US20060031451A1 - Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure - Google Patents

Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20060031451A1
US20060031451A1 US11/221,698 US22169805A US2006031451A1 US 20060031451 A1 US20060031451 A1 US 20060031451A1 US 22169805 A US22169805 A US 22169805A US 2006031451 A1 US2006031451 A1 US 2006031451A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
resource
policy
policy data
device
data structure
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US11/221,698
Inventor
Victor Lortz
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Intel Corp
Original Assignee
Intel Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority to US09/908,437 priority Critical patent/US6957261B2/en
Application filed by Intel Corp filed Critical Intel Corp
Priority to US11/221,698 priority patent/US20060031451A1/en
Assigned to INTEL CORPORATION reassignment INTEL CORPORATION ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: LORTZ, VICTOR B.
Publication of US20060031451A1 publication Critical patent/US20060031451A1/en
Application status is Abandoned legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00Arrangements for maintenance or administration or management of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/28Security in network management, e.g. restricting network management access
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00Arrangements for maintenance or administration or management of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/08Configuration management of network or network elements
    • H04L41/0893Assignment of logical groupings to network elements; Policy based network management or configuration
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to network resources
    • H04L63/101Access control lists [ACL]

Abstract

Managing policies includes receiving policy data associated with a resource from a resource owner over a network, authenticating the resource owner to determine whether to accept the received policy data, and storing the received policy data in a centralized data structure if the resource owner is authenticated.

Description

    CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
  • This application is a continuation application of and claims priority to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/908,437, filed Jul. 17, 2001.
  • BACKGROUND
  • The invention relates to resource policy management.
  • Policy data can include rules and access control information specifying permission levels associated with accessing a resource and to whom the permission is granted. It is important for a policy management system to allow the resource owner to be able to participate in the definition and the administration of policy data related to resources associated with a resource device.
  • In addition, the policy management system should be able to handle resources that may be distributed over a loosely coupled network such as a network using universal plug and play (UPnP) protocols. Furthermore, since the resources are distributed over a network and may be associated with different resource owners, the policy management system should provide security features for preventing unauthorized access to the resources and to policy data associated with the resources.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a policy management system.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an authorization device.
  • FIGS. 3A-3B show data structures.
  • FIGS. 4A, 4B, and 4C are flow charts of methods for resource policy management.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a system 10 with a client device 12 that can request access to a resource device 14 over a network 16. The resource 14 device includes one or more resources 15 and policy data 13 associated with the resources. The resource device 14 can send the policy data 13 associated with the resource 15 to an authorization device 18 to be stored in a centralized policy data structure 22 such as a database.
  • The authorization device 18 includes a policy manager 20 that manages the centralized policy data structure 22. The centralized policy data structure 22 includes authorization data and access control information for controlling access to resource 15. The resource device 14 can determine whether to grant a client device 12 access to the resource 15 by evaluating the policy data 13 associated with the resource 15. The operation of the system 10, including the authorization device 18 and the policy manager 20, is discussed in detail below.
  • The resource device 14 can be implemented, for example, as a personal computer (PC) configured to include a resource 15 such as a multimedia resource for playing videos over the network 16. The client device 12 can request access to the multimedia resource 15 to play a video. Before the client device 12 is permitted to access the multimedia resource 15, a determination is made as to whether the client device is authorized to access the resource. The resource device 14 can make this determination locally by evaluating the resource policy data 13 associated with the multimedia resource. Alternatively, the resource device 14 can query the policy manager 20 to make the authorization determination. The system 10 can include multiple client devices 12, resource devices 14 and authorization devices 18.
  • FIG. 2 shows an authorization device 18 having a policy manager 20. The authorization device 18 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 31 and a memory 35 connected to a bus 33. The CPU 31 can include, for example, an Intel Pentium® processor, or other processor. The CPU 31 is capable of processing data and executing programs residing in memory 35. Such programs can include an operating system, device drivers and other programs for the operation of the authorization device 18. The memory 35 can include static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or other memory.
  • The policy manager 20 can be implemented as a program that is executed by the CPU 31. The policy manager 20 manages the centralized policy data structure 22 which can be stored in a storage resource 24. Such a storage resource 24 can include, for example, a hard disk or an optical drive. The policy manager 20 includes the capability of allowing a user to access and edit the policy data structure 22 either locally or remotely over the network.
  • The centralized policy data structure 22 includes device policy data structure 22 a and user device policy data structure 22 b. The device policy data structure 22 a can include authorization and policy rules for controlling access to the resources 15 associated with each resource device 14. The user policy data structure 22 b also can include authorization and policy rules. The policy rules can reflect the preferences of interested entities such as the owner or manufacturer of the resource device 14 and the owner of the network. The authorization device 18 can be coupled to the network 16 using wired or wireless technologies. Such networks 16 can include, for example, the Internet, Ethernet, local area network (LAN), or peer-to-peer network.
  • FIG. 3A shows an example of a device policy data structure 22 a associated with a particular resource 15 and resource device 14. An entity responsible for the resource device 14 such as a resource owner can send policy data 13 associated with the resource device 14 to the authorization device 18. The authorization device 18 merges the received policy data 13 with the device policy data structure 22 a. The device policy data 13 and the device policy data structure 22 a can be organized according to various formats including an extensible markup language (XML) or other format that can be communicated over a network.
  • Each device policy data structure 22 a is identified by a unique policy identifier attribute 30 which may prevent unwanted collisions between device policy structures belonging to other resources and resource devices. As discussed earlier, the authorization device 18 can be configured to store the device policy data structure 22 a in the centralized policy data structure 22.
  • As shown in FIG. 3A, each device policy data structure 22 a is organized into a first portion 34 and a second portion 40. The first portion 34 corresponds to principal information specifying designated principals that can access the device policy data structure 22 a. A principal can include an entity that created the contents of the device policy structure 22 a. Examples of such an entity include the resource device 14, a client device 12, or other entity with an interest in the resource device. Although one principal entry is listed in the first portion 34, multiple principal entries can be specified to access the resources defined in the device policy data structure 22 a.
  • The policy manager 20 can use public/private key cryptography techniques to provide access control to the device policy data structure 22 a. Each principal entry can be identified by a key information attribute 36 containing the public/private key information associated with the principal entry. The key information attribute 36 manages access to the device policy data structure 22 a and allows secure communication with the authorization device 18. For example, a principal could use the private key corresponding to the key information attribute 36 to sign a request digitally and then send the digitally signed request to the authorization device 18. The authorization device 18 authenticates the received digitally signed request to determine whether to grant the principal access to the resource and the device policy data structure 22 a.
  • The second portion 40 includes data and resource operations provided by the resource device 14. The second portion 40 includes a resource name attribute 42 identifying the name of a resource 15 associated with the resource device 14. The actual name of the resource referenced by the resource name attribute 42 does not have to be unique because the resource name attribute is referenced with respect to the policy identifier attribute 30.
  • Each resource name attribute 42 also can include an access control list (ACL) attribute 41. In turn, each ACL attribute 41 can contain an access control entry (ACE) 43. These attributes contain information for controlling access to the resource 15 and the device policy data structure 22 a. Although one ACL attribute 41 and one ACE attribute 43 are illustrated, the policy manager 20 can manage more than one ACL attribute, and each ACL attribute can contain more than one ACE attribute.
  • Each ACE attribute 43 can include a subject attribute 45 specifying the public/private key information associated with a particular principal identified by the first portion 34 and who may be permitted to access a resource identified in a resource name attribute 42. For example, the key information in the subject attribute 45 corresponds to the key information in the key information attribute 36. As a result, a principal having key information specified in the key information attribute 36 can access the resource specified in the resource name attribute 42.
  • In addition, the ACE attribute 43 can include an access permission level attribute 44 that can be set to one of four access levels of permission in decreasing order of authority: (1) “owner” level which is the highest level of access, (2) “editor” level which allows access for editing, (3) “reviewer” level which allows access for reading only, and (4) “none” level which denies all access. The interpretation of the values specified in the access permission level attribute 44 can depend on the particular resource device 14. The permission level attribute 44 can be arranged to provide a hierarchy of permission levels. For example, a principal with a high access permission level also may be granted the privileges associated with a lower access permission level.
  • A principal, such as a resource owner, that is responsible for the resource device 14 can define the resource 15 identified in the resource name attribute 42. Resource names can be hierarchically structured to allow inheritance of an access permission level from a parent node in the hierarchy. For example, first and second resource can be identified by resource name attributes 42 of “PC” and “PC/media” respectively. The ACE attribute 43 associated with the first resource “PC” is evaluated if the ACE attribute associated with the second resource “PC/Media” does not grant the requested permission. Processing of an ACL attribute 41 can proceed in a bottom-up fashion. A parent node cannot revoke privileges granted by a child node by specifying an ACE attribute with a lower level of access than that granted by the parent node.
  • The resource names and their corresponding inheritance structure are within the scope of a single device policy structure 22 a. ACLs cannot inherit across device policy structures 22 a. However, as discussed below, resources 15 can inherit ACLs from resource groups defined in the user policy data structure 22 b defined by using an inheritance attribute 46 with an access level constraint. These restrictions reduce the likelihood that access control policies defined by a resource device 14 will be compromised by an unauthorized entity.
  • FIG. 3B illustrates an optional user policy data structure 22 b associated with resources 15 and resource devices 14. The user policy data structure 22 b includes a first portion 60 and a second portion 61. The first portion 60 is organized based on the device policy structure previously discussed. For example, the first portion 60 includes a principal attribute 34 and resource attributes 42 a and 42 b. The second portion 61 includes at least one principal group attribute 65 containing references to principal information 34 specified in the first portion 60. The second portion 61 also includes at least one resource group attribute 66 containing references to ACLs associated with resources 15.
  • As discussed below, use of a principal group attribute 65 and a resource group attribute 66 can allow resources and principals that have been defined by different resource devices 14 to be classified and organized according to the preferences of a single user or network owner. As a result, the administration of the policies included in the centralized policy data structure 22 is simplified.
  • A resource group attribute 65 permits the construction of groups of resources such that one ACL can apply to all the resources referenced in the resource group. In addition, the use of a resource group 66 allows a user such as a resource holder to author ACLs that can be included in the resource defined in the device policy data structure 22 a.
  • The policy manager 20 can process resource information in a resource group 66 contained in a user policy data structure 22 b in a manner similar to how it processes resource information in a resource device policy data structure 22 a. However, a resource group 66 can include explicit references to externally defined resources. The explicit references can cause the ACLs in the resource group 66 (and any of the parent nodes) to be processed after the resource's ACLs are processed. If the resource's ACL does not specify policy data to resolve a specific query, then the policy data of the resource group 66 is inherited. This external inheritance only occurs if the resource in the device policy data structure 22 a has the inheritance attribute 46 set.
  • The inheritance attribute 46, however, can place a limit on the privilege level that can be inherited. For example, a resource group 66 may grant “owner” privileges to a principal, but if a resource included in the resource group 66 limits the inheritance attribute to “editor,” that principal will have only “editor” privileges for the resource.
  • Since the ACLs defined in resource group ACLs in the user policy data structure 22 b may not inherit from the ACLs of resources defined in the device policy data structure 22 a, the chain of trust from a resource device 14 to a policy manager. 20 does not extend arbitrarily to other devices on the network 16. As a result, the resource user or holder must explicitly empower a key under the control of another resource device to access a resource group.
  • If a resource device 14 delegates authorization processing to the policy manager 20, the resource device should be able to trust the policy manager to guard its security information such as public/private key data. However, the trust relationship for empowering other keys is between a resource device 14 and the policy manager 20, and not between different resource devices.
  • FIG. 4A illustrates the processing requests to add and edit policy data. A policy manager 20 receives 100 policy data 13 from the resource device 14 associated with the resource 15 over the network 16. In one embodiment, the policy data 13 is sent over the network 16 in an XML format. The policy data 13 includes, for example, authorization policies, policy rules, or other policy-related data. The policy data 13 does not have to be received over the network, but can be edited locally directly through a user interface exposed by the authorization device. The policy data can grant supplementary conditional access to the resources of the resource owners.
  • Once the policy manager 20 has received the policy data 13, the policy manager authenticates 102 the resource owner. Such authentication can include determining whether to accept a request to add the policy data or to accept a request to edit the policy data already stored in the centralized policy data structure 22. Authentication can be accomplished using authentication techniques such as public key cryptography.
  • The resource owner can digitally sign policy data 13 in an XML format using a private key of a public/private key pair assigned to the resource owner. The policy manager 20 then can use the public key of the public/private key pair to authenticate the document sent by the resource owner. The authentication technique reduces the likelihood that an unauthorized user will add to or edit the policy data stored in the centralized policy data structure 22.
  • The policy manager 20 then determines 104 whether to accept the policy data 13 based on the results of authenticating the resource owner. If the authentication results are unsuccessful, then the resource owner is not authorized and the policy data 13 is rejected 106.
  • Otherwise, if the results of the authentication evaluation (block 102) reveal that the resource owner is authorized, then the policy manager 20 stores 108 the received policy data 13 in the centralized policy data structure 22. As discussed earlier, the resource owner can send two types of policy data 13 including device policy data 22 a and user policy data 22 b. The policy manager 20 can handle both types of policy data and merge them into the centralized policy data structure 22.
  • FIG. 4B illustrates a method for evaluating policy queries. The policy manager 20 receives 200 a policy query from a resource owner associated with the resource device 14. The policy query can include a query from a resource device 14 asking whether a request from a client to access a resource should be granted. The policy query can include a policy identifier, a resource name, an access permission level, and client credentials associated with the client seeking access to the resource. The information included in the policy query can be found in the centralized policy data structure 22.
  • Once the policy manager 20 receives (block 200) the policy query, it authenticates 202 the resource owner to determine whether to accept the policy query. As discussed earlier, an authentication technique that uses a public/private key pair can be used to determine the authenticity of the resource owner. The resource owner digitally signs the policy query using the private key of a public/private key pair assigned to the resource owner. The policy manager 20 then can use the public key of the public/private key pair to authenticate the policy query sent by the resource owner. Authentication reduces the likelihood that an unauthorized policy query is processed by the policy manager 20.
  • The policy manager 20 then determines 204 whether to accept the policy query based on the results of the authentication process (block 202). If the resource owner is not authorized then the policy query is rejected 206.
  • Otherwise, if the results of the authentication process (block 202) reveal that the policy query from the resource owner is valid, then the policy manager 20 searches 208 the centralized policy data structure 22 for the policy data specified by the policy identifier accompanying the policy query. Alternatively, the resource owner can send policy data 13 along with the policy query. In that case, the policy manager 20 can use the policy data 13 to evaluate the policy query.
  • The policy manager 20 evaluates 210 the policy data found during the search process (block 208) to determine whether the policy data grants the client access to the resource based on the client credentials and the access permission level. If the results of the evaluation reveal that the policy data does not grant the client access to the resource, then the policy manager 20 performs an additional search for a user policy data structure 22 b associated with the resource name. As discussed earlier, the user policy data structure 22 b may reference resource information in the device policy data structure 22 a.
  • The policy manager 20 then determines whether the user policy data structure 22 a grants the client access to the resource based on inheritance at least at the access permission level. If the policy data does not grant the client access to the resource, then the policy manager 20 performs a further search that includes searching for a user policy data structure 22 a associated with the resource name. The policy manager 20 then determines whether the policy data grants the client access to the resource based on the client credentials at least at the access permission level.
  • If the results of the policy data evaluation procedures (block 210) indicate that the policy data does not grant access to the client, the policy manager returns 212 a “failure” message to the resource owner. Otherwise, if the policy data evaluation procedures (block 210) indicate that the client should be granted access to the resource, then the policy manager 20 returns 214 a “successful” message to the resource owner. The resource owner receives the message and can take appropriate action such as notifying the client of the status of the resource request.
  • FIG. 4C illustrates a method of evaluating a resource request from a client device 12. The resource device 14 receives 300 a resource request from the client device 12 over the network 16. The resource request can include, for example, a request to access a resource 15 associated with the resource device 14.
  • Once the resource device 14 receives the resource request (block 300) from the client device 12, the resource device forwards 302 the request to the policy manager 20 associated with the authorization device 18. The policy manager 20 searches for policy data in the centralized policy data structure 22 based on the resource request. Once the policy manager 20 finds the policy data in the centralized policy data structure 22, it retrieves the policy data and sends it to the resource device 14.
  • The resource device 14 subsequently receives 304 the policy data from the policy manager 20 over the network 16. The resource device 14 evaluates 306 the received policy data to determine whether to grant the client access to the resource associated with the resource request. Evaluating the resource request includes examining the information accompanying the request such as the credentials of the client and the resource the client is seeking to access. Information in the client request is compared to information in the policy data received from the policy agent. The resource device grants 310 the client access to the resource if the evaluation results indicate that the client is permitted to access to the resource. Otherwise, the resource request from the client is denied 308.
  • Alternatively, instead of having the resource device 14 evaluate the policy data as discussed above, the resource device can receive a signal from the policy manager 20 indicating whether to grant access to the client. As before, the policy manager 20 evaluates the resource request and determines whether to grant the client access to the resource associated with the device.
  • In yet another embodiment, the resource device 14 can be configured to operate in a hybrid mode. In the hybrid mode, the resource device 14 can evaluate the policy data locally without forwarding the request. The decision whether to forward the request depends on factors such as the contents of the resource request, the status of the policy manager 20 or other factors. If the policy manager 20 is not operational at the time of the resource request, then the resource device 14 can perform the evaluation process locally and bypass the non-operational policy manager.
  • On other hand, the resource device 14 can forward the resource request to the policy manager 20 so that the policy manager evaluates the resource request and determines whether to grant access. As discussed above, the resource device 14 also can forward the resource request to the policy manager 20 and receive policy data from the policy manager 20. The policy data is then evaluated locally. The hybrid mode of operation can provide the resource device 14 with flexibility in processing resource requests.
  • The foregoing techniques can allow owners of resource devices 14 and associated resources 15 to participate actively in the definition and enforcement of centrally managed policy data. For example, a particular resource device or resource may contain a specialized feature requiring access control. The holder of the resource can add customized policy for controlling access to the specialized feature to the centralized policy data structure 22. In addition, the techniques can allow resource devices 14 that are dynamically added to a network to configure polices automatically and independently without manual intervention. Moreover, the resource device can inherit access control privileges from the centralized policy data structure 22.
  • The foregoing techniques can help secure the process of defining and enforcing policy data. A trust relationship can be established between the resource owner and the authorization device 18 using public key cryptography techniques. A unique identifier (e.g., cryptographic hash value) of a public key can be incorporated into the policy data to also function as a global identifier. As a result, the use of public key cryptography can reduce the likelihood of collisions between resource owners when accessing the policy data stored in the centralized policy data structure 22.
  • The techniques can provide an approach to access control based on the policy data structure instead of heavyweight and domain specific access control mechanisms such as Windows™ NT LAN manager (NTLM) or Kerberos. As a result, a resource owner using the above techniques can access the centralized policy data structure 22 using public key cryptography without needing to log onto the network and present a NTLM or a kerberos password.
  • Various modifications may be made. For example, other techniques can be used to encrypt policy data over the network. Such techniques include secured socket layer (SSL), transport layer security (TLS) and Internet protocol security (IPSEC). These alternative techniques offer different advantages, features and tradeoffs that should be examined before selecting a particular technique.
  • Various features of the invention can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software. For example, some aspects of the system can be implemented in computer programs executing on programmable computers. Each program can be implemented in a high level procedural or object-oriented programming language to communicate with a computer system. Furthermore, each such computer program can be stored on a storage medium, such as read-only-memory (ROM) readable by a general or special purpose programmable computer or processor, for configuring and operating the computer when the storage medium is read by the computer to perform the functions described above.
  • Other implementations are within the scope of the following claims.

Claims (1)

1. A device and/or method substantially as shown and described.
US11/221,698 2001-07-17 2005-09-08 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure Abandoned US20060031451A1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US09/908,437 US6957261B2 (en) 2001-07-17 2001-07-17 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure
US11/221,698 US20060031451A1 (en) 2001-07-17 2005-09-08 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11/221,698 US20060031451A1 (en) 2001-07-17 2005-09-08 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09/908,437 Continuation US6957261B2 (en) 2001-07-17 2001-07-17 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20060031451A1 true US20060031451A1 (en) 2006-02-09

Family

ID=25425802

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09/908,437 Expired - Fee Related US6957261B2 (en) 2001-07-17 2001-07-17 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure
US11/221,698 Abandoned US20060031451A1 (en) 2001-07-17 2005-09-08 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09/908,437 Expired - Fee Related US6957261B2 (en) 2001-07-17 2001-07-17 Resource policy management using a centralized policy data structure

Country Status (1)

Country Link
US (2) US6957261B2 (en)

Cited By (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060239279A1 (en) * 2005-04-22 2006-10-26 Microsoft Corporation Contact management in a serverless peer-to-peer system
US20060239295A1 (en) * 2005-04-22 2006-10-26 Microsoft Corporation Application programming interface for inviting participants in a serverless peer to peer network
US20110072497A1 (en) * 2005-10-31 2011-03-24 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. System and method of using personal data
US20130339517A1 (en) * 2012-06-15 2013-12-19 Symantec Corporation Techniques for providing dynamic account and device management
US20150256868A1 (en) * 2010-11-30 2015-09-10 At&T Intellectual Property I, Lp System for monetizing resources accessible to a mobile device server
WO2016015363A1 (en) * 2014-08-01 2016-02-04 苏州阔地网络科技有限公司 Resource control architecture, and method using said architecture
US9338169B2 (en) 2010-09-15 2016-05-10 At&T Intellectual Property I, Lp System for managing resources accessible to a mobile device server
US9369773B2 (en) 2010-08-20 2016-06-14 At&T Intellectual Property I, Lp System for establishing communications with a mobile device server
US9392316B2 (en) 2010-10-28 2016-07-12 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Messaging abstraction in a mobile device server
US9438530B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2016-09-06 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. System for synchronizing information
US9521129B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2016-12-13 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing software applications of a mobile device server
US9602868B2 (en) 2012-12-05 2017-03-21 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Method and apparatus for controlling a media device
US9654366B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2017-05-16 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing mobile device servers
US9736198B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2017-08-15 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Processing messages with a device server operating in a telephone

Families Citing this family (128)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7673323B1 (en) 1998-10-28 2010-03-02 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for maintaining security in a distributed computer network
US7350226B2 (en) * 2001-12-13 2008-03-25 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for analyzing security policies in a distributed computer network
US7277953B2 (en) * 2001-04-18 2007-10-02 Emc Corporation Integrated procedure for partitioning network data services among multiple subscribers
US9900286B2 (en) 2001-04-26 2018-02-20 Nokia Technologies Oy Device classification for media delivery
US7107610B2 (en) * 2001-05-11 2006-09-12 Intel Corporation Resource authorization
US7243369B2 (en) 2001-08-06 2007-07-10 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Uniform resource locator access management and control system and method
CA2410118C (en) * 2001-10-26 2007-12-18 Research In Motion Limited System and method for controlling configuration settings for mobile communication devices and services
US7921284B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2011-04-05 Gary Mark Kinghorn Method and system for protecting electronic data in enterprise environment
US7921450B1 (en) * 2001-12-12 2011-04-05 Klimenty Vainstein Security system using indirect key generation from access rules and methods therefor
US7930756B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2011-04-19 Crocker Steven Toye Multi-level cryptographic transformations for securing digital assets
US7380120B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2008-05-27 Guardian Data Storage, Llc Secured data format for access control
US7565683B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2009-07-21 Weiqing Huang Method and system for implementing changes to security policies in a distributed security system
USRE43906E1 (en) 2001-12-12 2013-01-01 Guardian Data Storage Llc Method and apparatus for securing digital assets
US7783765B2 (en) 2001-12-12 2010-08-24 Hildebrand Hal S System and method for providing distributed access control to secured documents
US8006280B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2011-08-23 Hildebrand Hal S Security system for generating keys from access rules in a decentralized manner and methods therefor
US10033700B2 (en) 2001-12-12 2018-07-24 Intellectual Ventures I Llc Dynamic evaluation of access rights
US7921288B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2011-04-05 Hildebrand Hal S System and method for providing different levels of key security for controlling access to secured items
US7681034B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2010-03-16 Chang-Ping Lee Method and apparatus for securing electronic data
US10360545B2 (en) 2001-12-12 2019-07-23 Guardian Data Storage, Llc Method and apparatus for accessing secured electronic data off-line
USRE41546E1 (en) 2001-12-12 2010-08-17 Klimenty Vainstein Method and system for managing security tiers
US8065713B1 (en) 2001-12-12 2011-11-22 Klimenty Vainstein System and method for providing multi-location access management to secured items
US7260555B2 (en) 2001-12-12 2007-08-21 Guardian Data Storage, Llc Method and architecture for providing pervasive security to digital assets
US7950066B1 (en) 2001-12-21 2011-05-24 Guardian Data Storage, Llc Method and system for restricting use of a clipboard application
US7334039B1 (en) 2002-02-01 2008-02-19 Oracle International Corporation Techniques for generating rules for a dynamic rule-based system that responds to requests for a resource on a network
US7243138B1 (en) * 2002-02-01 2007-07-10 Oracle International Corporation Techniques for dynamic rule-based response to a request for a resource on a network
US7855972B2 (en) * 2002-02-08 2010-12-21 Enterasys Networks, Inc. Creating, modifying and storing service abstractions and role abstractions representing one or more packet rules
US7430667B2 (en) * 2002-04-04 2008-09-30 Activcard Ireland Limited Media router
US7614077B2 (en) * 2002-04-10 2009-11-03 International Business Machines Corporation Persistent access control of protected content
US7725560B2 (en) 2002-05-01 2010-05-25 Bea Systems Inc. Web service-enabled portlet wizard
US20030229501A1 (en) * 2002-06-03 2003-12-11 Copeland Bruce Wayne Systems and methods for efficient policy distribution
US7469338B2 (en) * 2002-07-29 2008-12-23 Broadcom Corporation System and method for cryptographic control of system configurations
US7512810B1 (en) 2002-09-11 2009-03-31 Guardian Data Storage Llc Method and system for protecting encrypted files transmitted over a network
US8176334B2 (en) 2002-09-30 2012-05-08 Guardian Data Storage, Llc Document security system that permits external users to gain access to secured files
US7296235B2 (en) * 2002-10-10 2007-11-13 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Plugin architecture for extending polices
US20040073668A1 (en) * 2002-10-10 2004-04-15 Shivaram Bhat Policy delegation for access control
US7836310B1 (en) 2002-11-01 2010-11-16 Yevgeniy Gutnik Security system that uses indirect password-based encryption
US7890990B1 (en) 2002-12-20 2011-02-15 Klimenty Vainstein Security system with staging capabilities
US7653930B2 (en) 2003-02-14 2010-01-26 Bea Systems, Inc. Method for role and resource policy management optimization
US7591000B2 (en) 2003-02-14 2009-09-15 Oracle International Corporation System and method for hierarchical role-based entitlements
US7293286B2 (en) 2003-02-20 2007-11-06 Bea Systems, Inc. Federated management of content repositories
US7840614B2 (en) 2003-02-20 2010-11-23 Bea Systems, Inc. Virtual content repository application program interface
US7389511B1 (en) * 2003-02-25 2008-06-17 Novell, Inc. Method for performing distributed administration
US7810036B2 (en) 2003-02-28 2010-10-05 Bea Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for personalizing a portal
US7437441B1 (en) 2003-02-28 2008-10-14 Microsoft Corporation Using deltas for efficient policy distribution
US8707034B1 (en) 2003-05-30 2014-04-22 Intellectual Ventures I Llc Method and system for using remote headers to secure electronic files
US7558855B2 (en) * 2003-06-09 2009-07-07 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Vending network resources
US7594256B2 (en) * 2003-06-26 2009-09-22 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Remote interface for policy decisions governing access control
US20050033796A1 (en) * 2003-08-06 2005-02-10 International Business Machines Corporation Online autonomic operations guide
FR2859061B1 (en) * 2003-08-19 2005-12-02 Cit Alcatel Method and device for generating roles for elements of a communications network, based on role models
US7836312B2 (en) * 2003-08-28 2010-11-16 International Business Machines Corporation Information acquisition enabled/disabled inspection system
US20050050013A1 (en) * 2003-08-28 2005-03-03 Sharp Laboratories Of America, Inc. System and method for policy-driven device queries
US8015301B2 (en) * 2003-09-30 2011-09-06 Novell, Inc. Policy and attribute based access to a resource
US8127366B2 (en) 2003-09-30 2012-02-28 Guardian Data Storage, Llc Method and apparatus for transitioning between states of security policies used to secure electronic documents
US7703140B2 (en) 2003-09-30 2010-04-20 Guardian Data Storage, Llc Method and system for securing digital assets using process-driven security policies
US7467415B2 (en) * 2003-09-30 2008-12-16 Novell, Inc. Distributed dynamic security for document collaboration
US7299493B1 (en) * 2003-09-30 2007-11-20 Novell, Inc. Techniques for dynamically establishing and managing authentication and trust relationships
JP4014165B2 (en) * 2003-10-29 2007-11-28 インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーションInternational Business Maschines Corporation Access management system, access execution device, access execution program, access execution method, and recording medium
US7316027B2 (en) * 2004-02-03 2008-01-01 Novell, Inc. Techniques for dynamically establishing and managing trust relationships
US8046763B1 (en) * 2004-02-20 2011-10-25 Oracle America, Inc. Regulation of resource requests to control rate of resource consumption
US8613102B2 (en) 2004-03-30 2013-12-17 Intellectual Ventures I Llc Method and system for providing document retention using cryptography
US7774601B2 (en) 2004-04-06 2010-08-10 Bea Systems, Inc. Method for delegated administration
US7236990B2 (en) 2004-04-13 2007-06-26 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for information lifecycle workflow integration
US7246138B2 (en) 2004-04-13 2007-07-17 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for content lifecycles in a virtual content repository that integrates a plurality of content repositories
US7240076B2 (en) 2004-04-13 2007-07-03 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for providing a lifecycle for information in a virtual content repository
US7236975B2 (en) * 2004-04-13 2007-06-26 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for controlling access to anode in a virtual content repository that integrates a plurality of content repositories
US7236989B2 (en) 2004-04-13 2007-06-26 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for providing lifecycles for custom content in a virtual content repository
US7707427B1 (en) 2004-07-19 2010-04-27 Michael Frederick Kenrich Multi-level file digests
US8266429B2 (en) 2004-07-20 2012-09-11 Time Warner Cable, Inc. Technique for securely communicating and storing programming material in a trusted domain
US8312267B2 (en) 2004-07-20 2012-11-13 Time Warner Cable Inc. Technique for securely communicating programming content
US7506364B2 (en) * 2004-10-01 2009-03-17 Microsoft Corporation Integrated access authorization
US7685632B2 (en) * 2004-10-01 2010-03-23 Microsoft Corporation Access authorization having a centralized policy
US7904956B2 (en) 2004-10-01 2011-03-08 Microsoft Corporation Access authorization with anomaly detection
US8181219B2 (en) 2004-10-01 2012-05-15 Microsoft Corporation Access authorization having embedded policies
JP2006178554A (en) * 2004-12-21 2006-07-06 Hitachi Ltd Distributed policy cooperation method
US20060156388A1 (en) * 2005-01-13 2006-07-13 Vlad Stirbu Method and apparatus for a security framework that enables identity and access control services
GB2424726A (en) * 2005-03-31 2006-10-04 Hewlett Packard Development Co Management of computer based assets
US7774827B2 (en) * 2005-06-06 2010-08-10 Novell, Inc. Techniques for providing role-based security with instance-level granularity
US7885945B2 (en) * 2005-08-25 2011-02-08 Microsoft Corporation Secure schema identifier generation
US7917537B2 (en) 2005-09-26 2011-03-29 Oracle International Corporation System and method for providing link property types for content management
US7953734B2 (en) 2005-09-26 2011-05-31 Oracle International Corporation System and method for providing SPI extensions for content management system
US7818344B2 (en) 2005-09-26 2010-10-19 Bea Systems, Inc. System and method for providing nested types for content management
US7752205B2 (en) 2005-09-26 2010-07-06 Bea Systems, Inc. Method and system for interacting with a virtual content repository
US7788227B1 (en) 2006-03-03 2010-08-31 Microsoft Corporation Schema signing and just-in-time installation
US20080071804A1 (en) * 2006-09-15 2008-03-20 International Business Machines Corporation File system access control between multiple clusters
US8463852B2 (en) 2006-10-06 2013-06-11 Oracle International Corporation Groupware portlets for integrating a portal with groupware systems
US8520850B2 (en) 2006-10-20 2013-08-27 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Downloadable security and protection methods and apparatus
US8732854B2 (en) 2006-11-01 2014-05-20 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Methods and apparatus for premises content distribution
US8621540B2 (en) * 2007-01-24 2013-12-31 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Apparatus and methods for provisioning in a download-enabled system
US20080256458A1 (en) * 2007-04-02 2008-10-16 Siemens Medical Solutions Usa, Inc. Data Access Control System for Shared Directories and Other Resources
US8087066B2 (en) * 2007-04-12 2011-12-27 Oracle America, Inc. Method and system for securing a commercial grid network
US7908642B2 (en) * 2007-04-18 2011-03-15 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Policy store
US8346952B2 (en) * 2007-08-21 2013-01-01 Netapp, Inc. De-centralization of group administration authority within a network storage architecture
US8090860B2 (en) 2007-11-05 2012-01-03 Limelight Networks, Inc. Origin request with peer fulfillment
US20110208779A1 (en) * 2008-12-23 2011-08-25 Backa Bruce R System and Method for Policy Based Control of NAS Storage Devices
US20090187978A1 (en) * 2008-01-18 2009-07-23 Yahoo! Inc. Security and authentications in peer-to-peer networks
US8631470B2 (en) * 2008-02-20 2014-01-14 Bruce R. Backa System and method for policy based control of NAS storage devices
US8549654B2 (en) * 2008-02-20 2013-10-01 Bruce Backa System and method for policy based control of NAS storage devices
US20100037288A1 (en) * 2008-08-06 2010-02-11 International Business Machines Corporation Inherited Access Authorization to a Social Network
US20100043049A1 (en) * 2008-08-15 2010-02-18 Carter Stephen R Identity and policy enabled collaboration
US8396845B2 (en) 2008-09-26 2013-03-12 Microsoft Corporation Data-tier application component
US8380684B2 (en) * 2008-09-30 2013-02-19 Microsoft Corporation Data-tier application component fabric management
US20120246695A1 (en) * 2009-05-08 2012-09-27 Alexander Cameron Access control of distributed computing resources system and method
US9544147B2 (en) * 2009-05-22 2017-01-10 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Model based multi-tier authentication
US9602864B2 (en) 2009-06-08 2017-03-21 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Media bridge apparatus and methods
US8695079B1 (en) * 2010-09-29 2014-04-08 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Allocating shared resources
EP2630749B1 (en) 2010-10-22 2019-01-30 Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Development LP Distributed network instrumentation system
US8701157B1 (en) 2011-10-28 2014-04-15 Google Inc. Configuring policy settings on client computing devices
US9565472B2 (en) 2012-12-10 2017-02-07 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Apparatus and methods for content transfer protection
US8769633B1 (en) 2012-12-12 2014-07-01 Bruce R. Backa System and method for policy based control of NAS storage devices
US10069868B2 (en) * 2014-03-28 2018-09-04 Intel Corporation Systems and methods to facilitate multi-factor authentication policy enforcement using one or more policy handlers
US9935833B2 (en) 2014-11-05 2018-04-03 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Methods and apparatus for determining an optimized wireless interface installation configuration
US20160269373A1 (en) * 2015-03-12 2016-09-15 Fornetix Llc Systems and methods for organizing devices in a policy hierarchy
US10341384B2 (en) * 2015-07-12 2019-07-02 Avago Technologies International Sales Pte. Limited Network function virtualization security and trust system
US9866592B2 (en) * 2015-09-28 2018-01-09 BlueTalon, Inc. Policy enforcement system
US9986578B2 (en) 2015-12-04 2018-05-29 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Apparatus and methods for selective data network access
US9888039B2 (en) * 2015-12-28 2018-02-06 Palantir Technologies Inc. Network-based permissioning system
US9918345B2 (en) 2016-01-20 2018-03-13 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Apparatus and method for wireless network services in moving vehicles
US20190080103A1 (en) * 2016-02-23 2019-03-14 Carrier Corporation Policy-based automation and single-click streamlining of authorization workflows
US20170250966A1 (en) * 2016-02-26 2017-08-31 Fornetix Llc System and method for hierarchy manipulation in an encryption key management system
US10348485B2 (en) 2016-02-26 2019-07-09 Fornetix Llc Linking encryption key management with granular policy
US10091212B2 (en) 2016-03-04 2018-10-02 BlueTalon, Inc. Policy management, enforcement, and audit for data security
US10164858B2 (en) 2016-06-15 2018-12-25 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Apparatus and methods for monitoring and diagnosing a wireless network
US10185726B2 (en) 2016-08-26 2019-01-22 BlueTalon, Inc. Access control for nested data fields
US10291602B1 (en) 2017-04-12 2019-05-14 BlueTalon, Inc. Yarn rest API protection
US10250723B2 (en) 2017-04-13 2019-04-02 BlueTalon, Inc. Protocol-level identity mapping
US10027551B1 (en) 2017-06-29 2018-07-17 Palantir Technologies, Inc. Access controls through node-based effective policy identifiers
US10368255B2 (en) 2017-07-25 2019-07-30 Time Warner Cable Enterprises Llc Methods and apparatus for client-based dynamic control of connections to co-existing radio access networks
EP3550791A1 (en) 2018-04-03 2019-10-09 Palantir Technologies Inc. Controlling access to computer resources

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6353886B1 (en) * 1998-02-04 2002-03-05 Alcatel Canada Inc. Method and system for secure network policy implementation
US7020645B2 (en) * 2001-04-19 2006-03-28 Eoriginal, Inc. Systems and methods for state-less authentication

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6353886B1 (en) * 1998-02-04 2002-03-05 Alcatel Canada Inc. Method and system for secure network policy implementation
US7020645B2 (en) * 2001-04-19 2006-03-28 Eoriginal, Inc. Systems and methods for state-less authentication

Cited By (28)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060239279A1 (en) * 2005-04-22 2006-10-26 Microsoft Corporation Contact management in a serverless peer-to-peer system
US20060239295A1 (en) * 2005-04-22 2006-10-26 Microsoft Corporation Application programming interface for inviting participants in a serverless peer to peer network
US7571228B2 (en) * 2005-04-22 2009-08-04 Microsoft Corporation Contact management in a serverless peer-to-peer system
US20090248868A1 (en) * 2005-04-22 2009-10-01 Microsoft Corporation Contact Management in a Serverless Peer-to-Peer System
US7814214B2 (en) * 2005-04-22 2010-10-12 Microsoft Corporation Contact management in a serverless peer-to-peer system
US8036140B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2011-10-11 Microsoft Corporation Application programming interface for inviting participants in a serverless peer to peer network
US20110072497A1 (en) * 2005-10-31 2011-03-24 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. System and method of using personal data
US8151330B2 (en) * 2005-10-31 2012-04-03 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. System and method of using personal data
US9369773B2 (en) 2010-08-20 2016-06-14 At&T Intellectual Property I, Lp System for establishing communications with a mobile device server
US9338169B2 (en) 2010-09-15 2016-05-10 At&T Intellectual Property I, Lp System for managing resources accessible to a mobile device server
US9609655B2 (en) 2010-09-15 2017-03-28 At&T Intellectual Propery I, L.P. System for managing resources accessible to a mobile device server
US9654366B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2017-05-16 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing mobile device servers
US10356065B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2019-07-16 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing software applications of a mobile device server
US9521129B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2016-12-13 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing software applications of a mobile device server
US10484260B2 (en) * 2010-10-01 2019-11-19 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing mobile device servers
US9438530B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2016-09-06 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. System for synchronizing information
US9736198B2 (en) 2010-10-01 2017-08-15 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Processing messages with a device server operating in a telephone
US9392316B2 (en) 2010-10-28 2016-07-12 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Messaging abstraction in a mobile device server
US10172116B2 (en) 2010-10-28 2019-01-01 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Messaging abstraction in a mobile device server
US20150256868A1 (en) * 2010-11-30 2015-09-10 At&T Intellectual Property I, Lp System for monetizing resources accessible to a mobile device server
US9942588B2 (en) 2010-11-30 2018-04-10 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. System for monetizing resources accessible to a mobile device server
US9544627B2 (en) * 2010-11-30 2017-01-10 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. System for monetizing resources accessible to a mobile device server
US9769086B2 (en) * 2012-06-15 2017-09-19 Symantec Corporation Techniques for providing dynamic account and device management
US20130339517A1 (en) * 2012-06-15 2013-12-19 Symantec Corporation Techniques for providing dynamic account and device management
US20150188846A1 (en) * 2012-06-15 2015-07-02 Symantec Corporation Techniques for providing dynamic account and device management
US8984111B2 (en) * 2012-06-15 2015-03-17 Symantec Corporation Techniques for providing dynamic account and device management
US9602868B2 (en) 2012-12-05 2017-03-21 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Method and apparatus for controlling a media device
WO2016015363A1 (en) * 2014-08-01 2016-02-04 苏州阔地网络科技有限公司 Resource control architecture, and method using said architecture

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US6957261B2 (en) 2005-10-18
US20030018786A1 (en) 2003-01-23

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Miller et al. Capability myths demolished
Yu et al. Interoperable strategies in automated trust negotiation
US6941472B2 (en) System and method for maintaining security in a distributed computer network
US5276901A (en) System for controlling group access to objects using group access control folder and group identification as individual user
US8136143B2 (en) Generalized policy server
US7313692B2 (en) Trust management systems and methods
US8302149B2 (en) Virtual distributed security system
US7272625B1 (en) Generalized policy server
AU2003203708B2 (en) Persistent authorization context based on external authentication
USRE41186E1 (en) Method of encrypting information for remote access while maintaining access control
US6457130B2 (en) File access control in a multi-protocol file server
US9386040B2 (en) Policy-based service management system
US8176334B2 (en) Document security system that permits external users to gain access to secured files
KR100450402B1 (en) Access control method by a token with security attributes in computer system
US7010600B1 (en) Method and apparatus for managing network resources for externally authenticated users
EP2404258B1 (en) Access control using identifiers in links
CN101390084B (en) Domain management method, domain extension method and domain system
DE60301177T2 (en) Program, procedure and device for data protection
US20040088543A1 (en) Selective cross-realm authentication
US20140101457A1 (en) Method and system for providing document retention using cryptography
US7331058B1 (en) Distributed data structures for authorization and access control for computing resources
CN102104592B (en) Session migration between network policy servers
US7013332B2 (en) Distributed policy model for access control
US20050138416A1 (en) Object model for managing firewall services
US20020144149A1 (en) Trust ratings in group credentials

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: INTEL CORPORATION, CALIFORNIA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:LORTZ, VICTOR B.;REEL/FRAME:017103/0443

Effective date: 20011015

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION