US9800578B2 - Handling authentication failures in wireless communication systems - Google Patents
Handling authentication failures in wireless communication systems Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US9800578B2 US9800578B2 US15/335,124 US201615335124A US9800578B2 US 9800578 B2 US9800578 B2 US 9800578B2 US 201615335124 A US201615335124 A US 201615335124A US 9800578 B2 US9800578 B2 US 9800578B2
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- authentication
- failure
- messages
- cell
- ciphering
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H04W76/062—
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/30—Connection release
- H04W76/32—Release of transport tunnels
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
- H04L69/40—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass for recovering from a failure of a protocol instance or entity, e.g. service redundancy protocols, protocol state redundancy or protocol service redirection
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
- H04W84/042—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
Definitions
- This disclosure relates to authentication in wireless communication systems and, more specifically, to handling authentication failures.
- a network node such as mobility management entity (MME) or serving GPRS support node (SGSN) in a wireless communication network receives two or more consecutive authentication failure messages, e.g., AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING FAILURE messages or AUTHENTICATION FAILURE messages, from a user equipment (UE)
- the network node responds with an authentication rejection message, e.g., an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message or an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message.
- an authentication rejection message e.g., an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message or an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message.
- SIM subscriber identity module
- USIM universal SIM
- Such a UE will not make an attempt to connect to the wireless network unless a user restarts the UE (e.g., switch off and switch on) or re-enters the SIM or USIM (e.g., remove and re-insert), causing inconvenience to the user.
- a user restarts the UE (e.g., switch off and switch on) or re-enters the SIM or USIM (e.g., remove and re-insert), causing inconvenience to the user.
- FIG. 1 is an example wireless communication system that handles authentication failures according to some implementations.
- FIG. 2 is a first data flow diagram illustrating handling of authentication failures according to some implementations.
- FIG. 3 is a second data flow diagram illustrating handling of authentication failures according to some implementations.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an example method for handling authentication failures according to some implementations.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic illustrating an example user equipment apparatus according to some implementations.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic illustrating an example network node according to some implementations.
- the present disclosure is directed to handling authentication failures in wireless communication systems.
- a user equipment UE
- receives an authentication rejection message from a wireless communication network subsequent to transmitting two or more consecutive authentication failure messages the UE does not attempt to connect to the network until a user restarts the UE or re-enters the subscriber identity module (SIM) or universal SIM (USIM), which causes inconvenience to the user.
- SIM subscriber identity module
- USIM universal SIM
- FIG. 1 is an example wireless communication system 100 that handles authentication failures according to some implementations.
- a user equipment can transmit, via a first cell, a first set of messages including two or more AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING FAILURE messages or two or more AUTHENTICATION FAILURE messages indicating at least one of synch failure or medium access control (MAC) failure.
- the UE can include at least one of a subscriber identity module (SIM) or universal SIM (USIM).
- SIM subscriber identity module
- USIM universal SIM
- the UE can receive at least one of an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message or an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message subsequent to transmitting the two or more messages indicating synch failure or MAC failure.
- the UE can transmit an ATTACH message via a second cell.
- the ATTACH message can be transmitted during a new attach procedure.
- the first cell can be a Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) cell
- the second cell can be a Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) or Evolved UTRAN (E-UTRAN) cell.
- GSM Global System for Mobile communication
- UTRAN Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
- E-UTRAN Evolved UTRAN
- the UE can execute at least one of: deleting Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI), last visited registered Tracking Area Identity (TAI), TAI List and Key Set Identifier for E-UTRAN (eKSI), and entering an EMM-DEREGISTERED state; or deleting Packet Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (P-TMSI), P-TMSI signature, routing area identification (RAI) and GPRS ciphering key sequence number, and entering a GMM-DEREGISTERED state.
- GUI Globally Unique Temporary Identity
- TAI Tracking Area Identity
- eKSI TAI List and Key Set Identifier for E-UTRAN
- P-TMSI Packet Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
- P-TMSI signature P-TMSI signature
- RAI routing area identification
- GPRS ciphering key sequence number GPRS ciphering key sequence number
- the UE can transmit, via the second cell, a second set of messages including two or more AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING FAILURE messages or two or more AUTHENTICATION FAILURE messages indicating at least one of synch failure or MAC failure.
- the UE can receive at least one of an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message or an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message subsequent to transmitting the two or more messages indicating synch failure or MAC failure.
- the UE Upon receiving the AUTHENTICATION REJECT message or the AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message, the UE can determine at least one of a network having failed an authentication check or the USIM or SIM as invalid.
- the UE can release a radio resource connection and a packet switching signaling connection, bar from accessing the second cell, and transmit an ATTACH message via a third cell.
- the ATTACH message and the first set of messages or the second set of messages are transmitted to a same public land mobile network (PLMN).
- PLMN public land mobile network
- the UE can receive, from a network, an indicator instructing the UE to execute at least one of: a detach procedure, an attach procedure, PLMN selection, or switching radio access technology (RAT).
- the indicator is included in at least one of an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message or an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message.
- the handling of authentication failures enables the UE to automatically make attempt(s) to connect to the network upon receiving an authentication rejection message subsequent to transmitting two or more consecutive authentication failure messages.
- the described methods and systems can reduce a user's manual intervention and improve user experience.
- the example wireless communication system 100 includes a UE 102 and a wireless communication network 104 .
- the wireless communication network 104 includes at least one of a mobility management entity (MME) or serving GPRS support node (SGSN) 116 connected to a base station 106 for a first cell and a base station 108 for a second cell.
- MME mobility management entity
- SGSN serving GPRS support node
- the UE 102 can detect or receive radio signals from both base stations 106 and 108 and can communicate with the MME/SGSN 116 via the base station 106 or 108 to perform a mutual authentication.
- a network node other than MME/SGSN can be used to perform the authentication.
- the UE 102 when the UE 102 fails to connect or attach to the wireless network 104 via the first cell (i.e., via the base station 106 for the first cell) due to, for example, an authentication failure in an attach procedure between the UE 102 and the MME/SGSN 116 , the UE 102 can automatically select a second cell and try to connect or attach to the network 104 via the second cell (i.e., via the base station 108 for the second cell).
- the UE 102 can select a second cell for the UE 102 to attach to the network 104 .
- the UE 102 can transmit an attach message 114 , via the base station 108 for the second cell, to the MME/SGSN 116 to initiate a new attach procedure. For a better chance of successfully attaching to the network via the second cell, the UE 102 can select a second cell different than the first cell.
- the UE 102 can clear or delete various parameters stored at the UE 102 , such as GUTI, last visited registered TAI, TAI list and eKSI. In some cases, the UE 102 can clear or delete P-TMSI, P-TMSI signature, RAI and GPRS ciphering key sequence number. In some cases, the first cell and the second cell are from a same PLMN. In some cases, the first cell and the second cell use different radio access technologies (RATs). In some implementations, after the UE 102 fails the authentication procedure via the first cell, the UE 102 can bar the first cell.
- RATs radio access technologies
- the UE 102 can bar the first cell for a predefined time period and the UE 102 cannot use the first cell to connect to the network 104 during the predefined time period.
- the MME/SGSN 116 can send an indicator instructing the UE 102 to perform a procedure such as a detach, an attach, PLMN selection, or switching RAT.
- FIGS. 2-6 and associated descriptions provide additional details for these implementations.
- a UE 102 may be referred to but is not limited to as a mobile electronic device, user device, mobile station, subscriber station, portable electronic device, mobile communications device, wireless modem, push-to-talk (PTT) dispatch console, or wireless terminal.
- Examples of a UE may include but are not limited to a cellular phone, personal data assistant (PDA), smart phone, PTT dispatch console, laptop, tablet personal computer (PC), pager, portable computer, portable gaming device, wearable electronic device, test equipment, gambling machine, car/vehicle, notice board, home appliance or other mobile communications device having components for communicating voice or data via a wireless communication network.
- the wireless communication network may include a wireless link over at least one of a licensed spectrum and an unlicensed spectrum.
- a UE include mobile and fixed electronic devices.
- a UE may include a Mobile Equipment (ME) device and a removable memory module, such as a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) that includes a SIM, a USIM, or a Removable User Identity Module (R-UIM).
- UE can also refer to any hardware or software component that can terminate a communication session for a user.
- the terms “user equipment,” “UE,” “user equipment device,” “user agent,” “UA,” “user device,” and “mobile device” can be used synonymously herein.
- the wireless communication network 104 may include one or a plurality of radio access networks (RANs), other access networks such as fixed Ethernet or IEEE 802.11 WLAN, core networks (CNs), and external networks.
- the RANs may comprise one or more radio access technologies.
- the radio access technologies may be but are not limited to GSM, Interim Standard 95 (IS-95), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), CDMA2000 (Code Division Multiple Access), Evolved UMTS, Long Term Evolution (LTE), or LTE-Advanced.
- the core networks may be evolved packet cores (EPCs).
- a RAN is part of a wireless telecommunication system which implements a radio access technology, such as UMTS, CDMA2000, 3GPP LTE, and 3GPP LTE-A.
- a RAN includes at least one base station.
- a base station e.g., the base station 106 or 108
- the base station may be a radio base station that may control all or at least some radio-related functions in a fixed part of the system.
- the base station may provide radio interface within their coverage area or a cell for a UE to communicate.
- the base station or plurality of base stations may constitute the cellular network to provide a wide area of coverage.
- the base station directly communicates with one or a plurality of UEs, other base stations, and one or more core network nodes.
- FIG. 1 While elements of FIG. 1 are shown as including various component parts, portions, or modules that implement the various features and functionality, nevertheless these elements may instead include a number of sub-modules, third-party services, components, libraries, and such, as appropriate. Furthermore, the features and functionality of various components can be combined into fewer components as appropriate.
- FIG. 2 is a first data flow diagram 200 illustrating handling of authentication failures according to some implementations.
- the data flow diagram includes a UE 202 and an MME/SGSN 204 .
- various steps of the data flow diagram 200 can be run in parallel, in combination, in loops, or in any order.
- the MME/SGSN 204 can initiate an authentication procedure by sending an authentication request message, via a first cell, to the UE 202 .
- the authentication request message can be an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST message.
- the authentication request message can be an AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message.
- the authentication request message can include authentication parameters that can be used by the UE 202 for authentication check.
- the authentication procedure enables the UE 202 and the MME/SGSN 204 to perform a mutual authentication and is a part of an attach procedure when the UE 102 attempts to connect to a wireless network.
- the UE 202 can transmit, via the first cell, a first authentication failure message to the MME/SGSN 204 if the authentication parameters provided in the authentication request message at step 206 do not match authentication parameters stored or generated at the UE 202 .
- the authentication failure message can be an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING FAILURE message including a GPRS mobility management (GMM) cause of synch failure or medium access control (MAC) failure.
- GMM GPRS mobility management
- MAC medium access control
- the authentication failure message can be an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message including an Evolved Packet System (EPS) mobility management (EMM) cause of synch failure or MAC failure.
- EPS Evolved Packet System
- the UE 202 can send an authentication failure message including a GMM/EMM cause of synch failure and a re-synchronization token provided by the SIM/USIM.
- the authentication failure message can include a GMM/EMM cause other than synch failure and MAC failure.
- the MME/SGSN 204 can send a new set of authentication parameters to the UE 202 for re-authentication. For example, the MME/SGSN 204 can perform a re-synchronization based on the re-synchronization token received in the first authentication failure message and obtain the new set of authentication parameters from a home location register (HLR) or some other databases.
- HLR home location register
- the UE 202 can transmit, via the first cell, a second authentication failure message to the MME/SGSN 204 . Similar to the first authentication failure message, the second authentication failure message can be an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING FAILURE message or an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message including a GMM/EMM cause of synch failure or MAC failure.
- the MME/SGSN 204 can send, via the first cell, an authentication rejection message to the UE 202 .
- the authentication rejection message can be an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message.
- the first cell is an LTE cell
- the authentication rejection message can be an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message.
- the MME/SGSN 204 can send the authentication reject message after receiving more than two consecutive authentication failure messages from the UE 202 .
- the UE 202 can select a second cell different than the first cell for attaching to the network. For example, assuming that the UE 202 can receive or detect radio signals from multiple cells including the first cell, the UE 202 can select a second cell from the cells excluding the first cell. The second cell can be selected based on a predefined rule. For example, the UE 202 can select a cell different than the first cell that has a strongest radio signal. In some implementations, the UE 202 may randomly select a cell different than the first cell.
- the second cell and the first cell can be from a same or different PLMN.
- the second cell and the first cell can use the same or different RAT.
- GSM authentication is considered weaker than a UMTS authentication procedure or an authentication procedure via an E-UTRAN cell, and the UE 202 can restrict the second cell to be a UTRAN (e.g., UMTS) or E-UTRAN (e.g., LTE) cell.
- the first cell can be a UTRAN cell and the second cell can be another UTRAN cell.
- the UE 202 can select the second cell to be the same as the first cell if no other suitable cells are available.
- the UE 202 attempts to connect to the network using an attach procedure via the second cell. For example, the UE 202 can transmit an ATTACH message to the MME/SGSN 204 via the second cell. In some cases, the UE 202 can register its presence in a registration area of the second cell by the attach procedure. In some implementations, the attach procedure at step 216 does not use any of previously collected information such as TMSI, P-TMSI, GUTI, last visited registered TAI, TAI list and eKSI.
- the UE 202 can clear or delete GUTI, last visited registered TAI, TAI list, and eKSI stored at the UE 202 and enter an EMM-DEREGISTERED state.
- the UE 202 can clear or delete P-TMSI, P-TMSI signature, RAI and GPRS ciphering key sequence number at the UE 202 and enter a GMM-DEREGISTERED state.
- the UE 202 can perform the following prior to executing the attach procedure at step 216 :
- steps 214 and 216 can be repeated. For example, if the attach procedure at step 216 fails when the UE 202 receives an authentication reject message subsequent to transmitting two or more authentication failure messages indicating synch failure or MAC failure, the UE 202 can go back to step 214 to select a third cell different than the first cell and the second cell for attaching to the network.
- the number of times to repeat the steps 214 and 216 can be limited. For example, after receiving the authentication rejection message more than a predefined number of times, the UE 202 can determine that the MME/SGSN 204 has failed the authentication check or the UE 202 can consider the SIM or USIM as invalid.
- the third cell can be the same as the first cell or the second cell if no other suitable cells are available.
- the UE 202 may request radio resource (RR) or radio resource control (RRC) to release the RR connection and the PS signaling connection, if any.
- the UE 202 can bar a previous cell through which the UE 202 has tried but failed the attach procedure, and select a cell different than the previous cell to perform a new attach procedure.
- the UE 202 can bar the previous cell for a predefined time period. In other words, the UE 202 cannot select the barred cell during the predefined time period, forcing the UE 202 to select a cell different than the barred cell for a new attach procedure.
- FIG. 3 is a second data flow diagram 300 illustrating handling of authentication failures according to some implementations.
- the data flow diagram includes a UE 202 and an MME/SGSN 204 .
- various steps of the data flow diagram 300 can be run in parallel, in combination, in loops, or in any order.
- the MME/SGSN 204 sends an authentication request to the UE 202 and the UE 202 transmits two or more consecutive authentication failure messages.
- the MME/SGSN 204 can send an indicator to the UE 202 indicating one of the following:
- the MME/SGSN 204 can send an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message or an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message to the UE 202 including an indicator that instructs the UE 202 to perform a detach procedure, a detach and re-attach procedure, an attach procedure, a PLMN selection, RAT switching, or other procedures.
- the UE 202 can perform the corresponding procedure based on the indicator.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an example method 400 for handling authentication failures according to some implementations.
- the method 400 starts at block 402 , where a UE transmits, via a first cell, a first plurality of messages including at least one of AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING FAILURE messages or AUTHENTICATION FAILURE messages, to a network.
- the two or more of the first plurality of messages indicate at least one of synch failure or MAC failure and the UE includes at least one of a USIM or SIM.
- the UE receives at least one of an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message or an AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REJECT message subsequent to transmitting the two or more of the first plurality of messages indicating at least one of synch failure or MAC failure.
- the UE can delete or clear parameters stored at the UE. For example, the UE can perform at least one of: deleting GUTI, last visited registered TAI, TAI List and eKSI, and entering EMM-DEREGISTERED state; or deleting P-TMSI, P-TMSI signature, RAI and GPRS ciphering key sequence number, and entering GMM-DEREGISTERED state.
- the UE transmits an ATTACH message via a second cell to initiate a new attach procedure.
- the UE selects a second cell different than the first cell.
- the new attach procedure does not use previously collect information because the UE has cleared the parameters stored at the UE prior to the attach procedure.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic illustrating an example UE 500 apparatus according to some implementations.
- the example UE 500 includes a processing unit 502 , a computer-readable storage medium 504 (for example, ROM or flash memory), a wireless communication subsystem 506 , an interface 508 , and an I/O interface 510 .
- the processing unit 502 can include one or more processing components (alternatively referred to as “processors” or “central processing units” (CPUs)) configured to execute instructions related to one or more of the processes, steps, or actions described above in connection with one or more of the implementations disclosed herein.
- the processing unit 502 can also include other auxiliary components, such as random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM).
- the computer-readable storage medium 504 can be embodied by a non-transitory medium configured to store an operating system (OS) of the device 500 and various other computer-executable software programs for performing one or more of the processes, steps, or actions described above.
- OS operating system
- the wireless communication subsystem 506 may be configured to provide wireless communications for data information or control information provided by the processing unit 502 .
- the wireless communication subsystem 506 can include, for example, one or more antennas, a receiver, a transmitter, a local oscillator, a mixer, and a digital signal processing (DSP) unit.
- DSP digital signal processing
- the subsystem 506 can support multiple input multiple output (MIMO) transmissions.
- the receivers in the wireless communication subsystems 506 can be an advance receiver or a baseline receiver. Two receivers can be implemented with identical, similar, or different receiver processing algorithms.
- the user interface 508 can include, for example, one or more of a screen or touch screen (for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light emitting display (LED), an organic light emitting display (OLED), a microelectromechanical system (MEMS) display), a keyboard or keypad, a trackball, a speaker, and a microphone.
- a screen or touch screen for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light emitting display (LED), an organic light emitting display (OLED), a microelectromechanical system (MEMS) display), a keyboard or keypad, a trackball, a speaker, and a microphone.
- the I/O interface 510 can include, for example, a universal serial bus (USB) interface.
- USB universal serial bus
- FIG. 6 is a schematic illustrating an example network node 600 according to some implementations.
- the illustrated device 600 includes a processing module 602 , a wired communication subsystem 604 , and a wireless communication subsystem 606 .
- the wireless communication subsystem 606 can receive data traffic and control traffic from the UE.
- the wireless communication subsystem 606 may include a receiver and a transmitter.
- the wired communication subsystem 604 can be configured to transmit and receive control information between other access node devices via backhaul connections.
- the processing module 602 can include one or more processing components (alternatively referred to as “processors” or “central processing units” (CPUs)) capable of executing instructions related to one or more of the processes, steps, or actions described above in connection with one or more of the implementations disclosed herein.
- the processing module 602 can also include other auxiliary components, such as random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), secondary storage (for example, a hard disk drive, flash memory or other non-transitory storage medium).
- RAM random access memory
- ROM read only memory
- secondary storage for example, a hard disk drive, flash memory or other non-transitory storage medium.
- the processing module 602 can execute certain instructions and commands to provide wireless or wired communication, using the wired communication subsystem 604 or a wireless communication subsystem 606 .
- Various other components can also be included in the device 600 .
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
-
- The UE sets the EPS update status to EU2 NOT UPDATED and deletes any GUTI, last visited registered TAI, TAI List and eKSI. The UE enters the state EMM-DEREGISTERED.
- If there is a circuit switched (CS) fallback emergency call pending or CS fallback call pending, or a paging for CS fallback, the UE attempts to select GSM EDGE Radio Access Network (GERAN) or UTRAN radio access technology and proceeds with the appropriate Mobility Management (MM) and Call Control (CC) specific procedures.
- If there is a 1×CS fallback emergency call pending or 1×CS fallback call pending, or a paging for 1×CS fallback, the UE selects cdma2000 1× radio access technology. The UE then proceeds with appropriate cdma2000 1×CS procedures.
- If there is a 1×CS fallback emergency call pending or 1×CS fallback call pending, or a paging for 1×CS fallback, and the UE has dual Rx/Tx configuration and supports enhanced 1×CS fallback, the UE performs a new attach procedure.
- If there is no CS fallback emergency call pending, CS fallback call pending, 1×CS fallback emergency call pending, 1×CS fallback call pending, paging for CS fallback, or paging for 1×CS fallback and the rejected request was not for initiating a PDN connection for emergency bearer services, the UE subsequently, automatically initiate the attach procedure.
- If A/Gb mode or Iu mode is supported by the UE or if the UE does not support S1 mode, the UE (in addition) handle the GMM parameters GMM state, GPRS update status, P-TMSI, P-TMSI signature, RAI and GPRS ciphering key sequence number as follows:
- The MS sets the GPRS update status to GU2 NOT UPDATED, enter the state GMM-DEREGISTERED, and deletes any P-TMSI, P-TMSI signature, RAI and GPRS ciphering key sequence number.
- A GPRS MS operating in MS operation mode A or B in network operation mode I which is already IMSI attached for CS services in the network, is still IMSI attached for CS services in the network.
- If the rejected request was not for initiating a PDN connection for emergency bearer services, then
- a GPRS MS operating in MS operation mode A or B shall proceed with appropriate MM specific procedures. The MM sublayer shall act as in network operation mode II as long as the combined GMM procedures are not successful and no new RA is entered; and
- the MS may subsequently, automatically initiate the (GPRS) attach procedure.
- A UE in CS/PS mode 1 or CS/PS mode 2 of operation which is already IMSI attached for non-EPS services is still IMSI attached for non-EPS services.
- A UE in CS/PS mode 1 or CS/PS mode 2 of operation sets the update status to U2 NOT UPDATED.
-
- detach the UE;
- inform the UE that it needs to perform an attach procedure;
- inform the UE that it needs to perform an attach procedure by rejecting the ongoing tracking area update (TAU) or routing area update (RAU) procedure that initiated the authentication procedure with cause code #9 (UE identity cannot be derived by the network);
- inform the UE that it needs to perform PLMN selection; or
- inform the UE that it needs to switch RATs.
Claims (20)
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US15/335,124 US9800578B2 (en) | 2015-10-27 | 2016-10-26 | Handling authentication failures in wireless communication systems |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US201562247164P | 2015-10-27 | 2015-10-27 | |
| US15/335,124 US9800578B2 (en) | 2015-10-27 | 2016-10-26 | Handling authentication failures in wireless communication systems |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| US20170118203A1 US20170118203A1 (en) | 2017-04-27 |
| US9800578B2 true US9800578B2 (en) | 2017-10-24 |
Family
ID=57345678
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US15/335,124 Active US9800578B2 (en) | 2015-10-27 | 2016-10-26 | Handling authentication failures in wireless communication systems |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US9800578B2 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP3163927B1 (en) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2020147856A1 (en) * | 2019-01-18 | 2020-07-23 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Authentication processing method and device, storage medium, and electronic device |
| US11877218B1 (en) | 2021-07-13 | 2024-01-16 | T-Mobile Usa, Inc. | Multi-factor authentication using biometric and subscriber data systems and methods |
Families Citing this family (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US10051473B2 (en) | 2016-08-12 | 2018-08-14 | Apple Inc. | Secure connection release and network redirection |
| US11792172B2 (en) * | 2017-05-05 | 2023-10-17 | Nokia Technologies Oy | Privacy indicators for controlling authentication requests |
| CN110583001B (en) * | 2018-04-10 | 2022-05-17 | 联发科技(新加坡)私人有限公司 | Improved method, apparatus, and computer-readable storage medium for erroneous KSI handling in mobile communications |
| CN111356160B (en) * | 2018-12-20 | 2024-03-19 | 中国移动通信集团辽宁有限公司 | Method, device, equipment, system and medium for determining USIM card fault |
| CN114245372B (en) * | 2019-01-18 | 2024-03-15 | 华为技术有限公司 | Authentication method, device and system |
| CN112867001B (en) * | 2019-11-26 | 2022-07-15 | 维沃移动通信有限公司 | Authentication method, terminal device and network device |
| WO2021212298A1 (en) * | 2020-04-21 | 2021-10-28 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Fast resumption of network service in case of radio resource conflict |
| JP7237999B2 (en) | 2021-01-13 | 2023-03-13 | 本田技研工業株式会社 | Control system, moving object, control method and program |
| CN118450378B (en) * | 2023-09-20 | 2025-06-13 | 荣耀终端股份有限公司 | An exception handling method, device, equipment, medium and product |
| CN119743824A (en) * | 2023-09-26 | 2025-04-01 | 荣耀终端股份有限公司 | Communication method, electronic device and readable medium |
Citations (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20020044552A1 (en) * | 2000-02-22 | 2002-04-18 | Nokia Networks Oy | Integrity check in a communication system |
| US6397056B1 (en) * | 1999-04-30 | 2002-05-28 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | System and method for reducing network signaling load in a radio telecommunications network |
| US7574599B1 (en) * | 2002-10-11 | 2009-08-11 | Verizon Laboratories Inc. | Robust authentication and key agreement protocol for next-generation wireless networks |
| US20100266107A1 (en) | 2009-04-16 | 2010-10-21 | Alec Brusilovsky | Emergency call handling in accordance with authentication procedure in communication network |
| US20110246777A1 (en) * | 2009-10-07 | 2011-10-06 | Research In Motion Limited | System and Method for Managing Security Key Architecture in Multiple Security Contexts of a Network Environment |
| GB2481395A (en) | 2010-06-21 | 2011-12-28 | Nec Casio Mobile Comm Ltd | Call set-up management in a mobile radio communications network |
| US20130165077A1 (en) | 2011-12-23 | 2013-06-27 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Method and apparatus for identifying fake networks |
| US20170006469A1 (en) * | 2015-03-30 | 2017-01-05 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Authentication and key agreement with perfect forward secrecy |
-
2016
- 2016-10-26 US US15/335,124 patent/US9800578B2/en active Active
- 2016-10-27 EP EP16196089.3A patent/EP3163927B1/en active Active
Patent Citations (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US6397056B1 (en) * | 1999-04-30 | 2002-05-28 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | System and method for reducing network signaling load in a radio telecommunications network |
| US20020044552A1 (en) * | 2000-02-22 | 2002-04-18 | Nokia Networks Oy | Integrity check in a communication system |
| US7574599B1 (en) * | 2002-10-11 | 2009-08-11 | Verizon Laboratories Inc. | Robust authentication and key agreement protocol for next-generation wireless networks |
| US20100266107A1 (en) | 2009-04-16 | 2010-10-21 | Alec Brusilovsky | Emergency call handling in accordance with authentication procedure in communication network |
| US20110246777A1 (en) * | 2009-10-07 | 2011-10-06 | Research In Motion Limited | System and Method for Managing Security Key Architecture in Multiple Security Contexts of a Network Environment |
| GB2481395A (en) | 2010-06-21 | 2011-12-28 | Nec Casio Mobile Comm Ltd | Call set-up management in a mobile radio communications network |
| US20130165077A1 (en) | 2011-12-23 | 2013-06-27 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Method and apparatus for identifying fake networks |
| US20170006469A1 (en) * | 2015-03-30 | 2017-01-05 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Authentication and key agreement with perfect forward secrecy |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| Extended European Search Report issued in European Application No. 16196089.3 dated Jan. 31, 2017. |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2020147856A1 (en) * | 2019-01-18 | 2020-07-23 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Authentication processing method and device, storage medium, and electronic device |
| US12021867B2 (en) | 2019-01-18 | 2024-06-25 | Zte Corporation | Authentication processing method and device, storage medium, and electronic device |
| US11877218B1 (en) | 2021-07-13 | 2024-01-16 | T-Mobile Usa, Inc. | Multi-factor authentication using biometric and subscriber data systems and methods |
| US12245119B2 (en) | 2021-07-13 | 2025-03-04 | T-Mobile Usa, Inc. | Multi-factor authentication using biometric and subscriber data systems and methods |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| EP3163927A1 (en) | 2017-05-03 |
| US20170118203A1 (en) | 2017-04-27 |
| EP3163927B1 (en) | 2019-01-23 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US9800578B2 (en) | Handling authentication failures in wireless communication systems | |
| US8818367B2 (en) | Apparatuses and methods for handling mobility management (MM) back-off timers | |
| CN109819392B (en) | Method and device for reporting position information | |
| CN112449378B (en) | A communication method and device | |
| US10659999B2 (en) | Intersystem change between different radio access networks | |
| US11240856B2 (en) | Access point name determination for mission critical services | |
| US9668183B2 (en) | System and method for enabling quick recovery of services from a forbidden PLMN | |
| CN114788358B (en) | A communication method, a communication device and a communication system | |
| US20160192251A1 (en) | Scheme for scanning radio access technology (rat) in a cellular communication system | |
| KR20120104959A (en) | Handling reachability of mobile device when serving core network node changes | |
| JP6483815B2 (en) | Handling emergency calls using over the top service | |
| US9554259B2 (en) | Methods for handling a service request procedures, and apparatuses using the same | |
| CN113260042A (en) | Terminal equipment attachment method and terminal equipment | |
| US9258711B2 (en) | Wireless communication system and authentication method thereof | |
| CN111356231A (en) | Method and apparatus for detecting paging message, storage medium and electronic device | |
| EP4203551A1 (en) | Wireless communication method, terminal device, and network device | |
| WO2016174512A1 (en) | Resource control for wireless device detach | |
| CN110881183B (en) | Emergency service processing method and device | |
| CN110463230A (en) | Communication means and terminal device | |
| US10383169B2 (en) | Base station and terminal connection management method of base station | |
| KR20100024632A (en) | Apparatus and method for service registration in multi mode portable terminal | |
| CN116325997B (en) | Wireless communication method, terminal device and network device | |
| US20160135246A1 (en) | Handling of device-to-device communications interest indication | |
| CN119676774A (en) | Communication method and terminal device |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: BLACKBERRY LIMITED, CANADA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:BLACKBERRY CORPORATION;REEL/FRAME:040177/0353 Effective date: 20161028 Owner name: BLACKBERRY LIMITED, CANADA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:WIRTANEN, JEFFREY WILLIAM;ISLAM, MUHAMMAD KHALEDUL;REEL/FRAME:040177/0151 Effective date: 20161026 Owner name: BLACKBERRY CORPORATION, CALIFORNIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:BAKKER, JAN HENDRIK LUCAS;REEL/FRAME:040521/0112 Effective date: 20161026 |
|
| STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
| MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 4TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1551); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: OT PATENT ESCROW, LLC, ILLINOIS Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:BLACKBERRY LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:063471/0474 Effective date: 20230320 Owner name: OT PATENT ESCROW, LLC, ILLINOIS Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:BLACKBERRY LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:063471/0474 Effective date: 20230320 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LIMITED, IRELAND Free format text: NUNC PRO TUNC ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNOR:OT PATENT ESCROW, LLC;REEL/FRAME:064015/0001 Effective date: 20230511 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LIMITED, IRELAND Free format text: NUNC PRO TUNC ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNOR:BLACKBERRY LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:064066/0001 Effective date: 20230511 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LIMITED, IRELAND Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT 12817157 APPLICATION NUMBER PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 064015 FRAME: 0001. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNOR:OT PATENT ESCROW, LLC;REEL/FRAME:064807/0001 Effective date: 20230511 Owner name: MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LIMITED, IRELAND Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVE APPLICATION NUMBER PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 064015 FRAME: 0001. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNOR:OT PATENT ESCROW, LLC;REEL/FRAME:064807/0001 Effective date: 20230511 Owner name: OT PATENT ESCROW, LLC, ILLINOIS Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE COVER SHEET AT PAGE 50 TO REMOVE 12817157 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 063471 FRAME 0474. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNOR:BLACKBERRY LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:064806/0669 Effective date: 20230320 |
|
| MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 8TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1552); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Year of fee payment: 8 |