US8171336B2 - Method for protecting a secured real time clock module and a device having protection capabilities - Google Patents
Method for protecting a secured real time clock module and a device having protection capabilities Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US8171336B2 US8171336B2 US12/163,610 US16361008A US8171336B2 US 8171336 B2 US8171336 B2 US 8171336B2 US 16361008 A US16361008 A US 16361008A US 8171336 B2 US8171336 B2 US 8171336B2
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- real time
- time clock
- clock module
- secured real
- multiple input
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F1/00—Details not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00 and G06F21/00
- G06F1/04—Generating or distributing clock signals or signals derived directly therefrom
- G06F1/14—Time supervision arrangements, e.g. real time clock
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/81—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer by operating on the power supply, e.g. enabling or disabling power-on, sleep or resume operations
Definitions
- the present invention relates to methods for protecting a secured real time clock module and for a device having protection capabilities.
- Real time clock modules have various applications. They can be used for providing timing information for operating systems, for enforcing policies for time-sensitive data, for assisting in positioning calculations and the like.
- Real time clock signals can be tampered for various reasons including copyrighting piracy, concealing hacking or tampering attempts, reducing the functionality of a device and the like.
- One tampering method involves repetitive alterations of the supply voltage provided to the real time clock module, in order to force the secured real time clock (SRTC) module to reset, to get stuck, to output a secured key stored in the SRTC module, to read invalid commands, and the like.
- SRTC secured real time clock
- the supply voltage can be provided by a so-called “external” voltage supply unit—a voltage supply unit that is located outside an integrated circuit that includes the secured real time clock module.
- FIG. 1 schematically shows an example of an embodiment of a device that has secured real time clock (SRTC) module protection capabilities
- FIG. 2 schematically shows an example of an embodiment of a method for protecting a SRTC module
- FIG. 3 schematically shows an example of an embodiment of a method for protecting a SRTC module.
- an SRTC module can be protected by selectively locking its input ports and unlocking its input ports.
- the inputs ports are unlocked only if a predefined high frequency code is provided to a control input port of the SRTC module.
- a predefined high frequency code can not be generated by tampering the supply voltage provided to the SRTC module.
- the input ports are locked if they are not active during at least a first duration. This first duration is set in response to the timing of expected (valid or authorized) programming sequences of the SRCT module. Thus, during an programming sequence the input ports remain unlocked.
- FIG. 1 schematically shows an example of an embodiment of device 10 that has SRTC module protection capabilities.
- Device 10 can have information (data and/or media) processing capabilities.
- Device 10 can be a mobile device such as but not limited to laptop computer, a mobile phone, a media player, a mobile game console and the like.
- Device 10 can also be a stationary apparatus such as a desktop computer, a plasma screen, a television, a media entertainment system, a monitoring system, a stationary game console, a network node, a router, a switch, and the like.
- Device 10 can include one or more displays, processors, memory units, loudspeakers, microphones, DMA controllers, and the like.
- Device 10 can include multiple integrated circuits.
- Device 10 includes voltage supply unit 20 that is connected to integrated circuit 100 .
- Integrated circuit 100 includes low power mode circuit 120 , control module 110 , high frequency code generator 80 , high frequency clock generator 70 , and SRTC module 140 .
- SRTC module 140 includes multiple inputs, such as inputs 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k), control input 50 (p), protection module 130 , monitor 40 , a control circuit, registers 62 , high pass filter 66 , controller 60 and SRTC generator 90 .
- Voltage supply unit 20 provides supply voltage Vdd 131 to integrated circuit 100 . This supply voltage is sent to various components of integrated circuit 100 , including but not limited to low power mode circuit 120 and SRTC module 140 . Low power mode circuit 120 can apply power saving techniques that involve shutting down various components of integrated circuit 100 during low power periods. Low power mode circuit 120 provides a gated supply voltage Vgdd 132 to control module 110 , high frequency code generator 80 and high frequency clock generator 70 . Vgdd 132 is not provided during low-power periods.
- Vdd 131 and even Vgdd 132 can fluctuate or otherwise change.
- a change in a level of Vdd 131 or Vgdd 132 can cause supply voltage induced changes of input signals provides to one or more inputs ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) of SRTC module 140 . These changes should be filtered out.
- High frequency code generator 80 is connected to high frequency clock generator 70 , control module 110 and control input 50 (p) of SRTC module 140 . It generates a predefined high frequency code (denoted CODE 133 ) and sends it to control input 50 (p) while it receives an enabling signal (denoted EN 134 ) from control module 110 and while it receives a high frequency clock signal (for example a 20-30 Mega Hertz clock signal) from high frequency clock generator 70 . Once the provision of enabling signal EN 134 stops the high frequency code generator 80 stops generating the predefined high frequency code, even if it was in the middle of generating such a code.
- enabling signal EN 134 stops the high frequency code generator 80 stops generating the predefined high frequency code, even if it was in the middle of generating such a code.
- control module 110 high frequency code generator 80 , and high frequency clock generator 70 are disabled and the predefined high frequency code can not be sent to SRTC module 140 .
- the predefined high frequency code is used to unlock inputs 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) of SRTC module 140 . It has a frequency that is higher than the maximal frequency of supply voltage induced changes of an input signal that is provided to control input 50 (p).
- the high frequency can be few tens of megahertz while the maximal frequency of supply voltage induced changes is below one megahertz.
- the maximal frequency of the supply voltage induced changes is limited by the maximal frequency of voltage supply level changes. These changes are bounded by the relatively large capacitance of the voltage supply grid.
- SRTC module 140 includes high pass filter 66 that is connected between control input port 50 (p) and controller 60 .
- High pass filter 66 filters out supply voltage induced changes of an input signal that is provided to control input port 50 (p) and passes the high frequency predefined code.
- Control module 110 controls integrated circuit 100 or at least some portions of integrated circuit 100 . It is shut down during low power periods. It can determine when SRTC module 140 should be unlocked and send enabling signal EN 134 to high frequency code generator 80 . It can also write information (such as bit not limited to commands) to inputs 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) of SRTC module 140 .
- Input ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) of SRTC module 140 are connected to mask 30 .
- Mask 30 is also connected to controller 60 , to monitor 40 and to registers 62 .
- Controller 60 determines whether mask 60 should mask input signals that are receives over inputs 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) or to unmask these input signals. Inputs ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 ( k ) are locked or isolated when mask 30 masks these input signals. Input ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) are unlocked when mask 30 is transparent and unmasks these input signals.
- Controller 60 also controls SRTC generator 90 in response to control information.
- the control information can be provided over input ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) and can then be stored in registers 62 .
- the control of SRTC generator 90 can involve determining the frequency of the SRTC signal CLK 141 , halting SRTC generator 90 , renewing the operation of SRTC generator 90 and the like.
- SRTC module 140 can be programmed, by programming sequences. These programming sequences do not occur during low power periods.
- a programming sequence can include multiple commands that are spaced apart in time. The timing associated with a programming sequence (for example the timing gap between one command to another), are known in advance or can be estimated with a reasonable accuracy.
- SRTC module 140 should remain unlocked during the programming sequence, but should be locked during other periods. This can be guaranteed by determining a first duration (that is responsive to timing of a programming sequence) and locking SRTC module 140 if input ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) are idle during at least that first duration.
- the first duration is shorter and even much shorter than the duration of a typical low power period.
- the first duration can be shorter than few percents (for example shorter than 5%) of a low power period.
- a low power period can exceed one hundred milliseconds and can be much longer while the first duration can be few milliseconds.
- Monitor 40 is connected to the output ports of mask 30 .
- the activity of the output ports of mask 30 reflects the activity of input ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k).
- monitor 40 does not sense any activity. Accordingly, monitor 40 ignores supply voltage induced changes of input signals introduced when SRTC module 140 is locked.
- Controller 60 is also adapted to unlock input ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k) by instructing mask 30 to be transparent if, after these input ports are locked, a predefined high frequency code is received over control input port 50 (p) of SRTC module 140 .
- This high frequency code is high pass filtered by high pass filter 66 .
- Mask 30 is controlled by controller 60 . It masks input signals when SRTC module 140 is locked and is transparent when SRTC module 140 is unlocked.
- Mask 30 can include various circuits such as bit not limited to AND gates, OR gates, XOR gates, and the like.
- the type of logic gates of mask 30 are designed according to the level of an isolation signal (denoted ISOLATE 135 ) that should cause an isolation of input ports 50 ( 1 )- 50 (k).
- an isolation signal denoted ISOLATE 135
- the logic gates can be a combination of inverters and AND gates.
- the logic gate can be a NAND gate and the input signal can be passed through an inverter.
- FIG. 1 mask 30 includes logic gates 30 ( 1 ) and 30 (k) that are AND gates, each AND gate includes an inverting input port that receives isolation signal 135 such that when isolation signal is “high” mask 30 masks the input signals.
- FIG. 2 schematically shows an example of an embodiment of method 200 for protecting a SRTC module.
- Method 200 starts by stages 214 and 230 .
- Stage 214 includes monitoring the input ports of an SRTC module to determine an activity of the input port. An input port is deemed active during a period that it received input signals that change over time.
- Stage 214 conveniently includes stage 215 of monitoring output ports of a mask that is connected to the input ports of the SRTC module, in order to determine an activity of the multiple input ports of the SRTC module.
- Stage 215 can include ignoring supply voltage induces changes of input signals that are introduced while the multiple input ports of the SRTC module are locked.
- the mask is used to selectively lock the input ports of the SRTC module.
- Stage 214 is followed by stage 210 of locking multiple input ports of the SRTC module if the multiple input ports of the SRTC module are idle during at least a first duration.
- Stage 210 can also include stage 212 of locking the multiple input ports of the SRTC module by applying a mask on input signals provided to the multiple input ports of the SRTC.
- Method 200 also includes either one of stages 242 and 244 .
- Stages 242 and 244 can follow stage 210 .
- Stage 220 can be followed by stage 214 .
- Stage 242 includes generating the high frequency code by a high frequency code generator that is idle during each low-power period. Conveniently, the multiple input ports of the SRTC module are idle during at least one low-power period, each low-power period being longer than the first duration. Stage 242 can also include stage 246 of generating the high frequency code by a high frequency code generator as long as the high frequency code generator receives an enabling signal that is received only during periods that differ from low-power periods.
- Stage 244 includes receiving the high frequency code by a high frequency code generator that is idle during the low power period.
- the multiple input ports of the SRTC module are idle during at least one low-power period, each low-power period being substantially longer than the first duration.
- Stage 244 can include generating the high frequency code by a high frequency code generator as long as the high frequency code generator receives an enabling signal that is received only during periods that differ from low-power periods.
- Stages 242 and 244 are followed by stage 220 of unlocking the multiple input ports of the SRTC module if a predefined high frequency code is received over a control input port of the SRTC module.
- Changes in a supply voltage results in a supply voltage induced changes of an input signal provided to an input port of the SRTC module.
- a maximal frequency of the supply voltage induced changes of the input signal is lower than the high frequency of the predefined high frequency code.
- Stage 220 can include stage 222 of unmasking the input signals provided to the input ports of the SRTC module. Stage 222 can also include of high pass filtering signals sent over the control input port so as to filter out supply voltage induced changes.
- Stage 230 includes providing an SRTC signal when the multiple input ports of the SRTC module are locked and when the multiple input ports of the SRTC module are unlocked.
- FIG. 3 schematically shows an example of an embodiment of method 300 for protecting a SRTC module.
- method 300 is executed by protection module 130 .
- Method 300 starts by stage 302 of checking is any input port of the SRTC module is active. This stage is repeated until no input port of the SRTC module is active. Once the answer is negative stage 302 is followed by stage 304 of checking whether a first duration has lapsed since the last activity on one or more (or even all) input ports of the SRTC module. If the answer is negative stage 304 is followed by stage 302 , else it is followed by stage 306 of locking multiple input ports of the SRTC module.
- Stage 306 is followed by stage 308 of checking if a predefined high frequency code was received via a control input port of the SRTC module (after the multiple input ports of the SRTC module were locked). Stage 308 is repeated until receiving a positive answer and then it is followed by stage 310 of unlocking the multiple input ports of the SRTC module. Stage 310 is followed by stage 302 .
- any two components herein combined to achieve a particular functionality can be seen as “associated with” each other such that the desired functionality is achieved, irrespective of architectures or intermedial components.
- any two components so associated can also be viewed as being “operably connected,” or “operably coupled,” to each other to achieve the desired functionality.
- the invention is not limited to physical devices or units implemented in non-programmable hardware but can also be applied in programmable devices or units able to perform the desired device functions by operating in accordance with suitable program code.
- the devices may be physically distributed over a number of apparatuses, while functionally operating as a single device. For example,
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US12/163,610 US8171336B2 (en) | 2008-06-27 | 2008-06-27 | Method for protecting a secured real time clock module and a device having protection capabilities |
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US12/163,610 US8171336B2 (en) | 2008-06-27 | 2008-06-27 | Method for protecting a secured real time clock module and a device having protection capabilities |
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Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US8938796B2 (en) | 2012-09-20 | 2015-01-20 | Paul Case, SR. | Case secure computer architecture |
US9015838B1 (en) * | 2012-05-30 | 2015-04-21 | Google Inc. | Defensive techniques to increase computer security |
US9251341B1 (en) | 2012-05-30 | 2016-02-02 | Google Inc. | Defensive techniques to increase computer security |
US9268972B2 (en) | 2014-04-06 | 2016-02-23 | Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. | Tamper detector power supply with wake-up |
Families Citing this family (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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EP2973137A4 (en) | 2013-03-13 | 2016-10-19 | Intel Corp | Method and apparatus for hardware-assisted secure real time clock management |
US9135472B2 (en) | 2013-10-31 | 2015-09-15 | Square, Inc. | Systems and methods for secure processing with embedded cryptographic unit |
US10410202B1 (en) * | 2016-12-31 | 2019-09-10 | Square, Inc. | Expedited booting with brownout monitoring |
US10410189B2 (en) | 2017-09-30 | 2019-09-10 | Square, Inc. | Scanning system with direct access to memory |
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US9251341B1 (en) | 2012-05-30 | 2016-02-02 | Google Inc. | Defensive techniques to increase computer security |
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US9122633B2 (en) | 2012-09-20 | 2015-09-01 | Paul Case, SR. | Case secure computer architecture |
US9268972B2 (en) | 2014-04-06 | 2016-02-23 | Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. | Tamper detector power supply with wake-up |
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