WO2002060210A1 - Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card - Google Patents

Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2002060210A1
WO2002060210A1 PCT/NO2002/000035 NO0200035W WO02060210A1 WO 2002060210 A1 WO2002060210 A1 WO 2002060210A1 NO 0200035 W NO0200035 W NO 0200035W WO 02060210 A1 WO02060210 A1 WO 02060210A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
user
activation code
server
enabling
terminal
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/NO2002/000035
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2002060210A8 (en
Inventor
Leif Sandberg
Kjell RØDBERG-LARSEN
Original Assignee
Telenor Asa
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Telenor Asa filed Critical Telenor Asa
Priority to DE60226418T priority Critical patent/DE60226418D1/en
Priority to EP02711562A priority patent/EP1371255B1/en
Priority to HU0400771A priority patent/HUP0400771A2/en
Priority to JP2002560415A priority patent/JP2004518374A/en
Priority to CA002433321A priority patent/CA2433321A1/en
Priority to US10/466,486 priority patent/US7024226B2/en
Priority to AU2002230306A priority patent/AU2002230306B2/en
Priority to DK02711562T priority patent/DK1371255T3/en
Priority to KR10-2003-7009743A priority patent/KR100506432B1/en
Priority to BR0206632-7A priority patent/BR0206632A/en
Publication of WO2002060210A1 publication Critical patent/WO2002060210A1/en
Publication of WO2002060210A8 publication Critical patent/WO2002060210A8/en

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K17/00—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/006—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02—Terminal devices

Definitions

  • the present invention is related to Smart Cards and communication network, in particular a mobile telephone system using a one time activation code for activating at least a part of a Smart Card, e.g. PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) function in a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card.
  • PKI Public Key Infrastructure
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • PKI functions in a Smart Card e.g. a SIM card localized in a GSM cellular phone
  • PIN code is normally a relatively short personal number which has to be entered to enable the card for use.
  • PUK code is normally a much longer number which has to be entered after tree times of incorrectly entry of the PIN code. This prevents unauthorized access to the Smart Card.
  • the PUK code must be considerably longer than the PIN code. However, this emerges as a problem for the user because the code is difficult to remember. For most users it is necessary to store the PUK code e.g. on a piece of paper, and on rare occasions, when the PUK code is needed, it may probably be gone. Due to this, mobile telephone operators (or any other type of issuer) frequently have to replace the users Smart Card/ SIM. Because of security reasons, it is not a proper handling to reprint a PUK twice. This will imply extra cost and work to renew the subscription with a new PUK and a Smart Card as well .
  • the PUK code is a fixed code, thus requiring storage of the code locally in the Smart Card.
  • an activation code replacing the PUK code is generated centrally and will be send preferably by registered mail to the user of the Smart Card that may be a SIM card localized in a cellular phone.
  • the verification of the activation code is carried through simply by comparing (e.g. in a server of a telephone operator) the user entered activation code with the previously mailed one, which also is stored in the telephone operators activation server.
  • the activation code is a one time code, and replaces all the func- tions of the PUK code for the PKI function. Additionally it may be used to enable stored, but for the user previously hidden, functionalities in the Smart Card, e.g. PKI functionalities .
  • Fig. 1 is a view of the components and the data flow in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the example embodiment is based upon a mobile telephone network wherein the fixed PUK codes are replaced with one time activation codes.
  • the activation code may also be used to enable PKI functionalities stored in the SIM cards of the subscribers.
  • a user To make use of PKI functionalities, a user must in advance be registered and registration data must be verified at an RA (Registration Authority) . All relevant registration data must be available for the server generating activation codes, typically a server localized at a telephone opera- tor .
  • RA Registration Authority
  • the user may then be provided with a one time activation code which is generated in the server.
  • This code will be used to authenticate the user towards the server after the registration and to initiate the key generation process into the Smart Card.
  • the one time activation code will be provided to the user in a sealed envelope that is sent by post, e.g. as a registered letter to the home address of the user.
  • a "SIM PKI menu” must be enabled.
  • the PKI server transmits a - for the user's SIM card unique - code to the users phone to enable the "SIM PKI menu” .
  • This unique code should not be confused with the actual activation code described above.
  • This "SIM PKI menu” have until now been resting invisibly in the SIM card not accessible to the user.
  • the Activation Module in the PKI server will also fetch some unique parameters from the Card Production system, which also is stored in the particular SIM to be used as code for enable PKI menu in the SIM.
  • the "SIM PKI menu” is enabled, the user enters the activation code in his/her handset to enroll to the service.
  • the activation code is sent by SMS to the PKI Server. The user has 3 attempts to enter this code correctly.
  • the Activation Module verifies that the entered activation code corresponds to the one previously transmitted one.
  • the Activation Module transmits a "Generate PKI keys enabling command" back to the SIM, and the key generation application in the SIM will generate key pairs comprising private key and verification public key.
  • the verification public key (VPuK) is transmitted by SMS to the Activation Module, and the SMS is preferably encrypted according to GSM 03.48 for protection of sensitive information.
  • PIN_SIGNKEY is a personal self chosen signing key used for e.g. transaction signing, encryption and authentication.
  • the Activation Portal connects to the CA to issue a valid certificate with the public key associated with the user. This certificate is at the same time sent to a certification directory.
  • a confirmation of successful certification is sent back to the user and the PKI menu will then be disabled in the SIM.
  • the PKI functions in the SIM card are now enabled.
  • the present invention replaces the PUK code for the PKI part (not to be confused with that one for the GSM part) , which is usually, for security reasons, stored in two separated parts, with a one time activation code thus saving memory space and administration.
  • the present invention introduces a higher degree of security as no PUK is being stored neither centrally at the operator, nor in the terminal or on a piece of paper for the user to remember.
  • the present invention enables generating keys in connection with use of PKI, thus allowing the user to choose the signing PIN for authentication and transaction signing himself.
  • SIM cards may be reused for the user or for a new user then the PKI certificate renewal date (within 2-3 years) since new PKI data will be generated in the Smart Card for each new activation code.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephone Function (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Adornments (AREA)
  • Telephone Set Structure (AREA)
  • Control And Other Processes For Unpacking Of Materials (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Saccharide Compounds (AREA)
  • Inspection Of Paper Currency And Valuable Securities (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Semiconductor Integrated Circuits (AREA)

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method for enabling at least a part of a Smart Card. According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a one time activation code is generated in a server at a telephone operator. The activation code is sent via registered mail to a user of a Smart Card, e.g. a SIM card in a GSM cellular phone. When the user enters the activation code into the cellular phone, the entry is transmitted to the server for verification. Upon successful verification, the server transmits an enabling command to the phone for thereby enabling the intended part of the SIM card. This may be enabling of PKI functionalities that until now have been hidden in the SIM card and thus unavailable for the user. The user may then choose his own signing PIN for authentication, encryption and transaction signing. In case of enabling PKI functions, all necessary generation of private and public keys and establishment of certifications are carried through when the activation code is verified.

Description

Method for enabling PKI functions in a Smart Card
Field of the invention
The present invention is related to Smart Cards and communication network, in particular a mobile telephone system using a one time activation code for activating at least a part of a Smart Card, e.g. PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) function in a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card.
Background of the invention
PKI functions in a Smart Card, e.g. a SIM card localized in a GSM cellular phone, is normally protected by its own PIN code and PUK code (not the same as for the GSM part) . The PIN code is normally a relatively short personal number which has to be entered to enable the card for use. The PUK code is normally a much longer number which has to be entered after tree times of incorrectly entry of the PIN code. This prevents unauthorized access to the Smart Card.
For security reasons the PUK code must be considerably longer than the PIN code. However, this emerges as a problem for the user because the code is difficult to remember. For most users it is necessary to store the PUK code e.g. on a piece of paper, and on rare occasions, when the PUK code is needed, it may probably be gone. Due to this, mobile telephone operators (or any other type of issuer) frequently have to replace the users Smart Card/ SIM. Because of security reasons, it is not a proper handling to reprint a PUK twice. This will imply extra cost and work to renew the subscription with a new PUK and a Smart Card as well .
The PUK code is a fixed code, thus requiring storage of the code locally in the Smart Card. An additional problem due to the fact that the PUK code is a fixed code, is that the Smart Card is tied up to one user during its life time, and there is no possibility for changing the user for a certain subscription. This implies manufacturing and distribution of more Smart Card than necessary.
Summary of the invention
It is an object of the present invention to provide a method that eliminates the drawbacks described above. The features defined in the claims enclosed characterize this method.
More specifically, according to the present invention an activation code replacing the PUK code is generated centrally and will be send preferably by registered mail to the user of the Smart Card that may be a SIM card localized in a cellular phone. The verification of the activation code is carried through simply by comparing (e.g. in a server of a telephone operator) the user entered activation code with the previously mailed one, which also is stored in the telephone operators activation server. The activation code is a one time code, and replaces all the func- tions of the PUK code for the PKI function. Additionally it may be used to enable stored, but for the user previously hidden, functionalities in the Smart Card, e.g. PKI functionalities .
Brief description of the drawing
Fig. 1 is a view of the components and the data flow in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed description
The present invention will now be described in conjunction with an example embodiment referring to the above mentioned figure. However, the present invention is not limited to this particular embodiment, but may be used in other appli- cations with various substitutions without departing from the scope of the invention as defined in the enclosed claims .
The example embodiment is based upon a mobile telephone network wherein the fixed PUK codes are replaced with one time activation codes. In addition to replacing the traditional functions of the PUK code, the activation code may also be used to enable PKI functionalities stored in the SIM cards of the subscribers.
To make use of PKI functionalities, a user must in advance be registered and registration data must be verified at an RA (Registration Authority) . All relevant registration data must be available for the server generating activation codes, typically a server localized at a telephone opera- tor .
After successful registration, the user may then be provided with a one time activation code which is generated in the server. This code will be used to authenticate the user towards the server after the registration and to initiate the key generation process into the Smart Card. The one time activation code will be provided to the user in a sealed envelope that is sent by post, e.g. as a registered letter to the home address of the user.
However, before the user may enter the activation code, a "SIM PKI menu" must be enabled. Thus, the PKI server transmits a - for the user's SIM card unique - code to the users phone to enable the "SIM PKI menu" . This unique code should not be confused with the actual activation code described above. This "SIM PKI menu", have until now been resting invisibly in the SIM card not accessible to the user. The Activation Module in the PKI server will also fetch some unique parameters from the Card Production system, which also is stored in the particular SIM to be used as code for enable PKI menu in the SIM. When the "SIM PKI menu" is enabled, the user enters the activation code in his/her handset to enroll to the service. The activation code is sent by SMS to the PKI Server. The user has 3 attempts to enter this code correctly.
The Activation Module verifies that the entered activation code corresponds to the one previously transmitted one. The Activation Module then transmits a "Generate PKI keys enabling command" back to the SIM, and the key generation application in the SIM will generate key pairs comprising private key and verification public key.
The verification public key (VPuK) is transmitted by SMS to the Activation Module, and the SMS is preferably encrypted according to GSM 03.48 for protection of sensitive information.
The user is then requested to choose a PIN_SIGNKEY, which is a personal self chosen signing key used for e.g. transaction signing, encryption and authentication.
In the case of successful verification, the Activation Portal connects to the CA to issue a valid certificate with the public key associated with the user. This certificate is at the same time sent to a certification directory.
A confirmation of successful certification is sent back to the user and the PKI menu will then be disabled in the SIM. The PKI functions in the SIM card are now enabled.
The present invention replaces the PUK code for the PKI part (not to be confused with that one for the GSM part) , which is usually, for security reasons, stored in two separated parts, with a one time activation code thus saving memory space and administration. In addition, the present invention introduces a higher degree of security as no PUK is being stored neither centrally at the operator, nor in the terminal or on a piece of paper for the user to remember.
The present invention enables generating keys in connection with use of PKI, thus allowing the user to choose the signing PIN for authentication and transaction signing himself.
A further advantage with the present invention is that SIM cards may be reused for the user or for a new user then the PKI certificate renewal date (within 2-3 years) since new PKI data will be generated in the Smart Card for each new activation code.
The above -described example of the present invention is for illustrative purposes only. Other implementations and variations may be utilized without departing from the scope of the invention as defined in the following claims.

Claims

P a t e n t c l a i m s
1. Method for enabling at least a part of a Smart Card, said Smart Card associated to a terminal, said terminal connected to a communication network to which a server also is connected, said Smart Card accessible for a user of said terminal , c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n the following steps :
generating an activation code in said server
sending said activation code to said user
- adapting said terminal to prompt said user for his/her reading of said activation code
on response to said user's entry of said reading of said activation code into said terminal, transmitting said entry to said server through said communication network
on responds to receiving said entry, comparing said entry with said activation code
if said entry and said activation code are equal, transmitting an enabling command to said terminal through said communication network
upon receiving said activation code, enabling said at least a part of said Smart Card.
2. Method as defined in claim 1, c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that said part of said Smart Card is PKI functions and said server is a PKI server.
3. Method as defined in claim 2, c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that the step of enabling further includes the following steps:
generating a key pair including a private key and a public key
requesting said user to choose and enter a signing, encryption and authentication PIN into said terminal
transmitting said public key to said PKI server through said communication network
- from said PKI server, requesting a certificate for said user from a CA
4. Method as defined in claim 2 or 3 , c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that said PKI functions is stored in said Smart Card, but hidden for the user until enabling.
5. Method as defined in any of the preceding claims, c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that the step of adapting includes transmitting a menu enabling code to said terminal from said server providing said terminal with a menu for said prompting of said user for said reading of said activation code.
6. Method as defined in any of the preceding claims, c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that said communication network is a GSM network, said terminal is a GSM mobile telephone, and said Smart Card is a SIM card.
7. Method as defined in claim 6, c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that said transmitting of said reading from said terminal to said server is carried through via an SMS .
8. Method as defined in claim 6 or 7, c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that said activation code completely replaces the PUK code used for PKI .
9. Method as defined in any of the preceding claims, c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n that said activation code is sent to the user via registered mail .
PCT/NO2002/000035 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card WO2002060210A1 (en)

Priority Applications (10)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE60226418T DE60226418D1 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 PROCESS FOR RELEASING PKI FUNCTIONS IN A CHIP CARD
EP02711562A EP1371255B1 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card
HU0400771A HUP0400771A2 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card
JP2002560415A JP2004518374A (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method of operating PKI function in smart card
CA002433321A CA2433321A1 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card
US10/466,486 US7024226B2 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling PKI functions in a smart card
AU2002230306A AU2002230306B2 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling PKI functions in a smart card
DK02711562T DK1371255T3 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Procedure for activating PKI functions in an intelligent card
KR10-2003-7009743A KR100506432B1 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card
BR0206632-7A BR0206632A (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method to enable pki functions on a smart card

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NO20010427A NO313480B1 (en) 2001-01-24 2001-01-24 Procedure for opening all or part of a smart card
NO20010427 2001-01-24

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2002060210A1 true WO2002060210A1 (en) 2002-08-01
WO2002060210A8 WO2002060210A8 (en) 2003-12-11

Family

ID=19912059

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/NO2002/000035 WO2002060210A1 (en) 2001-01-24 2002-01-23 Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card

Country Status (16)

Country Link
US (1) US7024226B2 (en)
EP (1) EP1371255B1 (en)
JP (1) JP2004518374A (en)
KR (1) KR100506432B1 (en)
CN (1) CN1251549C (en)
AT (1) ATE394885T1 (en)
AU (1) AU2002230306B2 (en)
BR (1) BR0206632A (en)
CA (1) CA2433321A1 (en)
DE (1) DE60226418D1 (en)
DK (1) DK1371255T3 (en)
ES (1) ES2306759T3 (en)
HU (1) HUP0400771A2 (en)
NO (1) NO313480B1 (en)
RU (1) RU2258324C2 (en)
WO (1) WO2002060210A1 (en)

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EP1371255B1 (en) 2008-05-07
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