WO1999021142A1 - Tamper respondent enclosure - Google Patents
Tamper respondent enclosure Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO1999021142A1 WO1999021142A1 PCT/GB1998/003125 GB9803125W WO9921142A1 WO 1999021142 A1 WO1999021142 A1 WO 1999021142A1 GB 9803125 W GB9803125 W GB 9803125W WO 9921142 A1 WO9921142 A1 WO 9921142A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- enclosure
- layer
- lines
- wall
- area
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
- G08B13/12—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires
- G08B13/126—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires for a housing, e.g. a box, a safe, or a room
- G08B13/128—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires for a housing, e.g. a box, a safe, or a room the housing being an electronic circuit unit, e.g. memory or CPU chip
Definitions
- This invention relates to a tamper respondent enclosure .
- a tamper respondent enclosure may be used in the transport and storage of sensitive information, including information which is stored electronically.
- a tamper respondent enclosure includes means which, on detection of an attempt to penetrate the enclosure, initiates an appropriate response, for example activation of an alarm, or destruction or erasure of the sensitive material contained within the enclosure.
- a tamper respondent enclosure features a wall including appropriate penetration detection circuitry. Examples of tamper respondent enclosures, and laminates suitable for forming the walls of tamper respondent enclosures are described in our earlier patent application Nos .
- the enclosures disclosed in these documents are typically in the form of envelopes or shallow boxes, the walls of which are formed by folding flexible sheets incorporating tamper respondent features around the subject to be protected, to leave no direct opening through which penetration may be accomplished.
- the flexible sheets may include tracks or lines of conductive material forming part of one or more sensor circuits; an attempt to penetrate the enclosure resulting in damage to one or more of the lines creates a detectable change in the electrical state of the lines.
- drills having a diameter of as little as 0.05 mm are available, and using such a drill it may be possible to drill a hole through a tamper respondent sheet without breaking one of the monitored lines. Accordingly, it is conceivable that a small diameter hole could be drilled through a tamper respondent sheet and the penetration of the sheet remain undetected.
- a tamper respondent enclosure comprising: a wall including at least two layers; at least a first layer of the wall comprising a sheet of insulating material having lines of conductive material on first and second sides thereof, said lines forming part of at least one sensor circuit; means for detecting an interruption in said at least one circuit; a second layer of the wall comprising an area of conductive material separated from said lines by insulating material; and means for detecting an electrical connection between at least one of said lines and said area, the layers being arranged such that, at any point in the wall, the wall section includes at least one of said lines and said area.
- the invention is useful in detecting attempted penetration of the wall of the enclosure using metal drills which are small enough to penetrate an individual line without cutting the line, and thus will not create an interruption in the sensor circuit.
- a drill passes through one of the lines, the drill will create a detectable electrical connection on contacting the area of conductive material.
- at least one of the lines and the area is formed of a low melt material which is fluidised by the heat created by a drilling operation, such that the fluidised material will flow through the drilled hole and create an electrical connection between the line and the area; of course this arrangement would also detect penetration by a small diameter drill of non-conductive material.
- the area of conductive material of the second layer is provided by a conductive enclosure, most preferably a metal enclosure.
- the enclosure may be provided internally or externally of the layer including the lines of conductive material.
- the enclosure may be rigid or may be formed of a flexible material.
- the area of conductive material of the second layer may be earthed.
- the area of conductive material of the second layer may be provided by lines of conductive material of a layer comprising a sheet of insulating material with lines of conductive material on first and second sides thereof. Said lines may form part of a sensor circuit and be provided in combination with means for detecting an interruption in said circuit.
- the sensor circuit may form part of the sensor circuit for the first layer or may be operate independently thereof.
- the detection means may be common to the first and second layers or separate detection means may be provided for each layer.
- the first and second layers may be of similar form.
- the lines of conductive material on the first and second sides of the first layer are arranged such that at any point in the layer a layer section includes at least one of said lines.
- the lines are non-rectilinear.
- the insulating material tends to be disrupted by drilling, for example the material may incorporate fibres, or may bind to a drill, or may fracture on contact with a drill or the like.
- a method of forming a tamper respondent enclosure comprising the steps: providing at least a first layer comprising a sheet of insulating material having lines of conductive material on first and second sides thereof; connecting said lines to at least one sensor circuit including means for detecting an interruption in said at least one circuit; providing a second layer comprising an area of conductive material; providing means for detecting an electrical connection between at least one of said lines and said area; and arranging the layers to define a wall of an enclosure such that, at any point in the wall, the wall thickness includes at least one of said lines and said area.
- a tamper respondent enclosure comprising: a first enclosure portion having a wall including a layer of insulating material carrying lines of conductive material thereon, said lines forming part of at least one sensor circuit; means for detecting an interruption in said at least one circuit; a metal second enclosure portion; and means for detecting an electrical connection between at least one of said lines and said second enclosure portion.
- a tamper respondent enclosure comprising an insulated conductive enclosure portion; and means for detecting an change in an electrical characteristic of said enclosure portion.
- a reference voltage may be applied to the enclosure portion and on the enclosure portion being contacted by an earthed metal drill or other electrically conductive object there will be a detectable change in the monitored reference voltage.
- the capacitance of the enclosure portion may be monitored, by application of an AC reference potential, and there will be a detectable change in the monitored capacitance of the enclosure portion if another conductive object is brought into contact with the enclosure portion.
- Figure 1 is a perspective cut-away view of a tamper respondent enclosure in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention
- Figure 2 is a greatly enlarged schematic cross- sectional view of a portion of the wall of the enclosure of Figure 1;
- Figure 3 is a plan view of the wall portion of Figure 2;
- Figure 4 corresponds to Figure 2, and shows a small diameter drill penetrating part of the wall
- Figure 5 is a schematic illustration of elements of the enclosure of Figure 1;
- Figure 6 is a greatly enlarged schematic cross - sectional view of a portion of a wall of an enclosure in accordance with a further embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 7 is a circuit diagram representing the wall portions of Figure 6.
- FIG. 1 of the drawings illustrates a tamper respondent enclosure in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
- the enclosure 10 carries security sensitive information in an encryption module 12, access to the module 12 requiring use of a variable key, the nature of the key being retained in a memory 14.
- the enclosure is arranged to detect attempts to tamper with or penetrate the enclosure and accordingly contains an enclosure monitor 16 which, if tampering is 5 detected, activates an erase circuit 18 to erase the information stored in the memory 14 and encryption module 12.
- PCB printed circuit board
- the walls of the enclosure comprise three primary components: an inner metal enclosure portion 24; an intermediate enclosure portion 26 in form of a folded tamper respondent laminate 32; and an outer enclosure portion in the form of a moulding 28.
- the tamper respondent laminate 32 includes various detection layers which are monitored, via ribbon cable 30, by the enclosure monitor 16.
- the metal enclosure portion 24 provides physical protection against violent attempts to penetrate the enclosure 10 and disengage the
- the enclosure portion 24 also operates in conjunction with the laminate 32 to detect attempts to penetrate the enclosure using small diameter metal drills, as will be described.
- the tamper respondent laminate 32 may take a variety of forms, as described in the above-identified patent applications.
- the laminate 32 includes two primary layers 34, 35, as illustrated schematically in Figure 2 of the drawings.
- Each layer 34 comprises a thin insulating film 36, 37 carrying conductive tracks 38, 39, 40, 41 on the first and second sides thereof.
- the tracks 38 - 41 form a number of continuous conductors which will be broken if attempts are made to penetrate the films 36, 37.
- the tracks 38 - 41 are connected to the monitor 16, which continually monitors the electrical condition of the tracks .
- the tracks 38 - 41 may be arranged in any suitable pattern, and Figure 3 of the drawings illustrates non- rectilinear "saw tooth" tracks 38 on the upper face of the film 36.
- the tracks 38 are formed of semi -conductive ink which has been printed onto the film 36.
- the tracks 39 on the opposite side of the film 36 are the same pattern but are offset to lie directly below the spaces 42 between the tracks 38; the tracks 38, 39 are of a width and pitch, for example 250 and 500 microns, such that piercing of the film 36 at any point results in damage to at least one of the tracks 38, 39.
- the films 36, 37 are adhered to one another by adhesive (not shown) and are adhered to and folded around the metal enclosure portion 24 (adhesive not shown) , in a similar manner to gift wrapping a parcel.
- the film-wrapped metal enclosure portion 24 is located within a mould which is filled with cold pour thermosetting resin. The resin is cured and hardened to form the outer enclosure portion 28.
- the PCB 20 carrying the encryption module 12, memory
- monitor 16 erase circuit 18 and battery 22 are located within the metal enclosure portion 24, and the metal enclosure portion 24 is earthed to the PCB 20, as illustrated at 44 in Figure 5 of the drawings .
- the drill 46 may pass relatively easily through the moulding 28 and the intermediate enclosure portion 26, before encountering the metal enclosure portion 24, and such a partial penetration of the enclosure 10 is illustrated in Figure 4 of the drawings. If the drill 46 is of sufficiently small diameter, it is possible that the drill may pass through one or more tracks 38 - 41 without interrupting the conductive path through the tracks. However, if, as illustrated in Figure 4, the drill 46 passes through two tracks 38, 40, the metal drill 46 will form an electrical connection between the tracks 38, 40, which connection will result in a detectable change in an electrical characteristic of the conductors of which the tracks 38, 40 form a part.
- the track would be earthed to the PCB 20, via the drill 46, the enclosure portion 24 and the earth connection 44, again providing a detectable change in one or more electrical characteristics of the circuit of which the track 38 forms a part.
- the tracks 38 - 41 are formed of a low melt material, that is conductive ink which will melt at the elevated temperatures created by the action of the drill 46 passing through the intermediate enclosure portion 26.
- the conductive material which forms the tracks 38, 40 through which the drill 46 passes will be fluidised, and will flow through the holes 48, 49 created in the films 36, 37 by the drill 46; the fluidised material will provide a detectable electrical connection between the tracks 38, 40 and also between the tracks 38, 40 and the metal enclosure portion 24.
- FIG. 6 illustrates part of the wall 60 of an enclosure in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- the wall 60 incorporates a tamper respondent laminate 32 as described above.
- a further laminate 62 located inwardly of the laminate 32 is a further laminate 62, as described below.
- the laminate 62 comprises a very thin insulating film 63 of PET, PVC, polypropylene or PEN coated on each side with a layer of semi-conductive ink 64, 66.
- the ink is a low melt composition such that the ink will melt and flow when drilled. Further, the ink is printed relatively thickly to the same thickness as the film 62.
- the elements of the laminates 32, 62 are connected to form a sensor circuit 68 as illustrated in Figure 7 of the drawings.
- the tracks are arranged to define conductors 70, 71, 72, 73 and are arranged as a balanced bridge circuit with reference voltages being applied at appropriate points in the circuit.
- the ink layers 64, 66 are illustrated as a normally open switch element . Passage of a metal drill through the laminate 62 will create an electrical connection between the layer 64, 66, which will create a significant and detectable electrical imbalance in the circuit 68, detectable by the monitor 16. Of course, the drill may also disrupt one or more of the tracks 38 - 41, which disruption will also be detected.
- an enclosure in accordance with the invention may incorporate one or more of the many tamper respondent features described in the above-described patent applications. Further, in other embodiments, only a single tamper respondent layer 34, 35 may be provided in combination with the metal enclosure portion.
- an enclosure wall of an embodiment of the invention may consist of a normally insulated metal enclosure or a conductive ink laminate which is monitored to detect a conductive object, such as a metal drill or probe, contacting the enclosure or laminate and changing an electrical characteristic thereof.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU94535/98A AU9453598A (en) | 1997-10-17 | 1998-10-19 | Tamper respondent enclosure |
CA002306101A CA2306101A1 (en) | 1997-10-17 | 1998-10-19 | Tamper respondent enclosure |
EP98947701A EP1023707A1 (en) | 1997-10-17 | 1998-10-19 | Tamper respondent enclosure |
JP2000517388A JP2001521231A (en) | 1997-10-17 | 1998-10-19 | Alteration reaction enclosure |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GB9721932.3 | 1997-10-17 | ||
GBGB9721932.3A GB9721932D0 (en) | 1997-10-17 | 1997-10-17 | Tamper respondent enclosure |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO1999021142A1 true WO1999021142A1 (en) | 1999-04-29 |
Family
ID=10820658
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/GB1998/003125 WO1999021142A1 (en) | 1997-10-17 | 1998-10-19 | Tamper respondent enclosure |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1023707A1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2001521231A (en) |
AU (1) | AU9453598A (en) |
CA (1) | CA2306101A1 (en) |
GB (1) | GB9721932D0 (en) |
WO (1) | WO1999021142A1 (en) |
Cited By (43)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6895509B1 (en) | 2000-09-21 | 2005-05-17 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Tamper detection system for securing data |
WO2005098950A1 (en) * | 2004-04-08 | 2005-10-20 | W.L. Gore & Associates (Uk) Limited | Tamper respondent covering |
US6996953B2 (en) | 2004-01-23 | 2006-02-14 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System and method for installing a tamper barrier wrap in a PCB assembly, including a PCB assembly having improved heat sinking |
US7156233B2 (en) | 2004-06-15 | 2007-01-02 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Tamper barrier enclosure with corner protection |
FR2888025A1 (en) * | 2005-06-30 | 2007-01-05 | Sagem Comm | FILM MATERIAL FOR DETECTION OF INTRUSION, AND SECURE CONTAINER INCORPORATING SUCH MATERIAL |
US7180008B2 (en) | 2004-01-23 | 2007-02-20 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Tamper barrier for electronic device |
DE102006017506A1 (en) * | 2006-04-13 | 2007-10-18 | Thales E-Transactions Gmbh | Protective cover for e.g. cash-point dispenser, has inner and outer surfaces limited by contact surface, where cover is formed such that it rests against plate at contact surface and area is enclosed by combination of plate and cover |
US7760086B2 (en) | 2006-11-03 | 2010-07-20 | Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc | Tamper respondent sensor and enclosure |
US7787256B2 (en) | 2007-08-10 | 2010-08-31 | Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. | Tamper respondent system |
US8201267B2 (en) | 2008-10-24 | 2012-06-12 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Cryptographic device having active clearing of memory regardless of state of external power |
GB2504480A (en) * | 2012-07-27 | 2014-02-05 | Johnson Electric Sa | Multilayer Security Wrap Film for Protecting Electronic Device. |
GB2515996A (en) * | 2013-04-15 | 2015-01-14 | Johnson Electric Sa | Security wrap with tearable substrate |
CN105938818A (en) * | 2015-03-04 | 2016-09-14 | 国际商业机器公司 | Electronic package method and system with heat transfer element(s) |
US9554477B1 (en) | 2015-12-18 | 2017-01-24 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with enclosure-to-board protection |
US9555606B1 (en) | 2015-12-09 | 2017-01-31 | International Business Machines Corporation | Applying pressure to adhesive using CTE mismatch between components |
US9578764B1 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2017-02-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | Enclosure with inner tamper-respondent sensor(s) and physical security element(s) |
US9591776B1 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2017-03-07 | International Business Machines Corporation | Enclosure with inner tamper-respondent sensor(s) |
US9858776B1 (en) | 2016-06-28 | 2018-01-02 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assembly with nonlinearity monitoring |
US9881880B2 (en) | 2016-05-13 | 2018-01-30 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-proof electronic packages with stressed glass component substrate(s) |
US9894749B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-02-13 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with bond protection |
US9904811B2 (en) | 2016-04-27 | 2018-02-27 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-proof electronic packages with two-phase dielectric fluid |
US9913370B2 (en) | 2016-05-13 | 2018-03-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-proof electronic packages formed with stressed glass |
US9911012B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-03-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Overlapping, discrete tamper-respondent sensors |
US9913389B2 (en) | 2015-12-01 | 2018-03-06 | International Business Corporation Corporation | Tamper-respondent assembly with vent structure |
US9916744B2 (en) | 2016-02-25 | 2018-03-13 | International Business Machines Corporation | Multi-layer stack with embedded tamper-detect protection |
US9924591B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-03-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies |
US9978231B2 (en) | 2015-10-21 | 2018-05-22 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assembly with protective wrap(s) over tamper-respondent sensor(s) |
US9999124B2 (en) | 2016-11-02 | 2018-06-12 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with trace regions of increased susceptibility to breaking |
US10098235B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-10-09 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with region(s) of increased susceptibility to damage |
US10136519B2 (en) | 2015-10-19 | 2018-11-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Circuit layouts of tamper-respondent sensors |
US10172239B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-01-01 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent sensors with formed flexible layer(s) |
US10168185B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-01-01 | International Business Machines Corporation | Circuit boards and electronic packages with embedded tamper-respondent sensor |
US10271424B2 (en) | 2016-09-26 | 2019-04-23 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with in situ vent structure(s) |
US10299372B2 (en) | 2016-09-26 | 2019-05-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | Vented tamper-respondent assemblies |
US10306753B1 (en) | 2018-02-22 | 2019-05-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | Enclosure-to-board interface with tamper-detect circuit(s) |
US10321589B2 (en) | 2016-09-19 | 2019-06-11 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assembly with sensor connection adapter |
US10327329B2 (en) | 2017-02-13 | 2019-06-18 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assembly with flexible tamper-detect sensor(s) overlying in-situ-formed tamper-detect sensor |
US10327343B2 (en) | 2015-12-09 | 2019-06-18 | International Business Machines Corporation | Applying pressure to adhesive using CTE mismatch between components |
US10426037B2 (en) | 2015-07-15 | 2019-09-24 | International Business Machines Corporation | Circuitized structure with 3-dimensional configuration |
US10719633B2 (en) | 2015-04-29 | 2020-07-21 | Utimaco, Inc. | Inhibiting a penetration attack |
WO2020160082A1 (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2020-08-06 | Texas Instruments Incorporated | Tamper detection |
US11089675B2 (en) | 2018-10-22 | 2021-08-10 | Te Connectivity Corporation | Tamper sensor |
US11122682B2 (en) | 2018-04-04 | 2021-09-14 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent sensors with liquid crystal polymer layers |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB2256956A (en) * | 1991-06-21 | 1992-12-23 | Gore & Ass | Security enclosures |
GB2297540A (en) * | 1993-03-12 | 1996-08-07 | Gore & Ass | Tamper respondent enclosure |
-
1997
- 1997-10-17 GB GBGB9721932.3A patent/GB9721932D0/en not_active Ceased
-
1998
- 1998-10-19 WO PCT/GB1998/003125 patent/WO1999021142A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1998-10-19 JP JP2000517388A patent/JP2001521231A/en active Pending
- 1998-10-19 EP EP98947701A patent/EP1023707A1/en not_active Withdrawn
- 1998-10-19 AU AU94535/98A patent/AU9453598A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1998-10-19 CA CA002306101A patent/CA2306101A1/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB2256956A (en) * | 1991-06-21 | 1992-12-23 | Gore & Ass | Security enclosures |
GB2297540A (en) * | 1993-03-12 | 1996-08-07 | Gore & Ass | Tamper respondent enclosure |
Cited By (90)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6895509B1 (en) | 2000-09-21 | 2005-05-17 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Tamper detection system for securing data |
US7180008B2 (en) | 2004-01-23 | 2007-02-20 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Tamper barrier for electronic device |
US6996953B2 (en) | 2004-01-23 | 2006-02-14 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System and method for installing a tamper barrier wrap in a PCB assembly, including a PCB assembly having improved heat sinking |
US7475474B2 (en) | 2004-01-23 | 2009-01-13 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Method of making tamper detection circuit for an electronic device |
WO2005098950A1 (en) * | 2004-04-08 | 2005-10-20 | W.L. Gore & Associates (Uk) Limited | Tamper respondent covering |
US7978070B2 (en) | 2004-04-08 | 2011-07-12 | W. L. Gore & Associates (Uk) Ltd. | Tamper respondent enclosure |
US7156233B2 (en) | 2004-06-15 | 2007-01-02 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Tamper barrier enclosure with corner protection |
EP1742184A1 (en) * | 2005-06-30 | 2007-01-10 | SAGEM Communication | Film material for intrusion detection and secure container including such material |
FR2888025A1 (en) * | 2005-06-30 | 2007-01-05 | Sagem Comm | FILM MATERIAL FOR DETECTION OF INTRUSION, AND SECURE CONTAINER INCORPORATING SUCH MATERIAL |
DE102006017506A1 (en) * | 2006-04-13 | 2007-10-18 | Thales E-Transactions Gmbh | Protective cover for e.g. cash-point dispenser, has inner and outer surfaces limited by contact surface, where cover is formed such that it rests against plate at contact surface and area is enclosed by combination of plate and cover |
US7760086B2 (en) | 2006-11-03 | 2010-07-20 | Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc | Tamper respondent sensor and enclosure |
US7787256B2 (en) | 2007-08-10 | 2010-08-31 | Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. | Tamper respondent system |
US8201267B2 (en) | 2008-10-24 | 2012-06-12 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Cryptographic device having active clearing of memory regardless of state of external power |
GB2504480A (en) * | 2012-07-27 | 2014-02-05 | Johnson Electric Sa | Multilayer Security Wrap Film for Protecting Electronic Device. |
US9209139B2 (en) | 2012-07-27 | 2015-12-08 | Johnson Electric S.A. | Multilayer security wrap |
US9721199B2 (en) | 2013-04-15 | 2017-08-01 | Johnson Electric S.A. | Security wrap with tearable substrate |
GB2515996A (en) * | 2013-04-15 | 2015-01-14 | Johnson Electric Sa | Security wrap with tearable substrate |
US9560737B2 (en) | 2015-03-04 | 2017-01-31 | International Business Machines Corporation | Electronic package with heat transfer element(s) |
US10237964B2 (en) | 2015-03-04 | 2019-03-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | Manufacturing electronic package with heat transfer element(s) |
CN105938818A (en) * | 2015-03-04 | 2016-09-14 | 国际商业机器公司 | Electronic package method and system with heat transfer element(s) |
US11687680B2 (en) | 2015-04-29 | 2023-06-27 | Utimaco Inc. | Inhibiting a penetration attack |
US10719633B2 (en) | 2015-04-29 | 2020-07-21 | Utimaco, Inc. | Inhibiting a penetration attack |
US10524362B2 (en) | 2015-07-15 | 2019-12-31 | International Business Machines Corporation | Circuitized structure with 3-dimensional configuration |
US10426037B2 (en) | 2015-07-15 | 2019-09-24 | International Business Machines Corporation | Circuitized structure with 3-dimensional configuration |
US9913362B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-03-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with bond protection |
US10331915B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-06-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Overlapping, discrete tamper-respondent sensors |
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US10395067B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-08-27 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method of fabricating a tamper-respondent sensor assembly |
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US10378925B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-08-13 | International Business Machines Corporation | Circuit boards and electronic packages with embedded tamper-respondent sensor |
US10685146B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2020-06-16 | International Business Machines Corporation | Overlapping, discrete tamper-respondent sensors |
US9911012B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-03-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Overlapping, discrete tamper-respondent sensors |
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US10624202B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2020-04-14 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with bond protection |
US9924591B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-03-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies |
US9936573B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-04-03 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies |
US10334722B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-06-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies |
US10271434B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-04-23 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method of fabricating a tamper-respondent assembly with region(s) of increased susceptibility to damage |
US10098235B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2018-10-09 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with region(s) of increased susceptibility to damage |
US10264665B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-04-16 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper-respondent assemblies with bond protection |
US10257939B2 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2019-04-09 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method of fabricating tamper-respondent sensor |
US9591776B1 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2017-03-07 | International Business Machines Corporation | Enclosure with inner tamper-respondent sensor(s) |
US9578764B1 (en) | 2015-09-25 | 2017-02-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | Enclosure with inner tamper-respondent sensor(s) and physical security element(s) |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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AU9453598A (en) | 1999-05-10 |
EP1023707A1 (en) | 2000-08-02 |
CA2306101A1 (en) | 1999-04-29 |
GB9721932D0 (en) | 1997-12-17 |
JP2001521231A (en) | 2001-11-06 |
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