US20070180240A1 - Data security system for a database - Google Patents

Data security system for a database Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20070180240A1
US20070180240A1 US11603967 US60396706A US2007180240A1 US 20070180240 A1 US20070180240 A1 US 20070180240A1 US 11603967 US11603967 US 11603967 US 60396706 A US60396706 A US 60396706A US 2007180240 A1 US2007180240 A1 US 2007180240A1
Authority
US
Grant status
Application
Patent type
Prior art keywords
data
element
protection
information
method
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US11603967
Inventor
Ulf Dahl
Original Assignee
Ulf Dahl
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/62Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/62Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/62Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6227Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/088Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/007Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2141Access rights, e.g. capability lists, access control lists, access tables, access matrices
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2149Restricted operating environment
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC
    • Y10STECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10S707/00Data processing: database and file management or data structures
    • Y10S707/99931Database or file accessing
    • Y10S707/99939Privileged access

Abstract

A method and an apparatus for processing data provides protection for the data. The data is stored as encrypted data element values (DV) in records (P) in a first database (O-DB), each data element value being linked to a corresponding data element type (DT). In a second database (IAM-DB), a data element protection catalogue (DC) is stored, which for each individual data element type (DT) contains one or more protection attributes stating processing rules for data element values (DV), which in the first database (O-DB) are linked to the individual data element type (DT). In each user-initiated measure which aims at processing a given data element value (DV) in the first database (O-DB), a calling is initially sent to the data element protection catalogue for collecting the protection attribute/attributes associated with the corresponding data element types. The user's processing of the given data element value is controlled in conformity with the collected protection attribute/attributes.

Description

    CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED CASES
  • [0001]
    This is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/840,188, filed on Apr. 24, 2001, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/027,585, filed on Feb. 23, 1998, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,321,201, which is a national phase filing of International Application No. PCT/SE97/01089, filed on Jun. 18, 1997. The entire contents of each of these is incorporated by reference herein.
  • TECHNICAL FIELD
  • [0002]
    The present invention relates to the technical field of computer-aided information management, and concerns more specifically a method and an apparatus for data processing for accomplishing increased protection against unauthorized processing of data
  • BACKGROUND ART
  • [0003]
    In the field of computer-aided information management, it is strongly required that the protection against unauthorized access of data registers be increased, especially against violation of the individual's personal registers, i.e. registers containing information on individuals. In particular, there are regulations restricting and prohibiting the linking and matching of personal registers. Also in other fields, such as industry, defense, banking, insurance, etc, improved protection is desired against unauthorized access to the tools, databases, applications etc. that are used for administration and storing of sensitive information.
  • [0004]
    WO95/15628, which has the same owner as the present application, discloses a method for storing data, which results in increased possibilities of linking and matching with no risk of reduced integrity. The method, which is illustrated schematically in FIGS. 1 and 2 on the enclosed drawing sheets, concerns storing of information comprising on the one hand an identifying piece of information or original identity OID, for instance personal code numbers Pcn and, on the other hand, descriptive information DI. The information OID+DI is stored as records P in a database O-DB according to the following principle:
  • [0005]
    Step 1 OID (Pcn) is encrypted by means of a first, preferably non-reversible algorithm ALG1 to an update identity UID;
  • [0006]
    Step 2 UID is encrypted by means of a second, reversible algorithm ALG2 to a storage identity SID;
  • [0007]
    Step 3 SID and DI are stored as a record P in the database O-DB, SID serving as a record identifier;
  • [0008]
    Step 4 At predetermined times, an alteration of SID in all or selected records P is accomplished by SID of these records being decrypted by means of a decrypting algorithm ALG3 to UID, whereupon UID is encrypted by means of a modified second, reversible algorithm or ALG2′ to a new storage identity SID′, which is introduced as a new record identifier in the associated record P as replacement for previous SID. This results in a security-enhancing “floating” alteration of SID of the records.
  • [0009]
    For a closer description of the details and advantages of this encrypting and storing method, reference is made to WO95/15628, which is to be considered to constitute part of the present description. The storing principle according to steps 1-4 above is herein referred to as PTY, which is an abbreviation of the principal of PROTEGRITY which stands for “Protection and Integrity”.
  • [0010]
    A detailed technical description of PTY is also supplied in the document “PROTEGRITY (ASIS) Study 2”, Ver. 1.2, 1 Mar. 1996, by Leif Jonson. Also this document is to be considered to constitute part of the present description.
  • [0011]
    In the technical field at issue, so-called shell protections are today the predominant method of protection. Shell protection comprises on the one hand the external security (premises) and, on the other hand, an authorization check system ACS with user's passwords for controlling the access. ACS is used as shell protection for main frames, client/server systems and PC, but it does not give full protection and the information at issue can often relatively easily be subjected to unauthorized access. This protection has been found more “sensitive” information is be stored, which must permit managing via distribution, storing and processing in dynamically changing environments, especially local distribution to personal computers. Concurrently with this development, the limits of the system will be more and more indistinct and the effect afforded by a shell protection deteriorates.
  • SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • [0012]
    In view of that stated above, the object of the present invention is to provide an improved method for processing information, by means of which it is possible to increase the protection against unauthorized access to sensitive information.
  • [0013]
    A special object of the invention is to provide a technique for data processing or managing, which makes it possible for the person responsible for the system, the management of the organization etc. to easily establish and continuously adapt the user's possibility of processing stored information that is to be protected.
  • [0014]
    A further object of the invention is to provide a technique for data processing which offers protection against attempts at unauthorized data processing by means of non-accepted software.
  • [0015]
    One more object of the invention is to provide a technique for data processing according to the above-mentioned objects, which can be used in combination with the above-described PTY principle, for providing a safety system with an extremely high level of protection.
  • [0016]
    Thus, the invention provides a method for processing of data that is to be protected, comprising the measure of storing the data as encrypted data element values of records in a first database (O-DB), each data element value being linked to a corresponding data element type.
  • [0017]
    The inventive method is characterised by the following further measures:
  • [0018]
    storing in a second database (IAM-DB) a data element protection catalogue, which for each individual data element type contains one or more protection attributes stating processing rules for data element values, which in the first database are linked to the individual data element type,
  • [0019]
    in each user-initiated measure aiming at processing of a given data element value in the first database, initially producing a compelling calling to the data element protection catalogue for collecting the protection attribute/attributes associated with the corresponding data element type, and compellingly controlling the processing of the given data element value in conformity with the collected protection attribute/attributes.
  • [0020]
    In the present application the following definitions are used:
      • “Processing” may include all kinds of measures which mean any form of reading, printing, altering, coding, moving, copying etc. of data that is to be protected by the inventive method.
      • “Data element type” identifies a specific category of data. For example, identification information (name and address) could be particular data element type. Whereas, some descriptive information (social allowance) could be a different data element type, and other descriptive information could be yet another different data element type”.
      • “Data element value” concerns a value which in a given record specifies a data element type.
  • [0024]
    “Record” concerns a number of data element values which belong together and which are linked to the respective data element types, optionally also including a record identifier, by means of which the record can be identified. Example:
    DATA ELEMENT TYPE
    RECORD ID SOCIAL ALLOWANCE CAR
    XXXX XXXXX encrypted data encrypted data
    element value element value
    YYYY YYYYY encrypted data encrypted data
    element value element value
      • “Protection attribute indicating rules of processing” may concern:
        • data stored in the data element protection catalogue and providing complete information on the rule or rules applying to the processing of the corresponding data element, and/or
        • data stored in the data element protection catalogue and requiring additional callings to information stored in some other place, which, optionally in combination with the protection attributes, states the processing rules involved.
      • “Collection of protection attributes” may concern:
        • collection of the protection attributes in the form as stored in the data element protection catalogue, and/or
        • collection of data recovered from the protection attributes, for instance by decryption thereof.
      • “Encryption” may concern any form of encryption, tricryption, conversion of coding of plain-text data to non-interpretable (encrypted) data, and is especially to concern also methods of conversion including hashing.
  • [0032]
    The inventive method offers a new type of protection, which differs essentially from the prior-art shell protection and which works on the cell or data element level. Each data element type used in the records in the first database is thus associated with one or more protection attributes, which are stored in a separate data element protection catalogue and which protection attributes state rules of how to process the corresponding data element values. It should be particularly noted that the calling to the data element protection catalogue is required, or in other words compelling. This means that in a system, in which the method according to the invention is implemented, a user, who for instance wants to read a certain data element value in a given record in the first database, by his attempt to access to the element value automatically produces a system calling to the data element protection catalogue in the second database for collecting the protection attributes associated with the corresponding data element types. The continued processing procedure (reading of data element value) of the system is also controlled compellingly in accordance with the collected protection attribute/attributes applying to the corresponding data element types.
  • [0033]
    The term “data element protection catalogue” and the use thereof according to the invention must not be confused with the known term “active dictionary”, which means that, in addition to an operative database, there is a special table indicating different definitions or choices for data element values in the operative database, for instance that a data element value “yellow” in terms of definition means a color code which is within a numeric interval stated in such a reference table.
  • [0034]
    Preferably, the processing rules stated by the protection attributes are inaccessible to the user, and the read or collected protection attributes are preferably used merely internally by the system for controlling the processing. A given user, who, for instance, wants to read information stored in the database regarding a certain individual, thus need not at all be aware of the fact that certain protection attributes have been activated and resulted in certain, sensitive information for this individual being excluded from the information that is made available on e.g. a display. Each user-initiated measure aiming at processing of data element values thus involves on the one hand a compelling calling to the data element protection catalogue and, on the other hand, a continued processing which is compellingly subjected to those processing rules that are stated by the protection attributes, and this may thus be accomplished without the user obtaining information on what rules control the processing at issue, and especially without the user having any possibility of having access to the rules.
  • [0035]
    By altering, adding and removing protection attributes in the data element protection catalogue, the person responsible for the system or an equivalent person may easily determine, for each individual data element type, the processing rules applying to data element values associated with the individual data element type and thus easily maintain a high and clear safety quality in the system.
  • [0036]
    According to the invention, it is thus the individual data element (date element type) and not the entire register that becomes the controlling unit for the way in which the organization, operator etc. responsible for the system has determined the level of quality, responsibility and safety regarding the management of information.
  • [0037]
    To obtain a high level of protection, the data element protection catalogue is preferably encrypted so as to prevent unauthorized access thereto.
  • [0038]
    As preferred protection attributes, the present invention provides the following possibilities, which, however, are to be considered an incomplete, exemplifying list:
  • [0039]
    1. Statement of what “strength” or “level” (for instance none, 1, 2 . . . ) of encryption is to be used for storing the corresponding data element values in the database. Different data element values within one and the same record may thus be encrypted with mutually different strength.
  • [0040]
    2. Statement of what “strength” or “level” (for in-stance none, 1, 2, . . . ) of encryption is to be used for the corresponding data element values if these are to be transmitted on a net.
  • [0041]
    3. Statement of program and/or versions of program that are authorised to be used for processing the corresponding data element values.
  • [0042]
    4. Statement of “owner” of the data element type. Different data element values within one and the same record can thus have different owners.
  • [0043]
    5. Statement of sorting-out rules for the corresponding data element values, for instance, statement of method and time for automatic removal of the corresponding data element values from the database.
  • [0044]
    6. Statement whether automatic logging is to be made when processing the corresponding data element values.
  • [0045]
    According to a specially preferred embodiment of the invention, the above-described PTY storing method is used for encryption of all data that is to be encrypted in both the database (i.e. the data element values) and the data element protection catalogue (i.e. the protection attributes). In the normal case where each record has a record identifier (corresponding to SID) above), preferably also the record identifier is protected by means of PTY. Specifically, a floating alteration of the record identifiers in both the operative database and the data element protection catalogue can be made at desired intervals and at randomly selected times, in accordance with the above-described PTY principle. In the preferred embodiment, especially the encapsulated processor which is used for the PTY encryption can also be used for implementation of the callings to the data element protection catalogue and the procedure for processing according to the collected protection attributes.
  • [0046]
    The invention will now be explained in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, which schematically illustrate the inventive principle implemented in an exemplifying data system.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • [0047]
    FIG. 1 (prior art) schematically shows the principle of storing of data information according to the PTY principle in WO95/15628.
  • [0048]
    FIG. 2 (prior art) schematically shows the principle of producing floating storing identities according to the PTY principle in WO95/15628.
  • [0049]
    FIG. 3 schematically shows a computer system for implementing the method according to the invention.
  • [0050]
    FIG. 4 schematically shows the principle of data processing according to the invention with compelling callings to a data element protection catalogue.
  • [0051]
    FIG. 5 shows an example of a display image for determining of protection attributes in the data element protection catalogue.
  • DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT
  • [0052]
    In the following, the designation IAM (which stands for Information Assets Manager) will be used for the components and applications which in the embodiment are essential to the implementation of the invention.
  • [0053]
    Reference is first made to FIG. 3, which schematically illustrates a data managing system, in which the present invention is implemented and in which the following databases are included for storing information, in this example person-related information:
      • An open database P-DB which contains generally accessible data, such as personal name, article name, address etc. with the personal code number Pcn as plain text as record identifier;
      • An operative database O-DB, which contains data that is to be protected. Encrypted identification, in this case an encrypted personal code number, is used as record identifier (=storage identity SID). O-DB is used by authorised users for processing of individual records, such as reading and update;
      • An archive-database A-DB, which contains data transferred (sorted out) from the operative database O-DB and which is used for statistic questions, but not for questions directed to individual records. The transfer from O-DB to A-DB may take place in batches.
      • A database IAM-DB, which is a database essential to the implementation of the invention. This database contains a data element protection catalogue with protection attributes for such data element types as are associated with data element values in records—in the operative database O-DB. This database IAM-DB is preferably physically separated from the other O-DB and is inaccessible to the user. However, two or more sets of the data element protection catalogue may be available: on the one hand an original version to which only an authorised IAM operator has access and, on the other hand, a copy version which imports the data element protection catalogue from the original version and which may optionally be stored on the same file storage as the operative database O-DB. The two versions may be remote from each other, for instance be located in two different cities.
  • [0058]
    The data system in FIG. 3 further comprises a hardware component 10, a control module 20 (IAM-API), and a program module 30 (PTY-API). The function of these three components will now be described in more detail.
  • [0000]
    Hardware Component 10
  • [0059]
    The hardware component 10 acts as a distributed processor of its own in a computer. It has an encapsulation that makes it completely tamper-proof, which means that monitoring by so-called trace tools will not be possible.
  • [0060]
    The hardware component 10 can as an independent unit perform at least the following functions:
  • [0061]
    Creating variable, reversible and non-reversible encrypting algorithms for the PTY encryption and providing the algorithms with the necessary variables;
  • [0062]
    Initiating alterations of storage identities (SID) in stored data according to PTY, on the one hand data in O-DB and, on the other hand, data in the data element protection catalogue of IAM-DB;
  • [0063]
    Storing user authorizations having access to records in O-DB; and
  • [0064]
    Linking original identities OID to the correct record in O-DB.
  • [0000]
    Control Module 20 (IAM-API)
  • [0065]
    The control module 20 controls the handling of the types of data protection that the system can supply.
  • [0066]
    The control module carries out the processing requested via API (Application Program Interface) programming interface.
  • [0000]
    Program Module 30 (PTY-API) 30
  • [0067]
    The program module (PTY-API) 30 handles the dialogue between the application 40 involved (including ACS) and the hardware component 10. This module may further log events and control sorting out/removal of data from the operative database O-DB.
  • [0068]
    Reference is now made to FIG. 4, which illustrates the same four databases (P-DB, O-DB, A-DB, IAM-DB) as in FIG. 3 and which schematically illustrates how the processing of individual data elements are, according to the invention, controlled according to the rules that are stated by protection attributes in the data element protection catalogue, which is stored in the database IAM-DB.
  • [0069]
    The data that is to be stored concerns in this example a certain individual and contains: (1) generally accessible data such as name and address, (2) identifying information, such as personal code number (Pcn), and (3) descriptive information (DI). The generally accessible data name and address is stored together with personal code number (Pcn) in the open database P-DB, said storage being performable as plain text since this information is of the type that is generally accessible.
  • [0070]
    For storing the identifying information in combination with the descriptive information DI, the following steps will, however, be made, in which the following designations are used to describe encrypting and decrypting algorithms. Generally speaking, the encrypting and decrypting algorithms can be described as follows:
    F Type(Random number, Input data)=Results wherein:
  • [0071]
    F designates a function.
  • [0072]
    Type indicates the type of function as follows:
      • FKIR=Non-reversible encrypting algorithm
      • FKR=Reversible encrypting algorithm
      • FDKR=Decrypting algorithm
  • [0076]
    Random number
      • represents one or more constants and/or
      • variables included in the function F.
  • [0079]
    Input data
      • are the data to be encrypted or decrypted, and
  • [0081]
    Results indicate a unique function value for a given function
  • [0082]
    Step 1 Division of the information
      • Identifying information is separated from descriptive information;
  • [0084]
    Step 2 Preparation of storage identity SID:
      • An original identity OID is selected based on the identifying information. OID is here selected to be equal to the personal code number Pcn of the individual. OID is encrypted by means of a non-reversible encrypting algorithm ALG1, pre-pared randomly by the hardware component 10, to an update identity UID as follows:
        ALG1: F KIR(Random number, OID)=UID
      • ALG1 is such that attempts at decryption of UID to OID result in a great number of identities, which makes it impossible to link a specific UID to the corresponding OID.
      • Then UID is encrypted by means of a reversible algorithm ALG2, which is also produced at random by the hardware component 10, for generating a storage identity SID as follows:
        ALG2: F KR R(Random number, UID)=SID
      • ALG2 is such that there exists a corresponding decrypting algorithm ALG3, by means of which SID can be decrypted in order to recreate UID.
      • The storage identity SID is used, as described in step 4 above, as encrypted record identifier when storing encrypted data element values DV in the operative database O-DB.
  • [0090]
    Step 3 Production of encrypted data element values DV: The descriptive information DI associated with the original identity OID is converted into one or more encrypted data element values DV linked to a data element type DT each.
  • [0091]
     The encryption takes place as described below with a reversible encryption function FKR, which like the algorithms ALG1 and ALG2 above is also produced at random by the hardware component 10. The invention is distinguished by a compelling calling here being sent to the data element protection catalogue in the database IAM-DB for automatic collection of the protection attribute which is linked to the data element type at issue and which indicates “strength” or degree with which the encryption of the descriptive data is to be performed so as to generate the data element value DV.
  • [0092]
     The table, which in FIG. 4 is shown below the database IAMDB, symbolizes an exemplifying content of the data element protection catalogue, here designated DPC. As an example, it may here be assumed that the protection function Funcl corresponds to “degree of encryption”. If the descriptive information DI at issue is to be stored as a data element value DV associated with the specific data element type DT1 in the data element protection catalogue, the protection attribute “5” registered in the data element protection catalogue is collected automatically in this case. The descriptive information DI at issue will thus, automatically and compellingly, be encrypted with the strength “5” for generating an encrypted data element value DV as follows:
    F KR(Random number, DI)=encrypted data element value DV
      • For storing a less sensitive data element, for instance a data element of the data element type DT3, the compelling calling to the data element protection catalogue in IAM-DB would instead have resulted in the protection attribute “no” being collected, in which case no encryption would have been made on the descriptive data at issue, which then could be stored as plain text in the operative database ODE.
  • [0094]
    Step 4 Storing of records in the operative database O-DB: The encrypted storage identity SID according to step 2 in combination with the corresponding encrypted data element value or data element values DV according step 3 are stored as a record in the operative database O-DB.
  • [0095]
    As appears from the foregoing, a stored information record P has the following general appearance:
    Descript. information in the form
    of encrypted data element values
    Storage identity (SID) DV1 DV2 DV3 DV4
  • [0096]
    The original identity OID is encrypted according to the PTY principle in two steps, of which the first is non-reversible and the second is reversible. Thus, it is impossible to store the descriptive information DI along with a storage identity SID that never can be linked to the original identity OID, as well as to create “floating”, i.e. which change over time, storage identities SID while retaining the possibility of locating, for a specific original identity OID, the associated descriptive information DI stored.
  • [0097]
    The descriptive data DI is stored in accordance with protection attributes linked to each individual data element. This results in a still higher level of protection and a high degree of flexibility as to the setting up of rules, and continuous adaptation thereof, of how sensitive data is allowed to be used and can be used, down to the data element level.
  • [0098]
    To increase the level of protection still more, the data element protection catalogue DPC is preferably stored in IAM-DB in encrypted form in accordance with the PTY principle, in which case for instance the data element types correspond to the above storage identity and the protection attributes correspond to the descriptive information or data element values above, as schematically illustrated in FIG. 4. This efficiently prevents every attempt at circumventing the data element protection by unauthorized access and interpretation of the content of the data element protection catalogue.
  • [0099]
    In the illustrated embodiment, PTY can thus have the following functions:
  • [0100]
    Protecting the original identity OID in encrypted form (SID) on the operative database O-DB (as is known from said WO95/15628),
  • [0101]
    Protecting information in IAM-DB, particularly the protection attributes of the data element protection catalogue and the associated record identifier, and
  • [0102]
    Protecting descriptive information DI in the form of encrypted data element values DV for the data element types that have the corresponding protection activated in the data element protection catalogue, and in accordance with the corresponding protection attributes.
  • [0000]
    Functionality Protection
  • [0103]
    In the above embodiment of the procedure for inputting data in the operative database O-DB, only “degree of encryption” has so far been discussed as data element protection attribute in the data element protection catalogue DC. However, this is only one example among a number of possible protection attributes in the data element protection catalogue, which normally offers a plurality of protection attitudes for each data element. Preferred protection attributes have been indicated above in the general description.
  • [0104]
    A particularly interesting protection attribute is “protected programs”. The use of this data element protection attribute means that the data system may offer a new type of protection, which is here called “functionality protection and which means that only accepted or certified programs are allowed to be used and can be used in the system in the processing of data. It should be noted that this type of protection is still, according to the invention, on the data element level.
  • [0105]
    Now assume for the purpose of illustration that Func2 in the data element protection catalogue DPC in FIG. 4 corresponds to this protection attribute and that data elements of the data element type DTI and DT2, respectively, are only allowed to be processed with the accepted applications or programs P1 and P2, respectively. Unauthorized handling of the corresponding data elements by means of, for instance, a different program P3, or a modified version P1′ of P1, should be prevented. As protection attribute in the data element protection catalogue, data identifying PI and P2 is therefore stored. In a preferred example, an encryptographic check sum P1* and P2*, respectively, is created, in a manner known per se, based on every accepted program P1 and P2, respectively. These check sums may be considered to constitute a unique fingerprint of the respective accepted programs, and these fingerprints can be stored as protection catalogue as illustrated schematically in FIG. 4. It should however be noted that such check sums for accepted programs can optionally be stored in a data element protection attributes in the data element protection catalogue of their own for registering of accepted programs, separately from the data element protection catalogue with protection attributes for encryption strength.
  • [0106]
    If the last-mentioned type of protection “protected programs” is used, it should also be noted that the system, in connection with a user-initiated measure aiming at processing of a given data element, for instance in-putting a new data element value in a certain record, need not, carry out a complete examination of all programs accepted in the system. If, for instance, the user tries to use a program P3 for inputting in the operative database O-DB a new data element value, a compelling calling is sent to the data element protection catalogue in connection with the corresponding data element type, for instance DTI. The associated protection attribute P1* is then collected from the data element protection catalogue, which means that such a data element value is only allowed to be stored by means of the program P1. The attempt at registering the data element value by means of the program P3 would therefore fail.
  • [0107]
    By periodic use of the above-described functionality protection, it is possible to reveal and/or prevent that an unauthorized person (for instance a “hacker”) breaks into the system by means of a non-accepted program and modifies and/or adds descriptive data in such a manner that the descriptive data will then be identifying for the record. The data element values are thus not allowed to become identifying in the operative database O-DB.
  • [0000]
    Traceability/Logging
  • [0108]
    “Logging” or “traceability” is another type of protection which according to the invention can be linked to a data element type in the data element protection catalogue. If this protection is activated for a certain data element type, each processing of the corresponding data element values in the operative database O-DB will automatically and compellingly result in relevant information on the processing (“user”, “date”, “record”, “user pro-gram” etc.) being logged in a suitable manner, so that based on the log, it is possible to investigate after-wards who has processed the data element values at issue, when, by means of which program etc.
  • [0000]
    Reading of Data from the Operative Database O-DB
  • [0109]
    In connection with a user-initiated measure aiming at reading/altering data element values in the stored records in the operative database O-DB, the following steps are carried out, which specifically also comprise a compelling calling to the data element protection catalogue and “unpacking” of the data which is controlled automatically and compellingly by collected protection attributes.
  • [0110]
    Step 1 The record is identified by producing the storage identity SID at issue based on the original identity OID, (Pcn) that is associated with the data element value DV which is to be read, as follows
    F KR(F KIR(OID))=SID
  • [0111]
    Step 2 When the record has been found by means of SID, the encrypted data element value DV (i.e. the encrypted descriptive data that is to be read) is decrypted as follows by means of a decrypting algorithm FDKR:
    F DKR(DV)=descriptive data (plain text)
  • [0112]
     The carrying out of this decryption of the data element value, however, requires that the encryption-controlling protection attribute of the data element is first collected by the system from the data element protection catalogue DC, i.e. the attribute indicating with which strength or at which level the data element value DV stored in O-DB has been encrypted. Like in the above procedure for inputting of data in O-DB, also when reading, a compelling calling thus is sent to the data element protection catalogue DC for collecting information which is necessary for carrying out the processing, in this case the unpacking.
  • [0113]
     It will be appreciated that such a compelling calling to the data element protection catalogue DPC, when making an attempt at reading, may result in the attempt failing, wholly or partly, for several reasons, depending on the protection attribute at issue, which is linked to the data element value/values that is/are to be read. For instance, the attempt at reading may be interrupted owing to the user trying to use a non-accepted program and/or not being authorized to read the term involved.
  • [0114]
    If the data element protection catalogue is encrypted, the decoding key can be stored in a storage position separate from the first and the second database.
  • [0115]
    FIG. 5 shows an example of a user interface in the form of a dialogue box, by means of which a person responsible for IAM, i.e. a person responsible for security, may read and/or alter the protection attributes stated in the data element protection catalogue. In the Example in FIG. 5, the data element types “Housing allowance” and “Social allowance” have both been provided with protection attributes concerning encryption, sorting out, logging and owner. Moreover, registration of authorized users and protected programs linked to the data element type “Social allowance” has taken place in submenus.

Claims (81)

  1. 1-8. (canceled)
  2. 9. A data processing method comprising:
    maintaining a database containing a table of data in row and column format, at least portion of the data being encrypted;
    maintaining, separate from the table of data, information for controlling access to a specified proper subset of data in the table; and
    controlling access to the specified proper subset of data in the table according to the separately maintained information.
  3. 10. The method of claim 9, wherein controlling access comprises controlling access by a specified user or group of users.
  4. 11. The method of claim 9, wherein controlling access comprises controlling access by a specified program or group of programs.
  5. 12. The method of claim 9, wherein the separately maintained information comprises a separate table inaccessible to a user seeking access to the data.
  6. 13. The method of claim 9, wherein the separately maintained information comprises a separate table inaccessible to a program seeking access to the data.
  7. 14. The method of claim 9, wherein controlling access to the specified proper subset of the data comprises using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  8. 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is used to perform a cryptographic operation on the data.
  9. 16. The method of claim 14, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is used to store at least a portion of the separately maintained information.
  10. 17. The method of claim 14, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  11. 18. The method of claim 14, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  12. 19. The method of claim 9, wherein the specified proper subset of data comprises a specified column of data.
  13. 20. The method of claim 9, wherein the information for controlling access comprises information used in encrypting or decrypting data in the proper subset of data.
  14. 21. The method of claim 20, wherein the information used in encrypting or decrypting data comprises information identifying a way of encrypting or decrypting data in the proper subset of data.
  15. 22. The method of claim 9, wherein the information for controlling access comprises information identifying an owner of the proper subset of data.
  16. 23. The method of claim 9, wherein the information for controlling access comprises encrypted information.
  17. 24. The method of claim 9, further comprising:
    receiving a request for access to a particular data element in the table, the particular data element containing encrypted data;
    obtaining, from the separately maintained data, cryptographic information associated with a proper subset of data in the table, the proper subset containing the particular data element; and
    decrypting the data in the particular data element using the cryptographic information.
  18. 25. The method of claim 24, wherein decrypting the data is done using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  19. 26. The method of claim 25, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  20. 27. The method of claim 25, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  21. 28. The method of claim 9, further comprising
    receiving a request for access to a particular data element in the table, the particular data element containing encrypted data; and
    obtaining, from the separately maintained data, information associated with a proper subset of data in the table, the proper subset containing the particular data element; and
    providing decrypted data from the particular data element when the information from the separately maintained data indicates that the request for access to the particular data element is an authorized request.
  22. 29. The method of claim 28, further comprising decrypting the data from the particular data element using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  23. 30. The method of claim 29, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  24. 31. The method of claim 29, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  25. 32. A method comprising:
    providing a database containing a table having at least two columns of data; encrypting data in a first column using first cryptographic information; encrypting data in a second column using second cryptographic information; storing first and second cryptographic information outside of the table;
    controlling access to data in the first column using the first cryptographic information stored outside of the table; and
    controlling access to data in the second column using the second cryptographic information stored outside of the table.
  26. 33. The method of claim 32, further comprising storing the first and second cryptographic information in a separate table inaccessible to a user seeking access to the data.
  27. 34. The method of claim 32, further comprising storing the first and second cryptographic information in a separate table inaccessible to a program seeking access to the data.
  28. 35. The method of claim 32, wherein the first and second cryptographic information are stored, in encrypted form, outside of the table.
  29. 36. The method of claim 32, wherein at least a portion of the data is encrypted using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  30. 37. The method of claim 36, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  31. 38. The method of claim 36, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  32. 39. A database management system comprising:
    a database containing a table having at least two columns of data, at least one column of data being encrypted; and
    information stored outside of the table for controlling access to at least one column of data, the information including cryptographic information associated with the encrypted column of data.
  33. 40. The system of claim 39, wherein the information is stored in a separate table inaccessible to a user seeking access to the data.
  34. 41. The system of claim 39, wherein the information is stored in a separate table inaccessible to a program seeking access to the data.
  35. 42. The system of claim 39, wherein the information is stored in encrypted form.
  36. 43. The system of claim 39, further comprising a tamper-resistant hardware module for performing cryptographic operations on the encrypted column of data.
  37. 44. The system of claim 43, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  38. 45. The system of claim 43, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  39. 46. A data processing method comprising:
    maintaining a first set of data as a collection of records having fields, at least a portion of the data being encrypted;
    maintaining, separate from the first set of data, information for controlling access to a specified proper subset of the first data; and
    controlling access to the specified proper subset of the first set of data according to the separately maintained information.
  40. 47. The method of claim 46, wherein controlling access comprises controlling access by a specified user or group of users.
  41. 48. The method of claim 46, wherein controlling access comprises controlling access by a specified program or group of programs.
  42. 49. The method of claim 46, wherein the separately maintained information comprises information that is inaccessible to a user seeking access to the data.
  43. 50. The method of claim 46, wherein the separately maintained information comprises information that is inaccessible to a program seeking access to the data.
  44. 51. The method of claim 46, wherein controlling access to the specified proper subset of the data comprising using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  45. 52. The method of claim 51, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is used to perform a cryptographic operation on the data.
  46. 53. The method of claim 51, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is used to store at least a portion of the separately maintained information.
  47. 54. The method of claim 51, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  48. 55. The method of claims 51, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  49. 56. The method of claim 46, wherein the specified proper subset of data comprises a specified field of data.
  50. 57. The method of claim 46, wherein the information for controlling access comprises information used in encrypting or decrypting data in the proper subset of data.
  51. 58. The method of claim 46, wherein the information for controlling access comprises information identifying an owner of the proper subset of data.
  52. 59. The method of claim 46, wherein the information for controlling access comprises encrypted information.
  53. 60. The method of claim 46, further comprising:
    receiving a request for access to a particular data element in the first set of data, the particular data element containing encrypted data;
    obtaining, from the separately maintained data, cryptographic information associated with a proper subset of the first set of data, the proper subset containing the particular data element; and
    decrypting the data in the particular data element using the cryptographic information.
  54. 61. The method of claim 60, wherein decrypting the data is done using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  55. 62. The method of claim 61, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  56. 63. The method of claim 61, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  57. 64. The method of claim 60, wherein the proper subset comprises data in one or more specified fields.
  58. 65. The method of claim 46, further comprising
    receiving a request for access to a particular data element in the first set of data, the particular data element containing encrypted data; and
    obtaining, from the separately maintained data, information associated with a proper subset of data in the first set of data, the proper subset containing the particular data element; and
    providing decrypted data from the particular data element when the information from the separately maintained data indicates that the request for access to the particular data element is an authorized request.
  59. 66. The method of claim 65, further comprising decrypting the data from the particular data element using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  60. 67. The method of claim 66, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  61. 68. The method of claim 66, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  62. 69. A method comprising:
    providing a database containing at least two columns of data;
    encrypting data in a first column using first cryptographic information;
    encrypting data in a second column using second cryptographic information;
    storing the first and second cryptographic information apart from the two columns of data;
    controlling access to data in the first column using the first cryptographic information; and
    controlling access to data in the second column using the second cryptographic information.
  63. 70. The method of claim 69, further comprising storing the first and second cryptographic information in a location that is inaccessible to a user seeking access to the data.
  64. 71. The method of claim 69, further comprising storing the first and second cryptographic information in a location that is inaccessible to a program seeking access to the data.
  65. 72. The method of claim 69, wherein the first and second cryptographic information are stored, in encrypted form, outside of the first and second column.
  66. 73. The method of claim 69, wherein at least a portion of the data is encrypted using a tamper-resistant hardware module.
  67. 74. The method of claim 73, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  68. 75. The method of claim 73, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  69. 76. A database management system comprising:
    a database containing at least two columns of data, a first column of data being encrypted; and
    information stored outside of the first column of data for controlling access to the first column of data, the information including cryptographic information associated with the first column of data.
  70. 77. The system of claim 76, where in the information is stored in a location that is inaccessible to a user seeking access to the first column of data.
  71. 78. The system of claim 76, where in the information is stored in a location that is inaccessible to a program seeking access to the first column of data.
  72. 79. The system of claim 76, wherein the information is stored in encrypted form.
  73. 80. The system of claim 76, further comprising a tamper-resistant hardware module for performing cryptographic operations on the first column of data.
  74. 81. The system of claim 80, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module comprises a hardware security module.
  75. 82. The system of claim 80, wherein the tamper-resistant hardware module is selected from the group consisting of a hardware security appliance and a cryptographic card.
  76. 83. The method of claim 9, further comprising revealing an unauthorized access to the data.
  77. 84. The method of claim 32, wherein controlling access to data in the first column comprises revealing unauthorized access to the data.
  78. 85. The method of claim 46, wherein controlling access comprising revealing unauthorized access to the first set of data.
  79. 86. The method of claim 69, wherein controlling access to data in the first columns comprises revealing unauthorized access to the data.
  80. 87. The system of claim 39, wherein the information stored outside of the table comprises information for revealing unauthorized access to the database.
  81. 88. The system of claim 76, wherein the information stored outside of the table comprises information for revealing unauthorized access to the database.
US11603967 1996-06-20 2006-11-21 Data security system for a database Abandoned US20070180240A1 (en)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SE9602475-7 1996-06-20
SE9602475 1996-06-20
PCT/SE1997/001089 WO1997049211A1 (en) 1996-06-20 1997-06-18 Method and apparatus for data processing
US09027585 US6321201B1 (en) 1996-06-20 1998-02-23 Data security system for a database having multiple encryption levels applicable on a data element value level
US09840188 US20020174352A1 (en) 1996-06-20 2001-04-24 Data security system for a database
US11603967 US20070180240A1 (en) 1996-06-20 2006-11-21 Data security system for a database

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11603967 US20070180240A1 (en) 1996-06-20 2006-11-21 Data security system for a database
US12916274 US8402281B2 (en) 1996-06-20 2010-10-29 Data security system for a database

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09840188 Continuation US20020174352A1 (en) 1996-06-20 2001-04-24 Data security system for a database

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12916274 Continuation US8402281B2 (en) 1996-06-20 2010-10-29 Data security system for a database

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20070180240A1 true true US20070180240A1 (en) 2007-08-02

Family

ID=20403120

Family Applications (4)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09027585 Expired - Lifetime US6321201B1 (en) 1996-06-20 1998-02-23 Data security system for a database having multiple encryption levels applicable on a data element value level
US09840188 Abandoned US20020174352A1 (en) 1996-06-20 2001-04-24 Data security system for a database
US11603967 Abandoned US20070180240A1 (en) 1996-06-20 2006-11-21 Data security system for a database
US12916274 Expired - Lifetime US8402281B2 (en) 1996-06-20 2010-10-29 Data security system for a database

Family Applications Before (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09027585 Expired - Lifetime US6321201B1 (en) 1996-06-20 1998-02-23 Data security system for a database having multiple encryption levels applicable on a data element value level
US09840188 Abandoned US20020174352A1 (en) 1996-06-20 2001-04-24 Data security system for a database

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12916274 Expired - Lifetime US8402281B2 (en) 1996-06-20 2010-10-29 Data security system for a database

Country Status (9)

Country Link
US (4) US6321201B1 (en)
EP (2) EP1477881A3 (en)
JP (1) JP4167300B2 (en)
KR (1) KR20000022057A (en)
CN (1) CN1146178C (en)
DE (2) DE69730321D1 (en)
ES (1) ES2230609T3 (en)
RU (1) RU2198423C2 (en)
WO (1) WO1997049211A1 (en)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20090187553A1 (en) * 2008-01-21 2009-07-23 Suman Kumar Sarkar Method and system for facilitating verification of an entity based on business requirements
US9524345B1 (en) 2009-08-31 2016-12-20 Richard VanderDrift Enhancing content using linked context
US9639707B1 (en) 2010-01-14 2017-05-02 Richard W. VanderDrift Secure data storage and communication for network computing

Families Citing this family (115)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN1146178C (en) 1996-06-20 2004-04-14 普罗特格里特 诺狄克股份公司 Method and appts. for data processing
WO2001003087A1 (en) 1999-06-30 2001-01-11 Walker Digital, Llc Vending machine system and method for encouraging the purchase of profitable items
US7233912B2 (en) 1997-08-26 2007-06-19 Walker Digital, Llc Method and apparatus for vending a combination of products
US6430549B1 (en) * 1998-07-17 2002-08-06 Electronic Data Systems Corporation System and method for selectivety defining access to application features
DE19925910B4 (en) 1999-06-07 2005-04-28 Siemens Ag A method for working or processing data
US6938022B1 (en) * 1999-06-12 2005-08-30 Tara C. Singhal Method and apparatus for facilitating an anonymous information system and anonymous service transactions
US8473452B1 (en) 1999-09-20 2013-06-25 Ims Health Incorporated System and method for analyzing de-identified health care data
EP1236117B1 (en) 1999-11-12 2016-03-30 Protegrity Corporation Method for reencryption of a database
US20030021417A1 (en) 2000-10-20 2003-01-30 Ognjen Vasic Hidden link dynamic key manager for use in computer systems with database structure for storage of encrypted data and method for storage and retrieval of encrypted data
US7362868B2 (en) 2000-10-20 2008-04-22 Eruces, Inc. Hidden link dynamic key manager for use in computer systems with database structure for storage of encrypted data and method for storage and retrieval of encrypted data
US7325129B1 (en) 2000-11-16 2008-01-29 Protegrity Corporation Method for altering encryption status in a relational database in a continuous process
US6963980B1 (en) 2000-11-16 2005-11-08 Protegrity Corporation Combined hardware and software based encryption of databases
EP1207462A3 (en) * 2000-11-16 2005-12-21 Protegrity Research & Development A method for altering encryption status in a relation database in a continuous process
EP1207443B1 (en) * 2000-11-16 2015-08-26 Protegrity Corporation Encryption of databases based on a combination of hardware and software
US20070079119A1 (en) * 2000-11-16 2007-04-05 Ulf Mattsson Encryption key rotation
EP1209550A3 (en) 2000-11-27 2007-08-08 Protegrity Research & Development Preserving the data type of an encrypted data element
US7418098B1 (en) 2000-11-27 2008-08-26 Protegrity Corporation Data type preserving encryption
US20020066038A1 (en) * 2000-11-29 2002-05-30 Ulf Mattsson Method and a system for preventing impersonation of a database user
US7315859B2 (en) * 2000-12-15 2008-01-01 Oracle International Corp. Method and apparatus for management of encrypted data through role separation
US7454796B2 (en) * 2000-12-22 2008-11-18 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Obtaining temporary exclusive control of a printing device
US7757278B2 (en) * 2001-01-04 2010-07-13 Safenet, Inc. Method and apparatus for transparent encryption
DE60130902D1 (en) 2001-11-23 2007-11-22 Protegrity Res & Dev A method for detecting intrusion in a database system,
US20030200216A1 (en) * 2002-01-22 2003-10-23 Recording Industry Association Of America Method and system for identification of music industry releases and licenses
WO2003098898A1 (en) * 2002-05-13 2003-11-27 Rappore Technologies, Inc. Clearance-based method for dynamically configuring encryption strength
US20030226024A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2003-12-04 Qwest Communications International Inc. Secure internet documents
US20070107067A1 (en) * 2002-08-24 2007-05-10 Ingrian Networks, Inc. Secure feature activation
US20040193871A1 (en) * 2003-03-28 2004-09-30 Broadcom Corporation System and method for transmitting data using selective partial encryption
US7346160B2 (en) * 2003-04-23 2008-03-18 Michaelsen David L Randomization-based encryption apparatus and method
US7155612B2 (en) * 2003-04-30 2006-12-26 International Business Machines Corporation Desktop database data administration tool with row level security
US8862866B2 (en) 2003-07-07 2014-10-14 Certicom Corp. Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication
US20050018883A1 (en) * 2003-07-09 2005-01-27 Cross Match Technologies, Inc. Systems and methods for facilitating transactions
US7725947B2 (en) * 2003-08-06 2010-05-25 Sap Ag Methods and systems for providing benchmark information under controlled access
US7617177B2 (en) * 2003-08-06 2009-11-10 Sap Ag Methods and systems for providing benchmark information under controlled access
CA2478274C (en) 2003-08-19 2015-12-08 Certicom Corp. Method and apparatus for synchronizing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication
JPWO2005096120A1 (en) * 2004-04-02 2007-08-16 松下電器産業株式会社 Execution device
US7519835B2 (en) * 2004-05-20 2009-04-14 Safenet, Inc. Encrypted table indexes and searching encrypted tables
US7681042B2 (en) 2004-06-17 2010-03-16 Eruces, Inc. System and method for dis-identifying sensitive information and associated records
US7383462B2 (en) * 2004-07-02 2008-06-03 Hitachi, Ltd. Method and apparatus for encrypted remote copy for secure data backup and restoration
DE102004063964B4 (en) * 2004-10-20 2010-12-16 Vita-X Ag computer system
US20060266209A1 (en) * 2005-02-09 2006-11-30 Piotr Grabowski Reactive mechanism for firearms
US20060259950A1 (en) 2005-02-18 2006-11-16 Ulf Mattsson Multi-layer system for privacy enforcement and monitoring of suspicious data access behavior
US20070174271A1 (en) * 2005-02-18 2007-07-26 Ulf Mattsson Database system with second preprocessor and method for accessing a database
US20080022136A1 (en) * 2005-02-18 2008-01-24 Protegrity Corporation Encryption load balancing and distributed policy enforcement
US7788184B2 (en) * 2005-09-23 2010-08-31 Kane Larry J Method for preventing identity theft
US20070079386A1 (en) * 2005-09-26 2007-04-05 Brian Metzger Transparent encryption using secure encryption device
US20070079140A1 (en) * 2005-09-26 2007-04-05 Brian Metzger Data migration
US20070156606A1 (en) * 2005-12-29 2007-07-05 Larry Kane Method of securing a check transaction
US20070180275A1 (en) * 2006-01-27 2007-08-02 Brian Metzger Transparent encryption using secure JDBC/ODBC wrappers
US8386768B2 (en) * 2006-02-08 2013-02-26 Safenet, Inc. High performance data encryption server and method for transparently encrypting/decrypting data
US7717333B2 (en) * 2006-02-15 2010-05-18 Kane Larry J Method and means for registering a debit card
US7958091B2 (en) 2006-02-16 2011-06-07 Ingrian Networks, Inc. Method for fast bulk loading data into a database while bypassing exit routines
EP2005636B1 (en) 2006-04-13 2015-10-21 Certicom Corp. Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication
US7904732B2 (en) * 2006-09-27 2011-03-08 Rocket Software, Inc. Encrypting and decrypting database records
US20080116258A1 (en) * 2006-10-25 2008-05-22 Kane Larry J Multi-purpose payment card and method of using same
US8379865B2 (en) * 2006-10-27 2013-02-19 Safenet, Inc. Multikey support for multiple office system
US8380841B2 (en) * 2006-12-07 2013-02-19 Microsoft Corporation Strategies for investigating and mitigating vulnerabilities caused by the acquisition of credentials
US9355273B2 (en) 2006-12-18 2016-05-31 Bank Of America, N.A., As Collateral Agent System and method for the protection and de-identification of health care data
US8639948B2 (en) * 2006-12-28 2014-01-28 Teradata Us, Inc. Encrypted data management in database management systems
WO2008104965A3 (en) * 2007-02-26 2009-05-07 Yuval Eldar A system and method for automatic data protection in a computer network
US20100031321A1 (en) 2007-06-11 2010-02-04 Protegrity Corporation Method and system for preventing impersonation of computer system user
US20090030840A1 (en) * 2007-07-24 2009-01-29 Kane Larry J Method for limiting debit card transactions
US8826449B2 (en) 2007-09-27 2014-09-02 Protegrity Corporation Data security in a disconnected environment
US20090132804A1 (en) * 2007-11-21 2009-05-21 Prabir Paul Secured live software migration
US8225106B2 (en) 2008-04-02 2012-07-17 Protegrity Corporation Differential encryption utilizing trust modes
US20100030644A1 (en) * 2008-08-04 2010-02-04 Rajasekaran Dhamodharan Targeted advertising by payment processor history of cashless acquired merchant transactions on issued consumer account
US8612466B2 (en) * 2008-10-08 2013-12-17 International Business Machines Corporation Information processing apparatus, document retrieval system, document retrieval method, and program
CA2745365C (en) 2008-12-23 2013-01-08 J.J. Mackay Canada Limited Low power wireless parking meter and parking meter network
WO2010083454A3 (en) * 2009-01-15 2010-09-23 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Incentives associated with linked financial accounts
US20100306029A1 (en) * 2009-06-01 2010-12-02 Ryan Jolley Cardholder Clusters
US9841282B2 (en) 2009-07-27 2017-12-12 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Successive offer communications with an offer recipient
US9443253B2 (en) 2009-07-27 2016-09-13 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to provide and adjust offers
US8266031B2 (en) * 2009-07-29 2012-09-11 Visa U.S.A. Systems and methods to provide benefits of account features to account holders
US20110035280A1 (en) 2009-08-04 2011-02-10 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods for Targeted Advertisement Delivery
US20110035278A1 (en) 2009-08-04 2011-02-10 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods for Closing the Loop between Online Activities and Offline Purchases
US20110047072A1 (en) * 2009-08-07 2011-02-24 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods for Propensity Analysis and Validation
US20110087547A1 (en) * 2009-10-09 2011-04-14 Visa U.S.A. Systems and Methods for Advertising Services Based on a Local Profile
US20110087546A1 (en) * 2009-10-09 2011-04-14 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods for Anticipatory Advertisement Delivery
US20110087519A1 (en) * 2009-10-09 2011-04-14 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods for Panel Enhancement with Transaction Data
US9342835B2 (en) 2009-10-09 2016-05-17 Visa U.S.A Systems and methods to deliver targeted advertisements to audience
US20110087530A1 (en) * 2009-10-09 2011-04-14 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods to Provide Loyalty Programs
US9031860B2 (en) * 2009-10-09 2015-05-12 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and methods to aggregate demand
US8595058B2 (en) 2009-10-15 2013-11-26 Visa U.S.A. Systems and methods to match identifiers
US20110093324A1 (en) 2009-10-19 2011-04-21 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods to Provide Intelligent Analytics to Cardholders and Merchants
US20110093335A1 (en) * 2009-10-19 2011-04-21 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods for Advertising Services Based on an SKU-Level Profile
US8676639B2 (en) 2009-10-29 2014-03-18 Visa International Service Association System and method for promotion processing and authorization
US8626705B2 (en) 2009-11-05 2014-01-07 Visa International Service Association Transaction aggregator for closed processing
US20110125565A1 (en) * 2009-11-24 2011-05-26 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods for Multi-Channel Offer Redemption
US20110231225A1 (en) * 2010-03-19 2011-09-22 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods to Identify Customers Based on Spending Patterns
US8639567B2 (en) * 2010-03-19 2014-01-28 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and methods to identify differences in spending patterns
US8738418B2 (en) * 2010-03-19 2014-05-27 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and methods to enhance search data with transaction based data
US20110231224A1 (en) * 2010-03-19 2011-09-22 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods to Perform Checkout Funnel Analyses
US20110231258A1 (en) * 2010-03-19 2011-09-22 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods to Distribute Advertisement Opportunities to Merchants
US20110231305A1 (en) * 2010-03-19 2011-09-22 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and Methods to Identify Spending Patterns
US9697520B2 (en) * 2010-03-22 2017-07-04 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Merchant configured advertised incentives funded through statement credits
US9471926B2 (en) 2010-04-23 2016-10-18 Visa U.S.A. Inc. Systems and methods to provide offers to travelers
US8359274B2 (en) 2010-06-04 2013-01-22 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to provide messages in real-time with transaction processing
US8781896B2 (en) 2010-06-29 2014-07-15 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to optimize media presentations
US9760905B2 (en) 2010-08-02 2017-09-12 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to optimize media presentations using a camera
US9679299B2 (en) 2010-09-03 2017-06-13 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to provide real-time offers via a cooperative database
US9466075B2 (en) 2011-09-20 2016-10-11 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to process referrals in offer campaigns
US9477967B2 (en) 2010-09-21 2016-10-25 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to process an offer campaign based on ineligibility
US9558502B2 (en) 2010-11-04 2017-01-31 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to reward user interactions
CA2756489A1 (en) 2011-03-03 2012-09-03 J.J. Mackay Canada Limited Parking meter with contactless payment
US9009473B2 (en) 2011-10-13 2015-04-14 International Business Machines Corporation Providing consistent cryptographic operations across several applications
US9009472B2 (en) 2011-10-13 2015-04-14 International Business Machines Corporation Providing consistent cryptographic operations
CA145137S (en) 2012-04-02 2013-07-22 Jj Mackay Canada Ltd Single space parking meter
WO2014022412A1 (en) * 2012-07-31 2014-02-06 New York University Anti-counterfeiting technique via attributes
US9087209B2 (en) * 2012-09-26 2015-07-21 Protegrity Corporation Database access control
CN103020269B (en) * 2012-12-26 2016-09-07 广州市西美信息科技有限公司 A data verification method and apparatus
EP2757467A1 (en) * 2013-01-22 2014-07-23 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Management apparatus and method for managing data elements of a version control system
US20140258720A1 (en) * 2013-03-11 2014-09-11 Barracuda Networks, Inc. Systems and methods for transparent per-file encryption and decryption via metadata identification
US9792454B2 (en) 2015-01-16 2017-10-17 Protegrity Corporation Record level data security
US9691085B2 (en) 2015-04-30 2017-06-27 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods of natural language processing and statistical analysis to identify matching categories
CA2894350A1 (en) 2015-06-16 2016-12-16 J.J. Mackay Canada Limited Coin chute with anti-fishing assembly
US9930070B2 (en) 2015-11-11 2018-03-27 International Business Machines Corporation Modifying security policies of related resources

Citations (44)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6172664B2 (en) *
US4218582A (en) * 1977-10-06 1980-08-19 The Board Of Trustees Of The Leland Stanford Junior University Public key cryptographic apparatus and method
US4375579A (en) * 1980-01-30 1983-03-01 Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Database encryption and decryption circuit and method using subkeys
US4405829A (en) * 1977-12-14 1983-09-20 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Cryptographic communications system and method
US4417338A (en) * 1981-04-13 1983-11-22 Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Cryptographic key sharing circuit and method using code correction
US4424414A (en) * 1978-05-01 1984-01-03 Board Of Trustees Of The Leland Stanford Junior University Exponentiation cryptographic apparatus and method
US4649233A (en) * 1985-04-11 1987-03-10 International Business Machines Corporation Method for establishing user authenication with composite session keys among cryptographically communicating nodes
US4757534A (en) * 1984-12-18 1988-07-12 International Business Machines Corporation Code protection using cryptography
US4850017A (en) * 1987-05-29 1989-07-18 International Business Machines Corp. Controlled use of cryptographic keys via generating station established control values
US4876716A (en) * 1986-08-22 1989-10-24 Nec Corporation Key distribution method
US4935961A (en) * 1988-07-27 1990-06-19 Gargiulo Joseph L Method and apparatus for the generation and synchronization of cryptographic keys
US4955082A (en) * 1988-01-14 1990-09-04 The Tokyo Electric Power Company Ltd. Mobile communication system
US4956769A (en) * 1988-05-16 1990-09-11 Sysmith, Inc. Occurence and value based security system for computer databases
US5136642A (en) * 1990-06-01 1992-08-04 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Cryptographic communication method and cryptographic communication device
US5148481A (en) * 1989-10-06 1992-09-15 International Business Machines Corporation Transaction system security method and apparatus
US5150411A (en) * 1990-10-24 1992-09-22 Omnisec Cryptographic system allowing encrypted communication between users with a secure mutual cipher key determined without user interaction
US5265221A (en) * 1989-03-20 1993-11-23 Tandem Computers Access restriction facility method and apparatus
US5271007A (en) * 1990-12-25 1993-12-14 Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. Network system having controlled access to available resources
US5283830A (en) * 1991-12-17 1994-02-01 International Computers Limited Security mechanism for a computer system
US5369702A (en) * 1993-10-18 1994-11-29 Tecsec Incorporated Distributed cryptographic object method
US5375169A (en) * 1993-05-28 1994-12-20 Tecsec, Incorporated Cryptographic key management method and apparatus
US5438508A (en) * 1991-06-28 1995-08-01 Digital Equipment Corporation License document interchange format for license management system
US5446903A (en) * 1993-05-04 1995-08-29 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for controlling access to data elements in a data processing system based on status of an industrial process by mapping user's security categories and industrial process steps
US5459860A (en) * 1992-10-05 1995-10-17 International Business Machines Corporation Computerized system and process for managing a distributed database system
US5493668A (en) * 1990-12-14 1996-02-20 International Business Machines Corporation Multiple processor system having software for selecting shared cache entries of an associated castout class for transfer to a DASD with one I/O operation
US5504814A (en) * 1991-07-10 1996-04-02 Hughes Aircraft Company Efficient security kernel for the 80960 extended architecture
US5606610A (en) * 1993-11-30 1997-02-25 Anonymity Protection In Sweden Ab Apparatus and method for storing data
US5659614A (en) * 1994-11-28 1997-08-19 Bailey, Iii; John E. Method and system for creating and storing a backup copy of file data stored on a computer
US5661799A (en) * 1994-02-18 1997-08-26 Infosafe Systems, Inc. Apparatus and storage medium for decrypting information
US5680452A (en) * 1993-10-18 1997-10-21 Tecsec Inc. Distributed cryptographic object method
US5699428A (en) * 1996-01-16 1997-12-16 Symantec Corporation System for automatic decryption of file data on a per-use basis and automatic re-encryption within context of multi-threaded operating system under which applications run in real-time
US5751949A (en) * 1995-05-23 1998-05-12 Mci Corporation Data security system and method
US5757908A (en) * 1994-04-25 1998-05-26 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for enabling trial period use of software products: method and apparatus for utilizing an encryption header
US5768276A (en) * 1992-10-05 1998-06-16 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Digital control channels having logical channels supporting broadcast SMS
US5915025A (en) * 1996-01-17 1999-06-22 Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. Data processing apparatus with software protecting functions
US5915017A (en) * 1996-03-13 1999-06-22 Altera Corporation Method and apparatus for securing programming data of programmable logic device
US5917915A (en) * 1994-06-24 1999-06-29 Sony Corporation Scramble/descramble method and apparatus for data broadcasting
US5933498A (en) * 1996-01-11 1999-08-03 Mrj, Inc. System for controlling access and distribution of digital property
US5940507A (en) * 1997-02-11 1999-08-17 Connected Corporation Secure file archive through encryption key management
US5963642A (en) * 1996-12-30 1999-10-05 Goldstein; Benjamin D. Method and apparatus for secure storage of data
US6098172A (en) * 1997-09-12 2000-08-01 Lucent Technologies Inc. Methods and apparatus for a computer network firewall with proxy reflection
US6172664B1 (en) * 1993-12-07 2001-01-09 Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha Electronic apparatuses capable of scrambling confidential data for display
US6199582B1 (en) * 1998-12-25 2001-03-13 Advance Denki Kougyou Kabushiki Flow control valve
US6321201B1 (en) * 1996-06-20 2001-11-20 Anonymity Protection In Sweden Ab Data security system for a database having multiple encryption levels applicable on a data element value level

Family Cites Families (35)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4827508A (en) 1986-10-14 1989-05-02 Personal Library Software, Inc. Database usage metering and protection system and method
GB9003112D0 (en) 1990-02-12 1990-04-11 Int Computers Ltd Access control mechanism
JPH03276936A (en) * 1990-03-27 1991-12-09 Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> Communication system
RU2022343C1 (en) 1990-08-01 1994-10-30 Серпуховское высшее военное командно-инженерное училище ракетных войск им.Ленинского комсомола Storage protective device
GB2248951B (en) 1990-10-17 1994-04-06 Computer Resources Research Li Retrieval of data from a stored database
US5355474A (en) 1991-09-27 1994-10-11 Thuraisngham Bhavani M System for multilevel secure database management using a knowledge base with release-based and other security constraints for query, response and update modification
US5265164A (en) 1991-10-31 1993-11-23 International Business Machines Corporation Cryptographic facility environment backup/restore and replication in a public key cryptosystem
WO1993011619A1 (en) * 1991-12-04 1993-06-10 Enco-Tone, Ltd. Method and apparatus for data encryption and transmission
US5396623A (en) 1992-10-30 1995-03-07 Bmc Software Inc. Method for editing the contents of a DB2 table using an editproc manager
JPH06175842A (en) 1992-12-07 1994-06-24 Ricoh Co Ltd Integrated document processor
US5343527A (en) 1993-10-27 1994-08-30 International Business Machines Corporation Hybrid encryption method and system for protecting reusable software components
CA2149866C (en) 1993-11-15 1999-04-27 John L. Hayes A method and system for maintaining access security of input and output operations in a computer system
GB9402935D0 (en) 1994-02-16 1994-04-06 British Telecomm A method for controlling access to a database
JPH07262072A (en) 1994-03-16 1995-10-13 Fuji Xerox Co Ltd File controller
JPH07295876A (en) 1994-04-20 1995-11-10 Fuji Xerox Co Ltd Access right controlling device
JP3453842B2 (en) 1994-04-26 2003-10-06 三菱電機株式会社 Secure system
CN1912885B (en) 1995-02-13 2010-12-22 英特特拉斯特技术公司 Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
RU2067313C1 (en) 1995-03-29 1996-09-27 Акционерное общество закрытого типа "Особое конструкторское бюро систем автоматизированного проектирования" Device for protection against unauthorized access to information that is stored in personal computer
US6078925A (en) 1995-05-01 2000-06-20 International Business Machines Corporation Computer program product for database relational extenders
US5678041A (en) 1995-06-06 1997-10-14 At&T System and method for restricting user access rights on the internet based on rating information stored in a relational database
US5706507A (en) 1995-07-05 1998-01-06 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for controlling access to data located on a content server
US6112199A (en) 1995-10-18 2000-08-29 Nelson; Paul M. Data item values
US5787175A (en) 1995-10-23 1998-07-28 Novell, Inc. Method and apparatus for collaborative document control
US6581090B1 (en) 1996-10-14 2003-06-17 Mirror Image Internet, Inc. Internet communication system
CN1141846C (en) 1997-05-09 2004-03-10 美国阿尔卡塔尔资源有限合伙公司 SCP database migration
US6397330B1 (en) 1997-06-30 2002-05-28 Taher Elgamal Cryptographic policy filters and policy control method and apparatus
US6122640A (en) 1998-09-22 2000-09-19 Platinum Technology Ip, Inc. Method and apparatus for reorganizing an active DBMS table
DE69900260D1 (en) 1998-10-16 2001-10-11 Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd Production protection system content that digital products are treated,
US6421688B1 (en) 1999-10-20 2002-07-16 Parallel Computers Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for database fault tolerance with instant transaction replication using off-the-shelf database servers and low bandwidth networks
EP1236117B1 (en) 1999-11-12 2016-03-30 Protegrity Corporation Method for reencryption of a database
EP1207462A3 (en) 2000-11-16 2005-12-21 Protegrity Research &amp; Development A method for altering encryption status in a relation database in a continuous process
EP1207443B1 (en) 2000-11-16 2015-08-26 Protegrity Corporation Encryption of databases based on a combination of hardware and software
EP1209550A3 (en) 2000-11-27 2007-08-08 Protegrity Research &amp; Development Preserving the data type of an encrypted data element
EP1211589B1 (en) 2000-11-29 2007-04-11 Protegrity Research &amp; Development A method and system for preventing impersonation of a database user
US8316051B1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2012-11-20 Oralce International Corporation Techniques for adding multiple security policies to a database system

Patent Citations (46)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6172664B2 (en) *
US4218582A (en) * 1977-10-06 1980-08-19 The Board Of Trustees Of The Leland Stanford Junior University Public key cryptographic apparatus and method
US4405829A (en) * 1977-12-14 1983-09-20 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Cryptographic communications system and method
US4424414A (en) * 1978-05-01 1984-01-03 Board Of Trustees Of The Leland Stanford Junior University Exponentiation cryptographic apparatus and method
US4375579A (en) * 1980-01-30 1983-03-01 Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Database encryption and decryption circuit and method using subkeys
US4417338A (en) * 1981-04-13 1983-11-22 Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Cryptographic key sharing circuit and method using code correction
US4757534A (en) * 1984-12-18 1988-07-12 International Business Machines Corporation Code protection using cryptography
US4649233A (en) * 1985-04-11 1987-03-10 International Business Machines Corporation Method for establishing user authenication with composite session keys among cryptographically communicating nodes
US4876716A (en) * 1986-08-22 1989-10-24 Nec Corporation Key distribution method
US4850017A (en) * 1987-05-29 1989-07-18 International Business Machines Corp. Controlled use of cryptographic keys via generating station established control values
US4955082A (en) * 1988-01-14 1990-09-04 The Tokyo Electric Power Company Ltd. Mobile communication system
US4956769A (en) * 1988-05-16 1990-09-11 Sysmith, Inc. Occurence and value based security system for computer databases
US4935961A (en) * 1988-07-27 1990-06-19 Gargiulo Joseph L Method and apparatus for the generation and synchronization of cryptographic keys
US5265221A (en) * 1989-03-20 1993-11-23 Tandem Computers Access restriction facility method and apparatus
US5148481A (en) * 1989-10-06 1992-09-15 International Business Machines Corporation Transaction system security method and apparatus
US5136642A (en) * 1990-06-01 1992-08-04 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Cryptographic communication method and cryptographic communication device
US5150411A (en) * 1990-10-24 1992-09-22 Omnisec Cryptographic system allowing encrypted communication between users with a secure mutual cipher key determined without user interaction
US5493668A (en) * 1990-12-14 1996-02-20 International Business Machines Corporation Multiple processor system having software for selecting shared cache entries of an associated castout class for transfer to a DASD with one I/O operation
US5271007A (en) * 1990-12-25 1993-12-14 Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. Network system having controlled access to available resources
US5438508A (en) * 1991-06-28 1995-08-01 Digital Equipment Corporation License document interchange format for license management system
US5504814A (en) * 1991-07-10 1996-04-02 Hughes Aircraft Company Efficient security kernel for the 80960 extended architecture
US5283830A (en) * 1991-12-17 1994-02-01 International Computers Limited Security mechanism for a computer system
US5768276A (en) * 1992-10-05 1998-06-16 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Digital control channels having logical channels supporting broadcast SMS
US5459860A (en) * 1992-10-05 1995-10-17 International Business Machines Corporation Computerized system and process for managing a distributed database system
US5446903A (en) * 1993-05-04 1995-08-29 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for controlling access to data elements in a data processing system based on status of an industrial process by mapping user's security categories and industrial process steps
US5375169A (en) * 1993-05-28 1994-12-20 Tecsec, Incorporated Cryptographic key management method and apparatus
US5717755A (en) * 1993-10-18 1998-02-10 Tecsec,Inc. Distributed cryptographic object method
US5369702A (en) * 1993-10-18 1994-11-29 Tecsec Incorporated Distributed cryptographic object method
US5680452A (en) * 1993-10-18 1997-10-21 Tecsec Inc. Distributed cryptographic object method
US5898781A (en) * 1993-10-18 1999-04-27 Tecsec Incorporated Distributed cryptographic object method
US5606610A (en) * 1993-11-30 1997-02-25 Anonymity Protection In Sweden Ab Apparatus and method for storing data
US6172664B1 (en) * 1993-12-07 2001-01-09 Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha Electronic apparatuses capable of scrambling confidential data for display
US5661799A (en) * 1994-02-18 1997-08-26 Infosafe Systems, Inc. Apparatus and storage medium for decrypting information
US5757908A (en) * 1994-04-25 1998-05-26 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for enabling trial period use of software products: method and apparatus for utilizing an encryption header
US5917915A (en) * 1994-06-24 1999-06-29 Sony Corporation Scramble/descramble method and apparatus for data broadcasting
US5659614A (en) * 1994-11-28 1997-08-19 Bailey, Iii; John E. Method and system for creating and storing a backup copy of file data stored on a computer
US5751949A (en) * 1995-05-23 1998-05-12 Mci Corporation Data security system and method
US5933498A (en) * 1996-01-11 1999-08-03 Mrj, Inc. System for controlling access and distribution of digital property
US5699428A (en) * 1996-01-16 1997-12-16 Symantec Corporation System for automatic decryption of file data on a per-use basis and automatic re-encryption within context of multi-threaded operating system under which applications run in real-time
US5915025A (en) * 1996-01-17 1999-06-22 Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. Data processing apparatus with software protecting functions
US5915017A (en) * 1996-03-13 1999-06-22 Altera Corporation Method and apparatus for securing programming data of programmable logic device
US6321201B1 (en) * 1996-06-20 2001-11-20 Anonymity Protection In Sweden Ab Data security system for a database having multiple encryption levels applicable on a data element value level
US5963642A (en) * 1996-12-30 1999-10-05 Goldstein; Benjamin D. Method and apparatus for secure storage of data
US5940507A (en) * 1997-02-11 1999-08-17 Connected Corporation Secure file archive through encryption key management
US6098172A (en) * 1997-09-12 2000-08-01 Lucent Technologies Inc. Methods and apparatus for a computer network firewall with proxy reflection
US6199582B1 (en) * 1998-12-25 2001-03-13 Advance Denki Kougyou Kabushiki Flow control valve

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20090187553A1 (en) * 2008-01-21 2009-07-23 Suman Kumar Sarkar Method and system for facilitating verification of an entity based on business requirements
US7836046B2 (en) * 2008-01-21 2010-11-16 Oracle Financial Services Software Limited Method and system for facilitating verification of an entity based on business requirements
US9524345B1 (en) 2009-08-31 2016-12-20 Richard VanderDrift Enhancing content using linked context
US9639707B1 (en) 2010-01-14 2017-05-02 Richard W. VanderDrift Secure data storage and communication for network computing

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date Type
EP1477881A3 (en) 2013-02-27 application
JP2000512785A (en) 2000-09-26 application
EP0891661B1 (en) 2004-08-18 grant
EP0891661A1 (en) 1999-01-20 application
ES2230609T3 (en) 2005-05-01 grant
US8402281B2 (en) 2013-03-19 grant
RU2198423C2 (en) 2003-02-10 grant
CN1222272A (en) 1999-07-07 application
DE69730321D1 (en) 2004-09-23 grant
US20110246788A1 (en) 2011-10-06 application
US20020174352A1 (en) 2002-11-21 application
JP4167300B2 (en) 2008-10-15 grant
US6321201B1 (en) 2001-11-20 grant
DE69730321T2 (en) 2005-09-08 grant
CN1146178C (en) 2004-04-14 grant
KR20000022057A (en) 2000-04-25 application
EP1477881A2 (en) 2004-11-17 application
WO1997049211A1 (en) 1997-12-24 application

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Abbott et al. Security analysis and enhancements of computer operating systems
Simon et al. Separation of duty in role-based environments
US6275824B1 (en) System and method for managing data privacy in a database management system
US4262329A (en) Security system for data processing
US4683968A (en) System for preventing software piracy employing multi-encrypted keys and single decryption circuit modules
US5534855A (en) Method and system for certificate based alias detection
US5048085A (en) Transaction system security method and apparatus
Clark et al. A comparison of commercial and military computer security policies
US6292798B1 (en) Method and system for controlling access to data resources and protecting computing system resources from unauthorized access
US6968456B1 (en) Method and system for providing a tamper-proof storage of an audit trail in a database
US6035399A (en) Checkpoint object
US6484173B1 (en) Controlling access to a storage device
EP0302710A2 (en) A method of controlling the use of computer programs
US20040133803A1 (en) Methods and apparatus for protecting information
US7844829B2 (en) Secured database system with built-in antivirus protection
US6978366B1 (en) Secure document management system
US5671412A (en) License management system for software applications
US7380267B2 (en) Policy setting support tool
US20110145593A1 (en) Verifiable trust for data through wrapper composition
US20030041250A1 (en) Privacy of data on a computer platform
Sandhu et al. Role-based access control: A multi-dimensional view
US7322047B2 (en) Data security system and method associated with data mining
US20020174369A1 (en) Trusted computer system
EP0773490A1 (en) Security system for protecting information stored in storage media
US7313825B2 (en) Data security system and method for portable device