New! View global litigation for patent families

US20070245421A1 - Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability server - Google Patents

Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability server Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20070245421A1
US20070245421A1 US11759040 US75904007A US2007245421A1 US 20070245421 A1 US20070245421 A1 US 20070245421A1 US 11759040 US11759040 US 11759040 US 75904007 A US75904007 A US 75904007A US 2007245421 A1 US2007245421 A1 US 2007245421A1
Authority
US
Grant status
Application
Patent type
Prior art keywords
vulnerability
scanner
system
data
processing
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
US11759040
Other versions
US7793348B2 (en )
Inventor
Charles Lingafelt
Nigel Yell
Original Assignee
Lingafelt Charles S
Yell Nigel B
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1433Vulnerability analysis

Abstract

Method and apparatus for protecting a data processing system such as an Internet server from attack by a vandal who uses an offensive vulnerability scanner to find an externally visible vulnerability of the data processing system. The method includes determining an externally visible vulnerability using a defensive vulnerability scanner, configuring an intrusion detection system to detect a network flow associated with the vulnerability, and blocking that flow by a firewall or a router. The apparatus includes a defensive vulnerability scanner that finds an externally visible vulnerability and provides a description of the vulnerability, an intrusion detection system that detects a network flow that satisfies the description, and a firewall or a router that blocks the flow responsive to detection of the flow by the intrusion detection system.

Description

  • [0001]
    This application is a Divisional of Ser. No. 09/968,057, filed Oct. 1, 2001.
  • FIELD OF THE INVENTION
  • [0002]
    The present invention applies generally to the field of data processing security, and more particularly to method and apparatus for protecting a data processing system such as an Internet server from attack by vandals who find vulnerabilities in data processing systems by using vulnerability scanners.
  • BACKGROUND
  • [0003]
    As data processing activities become ever more important to our society, the reward for subverting these activities evidently grows proportionally in the mind of vandals who are both technically proficient and socially dysfunctional. Although the number of such vandals is relatively small, they do untold damage by spreading computer viruses, altering records, obliterating patiently collected databases, and so forth.
  • [0004]
    As a result, a number of useful tools have been developed to combat electronic vandalism. A recent advance by toolmakers is their development of vulnerability scanners. Vulnerability scanners probe a data processing system such as a host computer or an Internet server to uncover externally visible vulnerabilities, i.e., security vulnerabilities that can be detected and therefore exploited by someone interacting with the data processing system from the outside.
  • [0005]
    Scanners probe according to known vulnerabilities, for example those listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list sponsored by MITRE Corporation. Known vulnerabilities may include server misconfigurations, buffer-overflow problems that make operating systems vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, insecurities that cause operating systems to respond to vandals' prodding in ways that subtly identify the operating system's release level and thereby reveal its entire spectrum of vulnerabilities, and so forth.
  • [0006]
    When the vulnerability scanner determines that a data processing system has a particular vulnerability, the scanner reports that vulnerability to an administrator. Once so informed by the vulnerability scanner, the administrator may take preventive action, for example by installing an operating-system patch, by reconfiguring an improperly configured server, and so forth. Thus the information provided by the vulnerability scanner is invaluable in ferreting out externally visible vulnerabilities, so that they may be eliminated. Nevertheless, the data processing system continues to be at risk until the administrator actually takes the required action to eliminate the externally visible vulnerability.
  • [0007]
    Unfortunately, a vandal as well as an administrator may exploit the power of a vulnerability scanner to ferret out weakness in a data processing system. For example, the vandal may use the same scanner as that used by the administrator, identify exactly the same externally visible vulnerability as that identified by the administrator, and with benefit of this knowledge attack the data processing system on its weakest front. Because of the scanner's power to find externally visible vulnerabilities, the vandal's attack is highly likely to succeed if it is launched before the administrator acts to eliminate the vulnerability.
  • [0008]
    So, in a logical sense, tool makers and vandals play a game: an advance of one camp is countered by an advance of the other. Here, the toolmaker's legitimate advance—the vulnerability scanner—plays as well into the illegitimate hands of the vandal. Consequently, there is a need to protect a data processing system such as an Internet network server from attacks by vandals who use vulnerability scanners to identify the data processing system's externally visible vulnerabilities.
  • SUMMARY
  • [0009]
    The present invention protects a data processing system such as an Internet server from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner to find the data processing system's externally visible vulnerabilities and tailors the attack to exploit these vulnerabilities.
  • [0010]
    One embodiment of the invention is a method. The inventive method includes the steps of determining an externally visible vulnerability using a vulnerability scanner, configuring an observation engine such as an intrusion detection system to detect an inbound network flow that exploits the externally visible vulnerability, and, when such a network flow is detected by the observation engine, blocking that flow by a blocker such as a firewall or a router. Another embodiment of the invention is apparatus for protecting a data processing system such as an Internet server from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner. The inventive apparatus includes a vulnerability scanner that finds an externally visible vulnerability of the data processing system and provides a description of the vulnerability in terms of a network flow, which may be the flow used by the vulnerability scanner to detect the vulnerability; an observation engine such as an intrusion detection system that detects an inbound network flow that satisfies the description of the vulnerability; and a blocker such as a firewall or a router that blocks the network flow that satisfies the description of the vulnerability, responsive to detection of the flow by the observation engine.
  • [0011]
    Thus the present invention uses the power of a vulnerability scanner proactively to thwart a vandal's attempt to intrude upon a data processing system, rather than limit the use of the vulnerability scanner to calling an administrator's attention to a need to install a software patch or the like. As a result, the present invention closes the vandal's window of opportunity to exploit an externally visible vulnerability before the administrator upgrades the data processing system. These and other aspects of the invention will be more fully appreciated when considered in light of the following detailed description and drawings.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • [0012]
    FIG. 1, which is a block diagram, illustrates aspects of the structure of an exemplary embodiment of the invention.
  • [0013]
    FIG. 2, which is a flowchart, illustrates aspects of the operation of an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • [0014]
    The present invention enlists the power of a defensive vulnerability scanner to combat a vandal who himself uses an offensive vulnerability scanner to tailor a malicious attack upon a data processing system. According to the present invention, a defensive vulnerability scanner finds an externally visible vulnerability of the data processing system, and describes a network flow associated with the vulnerability to an observation engine such as an intrusion detection system. When the observation engine detects an incoming instance of the flow described by the vulnerability scanner, the observation engine instructs a blocker such as a firewall or a router to block the flow, thereby preventing the flow from reaching the protected data processing system.
  • [0015]
    FIG. 1 is a block diagram that shows aspects of the structure of an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. In FIG. 1, a vandal 100 attempts to attack a protected data processing system 110 through the Internet 120 or other communication network. The protected data processing system 110 may include an Internet web server or other data processing equipment.
  • [0016]
    In order to make his attack as effective as possible, the vandal 100 may attempt to discover weaknesses in the data processing system 110 by using his own vulnerability scanner (not shown), called here an “offensive” vulnerability scanner in recognition of its use by the vandal 100. Weaknesses found by the vandal 100 in this manner are called here “externally visible vulnerabilities.” The present invention includes no requirement, however, that the vandal 100 actually find vulnerabilities of the data processing system in this manner, and the term “externally visible vulnerabilities” includes all vulnerabilities of the data processing system 110 that could have been found in practice or in principle by the vandal 100 using an offensive vulnerability scanner. For example, the vandal 100 might have prior knowledge of a particular externally visible vulnerability, and tailor an attack accordingly, without actually probing the data processing system 110 with an offensive vulnerability scanner.
  • [0017]
    The data processing system 110 is protected from the vandal 100 by protective equipment that includes a defensive vulnerability scanner 130 (as a convenience, the descriptor “defensive” is now dropped). In general, there are two kinds of vulnerability scanners, network scanners and host scanners; the vulnerability scanner 130 may be of either kind, or may include attributes of both. An example of a network vulnerability scanner is the Cisco Secure Scanner™ of Cisco Systems, San Jose, Calif. (http://www.cisco.com); an example of a host vulnerability scanner is the Enterprise Security Manager™ of Symantec Corporation (formerly Axent), Cupertino, Calif. (http://www.symantec.com). Mention here of the Cisco and Symantec products is, of course, illustrative rather than limiting. In the future there may be application scanners also, and the present invention is intended to encompass these as well as network scanners and host scanners.
  • [0018]
    The vulnerability scanner 130 probes the data processing system 110 according to known externally visible vulnerabilities, for example vulnerabilities included in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list sponsored by MITRE Corporation, looking for weakness. To do so, the vulnerability scanner 130 may draw upon a vulnerabilities database accessed through the Internet 120. Because the vulnerabilities database may be updated frequently, the vulnerability scanner 130 may have state-of-the-art knowledge.
  • [0019]
    Output from the vulnerability scanner 130 may serve as input to an observation engine 140. The observation engine 140 may be an intrusion detection system, a sniffer, a passive flow monitor, or the like. Input to the observation engine 140 describes network flows determined by the vulnerability scanner 130 to be associated with weaknesses of the data processing system 110. These flows may be a subset of the flows used by the vulnerability scanner 130 to probe the data processing system 110. For example, the vulnerability scanner 130 might report the following:
  • [0020]
    01.02.03.04: (medium) (HTTP/8080/TCP) Server accepts the dot-dotURL “/../../../../../../etc/password”
  • [0021]
    This exemplary report describes a network flow associated with an externally visible vulnerability of medium importance, at destination address 01.02.03.04, using TCP protocol, port 8080, HTTP flow with a text string “/../../../../../../etc/password”. In other cases, input to the observation engine 140 may be mapped from output of the vulnerability scanner 130, according to known characteristics of the particular externally visible vulnerability, for example according to information provided by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list mentioned earlier. Output of the observation engine 140 may serve as input to a blocker 150. The blocker 150 may be a firewall, a router, software executed by the data processing system 110, a load balancer, or the like. The blocker 150 may, as needed, block or filter flows from the Internet 120 that would otherwise reach the data processing system 110.
  • [0022]
    FIG. 2 is a flowchart that describes aspects of the operation of an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, and is suitable for describing aspects of the operation of the exemplary structure shown in FIG. 1. As shown in FIG. 2, the vulnerability scanner 130 scans the data processing system 110, probing for externally visible vulnerabilities (step 200). If no externally visible vulnerabilities are found, the vulnerability scanner 130 continues to probe at appropriate intervals (step 200).
  • [0023]
    Otherwise (i.e., an externally visible vulnerability is found), the vulnerability engine 130 provides, to the observation engine 140, a description of a network flow that is associated with the externally visible vulnerability (step 210). The description may be, for example, the network flow used by the vulnerability scanner 130 to reveal the externally visible vulnerability. The observation engine 140 monitors inbound network flows (i.e., flows from the Internet 120 to the data processing system 1 10) that are addressed to the data processing system 110, awaiting arrival of an instance of a flow that satisfies the description provided by the vulnerability scanner 130 of the network flow associated with the externally visible vulnerability (step 220). When an instance of the flow associated with the externally visible vulnerability arrives, the observation engine 140 instructs the blocker 150 to block the flow associated with the externally visible vulnerability (step 230). In response, the blocker 150 institutes the required block (step 240), thereby preventing the flow associated with the externally visible vulnerability from reaching the data processing system 110.
  • [0024]
    A determination is made by the observation engine 140 or by other logic (for example, logic in the blocker 150, or in the vulnerability scanner 130, or in the data processing system 110) whether any earlier-instituted blocks should be lifted (step 250). An earlier-instituted block may be lifted, for example, after expiration of a prescribed interval of time following the last known arrival of the blocked flow, or after an appropriate software patch or upgrade has been installed. If an earlier-instituted block should be lifted, the earlier-instituted block is lifted (step 260). Following the lifting of the earlier-instituted block (step 260), or in the case where no earlier-instituted block is ready to be lifted, the observation engine 140 continues to scan the data processing system 110, probing for externally visible vulnerabilities (step 200).
  • [0025]
    Otherwise (i.e., absent the arrival of a flow associated with an externally visible vulnerability, which in FIG. 2 is the negative logical branch that follows step 220), a determination is made whether any earlier-instituted blocks should be lifted as described above (step 250), and the method continues as described above according to the outcome of this determination.
  • [0026]
    From the foregoing description, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the present invention provides method and apparatus for protecting a data processing system, such as an Internet server, from a malicious attack launched by a vandal who uses information provided by his own offensive vulnerability scanner to optimize the attack. The foregoing description is illustrative rather than limiting, however, and the present invention is limited only by the following claims.

Claims (23)

  1. 1. A method for protecting a data processing system against attack by a vandal, the method comprising the steps of:
    determining, by a vulnerability scanner, a first externally visible vulnerability of the data processing system, said first externally visible vulnerability being on a list, said list appearing in a database accessed by the vulnerability scanner;
    providing, by the vulnerability scanner to an observation engine, a description of a first instance of a network flow to the data processing system such that the first instance of the network flow is associated with the first externally visible vulnerability;
    detecting, by the observation engine, the first instance of the network flow satisfying said description;
    instructing, by the observation engine, a blocker to block the detected first instance of the network flow, said instructing being in response to said detecting; and
    blocking, by the blocker, the first instance of the network flow, said blocking being in response to said instructing.
  2. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the vulnerability scanner accesses the list in the database through the Internet.
  3. 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the vulnerability scanner is a network vulnerability scanner.
  4. 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the vulnerability scanner is a host vulnerability scanner.
  5. 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the vulnerability scanner is an application vulnerability scanner.
  6. 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the observation engine is an intrusion detection system.
  7. 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of blocking is performed by a firewall.
  8. 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of blocking is performed by a router.
  9. 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of blocking is performed by a load balancer.
  10. 10. The method of claim 1,
    wherein the step of providing said description is performed after the step of determining the first externally visible vulnerability is performed,
    wherein the step of detecting is performed after the step of providing said description is performed,
    wherein the step of instructing is performed after the step of detecting is performed, and
    wherein the step of blocking is performed after the step of instructing is performed.
  11. 11. Apparatus for protecting a data processing system against attack by a vandal, the apparatus comprising:
    a vulnerability scanner for determining a first externally visible vulnerability of the data processing system and for providing to an observation engine a description of a first instance of a network flow to the data processing system such that the first instance of the network flow is associated with the first externally visible vulnerability, said first externally visible vulnerability being on a list, said list appearing in a database;
    the observation engine for detecting the first instance of the network flow satisfying said description and for instructing a blocker to block the detected first instance of the network flow, said instructing being in response to said detecting; and
    the blocker for blocking the detected first instance of the network flow, said blocking being in response to said instructing.
  12. 12. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the vulnerability scanner accesses the list in the database through the Internet.
  13. 13. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the vulnerability scanner is a network vulnerability scanner.
  14. 14. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the vulnerability scanner is a host vulnerability scanner.
  15. 15. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the vulnerability scanner is an application vulnerability scanner.
  16. 16. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the observation engine is an intrusion detection system.
  17. 17. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the blocker is a firewall.
  18. 18. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the blocker is a router.
  19. 19. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the step of blocking is performed by a load balancer.
  20. 20. The apparatus of claim 11,
    wherein the vulnerability scanner provides said description to the observation engine after the vulnerability scanner determines the first externally visible vulnerability,
    wherein the observation engine detects the first instance of the network flow satisfying said description after the vulnerability scanner provides said description to the observation engine,
    wherein the observation engine instructs the blocker to block the detected first instance of the network flow after the observation engine detects the first instance of the network flow satisfying said description, and
    wherein the blocker blocks the detected first instance of the network flow after the observation engine instructs the blocker to block the detected first instance of the network flow.
  21. 21. Apparatus for protecting a data processing system against attack by a vandal, the apparatus comprising:
    a vulnerability scanner for determining a first externally visible vulnerability of the data processing system and for providing to an observation engine a description of a first instance of a network flow to the data processing system such that the first instance of the network flow is associated with the first externally visible vulnerability, said first externally visible vulnerability being on a list, said list appearing in a database;
    the observation engine for detecting the first instance of the network flow satisfying said description and for instructing a blocker to block the detected first instance of the network flow, said instructing being in response to said detecting; and
    the blocker for blocking the detected first instance of the network flow, said blocking being in response to said instructing,
    wherein the observation engine is adapted to lift a blocking of a earlier-blocked instance of the network flow, wherein the earlier-blocked instance of the network flow had been blocked due to having satisfied a description of the earlier-blocked instance provided by the vulnerability scanner responsive to the vulnerability scanner having determined a second externally visible vulnerability of the data processing system such that the earlier-blocked instance of the network flow is associated with the second externally visible vulnerability, and wherein the second externally visible vulnerability is on the list.
  22. 22. The apparatus of claim 21, wherein the observation engine is adapted to lift the blocking of the earlier-blocked instance in response to an elapse of a specified interval of time following a last known arrival of the earlier-blocked instance at the data processing system.
  23. 23. The apparatus of claim 21, wherein the observation engine is adapted to lift the blocking of the earlier-blocked instance in response to an installation of a software patch or upgrade in the data processing system in relation to the earlier externally visible vulnerability.
US11759040 2001-10-01 2007-06-06 Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner Expired - Fee Related US7793348B2 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US09968057 US7278161B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2001-10-01 Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner
US11759040 US7793348B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2007-06-06 Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11759040 US7793348B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2007-06-06 Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20070245421A1 true true US20070245421A1 (en) 2007-10-18
US7793348B2 US7793348B2 (en) 2010-09-07

Family

ID=25513663

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09968057 Active 2024-09-26 US7278161B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2001-10-01 Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner
US11759040 Expired - Fee Related US7793348B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2007-06-06 Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09968057 Active 2024-09-26 US7278161B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2001-10-01 Protecting a data processing system from attack by a vandal who uses a vulnerability scanner

Country Status (1)

Country Link
US (2) US7278161B2 (en)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20100251375A1 (en) * 2009-03-24 2010-09-30 G2, Inc. Method and apparatus for minimizing network vulnerability

Families Citing this family (40)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6546493B1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2003-04-08 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. System, method and computer program product for risk assessment scanning based on detected anomalous events
US7392545B1 (en) * 2002-01-18 2008-06-24 Cigital, Inc. Systems and methods for detecting software security vulnerabilities
CA2372034A1 (en) * 2002-02-14 2003-08-14 Cloakware Corporation Foiling buffer-overflow and alien-code attacks by encoding
US9350752B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2016-05-24 Securityprofiling, Llc Anti-vulnerability system, method, and computer program product
US9118709B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2015-08-25 Securityprofiling, Llc Anti-vulnerability system, method, and computer program product
US20070113272A2 (en) 2003-07-01 2007-05-17 Securityprofiling, Inc. Real-time vulnerability monitoring
US9118708B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2015-08-25 Securityprofiling, Llc Multi-path remediation
US9118711B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2015-08-25 Securityprofiling, Llc Anti-vulnerability system, method, and computer program product
US9100431B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2015-08-04 Securityprofiling, Llc Computer program product and apparatus for multi-path remediation
US8984644B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2015-03-17 Securityprofiling, Llc Anti-vulnerability system, method, and computer program product
US9118710B2 (en) 2003-07-01 2015-08-25 Securityprofiling, Llc System, method, and computer program product for reporting an occurrence in different manners
US20060018478A1 (en) * 2004-07-23 2006-01-26 Diefenderfer Kristopher G Secure communication protocol
US8171555B2 (en) * 2004-07-23 2012-05-01 Fortinet, Inc. Determining technology-appropriate remediation for vulnerability
US7774848B2 (en) * 2004-07-23 2010-08-10 Fortinet, Inc. Mapping remediation to plurality of vulnerabilities
US7703137B2 (en) * 2004-09-03 2010-04-20 Fortinet, Inc. Centralized data transformation
US7672948B2 (en) * 2004-09-03 2010-03-02 Fortinet, Inc. Centralized data transformation
US7665119B2 (en) * 2004-09-03 2010-02-16 Secure Elements, Inc. Policy-based selection of remediation
US7761920B2 (en) * 2004-09-03 2010-07-20 Fortinet, Inc. Data structure for policy-based remediation selection
EP1851666A1 (en) * 2005-02-02 2007-11-07 Universitetet I Oslo Intrusion detection for computer programs
US7574741B2 (en) * 2005-04-20 2009-08-11 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and system for preventing operating system detection
US7856661B1 (en) 2005-07-14 2010-12-21 Mcafee, Inc. Classification of software on networked systems
US8713686B2 (en) * 2006-01-25 2014-04-29 Ca, Inc. System and method for reducing antivirus false positives
US7757269B1 (en) 2006-02-02 2010-07-13 Mcafee, Inc. Enforcing alignment of approved changes and deployed changes in the software change life-cycle
US7895573B1 (en) 2006-03-27 2011-02-22 Mcafee, Inc. Execution environment file inventory
US8332929B1 (en) 2007-01-10 2012-12-11 Mcafee, Inc. Method and apparatus for process enforced configuration management
US9424154B2 (en) 2007-01-10 2016-08-23 Mcafee, Inc. Method of and system for computer system state checks
US8959647B2 (en) * 2007-02-27 2015-02-17 Microsoft Corporation Runtime security and exception handler protection
US8024801B2 (en) * 2007-08-22 2011-09-20 Agere Systems Inc. Networked computer system with reduced vulnerability to directed attacks
US7962961B1 (en) * 2007-12-13 2011-06-14 Symantec Corporation Responding to detected application vulnerability exploits
US8381284B2 (en) 2009-08-21 2013-02-19 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for enforcing security policies in a virtual environment
US8938800B2 (en) 2010-07-28 2015-01-20 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for network level protection against malicious software
US8925101B2 (en) 2010-07-28 2014-12-30 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for local protection against malicious software
US9112830B2 (en) 2011-02-23 2015-08-18 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for interlocking a host and a gateway
US9594881B2 (en) 2011-09-09 2017-03-14 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for passive threat detection using virtual memory inspection
US8713668B2 (en) 2011-10-17 2014-04-29 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for redirected firewall discovery in a network environment
US8800024B2 (en) 2011-10-17 2014-08-05 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for host-initiated firewall discovery in a network environment
US8739272B1 (en) 2012-04-02 2014-05-27 Mcafee, Inc. System and method for interlocking a host and a gateway
US8964260B2 (en) * 2012-10-17 2015-02-24 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method of controlling scan speed of scanner including automatic document feeder and scanner performing the same
US8973146B2 (en) 2012-12-27 2015-03-03 Mcafee, Inc. Herd based scan avoidance system in a network environment
CN105580023A (en) 2013-10-24 2016-05-11 迈克菲股份有限公司 Agent assisted malicious application blocking in a network environment

Citations (19)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5892903A (en) * 1996-09-12 1999-04-06 Internet Security Systems, Inc. Method and apparatus for detecting and identifying security vulnerabilities in an open network computer communication system
US5898836A (en) * 1997-01-14 1999-04-27 Netmind Services, Inc. Change-detection tool indicating degree and location of change of internet documents by comparison of cyclic-redundancy-check(CRC) signatures
US5931946A (en) * 1996-02-08 1999-08-03 Hitachi, Ltd. Network system having external/internal audit system for computer security
US5978842A (en) * 1997-01-14 1999-11-02 Netmind Technologies, Inc. Distributed-client change-detection tool with change-detection augmented by multiple clients
US6012087A (en) * 1997-01-14 2000-01-04 Netmind Technologies, Inc. Unique-change detection of dynamic web pages using history tables of signatures
US6148339A (en) * 1997-04-09 2000-11-14 Nec Corporation Health check system in network control system utilizing CORBA's event service
US6163844A (en) * 1997-03-06 2000-12-19 Software And Systems Engineering Limited Method for granting accesses to information in a distributed computer system
US6298445B1 (en) * 1998-04-30 2001-10-02 Netect, Ltd. Computer security
US6301668B1 (en) * 1998-12-29 2001-10-09 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and system for adaptive network security using network vulnerability assessment
US6304975B1 (en) * 1996-10-07 2001-10-16 Peter M. Shipley Intelligent network security device and method
US20020069356A1 (en) * 2000-06-12 2002-06-06 Kwang Tae Kim Integrated security gateway apparatus
US20020073337A1 (en) * 2000-08-30 2002-06-13 Anthony Ioele Method and system for internet hosting and security
US6550012B1 (en) * 1998-12-11 2003-04-15 Network Associates, Inc. Active firewall system and methodology
US6611869B1 (en) * 1999-10-28 2003-08-26 Networks Associates, Inc. System and method for providing trustworthy network security concern communication in an active security management environment
US6725377B1 (en) * 1999-03-12 2004-04-20 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. Method and system for updating anti-intrusion software
US6883033B2 (en) * 2001-02-20 2005-04-19 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for regulating incoming traffic to a server farm
US6892237B1 (en) * 2000-03-28 2005-05-10 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for high-speed parsing of network messages
US6931452B1 (en) * 1999-03-30 2005-08-16 International Business Machines Corporation Router monitoring
US7020783B2 (en) * 2000-04-17 2006-03-28 Circadence Corporation Method and system for overcoming denial of service attacks

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6317787B1 (en) 1998-08-11 2001-11-13 Webtrends Corporation System and method for analyzing web-server log files
US6631512B1 (en) 1999-01-15 2003-10-07 Gillis E Onyeabor Method and system for database-driven, scalable web page development, deployment-download, and execution

Patent Citations (19)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5931946A (en) * 1996-02-08 1999-08-03 Hitachi, Ltd. Network system having external/internal audit system for computer security
US5892903A (en) * 1996-09-12 1999-04-06 Internet Security Systems, Inc. Method and apparatus for detecting and identifying security vulnerabilities in an open network computer communication system
US6304975B1 (en) * 1996-10-07 2001-10-16 Peter M. Shipley Intelligent network security device and method
US5898836A (en) * 1997-01-14 1999-04-27 Netmind Services, Inc. Change-detection tool indicating degree and location of change of internet documents by comparison of cyclic-redundancy-check(CRC) signatures
US6012087A (en) * 1997-01-14 2000-01-04 Netmind Technologies, Inc. Unique-change detection of dynamic web pages using history tables of signatures
US5978842A (en) * 1997-01-14 1999-11-02 Netmind Technologies, Inc. Distributed-client change-detection tool with change-detection augmented by multiple clients
US6163844A (en) * 1997-03-06 2000-12-19 Software And Systems Engineering Limited Method for granting accesses to information in a distributed computer system
US6148339A (en) * 1997-04-09 2000-11-14 Nec Corporation Health check system in network control system utilizing CORBA's event service
US6298445B1 (en) * 1998-04-30 2001-10-02 Netect, Ltd. Computer security
US6550012B1 (en) * 1998-12-11 2003-04-15 Network Associates, Inc. Active firewall system and methodology
US6301668B1 (en) * 1998-12-29 2001-10-09 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and system for adaptive network security using network vulnerability assessment
US6725377B1 (en) * 1999-03-12 2004-04-20 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. Method and system for updating anti-intrusion software
US6931452B1 (en) * 1999-03-30 2005-08-16 International Business Machines Corporation Router monitoring
US6611869B1 (en) * 1999-10-28 2003-08-26 Networks Associates, Inc. System and method for providing trustworthy network security concern communication in an active security management environment
US6892237B1 (en) * 2000-03-28 2005-05-10 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for high-speed parsing of network messages
US7020783B2 (en) * 2000-04-17 2006-03-28 Circadence Corporation Method and system for overcoming denial of service attacks
US20020069356A1 (en) * 2000-06-12 2002-06-06 Kwang Tae Kim Integrated security gateway apparatus
US20020073337A1 (en) * 2000-08-30 2002-06-13 Anthony Ioele Method and system for internet hosting and security
US6883033B2 (en) * 2001-02-20 2005-04-19 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for regulating incoming traffic to a server farm

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20100251375A1 (en) * 2009-03-24 2010-09-30 G2, Inc. Method and apparatus for minimizing network vulnerability

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date Type
US7793348B2 (en) 2010-09-07 grant
US20030065945A1 (en) 2003-04-03 application
US7278161B2 (en) 2007-10-02 grant

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Levine et al. The use of honeynets to detect exploited systems across large enterprise networks
US5896499A (en) Embedded security processor
US7596807B2 (en) Method and system for reducing scope of self-propagating attack code in network
US7237264B1 (en) System and method for preventing network misuse
US7509675B2 (en) Non-invasive monitoring of the effectiveness of electronic security services
US20060242703A1 (en) Method and system for detecting unauthorized use of a communication network
US20090222907A1 (en) Data and a computer system protecting method and device
US20030212910A1 (en) Method and system for reducing the false alarm rate of network intrusion detection systems
US20020104017A1 (en) Firewall system for protecting network elements connected to a public network
US7386888B2 (en) Network isolation techniques suitable for virus protection
US7506360B1 (en) Tracking communication for determining device states
US20060031940A1 (en) System and method for protecting a computer system from malicious software
US20030101353A1 (en) Method, computer-readable medium, and node for detecting exploits based on an inbound signature of the exploit and an outbound signature in response thereto
US20060010485A1 (en) Network security method
US20070199060A1 (en) System and method for providing network security to mobile devices
US20030110394A1 (en) System and method for detecting and eliminating IP spoofing in a data transmission network
US20050278777A1 (en) Method and system for enforcing secure network connection
US20080295173A1 (en) Pattern-based network defense mechanism
US6363489B1 (en) Method for automatic intrusion detection and deflection in a network
US20030188190A1 (en) System and method of intrusion detection employing broad-scope monitoring
US7814542B1 (en) Network connection detection and throttling
US6405318B1 (en) Intrusion detection system
US7845007B1 (en) Method and system for intrusion detection in a computer network
US8539582B1 (en) Malware containment and security analysis on connection
US6957348B1 (en) Interoperability of vulnerability and intrusion detection systems

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
REMI Maintenance fee reminder mailed
LAPS Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees
FP Expired due to failure to pay maintenance fee

Effective date: 20140907