WO2001022372A1 - Procede permettant de securiser des donnees lors de transactions et systeme pour sa mise en oeuvre - Google Patents
Procede permettant de securiser des donnees lors de transactions et systeme pour sa mise en oeuvre Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2001022372A1 WO2001022372A1 PCT/IB2000/000625 IB0000625W WO0122372A1 WO 2001022372 A1 WO2001022372 A1 WO 2001022372A1 IB 0000625 W IB0000625 W IB 0000625W WO 0122372 A1 WO0122372 A1 WO 0122372A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- key
- smart card
- asymmetric
- application program
- encryption
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for securing data during computer transactions and a system for its implementation. More particularly, the subject of the invention is a method guaranteeing the confidentiality or authenticity of the data when it is transmitted over a public or private network.
- symmetric encryption system means a method for encrypting a document using a unique secret key, the same key for encrypting and decrypting the document.
- a so-called asymmetric encryption system comprises a pair of keys, one of which is known as a public key, for encrypting a document and the other known as a private key, allowing the encrypted document to be reconstructed.
- the so-called public key does not make it possible to decrypt a document. Only the corresponding private key can decrypt the document or the transaction.
- a and B wish to transmit encrypted information over a public network.
- B uses the public key of A to encrypt a document and sends the encrypted document to A.
- C can intercept communications between A and B.
- C generates a pair of encryption keys.
- a sends his public key to B C intercepts it and substitutes it with his own public key.
- B uses the key of C to encrypt the document and transmits it to A.
- the object of the method of the invention is to remedy the drawbacks mentioned above by providing a method allowing on the one hand to verify that access to a terminal can only be carried out by an authorized person and on the other hand apart from the fact that the information which will be encrypted with a view to its transmission can only be read by its recipient, these operations being carried out without there being any temporary storage of the encryption keys on the computers of the issuer or of the receiver.
- the process which is the subject of the invention is characterized by the steps mentioned in claim 1.
- the invention also relates to a system comprising a cooperating hardware part with software for implementing the method mentioned above.
- the system which is the subject of the invention is distinguished by the characteristics expressed in claim 10.
- This asymmetric encryption technique uses a one-way mathematical function with a 'secret strike' to reverse the function.
- This asymmetric technique requires a pair of keys to be implemented: a public key which can be freely distributed and which is used to encrypt a document thanks to an asymmetric algorithm and a private key which is the only one able to decrypt the document or the transaction which was encrypted using the corresponding public key.
- the length of the key is a parameter, but to generate so-called strong asymmetric keys it is essential to calculate them from large random numbers in the vicinity of which we systematically search for two prime numbers. To generate strong asymmetric keys, each pair of keys is further subjected to additional mathematical criteria until all the criteria are satisfied. Concerning symmetric keys, it is not essential to look for a prime number.
- the symmetric key can be formed by a character string or by any number of determined length.
- the method which is the subject of the invention firstly comprises an initialization step to authorize access to the user functions provided for by the application program, such as document encryption or the implementation of a digital signature.
- This initialization phase requires a brief description of the components of the system allowing the implementation of the method.
- the aim is to guarantee the confidentiality of a data transmission between two users, each having a standard type personal computer comprising means of communication such as a modem, a network card or any other means making it possible to establish a remote connection for bi-directional transmission of digital data.
- These computers are furthermore provided with a chip card reading device connected to the computer.
- the smart card reader will be integrated into the computer keyboard.
- Smart cards intended to be used in the reader are conventional cards comprising at least one calculation unit, a non-volatile memory, a volatile memory and an analog generator of random numbers.
- the card memory has at least one protected area in which the information which has previously been recorded therein cannot be read, using a reader. The contents of this memory area can nevertheless be restored and used by the card's calculation unit.
- smart cards dedicated to cryptography that is to say provided with a cryptographic co-processor and components making it possible to carry out the additional functions listed above are suitable for putting implementing the process which is the subject of the invention.
- a private key of an asymmetric encryption system for example of the RSA type, is installed in a protected area of the memory of the smart card.
- the corresponding public key is integrated in the file containing the code of the program intended to be executed on the computer.
- the public key residing in the program is not stored in the clear in the file used to support the application program. However, it can be reconstructed from information entered by the user.
- a method of implementing the public key in the application program will now be described.
- the 32 nd position corresponds to the second character of the pass phrase shifted by the same number of positions and so on until a 64 character sentence is obtained.
- Each byte of the key is then implanted in the table at an x coordinate, y where x represents the y th character of the pass phrase and where y represents the relative position of the byte in question in the key.
- Y is always between 1 and the length of the key.
- the application program invites the user to enter his pass phrase on the keyboard or by any other means, then determines the corresponding coordinates of each of the bytes forming the key.
- the key is then reconstituted by reading the different values located at the reconstructed coordinates. It is obvious that other methods making it possible to dissociate a key and to disperse it in a table of numbers can be envisaged. The goal is to make it difficult to reconstruct by simply analyzing the executable file used to support the application program.
- a pair of asymmetric keys (for example of the RSA type) is associated on the one hand with a smart card and on the other hand with a copy of the application software.
- the user In the initialization phase, the user must first insert the smart card into the reader connected to the computer and then launch the application program. The latter first checks the presence of the card in the reader, for example by interrogating the latter's bus. If a card is present in the reader, the program invites the user to enter the passphrase on the keyboard which will allow him to reconstitute the public key stored in the table of numbers mentioned above. The program then sends an initialization signal to the smart card. Upon receipt of this signal, the card generates a random number using its analog random number generator.
- This random number is first saved in a temporary memory and then transmitted to the application program.
- the application program encrypts this random number using an asymmetric algorithm, for example of the RSA type, using the previously reconstituted public key and transmits the encrypted random number to the smart card.
- the smart card decrypts the message received using the private key contained in its protected memory and compares the result obtained with the random number previously saved in its memory. In case of equality of these two numbers, the smart card sends a confirmation to the application program which will continue its execution. If the number obtained is not identical to that previously saved in the memory of the smart card, the card sends a negative response towards the application program which causes the latter to stop immediately.
- the application program After a successful initialization, starts a task which checks the presence of the card in the reader at regular time intervals. If the latter is removed from the reader, the program ends and the initialization sequence described above must be repeated. The application program then prompts the user to enter the name of the file which must be encrypted before transmission.
- the application program or preferably the smart card provides a random number and the program uses it, after checking its acceptability, as a symmetric key, for example of DES type. This key is then encrypted using an asymmetric algorithm using the reconstructed public key.
- the application program stores the encrypted symmetric key in memory, then encrypts any document or computer transaction using a standard symmetric algorithm using the symmetric key. It then forms a message comprising the file encrypted by the symmetric algorithm as well as the symmetric key, itself encrypted by the asymmetric algorithm. These two elements are then combined into a single computer file.
- the following steps are standard in encryption programs and may include several other steps. We will mention in particular the deletion of the source file in clear and the deletion of any temporary file created during symmetric encryption. At the end of these steps, we are in the presence of a memory image which represents a file comprising the original encrypted message as well as the symmetric key also encrypted. This memory image can then be saved on a mass memory such as a computer hard drive by view of its transmission by any appropriate means, whether through a communication network (Internet, Intranet etc.) or by sending a data medium (floppy disk, CD-ROM etc.).
- the reverse operations are performed by the recipient of the message.
- the user first inserts his card into the reader and then launches the application program.
- the initialization steps are identical to those described above and make it possible to verify that the copy of the program used and the smart card match well.
- the user chooses the decryption option of the application program and is asked to specify the file on which he wishes to work.
- the application program begins by separating from this file, the encrypted symmetric key from the document encrypted using this key.
- the smart card then transmits its private asymmetric key to the application program which then decrypts the symmetric key using the transmitted asymmetric key.
- the application program then decrypts the document using the symmetric key thus obtained and makes the decrypted file available to the user.
- the application program transmits the encrypted symmetric key to the smart card which decrypts it using its private asymmetric key.
- the smart card then transmits the symmetric key decrypted to the application program which uses it to decrypt the data file.
- This encryption method ensures that a transmitted encrypted message can only be decrypted by a user with a specific smart card and a copy of the corresponding software. It should also be noted that in the above-mentioned encryption method, the symmetric key used to encrypt the document itself is unique and is used only once, which makes the system less vulnerable in the event of interception. of an encrypted message during its transmission. This way of doing does not pose any problems either for the archiving of the exchanged messages since a transmitted message contains both the encrypted document and the unique key that was used to encrypt it, the latter itself being encrypted with another algorithm.
- the symmetric session key is generated by the smart card and then transmitted to the application program.
- the latter upon receipt of the symmetric key, encrypts the document to be processed using this key. It then encrypts this same symmetric key by the asymmetric algorithm using its reconstructed public key. The following steps are then identical to that described above.
- asymmetric keys used to encrypt and decrypt the symmetric session keys can be different from those used during the initialization step.
- a single pair of asymmetric keys is used, one private located in a protected memory area of the smart card and the other public dispersed in the application program.
- This pair of asymmetric keys is known to the supplier of the system which has implanted them in the smart card, respectively in the application program. The user of the system may therefore wish that this pair of asymmetric keys is only used for the initialization step enabling validation of access to a terminal as described above but is not used to encrypt the session key symmetric used to encrypt data.
- chip cards which comprise several different memory areas.
- a first memory area protected in write and read containing the private key giving access to a copy of the software comprising the corresponding public key as previously described, and a second memory area accessible only when the initialization step has been successful.
- the application program makes it possible to generate a second pair of asymmetric keys, for example of the RSA type, which are stored in the smart card.
- the smart card generates two random numbers and transmits them to the application software.
- the software calculates a pair of asymmetric keys from these two random numbers and verifies that the criteria of acceptability of the keys are respected.
- the keys thus generated are then transmitted to the smart card which saves them in the second memory area mentioned above.
- the pair of calculated keys that is to say the private key and the public key
- the pair of calculated keys can be stored in the smart card.
- These so-called private smart cards contain both a public key and a corresponding private key. They therefore make it possible to encrypt and decrypt the session keys used to encrypt the data. It is also possible to store only the public key in the smart card, the latter can then only be used for the encryption operation.
- the encryption operations for a file are as follows.
- the initialization step is identical to that described above.
- the application program asks the card to provide it with a random number which serves as a symmetric key for encrypting the data.
- the smart card then encrypts this symmetric key using the public asymmetric key contained in the second protected memory area and transmits this encrypted symmetric key to the application program.
- the latter forms a memory image grouping together the symmetric key encrypted by the asymmetric algorithm and the data encrypted according to the symmetric algorithm. This memory image can then be transmitted to its recipient.
- the decryption operation comprises the following steps. After a successful initialization, using the first pair of keys (private key in the card and public key dispersed in the application program), the application program separates the encrypted symmetric key from the data, then transmits the encrypted symmetric key to the smart card which decrypts it using the private key of the second set of asymmetric keys.
- the symmetric key once decrypted by the smart card, is transmitted to the application program which uses it to decrypt the data file using a symmetric algorithm.
- the second private key implanted in the smart card can be transmitted to the application program which uses it to decrypt the symmetric key using an asymmetric algorithm.
- the public key stored in the application program and used to authenticate a valid card / program combination is saved in clear in the application program. that is to say without being dispersed in a table of numbers.
- the user does not need to enter a passphrase to reconstitute the public key of the application program.
- PIN CODE personal identification code located in a protected memory area of the smart card.
- the size of the files to be processed is reduced by compressing them using a compression algorithm before the encryption operations.
- the previously compressed data file is then encrypted according to the methods set out above for transmission. By working on previously compressed data files, the time required for their encryption is reduced.
- the message transmitted on the communication network or by exchange of medium it is encrypted securely by means of a symmetrical algorithm, for example of the DES type, and contains the key which made it possible to encrypt it in a form which cannot be deciphered only by the holder of a card and a copy of the relevant program.
- a symmetrical algorithm for example of the DES type
- the fact that the message transmitted contains the symmetric key, itself coded, also facilitates data archiving.
- the symmetric session key is unique so that if it was decrypted by an unauthorized user, it can only decrypt a single message or transaction.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP00921003A EP1216458B1 (fr) | 1999-09-24 | 2000-05-11 | Procede permettant de securiser des donnees lors de transactions et systeme pour sa mise en oeuvre |
DE60032158T DE60032158T2 (de) | 1999-09-24 | 2000-05-11 | Verfahren zur absicherung von transaktionsdaten und system zur durchführung des verfahrens |
AU41401/00A AU4140100A (en) | 1999-09-24 | 2000-05-11 | Method for making secure data during transactions and implementing system |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CH1752/99 | 1999-09-24 | ||
CH01752/99A CH693295A5 (fr) | 1999-09-24 | 1999-09-24 | Procédé permettant de sécuriser des données lors detransactions et ensemble pour sa mise enoeuvre. |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2001022372A1 true WO2001022372A1 (fr) | 2001-03-29 |
Family
ID=4217740
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/IB2000/000625 WO2001022372A1 (fr) | 1999-09-24 | 2000-05-11 | Procede permettant de securiser des donnees lors de transactions et systeme pour sa mise en oeuvre |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1216458B1 (fr) |
AT (1) | ATE347152T1 (fr) |
AU (1) | AU4140100A (fr) |
CH (1) | CH693295A5 (fr) |
DE (1) | DE60032158T2 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2001022372A1 (fr) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7735132B2 (en) * | 2005-07-29 | 2010-06-08 | Research In Motion Limited | System and method for encrypted smart card PIN entry |
TWI774902B (zh) * | 2018-12-28 | 2022-08-21 | 新唐科技股份有限公司 | 密鑰保護方法及密鑰保護系統 |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10893033B2 (en) | 2018-06-28 | 2021-01-12 | Salesforce.Com, Inc. | Accessing client credential sets using a key |
Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB2100190A (en) * | 1981-06-05 | 1982-12-22 | Grey Lab Establishment | Protecting and checking documents |
US5317637A (en) * | 1991-12-24 | 1994-05-31 | Gao Gesellschaft Fur Automation Und Organisation Mbh | Data exchange system with a check of the apparatus for its authentication status |
EP0723251A2 (fr) * | 1995-01-20 | 1996-07-24 | Tandem Computers Incorporated | Procédé et appareil pour un utilisateur et dispositif de sécurité d'authentification |
EP0790587A1 (fr) * | 1996-02-14 | 1997-08-20 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Système de transmission comportant des dispositifs terminaux munis d'un circuit de prépaiement, dispositif terminal convenant à un tel système et procédé mis en oeuvre dans un tel système |
DE19716861A1 (de) * | 1997-04-22 | 1998-11-19 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verschlüsselungsverfahren und -vorrichtung |
GB2329499A (en) * | 1997-09-19 | 1999-03-24 | Ibm | Controlling access to electronically provided services |
-
1999
- 1999-09-24 CH CH01752/99A patent/CH693295A5/fr not_active IP Right Cessation
-
2000
- 2000-05-11 EP EP00921003A patent/EP1216458B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-05-11 WO PCT/IB2000/000625 patent/WO2001022372A1/fr active IP Right Grant
- 2000-05-11 AT AT00921003T patent/ATE347152T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2000-05-11 DE DE60032158T patent/DE60032158T2/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-05-11 AU AU41401/00A patent/AU4140100A/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB2100190A (en) * | 1981-06-05 | 1982-12-22 | Grey Lab Establishment | Protecting and checking documents |
US5317637A (en) * | 1991-12-24 | 1994-05-31 | Gao Gesellschaft Fur Automation Und Organisation Mbh | Data exchange system with a check of the apparatus for its authentication status |
EP0723251A2 (fr) * | 1995-01-20 | 1996-07-24 | Tandem Computers Incorporated | Procédé et appareil pour un utilisateur et dispositif de sécurité d'authentification |
EP0790587A1 (fr) * | 1996-02-14 | 1997-08-20 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Système de transmission comportant des dispositifs terminaux munis d'un circuit de prépaiement, dispositif terminal convenant à un tel système et procédé mis en oeuvre dans un tel système |
DE19716861A1 (de) * | 1997-04-22 | 1998-11-19 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verschlüsselungsverfahren und -vorrichtung |
GB2329499A (en) * | 1997-09-19 | 1999-03-24 | Ibm | Controlling access to electronically provided services |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7735132B2 (en) * | 2005-07-29 | 2010-06-08 | Research In Motion Limited | System and method for encrypted smart card PIN entry |
US8332935B2 (en) | 2005-07-29 | 2012-12-11 | Research In Motion Limited | System and method for encrypted smart card pin entry |
US9003516B2 (en) | 2005-07-29 | 2015-04-07 | Blackberry Limited | System and method for encrypted smart card pin entry |
TWI774902B (zh) * | 2018-12-28 | 2022-08-21 | 新唐科技股份有限公司 | 密鑰保護方法及密鑰保護系統 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
AU4140100A (en) | 2001-04-24 |
DE60032158T2 (de) | 2007-10-11 |
DE60032158D1 (de) | 2007-01-11 |
ATE347152T1 (de) | 2006-12-15 |
EP1216458B1 (fr) | 2006-11-29 |
EP1216458A1 (fr) | 2002-06-26 |
CH693295A5 (fr) | 2003-05-15 |
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