US9270649B1 - Secure software authenticator data transfer between processing devices - Google Patents
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- US9270649B1 US9270649B1 US13/793,327 US201313793327A US9270649B1 US 9270649 B1 US9270649 B1 US 9270649B1 US 201313793327 A US201313793327 A US 201313793327A US 9270649 B1 US9270649 B1 US 9270649B1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/062—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys
Definitions
- the field relates generally to cryptography, and more particularly to software authenticators implemented in processing devices.
- One-time passcode (OTP) authentication tokens may be implemented in hardware and software.
- Hardware authentication tokens are typically implemented as small, hand-held devices that display a series of passcodes over time. A user equipped with such an authentication token reads the currently displayed passcode and enters it into a computer or other element of an authentication system as part of an authentication operation. This type of dynamic passcode arrangement offers a significant security improvement over authentication based on a static password.
- Software authentication tokens, or software authenticators can be implemented in the form of software installed on a processing device such as a computer, mobile phone, tablet, etc.
- Conventional authentication tokens include both time-synchronous and event-synchronous tokens.
- the displayed passcodes are based on a secret value and the time of day.
- a verifier with access to the secret value and a time of day clock can verify that a given presented passcode is valid.
- time-synchronous authentication token is the RSA SecurID® user authentication token, commercially available from RSA, The Security Division of EMC Corporation, of Bedford, Mass., U.S.A.
- Event-synchronous tokens generate passcodes in response to a designated event, such as a user pressing a button on the token. Each time the button is pressed, a new passcode is generated based on a secret value and an event counter. A verifier with access to the secret value and the current event count can verify that a given presented passcode is valid.
- authentication tokens include hybrid time-synchronous and event-synchronous tokens.
- Passcodes can be communicated directly from the authentication token to a computer or other element of an authentication system, instead of being displayed to the user.
- a wired connection such as a universal serial bus (USB) interface may be used for this purpose.
- Wireless authentication tokens are also known.
- the passcodes are wirelessly communicated to a computer or other element of an authentication system.
- Hardware and software authentication tokens and other types of OTP devices are typically programmed with a random seed or other type of key that is also stored in a token record file.
- the record file is loaded into an authentication server, such that the server can create matching passcodes for the authentication token based on the key and the current time or current event count.
- Illustrative embodiments of the present invention provide techniques for secure transfer of software authenticator data between processing devices.
- a method comprises establishing a network connection between the first processing device and the second processing device for transfer of data associated with a software authenticator from the first processing device to the second processing device, encrypting the software authenticator data with encryption that is separate from encryption used for the network connection and transferring the encrypted software authenticator data from the first processing device to the second processing device.
- a method comprises establishing a network connection between a first processing device and a second processing device for transfer of data associated with a software authenticator from the first processing device to the second processing device, receiving encrypted data from the first processing device, wherein the encrypted data has encryption that is separate from encryption used for the network connection, decrypting the encrypted data to obtain data associated with a software authenticator and importing the software authenticator data into a software authenticator stored in a memory of the second processing device.
- FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram of an exemplary communication system in which embodiments of the present invention may be implemented.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a methodology for transfer of software authenticator data, according to an embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a methodology for importing software authenticator data, according to an embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 4 illustrates an example of software authenticator transfer, according to an embodiment of the invention.
- passcode as used herein is intended to include authentication information such as OTPs, or more generally any other information that may be utilized for cryptographic authentication purposes. Although the illustrative embodiments will be described below primarily in the context of OTPs, it is to be appreciated that the invention is more broadly applicable to any other type of passcode.
- the present invention in one or more illustrative embodiments provides techniques for facilitating secure transfer of software authenticators between processing devices.
- Software authenticators may employ mechanisms which ensure that a given user's authenticator is installed and running on the device it is intended for. For example, a user may register their mobile phone for use with a particular software authenticator. To prevent security breaches, software authenticators such as the RSA SecurID® authenticator will ensure that the authenticator is installed on the correct registered device.
- OTP generation in software authenticators typically requires an application which includes a seed, a serial number, a display interval, display digits, and other meta-data.
- Software authenticators can be distributed to end-users by an authenticator management server administrator using one of a number of methods. In one method, the software authenticator is distributed using a certificate file such as the SDTID file used for RSA SecurID® Software Authenticators. In other methods, the software authenticator may be distributed using a Compressed Token Format (CTF) string or dynamic seed provisioning.
- CTF Compressed Token Format
- An example of dynamic seed provisioning is the Cryptographic Token Key Initialization Protocol (CT-KIP).
- a user To transfer a software authenticator, a user must contact an information technology (IT) help desk, authenticator management server administrator or some other entity associated with the software authenticator to re-issue the software authenticator to a new device or to issue a new authenticator for the new device.
- IT information technology
- a user wishing to transfer a software authenticator may be forced to perform a number of tasks.
- a user may request a transfer by placing a support call to an IT help desk.
- the user may then be required to install a software authenticator application on the new device and email a device binding identification to the IT help desk.
- the authenticator or authenticator data can be bound to the device identification and e-mailed or otherwise sent to the end-user.
- the e-mail or other communication may embody the authenticator or contain links which initiate dynamic seed provisioning for the authenticator.
- the end-user follows the instructions in the e-mail or other communication to import and provision or re-provision the software authenticator.
- Such techniques for transferring and re-provisioning software authenticators can have significant drawbacks.
- the IT help desk or other support resource may have limited hours, or have significant wait times.
- a user may be inconvenienced when attempting to transfer and re-provision a software authenticator.
- Such techniques may also require significant costs for the software authenticator issuer.
- such techniques may expose sensitive and secure data to attack. For example, if provisioning of authenticators is done via e-mail, the e-mail may contain all of the data pertaining to a user's authenticator. Thus, if a user's e-mail account becomes compromised, the software authenticator may also be compromised. A user may also forward the e-mail to others, running the risk of releasing data which should not be exposed to third parties.
- embodiments of the invention provide techniques which give end-users a self-service option for transferring software authenticators that is more convenient, less expensive and simpler than conventional transfer and re-provisioning techniques.
- Embodiments of the invention provide methods for end-users to directly transfer authenticator data in a secure manner from one device to another wirelessly.
- embodiments of the invention described below may refer to a software authenticator which comprises a time-synchronous token such as the RSA SecurID® token, it is important to note that embodiments of the invention are not limited solely to use with time-synchronous tokens. Instead, embodiments of invention may be utilized with event-synchronous authentication tokens, challenge-response tokens, hash-chain tokens, or hybrid tokens that incorporate multiple such capabilities, such as hybrid time-synchronous and event-synchronous tokens.
- a given software authentication token may be a connected token or a disconnected token, or one capable of operating in both connected and disconnected modes.
- embodiments of the invention may be utilized to transfer multiple software authenticators, either serially or in parallel with one another.
- FIG. 1 shows a communication system 100 comprising a source mobile device 102 and a target mobile device 104 connected via a network 106 . While FIG. 1 shows source and target mobile devices 102 and 104 , respectively, embodiments of the invention are not limited solely to use with mobile devices. Instead, embodiments of the invention may be used more generally with processing devices, which include mobile devices such as cell phones, tablets, laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs), etc. as well as other computing and communication devices.
- PDAs personal digital assistants
- the source mobile device 102 comprises network interface circuitry 120 , a processor 122 , a memory 124 and a cryptographic module 126 comprising an authenticator data encryption module 128 .
- the target mobile device 104 comprises network interface circuitry 140 , a processor 142 , a memory 144 and a cryptographic module 146 comprising an authenticator data decryption module 148 .
- the processors 122 and 142 may comprise microprocessors, microcontrollers, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or other types of processing circuitry, as well as portions or combinations of such circuitry elements.
- ASICs application-specific integrated circuits
- FPGAs field-programmable gate arrays
- Each of the memories 124 and 144 may comprise random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), a hard disk drive (HDD), flash memory or other types of memory, in any combination.
- RAM random access memory
- ROM read-only memory
- HDD hard disk drive
- flash memory or other types of memory, in any combination.
- the memories 124 and 144 may be viewed as examples of what are more generally referred to herein as “computer program products” storing executable program code.
- the network interface circuitries 120 and 140 allow the source mobile device 102 and the target mobile device 104 , respectively, to communicate over the network 106 with one another and with other devices, servers, etc. not shown in FIG. 1 .
- the source mobile device 102 implements a cryptographic module 126 comprising an authenticator data encryption module 128 .
- the cryptographic module 126 may embody a software authenticator application, token or software authenticator instance.
- the authenticator data encryption module 128 allows for encrypting authenticator data required to transfer and re-provision a software authenticator.
- the target mobile device 104 implements a cryptographic module 146 comprising an authenticator data decryption module 148 .
- the cryptographic module 146 may embody a software authenticator application, token or software authenticator instance.
- the authenticator data decryption module 148 allows for decrypting authenticator data received in a software authenticator transfer used for re-provisioning the software authenticator.
- FIG. 1 shows source mobile device 102 and target mobile device 104 with authenticator data encryption module 128 and authenticator data decryption module 148 , respectively
- a given device may contain both an authenticator data encryption module and an authenticator data decryption module.
- a given device may act as a source of a software authenticator in one instance and a target in another instance.
- the designation of a device as a source or target device in FIG. 1 and throughout this description is for clarity of illustration. Such designations should not be construed as limiting a particular device as being solely a source or solely a target device.
- the source mobile device 102 and the target mobile device 104 may include additional components not specifically illustrated in FIG. 1 which are of a type commonly used in processing devices, as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art.
- the network 106 may be a short range or private network type.
- many processing devices including cellular phones come equipped with Bluetooth network interface circuitry.
- near field communication (NFC) network interface circuitry is equipped in many newer processing devices such as cellular phones.
- the network 106 may be another network type such as a WiFi or WiMAX network, a cellular network, a telephone or cable network, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN) a global computer network such as the Internet, or various portions or combinations of these and other types of networks.
- various elements of system 100 such as the source mobile device 102 and the target mobile device 104 , their associated functional modules such as the cryptographic modules 126 and 146 , respectively, and other elements may be implemented at least in part in the form of software.
- Such software is stored and executed utilizing respective memory and processor elements of at least one processing device.
- the system 100 may include additional or alternative processing platforms, as well as numerous distinct processing platforms in any combination, with each such platform comprising one or more computers, servers, storage devices or other types of processing devices.
- Such processing platforms may include cloud infrastructure comprising virtual machines (VMs) and one or more associated hypervisors.
- VMs virtual machines
- hypervisor platform An example of a commercially available hypervisor platform that may be used to implement portions of the communication system 100 is the VMware® vSphereTM which may have an associated virtual infrastructure management system such as the VMware® vCenterTM.
- the underlying physical machines may comprise one or more distributed processing platforms that include storage products, such as VNX and Symmetrix VMAX, both commercially available from EMC Corporation of Hopkinton, Mass. A variety of other storage products may be utilized to implement at least a portion of the system 100 .
- FIGS. 2-3 illustrate methodologies for transferring software authenticator data.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a methodology 200 for transfer of software authenticator data from the perspective of a first processing device, an example of which is the source mobile device 102 in FIG. 1 .
- the methodology 200 begins with initiating 202 transfer of data associated with a software authenticator from a first processing device to a second processing device.
- the second processing device may be the target mobile device 104 in FIG. 1 .
- a software authenticator may include various data such as a seed, a serial number, etc.
- a software authenticator application or token may be installed on both the first processing device and the second processing device, while only the first processing device has the data such as the seed and serial number required for the software authenticator to operate. In such instances, transfer of the software authenticator only requires transfer of the seed, serial number or other data associated with the software authenticator without transferring an entire software authenticator application or token.
- the second processing device may receive the entire software authenticator application or token from the first processing device.
- the methodology 200 continues with establishing 204 a network connection between the first processing device and the second processing device.
- a network connection may establish a short range or private network connection such as a Bluetooth or NFC connection between the first and second processing devices.
- various other network connections including combinations of network connections, may be established.
- the software authenticator data is encrypted 206 with encryption that is separate from encryption used for the network connection.
- the authenticator data encryption module 128 may be used to encrypt 206 the software authenticator data.
- Many network types provide for some type or layer of encryption to be applied to data which is transmitted over the network. For example, Bluetooth connections use shared-key authentication, strong encryption algorithms and can operate in various security modes. However, Bluetooth and other wireless network connections can introduce security vulnerabilities depending on how they are implemented and used in particular devices. This can lead to a compromise of device or software authenticator data, or render the transfer of software authenticator data susceptible to eavesdropping which is a serious concern when sensitive data such as the software authenticator data is being transmitted between devices.
- embodiments of the invention encrypt the software authenticator data with encryption that is separate from the encryption used for the network connection.
- portions of the authenticator data may also be separately encrypted. For example, if transfer of a given software authenticator requires transfer of both a seed value and a serial number, the seed value and the serial number may be encrypted with encryption separate from one another and separate from encryption used for the network connection.
- the encrypted software authenticator data is transferred 208 from the first processing device to the second processing device.
- the first and second processing devices may exchange a binding identification to ensure that the software authenticator data is installed only on the correct or authorized device.
- this binding identification can be used in the encryption of the software authenticator data or may be encrypted along with the software authenticator data, or otherwise folded into the encryption used for the software authenticator data.
- the encryption used to encrypt that software authenticator data may be implemented using a number of conventional techniques and processes, such as those disclosed in A. J. Menezes et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997, which is incorporated by reference herein. These conventional processes, being well known to those skilled in the art, will not be described in further detail herein, although embodiments of the invention may incorporate aspects of such processes.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a methodology 300 for importing and provisioning a software authenticator from the perspective of the second processing device referred to in FIG. 2 .
- the target mobile device 104 in FIG. 1 is an example of the second processing device referred to in FIG. 3 .
- the methodology 300 begins with establishing 302 a network connection between the first processing device and the second processing device.
- methodologies 200 and 300 describe the first processing device initiating the transfer of the software authenticator data, embodiments of the invention are not limited solely to this arrangement.
- the second processing device may initiate the transfer of the software authenticator data, or the first and second processing devices may both initiate a transfer of the software authenticator data.
- the network connection need not be used solely for the transfer of software authenticator data.
- establishing a network connection for the transfer of software authenticator data between the first and second processing devices does not require setting up a new network connection. Instead, embodiments of the invention may use one or more existing network connections between the first and second processing devices for transfer of the software authenticator data.
- Methodology 300 continues with receiving 304 encrypted data from the first processing device. As described above, this encrypted data has encryption that is separate from encryption used for the network connection.
- the encrypted data is decrypted 306 to obtain the software authenticator data.
- the authenticator data decryption module 148 may be used to perform the decryption 306 .
- the software authenticator data is then imported 308 or provisioned into a software authenticator stored in a memory of the second processing device.
- the software authenticator data may comprise a seed value, the seed value and a serial number, or some other data associated with a software authenticator.
- the software authenticator data may also comprise the software authenticator application itself.
- the memory of the second processing device may be the memory 144 in FIG. 1 or may be another memory such as a memory in the cryptographic module 146 .
- FIG. 4 illustrates a methodology for software authenticator exchange between two Apple® devices running the iOS mobile operating system.
- Old and new devices run respective iOS applications 402 and 404 .
- the old device is an example of a source device
- the new device is an example of a target device.
- a given device may be a source device in one instance and a target device in another instance.
- a given device may be configured to both transfer and receive software authenticators in accordance with embodiments of the invention.
- FIG. 4 illustrates a methodology for transfer of a software authenticator between two Apple® devices running the iOS mobile operating system
- embodiments are not limited solely for use with devices miming the iOS mobile operating system.
- devices running the Google® AndroidTM platform may also be used.
- software authenticators may be exchanged between a device running the iOS mobile operating system and a device running the AndroidTM platform, or between devices running various other operating systems.
- FIG. 4 will be described with respect to transfer of software authenticator data over a Bluetooth connection, embodiments are not limited solely to use with Bluetooth network connections. Instead, as detailed above, a variety of network connections may be used, including NFC, WiFi, infrared, etc.
- FIG. 4 begins with step 1 , where users of the old and new devices initiate authenticator transfer in their respective iOS mobile applications 402 and 404 .
- the respective iOS mobile applications 402 and 404 use respective Gamekit Frameworks 421 and 441 to establish a Bluetooth connection 406 .
- FIG. 4 shows the iOS mobile applications 402 and 404 utilizing the Gamekit Frameworks 421 and 441 to establish the Bluetooth connection, one or both of the iOS mobile applications 402 and 404 may alternatively use the iOS Core Bluetooth Framework.
- the package android.bluetooth may be used for managing Bluetooth functionality.
- the specific frameworks and/or packages used to implement the Bluetooth or other network connection may vary depending on the operating system version running on the devices.
- the iOS mobile application 402 retrieves authenticator data from the SecurID® software development kit (SDK) 423 for RSA SecurID® authentication tokens, serializes the software authenticator data and encrypts it for transport.
- SDK software development kit
- the SecurID® SDK 423 is suitably modified for implementing embodiments of the invention. It is important to note, however, that other SDKs, tools and information may be used for other types of software authenticators.
- the SecurID® SDK 423 is modified to be capable of serializing the software authenticator data.
- the software authenticator data is serialized to JavaScript Object Notation (JSON).
- JSON JavaScript Object Notation
- the software authenticator data may be encrypted using a key derived from a user-specified password or custom key derivation function (KDF).
- KDF custom key derivation function
- the iOS mobile application 402 may require the user to specify a strong password for encryption and decryption of the software authenticator data. Other encryption methods and algorithms may also be
- the software authenticator data is transferred from the old device to the new device in step 4 .
- the iOS mobile application 404 decrypts and de-serializes the received software authenticator data, again using a suitably modified version of a SecurID® SDK 443 in step 5 .
- the iOS mobile application 404 uses the decrypted software authenticator data to import or provision a software authenticator into an authenticator memory 445 in step 6 .
- the iOS mobile application 404 will then confirm that the software authenticator was successfully transferred in step 7 . It is important to note that more than one software authenticator may be transferred between devices. As such, the confirmation in step 7 can specify a particular software authenticator or authenticators which were successfully transferred.
- the iOS mobile application 402 running on the old device will remove the authenticators which were successfully transferred from the authenticator memory 425 in step 8 .
- Various processes and protocols may be used in the iOS mobile application 402 running on the old device, and more generally the source processing devices described herein, for removing authenticators after successful transfer of the software authenticator or authenticators. This eliminates multiple copies of the software authenticator or authenticators on different devices.
- the software authenticator may be re-seeded using a specific key derivation algorithm known by the target processing device and an authentication manager.
- This re-seeding may comprise application of a silent alarm function in a software authenticator, such that the re-seeding event is seamless to the end-user.
- an end-user will attempt to authenticate to some entity using the software authenticator.
- the software authenticator may generate an OTP using the software authenticator as usual.
- the authentication manager will perform its normal OTP time-based matching. Since the software authenticator is re-seeded, this will fail and a silent alarm is triggered.
- the authentication manager in response to the silent alarm, attempts to locate an OTP match with a derived seed. Assuming the software authenticator was successfully transferred and has not been tampered with or otherwise compromised, the authentication manager will find the derived seed which matches the re-seeded software authenticator and associate the new seed with the particular software authenticator. In some embodiments, this may involve caching the new seed. As a result, the source processing device and/or any other device which has an old copy of the software authenticator is rendered useless since these devices have not been re-seeded.
- the software authenticator may be configured to allow the end-user to register new devices.
- the software authenticator on a source processing device, a target processing device, or some other processing device may be configured to allow an end-user to register the target processing device before, during or after transfer of the software authenticator data.
- the target processing device may be registered with an authenticator management server, an IT help desk, or other entity associated with the software authenticator. Registering the target processing device can cause such entities to generate a special code, key, command or other instruction which is sent to the target processing device.
- This special code, key, command or other instruction can cause the software authenticator on the target processing device to re-seed, thus rendering old copies of the software authenticator useless.
- Use of a special code, key, command or other instruction can minimize exposure of the authenticator data in comparison to techniques wherein the software authenticator data is sent in an e-mail from an IT help desk, an SDTID file, etc.
- embodiments of the invention permit end-users to self-service their software authenticators in a seamless manner.
- embodiments of the invention are not limited to arrangements wherein the user cannot contact an IT help desk, authenticator management server administrator or other entity associated with the software authenticator. Instead, in some embodiments of the invention processing devices may communicate with such entities as part of the software authenticator transfer process.
- FIGS. 2-4 The particular processing operations and other system functionality described in conjunction with the flow diagrams of FIGS. 2-4 are presented by way of illustrative example only, and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention in any way.
- Alternative embodiments can use other types of processing operations for establishing a network connection, encrypting software authenticator data, etc.
- the ordering of the process steps may be varied in other embodiments, or certain steps may be performed concurrently with one another rather than serially.
- the software authenticator transfer functionality such as that described in conjunction with the flow diagrams of FIGS. 2-4 and the associated examples above can be implemented at least in part in the form of one or more software programs stored in memory and executed by a processor of a processing device such as a computer or server.
- a processor of a processing device such as a computer or server.
- a memory or other storage device having such program code embodied therein is an example of what is more generally referred to herein as a “computer program product.”
- the communication system 100 in FIG. 1 may include multiple instances of the source mobile device 102 or the target mobile device 104 .
- a single source mobile device can transfer one or more software authenticators to two or more target devices.
- a single source mobile device may also transfer one or more software authenticators to one target mobile device and one or more other software authenticators to another target mobile device.
- a given target mobile device may receive software authenticators from two or more source mobile devices, or receive parts of the software authenticator data associated with a given software authenticator from two or more source devices.
- Various other arrangements of source and target devices may be utilized.
- FIGS. 1 and 4 can be varied in other embodiments.
- the various simplifying assumptions made above in the course of describing the illustrative embodiments should also be viewed as exemplary rather than as requirements or limitations of the invention. Numerous other alternative embodiments within the scope of the appended claims will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art.
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US20220255913A1 (en) * | 2021-02-08 | 2022-08-11 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Enhanced multi-factor authentication based on physical and logical proximity to trusted devices and users |
US11863549B2 (en) | 2021-02-08 | 2024-01-02 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Adjusting security policies based on endpoint locations |
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