US20090160615A1 - Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof - Google Patents

Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20090160615A1
US20090160615A1 US12/314,456 US31445608A US2009160615A1 US 20090160615 A1 US20090160615 A1 US 20090160615A1 US 31445608 A US31445608 A US 31445608A US 2009160615 A1 US2009160615 A1 US 2009160615A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
signature
identifier
additional data
data set
controller
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US12/314,456
Inventor
William G. O'Brien
Tet Hin Yeap
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
BCE Inc
Original Assignee
BCE Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority to PCT/CA2007/002343 priority Critical patent/WO2009079734A1/en
Application filed by BCE Inc filed Critical BCE Inc
Assigned to BCE INC. reassignment BCE INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: MURRAY, SEAN MACLEAN, O'BRIEN, WILLIAM G., YEAP, TET HIN, ZLOBEC, SANRO
Publication of US20090160615A1 publication Critical patent/US20090160615A1/en
Application status is Abandoned legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/08Logistics, e.g. warehousing, loading, distribution or shipping; Inventory or stock management, e.g. order filling, procurement or balancing against orders
    • G06Q10/087Inventory or stock management, e.g. order filling, procurement, balancing against orders
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31User authentication
    • G06F21/42User authentication using separate channels for security data
    • G06F21/43User authentication using separate channels for security data wireless channels
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/78Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
    • G06F21/79Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/44Arrangements for executing specific programs
    • G06F9/445Program loading or initiating
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/02Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3825Use of electronic signatures
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/385Use of an alias or a single-use code
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401Transaction verification
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409Card specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097Mutual authentication between card and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975Use of encryption for mutual authentication
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/42Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment
    • G06Q20/425Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment using two different networks, one for transaction and one for security confirmation
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/0823Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using certificates
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/083Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using passwords
    • H04L63/0846Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using passwords using time-dependent-passwords, e.g. periodically changing passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity ; Protecting confidentiality; Key management; Integrity; Mobile application security; Using identity modules; Secure pairing of devices; Context aware security; Lawful interception
    • H04W12/08Access security
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity ; Protecting confidentiality; Key management; Integrity; Mobile application security; Using identity modules; Secure pairing of devices; Context aware security; Lawful interception
    • H04W12/10Integrity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless
    • H04L2209/805Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84Vehicles
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity ; Protecting confidentiality; Key management; Integrity; Mobile application security; Using identity modules; Secure pairing of devices; Context aware security; Lawful interception
    • H04W12/004Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity ; Protecting confidentiality; Key management; Integrity; Mobile application security; Using identity modules; Secure pairing of devices; Context aware security; Lawful interception using identity modules
    • H04W12/00407Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity ; Protecting confidentiality; Key management; Integrity; Mobile application security; Using identity modules; Secure pairing of devices; Context aware security; Lawful interception using identity modules using near field communication [NFC], e.g. NFC tag, smart tag or radio frequency identification [RFID] module

Abstract

A method which comprises generating a first signature by encoding an identifier with a first additional data set at a first time instant; responding to a first read request from a tag reader by releasing the first signature; generating a second signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set; and responding to a second read request by releasing the second signature. Also, a method which comprises obtaining a signature from a contactlessly readable tag; decrypting the signature with a key to obtain a candidate identifier and a scrambling code associated with the signature; and validating the candidate identifier based on at least one of the scrambling code and the signature.

Description

    CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION
  • This application is a continuation, and claims the benefit under 35 USC 120, of International Application No. PCT/CA2007/002343 filed on Dec. 20, 2007 and hereby incorporated by reference herein.
  • FIELD OF THE INVENTION
  • The present invention relates generally to contact-less tags and, more specifically, to a contact-less tag having a signature as well as to applications using the properties of such a tag.
  • BACKGROUND
  • Contact-less tags, such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, are becoming increasingly commonplace in various commercial applications, two non-limiting examples of which include access control and inventory management.
  • An RFID tag affixed to an item stores a code (e.g., a bit pattern) that is output in contact-less fashion to a reader, either in response to a request from the reader or autonomously by the tag. The reader captures the bit pattern and then an action may be taken, depending on the commercial application at hand. For example, in an access control scenario, the captured bit pattern may reveal that the person presumed to be carrying the tag (by virtue of an association with the bit pattern) is—or is not—authorized to enter a building or operate a vehicle. In an inventory management scenario, the bit pattern may give an indication of items contained on a pallet, for example, which may result in certain decisions being taken regarding shipping or storage of these items.
  • In both cases, the ease with which an RFID tag may be read by a reader enables rapid processing but also may lead to problems. In the access control scenario, for example, an RFID tag of an individual authorized to access certain property may be interrogated and then the bit pattern cloned for use by an impostor to gain what is in fact unauthorized access to such property. Similarly, in the inventory management scenario, an acquired knowledge of the bit pattern associated with a certain item may allow a malicious party to gain intelligence about inventory locations that the item's rightful owner (which may include the manufacturer all the way down to the retail customer) may wish to keep secret.
  • In both of the above scenarios, it is apparent that what is relevant to a malicious party is the knowledge that a certain bit pattern output by a certain RFID tag will either give access to property or indicate the presence of a specific inventory item. Whether the bit pattern is itself an encrypted version of some original data is actually of no relevance to the malicious party. Thus, schemes based on straightforward encryption of the bit pattern do not mitigate the problems mentioned above.
  • Against this background, there is clearly a need in the industry for a contact-less tag having improved properties.
  • SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • A first broad aspect of the present invention seeks to provide a method, which comprises generating a first signature by encoding an identifier with a first additional data set at a first time instant; responding to a first read request from a tag reader by releasing the first signature; generating a second signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set; and responding to a second read request by releasing the second signature.
  • A second broad aspect of the present invention seeks to provide an apparatus, which comprises means for generating a first signature by encoding an identifier with an additional data set at a first time instant; means for responding to a first read request from a tag reader by releasing the first signature; means for generating a second signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set; and means for responding to a second read request from a tag reader by releasing the second signature.
  • A third broad aspect of the present invention seeks to provide a computer-readable medium, which comprises computer-readable program code which, when interpreted by a computing apparatus, causes the computing apparatus to execute a method. The computer-readable program code comprises first computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to generate a first signature by encoding an identifier with an additional data set at a first time instant; second computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to respond to a first read request from a tag reader by releasing the first signature; third computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to generate a second signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set; and fourth computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to respond to a second read request from a tag reader by releasing the second signature.
  • A fourth broad aspect of the present invention seeks to provide a device for use in contact-less communication with a reader, which comprises a memory configured to store a first signature generated by encoding an identifier with a first additional data set at a first time instant; and a controller configured to generate a new signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set. The controller is further configured to cause the new signature to be stored in the memory after the second time instant.
  • A fifth broad aspect of the present invention seeks to provide a device for use in contact-less communication with a reader, which comprises a memory configured to store a signature that encodes a pre-determined identifier; a transceiver configured to contactlessly receive read requests from the reader and to contactlessly transmit responses thereto; a controller configured to respond to read requests received via the transceiver by releasing via the transceiver a current version of the signature stored in the memory, wherein the version of the signature stored in the memory varies over at least two time instants while continuing to encode the pre-determined identifier; and a power source for powering at least the controller.
  • These and other aspects and features of the present invention will now become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art upon review of the following description of specific embodiments of the invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • In the accompanying drawings:
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system comprising a reader and a tag, in accordance with a non-limiting embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing details of the tag, in accordance with a non-limiting embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a decoding function implemented by a controller in the tag, for generation of a signature at two points in time.
  • FIGS. 4A and 4B depict two possible functional architectures for generation of a signature.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates application of an embodiment of the present invention in an inventory management context.
  • FIG. 6A shows application of a non-limiting embodiment of the present invention in a validation context.
  • FIG. 6B is a block diagram of a multi-reader architecture, in accordance with a non-limiting embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7A is a flowchart showing operation of a processing entity of FIG. 6 when considering tags whose signatures encode a variable scrambling code and that are encrypted using a common key that is known to the reader or can be determined from an index supplied with the signature.
  • FIG. 7B is a flowchart similar to that of FIG. 7A, but where the common key is unknown to the reader.
  • FIG. 8 shows application of a non-limiting embodiment of the present invention in an identification context when considering tags whose signatures are encrypted using a variable key.
  • FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing operation of a processing entity of FIG. 8 when considering tags whose signatures are encrypted using a variable key.
  • It is to be expressly understood that the description and drawings are only for the purpose of illustration of certain embodiments of the invention and are an aid for understanding. They are not intended to be a definition of the limits of the invention.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • With reference to FIG. 1, there is shown a system comprising a reader 12 and a tag 14. Communication between the reader 12 and the tag 14 occurs over a contact-less medium 16. In a specific non-limiting embodiment, the contact-less medium 16 is a wireless medium that may include a spectrum of radio frequencies. Depending on the application at hand, the tag 14 could be affixed to: an item for sale, goods during transportation, a person's clothing, an animal, a piece of equipment (including communications equipment such as wireless communications equipment) and so on. For its part, the reader 12 can be fixed or mobile. In the fixed scenario, the reader 12 could be located at any desired position within a building, vehicle, warehouse, campus, etc. In the mobile scenario, the reader 12 could be implemented in a handheld or portable unit, for example.
  • FIG. 2 shows details of the tag 14, in accordance with a specific non-limiting embodiment of the present invention. The tag 14 comprises a memory 202, a transceiver 204 (including an antenna), a controller 206 and a power source 208.
  • The memory 202 stores a current signature 212. In addition, the memory 202 may store a program for execution by the controller 206, including computer-readable program code for causing the controller 206 to execute various steps and achieve wide-ranging functionality. In a non-limiting embodiment, the current signature 212 can take the form of a bit pattern having a certain number of bits. In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, the bit pattern exhibited by the current signature 212 is dynamic, that is to say the current signature 212 changes over time.
  • The controller 206 executes various functions that allow communication to take place via the transceiver 204 between the tag 14 and an external reader such as the reader 12. In what follows, communications will hereinafter be referred to as occurring with the reader 12 although it will be appreciated that the tag 14 may communicate similarly with other external readers that it encounters.
  • As part of its functionality, the controller 206 is operative to retrieve the current signature 212 from the memory 202 and to release the current signature 212 via the transceiver 204. Alternatively, depending on the computational capabilities of the controller 206, the controller 206 can be operative to compute the current signature 212 on demand and to release via the transceiver 204 the current signature 212 so computed.
  • It is recalled that in this embodiment, the current signature 212 is dynamic. Accordingly, the controller 206 is operative to communicate with the memory 202 in order to change the bit pattern of the current signature 212 stored in the memory 202. This can be achieved by executing diverse functionality that will be described in greater detail later on, and which may include implementing functional elements such as an encryption engine 222, a counter 230, a pseudo-random number generator 240, a geo-location module 250 and a clock module 260, among others.
  • The configuration of the power source 208 and its inter-relationship with the controller 206 depend on whether the tag 14 is categorized as “passive”, “active” or somewhere in between. Specifically, the tag 14 may be designed as “passive”, whereby transmissions of the current signature 212 via the transceiver 204 are effected in response to detection of a burst of energy via the transceiver 204, such burst of energy typically coming from the reader 12 issuing a “read request”. In this case, the controller 206 only needs to be powered during the short time period following the detection of the burst. In fact, the burst itself can charge the power source 208 for a brief period, enough to allow the controller 206 to cause transmission of the current signature 212 via the transceiver 204 in response to the read request. The current signature 212 may be extracted from the memory 202 or it may be generated on demand, upon receipt of the read request.
  • Alternatively, in some embodiments of an “active” tag, transmissions of the current signature 212 via the transceiver 204 are similarly effected in response to detection of a read request via the transceiver 204. In this case, the availability of the power source 208 allows the controller 206 to transmit the current signature 212 at a longer range than for passive devices. Certain active tags also have the capability to switch into a passive mode of operation upon depletion of the power source 208. In other embodiments of an active tag, transmissions of the current signature 212 are effected via the transceiver 204 at instances or intervals that are controlled by the controller 206. This can be referred to as autonomous (or unsolicited) issuance of the current signature 212. To this end, the controller 206 needs to be continuously powered from the power source 208.
  • Active and passive tags may have other features that will be known to those of skill in the art.
  • In still other cases, the power source 208 (either continually storing a charge or accumulating a sensed charge) can be connected to the controller 206 via a switch 210, which is optional. The switch 210 can be toggled between a first state during which an electrical connection is established between the power source 208 and the controller 206, and a second state during which this electrical connection is broken. The switch 210 is biased in the second state, and can be placed into the first state. Toggling into the first state can be achieved by a burst of energy that is sensed at a sensor (not shown) or by use of an activation element. In various non-limiting embodiments, the activation element may be a touch-sensitive pad on a surface of the tag 14, or a mechanical component (e.g., a button). Placing the switch 210 into the first state may also trigger the controller 260 to change the current signature 212 in the memory 202.
  • With reference now to FIG. 3, there is shown conceptually how the current signature 212 stored in the memory 202 may change over time. Specifically, different versions of the current signature 212 (denoted SA and SB) are generated by an encoding function 302 implemented by the controller 206. For notational convenience, the current signature 212 is used to denote which of the two signatures SA, SB is currently stored in the memory 202. The encoding function 302 generates the signatures SA and SB by encoding a common “identifier” (denoted ID) with a respective “additional data set” (denoted DA and DB) at respective time instants (denoted TA and TB). Thus, at TA, the signature SA is generated by encoding the identifier ID with the additional data set DA, whereas at TB, the signature SB is generated by encoding the identifier ID with the additional data set DB. While in this example, two time instants are shown and described, this is solely for simplicity, and it should be understood that in actuality, the current signature 212 may change many times.
  • The identifier ID is constant, and in one embodiment conveys information about the item, animal, vehicle, piece of equipment, etc., to which the tag 14 is affixed. Examples of such information include, without limitation: a serial number, a universal product code (UPC), a vehicle registration number (VIN) and a customized identifier. In another embodiment, the identifier ID conveys information about an expected user of the vehicle, clothing or mobile communication device, computer, restricted access area, network, etc., to which the tag 14 is affixed. Examples of such information include, without limitation: a name, an ID number, a driver's license number, an account number and login credentials.
  • In accordance with a non-limiting embodiment of the present invention, the additional data sets DA and DB are different, which makes both signatures SA, SB different. In fact, the two signatures SA, SB will appear scrambled relative to one another due to use of the encryption engine 222 within the encoding function 302. More specifically, the signatures SA and SB can be generated from the additional data sets DA and DB in a variety of ways, two of which will be described herein below.
  • First Approach
  • In a first approach, described with reference to FIG. 4A, the identifier ID is encrypted by the encryption engine 222 with a dynamic key—represented by the additional data sets DA, DB themselves, resulting in the two signatures SA, SB. The two signatures SA, SB will be different because the additional data sets DA, DB are different. In fact, they will appear scrambled relative to one another when observed by someone who has not applied a decryption process using a counterpart to the keys used by the encryption engine 222.
  • It will be noted that in order to make the first approach practical, the reader 12 needs to have knowledge of which key (i.e., which of the additional data sets DA, DB) was used for encryption of a received one of the signatures SA, SB, in order to effect proper decryption and recover the identifier ID. For this purpose, in order to assist the reader 12 in identifying the correct key to be used for decryption, and with reference again to FIG. 2, the current signature 212 may be accompanied by an index 214 also stored in the memory 202. The index 214 may point the reader 12 to the correct key to be used. The reader 12 may have access to a key database (not shown) for this purpose.
  • For example, consider the case where the keys (in this case, the additional data sets DA, DB) correspond to outputs of the pseudo-random number generator 240 having a seed known a priori to the tag 14 and to the reader 12. Here, at TA, the index 214 may indicate the sequential position in the output of the pseudo-random number generator 240 that corresponds to the additional data set DA, while at TB, the index 214 may indicate the sequential position in the output of the pseudo-random number generator 240 that corresponds to the additional data set DB. The reader 12 can then easily find the value occupying the correct sequential position in the output of an identical local pseudo-random number generator and effect successful decryption of the received signature (SA or SB).
  • Alternatively, the keys (in this case, the additional data sets DA, DB) are provided by the reader 12. This can be done where the reader 12 (or an entity associated therewith) decides that a change in the current signature 212 is required. As a variant, the reader 12 may issue a trigger which, when received by the controller 206, causes the controller 206 to effect a change in the current signature 212. In such cases, changes to the key (and thus to the current signature 212) are effected by the controller 206 in response to triggers received from the reader 12.
  • Second Approach
  • For other applications, the approach of FIG. 4B may be useful. Here, the identifier ID is augmented with differing scrambling codes (denoted CA and CB), and then encrypted by the encryption engine 222 with a common key (denoted K), thus producing the two signatures SA, SB. The “additional data set” DA used for encryption at TA is therefore composed of the key K and the scrambling code CA, while the “additional data set” DB used for encryption at TB is composed of the same key K and the scrambling code CB. The encryption process can be designed so that small differences (in terms of the number of bits where there is a difference) between the scrambling codes CA and CB will cause large differences (in terms of the number of bits where there is a difference) in the resultant signatures SA and SB. Thus, the scrambling codes CA, CB have the effect of scrambling (i.e., randomizing) the resultant signatures SA, SB.
  • The controller 206 is responsible for determining which scrambling code is to be used to generate a particular signature at a particular time instant. The current version of the scrambling code can be stored in the memory 202 and is denoted 220 for convenience. It will be appreciated based on the above description that the scrambling code CA corresponds to the current scrambling code 220 at TA and that the scrambling code CB corresponds to the current scrambling code 220 at TB.
  • Continuing with the second approach, several classes of embodiments are contemplated for changing the current scrambling code 220. In a first class of embodiments relevant to the approach of FIG. 4B, the current scrambling code 220 is changed in a way that can be predicted by the reader 12, that is to say, where the reader 12 (or an entity associated therewith) has knowledge of how each successive scrambling code is generated.
  • For example, the current scrambling code 220 can be changed each time (or, generally, each Nth time where N≧1) that the controller 206 receives a read request or releases the current signature 212 in response to a read request. This can ensure that the current signature 212 is different each Nth time that the controller 206 receives a read request. Alternatively, the current scrambling code 220 is changed every the current scrambling code 220 can be changed every set period of time (ex. every N seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc.). The variations in the current scrambling code 220 may governed in a variety of ways that are predictable to the reader 12. For example, the controller 206 may implement a counter 230, whose output is incremented (by a step size that can equal unity or can be negative, for example) after each Nth time that the controller 206 responds to a read request received from a nearby reader (or each N seconds, etc.). If the current scrambling code 220 is set to correspond to the current output of the counter 230, then the scrambling codes CA, CB used to generate the two signatures SA, SB will differ by the step size.
  • Alternatively, the controller 206 may implement the aforesaid pseudo-random number generator 240, which produces an output that depends on one or more previous values of the output and on a seed. If the current scrambling code 220 is set to correspond to the current output of the pseudo-random number generator 240, then the scrambling codes CA, CB used to generate the two signatures SA, SB will differ in accordance with the characteristics of the pseudo-random number generator 240.
  • Other variants will become apparent to those of skill in the art without departing from the scope of the present invention.
  • In a second class of embodiments relevant to the approach of FIG. 4B, the additional data sets DA, DB are not only predicted by the reader 12 but are actually controlled by the reader 12. This can be useful where the reader 12 (or an entity associated therewith) decides that a change in the current signature 212 is required. Alternatively, and recognizing that the key K is common to both of the additional data sets DA, DB, the reader 12 could supply the unique portions of the additional data sets DA, DB, namely the scrambling codes CA, CB.
  • As a variant, the reader 12 may simply issue a trigger which, when received by the controller 206, causes the controller 206 to effect a change in the current signature 212. In such cases, changes to the current signature 212 are effected by the controller 206 in response to triggers received from the reader 12.
  • In a third class of embodiments relevant to the approach of FIG. 4B, it may be desired to change the signatures SA, SB in a stochastic way, that is to say, without the need to follow an underlying pattern that could be predicted by the reader 12.
  • For example, the controller 206 may implement the aforementioned geo-location module 250, which is configured to output a current spatial position of the tag 14 or of an item or person to which it is affixed. If the current scrambling code 220 is set to correspond to the current output of the geo-location module 250, then the scrambling codes CA, CB used to generate the two signatures SA, SB will differ in a stochastic fashion.
  • Alternatively, the controller 206 may implement a clock module 260, which is configured to determine a current time. If the current scrambling code 220 is set to correspond to a value measured by the clock module 260 (e.g., number of milliseconds elapsed since midnight of the day before), then the scrambling codes CA, CB used to generate the two signatures SA, SB will differ in a stochastic fashion.
  • While the above embodiments have focused on temporal variations in the current signature 212 stored in the memory 202 of the tag 14, it is also within the scope of the present invention for the current signature 212 stored in the memory 202 of two different tags to be different at a common time instant (e.g., at a time when the tags are being read in bulk). This can be referred to as spatial scrambling. More particularly, with reference to FIG. 5, a plurality of tags 514 are affixed to a number of units 506 of a particular article. The units 506 may be arranged on a pallet 508, on a shelf or in a container, for example. To take a simple non-limiting example, the article in question can be a pair of denim jeans of a certain brand, size, style and color. Of course, the article could be any other item of which multiple units are available, such as a consumer product, food product, vehicle, etc. Other possibilities that may appear to one of skill in the art are within the scope of the present invention.
  • The tags 514 store respective signatures 510 that are each derived by encrypting an identifier 550 (common to the tags 514) and a respective one of a plurality of current scrambling codes 520 (different for the various tags 514) with a common key. The common identifier 550 can be used to identify the article in question (in this case, a pair of jeans of a particular brand, size, style, color, etc.). To ensure that the signatures 510 appear scrambled while nevertheless encrypting the common identifier 550, approaches such as the following may be taken.
  • In one non-limiting approach, a centralized entity generates unique current scrambling codes 520 and unique signatures 510 for each of the tags 514. The tags 514 are pre-loaded with their respective unique signatures 510 before being affixed to the units 506. In this approach, the unique signatures 510 are fixed, as a result of which the tags 514 can be greatly simplified since they do not need to perform any processing functions. Practically speaking, this allows a distributor to purchase a plurality of tags 514 that have been pre-loaded with unique signatures 510 in order to securely identify the units 506 of a particular article.
  • In another non-limiting approach, the tags 514 may each operate a respective clock module which, though structurally identical, may output different results, due to differences in oscillation characteristics (e.g., the oscillation crystals used, etc.) This will result in differences between the current scrambling code produced based on an output of the clock module of one of the tags 514 and the current scrambling code produced based on an output of the clock module of another one of the tags 514, albeit at the same time instant.
  • In yet another non-limiting approach, different current scrambling codes 520 can be produced as a result of the tags 514 each operating a respective pseudo-random number generator using a different seed, which could be pre-loaded by the above mentioned centralized entity.
  • Still other ways of making the current scrambling codes 520 different among the various tags 514 are within the scope of the present invention.
  • It is noted that the signatures 510 will tend to be widely varying even if the differences in the current scrambling codes 520 used to generate them are small, this effect being due to application of an encryption process, even when a common key is used. In fact, to an observer not equipped with the complementary key for decryption (which may be the same as the common key in a symmetric encryption scenario), the signatures 510 corresponding to the various units 506 on the pallet 508 will appear scrambled. This provides protection against external observers (e.g., thieves, corporate intelligence investigators) who may have gathered knowledge of signatures output by one or more units of the article in the past (e.g., from a previous purchase—or knowledge of a previous shipment—of the same brand, size, style and color of jeans) and are now on the lookout for the presence of units of the same article on the pallet 508. On the other hand, by using the appropriate key in order to decrypt any of the signatures 510, then no matter how diverse one such signature is from another, the common identifier 550 will be revealed alongside a stochastically derived scrambling code.
  • In order to allow the reader 12 to identify the appropriate key for decryption, each of the signatures 510 may be accompanied by the aforesaid index 214 stored in the memory 202. The index 214 may point the reader 12 to the correct key for decryption. For example, the index 214 could be a piece of public information such as a manufacturer identification code or a product category, such information being common to the units 506 but sufficiently generic to be of little value to an outside observer. This will allow the reader 12 (or an entity associated therewith) to select the correct key for decryption by accessing a table of keys (not shown) on the basis of the index. Such an approach can be useful to accelerate the decryption process and reduce the incidence of false positives (successful but inadvertent decryption of the wrong identifier) when multiple keys are potentially available to the reader 12.
  • It should also be appreciated that the signatures 510 on the various tags 514 can, in addition, be designed to change in a dynamic fashion (as described earlier), thus providing, in addition to spatial scrambling of the signatures 510, temporal scrambling of the signatures 510 that leads to even greater security vis-à-vis external observation.
  • In view of the foregoing, it should thus be appreciated that a common identifier, which is encoded within a plurality of signatures that vary over space (for multiple tags) and/or time (for the same tag), can be extracted by the reader 12 (or an entity associated therewith) by utilizing the appropriate key for decryption. This allows the reader 12 (or an entity associated therewith) to perform
      • (I) validation of the identifier based on the signature and/or the scrambling code; and/or
      • (II) an action related to identification, based on the identifier.
  • Both of these scenarios, which are not mutually exclusive, are now described in some detail.
  • In scenario (I), a dynamic scrambling code is used in the generation of a signature that continually encodes the same identifier, and it is of interest to recover the current scrambling code to detect a potential instance of tag cloning. Accordingly, with reference to FIG. 6A, there is shown a system that is similar to the system of FIG. 1. In addition, the system of FIG. 6A comprises a processing entity 610 that implements a validation operation, as will be described herein below. In various embodiments, the processing entity 610 referred to above may be connected to the reader 12, or it may be a remote entity. Such a remote entity may be reachable over a network, or it may be integrated with the reader 12. The system of FIG. 6A also includes a storage entity, such as a database 602, that is accessible to the processing entity 610 and stores a plurality of records 604, each associated with a respective identifier. For the purposes of the present example, one can consider that each identifier for which there exists a record in the database 602 is indicative of a privilege to access certain property or make certain transactions, although other scenarios are possible without departing from the scope of the present invention.
  • In accordance with one embodiment of the present invention, each of the records 604 also comprises a field 606 indicative of zero or more scrambling codes 608 that were encoded in signatures which were previously received and which encoded the respective identifier for that record. Thus, receipt of a particular signature that encodes the identifier in a given one of the records 604 as well as one of the scrambling code(s) 608 stored in the corresponding field 606 will indicate that the particular signature has been previously received and therefore its instant receipt may be indicative that a cloning attempt has been made.
  • More specifically, with reference to the flowchart in FIG. 7A, consider what happens following step 710 when a signature SX is received at a particular time instant by the reader 12. At the time of receipt, whether the signature SX encodes any particular identifier or scrambling code is unknown to the reader 12. At step 730, an attempt to decrypt the signature SX is made by the processing entity 610 using a decryption key KX. The decryption key KX may be known in advance to the processing entity 610. Alternatively, as shown in step 720, the signature SX may be accompanied by an index that allows the processing entity 610 to determine the appropriate decryption key KX. The result of the decryption attempt at step 730 is a candidate identifier IX and a candidate scrambling code, denoted CX.
  • At step 740, the processing entity 610 consults the database 602 based on the candidate identifier IX in an attempt to identify a corresponding record and extract therefrom a list of scrambling code(s) that have been received in the past in association with the candidate identifier IX. For the purposes of the present example, it is useful to assume that such a record exists (i.e., the “YES” branch is taken out of step 740), but if there is no such record, this may indicate that there is a high-level failure requiring further action. At step 750, the processing entity 610 compares the candidate scrambling code CX to the scrambling code(s) 608 in the field 606 of the record identified at step 740 and corresponding to identifier IX.
  • If there is a match, this indicates that the scrambling code CX has been used in the past in association with the identifier IX. Under certain conditions, this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was unsuccessful.
  • For example, if the signature SX was expected to change at least as often as every time that the tag on which it is stored was read, then the fact that the scrambling code CX matches one of the scrambling code(s) 608 stored in the field 606 of the record corresponding to identifier IX may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was unsuccessful. Alternatively, if the signature SX was expected to change every Nth time that the tag on which it is stored was read, then the processing entity 610 may look at how many of the scrambling code(s) 608 stored in the field 606 of the record corresponding to identifier IX correspond to the scrambling code CX, and if this number is greater than or equal to N, this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was unsuccessful. Alternatively still, if the signature SX was expected to change at least as often as every N seconds etc., then the processing entity 610 may look at how long ago it has been since a matching one of the scrambling code(s) 608 was first stored in the field 606 of the record corresponding to identifier IX, and if this time interval is greater than or equal to a pre-determined number of seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc., this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was unsuccessful. Where a conclusion is reached that the validation operation was unsuccessful, the privilege to access the property or make transactions may be revoked or at least questioned on the basis of suspected tag cloning.
  • On the other hand, if there is no match between the scrambling code CX and any of the scrambling code(s) 608 stored in the field 606 of the record corresponding to identifier IX, this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was potentially successful. In such a case, the default privilege to access the property or make transactions may be granted (or at least not revoked on the basis of suspected tag cloning).
  • In accordance with an alternative embodiment of the present invention, the field 606 in the record associated with each particular identifier may be indicative of an “expected” scrambling code, i.e., the scrambling code that should (under valid circumstances) be encoded in a signature received from a tag that encodes the particular identifier. Alternatively, the field 606 in the record associated with each particular identifier may be indicative of an “expected” signature, i.e., the signature that should (under valid circumstances) be received from a tag that encodes the particular identifier. Thus, upon receipt of the signature SX, if it is found to correspond to the expected signature (or if the scrambling code CX is found to correspond to the expected scrambling code), this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was potentially successful. On the other hand, if there is no match between the signature SX and the expected signature stored in the database 602 (or between the scrambling code CX and the expected scrambling code), this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was unsuccessful.
  • It should be appreciated that in the above alternative embodiments, the processing entity 610 may obtain knowledge of the expected scrambling code or the expected signature by implementing plural pseudo-random number generators for each of the identifiers, analogous to the pseudo-random number generator 240 implemented by the controller 206 in a given tag 14, which produces an output that depends on one or more previous values of the output and on a seed. Thus, the next output of the pseudo-random number generator implemented by the processing entity 610 for a given identifier allows the processing entity 610 to predict the scrambling code (or the signature) that should be received from a tag legitimately encoding the given identifier. In another embodiment, the processing entity 610 may know what is the expected scrambling code/signature because it has instructed the reader 12 to cause this expected scrambling code/signature to be stored in the memory of the tag.
  • In accordance with an alternative embodiment of the present invention, the database 602 simply comprises a running list of all signatures that have been received in the past. Thus, upon receipt of the signature SX, if it is found to correspond to one of the signatures on the list, this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was unsuccessful. On the other hand, if there is no match between the signature SX and any of the signatures stored in the database 602, this may lead the processing entity 610 to conclude that the validation operation was potentially successful (or at least not unsuccessful).
  • It should also be appreciated that having obtained the identifier IX, the processing entity 610 may also perform an action related to identification of an item associated with the particular tag that encoded the identifier IX.
  • In a first example of an action related to identification, the processing entity 610 may simply note the fact that the item (bearing the identifier IX) was encountered in a vicinity of the reader 12. This information may be stored in a database (not shown) or sent as a message, for example. In an inventory management scenario, the processing entity 610 may consult an inventory list and “check off” the item as having been located, or may signal that the presence of a spurious item (that is not on the inventory list) has been detected.
  • In another example of an action related to identification, the processing entity 610 may consult another database (not shown) in order to ascertain whether the identifier is on a list of identifiers associated with individuals/objects permitted to access, or prohibited from accessing, certain property. Examples of property include, without limitation: computing equipment, a computer network, a building, a portion of a building, an entrance, an exit and a vehicle.
  • In another example of an action related to identification, the processing entity 610 may consult another database (not shown) in order to ascertain whether the identifier is on a list of identifiers associated with individuals permitted to effect, or prohibited from effecting, a transaction, which could be a financial transaction or a login to controlled online content, for example.
  • FIG. 7B shows a variant where multiple keys are possible but no index (or one that does not permit identification of the appropriate decryption key) is provided along with the signature SX. Specifically, taking the “NO” branch after step 750 does not conclude the validation operation. Rather, the validation operation goes through step 770 where a next key is selected and then the validation operation returns to step 730, whereby steps 730 through 770 are re-executed until the earlier occurrence of (i) taking the “YES” branch at step 750 and (ii) exhaustion of all keys, which can result in the equivalent of taking the “NO” branch out of 740 (i.e., this may indicate that there is a high-level failure requiring further action).
  • It should be appreciated that in the above embodiments, encryption and decryption can be effected using various techniques known in the art, including encryption using a symmetric key, an asymmetric key pair, a public/private key pair, etc., as well as in accordance with a variety of algorithms and protocols For example, RSA and ECC are suitable examples of asymmetric encryption algorithms, while AES, DES, and Blowfish are suitable examples of symmetric algorithms. Still other possibilities exist and are within the scope of the present invention.
  • In the above example with reference to FIGS. 6A, 7A and 7B, although a single reader was described and illustrated, it should be appreciated that it is within the scope of the present invention to provide a multi-reader architecture, as shown in FIG. 6B. A plurality of readers 1012 are connected to each other and to a centralized control entity 1010 by a network 1030, which can be a public packet-switched network, a VLAN, a set of point-to-point links, etc. In such a case, the centralized control entity 1010 (e.g., a network controller) can implement the functionality of the processing entities 610, including encryption and validation. To this end, the centralized control entity 1010 maintains a master database 1020, which includes the equivalent of a consolidated version of various instances of the database 602 previously described as being associated with the reader 12 in the single-reader scenario.
  • Thus, decryption and validation can be performed entirely in the centralized control entity 1010. Alternatively, certain functionality (such as decryption) can be performed by the readers 1012 while other functionality (such as validation) can be performed by the centralized control entity 1010. Still alternatively, the processing entities 610 can inter-operate amongst themselves in the absence of the centralized entity 1010, thereby to implement decryption on a local basis, and the validation operation in a joint fashion. In such a distributed scenario, the master database 1020 can still be used, or the processing entities 610 can communicate with one another to share information in their respective databases 602.
  • In scenario (II), a dynamic key is used in the generation of a signature that encodes a constant identifier, and it is of interest to recover the underlying identifier despite the time-varying key. Accordingly, with reference now to FIG. 8, there is shown a system that is similar to the system of FIG. 1. In addition, the system of FIG. 8 comprises a processing entity 810 that implements an identification operation, as will be described herein below. The processing entity 810 may be connected to the reader 12, or it may be a remote entity. Such a remote entity may be reachable over a network, or it may be integrated with the reader 12. It should be understood that the system in FIG. 8 is being shown separately from the system in FIG. 6; however, it is within the scope of the present invention to combine the functionality of both systems.
  • With reference to the flowchart in FIG. 9, consider what happens following step 910 when a signature SY is received from a particular tag at a particular time instant by the reader 12. The signature SY is assumed to have been generated by encrypting an identifier IY using an encryption key that varies in a dynamic fashion. To this end, the particular tag may have generated the dynamic encryption key based on, for example:
      • the output of the aforementioned clock module 260 (e.g., in terms of seconds, minutes or hours of elapsed time since an event known also to the processing entity 810);
      • the output of the aforementioned geo-location module 250;
      • an index;
      • a seed for use by a pseudo-random number generator.
  • Still other possibilities are within the scope of the present invention. The decryption key can then be determined based on the above quantity. For example, the decryption key could be the above-mentioned output of the clock module or the geo-location module. Alternatively, the encryption key could be the output of a table or a pseudo-random number generator (both known to the processing entity 810) based on the above-mentioned seed, or at a position that corresponds to the above-mentioned index. In the latter case, the index or seed can be supplied along with the signature SY.
  • In accordance with the present embodiment, once the signature SY is read by the reader 12, the processing entity 810 is expected to determine the appropriate decryption key, denoted KY. Accordingly, at step 930, the processing entity 810 first determines a dynamic parameter that will allow the decryption key KY to be determined. Examples of the dynamic parameter include:
      • the output of a clock module (which attempts to emulate the aforementioned clock module 260) at the time of receipt of the signature SY (e.g., in terms of seconds, minutes or hours of elapsed time since a known event);
      • the output of a geo-location module (which can be similar to the aforementioned geo-location module 250);
      • the index or seed provided along with the signature SY.
  • Next, at step 940, the processing entity 810 obtains the decryption key KY based on the dynamic parameter determined at step 930. For example, where the dynamic parameter corresponds to the output of a clock module or a geo-location module, the decryption key KY could be the dynamic parameter itself. Alternatively, where the dynamic parameter is an index or a seed, the decryption key KY could be the output of the aforementioned table or pseudo-random number generator known to the processing entity 810, at a position that corresponds to the received index, or using the received seed.
  • Once the decryption key has been obtained, the signature SY is decrypted at step 950 using the decryption key. This leads to extraction of the identifier IY. It is noted that a scrambling code was not required in this embodiment, although its use is not disallowed. Having obtained the identifier IY, the processing entity 810 proceeds to step 960, where it performs an action related to identification of an item associated with the particular tag that encoded the identifier IY.
  • In a first example of an action related to identification, the processing entity 810 may simply note the fact that the item (bearing the identifier Iy) was encountered in a vicinity of the reader 12. This information may be stored in a database (not shown) or sent as a message, for example. In an inventory management scenario, the processing entity 810 may consult an inventory list and “check off” the item as having been located, or may signal that the presence of a spurious item (that is not on the inventory list) has been detected.
  • In another example of an action related to identification, the processing entity 810 may consult another database (not shown) in order to ascertain whether the identifier is on a list of identifiers associated with individuals/objects permitted to access, or prohibited from accessing, certain property. Examples of property include, without limitation: computing equipment, a computer network, a building, a building, a portion of a building, an entrance, an exit and a vehicle.
  • In yet another example of an action related to identification, the processing entity 810 may consult another database (not shown) in order to ascertain whether the identifier is on a list of identifiers associated with individuals permitted to effect, or prohibited from effecting, a transaction, which could be a financial transaction or a login to controlled online content, for example.
  • It should be appreciated that the processing entity 810 may also perform an action related to validation of the identifier IY in conjunction with the above action related to identification. Specifically, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention, the processing entity may consult a variant of the aforementioned database 602, where each of the records 604 now includes a field indicative of zero or more signatures which were previously received and which encoded the respective identifier for that record. Thus, receipt of a particular signature that encodes the identifier in a given one of the records 604 as well as one of the signature(s) stored in the corresponding field will indicate that the particular signature has been previously received and therefore its instant receipt may be indicative that a cloning attempt has been made.
  • In the above example with reference to FIGS. 8 and 9, although a single reader was described and illustrated, it should be appreciated that it is within the scope of the present invention to provide a multi-reader architecture, as in FIG. 6B.
  • Also, those skilled in the art will appreciate that in some embodiments, the functionality of any or all of the processing entity 610, the processing entity 810, the reader 12 and the readers 1012 may be implemented using pre-programmed hardware or firmware elements (e.g., application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), electrically erasable programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs), etc.), or other related components. In other embodiments, the functionality of the entity in question may be achieved using a computing apparatus that has access to a code memory (not shown) which stores computer-readable program code for operation of the computing apparatus, in which case the computer-readable program code could be stored on a medium which is fixed, tangible and readable directly by the entity in question (e.g., removable diskette, CD-ROM, ROM, fixed disk, USB drive), or the computer-readable program code could be stored remotely but transmittable to the entity in question via a modem or other interface device (e.g., a communications adapter) connected to a network (including, without limitation, the Internet) over a transmission medium, which may be either a non-wireless medium (e.g., optical or analog communications lines) or a wireless medium (e.g., microwave, infrared or other transmission schemes) or a combination thereof.
  • While specific embodiments of the present invention have been described and illustrated, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that numerous modifications and variations can be made without departing from the scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.

Claims (67)

1. A method, comprising:
generating a first signature by encoding an identifier with a first additional data set at a first time instant;
responding to a first read request from a tag reader by releasing the first signature;
generating a second signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set; and
responding to a second read request by releasing the second signature.
2. The method defined in claim 1, wherein the additional data set includes a key and a first scrambling code, and wherein encoding the identifier with the additional data set comprises augmenting the identifier with the first scrambling code and using the key to encrypt the result of the augmenting.
3. The method defined in claim 2, further comprising:
when responding to the first or second read request, accompanying the first or second signature, respectively, with an index associated with said key.
4. The method defined in claim 2, wherein the first scrambling code is received from the tag reader.
5. The method defined in claim 2, wherein the second additional data set includes said key and a second scrambling code, and wherein encoding the identifier with the second additional data set comprises augmenting the identifier with the second scrambling code and using the key to encrypt the result of the second augmenting.
6. The method defined in claim 5, wherein the second scrambling code differs from the first scrambling code by a pre-determined increment.
7. The method defined in claim 5, wherein the first and second scrambling codes are representative of the first and second time instants, respectively.
8. The method defined in claim 5, wherein the second scrambling code differs from the first scrambling code by a number of read requests to which a response has been issued between the first and second read requests.
9. The method defined in claim 5, wherein the second scrambling code differs from the first scrambling code in a first number of digits, wherein the second signature differs from the first signature in a second number of digits, the second number of digits being greater than the first number of digits.
10. The method defined in claim 5, wherein the first and second scrambling codes are representative of respective geographic locations.
11. The method defined in claim 5, wherein the first and second scrambling codes are representative of an output of a pseudo-random number generator at different chronological positions.
12. The method defined in claim 5, wherein the second scrambling code is received from the tag reader.
13. The method defined in claim 1, wherein the additional data set includes a key, and wherein encoding the identifier with the additional data set comprises using the key to encrypt the identifier.
14. The method defined in claim 13, the key being a first key, wherein the second additional data set includes a second key different from the first key, and wherein encoding the identifier with the second additional data set comprises using the second key to encrypt the identifier.
15. The method defined in claim 14, further comprising:
when responding to the first read request, accompanying the first signature with an index associated with the first key; and
when responding to the second read request, accompanying the second signature with an index associated with the second key.
16. The method defined in claim 14, wherein the first and second keys are representative of an output of a pseudo-random number generator at different chronological positions.
17. The method defined in claim 1, wherein generating the second signature is triggered by having responded to the first read request.
18. The method defined in claim 1, wherein generating the second signature is triggered by receipt of the second read request.
19. The method defined in claim 1, wherein generating the second signature is triggered by having responded to a pre-determined number of read requests since the first read request.
20. The method defined in claim 1, wherein generating the second signature is triggered by a pre-determined amount of time having elapsed since generating the first signature.
21. The method defined in claim 1, further comprising maintaining a clock function to keep time, wherein generating the second signature is triggered by a temporal event detected by the clock function.
22. The method defined in claim 1, wherein generating the second signature occurs upon receipt of a trigger from the tag reader.
23. Apparatus, comprising:
means for generating a first signature by encoding an identifier with an additional data set at a first time instant;
means for responding to a first read request from a tag reader by releasing the first signature;
means for generating a second signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set; and
means for responding to a second read request from a tag reader by releasing the second signature.
24. A computer-readable medium comprising computer-readable program code which, when interpreted by a computing apparatus, causes the computing apparatus to execute a method, the computer-readable program code comprising:
first computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to generate a first signature by encoding an identifier with an additional data set at a first time instant;
second computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to respond to a first read request from a tag reader by releasing the first signature;
third computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to generate a second signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set; and
fourth computer-readable program code for causing the computing apparatus to respond to a second read request from a tag reader by releasing the second signature.
25. A device for use in contact-less communication with a reader, comprising:
a memory configured to store a first signature generated by encoding an identifier with a first additional data set at a first time instant; and
a controller configured to generate a new signature by encoding the identifier with a second additional data set at a second time instant, the second additional data set being different from the first additional data set;
the controller further configured to cause the new signature to be stored in the memory after the second time instant.
26. The device defined in claim 25, wherein the first additional data set includes a key and a first scrambling code, and wherein the second additional data set includes the key and a second scrambling code.
27. The device defined in claim 26, the controller being aware of the first and second time instants by implementing a clock function, wherein the first and second scrambling codes are representative of the first and second time instants, respectively.
28. The device defined in claim 26, wherein the controller is further configured to receive the second scrambling code from the reader.
29. The device defined in claim 26, wherein the controller is further configured to receive an index from the reader and to generate the second scrambling code from the index.
30. The device defined in claim 26, wherein the controller is further configured to determine the second scrambling code.
31. The device defined in claim 26, wherein the second scrambling code differs from the first scrambling code by a pre-determined increment.
32. The device defined in claim 26, wherein the second scrambling code differs from the first scrambling code in a first number of digits, wherein the new signature differs from the first signature in a second number of digits, the second number of digits being greater than the first number of digits.
33. The device defined in claim 26, wherein the first and second scrambling codes are representative of respective geographic locations of the device.
34. The device defined in claim 26, wherein the first and second scrambling codes are representative of an output of a pseudo-random number generator at different chronological positions.
35. The device defined in claim 26, wherein encoding the identifier with the first additional data set comprises augmenting the identifier with the first scrambling code and using the key to encrypt the result of the augmenting.
36. The device defined in claim 35, wherein encoding the identifier with the second additional data set comprises augmenting the identifier with the second scrambling code and using the key to encrypt the result of the second augmenting.
37. The device defined in claim 25, wherein the first additional data set includes a key, and wherein encoding the identifier with the first additional data set comprises using the key to encrypt the identifier.
38. The device defined in claim 37, the key being a first key, wherein the second additional data set includes a second key, and wherein encoding the identifier with the second additional data set comprises using the second key to encrypt the identifier.
39. The device defined in claim 38, wherein the first and second keys are representative of an output of a pseudo-random number generator at different chronological positions.
40. The device defined in claim 25, wherein the new signature replaces the first signature when the new signature is stored in the memory.
41. The device defined in claim 25, the controller being further configured to release the new signature in response to a read request received from the reader after the second time instant.
42. The device defined in claim 41, wherein the controller is further configured to accompany the new signature with an index associated with the second key.
43. The device defined in claim 41, wherein the controller is caused to generate the new signature upon receipt of the read request.
44. The device defined in claim 41, wherein the controller is caused to generate the new signature when the read request is the Nth in a series of read requests, where N is an integer.
45. The device defined in claim 41, the controller being further configured to release the first signature in response to a read request received from the reader at a time instant between the first and second time instants.
46. The device defined in claim 41, the memory being further configured to store an index associated with the key, the controller being further configured to release the index when releasing the first signature or the new signature.
47. The device defined in claim 45, the memory being further configured to store an index associated with the key, the controller being further configured to release the index when releasing the first signature or the new signature.
48. The device defined in claim 25, wherein the controller is caused to generate the new signature by receipt of a trigger from the reader.
49. The device defined in claim 25, wherein the controller is caused to generate the new signature when a pre-determined amount of time has elapsed since generation of the first signature.
50. The device defined in claim 25, further comprising a clock module, wherein the controller is caused to generate the new signature upon detection of a temporal event by the clock module.
51. A device for use in contact-less communication with a reader, comprising:
a memory configured to store a signature that encodes a pre-determined identifier;
a transceiver configured to contactlessly receive read requests from the reader and to contactlessly transmit responses thereto;
a controller configured to respond to read requests received via the transceiver by releasing via the transceiver a current version of the signature stored in the memory, wherein the version of the signature stored in the memory varies over at least two time instants while continuing to encode the pre-determined identifier; and
a power source for powering at least the controller.
52. The device defined in claim 51, wherein the controller implements a clock function to keep time, wherein variations in the signature are related to variations in the time kept by the clock function.
53. The device defined in claim 51, the power source being dormant until a burst of energy from the reader is detected.
54. The device defined in claim 51, further comprising an externally controllable switch that can be toggled between a first state and a second state, in the first state the switch establishing an electrical connection between the power source and the controller, in the second state the switch breaking the electrical connection between the power source and the controller.
55. The device defined in claim 54, wherein the switch is biased in the second state and is configured to be placed in the first state upon activation by a user.
56. The device defined in claim 55, wherein activation by the user comprises the user applying physical contact to a portion of a surface of the device.
57. The device defined in claim 55, wherein the controller is configured to generate a new version of the signature when the switch is placed in the first state.
58. The device defined in claim 57, wherein the controller is configured to generate said new version of the signature by encoding the pre-determined identifier with an output of a pseudo-random number generator.
59. The device defined in claim 57, wherein the controller is configured to generate said new version of the signature by encoding the pre-determined identifier with an output of a clock function.
60. The device defined in claim 57, wherein the controller is configured to generate said new version of the signature by encoding the pre-determined identifier with an output of a counter.
61. The device defined in claim 57, wherein when the switch is placed in the second state after having been placed in the first state, and then is returned to the first state, the controller is configured to generate a further new version of the signature.
62. The device defined in claim 61, wherein the controller is configured to generate said further new version of the signature by encoding the pre-determined identifier with an output by a pseudo-random number generator.
63. The device defined in claim 61, wherein the controller is configured to generate said further new version of the signature by encoding the pre-determined identifier with an output of a clock function.
64. The device defined in claim 61, wherein the controller is configured to generate said further new version of the signature by encoding the pre-determined identifier with an output of a counter.
65. The device defined in claim 51, affixed to an item, wherein the pre-determined identifier corresponds to information about the item.
66. The device defined in claim 51, affixed to an item, wherein the pre-determined identifier corresponds to information about a user expected to be associated with the item.
67. The device defined in claim 51, implemented in a mobile communication device.
US12/314,456 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof Abandoned US20090160615A1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CA2007/002343 WO2009079734A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2007-12-20 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US14/539,401 US20150069137A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2014-11-12 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CA2007/002343 Continuation WO2009079734A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2007-12-20 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US14/539,401 Continuation US20150069137A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2014-11-12 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20090160615A1 true US20090160615A1 (en) 2009-06-25

Family

ID=40787423

Family Applications (10)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/314,455 Active 2033-12-23 US9305282B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US12/314,457 Active 2029-03-26 US8103872B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US12/314,456 Abandoned US20090160615A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US12/314,458 Active US7806325B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US12/343,268 Active 2030-11-22 US8412638B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-23 Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US12/343,187 Abandoned US20090240946A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-23 Dynamic identifier for use in identification of a device
US12/643,225 Active 2030-01-30 US8553888B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2009-12-21 Generation of communication device signatures for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions
US12/873,623 Abandoned US20100320269A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2010-09-01 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US13/852,352 Active 2030-05-30 US9971986B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2013-03-28 Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US14/539,401 Pending US20150069137A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2014-11-12 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof

Family Applications Before (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/314,455 Active 2033-12-23 US9305282B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US12/314,457 Active 2029-03-26 US8103872B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof

Family Applications After (7)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/314,458 Active US7806325B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-11 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US12/343,268 Active 2030-11-22 US8412638B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-23 Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US12/343,187 Abandoned US20090240946A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2008-12-23 Dynamic identifier for use in identification of a device
US12/643,225 Active 2030-01-30 US8553888B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2009-12-21 Generation of communication device signatures for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions
US12/873,623 Abandoned US20100320269A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2010-09-01 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US13/852,352 Active 2030-05-30 US9971986B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2013-03-28 Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US14/539,401 Pending US20150069137A1 (en) 2007-12-20 2014-11-12 Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (10) US9305282B2 (en)
EP (2) EP2223460A4 (en)
CA (5) CA2645990C (en)
WO (2) WO2009079734A1 (en)

Cited By (11)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20080218349A1 (en) * 2007-03-08 2008-09-11 Fujitsu Limited RFID system and RFID tag
US20090161872A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
CN102446319A (en) * 2011-09-09 2012-05-09 李建堂 Multi-function through-transport common pallet Internet-of-things circulation and sharing management system
CN103279852A (en) * 2013-06-06 2013-09-04 四川航天系统工程研究所 System and method for monitoring and managing warehouse goods in refined and real-time mode based on RFID
US8593257B1 (en) * 2010-06-14 2013-11-26 Impinj, Inc. RFID-based loss-prevention system
US8866596B1 (en) * 2010-09-25 2014-10-21 Impinj, Inc. Code-based RFID loss-prevention system
US8866595B1 (en) * 2010-09-25 2014-10-21 Impinj, Inc. Ticket-based RFID loss-prevention system
US8872636B1 (en) * 2010-09-25 2014-10-28 Impinj, Inc. Algorithm-based RFID loss-prevention system
US9037859B2 (en) 2008-12-18 2015-05-19 Bce Inc. Processing of communication device signatures for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions
US9189904B1 (en) * 2013-08-21 2015-11-17 Impinj, Inc. Exit-code-based RFID loss-prevention system
US9231928B2 (en) 2008-12-18 2016-01-05 Bce Inc. Validation method and system for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions

Families Citing this family (68)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9450776B2 (en) 2005-03-16 2016-09-20 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Forming a security network including integrated security system components
US20140143695A1 (en) 2007-06-12 2014-05-22 Ken Sundermeyer Control system user interface
US10237237B2 (en) 2007-06-12 2019-03-19 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Communication protocols in integrated systems
US10339791B2 (en) 2007-06-12 2019-07-02 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Security network integrated with premise security system
US9191228B2 (en) 2005-03-16 2015-11-17 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Cross-client sensor user interface in an integrated security network
GB2428821B (en) 2004-03-16 2008-06-04 Icontrol Networks Inc Premises management system
US8988221B2 (en) 2005-03-16 2015-03-24 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Integrated security system with parallel processing architecture
US10156959B2 (en) 2005-03-16 2018-12-18 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Cross-client sensor user interface in an integrated security network
US8963713B2 (en) 2005-03-16 2015-02-24 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Integrated security network with security alarm signaling system
US10200504B2 (en) 2007-06-12 2019-02-05 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Communication protocols over internet protocol (IP) networks
US10313303B2 (en) 2007-06-12 2019-06-04 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Forming a security network including integrated security system components and network devices
US9306809B2 (en) 2007-06-12 2016-04-05 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Security system with networked touchscreen
US10051078B2 (en) 2007-06-12 2018-08-14 Icontrol Networks, Inc. WiFi-to-serial encapsulation in systems
US9609003B1 (en) 2007-06-12 2017-03-28 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Generating risk profile using data of home monitoring and security system
US10079839B1 (en) 2007-06-12 2018-09-18 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Activation of gateway device
US10127802B2 (en) 2010-09-28 2018-11-13 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Integrated security system with parallel processing architecture
US10375253B2 (en) 2008-08-25 2019-08-06 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Security system with networked touchscreen and gateway
US9531593B2 (en) 2007-06-12 2016-12-27 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Takeover processes in security network integrated with premise security system
US9628440B2 (en) 2008-11-12 2017-04-18 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Takeover processes in security network integrated with premise security system
JP4760101B2 (en) * 2005-04-07 2011-08-31 ソニー株式会社 Content providing system, content reproduction apparatus, a program, and a content reproducing method
US8452981B1 (en) * 2006-03-01 2013-05-28 Nvidia Corporation Method for author verification and software authorization
EP2018741B1 (en) * 2006-05-15 2013-02-20 Nokia Corporation Contactless programming and testing of memory elements
US7711796B2 (en) 2006-06-12 2010-05-04 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Gateway registry methods and systems
US10142392B2 (en) 2007-01-24 2018-11-27 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Methods and systems for improved system performance
US9412248B1 (en) 2007-02-28 2016-08-09 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Security, monitoring and automation controller access and use of legacy security control panel information
US8451986B2 (en) 2007-04-23 2013-05-28 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Method and system for automatically providing alternate network access for telecommunications
US20160065414A1 (en) 2013-06-27 2016-03-03 Ken Sundermeyer Control system user interface
US20110087907A1 (en) * 2008-06-25 2011-04-14 Iiro Kristian Jantunen Power saving method and apparatus
US8607333B2 (en) * 2008-07-21 2013-12-10 Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute Radio frequency identification (RFID) security apparatus having security function and method thereof
TWI362596B (en) * 2008-07-23 2012-04-21 Inst Information Industry Intermediary apparatus, intermediary method, computer program product for storing a data in a storage apparatus, and data storage system comprising the same
US20100214080A1 (en) * 2009-02-24 2010-08-26 Sensormatic Electronics Corporation Radio frequency identification hardtag encode and feed system
US8638211B2 (en) 2009-04-30 2014-01-28 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Configurable controller and interface for home SMA, phone and multimedia
JP4612729B1 (en) * 2009-07-03 2011-01-12 パナソニック株式会社 Wireless terminal, information generation method, and information recording method
US8811615B2 (en) * 2009-08-05 2014-08-19 Verayo, Inc. Index-based coding with a pseudo-random source
US20110274275A1 (en) * 2009-08-25 2011-11-10 Maria Estela Seitz Trans-Security Components System and Methods
JP5423280B2 (en) * 2009-09-25 2014-02-19 ソニー株式会社 Communication device, a communication method, an information processing apparatus, information processing method, a program and a communication system,
EP2348465A1 (en) 2009-12-22 2011-07-27 Philip Morris Products S.A. Method and apparatus for storage of data for manufactured items
US8693530B2 (en) 2010-02-05 2014-04-08 Comcast Cable Communications, Llc Modulation analysis and distortion identification
US8971394B2 (en) 2010-02-05 2015-03-03 Comcast Cable Communications, Llc Inducing response signatures in a communication network
US8745370B2 (en) * 2010-06-28 2014-06-03 Sap Ag Secure sharing of data along supply chains
US8836467B1 (en) 2010-09-28 2014-09-16 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Method, system and apparatus for automated reporting of account and sensor zone information to a central station
US9147337B2 (en) 2010-12-17 2015-09-29 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Method and system for logging security event data
US9729342B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2017-08-08 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Defining and implementing sensor triggered response rules
US20130057392A1 (en) * 2011-03-14 2013-03-07 Roddy M. Bullock Method and System for Disabling an Electronic Device
US20120330833A1 (en) * 2011-06-24 2012-12-27 American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. Systems and methods for gesture-based interaction with computer systems
JP5912330B2 (en) * 2011-08-05 2016-04-27 任天堂株式会社 System, transmitter and management methods
US9496925B2 (en) 2011-09-30 2016-11-15 Nokia Technologies Oy Method, apparatus, and computer program product for remote wireless powering and control of an electronic device
US10360593B2 (en) * 2012-04-24 2019-07-23 Qualcomm Incorporated Retail proximity marketing
US9672519B2 (en) * 2012-06-08 2017-06-06 Fmr Llc Mobile device software radio for securely passing financial information between a customer and a financial services firm
GB201300939D0 (en) * 2013-01-18 2013-03-06 Corethree Ltd Offline voucher generation and redemption
US9380475B2 (en) 2013-03-05 2016-06-28 Comcast Cable Communications, Llc Network implementation of spectrum analysis
US9444719B2 (en) 2013-03-05 2016-09-13 Comcast Cable Communications, Llc Remote detection and measurement of data signal leakage
US9928975B1 (en) 2013-03-14 2018-03-27 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Three-way switch
US9867143B1 (en) 2013-03-15 2018-01-09 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Adaptive Power Modulation
US9287727B1 (en) 2013-03-15 2016-03-15 Icontrol Networks, Inc. Temporal voltage adaptive lithium battery charger
US9607464B2 (en) * 2013-03-15 2017-03-28 Zonar Systems, Inc. Method and apparatus for fuel island authorization for trucking industry using proximity sensors
US9685057B2 (en) * 2013-03-15 2017-06-20 Assa Abloy Ab Chain of custody with release process
US9860236B2 (en) 2013-03-15 2018-01-02 Assa Abloy Ab Method, system and device for generating, storing, using, and validating NFC tags and data
US9414348B2 (en) * 2013-04-22 2016-08-09 Nokia Technologies Oy Method and apparatus for determining dynamic access tokens for location-based services
BR112015027883A2 (en) 2013-05-06 2017-09-26 Huru Systems Ltd tracking and asset management
US9208032B1 (en) * 2013-05-15 2015-12-08 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Managing contingency capacity of pooled resources in multiple availability zones
EP3017580A1 (en) 2013-07-01 2016-05-11 Assa Abloy AB Signatures for near field communications
US9565022B1 (en) 2013-07-02 2017-02-07 Impinj, Inc. RFID tags with dynamic key replacement
CN103812854B (en) 2013-08-19 2015-03-18 深圳光启创新技术有限公司 Identity authentication system, device and method and identity authentication requesting device
US9741012B2 (en) 2014-11-05 2017-08-22 HURU Systems Ltd. Systems for secure tracking code generation, application, and verification
US10192198B2 (en) 2014-11-05 2019-01-29 HURU Systems Ltd. Tracking code generation, application, and verification using blockchain technology
KR20170105393A (en) * 2016-03-09 2017-09-19 삼성전자주식회사 Method and system for authentication of a storage device
US20180232971A1 (en) * 2017-02-10 2018-08-16 Microchip Technology Incorporated Systems And Methods For Managing Access To A Vehicle Or Other Object Using Environmental Data

Citations (80)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4771458A (en) * 1987-03-12 1988-09-13 Zenith Electronics Corporation Secure data packet transmission system and method
US5222137A (en) * 1991-04-03 1993-06-22 Motorola, Inc. Dynamic encryption key selection for encrypted radio transmissions
US5491750A (en) * 1993-12-30 1996-02-13 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for three-party entity authentication and key distribution using message authentication codes
US5694471A (en) * 1994-08-03 1997-12-02 V-One Corporation Counterfeit-proof identification card
US5778069A (en) * 1996-04-10 1998-07-07 Microsoft Corporation Non-biased pseudo random number generator
US5805702A (en) * 1995-09-29 1998-09-08 Dallas Semiconductor Corporation Method, apparatus, and system for transferring units of value
US5822430A (en) * 1996-11-20 1998-10-13 Technical Communications Corporation System for encoding encryption/decryption information into IFF challenges
US5832090A (en) * 1995-08-10 1998-11-03 Hid Corporation Radio frequency transponder stored value system employing a secure encryption protocol
US5892900A (en) * 1996-08-30 1999-04-06 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US5966082A (en) * 1997-05-23 1999-10-12 Intemec Ip Corp. Method of flagging partial write in RF tags
US6141695A (en) * 1996-12-04 2000-10-31 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Email system converts email data to a different format according to processing mode information set in memory in correspondence with post office information
US20020041683A1 (en) * 2000-09-29 2002-04-11 Hopkins Dale W. Method for selecting optimal number of prime factors of a modulus for use in a cryptographic system
US6393564B1 (en) * 1997-09-30 2002-05-21 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Decrypting device
US20020087867A1 (en) * 2000-11-28 2002-07-04 Oberle Robert R. RF ID card
US20020095507A1 (en) * 2001-01-17 2002-07-18 Jerdonek Robert A. Methods for pre-authentication of users using one-time passwords
US20020112174A1 (en) * 2000-12-18 2002-08-15 Yager David Frank Security code activated access control system
US20020147917A1 (en) * 2001-04-05 2002-10-10 Brickell Ernie F. Distribution of secured information
US20020184509A1 (en) * 1998-02-13 2002-12-05 Scheidt Edward M. Multiple factor-based user identification and authentication
US20030120925A1 (en) * 2001-12-21 2003-06-26 Rose Gregory G. Method and apparatus for simplified audio authentication
US20030169885A1 (en) * 2000-06-21 2003-09-11 Paolo Rinaldi On-line system for conditional access and audience control for communication services of the broadcast and multicast kind
US20030182565A1 (en) * 2001-03-29 2003-09-25 Toshihisa Nakano Data protection system that protects data by encrypting the data
US20030204743A1 (en) * 2002-04-16 2003-10-30 Srinivas Devadas Authentication of integrated circuits
US20040066278A1 (en) * 2002-10-04 2004-04-08 Hughes Michael A. Challenged-based tag authentication medel
US6778096B1 (en) * 1997-11-17 2004-08-17 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for deploying and tracking computers
US20040181681A1 (en) * 2003-03-11 2004-09-16 Rimage Corporation Cartridge validation with radio frequency identification
US20040252025A1 (en) * 2003-04-07 2004-12-16 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd. Shopping receptacle with in-built scanner
US20050037542A1 (en) * 2003-08-12 2005-02-17 Lintec Corporation Process for producing a semiconductor device
US20050123133A1 (en) * 2003-12-09 2005-06-09 Intelleflex Corporation Security system and method
US20050154896A1 (en) * 2003-09-22 2005-07-14 Mathias Widman Data communication security arrangement and method
US20050190892A1 (en) * 2004-02-27 2005-09-01 Dawson Martin C. Determining the geographical location from which an emergency call originates in a packet-based communications network
US6950522B1 (en) * 2000-06-15 2005-09-27 Microsoft Corporation Encryption key updating for multiple site automated login
WO2005098764A1 (en) * 2004-04-07 2005-10-20 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Data support with tan-generator and display
US6981151B1 (en) * 1999-04-08 2005-12-27 Battelle Energy Alliance, Llc Digital data storage systems, computers, and data verification methods
US7000114B1 (en) * 1999-05-31 2006-02-14 Fujitsu Limited Apparatus to create and/or verify digital signatures having a secure time element and an identifier of the apparatus
US20060049256A1 (en) * 2004-09-07 2006-03-09 Clay Von Mueller Transparently securing data for transmission on financial networks
US20060116899A1 (en) * 2003-02-10 2006-06-01 R Lax Michael Apparatus and methods for processing items
US20060124756A1 (en) * 2004-12-10 2006-06-15 Brown Kerry D Payment card with internally generated virtual account numbers for its magnetic stripe encoder and user display
US20060235805A1 (en) * 2005-04-13 2006-10-19 Mr. Feng Peng Universal anti-counterfeit method and system
US20060271386A1 (en) * 2005-05-31 2006-11-30 Bhella Kenneth S Methods and apparatus for locating devices
US20070008135A1 (en) * 2003-06-17 2007-01-11 United Security Applications Id, Inc. Electronic security system for monitoring and recording activity and data relating to persons or cargo
US20070022045A1 (en) * 2005-07-25 2007-01-25 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd. Method of transacting objects
US20070023508A1 (en) * 2005-01-31 2007-02-01 George Brookner Proximity validation system and method
US7178169B1 (en) * 2000-09-01 2007-02-13 Zoran Corporation Method and apparatus for securing transfer of and access to digital content
US20070057768A1 (en) * 2005-09-13 2007-03-15 Nec (China) Co., Ltd. Radio frequency identification system and method
US20070085689A1 (en) * 2005-10-13 2007-04-19 Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. RFID tag incorporating at least two integrated circuits
US20070095928A1 (en) * 2003-01-15 2007-05-03 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Physical items for holding data securely, and methods and apparatus for publishing and reading them
US20070103274A1 (en) * 2005-04-13 2007-05-10 Oliver Berthold Radio frequency identification (RFID) system that meets data protection requirements through owner-controlled RFID tag functionality
US20070104215A1 (en) * 2002-05-13 2007-05-10 Kiyon, Inc. Multi-Hop Ultra Wide Band Wireless Network Communication
US7246744B2 (en) * 2004-12-22 2007-07-24 Bce Inc. User authentication for contact-less systems
US20070198436A1 (en) * 2006-02-21 2007-08-23 Weiss Kenneth P Method and apparatus for secure access payment and identification
US20070194882A1 (en) * 2004-03-10 2007-08-23 Koninklijke Philips Electonics N.V. Authentication system and authentication apparatus
US20070214474A1 (en) * 2006-03-09 2007-09-13 Sbc Knowledge Ventures, L.P. Methods and systems to operate a set-top box
US20070234058A1 (en) * 2005-11-04 2007-10-04 White Charles A System and method for authenticating products
US20070255952A1 (en) * 2004-06-28 2007-11-01 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Session Initial Protocol Identification Method
US20080011835A1 (en) * 2004-07-12 2008-01-17 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method and apparatus for searching rights objects stored in portable storage device using object location data
US20080013807A1 (en) * 2004-07-01 2008-01-17 American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. Method and system for keystroke scan recognition biometrics on a smartcard
US20080061935A1 (en) * 2006-08-15 2008-03-13 Melendez Peter A Methods and systems for positioning data fields of a radio-frequency identification (rfid) tag
US7365636B2 (en) * 2004-08-25 2008-04-29 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba RFID tag device, tag identification device and radio communication system
US20080212771A1 (en) * 2005-10-05 2008-09-04 Privasphere Ag Method and Devices For User Authentication
US20080244271A1 (en) * 2007-03-28 2008-10-02 Legend Holdings Ltd Method and system for authentication based on wireless identification, wireless identification and server
US20080266055A1 (en) * 2004-02-06 2008-10-30 Christopher Gordon Gervase Turner Method and System for Controlling RFID Transponder Response Waiting Periods
US20090044012A1 (en) * 2001-07-10 2009-02-12 Xatra Fund Mx, Llc Rf transaction authentication using a random number
US7492258B1 (en) * 2006-03-21 2009-02-17 Radiofy Llc Systems and methods for RFID security
US20090048971A1 (en) * 2007-08-17 2009-02-19 Matthew Hathaway Payment Card with Dynamic Account Number
US20090160649A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US7673799B2 (en) * 2007-01-26 2010-03-09 Magtek, Inc. Card reader for use with web based transactions
US20100073147A1 (en) * 2006-12-06 2010-03-25 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Controlling data access to and from an rfid device
US20100135491A1 (en) * 2007-03-27 2010-06-03 Dhiraj Bhuyan Authentication method
US20100150342A1 (en) * 2008-12-16 2010-06-17 Richards Ronald W Encryption and decryption of records in accordance with group access vectors
US20100205047A1 (en) * 2009-02-12 2010-08-12 Denis Khoo Promotional Electronic Recipe Distribution
US7800499B2 (en) * 2007-06-05 2010-09-21 Oracle International Corporation RFID and sensor signing algorithm
US7876220B2 (en) * 2006-11-22 2011-01-25 Cintas Corporation Garment tracking and processing system
US7895437B2 (en) * 2005-05-31 2011-02-22 Vmware, Inc. Augmented single factor split key asymmetric cryptography-key generation and distributor
US7937583B2 (en) * 2003-08-15 2011-05-03 Venafi, Inc. Method of aggregating multiple certificate authority services
US7941663B2 (en) * 2007-10-23 2011-05-10 Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Authentication of 6LoWPAN nodes using EAP-GPSK
US7953974B2 (en) * 2005-02-17 2011-05-31 Fujitsu Limited Authentication method, authentication system, and tag device thereof, data reference client, authentication server, and data server
US20110185180A1 (en) * 2008-09-17 2011-07-28 Peter Gullberg Method and device for creating digital signature
US20110264907A1 (en) * 2010-04-27 2011-10-27 International Business Machines Corporation Securing information within a cloud computing environment
US8074889B2 (en) * 2001-07-10 2011-12-13 Xatra Fund Mx, Llc System for biometric security using a fob
US8131007B2 (en) * 1996-08-30 2012-03-06 Regents Of The University Of Minnesota Watermarking using multiple watermarks and keys, including keys dependent on the host signal

Family Cites Families (33)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4308235A1 (en) * 1993-03-10 1994-09-15 Thomson Brandt Gmbh A method of storing or playing back data packets
US6222440B1 (en) 1998-02-23 2001-04-24 Freshloc Technologies, Inc. Location, identification and telemetry system using strobed signals at predetermined intervals
US6484182B1 (en) * 1998-06-12 2002-11-19 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for publishing part datasheets
JP3252282B2 (en) * 1998-12-17 2002-02-04 松下電器産業株式会社 Method and apparatus for searching the scene
CA2290170C (en) 1999-01-29 2005-06-14 International Business Machines Corporation Improved digital signature
US7107462B2 (en) * 2000-06-16 2006-09-12 Irdeto Access B.V. Method and system to store and distribute encryption keys
US6961858B2 (en) * 2000-06-16 2005-11-01 Entriq, Inc. Method and system to secure content for distribution via a network
US20010054025A1 (en) * 2000-06-19 2001-12-20 Adams William M. Method of securely delivering a package
US6985588B1 (en) * 2000-10-30 2006-01-10 Geocodex Llc System and method for using location identity to control access to digital information
WO2002046968A2 (en) * 2000-12-05 2002-06-13 Openglobe, Inc. Automatic identification of dvd title using internet technologies and fuzzy matching techniques
US7150045B2 (en) * 2000-12-14 2006-12-12 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Method and apparatus for protection of electronic media
US20030069786A1 (en) * 2001-03-23 2003-04-10 Restaurant Services, Inc. System, method and computer program product for calendar dissemination in a supply chain management framework
US7080049B2 (en) * 2001-09-21 2006-07-18 Paymentone Corporation Method and system for processing a transaction
US7020635B2 (en) * 2001-11-21 2006-03-28 Line 6, Inc System and method of secure electronic commerce transactions including tracking and recording the distribution and usage of assets
US7146009B2 (en) 2002-02-05 2006-12-05 Surety, Llc Secure electronic messaging system requiring key retrieval for deriving decryption keys
US20050049979A1 (en) 2003-08-26 2005-03-03 Collins Timothy J. Method, apparatus, and system for determining a fraudulent item
US7090128B2 (en) * 2003-09-08 2006-08-15 Systems And Software Enterprises, Inc. Mobile electronic newsstand
CA2471055A1 (en) * 2004-06-16 2005-12-16 Qualtech Technical Sales Inc. A network security enforcement system
US20050285732A1 (en) 2004-06-25 2005-12-29 Sengupta Uttam K Radio frequency identification based system to track consumption of medication
JP2006053800A (en) 2004-08-12 2006-02-23 Ntt Docomo Inc Information supply method, information supply system and repeating apparatus
GB0419479D0 (en) 2004-09-02 2004-10-06 Cryptomathic Ltd Data certification methods and apparatus
US7711586B2 (en) * 2005-02-24 2010-05-04 Rearden Corporation Method and system for unused ticket management
CA2578186C (en) 2004-10-12 2012-07-10 Bce Inc. System and method for access control
US8576832B2 (en) 2005-03-29 2013-11-05 At&T Intellectual Property Ii Method and apparatus for enabling global telephony capabilities in communication networks
US7587502B2 (en) * 2005-05-13 2009-09-08 Yahoo! Inc. Enabling rent/buy redirection in invitation to an online service
US8151327B2 (en) * 2006-03-31 2012-04-03 The 41St Parameter, Inc. Systems and methods for detection of session tampering and fraud prevention
WO2008122923A2 (en) 2007-04-05 2008-10-16 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for distribution of credentials
US8183982B2 (en) 2007-08-14 2012-05-22 Infineon Technologies Ag System including reply signal that at least partially overlaps request
JP5525133B2 (en) 2008-01-17 2014-06-18 株式会社日立製作所 System and method for digital signatures and authentication
US8789150B2 (en) * 2011-09-22 2014-07-22 Kinesis Identity Security System Inc. System and method for user authentication
US20130232061A1 (en) * 2012-03-01 2013-09-05 Carmel - Haifa University Economic Corporation Ltd Reducing unsolicited traffic in communication networks
US20150170447A1 (en) * 2013-12-12 2015-06-18 James F Buzhardt Smart door lock
US9716788B2 (en) * 2014-11-13 2017-07-25 Verizon Patent And Licensing Inc. Multiple secondary device call controls and protocols

Patent Citations (87)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4771458A (en) * 1987-03-12 1988-09-13 Zenith Electronics Corporation Secure data packet transmission system and method
US5222137A (en) * 1991-04-03 1993-06-22 Motorola, Inc. Dynamic encryption key selection for encrypted radio transmissions
US5491750A (en) * 1993-12-30 1996-02-13 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for three-party entity authentication and key distribution using message authentication codes
US5694471A (en) * 1994-08-03 1997-12-02 V-One Corporation Counterfeit-proof identification card
US5832090A (en) * 1995-08-10 1998-11-03 Hid Corporation Radio frequency transponder stored value system employing a secure encryption protocol
US5805702A (en) * 1995-09-29 1998-09-08 Dallas Semiconductor Corporation Method, apparatus, and system for transferring units of value
US5778069A (en) * 1996-04-10 1998-07-07 Microsoft Corporation Non-biased pseudo random number generator
US8131007B2 (en) * 1996-08-30 2012-03-06 Regents Of The University Of Minnesota Watermarking using multiple watermarks and keys, including keys dependent on the host signal
US5892900A (en) * 1996-08-30 1999-04-06 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US5822430A (en) * 1996-11-20 1998-10-13 Technical Communications Corporation System for encoding encryption/decryption information into IFF challenges
US6141695A (en) * 1996-12-04 2000-10-31 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Email system converts email data to a different format according to processing mode information set in memory in correspondence with post office information
US5966082A (en) * 1997-05-23 1999-10-12 Intemec Ip Corp. Method of flagging partial write in RF tags
US6393564B1 (en) * 1997-09-30 2002-05-21 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Decrypting device
US6778096B1 (en) * 1997-11-17 2004-08-17 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for deploying and tracking computers
US20020184509A1 (en) * 1998-02-13 2002-12-05 Scheidt Edward M. Multiple factor-based user identification and authentication
US6981151B1 (en) * 1999-04-08 2005-12-27 Battelle Energy Alliance, Llc Digital data storage systems, computers, and data verification methods
US7000114B1 (en) * 1999-05-31 2006-02-14 Fujitsu Limited Apparatus to create and/or verify digital signatures having a secure time element and an identifier of the apparatus
US6950522B1 (en) * 2000-06-15 2005-09-27 Microsoft Corporation Encryption key updating for multiple site automated login
US20030169885A1 (en) * 2000-06-21 2003-09-11 Paolo Rinaldi On-line system for conditional access and audience control for communication services of the broadcast and multicast kind
US7178169B1 (en) * 2000-09-01 2007-02-13 Zoran Corporation Method and apparatus for securing transfer of and access to digital content
US20020041683A1 (en) * 2000-09-29 2002-04-11 Hopkins Dale W. Method for selecting optimal number of prime factors of a modulus for use in a cryptographic system
US20020087867A1 (en) * 2000-11-28 2002-07-04 Oberle Robert R. RF ID card
US20020112174A1 (en) * 2000-12-18 2002-08-15 Yager David Frank Security code activated access control system
US6983381B2 (en) * 2001-01-17 2006-01-03 Arcot Systems, Inc. Methods for pre-authentication of users using one-time passwords
US20020095507A1 (en) * 2001-01-17 2002-07-18 Jerdonek Robert A. Methods for pre-authentication of users using one-time passwords
US20030182565A1 (en) * 2001-03-29 2003-09-25 Toshihisa Nakano Data protection system that protects data by encrypting the data
US20020147917A1 (en) * 2001-04-05 2002-10-10 Brickell Ernie F. Distribution of secured information
US8074889B2 (en) * 2001-07-10 2011-12-13 Xatra Fund Mx, Llc System for biometric security using a fob
US20090044012A1 (en) * 2001-07-10 2009-02-12 Xatra Fund Mx, Llc Rf transaction authentication using a random number
US20030120925A1 (en) * 2001-12-21 2003-06-26 Rose Gregory G. Method and apparatus for simplified audio authentication
US20030204743A1 (en) * 2002-04-16 2003-10-30 Srinivas Devadas Authentication of integrated circuits
US20070104215A1 (en) * 2002-05-13 2007-05-10 Kiyon, Inc. Multi-Hop Ultra Wide Band Wireless Network Communication
US20040066278A1 (en) * 2002-10-04 2004-04-08 Hughes Michael A. Challenged-based tag authentication medel
US6842106B2 (en) * 2002-10-04 2005-01-11 Battelle Memorial Institute Challenged-based tag authentication model
US20070095928A1 (en) * 2003-01-15 2007-05-03 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Physical items for holding data securely, and methods and apparatus for publishing and reading them
US20060116899A1 (en) * 2003-02-10 2006-06-01 R Lax Michael Apparatus and methods for processing items
US20040181681A1 (en) * 2003-03-11 2004-09-16 Rimage Corporation Cartridge validation with radio frequency identification
US20040252025A1 (en) * 2003-04-07 2004-12-16 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd. Shopping receptacle with in-built scanner
US20070008135A1 (en) * 2003-06-17 2007-01-11 United Security Applications Id, Inc. Electronic security system for monitoring and recording activity and data relating to persons or cargo
US20050037542A1 (en) * 2003-08-12 2005-02-17 Lintec Corporation Process for producing a semiconductor device
US7937583B2 (en) * 2003-08-15 2011-05-03 Venafi, Inc. Method of aggregating multiple certificate authority services
US20050154896A1 (en) * 2003-09-22 2005-07-14 Mathias Widman Data communication security arrangement and method
US20050123133A1 (en) * 2003-12-09 2005-06-09 Intelleflex Corporation Security system and method
US20080266055A1 (en) * 2004-02-06 2008-10-30 Christopher Gordon Gervase Turner Method and System for Controlling RFID Transponder Response Waiting Periods
US20050190892A1 (en) * 2004-02-27 2005-09-01 Dawson Martin C. Determining the geographical location from which an emergency call originates in a packet-based communications network
US20070194882A1 (en) * 2004-03-10 2007-08-23 Koninklijke Philips Electonics N.V. Authentication system and authentication apparatus
US20070277044A1 (en) * 2004-04-07 2007-11-29 Hans Graf Data Support With Tan-Generator And Display
WO2005098764A1 (en) * 2004-04-07 2005-10-20 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Data support with tan-generator and display
US20070255952A1 (en) * 2004-06-28 2007-11-01 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Session Initial Protocol Identification Method
US20080013807A1 (en) * 2004-07-01 2008-01-17 American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. Method and system for keystroke scan recognition biometrics on a smartcard
US20080011835A1 (en) * 2004-07-12 2008-01-17 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method and apparatus for searching rights objects stored in portable storage device using object location data
US7365636B2 (en) * 2004-08-25 2008-04-29 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba RFID tag device, tag identification device and radio communication system
US20060049256A1 (en) * 2004-09-07 2006-03-09 Clay Von Mueller Transparently securing data for transmission on financial networks
US20060124756A1 (en) * 2004-12-10 2006-06-15 Brown Kerry D Payment card with internally generated virtual account numbers for its magnetic stripe encoder and user display
US7246744B2 (en) * 2004-12-22 2007-07-24 Bce Inc. User authentication for contact-less systems
US20070023508A1 (en) * 2005-01-31 2007-02-01 George Brookner Proximity validation system and method
US7953974B2 (en) * 2005-02-17 2011-05-31 Fujitsu Limited Authentication method, authentication system, and tag device thereof, data reference client, authentication server, and data server
US20060235805A1 (en) * 2005-04-13 2006-10-19 Mr. Feng Peng Universal anti-counterfeit method and system
US20070103274A1 (en) * 2005-04-13 2007-05-10 Oliver Berthold Radio frequency identification (RFID) system that meets data protection requirements through owner-controlled RFID tag functionality
US7895437B2 (en) * 2005-05-31 2011-02-22 Vmware, Inc. Augmented single factor split key asymmetric cryptography-key generation and distributor
US20060271386A1 (en) * 2005-05-31 2006-11-30 Bhella Kenneth S Methods and apparatus for locating devices
US20070022045A1 (en) * 2005-07-25 2007-01-25 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd. Method of transacting objects
US20070057768A1 (en) * 2005-09-13 2007-03-15 Nec (China) Co., Ltd. Radio frequency identification system and method
US20080212771A1 (en) * 2005-10-05 2008-09-04 Privasphere Ag Method and Devices For User Authentication
US20070085689A1 (en) * 2005-10-13 2007-04-19 Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. RFID tag incorporating at least two integrated circuits
US20070234058A1 (en) * 2005-11-04 2007-10-04 White Charles A System and method for authenticating products
US20070198436A1 (en) * 2006-02-21 2007-08-23 Weiss Kenneth P Method and apparatus for secure access payment and identification
US20070214474A1 (en) * 2006-03-09 2007-09-13 Sbc Knowledge Ventures, L.P. Methods and systems to operate a set-top box
US7492258B1 (en) * 2006-03-21 2009-02-17 Radiofy Llc Systems and methods for RFID security
US20080061935A1 (en) * 2006-08-15 2008-03-13 Melendez Peter A Methods and systems for positioning data fields of a radio-frequency identification (rfid) tag
US7876220B2 (en) * 2006-11-22 2011-01-25 Cintas Corporation Garment tracking and processing system
US20100073147A1 (en) * 2006-12-06 2010-03-25 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Controlling data access to and from an rfid device
US7673799B2 (en) * 2007-01-26 2010-03-09 Magtek, Inc. Card reader for use with web based transactions
US20100135491A1 (en) * 2007-03-27 2010-06-03 Dhiraj Bhuyan Authentication method
US20080244271A1 (en) * 2007-03-28 2008-10-02 Legend Holdings Ltd Method and system for authentication based on wireless identification, wireless identification and server
US7800499B2 (en) * 2007-06-05 2010-09-21 Oracle International Corporation RFID and sensor signing algorithm
US20090048971A1 (en) * 2007-08-17 2009-02-19 Matthew Hathaway Payment Card with Dynamic Account Number
US7941663B2 (en) * 2007-10-23 2011-05-10 Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Authentication of 6LoWPAN nodes using EAP-GPSK
US20090216679A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-08-27 Tet Hin Yeap Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US20090161872A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US20090159666A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US20090160649A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US20090240946A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-09-24 Tet Hin Yeap Dynamic identifier for use in identification of a device
US20110185180A1 (en) * 2008-09-17 2011-07-28 Peter Gullberg Method and device for creating digital signature
US20100150342A1 (en) * 2008-12-16 2010-06-17 Richards Ronald W Encryption and decryption of records in accordance with group access vectors
US20100205047A1 (en) * 2009-02-12 2010-08-12 Denis Khoo Promotional Electronic Recipe Distribution
US20110264907A1 (en) * 2010-04-27 2011-10-27 International Business Machines Corporation Securing information within a cloud computing environment

Cited By (26)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20080218349A1 (en) * 2007-03-08 2008-09-11 Fujitsu Limited RFID system and RFID tag
US8274367B2 (en) * 2007-03-08 2012-09-25 Fujitsu Limited RFID system and RFID tag
US7806325B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2010-10-05 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US20090160649A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US20090216679A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-08-27 Tet Hin Yeap Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US20090240946A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-09-24 Tet Hin Yeap Dynamic identifier for use in identification of a device
US20100185865A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2010-07-22 Bce Inc. Generation of communication device signatures for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions
US20090159666A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US20100320269A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2010-12-23 O'brien William G Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US8103872B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2012-01-24 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US9971986B2 (en) * 2007-12-20 2018-05-15 Bce Inc. Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US20090161872A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-06-25 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US8412638B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2013-04-02 Bce Inc. Method and system for validating a device that uses a dynamic identifier
US8553888B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2013-10-08 Bce Inc. Generation of communication device signatures for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions
US9305282B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2016-04-05 Bce Inc. Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof
US9231928B2 (en) 2008-12-18 2016-01-05 Bce Inc. Validation method and system for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions
US9037859B2 (en) 2008-12-18 2015-05-19 Bce Inc. Processing of communication device signatures for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions
US8593257B1 (en) * 2010-06-14 2013-11-26 Impinj, Inc. RFID-based loss-prevention system
US8866596B1 (en) * 2010-09-25 2014-10-21 Impinj, Inc. Code-based RFID loss-prevention system
US8866595B1 (en) * 2010-09-25 2014-10-21 Impinj, Inc. Ticket-based RFID loss-prevention system
US8872636B1 (en) * 2010-09-25 2014-10-28 Impinj, Inc. Algorithm-based RFID loss-prevention system
CN102446319A (en) * 2011-09-09 2012-05-09 李建堂 Multi-function through-transport common pallet Internet-of-things circulation and sharing management system
CN103279852A (en) * 2013-06-06 2013-09-04 四川航天系统工程研究所 System and method for monitoring and managing warehouse goods in refined and real-time mode based on RFID
US9691243B1 (en) 2013-08-21 2017-06-27 Impinj, Inc. Exit-code-based RFID loss-prevention system
US9189904B1 (en) * 2013-08-21 2015-11-17 Impinj, Inc. Exit-code-based RFID loss-prevention system
US10186127B1 (en) 2013-08-21 2019-01-22 Impinj, Inc. Exit-code-based RFID loss-prevention system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US20090160649A1 (en) 2009-06-25
CA2647312A1 (en) 2009-06-20
US8553888B2 (en) 2013-10-08
US20100185865A1 (en) 2010-07-22
US8412638B2 (en) 2013-04-02
CA2936737A1 (en) 2009-06-20
US20130212398A1 (en) 2013-08-15
CA2689824A1 (en) 2009-07-02
WO2009079766A1 (en) 2009-07-02
US9971986B2 (en) 2018-05-15
US20100320269A1 (en) 2010-12-23
WO2009079734A1 (en) 2009-07-02
CA2647318A1 (en) 2009-06-20
US20090161872A1 (en) 2009-06-25
EP2223460A4 (en) 2011-12-28
EP2235872A1 (en) 2010-10-06
US20090240946A1 (en) 2009-09-24
US20090216679A1 (en) 2009-08-27
US20090159666A1 (en) 2009-06-25
US9305282B2 (en) 2016-04-05
US7806325B2 (en) 2010-10-05
US8103872B2 (en) 2012-01-24
CA2647318C (en) 2016-09-20
EP2235872A4 (en) 2012-02-22
EP2223460A1 (en) 2010-09-01
CA2645990C (en) 2014-07-29
CA2689824C (en) 2015-03-03
CA2645990A1 (en) 2009-06-20
US20150069137A1 (en) 2015-03-12

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Duc et al. Enhancing security of EPCglobal Gen-2 RFID tag against traceability and cloning
JP5680725B2 (en) Method and apparatus for providing authentication and confidentiality of low complexity device
US7178026B2 (en) Identification code management method and management system
JP4709866B2 (en) Access system and access method
Engberg et al. Zero-knowledge Device Authentication: Privacy & Security Enhanced RFID preserving Business Value and Consumer Convenience.
JP5802137B2 (en) Secure centralized authentication system having a private data storage device, and method
Dimitriou A secure and efficient RFID protocol that could make big brother (partially) obsolete
US20160098723A1 (en) System and method for block-chain verification of goods
US8917159B2 (en) Fully secure item-level tagging
US6778066B2 (en) Personal identification badge that resets on the removal of the badge from the wearer
US9262655B2 (en) System and method for enhanced RFID instrument security
CN101103365B (en) Method for operating radio frequency identification system, and the system and device
EP1755061B1 (en) Protection of non-promiscuous data in an RFID transponder
AU2006203768B2 (en) Device authentication using a unidirectional protocol
Lehtonen et al. From identification to authentication–a review of RFID product authentication techniques
JP5805790B2 (en) Identity theft prevention and information security systems process
Rotter A framework for assessing RFID system security and privacy risks
US8322608B2 (en) Using promiscuous and non-promiscuous data to verify card and reader identity
US7273181B2 (en) Device and method for authenticating and securing transactions using RF communication
EP1832039B1 (en) Control of rfid data exchange
CN101553829B (en) Controlling data access to and from an RFID device
US7832001B2 (en) Identification system and method
US20060087407A1 (en) Master tags
US7952481B2 (en) Systems and methods for RFID security
WO2005008563A2 (en) Encryption of radio frequency identification tags

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: BCE INC.,CANADA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:O'BRIEN, WILLIAM G.;YEAP, TET HIN;MURRAY, SEAN MACLEAN;AND OTHERS;SIGNING DATES FROM 20080213 TO 20080214;REEL/FRAME:022028/0618

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- AFTER EXAMINER'S ANSWER OR BOARD OF APPEALS DECISION