US20080256364A1 - Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services - Google Patents
Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US20080256364A1 US20080256364A1 US10/246,276 US24627602A US2008256364A1 US 20080256364 A1 US20080256364 A1 US 20080256364A1 US 24627602 A US24627602 A US 24627602A US 2008256364 A1 US2008256364 A1 US 2008256364A1
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- preferences
- security
- service
- message
- community
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 51
- 238000004422 calculation algorithm Methods 0.000 claims description 52
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 21
- PCHJSUWPFVWCPO-UHFFFAOYSA-N gold Chemical compound [Au] PCHJSUWPFVWCPO-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 16
- 229910052737 gold Inorganic materials 0.000 description 16
- 239000010931 gold Substances 0.000 description 16
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 12
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 6
- BQCADISMDOOEFD-UHFFFAOYSA-N Silver Chemical compound [Ag] BQCADISMDOOEFD-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 4
- 229910052709 silver Inorganic materials 0.000 description 4
- 239000004332 silver Substances 0.000 description 4
- 238000013519 translation Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 4
- 239000003795 chemical substances by application Substances 0.000 description 3
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 description 3
- 239000010970 precious metal Substances 0.000 description 3
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000000737 periodic effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000000344 soap Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000009466 transformation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000000844 transformation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 235000008694 Humulus lupulus Nutrition 0.000 description 1
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000295 complement effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013497 data interchange Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000463 material Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000008520 organization Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003442 weekly effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/30—Monitoring
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2113—Multi-level security, e.g. mandatory access control
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
Definitions
- the computer program listing appendix includes the following files:
- the present invention relates to computer-based devices and methods to negotiate and implement security arrangements between two or more Web Services. More particularly, it relates to devices and methods that specify input and output interfaces, compute and generate a security contract consistent with inputs, and implement security in accordance with negotiated security arrangements. Particular aspects of the present invention are described in the claims, specification and drawings.
- B2B and A2A electronic commerce are replacing former protocols for electronic data interchange (EDI).
- EDI electronic data interchange
- Standards related to simple web service include UDDI, WSDL, XSDL and SOAP.
- these standards do not fully meet the security, reliability, manageability, and choreography requirements for practical B2B and A2A electronic commerce.
- Security in particular presents numerous options and configuration issues. Collaborative web services and their security needs are expected to evolve as non-web businesses do. There is no any comprehensive or unified device or method that dynamically resolves and updates security options and configurations as web services evolve.
- Choreography efforts include ebXML/BPSS from OASIS, WSFL from IBM, and XLANG from Microsoft.
- Conversation efforts include ebXML/TRP from OASIS and Microsoft's WS-routing.
- the dominant security effort is WS-security from IBM and Microsoft, there is also a complementary security effort in OASIS called SAML.
- SAML complementary security effort in OASIS
- W3C is addressing standardization in all of these areas. Key industry players have formed a rival consortium called WSI. However, they have not addressed the dynamic security negotiation issue.
- the present invention relates to computer-based devices and methods negotiate and implement security arrangements between two or more web services. More particularly, it relates to devices and methods that specify input and output interfaces, computation and generation of a security contract consistent with inputs, and implementation of security in accordance with negotiated security arrangements. Particular aspects of the present invention are described in the claims, specification and drawings.
- FIG. 1 illustrates communities and networks of communities, which are one environment in which computer-assisted, dynamic negotiation of security arrangements is useful.
- FIG. 2 depicts negotiation and implementation of security arrangements.
- FIG. 3 illustrates reconciling preferences among algorithm types.
- FIG. 4 illustrates alternative embodiments for obtaining receiver's information when the sender is local to calculations of the security arrangements.
- FIG. 5 illustrates one network of program logic and resources that can be used to implement aspects of the present invention.
- FIG. 1 illustrates communities and networks of communities, which are one environment in which computer-assisted, dynamic negotiation of security arrangements is useful.
- a community maintains a local registry that includes information such as users, companies, services and connectors that are part of the community.
- the community can be a marketplace, an enterprise or a sub enterprise.
- communities can belong to one or more community networks. Typically, communities and networks have some common business interest. Interoperation is between member communities in one or more community networks.
- the networks include a gold marketplace network 1 , a precious metal marketplace network 2 , a private network 3 and a global trading web network 4 . In this illustration, the gold marketplace network 1 and the precious metal marketplace network 2 are contained within the global trading web network 4 .
- the precious metals marketplace network 2 includes gold and silver marketplaces 14 , 13 .
- Gold marketplace customers can trade silver in the silver marketplace 13 and silver marketplace customers can trade in gold 14 .
- One community, PQR Enterprise 17 belongs to the gold marketplace network 1 , the private network 3 and the global trading web network 4 ; another community, ABC Big Supplier 18 belongs to the private network 3 .
- XYZ Gold 14 is a marketplace or community for trading gold.
- Enterprises belong to this community. Enterprises like PQR Enterprise 17 that have formed a community by themselves belong to the gold marketplace network 1 . These communities are part of the gold marketplace network 1 , and the global trading web network 4 .
- Small supplier 15 is part of the gold marketplace community.
- Other enterprises 16 are communities that are part of the gold marketplace community network 1 .
- XYZ Gold 14 and other gold marketplace entities 15 - 17 indicate that the gold marketplace requires all traffic between enterprises (communities or otherwise) transacting gold trading to be routed through XYZ Gold 14 , for instance, to collect billing and business intelligence information.
- PQR Enterprise 17 is a community is part of the gold marketplace and also part of local private network with supplier 18 .
- Small supplier 15 may be an individual small supplier that does not want to form a community by itself and instead registers its metadata, such as users, organizations, services and transformations, in the registry of the gold marketplace.
- ABC Big Supplier 18 has formed a private network of its own, for instance because it wants to keep its metadata, internal back office systems and transformations hidden from general public access because they were developed at considerable cost.
- PRQ 17 is a customer of ABC 18 , it participates in the private network 3 .
- Financial service provider DEF Financial 12 wants to provide financial services to anyone in the global trading web network 4 , such forms a community of its own and registers with the global trading web root 11 .
- a network of communities makes available a global registry of communities. The global registry permits lookup of the community and determination of one or more routes to that community, or to external connectors through which the electronic commerce documents bound for the community may be routed. Documents routed from one community to another may be routed directly between external connectors for the two communities or indirectly through one or more intermediary communities. Business and security rules for transactions involving the communities also can be defined and maintained in community registries.
- FIG. 1 illustrates the mixed loyalties of entities and communities that create an impetus for interoperability among electronic commerce platforms.
- Connector is a general term for applications that communicate with other applications.
- Connectors may communicate on a peer-to-peer (P2P) basis or on a directed basis through other connectors that function as hubs, gateways, external ports, central connectors, etc.
- P2P peer-to-peer
- Connectors that communicate P2P are able to communicate with other connectors that use the same transport/envelope protocols.
- Connectors that communicate P2P optionally may enlist the assistance of other hub connectors that perform translation services, when trying to communicate with a connector that does not use the same transport/envelope protocol.
- Connectors that communicate on a directed basis communicate through hub connectors according to routing rules.
- Routing rules among connectors can be mapped in a directed graph, supporting one or more hub and spoke topologies for one or more transport/envelope protocols.
- a hub and spoke topology directs communications along spokes to hubs, in one or more tiers. This facilitates centralized services such as billing, business intelligence collection, tracking, auditing, accounting, or others.
- Multiple hub and spoke organizations may overlay the same connectors to support different transport/envelope protocols and technologies, as suggested by FIG. 2 . For instance, a stronger hub and spoke organization may be required to use Sonic as a transport technology than to use HTTP or HTTPS.
- communication routes may depend on whether the source and destination are part of the same community.
- a sub-community which may include the whole community
- centralized functions may be unneeded and P2P communications permitted among connectors that otherwise are directed to communicate with parent connectors when communicating with destinations in other sub-communities.
- Connectors may be labeled simple connectors (sometimes simply called connectors), hubs (sometimes called gateways or routers) or central connectors. Alternatively, they may be described functionally. Simple connectors are directed to communicate via hub connectors, except when they are permitted to communicate P2P among connectors in the same sub-community. So-called hubs are used by connectors that are explicitly directed or linked to them. Hubs may serve more than one function and, accordingly, may appear more than once in a route from a source to a destination. Hubs forward electronic commerce documents or messages. Hubs also may translate among transport protocols that support a common envelope protocol. For instance, a hub may translate envelope protocols and also implement a different transport protocol upon transmission than upon receipt.
- a central connector is a special case of a hub, which can be used by connectors that are not explicitly directed or linked to them.
- a central connector is useful, for instance, to carry out translation functions when traversing connectors from a source according to routing rules does not lead to any hub that supports the transport/envelope protocol used by the destination.
- a schema and a process flow provide an overview of security arrangements according to aspects of the present invention.
- negotiation of security arrangements is carried out by a computer-based process that uses security profiles of sending and receiving services to determine a mutually agreeable security arrangement.
- this security arrangement is negotiated or potentially updated regularly, without user intervention.
- This arrangement may be negotiated, updated or checked for validity at a user request or without user intervention whenever messages are exchanged or on some other periodic or occasional basis, such as monthly, weekly, daily, on occurrence of an event that impacts exchange of messages between a particular sender and receiver (e.g., a software component failure or a change in security preferences), when a previously negotiated arrangement fails, or on some other periodic or occasional basis.
- the schema SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD in the source code appendix, describes some inputs to negotiation of security arrangements.
- the schema SecurityContract.XSD also in the source code appendix, describes one embodiment of negotiated security arrangements, in a so-called security interoperability contract document (“SCID”).
- SCID security interoperability contract document
- the schema SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD in the source code appendix, can be used to validate a plurality input files to negotiation of security arrangements.
- the machine-readable input files are XML documents.
- other data structures may be used to store the same information, for instance a tree structure modeled after the XML code.
- the schema SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD is best understood by loading the file into an integrated development environment (IDE) such as XML Spy TM, which provides several alternative views of the schema, including a documentation generation view. Sender and receiver security interoperability contract document information blocks are defined by this schema.
- SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD includes several components that are used to define sender and receiver security information.
- the CommunitySecurityPolicyPreference component states the community preferences to sign the header, encrypt the credential, and credential preferences. It can be used to specify a default value for a whole community or it could be adapted to specify a default value for a collaboration partner (CP).
- the SAMsgSecurityPolicy component allows specification of signature and encryption preferences and authentication options. Message exchanged between services may have multiple parts. Signature and encryption policies can be applied to the whole message or individual parts. This approach can readily be extended to applying signature and encryption policies to elements within the parts.
- the PublicKeys component identifies key records for this CP.
- the ConnectorCapability component provides routing information to a resource that implements part of the security arrangement, such as a connector name. It includes connector capability parameters such as encryption capability, signature capability, an encryption public key party, and signing public key party.
- Public key party can be the sender's CP, the receiver's CP, or the owner of the connector, depending on whether signing or encryption is involved. If the public key party is not defined, the key of the message sender can be used for signing and the key of the message receiver can be used for encryption.
- the SecurityContainer component can be used to carry additional objects that are useful for security.
- the SendingCPSecurityPolicyProfile component includes the sending CP's available credentials information.
- the CPSendServicesSecurityPolicy and CPRecvServicesSecurityPolicy component include sets of security policies for the sending and receiving services, respectively. The services preferences and overrides can be defined here.
- the schema SecurityContract.XSD also in the source code appendix, can be used as a model for preparing a machine-readable security interoperability contract document.
- the machine-readable document is an XML document.
- other data structures may be used to store the same information, for instance a tree structure modeled after the XML code.
- This schema defines policies and channels for security policies.
- a security channel defines resources and routes to resources that carry out security algorithms, such as signature, encryption and authentication algorithms. It also may include non-repudiation and authorization resources.
- the process flow FIG. 2 can be used to describe negotiation and implementation of security arrangements.
- the preferences of the sending and receiving services are maintained in a registry 201 .
- This registry may be accessible to the sending and receiving services, so that either service can compute security arrangements, or it may be available to a security arrangement computing service that is accessible to one or both of the sending and receiving services.
- the sending and receiving services may maintain their own registries. Or, a protocol may be developed for the sending and receiving services to exchange their security preferences as part of the negotiation of security arrangements.
- a registry 201 further may maintain information regarding default preferences of a collaboration partner that owns a service or a community to which a collaboration partner belongs, or both.
- Default preferences may be overridden by service-specific preferences, in general, or certain default preferences may be given precedence over service-specific preferences. Default preferences of collaboration partners may be treated differently than default preferences of the community.
- Input statements of security arrangement preferences are taken from the registry 201 or another source and acted upon by a security arrangements computing service 202 . In one embodiment, this computing service is a security contract builder.
- a set of security arrangements are output 203 . These arrangements may be confirmed with the sending and receiving services, may be subject to a veto by the sending or receiving service, or may be trusted by the sending and receiving services.
- the sending service or another service responsive to the sending service 205 uses the security arrangements 203 to process the document 204 for transmission to the receiving service 209 .
- the security arrangements will call for obtaining an assertion from a trusted assertion service 206 .
- the sending and receiving services may agree to use a SAML service to generate authentication assertions.
- the security arrangement 203 would call for generation of a SAML assertion and the sending service 205 would obtain a SAML assertion from a SAML server 206 .
- an electronic notarization might be provided by a trusted service 206 .
- Banks or security authorities might be trusted to generate authentication assertions, in a function analogous to notarization.
- the security arrangements will call for obtaining public keys used in asymmetrical signing or encryption from a public keys source 208 .
- the sending and receiving services may agree to use an XKMS service to exchange public keys.
- the security arrangement 203 would specify the XKMS service address as the source of public keys.
- the sending service 205 and the receiving service 209 both would access the agreed keys source 208 .
- the sending service 205 communicates the document 204 through a network 207 to the receiving party 209 .
- the routing and transport through the network 207 may be part of the security arrangements or, preferably, may be handled by a secure transport infrastructure.
- the security arrangements 203 may be provided by the computing service 202 to the receiving party 209 or otherwise made accessible to the receiving party, independent of the message carrying the document 204 . Alternatively, the security arrangements 203 may be included with the document 204 according to a prearranged protocol.
- the prearranged protocol may call for the message header or message part to be signed and/or encrypted using the parties' respective keys.
- the files SecuritySenderInfo.XML, SecurityReceiverInfo.XML, and ComputeSecurityContract.XML provide an example of sender and receiver preferences and a resulting computed security arrangement.
- the sender and receiver preferences are stated in XML code conforming to the XML schema explained above.
- the computed security arrangement is stated in an interoperability security contract document conforming to the SecurityContract.XSD schema in the source code appendix.
- the sender preferences information includes community preferences and service preferences.
- the community preferences address security algorithms, preferences to sign the header, encrypt the credential and for selection among available credentials.
- the community preferences also may rank order the security algorithms or otherwise indicate preference among the security algorithms.
- a similar set of preferences might be provided for a collaboration partner, either instead of more in addition to preferences for a community.
- the community has six sets of signature algorithms options in elements named XMLSignatureAlgorithmTemplate and three sets of encryption algorithms options in elements named XMLEncryptionAlgorithmTemplate. These sets of options are templates. More than one template of options can be provided for a particular algorithm. Use of templates simplifies configuration of options and increases the likelihood consistent option sets will be selected by sending and receiving services.
- the community in this example prefers not to sign headers or encrypt credentials and accepts basic credentials.
- a community or a collaboration partner may have preferences for any security arrangement options that the service can select, or the community or collaboration partner may have preferences for only some options.
- Community preferences in a sender's preference file should correspond to community preferences stated elsewhere, such as in a registry entry for community preferences.
- the file CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreferences.XML is an example of a file used to record some or all of a community's security preferences.
- the service records in SAMsgSecurityPolicy its preferences for handling message parts, for signature and encryption of the message as a whole, and for authentication. Messages may have several parts. Corresponding to a message part, a service may identify the message part and express a preference for signing or not signing or for encrypting or not encrypting a message part. In this embodiment, a preference for a category of algorithm, such as a general algorithm or in XML-specific algorithm can be selected. In other embodiments, the service might not specify a category of algorithm or it might specify a specific algorithm.
- the receiver's (buyer's) public key in an X509 format, is use for signature and authentication.
- Two resources, so-called connectors, are identified for the sending service to use for signing and encryption.
- the sender's available credentials are identified as basic and X509 credentials.
- the sending service's security arrangement preferences are rank ordered from one to three under SecurityPolicyTemplatePreference. In this example, the three encryption preferences are all for XML-specific encryption.
- Receiving party preferences are found in the source code appendix file SecurityReceiverInfo.XML.
- the elements of the receiving party's preference profile are very similar to those of the sending party, even using the same element types from the schema.
- Significant differences are found in authentication and authorization, since the logic applicable to authentication and authorization depends on whether you are presenting your credentials or determining whether to accept what is presented. For instance, the SendingCPSecurityProfile of the sending party lists available credentials. This element is not part of the receiving party's preferences. This issue is addressed by the receiving party's CPRecvServicesSecurityPolicy, which identifies AcceptedCredentials.
- FIG. 3 illustrates reconciling preferences among algorithm types.
- Stacks 301 and 302 represent sending and receiving preferences.
- A is the most secure and G the least secure.
- preference B and D match.
- a decision rule for choosing between B or D might take into account one or both stacks of preferences. For instance, the receiving service's preference (D) for signature or the sending service's preference (B) for encryption might be selected from among the matches.
- the second type of preferences is for whether or not to sign or encrypt a part of a message. What to sign or encrypt is addressed by the SAMsgPart elements of SAMsgSecurityPolicy.
- the message parts in the example are Order and Image.
- sender and receiver preferences match, for signing and encrypting the Order and only encrypting the Image. Preferences would not match if the receiver wanted the Image signed, as well as the Order. Then, a decision rule would be needed to resolve the mismatch.
- the available decision rules could include: receiver wins, sender wins, highest requirement wins or lowest requirement wins.
- One type of preference reconciliation determines whether to apply a security measure. The other type selects among option templates, when the security measure is applied.
- the security policy section sets out the signature policy, and encryption policy and encryption key information. It also may set out policies regarding authentication, authorization and non-repudiation of origin or receipt.
- the same signature and encryption policy is applied to all parts of the document.
- multiple algorithms could be applied to different parts.
- the algorithm selected for signature, encryption and authentication are abstracted through templates containing options sets, simplifying the selection of algorithms. Selected algorithms are associated with logic and resources, so different services or processes can be used for signing/verifying and encrypting/decrypting different parts of a message.
- a public key or certificate can be transmitted in the encryption key element of the security policy section.
- the security channel section describes services or connectors involved in applying security policies.
- the channel section identifies a source connector that requires assistance in applying a security policy (e.g., the sending service requesting encryption), and a target connector that applies the security policy or acts as an intermediary to logic and resources that apply the security policy.
- a security policy such as signing, encryption, authentication, authorization or non-repudiation, specific information required to carry out the security policy is provided in the security channel section.
- the data used to determine security arrangements can be categorized as message and activity related data, CP-service related data, security algorithms related data, routing related data, encryption key related data and configuration data. Some additional detail regarding use of these categories of is described below.
- Message and activity related data relates to digital signatures, encryption, non-repudiation, and authorization.
- a receiver may require non-repudiation measures for a sender, amounting to a trusted party verification of the sender's message to receiver.
- a sender may require non-repudiation measures for a receiver, amounting to a trusted party verification of receipt of sender's message by the receiver.
- signatures and encryption can be applied on an element basis, to particular items of data, if fine granularity is desired.
- overrides can be specified for pairs of sending and receiving services. For instance, a pre-existing or proven relationship can be treated differently than an entirely new relationship. Overrides to security policies can be implemented to cautiously reduce (or increase, as warranted) security requirements in particular cases.
- CP-related data includes authentication and authorization data.
- Authorization is the process of granting or denying access to a network resource. Authorization to access most computer security systems is a two-step process. The first stage is authentication, which ensures that a principal (user, process, application or service) is who it claims to be. The second stage is authorization, which allows the principal access to various resources based on their identity. Authorization is also called access control. Access control is used to authorize access to website resources. It manages information about users, groups of users, and the roles assigned to users. SAML provides an XML-based means to share information about security events (authentication and authorization) and attributes (e.g. credit rating) in a SOAP message.
- This SAML data can then be sent to a third-party, and this enables ‘distributed trust’, whereby the user signs on once, but can re-use their authentication or authorization details.
- the issuing authority decides whether to grant the request by subject services or sender, for access type to resource web service, given the evidence provided by the requestor.
- the authorization decision allows or denies a subject access to a specific resource.
- SAML is useful option for web services security, but it requires an initial degree of trust and technical resources. In instances when SAML is unavailable or not preferred, other approaches such as ID/password and a table of privileges associated with an ID can be used.
- the present invention is not limited by the authorization technology used, but extends more abstractly to selection among presently available or hereafter invented technologies. With either SAML authorization or ID/password technologies, the authorization data can be encrypted and built into the message.
- Security algorithms related data includes algorithms and configuration options for signature, encryption and non-repudiation.
- signature algorithms options may include use of XMLDsig, choice of a Canonicalization algorithm, a signature method and a digest algorithm.
- Encryption/decryption options may include key size, key and method. Default may be inherited by a service, either overriding the services preferences or being overridden. In addition, specific overrides can be specified for CP pairs, as described above. Option templates, also described above, simplify negotiation of security arrangements. Different options will apply to XML and non-XML algorithms, signature algorithms for example.
- XML signature algorithms e.g., XMLDisg
- PCKS#7 non-XML algorithms
- Use of community standard security templates are preferred, to ensure that there is at least one match between preference lists of the respective services.
- a community may require all CP's or all services operating in the community to support a particular community standard security option set, to assure that messages can be exchanged within the community.
- Routing related data includes how to access logic and resources that implement authentication/verification, signing/verification, and encryption/decryption. Any type of access information may be used, such as a universal resource name (URN) or universal resource locator (URL).
- URN universal resource name
- URL universal resource locator
- a message may take multiple hops through connectors for translation or other value-added services. Accordingly, multiple route steps may be associated with any action. Security typically will need to be reapplied after any translation or other value-added service.
- Encryption key related data is generally discussed above.
- Configuration data includes default (e.g., community or collaboration partner) preferences and credential preferences.
- FIG. 4 illustrates alternative embodiments for obtaining receiver's information when the sender is local to calculations of the security arrangements.
- local 431 and remote 432 registries are indicated.
- the sender is local and the receiver remote.
- the sender's data is current and complete in the local registry 431 .
- the sender's information is collected 421 and made available to the logic and resources that compute the security arrangements 411 .
- the receiver's data may be current and complete, for instance if the receiver is in the same community as the sender and there is a community-wide registry, or if the receiver's information has been recently obtained and locally cached.
- a process 422 or 423 is invoked to collect the receiver information and make it available to the logic that computes security arrangements.
- a set of security arrangements 401 result.
- FIG. 5 illustrates one network of program logic and resources that can be used to implement aspects of the present invention.
- the logic components of this network include: send side collection 551 , receive side collection 552 , data object manager 541 , routing manager 542 , credential negotiator 531 , template negotiator 532 , connector manager 533 , authentication manager 521 , policy manager 522 , public key manager 523 , algorithm manager 524 , policy builder 511 , channel builder 512 and security arrangements document builder 501 .
- One embodiment of program logic operative in a community of collaboration partners to generate security arrangements can be described as follows: Collect the receiver security information, including an attribute assertion to authenticate the sender CP. Collect the sender security information. Look into routing block to find all connectors information to implement security measures. Get capability parameters for each connector. Walk through the routing chain to find which connector-pair to use for authentication, signature, and encryption. Get the receiver's service-activity-message object. This may include getting a SAMsgSecurityPolicy object from the receiver. This will have multiple parts and it can have signature and encryption policies for the whole message.
- SAMsgSecurityPolicy object may include getting a SAMsgSecurityPolicy object from the sender, and match the override options the SAMsgSecurityPolicy object accordingly. (Override decision tables are discussed below.) From the SAMsgSecurityPolicy object, find all algorithms required for this message, and build RequiredAlgorithmList. Get community preference objects for both SenderInfo and ReceiverInfo. This may include getting a CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreference object of the sender, which includes security algorithm templates, and community security policy preferences. It also may include getting a CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreference object of the receiver, if not the same community. If they are in the same community, it may be sufficient to set an object pointer.
- Decision tables may be used to implement the type of preference reconciliation related to whether to sign or encrypt part of a message. Again, decisions could be biased to accept preference not to sign or to accept the receiver's preference, or just the opposite. Some decision tables that could be used to implement possible decision rules follow:
- the present invention is readily extended to support signing and encryption at intermediate connectors along a path between a sender and receiver. It is useful to be able to sign and encrypt documents at connectors along a routing path that are not the message originators or final receivers. This may be useful for gateways, routers and central connectors. For gateways, signing and encryption may need to be performed by a gateway if signed/encrypted message data is transformed from one envelope protocol to another. For routers and central connectors, it may be desirable to use a single entry/exit point into the enterprise for external communities. A router or central connector may act as the central security hub and perform or organize security operations on behalf of the entire enterprise. This may simplifies the PKI management and other administrative burdens.
- This functionality can be configured by setting up the security capabilities of connectors in the enterprise's part of a community.
- a connector can be configured on an envelope/transport protocol basis to have signing capability or encryption capability and can be linked to signing and encryption capabilities of the collaboration partner at other connectors.
- gateways and routers you could configure the connector to use the key of the CP owner or the gateway/router connector.
- One embodiment is a method of dynamically determining security options for exchange of one or more messages between sending and receiving services.
- This method uses sender and receiver security preferences, which may take the form of machine security profiles for first and second services.
- the security profiles may identify security options/elements and option subsets that are acceptable to the respective services.
- the options may include requirements to sign or encrypt one or more parts of the message, signing option subsets corresponding to one or more signing algorithms, encryption option subsets corresponding to one or more encryption algorithms, identification of signing and encryption keys and identification of an authentication algorithm.
- the dynamic method includes accessing the security profiles and selecting a particular option set that is acceptable to the respective services.
- this option set can be used to communicate a message between the respective services.
- Security profiles can be maintained in one or more registries that are accessible to security logic of the first and second services.
- Default option subsets and/or preferences can be specified in community or collaboration partner security profiles and may be copied into service security profiles.
- Requirements to sign or encrypt can be applied to the parts of the message or to a message as a whole.
- Signature and encryption algorithms may be applied to a message as a whole, reducing complexity. Signing and encryption keys may be symmetrical or asymmetrical.
- Authentication may be carried out by a trusted agent, such as a SAML server, before communicating the message between the respective services.
- Authentication by a trusted agent may be evidenced by authentication assertion.
- authentication may include submitting credentials for examination by the receiving service. These credentials may be part of the message or may be transmitted in addition to the message.
- authorization may be addressed by security arrangements.
- the security profiles may include identification of at least one authorization algorithm to establish a sending service's privileges. This authorization may be implemented by a trusted agent before communicating the message or by submitting credentials to the service receiving the message.
- a further aspect of the present invention is taken into account preferences of the respective services among option subsets for signing and/or encryption. Preferences of one or both of the services may be taken into account.
- Determination of security arrangements may include determining resources to be used by the respective parties to implement any combination of signatures, encryption, authentication, authorization or non-repudiation. Resources, algorithms and option says may be packaged into security channels. A security channel may implement a single aspect of security.
Abstract
Description
- This application is related to the commonly owned U.S. Letters patent application Ser. No. 10/199,967, entitled “Electronic Commerce Community Networks and Intra/Inter Community Secure Routing Implementation”, by inventors Raghunath Sapuram, Jayaram Rajan Kasi, Todd Klaus, Christopher Crall, and Joseph Sanfilippo, filed on 19 Jul. 2002 and incorporated herein by reference. This application also is related to the commonly owned U.S. Letters Patent application Ser. No. 10/199,963, entitled “Registry Driven Interoperability and Exchange of Documents”, by inventors Christopher Todd Ingersoll, Jayaram Rajan Kasi, Alexander Holmes, Michael Clark, Ashok Aletty, Sathish Babu K. Senathi, and Helen S. Yuen, filed on 19 Jul. 2002 and incorporated herein by reference.
- This application is related to two commonly owned U.S. Letters Patent Applications filed the same day as this application, entitled “Exposing Process Flows And Choreography Controllers As Web Services”, by inventors Jayaram Rajan Kasi, Vinkesh Omprakash Mehta, Raghunath Sapuram, and Ram Shankar and “Dynamic Interoperability Contract for Web Services”, by inventors Jayaram Rajan Kasi, Rashmi Murthy, Symon Szu-yuan Chang, Todd Klaus, and Helen Yuen. The two applications filed the same day are hereby incorporated by reference.
- A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material that is subject to copyright protection. The copyright owner has no objection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent document or the patent disclosure as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office patent file or records, but otherwise reserves all copyright rights whatsoever.
- A computer program listing appendix comprising duplicate copies of a compact disc, named “CM1035,” accompanies this application and is incorporated by reference. The computer program listing appendix includes the following files:
-
SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD 25,351 bytes created Sep. (File containing schema for negotiation 17, 2002 inputs.) SecurityContractKeyInfo.XSD 15,532 bytes created Sep. (File containing schema for keys used 17, 2002 for security.) SecurityContract.XSD 15,298 bytes created Sep. (File containing schema for security contract 17, 2002 output from negotiation.) CommunitySecurityTemplatesInfo.XML 9,065 bytes created Aug. (File containing schema for negotiation 29, 2002 inputs.) SecuritySenderInfo.XML 13,302 bytes created Sep. (File containing sender info in example.) 11, 2002 SecurityReceiverInfo.XML 17,221 bytes created Sep. (File containing sender info in example.) 12, 2002 ComputeSecurityContract.XML 4,689 bytes created Sep. (File containing computed security contract 12, 2002 in example.) - The present invention relates to computer-based devices and methods to negotiate and implement security arrangements between two or more Web Services. More particularly, it relates to devices and methods that specify input and output interfaces, compute and generate a security contract consistent with inputs, and implement security in accordance with negotiated security arrangements. Particular aspects of the present invention are described in the claims, specification and drawings.
- Business-to-business (B2B) and application-to-application (A2A) electronic commerce are replacing former protocols for electronic data interchange (EDI). As businesses strive to improve their efficiency with B2B and A2A systems, a number of incompatible platforms and competing standards have emerged. Among compatible standards, gaps remain to be filled. For instance, the industry has defined what a simple web service is. Standards related to simple web service include UDDI, WSDL, XSDL and SOAP. However, these standards do not fully meet the security, reliability, manageability, and choreography requirements for practical B2B and A2A electronic commerce. Security in particular presents numerous options and configuration issues. Collaborative web services and their security needs are expected to evolve as non-web businesses do. There is no any comprehensive or unified device or method that dynamically resolves and updates security options and configurations as web services evolve.
- There are a number of industry initiatives to extend standards applicable to B2B and A2A electronic commerce. Choreography efforts include ebXML/BPSS from OASIS, WSFL from IBM, and XLANG from Microsoft. Conversation efforts include ebXML/TRP from OASIS and Microsoft's WS-routing. The dominant security effort is WS-security from IBM and Microsoft, there is also a complementary security effort in OASIS called SAML. For reliability, there are proposals from Microsoft, ebXML/TRP from OASIS, and HTTPR from IBM. W3C is addressing standardization in all of these areas. Key industry players have formed a rival consortium called WSI. However, they have not addressed the dynamic security negotiation issue.
- Accordingly, an opportunity arises to develop methods and devices that dynamically resolve security option and configuration issues for trading partners.
- The present invention relates to computer-based devices and methods negotiate and implement security arrangements between two or more web services. More particularly, it relates to devices and methods that specify input and output interfaces, computation and generation of a security contract consistent with inputs, and implementation of security in accordance with negotiated security arrangements. Particular aspects of the present invention are described in the claims, specification and drawings.
-
FIG. 1 illustrates communities and networks of communities, which are one environment in which computer-assisted, dynamic negotiation of security arrangements is useful. -
FIG. 2 depicts negotiation and implementation of security arrangements. -
FIG. 3 illustrates reconciling preferences among algorithm types. -
FIG. 4 illustrates alternative embodiments for obtaining receiver's information when the sender is local to calculations of the security arrangements. -
FIG. 5 illustrates one network of program logic and resources that can be used to implement aspects of the present invention. - The following detailed description is made with reference to the figures. Preferred embodiments are described to illustrate the present invention, not to limit its scope, which is defined by the claims. Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize a variety of equivalent variations on the description that follows.
-
FIG. 1 illustrates communities and networks of communities, which are one environment in which computer-assisted, dynamic negotiation of security arrangements is useful. Among these communities, a community maintains a local registry that includes information such as users, companies, services and connectors that are part of the community. The community can be a marketplace, an enterprise or a sub enterprise. Communities can belong to one or more community networks. Typically, communities and networks have some common business interest. Interoperation is between member communities in one or more community networks. The networks include agold marketplace network 1, a preciousmetal marketplace network 2, aprivate network 3 and a globaltrading web network 4. In this illustration, thegold marketplace network 1 and the preciousmetal marketplace network 2 are contained within the globaltrading web network 4. The preciousmetals marketplace network 2 includes gold andsilver marketplaces silver marketplace 13 and silver marketplace customers can trade ingold 14. One community,PQR Enterprise 17 belongs to thegold marketplace network 1, theprivate network 3 and the globaltrading web network 4; another community,ABC Big Supplier 18 belongs to theprivate network 3. In this illustration,XYZ Gold 14 is a marketplace or community for trading gold. Enterprises belong to this community. Enterprises likePQR Enterprise 17 that have formed a community by themselves belong to thegold marketplace network 1. These communities are part of thegold marketplace network 1, and the globaltrading web network 4.Small supplier 15 is part of the gold marketplace community.Other enterprises 16 are communities that are part of the goldmarketplace community network 1. The connections betweenXYZ Gold 14 and other gold marketplace entities 15-17 indicate that the gold marketplace requires all traffic between enterprises (communities or otherwise) transacting gold trading to be routed throughXYZ Gold 14, for instance, to collect billing and business intelligence information.PQR Enterprise 17 is a community is part of the gold marketplace and also part of local private network withsupplier 18.Small supplier 15 may be an individual small supplier that does not want to form a community by itself and instead registers its metadata, such as users, organizations, services and transformations, in the registry of the gold marketplace. On the other hand,ABC Big Supplier 18 has formed a private network of its own, for instance because it wants to keep its metadata, internal back office systems and transformations hidden from general public access because they were developed at considerable cost. BecausePRQ 17 is a customer ofABC 18, it participates in theprivate network 3. Financial serviceprovider DEF Financial 12 wants to provide financial services to anyone in the globaltrading web network 4, such forms a community of its own and registers with the globaltrading web root 11. A network of communities makes available a global registry of communities. The global registry permits lookup of the community and determination of one or more routes to that community, or to external connectors through which the electronic commerce documents bound for the community may be routed. Documents routed from one community to another may be routed directly between external connectors for the two communities or indirectly through one or more intermediary communities. Business and security rules for transactions involving the communities also can be defined and maintained in community registries. In general,FIG. 1 illustrates the mixed loyalties of entities and communities that create an impetus for interoperability among electronic commerce platforms. - Connector is a general term for applications that communicate with other applications. Connectors may communicate on a peer-to-peer (P2P) basis or on a directed basis through other connectors that function as hubs, gateways, external ports, central connectors, etc. Connectors that communicate P2P are able to communicate with other connectors that use the same transport/envelope protocols. Connectors that communicate P2P optionally may enlist the assistance of other hub connectors that perform translation services, when trying to communicate with a connector that does not use the same transport/envelope protocol. Connectors that communicate on a directed basis communicate through hub connectors according to routing rules. Routing rules among connectors can be mapped in a directed graph, supporting one or more hub and spoke topologies for one or more transport/envelope protocols. A hub and spoke topology directs communications along spokes to hubs, in one or more tiers. This facilitates centralized services such as billing, business intelligence collection, tracking, auditing, accounting, or others. Multiple hub and spoke organizations may overlay the same connectors to support different transport/envelope protocols and technologies, as suggested by
FIG. 2 . For instance, a stronger hub and spoke organization may be required to use Sonic as a transport technology than to use HTTP or HTTPS. Optionally, communication routes may depend on whether the source and destination are part of the same community. Within a sub-community (which may include the whole community), centralized functions may be unneeded and P2P communications permitted among connectors that otherwise are directed to communicate with parent connectors when communicating with destinations in other sub-communities. - Connectors may be labeled simple connectors (sometimes simply called connectors), hubs (sometimes called gateways or routers) or central connectors. Alternatively, they may be described functionally. Simple connectors are directed to communicate via hub connectors, except when they are permitted to communicate P2P among connectors in the same sub-community. So-called hubs are used by connectors that are explicitly directed or linked to them. Hubs may serve more than one function and, accordingly, may appear more than once in a route from a source to a destination. Hubs forward electronic commerce documents or messages. Hubs also may translate among transport protocols that support a common envelope protocol. For instance, a hub may translate envelope protocols and also implement a different transport protocol upon transmission than upon receipt. A central connector is a special case of a hub, which can be used by connectors that are not explicitly directed or linked to them. A central connector is useful, for instance, to carry out translation functions when traversing connectors from a source according to routing rules does not lead to any hub that supports the transport/envelope protocol used by the destination.
- A schema and a process flow provide an overview of security arrangements according to aspects of the present invention. In this context, negotiation of security arrangements is carried out by a computer-based process that uses security profiles of sending and receiving services to determine a mutually agreeable security arrangement. Preferably, this security arrangement is negotiated or potentially updated regularly, without user intervention. This arrangement may be negotiated, updated or checked for validity at a user request or without user intervention whenever messages are exchanged or on some other periodic or occasional basis, such as monthly, weekly, daily, on occurrence of an event that impacts exchange of messages between a particular sender and receiver (e.g., a software component failure or a change in security preferences), when a previously negotiated arrangement fails, or on some other periodic or occasional basis. The schema SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD, in the source code appendix, describes some inputs to negotiation of security arrangements. The schema SecurityContract.XSD, also in the source code appendix, describes one embodiment of negotiated security arrangements, in a so-called security interoperability contract document (“SCID”). The process flow
FIG. 1 can be used to describe negotiation and implementation of security arrangements. - The schema SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD, in the source code appendix, can be used to validate a plurality input files to negotiation of security arrangements. In this embodiment, the machine-readable input files are XML documents. In other embodiments, other data structures may be used to store the same information, for instance a tree structure modeled after the XML code. The schema SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD is best understood by loading the file into an integrated development environment (IDE) such as XML Spy TM, which provides several alternative views of the schema, including a documentation generation view. Sender and receiver security interoperability contract document information blocks are defined by this schema. Viewed in Spy's schema design view, SecuritySenderReceiverInfo.XSD includes several components that are used to define sender and receiver security information. The CommunitySecurityPolicyPreference component states the community preferences to sign the header, encrypt the credential, and credential preferences. It can be used to specify a default value for a whole community or it could be adapted to specify a default value for a collaboration partner (CP). The SAMsgSecurityPolicy component allows specification of signature and encryption preferences and authentication options. Message exchanged between services may have multiple parts. Signature and encryption policies can be applied to the whole message or individual parts. This approach can readily be extended to applying signature and encryption policies to elements within the parts. The PublicKeys component identifies key records for this CP. The ConnectorCapability component provides routing information to a resource that implements part of the security arrangement, such as a connector name. It includes connector capability parameters such as encryption capability, signature capability, an encryption public key party, and signing public key party. Public key party can be the sender's CP, the receiver's CP, or the owner of the connector, depending on whether signing or encryption is involved. If the public key party is not defined, the key of the message sender can be used for signing and the key of the message receiver can be used for encryption. The SecurityContainer component can be used to carry additional objects that are useful for security. The SendingCPSecurityPolicyProfile component includes the sending CP's available credentials information. The CPSendServicesSecurityPolicy and CPRecvServicesSecurityPolicy component include sets of security policies for the sending and receiving services, respectively. The services preferences and overrides can be defined here.
- The schema SecurityContract.XSD, also in the source code appendix, can be used as a model for preparing a machine-readable security interoperability contract document. In this embodiment, the machine-readable document is an XML document. In other embodiments, other data structures may be used to store the same information, for instance a tree structure modeled after the XML code. This schema defines policies and channels for security policies. A security channel defines resources and routes to resources that carry out security algorithms, such as signature, encryption and authentication algorithms. It also may include non-repudiation and authorization resources.
- The process flow
FIG. 2 can be used to describe negotiation and implementation of security arrangements. In one embodiment, the preferences of the sending and receiving services are maintained in aregistry 201. This registry may be accessible to the sending and receiving services, so that either service can compute security arrangements, or it may be available to a security arrangement computing service that is accessible to one or both of the sending and receiving services. The sending and receiving services may maintain their own registries. Or, a protocol may be developed for the sending and receiving services to exchange their security preferences as part of the negotiation of security arrangements. Aregistry 201 further may maintain information regarding default preferences of a collaboration partner that owns a service or a community to which a collaboration partner belongs, or both. Default preferences may be overridden by service-specific preferences, in general, or certain default preferences may be given precedence over service-specific preferences. Default preferences of collaboration partners may be treated differently than default preferences of the community. Input statements of security arrangement preferences are taken from theregistry 201 or another source and acted upon by a securityarrangements computing service 202. In one embodiment, this computing service is a security contract builder. A set of security arrangements areoutput 203. These arrangements may be confirmed with the sending and receiving services, may be subject to a veto by the sending or receiving service, or may be trusted by the sending and receiving services. The sending service or another service responsive to the sendingservice 205 uses thesecurity arrangements 203 to process thedocument 204 for transmission to thereceiving service 209. In some circumstances, the security arrangements will call for obtaining an assertion from a trustedassertion service 206. For instance, the sending and receiving services may agree to use a SAML service to generate authentication assertions. Thesecurity arrangement 203 would call for generation of a SAML assertion and the sendingservice 205 would obtain a SAML assertion from aSAML server 206. In another embodiment, an electronic notarization might be provided by a trustedservice 206. Banks or security authorities might be trusted to generate authentication assertions, in a function analogous to notarization. In some circumstances, the security arrangements will call for obtaining public keys used in asymmetrical signing or encryption from apublic keys source 208. For instance, the sending and receiving services may agree to use an XKMS service to exchange public keys. Thesecurity arrangement 203 would specify the XKMS service address as the source of public keys. The sendingservice 205 and thereceiving service 209 both would access the agreedkeys source 208. In accordance with thesecurity arrangements 203 the sendingservice 205 communicates thedocument 204 through anetwork 207 to the receivingparty 209. The routing and transport through thenetwork 207 may be part of the security arrangements or, preferably, may be handled by a secure transport infrastructure. Thesecurity arrangements 203 may be provided by thecomputing service 202 to the receivingparty 209 or otherwise made accessible to the receiving party, independent of the message carrying thedocument 204. Alternatively, thesecurity arrangements 203 may be included with thedocument 204 according to a prearranged protocol. For instance, it may be part of the message header or it may be a separate part of the message. The prearranged protocol may call for the message header or message part to be signed and/or encrypted using the parties' respective keys. With this process flow and schemas above in mind, an example from the source code appendix may be explained. - The files SecuritySenderInfo.XML, SecurityReceiverInfo.XML, and ComputeSecurityContract.XML provide an example of sender and receiver preferences and a resulting computed security arrangement. The sender and receiver preferences are stated in XML code conforming to the XML schema explained above. The computed security arrangement is stated in an interoperability security contract document conforming to the SecurityContract.XSD schema in the source code appendix.
- In this example, the sender preferences information includes community preferences and service preferences. The community preferences address security algorithms, preferences to sign the header, encrypt the credential and for selection among available credentials. The community preferences also may rank order the security algorithms or otherwise indicate preference among the security algorithms. A similar set of preferences might be provided for a collaboration partner, either instead of more in addition to preferences for a community. In this example, the community has six sets of signature algorithms options in elements named XMLSignatureAlgorithmTemplate and three sets of encryption algorithms options in elements named XMLEncryptionAlgorithmTemplate. These sets of options are templates. More than one template of options can be provided for a particular algorithm. Use of templates simplifies configuration of options and increases the likelihood consistent option sets will be selected by sending and receiving services. The community in this example prefers not to sign headers or encrypt credentials and accepts basic credentials. In general, a community or a collaboration partner may have preferences for any security arrangement options that the service can select, or the community or collaboration partner may have preferences for only some options. Community preferences in a sender's preference file should correspond to community preferences stated elsewhere, such as in a registry entry for community preferences. The file CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreferences.XML is an example of a file used to record some or all of a community's security preferences.
- The service (sending service in this example) records in SAMsgSecurityPolicy its preferences for handling message parts, for signature and encryption of the message as a whole, and for authentication. Messages may have several parts. Corresponding to a message part, a service may identify the message part and express a preference for signing or not signing or for encrypting or not encrypting a message part. In this embodiment, a preference for a category of algorithm, such as a general algorithm or in XML-specific algorithm can be selected. In other embodiments, the service might not specify a category of algorithm or it might specify a specific algorithm.
- Other arrangements for security are also covered by this example. The receiver's (buyer's) public key, in an X509 format, is use for signature and authentication. Two resources, so-called connectors, are identified for the sending service to use for signing and encryption. The sender's available credentials are identified as basic and X509 credentials. The sending service's security arrangement preferences are rank ordered from one to three under SecurityPolicyTemplatePreference. In this example, the three encryption preferences are all for XML-specific encryption. These and other details of this example are found in the source code appendix file SecuritySenderInfo.XML.
- Receiving party preferences are found in the source code appendix file SecurityReceiverInfo.XML. In general, the elements of the receiving party's preference profile are very similar to those of the sending party, even using the same element types from the schema. Significant differences are found in authentication and authorization, since the logic applicable to authentication and authorization depends on whether you are presenting your credentials or determining whether to accept what is presented. For instance, the SendingCPSecurityProfile of the sending party lists available credentials. This element is not part of the receiving party's preferences. This issue is addressed by the receiving party's CPRecvServicesSecurityPolicy, which identifies AcceptedCredentials.
- In this example, two types of preferences are stated that the security arrangements logic reconciles. One type of preferences is among algorithm templates. The element SecurityPolicyTemplatePreference appears twice in each of the sending and receiving services' preferences, setting forth community and service-specific preferences among algorithms.
FIG. 3 illustrates reconciling preferences among algorithm types.Stacks preference stacks - A set of computed security arrangements for this example appear in ComputeSecurityContract.XML, which is partially reproduced below:
-
<SecurityContractICD ... > <SecurityPolicies> <SignaturePolicies> <XMLDsigPolicy PolicyId=“P-XMLSignatureRSA-MD5-C14N”> <SignaturePolicyAlgorithm>...</SignaturePolicyAlgorithm> <SignatureAlg...>MD5withRSA</SignatureAlg...> <HashFunction>MD5</HashFunction> <Canonical ...>...14n-20001026</Canonical ...> <Transform>...#RoutingSignatureT...</Transform> </XMLDsigPolicy> </SignaturePolicies> <EncryptionPolicies> <XMLEncryptionPolicy PolicyId=“P-XMLEncrypt3DES-RSA- 2048”> <EncryptionPolicyAlgorithm>http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc# </EncryptionPolicyAlgorithm> <EncryptionMethod>http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#3des- cbc</EncryptionMethod> <KeySize>2048</KeySize> <KeyEncryptionMethod>http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa- 1_5</KeyEncryptionMethod> </XMLEncryptionPolicy> </EncryptionPolicies> <EncryptionKeyInfo KeyOwner=“x- ccns:commerceone.com:CollaborationParty::sellParty”> <PublicKeyID>DefaultTestCert</PublicKeyID> <X509Data> <X509Certificate>LS0tLS1... == </X509Certificate> </X509Data> </EncryptionKeyInfo> </SecurityPolicies> <SecurityChannel channelId=“CHANNEL1” sourceConnector=“x- ccns:cup.commerceone.com:connector::centerSell” targetConnector=“x- ccns:cup.commerceone.com:connector::centerSell”> <Confidential AlgorithmId=“P-XMLEncrypt3DES-RSA-2048”> <PublicKeyName KeyOwner=“x- ccns:commerceone.com:CollaborationParty::sellParty”>DefaultTestCert </PublicKeyName> <MessagePart PartName=“Order” isOptional=“false”/> <MessagePart PartName=“Image” isOptional=“false”/> </Confidential> </SecurityChannel> <SecurityChannel channelId=“CHANNEL2” sourceConnector=“x- ccns:cup.commerceone.com:connector::buy” targetConnector=“x- ccns:cup.commerceone.com:connector::sell”> <Integrity AlgorithmId=“P-XMLSignatureRSA-MD5-C14N”> <PublicKeyName KeyOwner=“OwnerA”>BuyerPublicKey</PublicKeyName> <MessagePart PartName=“Order” isOptional=“false”/> </Integrity> </SecurityChannel> </SecurityContractICD>
This set of security arrangements has two major sections for security policy and security channels. In this example, there is one security policy applicable to the entire message and multiple security channels to implement parts of the security policy. The security policy section sets out the signature policy, and encryption policy and encryption key information. It also may set out policies regarding authentication, authorization and non-repudiation of origin or receipt. In this embodiment, the same signature and encryption policy is applied to all parts of the document. In other embodiments, multiple algorithms could be applied to different parts. The algorithm selected for signature, encryption and authentication are abstracted through templates containing options sets, simplifying the selection of algorithms. Selected algorithms are associated with logic and resources, so different services or processes can be used for signing/verifying and encrypting/decrypting different parts of a message. A public key or certificate can be transmitted in the encryption key element of the security policy section. The security channel section describes services or connectors involved in applying security policies. For a particular policy, the channel section identifies a source connector that requires assistance in applying a security policy (e.g., the sending service requesting encryption), and a target connector that applies the security policy or acts as an intermediary to logic and resources that apply the security policy. For a particular security policy, such as signing, encryption, authentication, authorization or non-repudiation, specific information required to carry out the security policy is provided in the security channel section. - The data used to determine security arrangements can be categorized as message and activity related data, CP-service related data, security algorithms related data, routing related data, encryption key related data and configuration data. Some additional detail regarding use of these categories of is described below. Message and activity related data relates to digital signatures, encryption, non-repudiation, and authorization. For non-repudiation, a receiver may require non-repudiation measures for a sender, amounting to a trusted party verification of the sender's message to receiver. Similarly, a sender may require non-repudiation measures for a receiver, amounting to a trusted party verification of receipt of sender's message by the receiver. Beyond the description above, it should be mentioned that signatures and encryption can be applied on an element basis, to particular items of data, if fine granularity is desired. In addition, overrides can be specified for pairs of sending and receiving services. For instance, a pre-existing or proven relationship can be treated differently than an entirely new relationship. Overrides to security policies can be implemented to cautiously reduce (or increase, as warranted) security requirements in particular cases.
- CP-related data includes authentication and authorization data. Authorization is the process of granting or denying access to a network resource. Authorization to access most computer security systems is a two-step process. The first stage is authentication, which ensures that a principal (user, process, application or service) is who it claims to be. The second stage is authorization, which allows the principal access to various resources based on their identity. Authorization is also called access control. Access control is used to authorize access to website resources. It manages information about users, groups of users, and the roles assigned to users. SAML provides an XML-based means to share information about security events (authentication and authorization) and attributes (e.g. credit rating) in a SOAP message. This SAML data can then be sent to a third-party, and this enables ‘distributed trust’, whereby the user signs on once, but can re-use their authentication or authorization details. With SAML or a similar trusted party technology, the issuing authority decides whether to grant the request by subject services or sender, for access type to resource web service, given the evidence provided by the requestor. The authorization decision allows or denies a subject access to a specific resource. SAML is useful option for web services security, but it requires an initial degree of trust and technical resources. In instances when SAML is unavailable or not preferred, other approaches such as ID/password and a table of privileges associated with an ID can be used. The present invention is not limited by the authorization technology used, but extends more abstractly to selection among presently available or hereafter invented technologies. With either SAML authorization or ID/password technologies, the authorization data can be encrypted and built into the message.
- Security algorithms related data includes algorithms and configuration options for signature, encryption and non-repudiation. As the schema illustrates, signature algorithms options (XML or non-XML) may include use of XMLDsig, choice of a Canonicalization algorithm, a signature method and a digest algorithm. Encryption/decryption options (XML or non-XML) may include key size, key and method. Default may be inherited by a service, either overriding the services preferences or being overridden. In addition, specific overrides can be specified for CP pairs, as described above. Option templates, also described above, simplify negotiation of security arrangements. Different options will apply to XML and non-XML algorithms, signature algorithms for example. XML signature algorithms, e.g., XMLDisg, my offer options for method, Canonicalization, transform and digest, while non-XML algorithms, e.g., PCKS#7, may have options for signature and digest methods, only. Use of community standard security templates are preferred, to ensure that there is at least one match between preference lists of the respective services. A community may require all CP's or all services operating in the community to support a particular community standard security option set, to assure that messages can be exchanged within the community.
- Routing related data includes how to access logic and resources that implement authentication/verification, signing/verification, and encryption/decryption. Any type of access information may be used, such as a universal resource name (URN) or universal resource locator (URL). As discussed in one of the prior applications referred to above, a message may take multiple hops through connectors for translation or other value-added services. Accordingly, multiple route steps may be associated with any action. Security typically will need to be reapplied after any translation or other value-added service.
- Encryption key related data is generally discussed above.
- Configuration data includes default (e.g., community or collaboration partner) preferences and credential preferences.
-
FIG. 4 illustrates alternative embodiments for obtaining receiver's information when the sender is local to calculations of the security arrangements. In the figure, local 431 and remote 432 registries are indicated. In this example, the sender is local and the receiver remote. The sender's data is current and complete in thelocal registry 431. The sender's information is collected 421 and made available to the logic and resources that compute thesecurity arrangements 411. The receiver's data may be current and complete, for instance if the receiver is in the same community as the sender and there is a community-wide registry, or if the receiver's information has been recently obtained and locally cached. Depending on where the receiver's information can be found, 431 or 432, aprocess security arrangements 401 result. -
FIG. 5 illustrates one network of program logic and resources that can be used to implement aspects of the present invention. The logic components of this network include: sendside collection 551, receiveside collection 552, data objectmanager 541,routing manager 542,credential negotiator 531,template negotiator 532,connector manager 533,authentication manager 521,policy manager 522, publickey manager 523,algorithm manager 524,policy builder 511,channel builder 512 and security arrangements documentbuilder 501. - One embodiment of program logic operative in a community of collaboration partners to generate security arrangements can be described as follows: Collect the receiver security information, including an attribute assertion to authenticate the sender CP. Collect the sender security information. Look into routing block to find all connectors information to implement security measures. Get capability parameters for each connector. Walk through the routing chain to find which connector-pair to use for authentication, signature, and encryption. Get the recever's service-activity-message object. This may include getting a SAMsgSecurityPolicy object from the receiver. This will have multiple parts and it can have signature and encryption policies for the whole message. It also may include getting a SAMsgSecurityPolicy object from the sender, and match the override options the SAMsgSecurityPolicy object accordingly. (Override decision tables are discussed below.) From the SAMsgSecurityPolicy object, find all algorithms required for this message, and build RequiredAlgorithmList. Get community preference objects for both SenderInfo and ReceiverInfo. This may include getting a CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreference object of the sender, which includes security algorithm templates, and community security policy preferences. It also may include getting a CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreference object of the receiver, if not the same community. If they are in the same community, it may be sufficient to set an object pointer. Get CP-Service objects for both sender and receiver services and get CP objects for corresponding communities. This may include building the CPSecurityPolicyPreference of the sender and receiver. Based on the sender and receiver preferences and the decision rules in a RequiredAlgorithmList, select from the preference lists, and build a RequiredTemplateObjectList. If the services' respective preference list do not match on any algorithm, community defaults may generate a match. Get a ServiceAuthentication object for the receiver service. This will have one or more authentication method specified, including accepted credentials and authentication mode. Match the credential from ServiceAuthentication object and available credentials from CPSecurityPolicyPreference of the sender. If there is more than one match, then get the one that matches CredentialPreference from CPSecurityPolicyPreference of the receiver, or from CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreference corresponding to the receiver. Get the value of SignMessageHeader and EncryptCredential from either the CPSecurityPolicyPreference of the receiver or from CommunitySecurityTemplatesPreference object of the receiver. If no value is specified in either place, set it to a default such as false or true. Using the available sender's credential selected by the receiver, the authentication mode specified in the ServiceAuthentication object for the Receiver the SignMessageHeader Boolean attribute, and the EncryptCredential to build the authentication algorithm. Base on the connector's PublicKeyCapability to get the proper key. This may include getting the encryption key of the sender, if an encryption is required, and getting signature key ID of the receiver, if a signature is required. Get the authentication key ID of the receiver, if an X509 authentication is required. Build the policy section of the security arrangements. Find the connector for the channel section and build the channel section of the security arrangements.
- Decision tables may be used to implement the type of preference reconciliation related to whether to sign or encrypt part of a message. Again, decisions could be biased to accept preference not to sign or to accept the receiver's preference, or just the opposite. Some decision tables that could be used to implement possible decision rules follow:
-
Sender Preference Signature Signature Required Optional No Signature Receiver Signature Sign Sign Error Preference Required Signature Sign Don't Sign Don't Sign Optional No Signature Error Don't Sign Don't Sign -
Sender Encryption Encryption Required Optional No Encryption Receiver Encryption Encrypt Encrypt Error Required Encryption Encrypt Don't Don't Encrypt Optional Encrypt No Encryption Error Don't Don't Encrypt Encrypt -
Sender Signature Signature Required Optional No Signature Receiver Signature Sign Sign Sign Required Signature Sign Don't Sign Don't Sign Optional No Signature Don't Sign Don't Sign Don't Sign -
Sender Encryption Encryption Required Optional No Encryption Receiver Encryption Encrypt Encrypt Encrypt Required Encryption Encrypt Don't Encrypt Don't Encrypt Optional No Don't Don't Encrypt Don't Encrypt Encryption Encrypt - The present invention is readily extended to support signing and encryption at intermediate connectors along a path between a sender and receiver. It is useful to be able to sign and encrypt documents at connectors along a routing path that are not the message originators or final receivers. This may be useful for gateways, routers and central connectors. For gateways, signing and encryption may need to be performed by a gateway if signed/encrypted message data is transformed from one envelope protocol to another. For routers and central connectors, it may be desirable to use a single entry/exit point into the enterprise for external communities. A router or central connector may act as the central security hub and perform or organize security operations on behalf of the entire enterprise. This may simplifies the PKI management and other administrative burdens. This functionality can be configured by setting up the security capabilities of connectors in the enterprise's part of a community. A connector can be configured on an envelope/transport protocol basis to have signing capability or encryption capability and can be linked to signing and encryption capabilities of the collaboration partner at other connectors. In the case of gateways and routers, you could configure the connector to use the key of the CP owner or the gateway/router connector.
- From the preceding description, it will be apparent to those of skill in the art that a wide variety of systems and methods can be constructed from aspects and components of the present invention. One embodiment is a method of dynamically determining security options for exchange of one or more messages between sending and receiving services. This method uses sender and receiver security preferences, which may take the form of machine security profiles for first and second services. The security profiles may identify security options/elements and option subsets that are acceptable to the respective services. The options may include requirements to sign or encrypt one or more parts of the message, signing option subsets corresponding to one or more signing algorithms, encryption option subsets corresponding to one or more encryption algorithms, identification of signing and encryption keys and identification of an authentication algorithm. The dynamic method includes accessing the security profiles and selecting a particular option set that is acceptable to the respective services. Optionally, this option set can be used to communicate a message between the respective services. Several options and aspects of the present invention can be added to this embodiment. Security profiles can be maintained in one or more registries that are accessible to security logic of the first and second services. Default option subsets and/or preferences can be specified in community or collaboration partner security profiles and may be copied into service security profiles. Requirements to sign or encrypt can be applied to the parts of the message or to a message as a whole. Signature and encryption algorithms may be applied to a message as a whole, reducing complexity. Signing and encryption keys may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. Authentication may be carried out by a trusted agent, such as a SAML server, before communicating the message between the respective services. Authentication by a trusted agent may be evidenced by authentication assertion. Alternatively, authentication may include submitting credentials for examination by the receiving service. These credentials may be part of the message or may be transmitted in addition to the message. In addition to authentication, authorization may be addressed by security arrangements. The security profiles may include identification of at least one authorization algorithm to establish a sending service's privileges. This authorization may be implemented by a trusted agent before communicating the message or by submitting credentials to the service receiving the message. A further aspect of the present invention is taken into account preferences of the respective services among option subsets for signing and/or encryption. Preferences of one or both of the services may be taken into account. Any of the decision rules discussed above may be applied, including receiver wins, sender wins, most secure wins, least secure wins or a weighted factoring of both services' preferences. Determination of security arrangements may include determining resources to be used by the respective parties to implement any combination of signatures, encryption, authentication, authorization or non-repudiation. Resources, algorithms and option says may be packaged into security channels. A security channel may implement a single aspect of security.
- While the present invention is disclosed by reference to the preferred embodiments and examples detailed above, it is understood that these examples are intended in an illustrative rather than in a limiting sense. Computer-assisted processing is implicated in the described embodiments. Accordingly, the present invention may be embodied in methods for computer-assisted processing, systems including logic to implement the methods, media impressed with logic to carry out the methods, data streams impressed with logic to carry out the methods, or computer-accessible processing services. It is contemplated that modifications and combinations will readily occur to those skilled in the art, which modifications and combinations will be within the spirit of the invention and the scope of the following claims.
Claims (19)
Priority Applications (8)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US10/246,276 US7444522B1 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2002-09-18 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services |
AU2003263904A AU2003263904B2 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2003-08-19 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services |
JP2004537673A JP2005539453A (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2003-08-19 | Dynamic negotiation of security configuration between web services |
EP03797854A EP1540479A4 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2003-08-19 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services |
CNB038251655A CN100342347C (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2003-08-19 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services |
KR1020057004614A KR100970771B1 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2003-08-19 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services??? ?? |
PCT/US2003/025894 WO2004027618A1 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2003-08-19 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services |
JP2011177761A JP4892640B2 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2011-07-28 | Dynamic negotiation of security configuration between web services |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US10/246,276 US7444522B1 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2002-09-18 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US20080256364A1 true US20080256364A1 (en) | 2008-10-16 |
US7444522B1 US7444522B1 (en) | 2008-10-28 |
Family
ID=32028951
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US10/246,276 Expired - Fee Related US7444522B1 (en) | 2002-09-18 | 2002-09-18 | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7444522B1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1540479A4 (en) |
JP (2) | JP2005539453A (en) |
KR (1) | KR100970771B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN100342347C (en) |
AU (1) | AU2003263904B2 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2004027618A1 (en) |
Cited By (11)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20050120121A1 (en) * | 2001-03-30 | 2005-06-02 | Microsoft Corporation | Service routing and web integration in a distributed, multi-site user authentication system |
US20050204041A1 (en) * | 2004-03-10 | 2005-09-15 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-domain authentication |
US20080141336A1 (en) * | 2006-12-08 | 2008-06-12 | Jochen Haller | Secure execution environments for process models |
US20090012987A1 (en) * | 2007-07-05 | 2009-01-08 | Kaminsky David L | Method and system for delivering role-appropriate policies |
US20090187988A1 (en) * | 2008-01-18 | 2009-07-23 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-network reputation for online services |
US20090204808A1 (en) * | 2002-05-15 | 2009-08-13 | Microsoft Corporation | Session Key Security Protocol |
US7685631B1 (en) | 2003-02-05 | 2010-03-23 | Microsoft Corporation | Authentication of a server by a client to prevent fraudulent user interfaces |
US20100146582A1 (en) * | 2008-12-04 | 2010-06-10 | Dell Products L.P. | Encryption management in an information handling system |
WO2013048828A1 (en) * | 2011-09-30 | 2013-04-04 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Systems and methods for generating schemas that represent multiple data sources |
US8924431B2 (en) | 2011-09-30 | 2014-12-30 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Pluggable domain-specific typing systems and methods of use |
US20160043868A1 (en) * | 2014-08-05 | 2016-02-11 | Frank Oliver Hoffmann | End-to-end tamper protection in presence of cloud integration |
Families Citing this family (19)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7451107B1 (en) * | 2000-01-28 | 2008-11-11 | Supply Chain Connect, Llc | Business-to-business electronic commerce clearinghouse |
US8561161B2 (en) * | 2002-12-31 | 2013-10-15 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and system for authentication in a heterogeneous federated environment |
US20060010251A1 (en) * | 2004-06-16 | 2006-01-12 | Nokia Corporation | Global community naming authority |
JP4455418B2 (en) * | 2005-06-13 | 2010-04-21 | キヤノン株式会社 | Communication parameter setting method and communication apparatus |
US20060294383A1 (en) * | 2005-06-28 | 2006-12-28 | Paula Austel | Secure data communications in web services |
US20070276948A1 (en) * | 2006-05-24 | 2007-11-29 | Sap Ag | System and method for automated configuration and deployment of applications |
US8122500B2 (en) * | 2006-06-23 | 2012-02-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tracking the security enforcement in a grid system |
US20080208806A1 (en) * | 2007-02-28 | 2008-08-28 | Microsoft Corporation | Techniques for a web services data access layer |
US20090099882A1 (en) * | 2007-10-15 | 2009-04-16 | Sap Ag | Enhanced Security Framework for Composite Applications |
US8396806B2 (en) * | 2007-10-30 | 2013-03-12 | Red Hat, Inc. | End user license agreements associated with messages |
US8572691B2 (en) * | 2008-07-17 | 2013-10-29 | International Business Machines Corporation | Selecting a web service from a service registry based on audit and compliance qualities |
CN101325483B (en) * | 2008-07-28 | 2011-06-15 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | Method and apparatus for updating symmetrical cryptographic key, symmetrical ciphering method and symmetrical deciphering method |
US8732094B2 (en) | 2010-07-30 | 2014-05-20 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Enforcement of security requirements for a business model |
JP5490157B2 (en) * | 2012-02-02 | 2014-05-14 | 株式会社エヌ・ティ・ティ・データ | Profile generation apparatus and profile generation method |
JP6066586B2 (en) * | 2012-05-22 | 2017-01-25 | キヤノン株式会社 | Information processing system, control method thereof, and program thereof |
US9009817B1 (en) | 2013-03-12 | 2015-04-14 | Open Invention Network, Llc | Virtual smart card to perform security-critical operations |
US9032505B1 (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2015-05-12 | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | Creating secure connections between distributed computing devices |
US10432592B2 (en) * | 2015-05-10 | 2019-10-01 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Password encryption for hybrid cloud services |
US9471404B1 (en) | 2015-10-07 | 2016-10-18 | International Business Machines Corporation | Enriching API registry using big data analytics |
Citations (15)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5157726A (en) * | 1991-12-19 | 1992-10-20 | Xerox Corporation | Document copy authentication |
US5159630A (en) * | 1991-05-29 | 1992-10-27 | International Communication Systems Corporation | Facsimile message encryption system |
US5557798A (en) * | 1989-07-27 | 1996-09-17 | Tibco, Inc. | Apparatus and method for providing decoupling of data exchange details for providing high performance communication between software processes |
US5784566A (en) * | 1996-01-11 | 1998-07-21 | Oracle Corporation | System and method for negotiating security services and algorithms for communication across a computer network |
US5790677A (en) * | 1995-06-29 | 1998-08-04 | Microsoft Corporation | System and method for secure electronic commerce transactions |
US5935248A (en) * | 1995-10-19 | 1999-08-10 | Fujitsu Limited | Security level control apparatus and method for a network securing communications between parties without presetting the security level |
US6049785A (en) * | 1993-12-16 | 2000-04-11 | Open Market, Inc. | Open network payment system for providing for authentication of payment orders based on a confirmation electronic mail message |
US6148290A (en) * | 1998-09-04 | 2000-11-14 | International Business Machines Corporation | Service contract for managing service systems |
US6226746B1 (en) * | 1998-03-20 | 2001-05-01 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Stack-based system and method to combine security requirements of methods |
US6389533B1 (en) * | 1999-02-05 | 2002-05-14 | Intel Corporation | Anonymity server |
US20030074579A1 (en) * | 2001-10-16 | 2003-04-17 | Microsoft Corporation | Virtual distributed security system |
US20030208505A1 (en) * | 2002-05-03 | 2003-11-06 | Ward Mullins | Dynamic class inheritance and distributed caching with object relational mapping and cartesian model support in a database manipulation and mapping system |
US6671695B2 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2003-12-30 | The Procter & Gamble Company | Dynamic group generation and management |
US6732101B1 (en) * | 2000-06-15 | 2004-05-04 | Zix Corporation | Secure message forwarding system detecting user's preferences including security preferences |
US7219223B1 (en) * | 2002-02-08 | 2007-05-15 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing data from a service to a client based on encryption capabilities of the client |
Family Cites Families (26)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5005200A (en) | 1988-02-12 | 1991-04-02 | Fischer Addison M | Public key/signature cryptosystem with enhanced digital signature certification |
US5311438A (en) | 1992-01-31 | 1994-05-10 | Andersen Consulting | Integrated manufacturing system |
US5224166A (en) | 1992-08-11 | 1993-06-29 | International Business Machines Corporation | System for seamless processing of encrypted and non-encrypted data and instructions |
US5539828A (en) * | 1994-05-31 | 1996-07-23 | Intel Corporation | Apparatus and method for providing secured communications |
US5812669A (en) | 1995-07-19 | 1998-09-22 | Jenkins; Lew | Method and system for providing secure EDI over an open network |
US5757915A (en) * | 1995-08-25 | 1998-05-26 | Intel Corporation | Parameterized hash functions for access control |
US6115744A (en) | 1996-07-30 | 2000-09-05 | Bea Systems, Inc. | Client object API and gateway to enable OLTP via the internet |
US6072942A (en) | 1996-09-18 | 2000-06-06 | Secure Computing Corporation | System and method of electronic mail filtering using interconnected nodes |
US6425119B1 (en) | 1996-10-09 | 2002-07-23 | At&T Corp | Method to produce application oriented languages |
US5941945A (en) | 1997-06-18 | 1999-08-24 | International Business Machines Corporation | Interest-based collaborative framework |
ES2175936T3 (en) * | 1998-01-16 | 2002-11-16 | Macrovision Corp | SYSTEM AND METHOD TO AUTHENTICATE HOMOLOGICAL COMPONENTS. |
US6393442B1 (en) | 1998-05-08 | 2002-05-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | Document format transforations for converting plurality of documents which are consistent with each other |
US6269380B1 (en) | 1998-08-31 | 2001-07-31 | Xerox Corporation | Property based mechanism for flexibility supporting front-end and back-end components having different communication protocols |
US6125391A (en) | 1998-10-16 | 2000-09-26 | Commerce One, Inc. | Market makers using documents for commerce in trading partner networks |
US6463460B1 (en) | 1999-04-23 | 2002-10-08 | The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy | Interactive communication system permitting increased collaboration between users |
FI108373B (en) * | 1998-12-16 | 2002-01-15 | Sonera Smarttrust Oy | Procedures and systems for realizing a digital signature |
US6538673B1 (en) | 1999-08-23 | 2003-03-25 | Divine Technology Ventures | Method for extracting digests, reformatting, and automatic monitoring of structured online documents based on visual programming of document tree navigation and transformation |
US6434628B1 (en) | 1999-08-31 | 2002-08-13 | Accenture Llp | Common interface for handling exception interface name with additional prefix and suffix for handling exceptions in environment services patterns |
AU1450501A (en) | 1999-11-02 | 2001-05-14 | Commerce One Operations Inc | Commerce community schema for the global trading web |
US6636889B1 (en) | 2000-01-04 | 2003-10-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and method for client replication of collaboration space |
DE10024347B4 (en) * | 2000-05-17 | 2007-02-22 | Fujitsu Limited, Kawasaki | Security service layer |
JP2001325172A (en) * | 2000-05-17 | 2001-11-22 | Fujitsu Ltd | Communication setting management system |
GB0027280D0 (en) * | 2000-11-08 | 2000-12-27 | Malcolm Peter | An information management system |
JP2002261839A (en) * | 2001-02-28 | 2002-09-13 | Fujitsu Ltd | System for managing communication security and its program |
JP4390405B2 (en) * | 2001-05-31 | 2009-12-24 | 富士通株式会社 | Computer system, service layer, policy cache function unit, and policy management device |
US20030046583A1 (en) | 2001-08-30 | 2003-03-06 | Honeywell International Inc. | Automated configuration of security software suites |
-
2002
- 2002-09-18 US US10/246,276 patent/US7444522B1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2003
- 2003-08-19 CN CNB038251655A patent/CN100342347C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-08-19 KR KR1020057004614A patent/KR100970771B1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2003-08-19 EP EP03797854A patent/EP1540479A4/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2003-08-19 JP JP2004537673A patent/JP2005539453A/en active Pending
- 2003-08-19 WO PCT/US2003/025894 patent/WO2004027618A1/en active Application Filing
- 2003-08-19 AU AU2003263904A patent/AU2003263904B2/en not_active Ceased
-
2011
- 2011-07-28 JP JP2011177761A patent/JP4892640B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (15)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5557798A (en) * | 1989-07-27 | 1996-09-17 | Tibco, Inc. | Apparatus and method for providing decoupling of data exchange details for providing high performance communication between software processes |
US5159630A (en) * | 1991-05-29 | 1992-10-27 | International Communication Systems Corporation | Facsimile message encryption system |
US5157726A (en) * | 1991-12-19 | 1992-10-20 | Xerox Corporation | Document copy authentication |
US6049785A (en) * | 1993-12-16 | 2000-04-11 | Open Market, Inc. | Open network payment system for providing for authentication of payment orders based on a confirmation electronic mail message |
US5790677A (en) * | 1995-06-29 | 1998-08-04 | Microsoft Corporation | System and method for secure electronic commerce transactions |
US5935248A (en) * | 1995-10-19 | 1999-08-10 | Fujitsu Limited | Security level control apparatus and method for a network securing communications between parties without presetting the security level |
US5784566A (en) * | 1996-01-11 | 1998-07-21 | Oracle Corporation | System and method for negotiating security services and algorithms for communication across a computer network |
US6226746B1 (en) * | 1998-03-20 | 2001-05-01 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Stack-based system and method to combine security requirements of methods |
US6148290A (en) * | 1998-09-04 | 2000-11-14 | International Business Machines Corporation | Service contract for managing service systems |
US6389533B1 (en) * | 1999-02-05 | 2002-05-14 | Intel Corporation | Anonymity server |
US6732101B1 (en) * | 2000-06-15 | 2004-05-04 | Zix Corporation | Secure message forwarding system detecting user's preferences including security preferences |
US6671695B2 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2003-12-30 | The Procter & Gamble Company | Dynamic group generation and management |
US20030074579A1 (en) * | 2001-10-16 | 2003-04-17 | Microsoft Corporation | Virtual distributed security system |
US7219223B1 (en) * | 2002-02-08 | 2007-05-15 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing data from a service to a client based on encryption capabilities of the client |
US20030208505A1 (en) * | 2002-05-03 | 2003-11-06 | Ward Mullins | Dynamic class inheritance and distributed caching with object relational mapping and cartesian model support in a database manipulation and mapping system |
Cited By (26)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20050120121A1 (en) * | 2001-03-30 | 2005-06-02 | Microsoft Corporation | Service routing and web integration in a distributed, multi-site user authentication system |
US7810136B2 (en) | 2001-03-30 | 2010-10-05 | Microsoft Corporation | Service routing and web integration in a distributed, multi-site user authentication system |
US7971240B2 (en) | 2002-05-15 | 2011-06-28 | Microsoft Corporation | Session key security protocol |
US20090204808A1 (en) * | 2002-05-15 | 2009-08-13 | Microsoft Corporation | Session Key Security Protocol |
US7685631B1 (en) | 2003-02-05 | 2010-03-23 | Microsoft Corporation | Authentication of a server by a client to prevent fraudulent user interfaces |
US8776199B2 (en) | 2003-02-05 | 2014-07-08 | Microsoft Corporation | Authentication of a server by a client to prevent fraudulent user interfaces |
US7636941B2 (en) * | 2004-03-10 | 2009-12-22 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-domain authentication |
US8689311B2 (en) | 2004-03-10 | 2014-04-01 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-domain authentication |
US7950055B2 (en) | 2004-03-10 | 2011-05-24 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-domain authentication |
US20050204041A1 (en) * | 2004-03-10 | 2005-09-15 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-domain authentication |
US9111276B2 (en) * | 2006-12-08 | 2015-08-18 | Sap Se | Secure execution environments for process models |
US20080141336A1 (en) * | 2006-12-08 | 2008-06-12 | Jochen Haller | Secure execution environments for process models |
US20090012987A1 (en) * | 2007-07-05 | 2009-01-08 | Kaminsky David L | Method and system for delivering role-appropriate policies |
US8001582B2 (en) | 2008-01-18 | 2011-08-16 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-network reputation for online services |
US8484700B2 (en) | 2008-01-18 | 2013-07-09 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-network reputation for online services |
US20090187988A1 (en) * | 2008-01-18 | 2009-07-23 | Microsoft Corporation | Cross-network reputation for online services |
US20100146582A1 (en) * | 2008-12-04 | 2010-06-10 | Dell Products L.P. | Encryption management in an information handling system |
WO2013048828A1 (en) * | 2011-09-30 | 2013-04-04 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Systems and methods for generating schemas that represent multiple data sources |
US8924431B2 (en) | 2011-09-30 | 2014-12-30 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Pluggable domain-specific typing systems and methods of use |
US9020981B2 (en) | 2011-09-30 | 2015-04-28 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Systems and methods for generating schemas that represent multiple data sources |
US9607018B2 (en) | 2011-09-30 | 2017-03-28 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Pluggable domain-specific typing systems and methods of use |
US9811543B2 (en) | 2011-09-30 | 2017-11-07 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Systems and methods for generating schemas that represent multiple data sources |
US10114879B2 (en) | 2011-09-30 | 2018-10-30 | Comprehend Systems, Inc. | Systems and methods for generating pluggable domain-specific data types |
US10901961B2 (en) | 2011-09-30 | 2021-01-26 | Saama Technologies, Inc. | Systems and methods for generating schemas that represent multiple data sources |
US20160043868A1 (en) * | 2014-08-05 | 2016-02-11 | Frank Oliver Hoffmann | End-to-end tamper protection in presence of cloud integration |
US9906367B2 (en) * | 2014-08-05 | 2018-02-27 | Sap Se | End-to-end tamper protection in presence of cloud integration |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US7444522B1 (en) | 2008-10-28 |
JP2011238289A (en) | 2011-11-24 |
JP4892640B2 (en) | 2012-03-07 |
JP2005539453A (en) | 2005-12-22 |
KR20050057416A (en) | 2005-06-16 |
CN100342347C (en) | 2007-10-10 |
EP1540479A1 (en) | 2005-06-15 |
AU2003263904B2 (en) | 2009-04-23 |
CN1695123A (en) | 2005-11-09 |
EP1540479A4 (en) | 2010-12-08 |
WO2004027618A1 (en) | 2004-04-01 |
AU2003263904A1 (en) | 2004-04-08 |
KR100970771B1 (en) | 2010-07-16 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US7444522B1 (en) | Dynamic negotiation of security arrangements between web services | |
KR101003557B1 (en) | Electronic commerce community networks and intra/inter community secure routing implementation | |
Boritz et al. | Security in XML-based financial reporting services on the Internet | |
US7467399B2 (en) | Context-sensitive confidentiality within federated environments | |
US8719562B2 (en) | Secure service network and user gateway | |
US7949871B2 (en) | Method for creating virtual service connections to provide a secure network | |
US6073242A (en) | Electronic authority server | |
JP2005517348A (en) | A secure electronic messaging system that requires a key search to derive a decryption key | |
EP1540874A2 (en) | Dynamic interoperability contract for web services | |
Chang et al. | Managing security policy in a large distributed web services environment | |
INCIDENTAL et al. | Security in a Web Services World: A Proposed Architecture and Roadmap | |
AU2014203495B2 (en) | Electronic commerce community networks and intra/inter community secure routing implementation | |
AU2012203328B2 (en) | Electronic commerce community networks and intra/inter community secure routing implementation | |
An | Security AND Privacy White Paper | |
Kim et al. | Trusted Information Sharing Model in Collaborative Systems | |
Sharma et al. | Web Services and Interoperability: Security Challenges | |
Sharon Boeyen et al. | Liberty Trust Models Guidelines | |
Venezuela et al. | Liberty ID-WSF Security and Privacy Overview | |
Wesnarat | Identity Management im Liberty Alliance Project |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: COMMERCE ONE OPERATIONS, INC., CALIFORNIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:CHANG, SYMON SZU-YUAN;SANFILIPPO, JOSEPH S.;KASI, JAYARAM RAJAN;AND OTHERS;REEL/FRAME:013615/0470;SIGNING DATES FROM 20021112 TO 20021212 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: JGR ACQUISTION, INC., DELAWARE Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:COMMERCE ONE OPERATIONS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:015494/0720 Effective date: 20041208 Owner name: JGR ACQUISTION, INC.,DELAWARE Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:COMMERCE ONE OPERATIONS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:015494/0720 Effective date: 20041208 Owner name: JGR ACQUISITION, INC., DELAWARE Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:COMMERCE ONE OPERATIONS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:015494/0720 Effective date: 20041208 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, LLC, NEW YORK Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:JGR ACQUISITION, INC.;REEL/FRAME:017519/0977 Effective date: 20051114 Owner name: OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, LLC,NEW YORK Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:JGR ACQUISITION, INC.;REEL/FRAME:017519/0977 Effective date: 20051114 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: WELLS FARGO FOOTHILL, INC., AS AGENT, MASSACHUSETT Free format text: PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNORS:PERFECT COMMERCE, INC.;PERFECT COMMERCE OPERATIONS, INC.;COMMERCE ONE, LLC;AND OTHERS;REEL/FRAME:017468/0615 Effective date: 20060331 Owner name: WELLS FARGO FOOTHILL, INC., AS AGENT,MASSACHUSETTS Free format text: PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNORS:PERFECT COMMERCE, INC.;PERFECT COMMERCE OPERATIONS, INC.;COMMERCE ONE, LLC;AND OTHERS;REEL/FRAME:017468/0615 Effective date: 20060331 |
|
STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
FPAY | Fee payment |
Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
FPAY | Fee payment |
Year of fee payment: 8 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: PERFECT COMMERCE HOLDINGS, LLC, VIRGINIA Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:CORMINE, LLC;REEL/FRAME:042446/0156 Effective date: 20091215 Owner name: CORMINE, LLC, VIRGINIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:WELLS FARGO FOOTHILL, INC.;REEL/FRAME:042446/0085 Effective date: 20070727 |
|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: MAINTENANCE FEE REMINDER MAILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: REM.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
LAPS | Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
STCH | Information on status: patent discontinuation |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEES UNDER 37 CFR 1.362 |
|
FP | Lapsed due to failure to pay maintenance fee |
Effective date: 20201028 |