WO1999057901A1 - Mecanisme d'appariement entre un recepteur et un module de securite - Google Patents
Mecanisme d'appariement entre un recepteur et un module de securite Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO1999057901A1 WO1999057901A1 PCT/IB1999/000821 IB9900821W WO9957901A1 WO 1999057901 A1 WO1999057901 A1 WO 1999057901A1 IB 9900821 W IB9900821 W IB 9900821W WO 9957901 A1 WO9957901 A1 WO 9957901A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- receiver
- detachable
- module
- information
- security
- Prior art date
Links
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 32
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000013598 vector Substances 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/109—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by using specially-adapted hardware at the client
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/16—Program or content traceability, e.g. by watermarking
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/305—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals by remotely controlling device operation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
- G06F21/725—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits operating on a secure reference time value
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/77—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in smart cards
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
- G06F21/85—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices interconnection devices, e.g. bus-connected or in-line devices
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0806—Details of the card
- G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
- G07F7/0826—Embedded security module
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
- H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
- H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
- H04N21/4181—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
- H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
- H04N21/4367—Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N7/00—Television systems
- H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
- H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
- H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2141—Access rights, e.g. capability lists, access control lists, access tables, access matrices
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2143—Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
Definitions
- This invention relates to a system for controlling the transfer of information between a receiver and a security module, in particular for a pay-TV system, as well as to a method for controlling the transfer of scrambled information.
- a pay TV unscrambling system consists of a receiver and a security module. This module can be detachable or fixed. The task of the receiver is to unscramble the received signals. The main mission of the security module is to control the operation by verifying the descrambling authorization and by supplying, if necessary, the information necessary for the functioning of the descrambling module, for example by supplying descrambling vectors called "control word ".
- the given security module can only be used in the receiver for which the said security module has been designed;
- the information flow exchanged between the security module and the receiver is unique. This uniqueness prevents the public broadcasting of this stream allowing other receivers to work without the security module provided for this purpose.
- the solution proposed to the problems mentioned above uses at least one encryption key specific to the receiver.
- This (or these) key (s) is (are) called pairing key (s).
- At least one of the keys is different for each receiver.
- This (or these) key (s) is (are) installed (s) in the non-volatile memory of the receiver, either when the said receiver is manufactured, or at a later stage.
- the receiver does not provide the outside world with any means of access to this (these) key (s).
- One possible way to program this key in the security module is to use the central information system which manages the fleet of receivers and which can drown in the flow of the video transmission information for the programming of this key in the memory non-volatile and secret security modules.
- the formatting of this procedure is of course kept secret.
- the security module When transferring sensitive information and / or necessary for the operation of the system from the security module to the receiver (typically "control words", but other information can be transferred as well), the security module encrypts this information using one or more unique pairing keys, common to only the receiver / security module pair.
- the encryption method is arbitrary but known to the security module, and the receiver knows the corresponding decryption method. Once received by the receiver, this information is then decrypted by said receiver using the known decryption method and the pairing key. - 3 - stored in its non-volatile memory. Said information is then in clear and usable by said receiver.
- the invention therefore provides a system for controlling the transmission of information between a receiver and a security module, in particular for a pay television system, where the transmitted information is encrypted and decrypted by means of at least one key. unique encryption, stored on the one hand in the receiver, and on the other hand in the security module.
- the invention also relates to a scrambling system 0 for scrambled information and to a pay-TV system comprising a transmission control system.
- the invention relates to a method for controlling the transmission of information between a receiver and a security module, in particular for a pay television system, characterized in that at least one key is stored. single encryption, on the one hand in the receiver, and on the other hand in the security module, and that the information transmitted between the receiver and the security module is encrypted and decrypted by means of at least one said key unique encryption.
- the system may include a matching verification mechanism.
- the central information system can register a personal number with the receiver in the security module paired with said receiver, for example generated randomly by the latter, or simply use its serial number.
- a means is offered to the receiver to freely verify this personal number registered in the security module and to compare it with that stored in its non-volatile memory.
- This mechanism has the advantage of not using improper data.
- the result of an encryption followed by a decryption by a different key usually provides a pseudo-random result. If the result is not recognized as false and this result is used as it is, it could result in damage to the receiver or to the devices connected to it.
- Some types of receivers have a detachable descrambling module. This module supports a number of operations including the descrambling operation of the received signals. The transfer of sensitive information then takes place between the detachable security module and this detachable descrambling module. The encryption mechanism of the communication described above between a receiver and a security module is then transferred as it is between the detachable security module and the detachable descrambling module.
- the pairing mechanism described above between the security module and the receiver is then transferred as it is between the detachable security module and the detachable descrambling module.
- a transfer of scrambled signals then takes place between the detachable scrambling module and the receiver.
- the encryption mechanism of the communication as well as the matching mechanism described above, between the security module and the receiver, is then transferred as it is between the receiver and the detachable descrambling module.
- detachable unscrambling module and the detachable security module can be performed by a single module called the detachable descrambling and security module.
- the previously described matching mechanism is then transferred as is between the detachable unscrambling and security module and the receiver.
- the pairing key (s) can be used to encrypt a flow of sensitive data and / or necessary for the operation of the system in the opposite direction, by inverting respectively: - receiver and detachable security module ;
- a pairing key is specific to a device (receiver or detachable module)
- the same principles apply to the use of one (or more) own pairing key (s) ) to a group of devices.
- Figure 1 illustrates a configuration using a receiver and a detachable security module.
- Figure 2 illustrates a configuration using a receiver, a detachable unscrambling module and a detachable security module.
- Figure 3 illustrates a configuration using a receiver and a detachable descrambling and security module.
- Receiver A in Figure 1 receives a stream of scrambled video information 1 from a source such as a satellite or cable receiver.
- This flow of the order of several megabits per second, is formatted in the receiver A and then transmitted to a control unit B which is responsible for unscrambling and managing the authorization to access the scrambled video information.
- this control unit B periodically interrogates the detachable security module C (channel 3) which responds to it with a flow of sensitive data and / or necessary for the operation of the control unit B (channel 4) .
- These exchanges are carried out at low bit rates and can be easily processed by the microprocessors of the smart cards available on the market.
- the detachable security module C comprises at least one encryption key K in a non-volatile memory by which are encrypted the sensitive data and / or necessary for the operation of the control unit B (channel 4) to the receiver A.
- This key K is unique to the receiver A and registered with the detachable security module C, making the information flow 4 unique to this set.
- the public dissemination of this information 4 will no longer be of any use to other receivers because for the latter, not being in possession of the same key K, the flow of information is perfectly incomprehensible.
- the control unit B can recover the unscrambled video signal 2, this being processed and then transmitted in a standard form (PAL, SECAM, NTSC) to the video monitor.
- a variant of the invention implements an encryption of the same nature of the information 3 sent to the detachable security module C either by the same key K or by a different key J, unique and specific to the assembly formed by the receiver A and the detachable security module C. Thus, any attempt to find the key K of the information flow 4 is made much more difficult.
- Figure 2 illustrates a variant using a detachable descrambling module D integrating the control unit B.
- the video stream - 7 - scrambled 1 is shaped by the receiver A and routed to the detachable unscrambling module D.
- the operating mode described for Figure 1 between the receiver A and the detachable security module C is this time applied to the dialogue between the detachable descrambling module D and the detachable security module C.
- the key K is written in a secret part of the detachable descrambling module D in place of the receiver A.
- the information provided by the detachable security module C at detachable descrambling module D are encrypted and therefore without values for another detachable descrambling module D.
- the information transmitted to the receiver A constitutes a stream of unscrambled video information 6 which can be easily used, for illicit copies for example.
- the stream 6 is encrypted in the detachable unscrambling module D before being transmitted to the receiver A for decryption by the decryption unit E '. This operation is carried out by a key K ′ specific only to the receiver assembly A and to the detachable descrambling module D. Therefore, the information flow 6 no longer has any meaning and can only be understood by the receiver A having the same key K '.
- the receiver A can add control information to the detachable unscrambling module D.
- this information is encrypted by the encryption unit E to obtain a scrambled video stream 6 containing encrypted control information.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a variant of the invention where the detachable security module is integrated in a detachable security and unscrambling module F.
- the function of this module is to unscramble and manage the authorization of the video signals received by the receiver A
- this module comprises a unique encryption key, specific to the - 8 - receiver A and registered in this detachable unlocking and security module F.
- the unscrambled video stream 6 is encrypted by this key and transmitted in this form to receiver A.
- the latter thanks to the unit decryption E ', and using the same unique key, will be able to find the clear video signal.
- control information contained in the scrambled video stream 1 can be encrypted by means of a unique encryption key by the unit E before their transmission to the descrambling and security module. detachable F.
- the matching check can be carried out.
- the receiver A registers a personal number, for example its serial number, in the detachable security module C.
- the receiver can at any time, verify that the detachable security module C is indeed the one intended for him.
- the control can be done at two levels: a first level between the detachable unscrambling module D and the detachable security module C; and a second level between the detachable unscrambling module D and the receiver A. This second level is particularly important if the unscrambled information 6 is encrypted in the direction of the receiver A.
- the pairing control is carried out between the receiver A and the detachable descrambling and safety module F.
- the receiver A is an MPEG decoder using "control words" (information necessary for descrambling the signal) for descrambling the video signal.
- control words are provided by the detachable security module C.
- This module for example an intelligent smart card, includes a non-volatile memory for their storage. - 9 -
- the detachable descrambling module D is a PCMCIA type card including an MPEG decoder (control unit B).
- the detachable unscrambling and security module F is produced in the form of an intelligent chip card integrating an MPEG decoder and a security module C.
- the unique encryption key K is common to a group of receivers. This possibility is interesting, for example, in a school with several receivers to which the same detachable security module will be applied as required. Likewise, several detachable security modules include the same encryption key so that they can be placed in any of the receivers in the group.
- the pairing control is done on a number which is no longer specific to a receiver but to a group of receivers. A combination can be made with a number made up of two parts, one qualifying the group, the other qualifying the receiver. The uniqueness of the personal number is respected, the matching conformity test then being done more than on the group part of this number.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Technology Law (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
- Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
- Circuits Of Receivers In General (AREA)
- Compression Or Coding Systems Of Tv Signals (AREA)
- Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
- Input Circuits Of Receivers And Coupling Of Receivers And Audio Equipment (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (23)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
SI9930122T SI1078524T1 (en) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Mechanism for matching a receiver with a security module |
NZ507807A NZ507807A (en) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Mechanism for matching a receiver with a security module |
KR1020007012208A KR100607314B1 (ko) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | 수신기 및 보안 모듈간 정합 메카니즘 |
PL99343941A PL193427B1 (pl) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Sposób sterowania przesyłaniem informacji, systemi odłączalny moduł oraz deszyfrujący odbiornik stanowiący część systemu odbioru płatnej telewizji |
BRPI9909710A BRPI9909710B1 (pt) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | mecanismo para adaptar um receptor a um módulo de segurança |
JP2000547780A JP2002514862A (ja) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | レシーバおよびセキュリティモジュール間のマッチングメカニズム |
AT99917016T ATE222441T1 (de) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Anpassvorrichtung zwischen einem empfänger und einem sicherheitsmodul |
AU35297/99A AU751436B2 (en) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Mechanism for matching a receiver with a security module |
APAP/P/2000/002000A AP2000002000A0 (en) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Mechanism for matching a receiver with a security module. |
EEP200000639A EE200000639A (et) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Maksutelevisiooni vastuvõtusüsteem, meetod ülekantava informatsiooni kontrollimiseks, turvamoodul, deskrambleerimismoodul ja deskrambleerimisvastuvõtja |
IL13936499A IL139364A0 (en) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Mechanism for matching a receiver with a security module |
EP99917016A EP1078524B2 (fr) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Mecanisme d'appariement entre un recepteur et un module de securite |
HU0301133A HU224950B1 (en) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Pay tv receiver, removable security modul, removable decoder and method for controlling data transmission in pay tv receivers |
SK1649-2000A SK16492000A3 (sk) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Spôsob riadenia prenosu informácie a zariadenie na vykonávanie spôsobu |
DE69902527T DE69902527T3 (de) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Anpassvorrichtung zwischen einem empfänger und einem sicherheitsmodul |
EA200001072A EA002703B1 (ru) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Механизм согласования приемника с модулем защиты |
DK99917016T DK1078524T4 (da) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Parringsmekanisme mellem en modtager og et sikkerhedsmodul |
UA2000126986A UA60366C2 (uk) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-06-05 | Механізм узгодження приймача із захисним модулем |
IS5648A IS5648A (is) | 1998-05-07 | 2000-09-29 | Vélbúnaður til að para móttakara við öryggiseiningu |
IL139364A IL139364A (en) | 1998-05-07 | 2000-10-30 | A mechanism for adjusting a receiver with a security module |
BG104905A BG64137B1 (bg) | 1998-05-07 | 2000-11-02 | Механизъм за съгласуване на приемник със защитен модул |
NO20005533A NO331328B1 (no) | 1998-05-07 | 2000-11-02 | Mekanisme for a oppna tilpasning mellom en mottaker og en sikkerhetsmodul |
HR20000753A HRP20000753A2 (en) | 1998-05-07 | 2000-11-06 | Mechanism for matching a receiver with a security module |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
IB9800681 | 1998-05-07 | ||
IBPCT/IB98/00681 | 1998-05-07 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO1999057901A1 true WO1999057901A1 (fr) | 1999-11-11 |
Family
ID=11004712
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/IB1999/000821 WO1999057901A1 (fr) | 1998-05-07 | 1999-05-06 | Mecanisme d'appariement entre un recepteur et un module de securite |
Country Status (37)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1078524B2 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP2002514862A (fr) |
KR (1) | KR100607314B1 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN1181684C (fr) |
AP (1) | AP2000002000A0 (fr) |
AR (1) | AR015072A1 (fr) |
AT (1) | ATE222441T1 (fr) |
AU (1) | AU751436B2 (fr) |
BG (1) | BG64137B1 (fr) |
BR (1) | BRPI9909710B1 (fr) |
CU (1) | CU22758A3 (fr) |
CZ (1) | CZ301694B6 (fr) |
DE (1) | DE69902527T3 (fr) |
DK (1) | DK1078524T4 (fr) |
EA (1) | EA002703B1 (fr) |
EE (1) | EE200000639A (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2181418T5 (fr) |
GE (1) | GEP20032936B (fr) |
HR (1) | HRP20000753A2 (fr) |
HU (1) | HU224950B1 (fr) |
ID (1) | ID26103A (fr) |
IL (2) | IL139364A0 (fr) |
IS (1) | IS5648A (fr) |
MY (1) | MY124673A (fr) |
NO (1) | NO331328B1 (fr) |
NZ (1) | NZ507807A (fr) |
OA (1) | OA12034A (fr) |
PL (1) | PL193427B1 (fr) |
PT (1) | PT1078524E (fr) |
SI (1) | SI1078524T1 (fr) |
SK (1) | SK16492000A3 (fr) |
TR (1) | TR200003258T2 (fr) |
TW (1) | TW412909B (fr) |
UA (1) | UA60366C2 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO1999057901A1 (fr) |
YU (1) | YU49340B (fr) |
ZA (1) | ZA200006172B (fr) |
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EP1211898A2 (fr) * | 2000-11-20 | 2002-06-05 | Nokia Corporation | Système de protection de contenu numérique pour des enregistreurs digitaux |
WO2004114664A1 (fr) | 2003-06-20 | 2004-12-29 | Nagravision Sa | Décodeur et système destiné au traitement de données de télévision à péage et procédé pour la gestion d’au moins deux décodeurs |
FR2866772A1 (fr) * | 2004-02-20 | 2005-08-26 | Viaccess Sa | Procede d'appariement d'un terminal recepteur avec une pluralite de cartes de controle d'acces |
FR2866773A1 (fr) * | 2004-02-20 | 2005-08-26 | Viaccess Sa | Procede d'appariement d'un nombre n de terminaux recepteurs avec un nombre m de cartes de controle d'acces conditionnel |
WO2006100361A1 (fr) * | 2005-03-23 | 2006-09-28 | Viaccess | Procédé d ' appar iement entre un terminal et un processeur de sécurité, système et programme informatique pour la mise en œuvre du procéde |
EP1742474A1 (fr) * | 2005-07-07 | 2007-01-10 | Nagracard S.A. | Méthode et dispositif de contrôle d'accès à des données chiffrées |
US7436953B2 (en) | 2001-09-13 | 2008-10-14 | Nds Limited | Hacking prevention system |
EP1377035B1 (fr) * | 2002-06-28 | 2010-02-24 | Nagravision S.A. | Méthode de mise à jour de clés de sécurité dans un décodeur de télévision |
FR2940691A1 (fr) * | 2008-12-31 | 2010-07-02 | Viaccess Sa | Procedes de transmission, de reception et d'identification, processeur de securite et support d'enregistrement d'informations pour ces procedes. |
US8528106B2 (en) | 2004-02-20 | 2013-09-03 | Viaccess | Process for matching a number N of reception terminals with a number M of conditional access control cards |
US8549655B2 (en) | 2008-05-29 | 2013-10-01 | Nagravision S.A. | Unit and method for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data |
US8683581B2 (en) | 2010-12-01 | 2014-03-25 | Nagravision S.A. | Method for authenticating a terminal |
US8782417B2 (en) | 2009-12-17 | 2014-07-15 | Nagravision S.A. | Method and processing unit for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data |
US8819434B2 (en) | 2009-12-17 | 2014-08-26 | Nagravision S.A. | Method and processing unit for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data |
US9197312B2 (en) | 2013-03-11 | 2015-11-24 | Nagravision S.A. | Near field communication system in a local network |
US9215505B2 (en) | 2013-05-07 | 2015-12-15 | Nagravision S.A. | Method and system for secure processing a stream of encrypted digital audio/video data |
US9582685B2 (en) | 2010-11-19 | 2017-02-28 | Nagravision S.A. | Method to detect cloned software |
US9686580B2 (en) | 2012-03-30 | 2017-06-20 | Nagravision S.A. | Security device for pay-tv receiver decoder |
EP3293979A1 (fr) * | 2016-09-09 | 2018-03-14 | Nagravision S.A. | Marquage pour un dispositif de rendu hôte par un dispositif de traitement multimédia portable |
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US7224797B2 (en) * | 2001-08-17 | 2007-05-29 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | System and method for hybrid conditional access for receivers of encrypted transmissions |
TW200421811A (en) * | 2002-09-24 | 2004-10-16 | Nagracard Sa | Multiple pairing control method |
US7224310B2 (en) | 2002-11-20 | 2007-05-29 | Nagravision S.A. | Method and device for the recognition of the origin of encrypted data broadcasting |
US7992175B2 (en) | 2006-05-15 | 2011-08-02 | The Directv Group, Inc. | Methods and apparatus to provide content on demand in content broadcast systems |
FR2902585B1 (fr) * | 2006-06-14 | 2008-09-26 | Viaccess Sa | Procedes de diffusion et de reception d'un programme multimedia embrouille, tete de reseau, terminal, recepteur et processeur de securite pour ces procedes |
FR2905215B1 (fr) * | 2006-08-23 | 2009-01-09 | Viaccess Sa | Procede de transmission d'une donnee complementaire a un terminal de reception |
EP1968316A1 (fr) | 2007-03-06 | 2008-09-10 | Nagravision S.A. | Procédé pour contrôler l'accès à des contenus audio/vidéo d'accès conditionnel |
FR2921175A1 (fr) * | 2007-09-14 | 2009-03-20 | Sagem Securite Sa | Carte a circuit integre a tampon d'entree/sortie securise |
ATE484148T1 (de) | 2008-02-11 | 2010-10-15 | Nagravision Sa | Methode zur aktualisierung und verwaltung einer anwendung für die verarbeitung von audiovisuellen daten in einer multimediaeinheit über ein modul mit bedingtem zugriff |
EP2373019A1 (fr) | 2010-03-29 | 2011-10-05 | Nagravision S.A. | Débrouillage sécurisé d'un flux de données audio/vidéo |
WO2012072772A1 (fr) | 2010-12-02 | 2012-06-07 | Nagravision S.A. | Système et procédé d'enregistrement de contenu crypté présentant des conditions d'accès |
WO2013004597A1 (fr) | 2011-07-01 | 2013-01-10 | Nagravision S.A. | Procédé de lecture d'évènements pouvant être répétés sur un lecteur multimédia |
EP2827601A1 (fr) | 2013-07-19 | 2015-01-21 | Nagravision S.A. | Méthode et dispositif pour la protection des clés de déchiffrement d'un décodeur |
CN108833944A (zh) * | 2018-07-09 | 2018-11-16 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | 视频分发方法 |
DE102021101101A1 (de) | 2021-01-20 | 2022-07-21 | zereOS GmbH | Adapter und Verfahren zum Beeinflussen oder Diagnostizieren eines Geräts |
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EP1211898A2 (fr) * | 2000-11-20 | 2002-06-05 | Nokia Corporation | Système de protection de contenu numérique pour des enregistreurs digitaux |
EP1211898A3 (fr) * | 2000-11-20 | 2002-10-02 | Nokia Corporation | Système de protection de contenu numérique pour des enregistreurs digitaux |
US6959090B1 (en) | 2000-11-20 | 2005-10-25 | Nokia Corporation | Content Protection scheme for a digital recording device |
US7436953B2 (en) | 2001-09-13 | 2008-10-14 | Nds Limited | Hacking prevention system |
EP1377035B1 (fr) * | 2002-06-28 | 2010-02-24 | Nagravision S.A. | Méthode de mise à jour de clés de sécurité dans un décodeur de télévision |
WO2004114664A1 (fr) | 2003-06-20 | 2004-12-29 | Nagravision Sa | Décodeur et système destiné au traitement de données de télévision à péage et procédé pour la gestion d’au moins deux décodeurs |
WO2005081526A1 (fr) * | 2004-02-20 | 2005-09-01 | Viaccess | Procede d'appariement d'un nombre n de terminaux recepteurs avec un nombre m de cartes de controle d'acces conditionnel |
WO2005081525A1 (fr) * | 2004-02-20 | 2005-09-01 | Viaccess | Procede d'appariement d'un terminal recepteur avec une pluralite de cartes de controle d'acces |
US8528106B2 (en) | 2004-02-20 | 2013-09-03 | Viaccess | Process for matching a number N of reception terminals with a number M of conditional access control cards |
KR101155243B1 (ko) | 2004-02-20 | 2012-07-06 | 비악세스 | 복수개의 접근 제어 카드로 수신 단말기를 매칭시키는 방법 |
FR2866773A1 (fr) * | 2004-02-20 | 2005-08-26 | Viaccess Sa | Procede d'appariement d'un nombre n de terminaux recepteurs avec un nombre m de cartes de controle d'acces conditionnel |
FR2866772A1 (fr) * | 2004-02-20 | 2005-08-26 | Viaccess Sa | Procede d'appariement d'un terminal recepteur avec une pluralite de cartes de controle d'acces |
WO2006100361A1 (fr) * | 2005-03-23 | 2006-09-28 | Viaccess | Procédé d ' appar iement entre un terminal et un processeur de sécurité, système et programme informatique pour la mise en œuvre du procéde |
FR2883683A1 (fr) * | 2005-03-23 | 2006-09-29 | Viaccess Sa | Procede d'appariement entre un terminal et un processeur de securite, systeme et programme informatique pour la mise en oeuvre du procede |
US7908491B2 (en) | 2005-07-07 | 2011-03-15 | Nagracard S.A. | Method and device for controlling access to encrypted data |
WO2007006735A1 (fr) * | 2005-07-07 | 2007-01-18 | Nagracard S.A. | Methode et dispositif de controle d'acces a des donnees chiffrees |
EP1742474A1 (fr) * | 2005-07-07 | 2007-01-10 | Nagracard S.A. | Méthode et dispositif de contrôle d'accès à des données chiffrées |
US8549655B2 (en) | 2008-05-29 | 2013-10-01 | Nagravision S.A. | Unit and method for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data |
CN102265634B (zh) * | 2008-12-31 | 2014-12-24 | 维亚塞斯公司 | 一种传送、接收及识别方法,及安全处理器与记录载体 |
CN102265634A (zh) * | 2008-12-31 | 2011-11-30 | 维亚塞斯公司 | 一种传送、接收及识别方法,及安全处理器与记录载体 |
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WO2010076163A1 (fr) * | 2008-12-31 | 2010-07-08 | Viaccess | Procédés de transmission, de réception et d'identification, processeur de sécurité et support d'enregistrement d'informations pour ces procédés |
US9258612B2 (en) | 2008-12-31 | 2016-02-09 | Viaccess | Transmission, reception and identification methods, security processor and information recording medium for said methods |
US8782417B2 (en) | 2009-12-17 | 2014-07-15 | Nagravision S.A. | Method and processing unit for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data |
US8819434B2 (en) | 2009-12-17 | 2014-08-26 | Nagravision S.A. | Method and processing unit for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data |
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US9946855B2 (en) | 2010-11-19 | 2018-04-17 | Nagravision S.A. | Method to detect cloned software |
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US9686580B2 (en) | 2012-03-30 | 2017-06-20 | Nagravision S.A. | Security device for pay-tv receiver decoder |
US9819988B2 (en) | 2012-03-30 | 2017-11-14 | Nagravision S. A. | Security device for pay-TV receiver decoder |
US9344154B2 (en) | 2013-03-11 | 2016-05-17 | Nagravision S.A. | Near field communication system in a local network |
US9197312B2 (en) | 2013-03-11 | 2015-11-24 | Nagravision S.A. | Near field communication system in a local network |
US9215505B2 (en) | 2013-05-07 | 2015-12-15 | Nagravision S.A. | Method and system for secure processing a stream of encrypted digital audio/video data |
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WO2018046631A1 (fr) * | 2016-09-09 | 2018-03-15 | Nagravision S.A. | Étiquetage de dispositif de rendu hôte par un dispositif de traitement multimédia portable |
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