US8745405B2 - Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia - Google Patents
Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US8745405B2 US8745405B2 US13/028,715 US201113028715A US8745405B2 US 8745405 B2 US8745405 B2 US 8745405B2 US 201113028715 A US201113028715 A US 201113028715A US 8745405 B2 US8745405 B2 US 8745405B2
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- biometric template
- test data
- interval
- item
- storage device
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related, expires
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
-
- H04L29/06809—
Definitions
- the present invention relates to seed and key generation systems for encryption methods. More particularly, the invention relates to a seed and a key generation system for non-deterministic biometric indicia.
- the system does not store all necessary information for regenerating an encryption seed or generation an encryption key. Instead, the system destroys the seed and key and requires a live biometric sample to recreate the seed/key.
- Access to the storage device may be limited to one or more authenticated users.
- the user To authenticate a user, the user must initially enroll a biometric identifier specific to the user. This biometric identifier serves as an authentication password to verify the user's identity.
- the user provides the same biometric identifier, referred to as a live biometric identifier. The enrolled and live biometric identifiers are compared, and if the authentication system determines that the biometric identifiers likely belong to the same user, the system unlocks or otherwise retrieves a key for accessing the storage device.
- the key is encrypted prior to being stored on the storage device or otherwise made accessible by the storage device. Encryption of the key does provide some security, as a hacker (who does not have access to the live biometric identifier for the specific user) must decrypt the key prior to accessing the device. However, decryption of the key is often elementary to skilled hackers.
- Another layer of security is often added to the storage device by requiring that the key be regenerated each time access to the device is requested.
- a seed must be stored (either in encrypted or even hashed form or unencrypted or unhashed form). Similar to the encrypted key, a stored encrypted seed is still vulnerable to hackers.
- authentication systems In view of the concerns with storing the seed/key on the storage device or otherwise making accessible by the device, authentication systems have been developed that do not store the seed and/or key on the storage device itself. Instead, the seed and/or key is communicated or otherwise transferred to an authentication server, at which it is stored. When the user desires to access the storage device, the authentication system verifies the user's identity and transfers the seed and/or key to the device for accessing of the device. This authentication method is still vulnerable to security risks, as transferring the seed and/or key increases the potential for hacking and compromises the overall security of the encryption system.
- the above security disadvantages are germane to many common encryption methods, including symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption, and authentication systems, such as a one-time password authentication system. Specifically, supply of a password in a HOTP algorithm is particularly subject to security risks.
- the HOTP algorithm is an HMAC based one-time password authentication system.
- OTP algorithms provide a single-use (i.e., one-time) password based on a known time, a known last password entered, and a key (or a seed for generating a key) stored by or at an authentication server.
- a client which could be a storage device or software on the user side, and the authentication server run the HOTP algorithm in parallel.
- the authentication server running the HOTP algorithm typically uses an input key, a timer (or counter), and a known previous password to determine the next password in the algorithm's sequence.
- the storage device or software on the user will output a password.
- the outputted password at the user side is compared to the password, at the authentication side, determined by the HOTP algorithm to be the next password in the sequence. The comparison is performed by the authentication server. If the passwords match, the user is granted access to the storage device. The outputted password at the user side is different each time and only viable for a short time, thus making it a one-time password.
- an encryption system that does not store or otherwise provide access to all of the information necessary for obtaining access to a storage device. More particularly, there is a need for an encryption system that requires a live biometric identifier be provided at the time of access to the device for purposes of generating the seed and/or key—as opposed to merely authenticating an identity of the user.
- Embodiments of the present invention solve the above-mentioned problems and provide a distinct advance in the art of seed and key generation systems. More particularly, embodiments of the invention provide a system, a computer program, and methods for seed and key generation from a non-deterministic live biometric identifier. The system of the present invention performs the methods implemented via the computer program.
- the system broadly comprises a storage device for interfacing with a computer; and a computer-readable storage medium integrated in or accessible by the storage device, the computer-readable medium having a plurality of modules comprising a plurality of code segments stored thereon, including an initialization module comprising an enrollment module for enrolling a biometric template and a seed generation module for initially generating a seed, a live capture module for capturing a live biometric template upon a user desiring to access the storage device, a seed regeneration module for regenerating the seed upon the user desiring to access the storage device, and a key generation module for generating a key from the seed.
- an initialization module comprising an enrollment module for enrolling a biometric template and a seed generation module for initially generating a seed
- a live capture module for capturing a live biometric template upon a user desiring to access the storage device
- a seed regeneration module for regenerating the seed upon the user desiring to access the storage device
- a key generation module for generating a key from
- the enrollment module first receives information indicative of at least one biometric template specific to a user for storing on, or otherwise making accessible by, the storage device.
- the biometric template is then an enrolled biometric template that is used for comparison to any future, live capture biometric templates.
- the present invention assigns an optimization value to the enrolled biometric template. This optimization value is indicative of at least one representative feature of the enrolled biometric template.
- the seed is initially generated as part of the initialization stage.
- An item of test data is encrypted using the optimization value associated with the enrolled biometric template.
- the seed i.e., the optimization value
- the seed is then destroyed, leaving only the encrypted item of test data, the unencrypted item of test data, and the enrolled biometric template stored on the storage device or otherwise made accessible by the device.
- the initialization stage is then complete, and the user may access the storage device at a future time by providing a live biometric template.
- the live biometric template is required for generating the seed previously destroyed during the initialization stage.
- the seed is regenerated by first comparing the enrolled biometric template with the live biometric template and determining an interval having a range based on a probability that the enrolled and live templates are specific to the same user.
- the interval has a plurality of values, and one of the values is indicative of or is the same as the destroyed encryption seed associated with the optimization value for the enrolled biometric template.
- the present invention then iteratively tests the values within the interval by using each value to decrypt the stored, encrypted item of test data. If the encrypted item of test data can be decrypted with the tested value, then the tested value is the seed associated with the optimization value and used to encrypt the item of test data, such that the seed is regenerated.
- embodiments of the present invention generate the key using reflective code.
- the present invention employs a first code segment that at runtime observes and modifies a structure and a behavior of itself to generate a second code segment.
- the second code segment then uses the seed to generate the key.
- the key is operable to encrypt or decrypt one or more files stored on the storage device or to provide access to the storage device.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a seed and key generation system constructed in accordance with various embodiments of the current invention
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram of various modules comprising a plurality of code segments stored on a computer-readable medium of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram of at least some steps of a method for seed and key generation.
- FIG. 4 is a flow chart of at least some steps of a method for seed and key generation.
- references to “one embodiment,” “an embodiment,” or “embodiments” mean that the feature or features being referred to are included in at least one embodiment of the technology.
- references to “one embodiment,” “an embodiment,” or “embodiments” in this description do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment and are also not mutually exclusive unless so stated and/or except as will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art from the description.
- a feature, structure, act, etc. described in one embodiment may also be included in other embodiments, but is not necessarily included.
- the present technology can include a variety of combinations and/or integrations of the embodiments described herein.
- FIG. 1 A dynamic seed and key generation system 10 constructed in accordance with various embodiments of the present invention is shown in FIG. 1 .
- the system 10 employs a storage device 12 , such as a flash drive or mobile wireless device, for interfacing with a computing device 14 (also referred to herein as a “computer”).
- the storage device 12 includes an integrated computer-readable storage medium 16 or is otherwise operable to access a computer-readable storage medium 16 .
- the storage medium 16 has a plurality of modules comprising a plurality of code segments stored on the computer-readable medium for implementing a computer program and a method of embodiments of the present invention.
- the various components or steps of the computer program and method are referred to herein as modules.
- the seed and key generation system 10 can be used for allowing a user access to a secure repository stored on the storage device 12 .
- the secure repository may be a database, a hard drive, a file, a folder, or any digital location to which access is limited based on the identity of the user.
- the system 10 can be used for encrypting/decrypting files or folders stored on the storage device 12 .
- the system 10 can be used with both symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods and with various authentication systems, including a one-time password (OTP) algorithm, such as a HOTP algorithm.
- OTP one-time password
- the seed and key generation system 10 broadly comprises the storage device 12 ; an initialization module 100 for initializing the storage device 12 for accessibility to the secure repository or for encryption/decryption purposes in the future, the initialization module 100 including an enrollment sub-module 102 for enrolling a biometric template, for determining an optimization parameter associated with the enrolled biometric template, and for storing the enrolled biometric template on, or otherwise making accessible to, the storage device, and a seed generation sub-module 104 for generating a seed using the optimization parameter associated with the enrolled biometric template, encrypting an item of test data with the seed, and subsequently destroying the seed; a live capture module 110 for capturing a live biometric template for use in regenerating the seed; a seed regeneration module 120 for regenerating the destroyed seed based on statistical matching of the enrolled and live biometric templates; and a key generation module 130 for generating a key from the regenerated seed.
- an enrollment sub-module 102 for enrolling a biometric template, for determining an optimization parameter
- the dynamic seed and key generation system 10 may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof.
- the components of the seed and key generation system 10 may be implemented as software programs or processor-executable code segments that may be stored on the computer-readable storage medium 16 .
- a “computer-readable medium” or a “computer-readable storage medium” can be any device that can contain or store the computer program for use by or in connection with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
- the computer-readable medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electro-magnetic, biochemical, or semi-conductor system, apparatus, or device.
- examples of the computer-readable medium include the following: a portable computer diskette, a hard drive, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), a portable compact disk read-only memory (CDROM), a digital video disc (DVD), a Blu-RayTM disc, and the like.
- the computer-readable medium 16 is integrated with, or accessible by, the storage device 12 , which may be portable, such as a flash drive or thumb drive, and that is interfaced with the computing device 14 . In other embodiments, the computer-readable medium 16 may be integrated with or accessible by the computing device 14 .
- An exemplary computing device 14 generally comprises any device that is capable of running an operating system and executing software applications, such as a workstation, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a palmtop computer, a tablet computer, such as an IPAD®, a mobile wireless communications device, a point of sale terminal, a credit card scanner, and the like.
- the computing device includes data processing circuitry coupled with memory components to execute computer code or software, such as processors, microprocessors, multi-core microprocessors, microcontrollers, combinations thereof, and the like.
- the various modules and sub-modules described herein represent steps implemented by the method.
- the steps of the method are preferably implemented via the computer program or software comprising a plurality of code segments stored on the computer-readable medium 15 and executable by the computing device 14 .
- reference to the modules should be understood to encompass both the method and the computer program of the present invention.
- the initialization of the storage device includes enrolling an enrolled biometric template via the enrollment module and creating or generating a seed via the seed generation module. Initialization is required so that the storage device is associated with a specific user, such that only the specific user can access a secure repository on the storage device, encrypt/decrypt files or folders saved on the storage device, or obtain a password via an OTP algorithm, such as a HOTP algorithm. In most circumstances, the initialization of the storage device will only be required once. However, should the user wish to erase the storage device, enroll a different biometric identifier, or enroll a different or additional user, the initialization will need to be performed again.
- the initialization module 100 comprises an enrollment sub-module 102 (or simply, an enrollment module) and a seed generation sub-module 104 (or simply, a seed generation module).
- the enrollment module 102 is operable to enroll a biometric template, determine the optimization parameter associated with the enrolled biometric template, and store the enrolled biometric template on, or otherwise make accessible by, the storage device.
- the seed and key generation system employs biometric indicia to generate the seed/key, allow access to files or information, encrypt/decrypt files or information, or provide one-time passwords when used with a OTP algorithm (collectively or individually broadly referred to herein as “allowing access to the storage device”).
- the enrolled biometric template is permanently stored on or otherwise made accessible to the storage device, as illustrated in FIGS. 1 and 3 .
- the live biometric template which is discussed below, is provided for seed and key generation at the time the user wishes to access the storage device, but the live biometric template is not permanently stored on the storage device and is deleted once access is granted.
- the modules, the enrolled biometric template, and other information discussed herein as stored on the storage device or otherwise made accessible by the storage device may be stored at a third-party storage device 18 , such as an authentication server 18 , the computing device 14 , or the like.
- the storage device 12 may communicate with the computing device 14 and/or the third-party storage device 18 via known communication networks 20 and techniques, including device-to-device networking, cloud networking, an Ethernet network, an 802.11 wireless network, a blue tooth network, a computer bus, or any other device, apparatus, system, or combination thereof capable of enabling communication, individually or collectively, among the storage device, the computing device, and the third-party storage device.
- the biometric indicia for a particular biometric identifier is obtained through a biometric sensor 22 , which may be coupled with, integrated in, or accessible by the storage device 12 and/or the computing device 14 .
- the storage device could be a mobile wireless communications device, and the biometric sensor could be integrated with the communications device.
- the storage device could be a flash or thumb drive including an integrated biometric sensor.
- An even further alternative could be a biometric sensor coupled to the storage device and/or computing device.
- the biometric sensor could be a fingerprint scanner or other suitable biometric sensor for receiving the biometric identifier, identifying and capturing unique biometric indicia associated with the biometric identifier, and creating the biometric template. It should be understood that the biometric sensor could be any device to extract biometric indicia sufficient for creating a biometric template or that otherwise creates unique indicia. For example, a lightwave spectrum sensor captures biometric characteristics not visible to the human eye.
- biometric indicia including fingerprints, palm prints, the orientation and arrangement of features on a face, iris scans, and DNA.
- biometric indicia will be described with respect to a fingerprint.
- a user of the invention To enroll a biometric identifier specific to the user, a user of the invention initially provides at least one and often several samples of the same biometric identifier (i.e., the same finger for obtaining a fingerprint scan), as referenced at Step 200 of FIG. 4 .
- Biometric indicia specific to the biometric identifier is then extracted via known biometric techniques, as referenced at Step 202 .
- biometric indicia associated with the biometric identifier is therefore non-deterministic, in that the collective biometric indicia cannot be accurately identified each time the biometric identifier is scanned or sampled.
- biometric indicia specific to the biometric identifier.
- An exemplary, although non-limiting, algorithm for fingerprints is a vector-based matching algorithm.
- the goal of any algorithm for digitally representing a biometric identifier as a biometric template is to identify the representative features that will most likely be extracted from any future scan or sample taken of the particular biometric identifier.
- a representative feature may be a pattern of ridges or valleys in the fingerprint that will likely be identified in any future fingerprint scans.
- one or more scans or samples of the biometric identifier may be taken for obtaining the one or more representative features.
- the present invention identifies an optimization value specific to the enrolled biometric indicia, as referenced at Step 204 .
- the optimization value is a value, parameter, or other feature that is statistically highly likely to be the same as or close to a value, parameter, or other feature identified in any future live scan or sample of the biometric identifier.
- the optimization value is unique to the particular biometric identifier.
- the optimization value is not necessarily the value that is most representative of the biometric identifier. Instead, the optimization value can be a value that is statistically close to a representative value of the biometric identifier.
- the optimization value may be determined through various known optimization techniques, including, but not limited to, averaging the biometric indicia of each sample or scan of the biometric identifier and creating a correlation and a projection and determining expected asymptotes.
- the seed is initially generated.
- the seed can be a key to allow access to the storage device 12 , or the seed can be used to create, derive, or generate a key that in turn allows access to the storage device.
- the seed is used for both purposes.
- the seed is first used to encrypt an item of test data, as referenced at Step 206 .
- the item of test data is preferably a relatively small-sized piece of data, such as less than approximately 1 MB, that is used as a standard or measure by which to determine if a seed regenerated in the future is the same as the seed initially created by the seed generation module 104 .
- the unencrypted item of test data i.e., the item of test data in its initial form before encryption with the seed
- the encrypted item of test data are stored on or otherwise made accessible by the storage device, as referenced at Step 208 .
- the seed is then subsequently destroyed, as references at Step 210 .
- the seed is the optimization value associated with the enrolled biometric indicia or is otherwise information indicative of the optimization value.
- the seed is directly associated with the enrolled biometric indicia, and, in particular, the biometric identifier specific to the user. Encryption of the item of test data is performed using, at least in part, the optimization value or information associated with or indicative of the optimization value.
- the enrolled biometric template is created, as referenced at Step 212 .
- the enrolled biometric indicia is hashed or otherwise transformed with the aid of an injective function or via other known techniques.
- the enrolled biometric template is the digital representation of the biometric identifier (a present size of a common biometric template is approximately 1 MB). Because the biometric indicia is hashed, the optimization value cannot be determined based on knowing the enrolled biometric template alone, as the result of an injective function such as a hashing algorithm is to prevent reverse engineering of the enrolled biometric template.
- optimization value is determined or assigned prior to creation of the enrolled biometric template (i.e., prior to hashing the biometric indicia to obtain the biometric template)
- reference herein to the optimization value being associated with the enrolled biometric template shall be understood to encompass the optimization value being associated with biometric indicia for the enrolled biometric identifier.
- the present invention Upon determining an optimization value for the enrolled biometric template and creating the enrolled biometric template, the present invention stores the enrolled biometric template on the storage device or in a location accessible by the storage device, as referenced at Step 214 .
- the enrolled biometric template may be further encrypted or hashed prior to storage.
- the three items of information relevant to future seed regeneration and key generation remain stored on the storage device or otherwise accessible to the device, namely the enrolled biometric template, the unencrypted item of test data, and the encrypted item of test data.
- all information or data necessary for obtaining access to the storage device is not stored on the device or accessible to the device.
- the encrypted key is stored on the device
- all the information necessary for obtaining access to the storage device is stored on the device.
- the user cannot access the storage device without providing a live biometric scan that authenticates the user and allows decryption of the key.
- the encrypted key is still stored on the device, the device remains vulnerable to hacking.
- the same issues remain even if a seed for generating the key, rather than the key itself, is stored on the device (in encrypted or unencrypted form).
- a result of not storing on the storage device all information necessary for obtaining access to the device is that access to the device cannot be obtained—under any hacking or vulnerability scenarios—without a live biometric identifier being provided at the time of granting access.
- embodiments of the present invention receive a live biometric template via the live capture module 110 and perform a seed regeneration via the seed regeneration module 120 .
- the live capture module 110 is performed subsequent to the initialization module 100 and prior to each time the user desires to access the storage device 12 .
- the user When desiring to access the storage device, the user will provide the biometric identifier used for the enrollment module 102 described above. A scan or sample of the biometric identifier will be taken via the biometric sensor 22 , the biometric indicia associated with the biometric identifier will be identified, and a biometric template will be created, similar to the enrollment method described above for the enrolled biometric template.
- the biometric template created each time the user provides the biometric identifier for access to the storage device (but subsequent to the initialization of the storage device) is herein referred to as a live biometric template.
- the live capture module 110 will then receive information indicative of the live biometric template. As detailed below, the live biometric template is then used to regenerate the seed.
- the live capture module 110 may only need to be performed upon interfacing the storage device with a particular computing device, upon a period of time expiring, upon opening or selecting the secure repository, upon request or initiation of a particular event, or at any other time or upon any other action specified by the user during the initialization of the storage device.
- the seed regeneration module 120 is performed. Referring to FIG. 2 and Step 218 of FIG. 4 , the enrolled biometric template is compared with the live biometric template to determine a likelihood that the templates are indicative of the same biometric identifier (i.e., specific to the same user).
- the seed regeneration module 120 performs a matching algorithm by comparing the biometric indicia for each of the templates and determining a matching value or score that represents the probability that the templates “match” (i.e., the templates are specific to the same user).
- the matching score will be a 100% probability for non-deterministic biometric identifiers, as the biometric indicia for the live biometric template will most likely be different than the indicia for the enrolled biometric template.
- the matching score will be sufficiently indicative of the biometric indicia of the enrolled biometric template for purposes of the present invention.
- embodiments of the present invention determine a statistical interval having a range based on the matching score, namely a probability that the enrolled and live biometric templates are specific to the same user.
- a plurality of values lie within the interval.
- a size of the range of the interval from the lowest value to the highest value is dependent on the matching score. The higher the matching score (i.e., the more likely the enrolled and live biometric templates belong to the same user), the smaller the range of the interval. Similarly, the lower the matching score, the larger the range of the interval.
- the size of the range of the interval is inversely proportional to the magnitude of the matching score.
- the values that lie within the interval are indicative of the representative features of the live biometric indicia specific to the live biometric identifier. Similar to as discussed above with respect to the enrolled biometric template, the algorithm for creating the live biometric template will identify prominent characteristics or representative features associated with the live biometric identifier. These prominent characteristics will then be represented by the live biometric indicia as values. At least one of these values will lie within the range of the interval in the event the enrolled and live biometric identifiers are the same.
- the interval determined by the seed regeneration module will encompass the optimization value for the enrolled biometric template—even though the optimization value for the enrolled template is no longer known. This is because the optimization value for the enrolled template is indicative of a prominent characteristic or representative feature of the biometric identifier provided during the enrollment process. Moreover, the values that lie within the interval are indicative of one or more prominent characteristics or representative features of the biometric identifier provided for access to the storage device subsequent to the enrollment process. Although the likelihood of assigning the same value for the same prominent characteristic for both templates is very low, the likelihood of the biometric template algorithm identifying one or more values close to the optimization value and within a range suitable for performing the seed regeneration of the present invention is high.
- the seed regeneration module of the present invention guarantees that if the enrolled and live biometric templates belong to the same biometric identifier, then the optimization value associated with the enrolled biometric template will lie within the range of the determined interval (assuming that a suitable scan or sample of the live biometric identifier was obtained). Further, because the optimization value is the same as or associated with the destroyed seed, the seed regeneration module determines a statistical interval having a plurality of values, wherein one of the values is indicative of or is the same as the destroyed encryption seed associated with the optimization value for the enrolled biometric template.
- embodiments of the present invention apply a filter to the interval to reduce any noise in the interval, as referenced at Step 220 of FIG. 4 .
- the filtered interval has fewer values remaining therein than prior to application of the filter.
- the filter of embodiments of the present invention discards vales known to not be the optimization value based on filtering techniques known in the art, such that subsequent to application of the filter, the value indicative of or the same as the destroyed encryption seed remains in the filtered interval.
- An exemplary filter is a checksum filter.
- embodiments of the present invention regenerate or otherwise uncover the seed via an iterative testing process.
- the seed regeneration module individually tests, according to a scheduled sequence, the values within the interval to determine if one of the particular values is the seed. To test a value, the value is used to decrypt the item of test data previously encrypted with the seed associated with the optimization value for the enrolled biometric template. If decryption is successful, then the seed regeneration module 120 knows that the tested value is the seed previously destroyed during the enrollment process. The tested value is then a regenerated seed.
- the seed regeneration module iteratively tests the next value in the scheduled sequence to determine if the next value decrypts the encrypted item of test data.
- the decryption of the encrypted item of test data is evaluated against the stored item of test data (i.e., the item of test data that was not encrypted and was originally stored during the enrollment process) to confirm that the two items of test data are indeed the same item of data.
- the iterative testing of the values within the range is preferably performed according to the scheduled sequence.
- the scheduled sequence may be in any preferred order, including forward sequential, reverse sequential, or based on an order dependent on a statistical likelihood that a particular value, or range of values, in the interval is the seed.
- the iterative testing is ceased, such that no further value within the interval is tested.
- the regenerated seed could be used as a key to allow access to the storage device.
- embodiments of the present invention provide the key generation module 130 for generating the key using the seed, as referenced at Step 224 , which provides an additional layer of security in obtaining access to the storage device.
- the key may be generated via known techniques and methods, embodiments of the present invention preferably employ reflective code to generate the key.
- Reflective code is a system or method of coding wherein a code segment observes and modifies a structure and a behavior of the code segment at runtime, and based on the structure and behavior, generates a second code segment.
- reflective code is computer source code that can access metadata about the environment, classes, methods, and data at runtime.
- reflective code can dynamically instantiate objects that are otherwise unknown at coding or compile-time, execute functions or methods, and destroy objects.
- code written in Java may use classes and methods in java.lang.reflect package to provide reflections.
- Ruby code may use methods from the Object class, such as const_get( ) and send( ) for reflection.
- reflective code algorithms may use several different algorithms based on characteristics of the seed.
- a different algorithm may be selected at runtime based on a modulo of the seed, a sum of the digits of the seed, or various other characteristics of the seed.
- Other key generation algorithms may utilize fuzzy logic, Kohonen maps, neural networks, heuristic functions, or other techniques to generate the key.
- Embodiments of the present invention employ a first code segment that is reflective code and thus observes and modifies its structure and behavior at runtime.
- the first code segment generates a second code segment based on the observations and modifications of its structure and behavior at runtime.
- the results of these observations and modifications of the first code segment at runtime thus generate as data or instructions, i.e., a second code segment.
- the second code segment is then used to generate the key for allowing access to the storage device.
- the second code segment uses the regenerated seed to generate the key.
- Reflective code does not require obfuscation of the key generation algorithm because the key generation algorithm is not otherwise generated or known until runtime. Because the seed is necessary to know the key generation algorithm, and further because the seed and the second code segment for ultimately generating the key are never stored on the storage device, use of reflective code provides a secure key generation technique. Thus, use of reflective code to generate the key allows for the code necessary for generating the key not being stored on the storage device. Instead, the first code segment that generates the second code segment at runtime, based on the first code segment's structure and behavior, is the only code stored on or otherwise made accessible by the storage device. Moreover, in embodiments of the present invention, the key cannot be generated without the second code segment first receiving the seed.
- Alternative embodiments of the present invention may include multiple layers of reflective code segments that iteratively generate an additional or next code segment in the runtime sequence.
- the first code segment could generate the second code segment, which in turn could generate a third code segment that is used to generate the key, or the third code segment could generate a fourth code segment that is used to generate the key.
- use of reflective code for generating the key embodies at least one code segment being a reflective code segment.
- the key is generated, it is used to allow access to the storage device. Neither the seed nor the key must be saved on, or otherwise made accessible by, the storage device to obtain access. Instead, the user need only provide a live biometric identifier to begin the seed regeneration and key generation processes.
- Embodiments of the present invention are well-suited for various authentication methods, including a HOTP authentication system.
- the key may be regenerated and provided to a HOTP access module 140 , as illustrated in FIG. 3 .
- the key is fed to the HOTP algorithm to provide the password for entry by the user.
- the user must enter a one-time password to gain access to the storage device.
- the key is also stored at an authentication server. Based on the last password entered (Password N ) and the expired time since the last password was entered, the authentication server knows the one-time password (Password N+1 ) that should be entered by the user.
- the seed is retrieved from the live biometric template and the key is generated, according to the above-described process.
- This key is then fed to the HOTP algorithm to obtain the one-time password to be provided by the user.
- the authentication server authenticates the one-time password provided by the user.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
- Biodiversity & Conservation Biology (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims (20)
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US13/028,715 US8745405B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2011-02-16 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
US14/290,306 US9160532B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2014-05-29 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
US14/880,686 US9755830B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2015-10-12 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US30543510P | 2010-02-17 | 2010-02-17 | |
US13/028,715 US8745405B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2011-02-16 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US14/290,306 Continuation US9160532B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2014-05-29 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US20110264919A1 US20110264919A1 (en) | 2011-10-27 |
US8745405B2 true US8745405B2 (en) | 2014-06-03 |
Family
ID=44816789
Family Applications (3)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US13/028,715 Expired - Fee Related US8745405B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2011-02-16 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
US14/290,306 Expired - Fee Related US9160532B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2014-05-29 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
US14/880,686 Expired - Fee Related US9755830B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2015-10-12 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
Family Applications After (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US14/290,306 Expired - Fee Related US9160532B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2014-05-29 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
US14/880,686 Expired - Fee Related US9755830B2 (en) | 2010-02-17 | 2015-10-12 | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (3) | US8745405B2 (en) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US9992171B2 (en) | 2014-11-03 | 2018-06-05 | Sony Corporation | Method and system for digital rights management of encrypted digital content |
US11831766B2 (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2023-11-28 | David Kye Liang Lee | Generation of encryption keys using biometrics |
Families Citing this family (26)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
TWI566564B (en) * | 2012-04-25 | 2017-01-11 | Samton International Development Technology Co Ltd | Virtual reality authentication circuit, system and electronic consumption method |
CN103368954B (en) * | 2013-07-02 | 2016-06-08 | 山东科技大学 | A kind of smart card registration entry based on password and biological characteristic |
US9218473B2 (en) * | 2013-07-18 | 2015-12-22 | Suprema Inc. | Creation and authentication of biometric information |
GB2517777B (en) * | 2013-08-30 | 2015-08-05 | Cylon Global Technology Inc | Data encryption and smartcard storing encrypted data |
CN103532956A (en) * | 2013-10-18 | 2014-01-22 | 浪潮电子信息产业股份有限公司 | Biological information-based authentication method in cloud operation system |
US9813246B2 (en) * | 2013-10-29 | 2017-11-07 | Jory Schwach | Encryption using biometric image-based key |
US8838071B1 (en) | 2014-04-30 | 2014-09-16 | Oto Technologies Llc | Secure communications smartphone system |
US9774596B2 (en) * | 2014-05-23 | 2017-09-26 | Fujitsu Limited | Privacy-preserving biometric authentication |
US9590984B2 (en) | 2014-06-04 | 2017-03-07 | Grandios Technologies, Llc | Smartphone fingerprint pass-through system |
US20150358333A1 (en) * | 2014-06-04 | 2015-12-10 | Grandios Technologies, Llc | Geo-location and biometric presence security |
CN104734848A (en) * | 2015-03-02 | 2015-06-24 | 郑州轻工业学院 | Recombinant DNA technology based information encrypting and hiding method and application |
CN106161350B (en) * | 2015-03-31 | 2020-03-10 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and device for managing application identifier |
CN105119717A (en) * | 2015-07-21 | 2015-12-02 | 郑州轻工业学院 | DNA coding based encryption system and encryption method |
IT201600127809A1 (en) * | 2016-12-19 | 2018-06-19 | DEVICE FOR PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS WITH CONTACTLESS TECHNOLOGY (NFC), WITH GENERATING ALGORITHM OTP CODE UNIQUE INTEGRAL TEXT STRING TEMPLATE GENERATED BY BIOMETRIC SCANNING OF THE DIGITAL FOOTPRINT, WITH TOKEN OTP FUNCTION, RECOGNITION OF IDENTITY AND SUBSCRIPTION FEATURE PUBLIC AND RELATED PROCESSES OF OPERATION, ASSOCIATION AND USE | |
WO2019078858A1 (en) * | 2017-10-18 | 2019-04-25 | Visa International Service Association | Biometric data security system and method |
US11943363B2 (en) | 2017-12-08 | 2024-03-26 | Visa International Service Association | Server-assisted privacy protecting biometric comparison |
US11223478B2 (en) | 2018-04-04 | 2022-01-11 | Sri International | Biometric authentication with template privacy and non-interactive re-enrollment |
US11023569B2 (en) * | 2018-05-29 | 2021-06-01 | Sri International | Secure re-enrollment of biometric templates using functional encryption |
US11283793B2 (en) * | 2018-10-18 | 2022-03-22 | Oracle International Corporation | Securing user sessions |
CN109586921B (en) * | 2018-12-14 | 2021-07-02 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | Method and system for realizing dynamic password |
US10825275B2 (en) * | 2018-12-19 | 2020-11-03 | Ranjeev K. Singh | Blockchain-controlled and location-validated locking systems and methods |
CN111651774B (en) * | 2019-03-04 | 2022-04-26 | 北京大学 | Universal method for converting generated probability model into encoder and encryption method |
CN112084507A (en) * | 2019-06-13 | 2020-12-15 | 罗伯特·博世有限公司 | Method for secure access to an electronic control unit |
US10769873B1 (en) * | 2019-06-28 | 2020-09-08 | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | Secure smart unlocking |
US11200333B2 (en) * | 2019-08-13 | 2021-12-14 | International Business Machines Corporation | File exposure to an intended recipient |
CN111182003A (en) * | 2020-02-28 | 2020-05-19 | 北京帕斯沃得科技有限公司 | Identity authentication method based on authentication terminal |
Citations (29)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5832091A (en) * | 1994-09-07 | 1998-11-03 | Mytec Technologies Inc. | Fingerprint controlled public key cryptographic system |
US6038315A (en) * | 1997-03-17 | 2000-03-14 | The Regents Of The University Of California | Method and system for normalizing biometric variations to authenticate users from a public database and that ensures individual biometric data privacy |
US6049612A (en) * | 1997-03-10 | 2000-04-11 | The Pacid Group | File encryption method and system |
US6185316B1 (en) * | 1997-11-12 | 2001-02-06 | Unisys Corporation | Self-authentication apparatus and method |
US6219794B1 (en) * | 1997-04-21 | 2001-04-17 | Mytec Technologies, Inc. | Method for secure key management using a biometric |
US6363485B1 (en) * | 1998-09-09 | 2002-03-26 | Entrust Technologies Limited | Multi-factor biometric authenticating device and method |
US20030091218A1 (en) * | 2001-07-25 | 2003-05-15 | Larry Hamid | Method of hash string extraction |
US6687375B1 (en) * | 1999-06-02 | 2004-02-03 | International Business Machines Corporation | Generating user-dependent keys and random numbers |
US20040044989A1 (en) * | 2002-08-30 | 2004-03-04 | Thomas Vachuska | Apparatus and method using pre-described patterns and reflection to generate source code |
US20040111625A1 (en) * | 2001-02-14 | 2004-06-10 | Duffy Dominic Gavan | Data processing apparatus and method |
US6928163B1 (en) * | 1999-07-20 | 2005-08-09 | International Business Machines Corporation | Methods, systems and computer program products for generating user-dependent RSA values without storing seeds |
US20050229009A1 (en) * | 1999-06-21 | 2005-10-13 | Fujitsu Limited | Method and equipment for encrypting/decrypting physical characteristic information, and identification system utilizing the physical characteristic information |
US20060123239A1 (en) * | 2004-12-07 | 2006-06-08 | Emin Martinian | Biometric based user authentication with syndrome codes |
US20070038863A1 (en) * | 2003-10-20 | 2007-02-15 | Nhan Nguyen | System and Method for Decoupling Identification from Biometric Information in Biometric Access Systems |
US20070050303A1 (en) * | 2005-08-24 | 2007-03-01 | Schroeder Dale W | Biometric identification device |
US20070174633A1 (en) * | 2004-12-07 | 2007-07-26 | Draper Stark C | Biometric Based User Authentication and Data Encryption |
US20070180261A1 (en) * | 2004-06-09 | 2007-08-02 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. | Biometric template protection and feature handling |
US20090006855A1 (en) * | 2004-11-16 | 2009-01-01 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. | Securely Computing a Similarity Measure |
US7474769B1 (en) * | 2004-09-14 | 2009-01-06 | Unisys Corporation | Bioindex mechanism for increasing the relative speed of biometric identification against large population samples |
US7526653B1 (en) * | 1999-08-25 | 2009-04-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method of data protection |
US20090164979A1 (en) * | 2007-12-20 | 2009-06-25 | Fischer Martin P | System landscape trace |
US7620818B2 (en) * | 2004-12-07 | 2009-11-17 | Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories, Inc. | Biometric based user authentication and data encryption |
US20090310779A1 (en) * | 2006-07-20 | 2009-12-17 | Privylink Pte Ltd | Method for generating cryptographic key from biometric data |
US20100316260A1 (en) * | 2009-06-15 | 2010-12-16 | Xerox Corporation | Biometric data encryption |
US20110271120A1 (en) * | 2009-01-09 | 2011-11-03 | Thomas Andreas Maria Kevenaar | Method and System for Verifying the Identity of an Individual by Employing Biometric Data Features Associated with the Individual |
US8239685B2 (en) * | 2007-10-24 | 2012-08-07 | Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute | Biometric authentication method |
US8312291B2 (en) * | 2006-12-28 | 2012-11-13 | Telecom Italia S.P.A. | Method and system for biometric authentication and encryption |
US8347106B2 (en) * | 2007-07-03 | 2013-01-01 | Nds Limited | Method and apparatus for user authentication based on a user eye characteristic |
US8417960B2 (en) * | 2006-09-06 | 2013-04-09 | Hitachi, Ltd. | Method for generating an encryption key using biometrics authentication and restoring the encryption key and personal authentication system |
Family Cites Families (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5280527A (en) * | 1992-04-14 | 1994-01-18 | Kamahira Safe Co., Inc. | Biometric token for authorizing access to a host system |
US6035398A (en) * | 1997-11-14 | 2000-03-07 | Digitalpersona, Inc. | Cryptographic key generation using biometric data |
US6687675B1 (en) * | 1999-06-04 | 2004-02-03 | Lurley Archambeau | Message storage device |
US20030219121A1 (en) * | 2002-05-24 | 2003-11-27 | Ncipher Corporation, Ltd | Biometric key generation for secure storage |
ATE343273T1 (en) * | 2002-05-31 | 2006-11-15 | Scient Generics Ltd | BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM |
SE522615C2 (en) * | 2002-07-09 | 2004-02-24 | Martin Tiberg Med Tiberg Techn | A method and system for biometric identification or verification. |
US7574734B2 (en) * | 2002-08-15 | 2009-08-11 | Dominique Louis Joseph Fedronic | System and method for sequentially processing a biometric sample |
US7272245B1 (en) * | 2004-05-13 | 2007-09-18 | The United States Of America As Represented By The National Security Agency | Method of biometric authentication |
EP1759259A2 (en) * | 2004-06-09 | 2007-03-07 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Architectures for privacy protection of biometric templates |
KR20070024633A (en) * | 2004-06-25 | 2007-03-02 | 코닌클리케 필립스 일렉트로닉스 엔.브이. | Renewable and private biometrics |
TWI249314B (en) * | 2004-10-15 | 2006-02-11 | Ind Tech Res Inst | Biometrics-based cryptographic key generation system and method |
US8384515B2 (en) * | 2008-09-15 | 2013-02-26 | Accenture Global Services Limited | Biometric processing using random projection transforms |
US20110047377A1 (en) * | 2009-08-19 | 2011-02-24 | Harris Corporation | Secure digital communications via biometric key generation |
-
2011
- 2011-02-16 US US13/028,715 patent/US8745405B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2014
- 2014-05-29 US US14/290,306 patent/US9160532B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2015
- 2015-10-12 US US14/880,686 patent/US9755830B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (30)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5832091A (en) * | 1994-09-07 | 1998-11-03 | Mytec Technologies Inc. | Fingerprint controlled public key cryptographic system |
US6049612A (en) * | 1997-03-10 | 2000-04-11 | The Pacid Group | File encryption method and system |
US6038315A (en) * | 1997-03-17 | 2000-03-14 | The Regents Of The University Of California | Method and system for normalizing biometric variations to authenticate users from a public database and that ensures individual biometric data privacy |
US6219794B1 (en) * | 1997-04-21 | 2001-04-17 | Mytec Technologies, Inc. | Method for secure key management using a biometric |
US6185316B1 (en) * | 1997-11-12 | 2001-02-06 | Unisys Corporation | Self-authentication apparatus and method |
US6363485B1 (en) * | 1998-09-09 | 2002-03-26 | Entrust Technologies Limited | Multi-factor biometric authenticating device and method |
US6687375B1 (en) * | 1999-06-02 | 2004-02-03 | International Business Machines Corporation | Generating user-dependent keys and random numbers |
US20050229009A1 (en) * | 1999-06-21 | 2005-10-13 | Fujitsu Limited | Method and equipment for encrypting/decrypting physical characteristic information, and identification system utilizing the physical characteristic information |
US6928163B1 (en) * | 1999-07-20 | 2005-08-09 | International Business Machines Corporation | Methods, systems and computer program products for generating user-dependent RSA values without storing seeds |
US7526653B1 (en) * | 1999-08-25 | 2009-04-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method of data protection |
US8607056B2 (en) * | 2001-02-14 | 2013-12-10 | Genkey Netherlands B.V. | Data processing apparatus and method |
US20040111625A1 (en) * | 2001-02-14 | 2004-06-10 | Duffy Dominic Gavan | Data processing apparatus and method |
US20030091218A1 (en) * | 2001-07-25 | 2003-05-15 | Larry Hamid | Method of hash string extraction |
US20040044989A1 (en) * | 2002-08-30 | 2004-03-04 | Thomas Vachuska | Apparatus and method using pre-described patterns and reflection to generate source code |
US20070038863A1 (en) * | 2003-10-20 | 2007-02-15 | Nhan Nguyen | System and Method for Decoupling Identification from Biometric Information in Biometric Access Systems |
US20070180261A1 (en) * | 2004-06-09 | 2007-08-02 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. | Biometric template protection and feature handling |
US7474769B1 (en) * | 2004-09-14 | 2009-01-06 | Unisys Corporation | Bioindex mechanism for increasing the relative speed of biometric identification against large population samples |
US20090006855A1 (en) * | 2004-11-16 | 2009-01-01 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. | Securely Computing a Similarity Measure |
US7620818B2 (en) * | 2004-12-07 | 2009-11-17 | Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories, Inc. | Biometric based user authentication and data encryption |
US20070174633A1 (en) * | 2004-12-07 | 2007-07-26 | Draper Stark C | Biometric Based User Authentication and Data Encryption |
US20060123239A1 (en) * | 2004-12-07 | 2006-06-08 | Emin Martinian | Biometric based user authentication with syndrome codes |
US20070050303A1 (en) * | 2005-08-24 | 2007-03-01 | Schroeder Dale W | Biometric identification device |
US20090310779A1 (en) * | 2006-07-20 | 2009-12-17 | Privylink Pte Ltd | Method for generating cryptographic key from biometric data |
US8417960B2 (en) * | 2006-09-06 | 2013-04-09 | Hitachi, Ltd. | Method for generating an encryption key using biometrics authentication and restoring the encryption key and personal authentication system |
US8312291B2 (en) * | 2006-12-28 | 2012-11-13 | Telecom Italia S.P.A. | Method and system for biometric authentication and encryption |
US8347106B2 (en) * | 2007-07-03 | 2013-01-01 | Nds Limited | Method and apparatus for user authentication based on a user eye characteristic |
US8239685B2 (en) * | 2007-10-24 | 2012-08-07 | Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute | Biometric authentication method |
US20090164979A1 (en) * | 2007-12-20 | 2009-06-25 | Fischer Martin P | System landscape trace |
US20110271120A1 (en) * | 2009-01-09 | 2011-11-03 | Thomas Andreas Maria Kevenaar | Method and System for Verifying the Identity of an Individual by Employing Biometric Data Features Associated with the Individual |
US20100316260A1 (en) * | 2009-06-15 | 2010-12-16 | Xerox Corporation | Biometric data encryption |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US9992171B2 (en) | 2014-11-03 | 2018-06-05 | Sony Corporation | Method and system for digital rights management of encrypted digital content |
US11831766B2 (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2023-11-28 | David Kye Liang Lee | Generation of encryption keys using biometrics |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20110264919A1 (en) | 2011-10-27 |
US9755830B2 (en) | 2017-09-05 |
US20150263857A1 (en) | 2015-09-17 |
US20160119138A1 (en) | 2016-04-28 |
US9160532B2 (en) | 2015-10-13 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US9755830B2 (en) | Dynamic seed and key generation from biometric indicia | |
US11336643B2 (en) | Anonymizing biometric data for use in a security system | |
US8332637B2 (en) | Methods and systems for nonce generation in a token | |
US9286455B2 (en) | Real identity authentication | |
US10205723B2 (en) | Distributed storage of authentication data | |
KR102132507B1 (en) | Resource management based on biometric data | |
US20190311148A1 (en) | System and method for secure storage of electronic material | |
US9935947B1 (en) | Secure and reliable protection and matching of biometric templates across multiple devices using secret sharing | |
US20180082050A1 (en) | Method and a system for secure login to a computer, computer network, and computer website using biometrics and a mobile computing wireless electronic communication device | |
US8812860B1 (en) | Systems and methods for protecting data stored on removable storage devices by requiring external user authentication | |
WO2017000829A1 (en) | Method for checking security based on biological features, client and server | |
CN111931144B (en) | Unified safe login authentication method and device for operating system and service application | |
US20070237366A1 (en) | Secure biometric processing system and method of use | |
US9485098B1 (en) | System and method of user authentication using digital signatures | |
US9213818B2 (en) | Anonymous authentication using backup biometric information | |
US20070220274A1 (en) | Biometric authentication system | |
US10951609B2 (en) | System to effectively validate the authentication of OTP usage | |
US11681787B1 (en) | Ownership validation for cryptographic asset contracts using irreversibly transformed identity tokens | |
CN113826095A (en) | Single click login process | |
TWI724681B (en) | Managing cryptographic keys based on identity information | |
US20070226515A1 (en) | Secure biometric processing system and method of use | |
EP3745289A1 (en) | Apparatus and method for registering biometric information, apparatus and method for biometric authentication | |
TWI844338B (en) | Passwordless authentication method and computer program product | |
JP7320101B2 (en) | Computer system, server, terminal, program, and information processing method |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: CEELOX, INC., FLORIDA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:PIZANO, ERIX;SASS, JOE;REEL/FRAME:025968/0007 Effective date: 20110315 |
|
STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: CIP, LLC, KANSAS Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CEELOX, INC.;REEL/FRAME:033571/0060 Effective date: 20130423 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: CEELOX PATENTS, LLC, KANSAS Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CIP, LLC;REEL/FRAME:033584/0645 Effective date: 20130206 |
|
MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 4TH YR, SMALL ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M2551) Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: MAINTENANCE FEE REMINDER MAILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: REM.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY |
|
LAPS | Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY |
|
STCH | Information on status: patent discontinuation |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEES UNDER 37 CFR 1.362 |
|
FP | Lapsed due to failure to pay maintenance fee |
Effective date: 20220603 |