US20040243852A1 - Method, system and software for state signing of internet resources - Google Patents

Method, system and software for state signing of internet resources Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20040243852A1
US20040243852A1 US10857536 US85753604A US2004243852A1 US 20040243852 A1 US20040243852 A1 US 20040243852A1 US 10857536 US10857536 US 10857536 US 85753604 A US85753604 A US 85753604A US 2004243852 A1 US2004243852 A1 US 2004243852A1
Authority
US
Grant status
Application
Patent type
Prior art keywords
client
transmission
security metadata
metadata
urls
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US10857536
Inventor
Adam Rosenstein
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Citrix Systems Inc
Original Assignee
CAYMAS SYSTEMS Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/606Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/64Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • G06F21/645Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures using a third party
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity

Abstract

A method, system, and software for state signing of Internet resources is presented in which web pages and other Internet resources are signed after the insertion of metadata indicating intended and authorized uses. In one embodiment, the signing is accomplished through use of a cryptographic signature added to any data item passed to a client that is likely to be passed back to the server later, such as a cookie, URL, or data integrity item. Enabling/disabling of state signing for various data items can be controlled through policies tied to URL prefixes.

Description

    CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
  • This patent application claims priority to, and incorporates by reference in its entirety, U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/473,931, entitled “Method, System and Software for State Signing of Internet Resources” and filed May 28, 2003. This patent application incorporates by reference in its entirety each of the following co-pending U.S. patent applications: 1) “Method and System for Identifying Bidirectional Packet Flow” filed on May 28, 2004; 2) “Policy Based Network Address Translation” filed on May 28, 2004; and 3) “Multilayer Access Control Security System” filed on May 28, 2004.[0001]
  • BACKGROUND
  • Internet resources, and in particular web applications, are often developed with fields which can be altered or abused by those accessing a resource. However, the resource developer may assume that the resource is unalterable or secret (unpredictable or incapable of being guessed). These fields can include, for example, cookies, hidden inputs on forms and Uniform Resource Locators (“URLs”). [0002]
  • Many Internet applications, such as web sites and other corporate resources, can be infiltrated using only a text editor. Exemplary Internet attacks that exploit misplaced trust in client data include cookie tampering, parameter tampering, hidden field manipulation, stealth commanding, forceful browsing, Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, overflow attacks, and others application level attacks. [0003]
  • Current solutions to prevent field tampering exist in the form of software that monitors all traffic going to and from an Internet application. Based on a comprehensive rule set that identifies normal application use, existing products infer session information and analyze all Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”) packets by putting all packets through a rule engine that represents the web application state machine. A rule set maintained by the rule engine mirrors the complexity of the web application and is derived using either explicit configuration or a “learning mode” which attempts to generate the state machine by observing presumably “correct” behavior. [0004]
  • Existing solutions have significant drawbacks, however, in terms of configuration complexity, scalability, performance and accuracy. Every web site or web application has a different set of rules that must be learned or configured into the system. Changes to the web site may cause the rule set to be rendered invalid and can require reconfiguration or relearning of a new rule set. The complexity of the rules also requires significant CPU capacity and memory to process each web transaction. [0005]
  • For the foregoing reasons, a need exists for a method, system and software for state signing to determine whether fields in a web page or other Internet resource have been altered or abused. [0006]
  • SUMMARY
  • Before the present methods and systems are described, it is to be understood that this invention is not limited to the particular methodologies and systems described, as these may vary. It is also to be understood that the terminology used in the description is for the purpose of describing the particular versions or embodiments only, and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention which will be limited only by the appended claims. [0007]
  • It must also be noted that as used herein and in the appended claims, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” include plural references unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. Thus, for example, reference to a “server” is a reference to one or more servers and equivalents thereof known to those skilled in the art, and so forth. Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meanings as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Although any methods, materials, and devices similar or equivalent to those described herein can be used in the practice or testing of embodiments of the present invention, the preferred methods, materials, and devices are now described. All publications mentioned herein are incorporated by reference. Nothing herein is to be construed as an admission that the invention is not entitled to antedate such disclosure by virtue of prior invention. [0008]
  • In an embodiment, a state signing procedure is used to encode the “state” of the web application into the page delivered to the client. In an embodiment, no server side configuration is required. In an alternate embodiment, the only configuration needed on the device (hardware, software, or combination thereof) implementing the state signing function is to enable or disable the state signing for a particular web site. Because a server requires only minimal configuration, web sites may incorporate the state signing system without otherwise modifying the web site or installing software containing complex rules. In an embodiment, the state signing procedure is implemented when the web server transmits the page (either directly or via a web proxy). Changes in the web application do not affect the state signing procedure because the web page is not signed until it is transmitted. [0009]
  • In an embodiment, state signing is performed by incorporating security metadata in transmissions from a network application server to a client. The security metadata may contain descriptions describing intended network application semantics. The security metadata may indicate how a URL, cookie, data integrity item (used in form field verification) or other network application element is to be used. At some point subsequent to the receipt of the requested network application element, the client transmits a request back to the server. The server may analyze the transmission from the client to determine if it conforms to the intended network application semantics and is safe to use. [0010]
  • Intended network application semantics are descriptions of ways in which information can be returned to the server from the client in a form that does not put the server at risk. Examples of intended network application semantics include: returning cookies to servers without modification by the client; clients following links presented to them by the server; clients not modifying the path portions of Uniform Resource Identifiers (“URIs”) before requesting them; clients not modifying queries embedded in the application data; and clients only supplying form data which conforms to the application's expectations or constraints. Constraints that may be used include the length of the data, type of the data, conformance to types of variables or expected values. [0011]
  • In an embodiment, a transmission of the application data from an application server is intercepted, proxied, processed or filtered to identify one or more URLs embedded within the transmissions. A predicted form of a client request containing the one or more URLs is generated, indicating how the URL is expected to be requested in the future, and security metadata containing constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs is generated. The application data is combined with the security metadata and transmitted to the client. When the client returns the URI and the security metadata via a request, the URI is validated against the security metadata to ensure that the URI fits within the constraints by which the client may request the URLs. [0012]
  • In an embodiment, a cryptographic signature is applied over the predicted form of the client request containing the one or more URLs previously transmitted by the application server. The client may return the transmission including the security metadata and the cryptographic signature. The cryptographic signature may be verified to ensure that neither the metadata nor the URI have been altered. [0013]
  • In an embodiment, a system is generated in which a subsystem receives resource requests from a client to an application server, and a state signing subsystem signs responses to the resource requests delivered to a client from the application server to indicate authenticity. Each of the system and the subsystem may include one or more of hardware and software. [0014]
  • Enabling/disabling state signing for various data items may be controlled through policies tied to URL prefixes. In an embodiment, individual signatures are accompanied by a control word, embedded into the client side state, and covered by the signature. In an embodiment, the control word includes one or more flags and values which control how the signature is verified when the data item is returned.[0015]
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form a part of the specification, illustrate embodiments of the present invention and, together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention. [0016]
  • FIGS. 1A and 1B illustrate exemplary direct and indirect client-server requests for application data, respectively, according to embodiments; [0017]
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary client-server model using a state signer for application data signing and verification according to an embodiment; [0018]
  • FIGS. 3A and 3B illustrate exemplary signed URLs and cookies, respectively, according to embodiments; [0019]
  • FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary table of signature metadata according to an embodiment; [0020]
  • FIG. 5 illustrates an example of cookie signing for a set cookie operation according to an embodiment; [0021]
  • FIG. 6 illustrates an example of cookie signing according to an embodiment.[0022]
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • In describing the embodiments of the invention illustrated in the drawings, specific terminology will be used for the sake of clarity. However, the invention is not intended to be limited to the specific terms so selected, and it is to be understood that each specific term includes all technical equivalents which operate in a similar manner to accomplish a similar purpose. [0023]
  • Computer program instructions for implementing a software embodiment of the present invention may be stored in a computer program memory or on a computer readable carrier such as a disk, memory stick, portable memory device, communications signal or carrier wave. The steps to complete the methods described herein may be carried out in any computer programming language including object oriented programs including but not limited to Java, C++, Visual Basic, Perl, PHP, and procedural programming languages such as C and Fortran. Other types of programming languages may be utilized, and the invention is not limited to any particular programming language, procedural, object oriented or otherwise. [0024]
  • Computing platforms for implementing the system include but are not limited to microprocessors and associated peripherals such as external Random Access Memory (RAM), Read Only Memory (ROM) and storage devices including but not limited to magnetic drives, optical and magneto-optical drives, removable storage devices including CD-ROMs, removable magnetic cards, or other types of fixed or removable storage devices. Network interfaces are also included in the computing platform in the form of Ethernet cards, adaptors or other components that allow the transmission and reception of data to and from other computers. Multiprocessor systems and network processors, used individually or coupled together, may be utilized. A computing platform may be constructed from elementary components including a microprocessor and associated peripherals, or may be a pre-assembled computer or computing workstation. The system may also be implemented on custom hardware including Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) or Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). In addition, the system can be embodied in an application server as a web server module, servlets, CGI programs or scripts, server side includes, or directly into the web server source code, application source code either dynamically or statically, or into the operating system itself. [0025]
  • FIG. 1A illustrates an exemplary configuration for direct client-server requests according to an embodiment. As shown, a client [0026] 100 may issue a request 102 to a server 110. The server 110 may reply to the request 102 with application data 104 and a return request 105, where the return request 105 is triggered by the application data 104. The request 102 may be in the form of a URL containing a HTTP address for a resource such as a web page, a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) command or other instruction requesting data, code or other digital information from the server 110. The server 110 may subsequently return application data 104 to the client 100. The application data 104 may contain the requested data, code or other digital information. The application data 104 may alternately include error messages indicating that the requested information is not available.
  • Referring to FIG. 1B, a firewall/proxy [0027] 120 may be used between the client 100 and the server 110. When the firewall/proxy 120 is used as a firewall, packets that comprise the request 120 may be examined to determine if they contain requests that could be harmful to the server 110. If it is determined that a request 120 is potentially harmful to the server 110, based on a complex set of rules for inspection of the packets, the request 102 may not be forwarded to the server 110.
  • When the firewall/proxy [0028] 120 is used as a proxy, it may intercept all requests 102 made by the client 100 and determine if those requests are safe for the server 110. If the requests 102 are deemed to be safe, the proxy 120 forwards the request 103 to the server 110 on behalf of the client 100. In both cases, if the request 103 is approved, the application data 104 is returned from the server 110 to the client 100. Subsequent return requests 105 may be subject to the same inspection process to determine if they are safe for the server 110. In all cases, acceptable request are forwarded to the server 110 without modification. In an embodiment, the firewall/proxy 120 also subjects application data 104 to tests that determine if the application data 104 carries signs of a successful attack. The application data 104 may be dropped if the test indicate that an attack has been carried out.
  • Referring to FIG. 2, the present method, system and software may use a state signer [0029] 200 that is placed between the client 100 and the server 110 to receive a request 102 and forward the request 102 to the server 110 as a forwarded request 103. The forwarded request 103 may be a proxy request, with either the state signer 200 or another device acting as the proxy. Upon receiving the forwarded request 103, the server 110 may fulfill the request by sending application data 104 to the state signer 200. The state signer 200 may perform a signing operation that results in signed application data 202 being sent to the client 100. The client 100 may make a signed return request 204 based on the request 102. The state signer 200 may examine the signed return request 204 to determine if the data received by the client 100 has been tampered with. If the data has not been tampered with, a verified return request 206 may be made to the server 110. If the state signer 200 does not verify the signed return request 204, the state signer 200 may, based on its configuration, ignore the request completely, resulting in a dropped request 215, or reply to client 100 with a denied request 217 bearing an error code. In an embodiment, all requests subsequent to the receipt of signed application data 202 are signed return requests, such as signed return request 204. In an alternate embodiment, the state signer 200 is configured to verify only certain requests and to sign only certain application data 104. This discriminatory verification and signing may be accomplished through the use of policies installed into the state signer 200 that select which pieces of application data 104 are signed in the signed application data 202. These policies may be triggered by or based on URI prefixes associated with each application element, user IDs or other policy predicates. The policies may also be used to determine which requests are in the signed return request 204 as opposed to the unsigned return request form of return request 105.
  • FIG. 3A illustrates a signed URL containing a URL data item [0030] 300, a Control Word (CW) 330, an Extended Control Word 1 (ECW1) 320, an Extended Control Word 2 (ECW2) 310, and a signature 340. The URL data item 300 may contain a request for resources. The Control Word 330, the Extended Control Word 1 320, and the Extended Control Word 2 310 may contain metadata indicating one or more aspects of how the URL data item 300 is used. In an embodiment, the URL data item 300 is signed separately from the metadata. In an alternate embodiment, a query field may indicate a portion of the URI corresponding to user-supplied data. The signature 340 may cover this portion of the request if the query was present in the application data 204 when signing took place. Conversely, if the query represents user-supplied data, the signature 340 does not cover the text of the query. In this instance, ECW1 320, for example, may contain a Form Verification Block (FVB) that imposes constraints. The FVB may be covered by the signature 340, may constrain the data that appears in the query and may apply constraints on the data that appears in the body of the request. CW 330 may include information allowing the state signer 200 to determine which portions of the request are covered by the signature 340 (e.g. query signed v. query not signed) and indicating the presence or absence of FVB information. Similarly, the request 300 may also include a fragment identifier that refers to a subsection of the requested resource. Since the fragment is never returned in a subsequent client request, the signature 340 does not cover the text of the fragment identifier.
  • Referring to FIG. 3B, a signed cookie is illustrated in which a cookie data item [0031] 350 is combined with metadata, comprising CW 330 and ECW1 320, and the signature 340 to produce a cookie item containing additional information such that the state signer 200 can verify its authenticity and safety.
  • FIGS. 5 and 6 illustrate cookie-signing examples for a set cookie operation and a return cookie operation, respectively. The upper portion of FIG. 5 illustrates the set cookie header before signing. The lower portion of FIG. 5 represents the set cookie header after signing. In an embodiment, the data items of“PART NUMBER,” “BASS_CLARINET,” “ITEM_PRICE” and “$237.14” are signed. In an alternate embodiment, the cookie attributes (e.g. path and secure) may be signed. Referring to FIG. 6, the data items of “CUSTOMER,” “WILE E COYOTE,” “PART_NUMBER,” “ROCKET LAUNCHER [0032] 001,” “SHIPPING” AND “FEDEX” in the upper portion of FIG. 6 are signed.
  • Signatures are generated using keys and the text (data fields, metadata fields, or combinations thereof) to be signed. In an embodiment, the signature of a data item is generated using three inputs: UID, text, and key: [0033]
  • a uid: the numeric user ID of the requesting user, expressed as an ASCII-encoded hex value, true integer or other numerical representation. [0034]
  • text: holds all text of the object to be protected, and in this embodiment includes signature metadata. For cookies, the text is the single Name/Value (NV) pair appearing after a “Set-Cookie:” or “Set-Cookie[0035] 2:” literal, excluding reducible white space. In this embodiment, and as illustrated in FIGS. 5 and 6, each NV pair is signed separately and the header arguments are not signed. For URLs, the text may include the fully resolved URL including the protocol, host and full path.
  • key: a system-wide randomly generated character string, 20 bytes in length, zero-padded out to 64 bytes. [0036]
  • In an embodiment, a system-wide state signing key, the User IID (UID) associated with the request and the text of the data item (cookie or URL) modified with metadata are concatenated and used as input to a cryptographic signing algorithm. The resulting value from this signing operation may be appended to another permutation of the system-wide state signing key and used as input to the signing algorithm again. In this embodiment, the signature incorporates the identity of the user for whom it was generated in order to prevent the theft of signed elements from caches and cookie files as well as snooping (including proxies such as local proxies, reverse proxies, distributed proxies, corporate proxies, or other proxies). [0037]
  • In an embodiment, signing a data item means performing the following transformation over its text: [0038] sign ( text _ , uid _ , key _ ) SHA1_t ( key opad + SHA1_b ( key ipad + uid + text )
    Figure US20040243852A1-20041202-M00001
  • where the following definitions hold: [0039]
  • The plus operator (‘+’) is meant to indicate string concatenation; [0040]
  • The O-plus operator (‘⊕’) is meant to indicate exclusive bitwise OR (XOR) operation; [0041]
  • SHA1_t(text) returns the SHA1 digest of its argument, text, as a hex string (40 characters); [0042]
  • SHA1_b(text) returns the SHA1 digest of its argument, text, as a 20 byte number; [0043]
  • ipad=the byte 0×36 repeated 64 times; [0044]
  • opad=the byte 0×5C repeated 64 times; and [0045]
  • key=the encryption key used to generate the secure signature. [0046]
  • This function returns the signature to be appended to the state data. [0047]
  • In addition to the signature itself, a control word may be incorporated into the item's text before signing it. The control word carries information used by the state signer [0048] 200 when later verifying the signature. In an embodiment, the control word is expressed as an ASCII-encoded 3-byte hex value (6 characters).
  • FIG. 4 illustrates a table for Control Word [0049] 330 content used in one embodiment. CW 330 includes metadata that may indicate the intent of the request, as well as information regarding the signature, how that signature was obtained and a marker facilitating rapid discrimination of signed from unsigned requests.
  • In an embodiment, CW [0050] 330 has the following grammar:
  • CTRLWD=“F81” KEY QUERY SECURE [0051]
  • KEY=“0” for key [0052] 0 or “1” for key 1
  • QUERY=“8” for ignore query or “C” for sign query [0053]
  • SECURE=“0” for http backend [0054] 0 or “8” for https backend
  • In the abovementioned embodiment, eight legal hexadecimal values of CW [0055] 330 may be used: 0xF81080, 0xF810C0, 0xF81180, 0xF811C0, 0xF81088, 0xF810C8, 0xF81188 and 0xF811C8. In an embodiment, CW 330 appears in a predictable location within any signed text, thus the presence of the text “F81” may be used to distinguish signed content from unsigned content. In this embodiment, extra “marker bits” are included in the control word.
  • ECW1 [0056] 320 and ECW2 310 may be used for FVBs and Signature Expiry Blocks (SEBs), respectively. SEBs may contain an ASCII-encoded date (e.g. ASN.1) beyond which the signature is considered invalid. Each may be used for other purposes as well and may act as extensions to CW 330.
  • It is preferable, for security reasons, to update or regenerate the key used for encryption periodically to protect against the possibility of undetected key compromise. In an embodiment, a system-wide key is used rather than per connection, per-application, or per-user keys. In this embodiment, two keys are active in the system at any given time to allow for periodic rotation of the keys. A simple index may be used to track which key is active. In alternate embodiments, a larger number of keys can be used, or the keys can be varied for each connection, application or user. As will be understood by one skilled in the art, a variety of security techniques may be applied for key generation, and public key and/or private key systems may be used. [0057]
  • Changing or rotating keys may result in a broken client-side state resulting in unusable bookmarks, cookies and/or cached web pages. In an embodiment, the key regeneration interval is set to one month to allow for a maximum two-week window of usability for the client-side state. In addition, the system administrator may cause the state signer [0058] 200 to return a “301 Permanent Redirect” message for requests using a key that is valid but not current. This redirect may include a URI signed using the current key. This process may permit bookmarks and cache entries to be updated in many types of Internet browsers including INTERNET EXPLORER® browsers produced by Microsoft Corporation. In this embodiment, bookmarks remain current as long as they are requested at least once every key refresh period. In an alternate embodiment, link verifier software is used to verify the link and refresh broken links with data signed by the current key.
  • In an embodiment, keys are 20 bytes long and are cryptographically random. In this embodiment, the keys are generated by a random number generator, such as the random number generator produced by Cavium Networks. Other embodiments with longer or shorter keys are possible, and as previously mentioned, a number of key generation techniques may be utilized. [0059]
  • In an embodiment, cookie signing can be enabled or disabled. In this embodiment, cookie signing may be controlled on the basis of the URI prefix of the requested URI, as well as the URI prefix of the cookie's PATH attribute. In this embodiment, if cookie signing is disabled on any URI prefix, the setting is not re-enabled on any URL descendant of that prefix. [0060]
  • A cookie may not always bear a PATH attribute. For a cookie without a PATH attribute, the standard protocol may be to default to the request-host for the domain and the path of the request URL that generated the set-cookie response, up to, but not including, the right-most “/.” Preferably, all cookie signing operations occur only on the re-written cookie attributes. In this embodiment, cookie signing takes place after the rewrite on the request headers, but before the rewrite on the response headers. When an incoming Cookie:request header or Set-Cookie:response header is received, a prefix table lookup may be performed over the text of its PATH attribute. If cookie signing is enabled, for that PATH, a valid signature must appear on that cookie. If not, the cookie may be passed through unmodified. A management interface may be provided to ensure that if cookie signing is disabled on any particular prefix, other policies bearing that prefix “inherit” that state. [0061]
  • With respect to cookie requests, the process may be initiated by consulting a policy database to determine the state of the cookie signing feature (enabled/disabled) for both signature checking and the subsequent signature generation. In an embodiment, the authenticated user ID of the requestor is also examined. [0062]
  • For cookie bearing requests that need to be verified, a signature may be generated over the user ID and the name value text (plus control word and metadata). The generated signature may be compared to the signature embedded in the returned cookie to determine if the generated signature is indeed verified. If the generated signature is verified, the cookie passes verification. If it is not verified, the cookie, along with its associated attributes, is deleted from the output stream. [0063]
  • For cookie bearing replies, the state of the cookie signing feature associated with the original URI request may be recalled. [0064]
  • In a next step for cookie replies, a scan may be performed at the application layer to detect cookie headers and to return the appropriate fields including the cookie name, value, domain, and path. This step may also be performed on cookie requests. [0065]
  • For identified cookies, a control word may be added. The cookie may then be signed and appropriately inserted into the output stream. [0066]
  • For URL signing, relative URLs may first be resolved to permit signing. Exemplary URLs that need to be resolved may include network-path references, absolute-path references and relative-path references. Although fully resolved URLs are used in signature generation, the output stream may not need to reference the fully resolved URL. [0067]
  • In both cookie and URI signing, the state signer [0068] 200 may remove the signature, CW 330 and associated metadata from the requested URI and/or cookie before forwarding it to the application server 110.
  • Although the invention has been described with reference to the preferred embodiments, it will be apparent to one skilled in the art that variations and modifications are contemplated within the spirit and scope of the invention. The drawings and description of the preferred embodiments are made by way of example rather than to limit the scope of the invention, and it is intended to cover within the spirit and scope of the invention all such changes and modifications. [0069]

Claims (23)

    What is claimed is:
  1. 1. A method for monitoring transmissions between a network application server and a client, the method comprising:
    incorporating security metadata in a server transmission from a network application server to a client, wherein the security metadata includes a description of the intended network application semantics;
    receiving a client transmission from the client, wherein the client transmission includes returned metadata; and
    determining, using the returned metadata, whether the client transmission conforms to the intended network application semantics.
  2. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the security metadata is transmitted with application data.
  3. 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the security metadata is transmitted separate from application data.
  4. 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the security metadata further comprises authorization information for client transmissions, wherein the authorization information indicates which client transmissions are authorized.
  5. 5. A method applied between a network application server and a client to ensure data security:
    intercepting a transmission of application data from a network application server to a client;
    identifying one or more Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) embedded in the transmission;
    generating security metadata containing constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs; and
    transmitting the transmission of application data and the security metadata to the client.
  6. 6. The method of claim 5, further comprising:
    receiving a client transmission from the client, wherein the client transmission includes a URL request and the security metadata; and
    validating the URL request against the security metadata to ensure that the URL request fits within the constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs.
  7. 7. The method of claim 5, further comprising generating a cryptographic signature over the predicted form of the client request containing the one or more URLs previously transmitted by the application server, and wherein transmitting further comprises transmitting the cryptographic signature to the client.
  8. 8. The method of claim 7, further comprising:
    receiving a transmission from the client, wherein the transmission from the client includes a URL request and the security metadata;
    validating the URL request against the security metadata to ensure that the URL request fits within the constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs; and
    verifying the cryptographic signature.
  9. 9. An apparatus for monitoring transmissions between a network application server and a client, the apparatus comprising:
    a transmitter for incorporating security metadata in one or more server transmissions from a network application server to a client, wherein the security metadata includes a description of the intended network application semantics;
    a receiver for receiving one or more client transmissions from the client, wherein the one or more client transmissions include returned metadata; and
    an analyzer for determining, using the returned metadata, whether the one or more client transmissions conform to the intended network application semantics.
  10. 10. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the security metadata is transmitted with the application data.
  11. 11. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the security metadata is transmitted separate from the application data.
  12. 12. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the security metadata further comprises authorization information for client transmissions, wherein the authorization information indicates which client transmissions are authorized.
  13. 13. An apparatus for insuring data security, comprising:
    a receiver for intercepting a transmission of application data from a network application server to a client;
    a parser for identifying one or more URLs embedded in the transmission;
    a metadata generator for generating security metadata containing constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs; and
    a transmitter for transmitting the transmission of application data and the security metadata to the client.
  14. 14. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising:
    a second receiver for receiving a client transmission from the client, wherein the client transmission includes a URL request and the security metadata; and
    a validator for validating the URL request against the security metadata to ensure that the URL request fits within the constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs.
  15. 15. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising a generator for generating a cryptographic signature over the predicted form of the client request containing the one or more URLs previously transmitted by the application server, and wherein the transmitter further transmits the cryptographic signature to the client.
  16. 16. The method of claim 15, further comprising:
    a second receiver for receiving a transmission from the client, wherein the transmission from the client includes a URL request and the security metadata;
    a validator for validating the URL request against the security metadata to ensure that the URL request fits within the constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs; and
    a verifier for verifying the cryptographic signature.
  17. 17. A system for performing state signing of network resources, comprising:
    a first subsystem for receiving one or more resource requests from a client to an application server; and
    a state signing subsystem for signing responses to resource requests delivered to a client from the application server, wherein the resource requests are signed to indicate authenticity.
  18. 18. The system of claim 17, wherein the state signing subsystem includes a cryptographic signature for the generation of a cryptographic signature over at least a portion of the response to the resource request.
  19. 19. The system of claim 18, wherein the state signing subsystem further includes a verification subsystem for the determination as to whether a resource request has been altered.
  20. 20. A computer program embodied on a computer-readable medium for signing the state of application data transmitted over a network, the computer program comprising:
    a source code segment for intercepting a transmission of application data from an application server to a client;
    a source code segment for identifying one or more URLs embedded in the transmission;
    a source code segment for generating security metadata containing constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs;
    a source code segment for transmitting the transmission of application data and the security metadata to the client.
  21. 21. The computer program of claim 20, further comprising:
    a source code segment for receiving a client transmission from the client, wherein the client transmission includes a URL request and the security metadata; and
    a source code segment for validating the URL request against the security metadata to ensure that the URL request fits within the constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs.
  22. 22. The computer program of claim 20, further comprising a source code segment for generating a cryptographic signature over the predicted form of the client request containing the one or more URLs previously transmitted by the application server, and wherein the source code segment for transmitting further transmits the cryptographic signature to the client.
  23. 23. The computer program of claim 22, further comprising:
    a source code segment for receiving a client transmission from the client, wherein the client transmission includes a URL request and the security metadata;
    a source code segment for validating the URL request against the security metadata to ensure that the URL request fits within the constraints on the manner in which the client requests the one or more URLs; and
    a source code segment for verifying the cryptographic signature.
US10857536 2003-05-28 2004-05-28 Method, system and software for state signing of internet resources Abandoned US20040243852A1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US47393103 true 2003-05-28 2003-05-28
US10857536 US20040243852A1 (en) 2003-05-28 2004-05-28 Method, system and software for state signing of internet resources

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10857536 US20040243852A1 (en) 2003-05-28 2004-05-28 Method, system and software for state signing of internet resources
US11832434 US7861087B2 (en) 2003-05-28 2007-08-01 Systems and methods for state signing of internet resources

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US11832434 Continuation US7861087B2 (en) 2003-05-28 2007-08-01 Systems and methods for state signing of internet resources

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20040243852A1 true true US20040243852A1 (en) 2004-12-02

Family

ID=33490674

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US10857536 Abandoned US20040243852A1 (en) 2003-05-28 2004-05-28 Method, system and software for state signing of internet resources
US11832434 Active 2025-12-09 US7861087B2 (en) 2003-05-28 2007-08-01 Systems and methods for state signing of internet resources

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US11832434 Active 2025-12-09 US7861087B2 (en) 2003-05-28 2007-08-01 Systems and methods for state signing of internet resources

Country Status (2)

Country Link
US (2) US20040243852A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2004107132A3 (en)

Cited By (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20070033566A1 (en) * 2006-08-08 2007-02-08 Endl Texas, Llc Storage Management Unit to Configure Zoning, LUN Masking, Access Controls, or Other Storage Area Network Parameters
US20080115201A1 (en) * 2006-11-13 2008-05-15 Microsoft Corporation Refreshing a page validation token
WO2008071795A3 (en) * 2006-12-15 2008-10-09 Soerensen Hans Martin Boesgaard Digital data authentication
US20090158384A1 (en) * 2007-12-18 2009-06-18 Microsoft Corporation Distribution of information protection policies to client machines
US20100161973A1 (en) * 2005-12-08 2010-06-24 Microsoft Corporation Request authentication token
US20100299527A1 (en) * 2008-07-09 2010-11-25 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd Near field communication (nfc) device and method for selectively securing records in a near field communication data exchange format (ndef) message
US20110161403A1 (en) * 2009-12-31 2011-06-30 Nokia Corporation Method and apparatus for providing client-side caching
US20130046817A1 (en) * 2011-08-20 2013-02-21 Blis Media Limited Verifying the Transfer of a Data File
US9191405B2 (en) 2012-01-30 2015-11-17 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Dynamic cross-site request forgery protection in a web-based client application
US20170093575A1 (en) * 2015-09-30 2017-03-30 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Code signing service

Families Citing this family (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7117239B1 (en) 2000-07-28 2006-10-03 Axeda Corporation Reporting the state of an apparatus to a remote computer
US7185014B1 (en) 2000-09-22 2007-02-27 Axeda Corporation Retrieving data from a server
US8108543B2 (en) 2000-09-22 2012-01-31 Axeda Corporation Retrieving data from a server
US7254601B2 (en) 2001-12-20 2007-08-07 Questra Corporation Method and apparatus for managing intelligent assets in a distributed environment
US7178149B2 (en) 2002-04-17 2007-02-13 Axeda Corporation XML scripting of soap commands
US7966418B2 (en) 2003-02-21 2011-06-21 Axeda Corporation Establishing a virtual tunnel between two computer programs
US8582556B2 (en) * 2006-06-06 2013-11-12 At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P. Method and apparatus for maintaining state information on a client device configured for VOIP communication
US8370479B2 (en) 2006-10-03 2013-02-05 Axeda Acquisition Corporation System and method for dynamically grouping devices based on present device conditions
US8065397B2 (en) 2006-12-26 2011-11-22 Axeda Acquisition Corporation Managing configurations of distributed devices
US9083746B2 (en) * 2007-10-19 2015-07-14 Imation Corp. Method of providing assured transactions using secure transaction appliance and watermark verification
CN101572598B (en) 2008-04-28 2013-03-06 国际商业机器公司 Method and device for reliable rapid integration
US8955033B2 (en) * 2008-11-25 2015-02-10 Citrix Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for HTTP callouts for policies
US8745750B2 (en) * 2011-04-21 2014-06-03 Microsoft Corporation Origination verification using execution transparent marker context

Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5708780A (en) * 1995-06-07 1998-01-13 Open Market, Inc. Internet server access control and monitoring systems
US5907621A (en) * 1996-11-15 1999-05-25 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for session management
US6311278B1 (en) * 1998-09-09 2001-10-30 Sanctum Ltd. Method and system for extracting application protocol characteristics
US20020049900A1 (en) * 2000-10-06 2002-04-25 International Business Machines Corporation, Armonk,New York, 10504 Method and apparatus for cryptographic stateless protocol using asymmetric encryption
US6480894B1 (en) * 1998-03-06 2002-11-12 I2 Technologies Us, Inc. System and method for maintaining a state for a user session using a web system
US20030051142A1 (en) * 2001-05-16 2003-03-13 Hidalgo Lluis Mora Firewalls for providing security in HTTP networks and applications
US20040054779A1 (en) * 2002-09-13 2004-03-18 Yoshiteru Takeshima Network system
US6710786B1 (en) * 1997-02-03 2004-03-23 Oracle International Corporation Method and apparatus for incorporating state information into a URL

Family Cites Families (166)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7006881B1 (en) 1991-12-23 2006-02-28 Steven Hoffberg Media recording device with remote graphic user interface
US6515968B1 (en) 1995-03-17 2003-02-04 Worldcom, Inc. Integrated interface for real time web based viewing of telecommunications network call traffic
US8332478B2 (en) 1998-10-01 2012-12-11 Digimarc Corporation Context sensitive connected content
US5862325A (en) 1996-02-29 1999-01-19 Intermind Corporation Computer-based communication system and method using metadata defining a control structure
US6006242A (en) 1996-04-05 1999-12-21 Bankers Systems, Inc. Apparatus and method for dynamically creating a document
US6909708B1 (en) 1996-11-18 2005-06-21 Mci Communications Corporation System, method and article of manufacture for a communication system architecture including video conferencing
US7145898B1 (en) 1996-11-18 2006-12-05 Mci Communications Corporation System, method and article of manufacture for selecting a gateway of a hybrid communication system architecture
US6754181B1 (en) 1996-11-18 2004-06-22 Mci Communications Corporation System and method for a directory service supporting a hybrid communication system architecture
US5999525A (en) 1996-11-18 1999-12-07 Mci Communications Corporation Method for video telephony over a hybrid network
US5867494A (en) 1996-11-18 1999-02-02 Mci Communication Corporation System, method and article of manufacture with integrated video conferencing billing in a communication system architecture
US6335927B1 (en) 1996-11-18 2002-01-01 Mci Communications Corporation System and method for providing requested quality of service in a hybrid network
US6731625B1 (en) 1997-02-10 2004-05-04 Mci Communications Corporation System, method and article of manufacture for a call back architecture in a hybrid network with support for internet telephony
US7076736B2 (en) 2001-07-31 2006-07-11 Thebrain Technologies Corp. Method and apparatus for sharing many thought databases among many clients
WO1999046662A3 (en) 1998-03-12 1999-11-25 Dmw Worldwide Inc System for operating on client defined rules
US6226618B1 (en) 1998-08-13 2001-05-01 International Business Machines Corporation Electronic content delivery system
US7882247B2 (en) 1999-06-11 2011-02-01 Netmotion Wireless, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing secure connectivity in mobile and other intermittent computing environments
US7200804B1 (en) 1998-12-08 2007-04-03 Yodlee.Com, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing automation to an internet navigation application
US6725425B1 (en) 1998-12-08 2004-04-20 Yodlee.Com Method and apparatus for retrieving information from semi-structured, web-based data sources
US6859212B2 (en) 1998-12-08 2005-02-22 Yodlee.Com, Inc. Interactive transaction center interface
US6263363B1 (en) 1999-01-28 2001-07-17 Skydesk, Inc. System and method for creating an internet-accessible working replica of a home computer on a host server controllable by a user operating a remote access client computer
US6400996B1 (en) 1999-02-01 2002-06-04 Steven M. Hoffberg Adaptive pattern recognition based control system and method
US6505230B1 (en) 1999-05-14 2003-01-07 Pivia, Inc. Client-server independent intermediary mechanism
US6816274B1 (en) 1999-05-25 2004-11-09 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Method and system for composition and delivery of electronic mail
US7055739B1 (en) 1999-05-25 2006-06-06 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Identity-coded surface with reference points
US7707082B1 (en) 1999-05-25 2010-04-27 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Method and system for bill management
US6957768B1 (en) 1999-05-25 2005-10-25 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Computer system control via interface surface
US7106888B1 (en) 1999-05-25 2006-09-12 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Signature capture via interface surface
US7173722B1 (en) 1999-05-25 2007-02-06 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Method and system for printing a photograph
US6549935B1 (en) 1999-05-25 2003-04-15 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Method of distributing documents having common components to a plurality of destinations
US7185075B1 (en) 1999-05-26 2007-02-27 Fujitsu Limited Element management system with dynamic database updates based on parsed snooping
US7165041B1 (en) 1999-05-27 2007-01-16 Accenture, Llp Web-based architecture sales tool
US6957186B1 (en) 1999-05-27 2005-10-18 Accenture Llp System method and article of manufacture for building, managing, and supporting various components of a system
US6721713B1 (en) 1999-05-27 2004-04-13 Andersen Consulting Llp Business alliance identification in a web architecture framework
US6519571B1 (en) 1999-05-27 2003-02-11 Accenture Llp Dynamic customer profile management
US6615166B1 (en) 1999-05-27 2003-09-02 Accenture Llp Prioritizing components of a network framework required for implementation of technology
US6473794B1 (en) 1999-05-27 2002-10-29 Accenture Llp System for establishing plan to test components of web based framework by displaying pictorial representation and conveying indicia coded components of existing network framework
US6536037B1 (en) 1999-05-27 2003-03-18 Accenture Llp Identification of redundancies and omissions among components of a web based architecture
US6633878B1 (en) 1999-07-30 2003-10-14 Accenture Llp Initializing an ecommerce database framework
US6609128B1 (en) 1999-07-30 2003-08-19 Accenture Llp Codes table framework design in an E-commerce architecture
US6601233B1 (en) 1999-07-30 2003-07-29 Accenture Llp Business components framework
US6514085B2 (en) 1999-07-30 2003-02-04 Element K Online Llc Methods and apparatus for computer based training relating to devices
US7100195B1 (en) 1999-07-30 2006-08-29 Accenture Llp Managing user information on an e-commerce system
US6718535B1 (en) 1999-07-30 2004-04-06 Accenture Llp System, method and article of manufacture for an activity framework design in an e-commerce based environment
US6704873B1 (en) 1999-07-30 2004-03-09 Accenture Llp Secure gateway interconnection in an e-commerce based environment
US6523027B1 (en) 1999-07-30 2003-02-18 Accenture Llp Interfacing servers in a Java based e-commerce architecture
US6792086B1 (en) 1999-08-24 2004-09-14 Microstrategy, Inc. Voice network access provider system and method
US6339832B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-01-15 Accenture Llp Exception response table in environment services patterns
US6496850B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-12-17 Accenture Llp Clean-up of orphaned server contexts
US6601234B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-07-29 Accenture Llp Attribute dictionary in a business logic services environment
US6289382B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2001-09-11 Andersen Consulting, Llp System, method and article of manufacture for a globally addressable interface in a communication services patterns environment
US6606660B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-08-12 Accenture Llp Stream-based communication in a communication services patterns environment
US6529948B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-03-04 Accenture Llp Multi-object fetch component
US6640244B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-10-28 Accenture Llp Request batcher in a transaction services patterns environment
US6502213B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-12-31 Accenture Llp System, method, and article of manufacture for a polymorphic exception handler in environment services patterns
US6434628B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-08-13 Accenture Llp Common interface for handling exception interface name with additional prefix and suffix for handling exceptions in environment services patterns
US6442748B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-08-27 Accenture Llp System, method and article of manufacture for a persistent state and persistent object separator in an information services patterns environment
US6640249B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-10-28 Accenture Llp Presentation services patterns in a netcentric environment
US6324647B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2001-11-27 Michel K. Bowman-Amuah System, method and article of manufacture for security management in a development architecture framework
US6640238B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-10-28 Accenture Llp Activity component in a presentation services patterns environment
US6256773B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2001-07-03 Accenture Llp System, method and article of manufacture for configuration management in a development architecture framework
US6636242B2 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-10-21 Accenture Llp View configurer in a presentation services patterns environment
US6477580B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-11-05 Accenture Llp Self-described stream in a communication services patterns environment
US6615253B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-09-02 Accenture Llp Efficient server side data retrieval for execution of client side applications
US6571282B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-05-27 Accenture Llp Block-based communication in a communication services patterns environment
US6662357B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-12-09 Accenture Llp Managing information in an integrated development architecture framework
US6370573B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-04-09 Accenture Llp System, method and article of manufacture for managing an environment of a development architecture framework
US6539396B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-03-25 Accenture Llp Multi-object identifier system and method for information service pattern environment
US6438594B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-08-20 Accenture Llp Delivering service to a client via a locally addressable interface
US6615199B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-09-02 Accenture, Llp Abstraction factory in a base services pattern environment
US6549949B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-04-15 Accenture Llp Fixed format stream in a communication services patterns environment
US6529909B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-03-04 Accenture Llp Method for translating an object attribute converter in an information services patterns environment
US6842906B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2005-01-11 Accenture Llp System and method for a refreshable proxy pool in a communication services patterns environment
US6477665B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-11-05 Accenture Llp System, method, and article of manufacture for environment services patterns in a netcentic environment
US6434568B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-08-13 Accenture Llp Information services patterns in a netcentric environment
US6742015B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2004-05-25 Accenture Llp Base services patterns in a netcentric environment
US6715145B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2004-03-30 Accenture Llp Processing pipeline in a base services pattern environment
US6550057B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-04-15 Accenture Llp Piecemeal retrieval in an information services patterns environment
US6405364B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2002-06-11 Accenture Llp Building techniques in a development architecture framework
US7139999B2 (en) 1999-08-31 2006-11-21 Accenture Llp Development architecture framework
US6601192B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-07-29 Accenture Llp Assertion component in environment services patterns
US6578068B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-06-10 Accenture Llp Load balancer in environment services patterns
US6332163B1 (en) 1999-09-01 2001-12-18 Accenture, Llp Method for providing communication services over a computer network system
US7206805B1 (en) 1999-09-09 2007-04-17 Oracle International Corporation Asynchronous transcription object management system
US6850252B1 (en) 1999-10-05 2005-02-01 Steven M. Hoffberg Intelligent electronic appliance system and method
US6671818B1 (en) 1999-11-22 2003-12-30 Accenture Llp Problem isolation through translating and filtering events into a standard object format in a network based supply chain
US7130807B1 (en) 1999-11-22 2006-10-31 Accenture Llp Technology sharing during demand and supply planning in a network-based supply chain environment
US7124101B1 (en) 1999-11-22 2006-10-17 Accenture Llp Asset tracking in a network-based supply chain environment
US6606744B1 (en) 1999-11-22 2003-08-12 Accenture, Llp Providing collaborative installation management in a network-based supply chain environment
US6970849B1 (en) 1999-12-17 2005-11-29 Microsoft Corporation Inter-server communication using request with encrypted parameter
US7047411B1 (en) 1999-12-17 2006-05-16 Microsoft Corporation Server for an electronic distribution system and method of operating same
US7167844B1 (en) 1999-12-22 2007-01-23 Accenture Llp Electronic menu document creator in a virtual financial environment
US6629081B1 (en) 1999-12-22 2003-09-30 Accenture Llp Account settlement and financing in an e-commerce environment
US7069234B1 (en) 1999-12-22 2006-06-27 Accenture Llp Initiating an agreement in an e-commerce environment
US7072934B2 (en) 2000-01-14 2006-07-04 Saba Software, Inc. Method and apparatus for a business applications server management system platform
US6643652B2 (en) 2000-01-14 2003-11-04 Saba Software, Inc. Method and apparatus for managing data exchange among systems in a network
US6904449B1 (en) 2000-01-14 2005-06-07 Accenture Llp System and method for an application provider framework
WO2001052090A3 (en) 2000-01-14 2001-12-13 Michael L Dufner Method and apparatus for a web content platform
CA2399641A1 (en) 2000-02-10 2001-08-16 Involve Techology, Inc. System for creating and maintaining a database of information utilizing user opinions
US7437408B2 (en) 2000-02-14 2008-10-14 Lockheed Martin Corporation Information aggregation, processing and distribution system
US20020059274A1 (en) 2000-03-03 2002-05-16 Hartsell Neal D. Systems and methods for configuration of information management systems
US20020049841A1 (en) 2000-03-03 2002-04-25 Johnson Scott C Systems and methods for providing differentiated service in information management environments
US20020049608A1 (en) 2000-03-03 2002-04-25 Hartsell Neal D. Systems and methods for providing differentiated business services in information management environments
US20020174227A1 (en) 2000-03-03 2002-11-21 Hartsell Neal D. Systems and methods for prioritization in information management environments
US20020065864A1 (en) 2000-03-03 2002-05-30 Hartsell Neal D. Systems and method for resource tracking in information management environments
US6502102B1 (en) 2000-03-27 2002-12-31 Accenture Llp System, method and article of manufacture for a table-driven automated scripting architecture
US6907546B1 (en) 2000-03-27 2005-06-14 Accenture Llp Language-driven interface for an automated testing framework
US6701514B1 (en) 2000-03-27 2004-03-02 Accenture Llp System, method, and article of manufacture for test maintenance in an automated scripting framework
US6701345B1 (en) 2000-04-13 2004-03-02 Accenture Llp Providing a notification when a plurality of users are altering similar data in a health care solution environment
US6976090B2 (en) 2000-04-20 2005-12-13 Actona Technologies Ltd. Differentiated content and application delivery via internet
US7225244B2 (en) 2000-05-20 2007-05-29 Ciena Corporation Common command interface
US7113934B2 (en) 2000-05-25 2006-09-26 Fujitsu Limited Element management system with adaptive interfacing selected by last previous full-qualified managed level
US6891953B1 (en) 2000-06-27 2005-05-10 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for binding enhanced software features to a persona
US7158953B1 (en) 2000-06-27 2007-01-02 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for limiting the use of user-specific software features
US6990453B2 (en) 2000-07-31 2006-01-24 Landmark Digital Services Llc System and methods for recognizing sound and music signals in high noise and distortion
US20020032798A1 (en) 2000-09-08 2002-03-14 Wei Xu Systems and methods for packet sequencing
US20020099738A1 (en) 2000-11-22 2002-07-25 Grant Hugh Alexander Automated web access for back-end enterprise systems
US6877025B2 (en) 2000-12-18 2005-04-05 International Business Machines Corp. Integrated JSP and command cache for web applications with dynamic content
US20020116582A1 (en) 2000-12-18 2002-08-22 Copeland George P. Batching of invalidations and new values in a web cache with dynamic content
US6795089B2 (en) 2000-12-20 2004-09-21 Microsoft Corporation Dynamic, live surface and model elements for visualization and modeling
US20040073512A1 (en) 2001-02-23 2004-04-15 David Maung Unique session storage design
US6954736B2 (en) 2001-03-23 2005-10-11 Restaurant Services, Inc. System, method and computer program product for order confirmation in a supply chain management framework
US7171379B2 (en) 2001-03-23 2007-01-30 Restaurant Services, Inc. System, method and computer program product for normalizing data in a supply chain management framework
US7039606B2 (en) 2001-03-23 2006-05-02 Restaurant Services, Inc. System, method and computer program product for contract consistency in a supply chain management framework
US7072843B2 (en) 2001-03-23 2006-07-04 Restaurant Services, Inc. System, method and computer program product for error checking in a supply chain management framework
US20030074206A1 (en) 2001-03-23 2003-04-17 Restaurant Services, Inc. System, method and computer program product for utilizing market demand information for generating revenue
US7120596B2 (en) 2001-03-23 2006-10-10 Restaurant Services, Inc. System, method and computer program product for landed cost reporting in a supply chain management framework
US7506047B2 (en) 2001-03-30 2009-03-17 Bmc Software, Inc. Synthetic transaction monitor with replay capability
US20050210263A1 (en) 2001-04-25 2005-09-22 Levas Robert G Electronic form routing and data capture system and method
US7134075B2 (en) 2001-04-26 2006-11-07 International Business Machines Corporation Conversion of documents between XML and processor efficient MXML in content based routing networks
WO2002099675A1 (en) 2001-06-04 2002-12-12 Sentiat Technologies, Inc. Method and computer system for isolating and interrelating components of an application
US7043716B2 (en) 2001-06-13 2006-05-09 Arius Software Corporation System and method for multiple level architecture by use of abstract application notation
US7117504B2 (en) 2001-07-10 2006-10-03 Microsoft Corporation Application program interface that enables communication for a network software platform
US7013290B2 (en) 2001-08-03 2006-03-14 John Allen Ananian Personalized interactive digital catalog profiling
US20030041167A1 (en) 2001-08-15 2003-02-27 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for managing secure geographic boundary resources within a network management framework
US7085850B2 (en) * 2001-08-22 2006-08-01 International Business Machines Corporation Stateless message processing scheme for network processors interactions
US20040103147A1 (en) 2001-11-13 2004-05-27 Flesher Kevin E. System for enabling collaboration and protecting sensitive data
US7225040B2 (en) 2001-11-14 2007-05-29 Exxon Mobil Oil Corporation Method and system for reducing lead-time in the packaging industry
US20030105977A1 (en) 2001-12-05 2003-06-05 International Business Machines Corporation Offload processing for secure data transfer
US7509393B2 (en) 2001-12-19 2009-03-24 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for caching role-specific fragments
US7054367B2 (en) 2001-12-31 2006-05-30 Emc Corporation Edge detection based on variable-length codes of block coded video
US7023979B1 (en) 2002-03-07 2006-04-04 Wai Wu Telephony control system with intelligent call routing
US7107285B2 (en) 2002-03-16 2006-09-12 Questerra Corporation Method, system, and program for an improved enterprise spatial system
US7191469B2 (en) 2002-05-13 2007-03-13 Green Border Technologies Methods and systems for providing a secure application environment using derived user accounts
US7631107B2 (en) 2002-06-11 2009-12-08 Pandya Ashish A Runtime adaptable protocol processor
US7484208B1 (en) 2002-12-12 2009-01-27 Michael Nelson Virtual machine migration
US7218779B2 (en) 2003-01-21 2007-05-15 Microsoft Corporation Ink divider and associated application program interface
US7613822B2 (en) 2003-06-30 2009-11-03 Microsoft Corporation Network load balancing with session information
US7636917B2 (en) 2003-06-30 2009-12-22 Microsoft Corporation Network load balancing with host status information
US8131739B2 (en) 2003-08-21 2012-03-06 Microsoft Corporation Systems and methods for interfacing application programs with an item-based storage platform
US8238696B2 (en) 2003-08-21 2012-08-07 Microsoft Corporation Systems and methods for the implementation of a digital images schema for organizing units of information manageable by a hardware/software interface system
US7529811B2 (en) 2003-08-21 2009-05-05 Microsoft Corporation Systems and methods for the implementation of a core schema for providing a top-level structure for organizing units of information manageable by a hardware/software interface system
US7552109B2 (en) 2003-10-15 2009-06-23 International Business Machines Corporation System, method, and service for collaborative focused crawling of documents on a network
US7130812B1 (en) 2003-11-26 2006-10-31 Centergistic Solutions, Inc. Method and system for managing real time data
US7194451B2 (en) 2004-02-26 2007-03-20 Microsoft Corporation Database monitoring system
US20050262063A1 (en) 2004-04-26 2005-11-24 Watchfire Corporation Method and system for website analysis
US7240150B1 (en) 2004-04-30 2007-07-03 Emc Corporation Methods and apparatus for processing access requests in a content addressable computer system
US7454479B2 (en) 2004-05-28 2008-11-18 Microsoft Corporation Flexible teleport architecture
US9077611B2 (en) 2004-07-07 2015-07-07 Sciencelogic, Inc. Self configuring network management system
US7506338B2 (en) 2004-08-30 2009-03-17 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for simplifying the deployment and serviceability of commercial software environments
US7987272B2 (en) 2004-12-06 2011-07-26 Cisco Technology, Inc. Performing message payload processing functions in a network element on behalf of an application
US7606267B2 (en) 2004-12-10 2009-10-20 Cisco Technology, Inc. Reducing the sizes of application layer messages in a network element
US8145777B2 (en) 2005-01-14 2012-03-27 Citrix Systems, Inc. Method and system for real-time seeking during playback of remote presentation protocols
US20060161671A1 (en) 2005-01-14 2006-07-20 Citrix Systems, Inc. Method and systems for capture and replay of remote presentation protocol data
US20070174429A1 (en) 2006-01-24 2007-07-26 Citrix Systems, Inc. Methods and servers for establishing a connection between a client system and a virtual machine hosting a requested computing environment
US8151323B2 (en) 2006-04-12 2012-04-03 Citrix Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for providing levels of access and action control via an SSL VPN appliance
JP4936551B2 (en) 2007-11-16 2012-05-23 キヤノン株式会社 Management device, management method, and computer program

Patent Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5708780A (en) * 1995-06-07 1998-01-13 Open Market, Inc. Internet server access control and monitoring systems
US5907621A (en) * 1996-11-15 1999-05-25 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for session management
US6710786B1 (en) * 1997-02-03 2004-03-23 Oracle International Corporation Method and apparatus for incorporating state information into a URL
US6480894B1 (en) * 1998-03-06 2002-11-12 I2 Technologies Us, Inc. System and method for maintaining a state for a user session using a web system
US6311278B1 (en) * 1998-09-09 2001-10-30 Sanctum Ltd. Method and system for extracting application protocol characteristics
US20020049900A1 (en) * 2000-10-06 2002-04-25 International Business Machines Corporation, Armonk,New York, 10504 Method and apparatus for cryptographic stateless protocol using asymmetric encryption
US20030051142A1 (en) * 2001-05-16 2003-03-13 Hidalgo Lluis Mora Firewalls for providing security in HTTP networks and applications
US20040054779A1 (en) * 2002-09-13 2004-03-18 Yoshiteru Takeshima Network system

Cited By (24)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9282088B2 (en) 2005-12-08 2016-03-08 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Request authentication token
US8560841B2 (en) 2005-12-08 2013-10-15 Microsoft Corporation Request authentication token
US20100161973A1 (en) * 2005-12-08 2010-06-24 Microsoft Corporation Request authentication token
US7769842B2 (en) 2006-08-08 2010-08-03 Endl Texas, Llc Storage management unit to configure zoning, LUN masking, access controls, or other storage area network parameters
US20070033566A1 (en) * 2006-08-08 2007-02-08 Endl Texas, Llc Storage Management Unit to Configure Zoning, LUN Masking, Access Controls, or Other Storage Area Network Parameters
US20080115201A1 (en) * 2006-11-13 2008-05-15 Microsoft Corporation Refreshing a page validation token
US8424073B2 (en) * 2006-11-13 2013-04-16 Microsoft Corporation Refreshing a page validation token
US8949607B2 (en) 2006-12-15 2015-02-03 Codesealer Aps Digital data authentication
WO2008071795A3 (en) * 2006-12-15 2008-10-09 Soerensen Hans Martin Boesgaard Digital data authentication
US20100017615A1 (en) * 2006-12-15 2010-01-21 Boesgaard Soerensen Hans Martin Digital data authentication
US8468351B2 (en) * 2006-12-15 2013-06-18 Codesealer Aps Digital data authentication
US8156538B2 (en) * 2007-12-18 2012-04-10 Microsoft Corporation Distribution of information protection policies to client machines
US20090158384A1 (en) * 2007-12-18 2009-06-18 Microsoft Corporation Distribution of information protection policies to client machines
US9059857B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2015-06-16 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd Near field communication (NFC) device and method for selectively securing records in a near field communication data exchange format (NDEF) message
US9032211B2 (en) * 2008-07-09 2015-05-12 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Near field communication (NFC) device and method for selectively securing records in a near field communication data exchange format (NDEF) message
US8930707B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2015-01-06 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd Near field communication (NFC) device and method for selectively securing records in a near field communication data exchange format (NDEF) message
US20100299527A1 (en) * 2008-07-09 2010-11-25 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd Near field communication (nfc) device and method for selectively securing records in a near field communication data exchange format (ndef) message
US9949132B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2018-04-17 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd Near field communication (NFC) device and method for selectively securing records in a near field communication data exchange format (NDEF) message
US8335819B2 (en) * 2009-12-31 2012-12-18 Nokia Corporation Method and apparatus for providing client-side caching
US20110161403A1 (en) * 2009-12-31 2011-06-30 Nokia Corporation Method and apparatus for providing client-side caching
US20130046817A1 (en) * 2011-08-20 2013-02-21 Blis Media Limited Verifying the Transfer of a Data File
US9009222B2 (en) * 2011-08-20 2015-04-14 Blis Media Limited Verifying the transfer of a data file
US9191405B2 (en) 2012-01-30 2015-11-17 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Dynamic cross-site request forgery protection in a web-based client application
US20170093575A1 (en) * 2015-09-30 2017-03-30 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Code signing service

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date Type
WO2004107132A3 (en) 2006-04-13 application
US20070271599A1 (en) 2007-11-22 application
US7861087B2 (en) 2010-12-28 grant
WO2004107132A2 (en) 2004-12-09 application

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Gasser et al. An architecture for practical delegation in a distributed system
US7114180B1 (en) Method and system for authenticating and authorizing requestors interacting with content servers
US7360096B2 (en) Securely processing client credentials used for Web-based access to resources
US6961783B1 (en) DNS server access control system and method
US7434252B2 (en) Role-based authorization of network services using diversified security tokens
Jovanovic et al. Preventing cross site request forgery attacks
US7096493B1 (en) Internet file safety information center
EP0940960A1 (en) Authentication between servers
Franks et al. An extension to HTTP: digest access authentication
US20040143738A1 (en) System for providing session-based network privacy, private, persistent storage, and discretionary access control for sharing private data
US20060294366A1 (en) Method and system for establishing a secure connection based on an attribute certificate having user credentials
US6032260A (en) Method for issuing a new authenticated electronic ticket based on an expired authenticated ticket and distributed server architecture for using same
US7216236B2 (en) Secure session management and authentication for web sites
US20050251856A1 (en) Network access using multiple authentication realms
US7627896B2 (en) Security system providing methodology for cooperative enforcement of security policies during SSL sessions
Somorovsky et al. All your clouds are belong to us: security analysis of cloud management interfaces
US20050262357A1 (en) Network access using reverse proxy
US20030037138A1 (en) Method, apparatus, and program for identifying, restricting, and monitoring data sent from client computers
US7500099B1 (en) Method for mitigating web-based “one-click” attacks
US7313822B2 (en) Application-layer security method and system
US20030204719A1 (en) Application layer security method and system
US20070266426A1 (en) Method and system for protecting against denial of service attacks using trust, quality of service, personalization, and hide port messages
US7673135B2 (en) Request authentication token
US20060265446A1 (en) Dynamic executable
US6581093B1 (en) Policy validation in a LDAP directory

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC., CALIFORNIA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:ROSENSTEIN, ADAM H.;REEL/FRAME:015104/0977

Effective date: 20040527

AS Assignment

Owner name: GOLD HILL VENTURE LENDING 03, L.P., CALIFORNIA

Free format text: SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAN SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:018534/0189

Effective date: 20061108

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS AGENT, CALIFORNIA

Free format text: SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAN SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:018534/0189

Effective date: 20061108

AS Assignment

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS AGENT, CALIFORNIA

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE CAYMAN SYSTEMS, INC. PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 018534 FRAME0189;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:018554/0799

Effective date: 20061108

Owner name: GOLD HILL VENTURE LENDING 03, L.P., CALIFORNIA

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE CAYMAN SYSTEMS, INC. PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 018534 FRAME0189;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:018554/0799

Effective date: 20061108

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS AGENT, CALIFORNIA

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE CAYMAN SYSTEMS, INC. PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 018534 FRAME0189. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:018554/0799

Effective date: 20061108

Owner name: GOLD HILL VENTURE LENDING 03, L.P., CALIFORNIA

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE CAYMAN SYSTEMS, INC. PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 018534 FRAME0189. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:018554/0799

Effective date: 20061108

AS Assignment

Owner name: CAYMAS (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS),

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:020103/0495

Effective date: 20070326

AS Assignment

Owner name: CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC., FLORIDA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC;REEL/FRAME:021240/0281

Effective date: 20070605

AS Assignment

Owner name: CAYMAS (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS),

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:021305/0252

Effective date: 20070326

Owner name: CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC., FLORIDA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CAYMAS (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC;REEL/FRAME:021305/0261

Effective date: 20070605