E-mail service system having dynamic IP filtering module and dynamic IP address filtering method
US7054902B2 (en) * 2001-10-23 2006-05-30 Packeteer, Inc. Multicast delivery systems and methods
JP3910051B2 (en) 2001-11-30 2007-04-25 松下電器産業株式会社 E-mail server device, e-mail system, and e-mail delivery method
US7487212B2 (en) * 2001-12-14 2009-02-03 Mirapoint Software, Inc. Fast path message transfer agent
JP2003196217A (en) 2001-12-28 2003-07-11 Nec Corp Junk mail rejection setting method and mail device
JP2003234784A (en) 2002-02-13 2003-08-22 Nec Corp Method of blocking unwanted e-mail and receiving server
JP2003271524A (en) * 2002-03-15 2003-09-26 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Mail server
JP3984869B2 (en) * 2002-06-11 2007-10-03 日本電気株式会社 E-mail communication system
US20040024859A1 (en) * 2002-08-05 2004-02-05 Gerald Bloch Method and apparatus for communications network resource utilization assessment
US8145759B2 (en) * 2002-11-04 2012-03-27 Oracle America, Inc. Dynamically configurable resource pool
JP4322495B2 (en) 2002-11-19 2009-09-02 日本電気株式会社 Spam mail suppression device, spam mail suppression method, and spam mail suppression program
JP4043355B2 (en) * 2002-12-10 2008-02-06 富士通株式会社 Server load balancing program, server load balancing method, and server load balancing device
US7346700B2 (en) * 2003-04-07 2008-03-18 Time Warner Cable, A Division Of Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. System and method for managing e-mail message traffic
US20050010644A1 (en) * 2003-07-07 2005-01-13 Brown Scott T. High performance electronic message delivery engine
JP4291664B2 (en) * 2003-10-14 2009-07-08 株式会社日立製作所 Storage apparatus and system having communication buffer reservation function
US8499042B2 (en) 2004-01-30 2013-07-30 Unwired Planet, Inc. System for managing e-mail traffic
US7849142B2 (en) * 2004-05-29 2010-12-07 Ironport Systems, Inc. Managing connections, messages, and directory harvest attacks at a server

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001016695A1 (en) * 1999-09-01 2001-03-08 Katsikas Peter L System for eliminating unauthorized electronic mail
US20040199585A1 (en) * 2001-06-29 2004-10-07 Bing Wang Apparatus and method for handling electronic mail
US20030050988A1 (en) * 2001-08-31 2003-03-13 Murray Kucherawy E-mail system providing filtering methodology on a per-domain basis
US20030187996A1 (en) * 2001-11-16 2003-10-02 Cardina Donald M. Methods and systems for routing messages through a communications network based on message content
WO2003071390A2 (en) * 2002-02-19 2003-08-28 Postini Corporation E-mail management services

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103546449A (en) * 2012-12-24 2014-01-29 哈尔滨安天科技股份有限公司 E-mail virus detection method and device based on attachment formats

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
GB2432762A (en) 2007-05-30
GB0705906D0 (en) 2007-05-09
GB2432762B (en) 2009-07-15
JP2008517381A (en) 2008-05-22
CN101040494A (en) 2007-09-19
US8495145B2 (en) 2013-07-23
JP4904278B2 (en) 2012-03-28
US20060085506A1 (en) 2006-04-20
DE112005002429T5 (en) 2007-09-06
DE112005002429B4 (en) 2018-02-22

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US7774420B2 (en) Managing on-demand email storage
JP4065422B2 (en) Apparatus and method for processing electronic mail
US9037660B2 (en) Managing electronic messages
US8495145B2 (en) Controlling receipt of undesired electronic mail
US8271596B1 (en) Apparatus and methods for controlling the transmission of messages
US8364773B2 (en) E-mail authentication
US20030233418A1 (en) Practical techniques for reducing unsolicited electronic messages by identifying sender's addresses
US20150106938A1 (en) Email delivery system using metadata on emails to manage virtual storage
WO2004013796A1 (en) Practical techniques for reducing unsolicited electronic messages by identifying sender’s addresses
US20140215571A1 (en) E-mail authentication
US20130174281A1 (en) Messaging stamp authority
US20090172176A1 (en) Method and apparatus for filtering electronic messages
WO2006129962A1 (en) System for blocking spam mail and method of the same
US9887950B2 (en) Validating E-mails using message posting services
US20070220125A1 (en) Techniques to control electronic mail delivery
CN101317409A (en) Anti-spam application storage system
US20050216588A1 (en) Blocking specified unread messages to avoid mailbox overflow
US8874646B2 (en) Message managing system, message managing method and recording medium storing program for that method execution
US20250286848A1 (en) Information communication device and information communication program
KR101399037B1 (en) Method and device for processing spam mail using ip address of sender
JP2004178541A (en) Information distribution device and program thereof
KR100657517B1 (en) System for creating and updating content nodes, methods for creating and updating content nodes, and storage media recording programs therefor
JP2003169094A (en) Mail detecting and restricting method and mail server
KR100673398B1 (en) Recording medium storing message management system, message management method and program execution method
Soysa et al. GridEmail: A case for economically regulated internet-based interpersonal communications

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BW BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU CZ DE DK DM DZ EC EE EG ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KM KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV LY MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NA NG NI NO NZ OM PG PH PL PT RO RU SC SD SE SG SK SL SM SY TJ TM TN TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VC VN YU ZA ZM ZW

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): BW GH GM KE LS MW MZ NA SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT LT LU LV MC NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 2007536956

Country of ref document: JP

ENP Entry into the national phase

Ref document number: 0705906

Country of ref document: GB

Kind code of ref document: A

Free format text: PCT FILING DATE = 20051013

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 0705906.6

Country of ref document: GB

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 200580033156.9

Country of ref document: CN

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 1120050024296

Country of ref document: DE

RET De translation (de og part 6b)

Ref document number: 112005002429

Country of ref document: DE

Date of ref document: 20070906

Kind code of ref document: P

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 05812382

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

REG Reference to national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: 8607