New! View global litigation for patent families

US20020084325A1 - Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter - Google Patents

Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20020084325A1
US20020084325A1 US10013277 US1327701A US2002084325A1 US 20020084325 A1 US20020084325 A1 US 20020084325A1 US 10013277 US10013277 US 10013277 US 1327701 A US1327701 A US 1327701A US 2002084325 A1 US2002084325 A1 US 2002084325A1
Authority
US
Grant status
Application
Patent type
Prior art keywords
ballot
voter
printed
ballots
voting
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
US10013277
Other versions
US6968999B2 (en )
Inventor
David Reardon
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Reardon David C
Original Assignee
Reardon David C.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C13/00Voting apparatus

Abstract

An apparatus and method of voting is disclosed for creating and recording both an electronic and printed ballot for each voter. The system can employ a variety of vote selection means which can lead to the generation of an electronic tally of the vote in addition to the printing of a paper ballot. The printed ballot includes only the names of the candidates for whom the voter has voted in a form that is easily readable by both humans and machine. This unambiguous printed ballot makes it easy for voters to verify the accuracy of their intended vote and can subsequently be used to casting the voter's official vote or saved to provide an audit trail for subsequent confirmation of the electronic tally. These and other features accelerate the initial tabulation of results while providing multiple safeguards against fraud and a reliable means of verifying voter intent.

Description

    CLAIM OF PRIORITY BASED ON CO-PENDING PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
  • [0001]
    The present application is related to co-pending Provisional Patent Application Serial No. 60/258,346 filed Dec. 28, 2000 entitled “A Computer Enhanced Voting System Including Verifiable, Custom Printed Ballots Imprinted to the Specifications of Each Voter”, and based on which priority is herewith claimed under 35 U.S.C. §119(e) and the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
  • BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  • [0002]
    This invention relates in general to electronic voting systems and more specifically to a voting system that includes a means to print customized ballots at the time a voter casts his or her ballot.
  • [0003]
    The presidential election of 2000 illustrated the hazards of punch card ballots and the uncertainty of verify ring voter intent. Indeed, since punch card ballots are not easily read by voters, there were many voters who subsequently felt disenfranchised based on the fear that their intended vote was not accurately recorded.
  • [0004]
    This national controversy revealed that there is the need for a method to cast ballots that is (1) easy for humans to read, so that both voters and election officials can verify the accuracy of the cast vote, (2) easy for machines to read for the purpose of automating the count, and (3) provides for multiple paths of verification.
  • [0005]
    A number of electronic voting methods have been devised (De Phillipo, U.S. Pat. No. 4,015,106, Narey et al., U.S. Pat. No. 4,021,780, and Moldovan, Jr. et al., U.S. Pat. No. 4,010,353, Challener, et al. U.S. Pat. No. 6,081,793, Kilian, et al. U.S. Pat. No. 6,092,051) but these have proven to be too expensive or cumbersome for widespread use.
  • [0006]
    Many of these new technologies seek to replace the paper ballot with secure digital records. While the electronically cast votes are easy to count and transmit, public confidence in a voting system will be undermined in any system that lacks a physical paper ballot. The paper ballot is s tangible evidence of the cast vote and may be considered as an essential element in the verification of computer tallies.
  • [0007]
    This invention relates in general to a voting system that combines the speed and accuracy of computer technology with the advantages of paper ballots in a novel fashion that produces numerous advantages in terms of speed, ease of use, and multiple levels of verification.
  • SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • [0008]
    A voting system is disclosed, according to one embodiment of the present invention, for use by voters to cast ballots therein during an election. The voting system includes an electronic precinct computing unit that is connected to a selection entry means by which the voter enters his selection of votes and a printer means by which a paper ballot is generated that identifies in an unambiguous fashion the votes cast in a form that is easily readable by both humans and an appropriate scanning machine that would be used for an automated tallying of the printed ballots. In addition, as an enhancement of the basic invention, the precinct computing unit may store an electronic record of the cast votes in a removable memory unit that may subsequently be transported to a central location and/or be networked via the Internet or a closed computer network to a central headquarters computer. By these additional means, a computer generated tally of the votes may be computed prior to the scanning of the printed ballots and used for the announcement of the initial results, subject to verification of the results by scanning of the printed ballots. By means of a unique ballot number and a printed receipt, it is also possible for a voter to subsequently confirm that the voter's intended vote was properly included in the final tally and to even identify the printed ballot in the event that allegations of fraud arise.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • [0009]
    [0009]FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an electronic voting system according to one embodiment of the present invention that illustrates the relationship between the key elements.
  • [0010]
    [0010]FIG. 2 is an illustration of a printed ballot according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT
  • [0011]
    For the purposes of promoting an understanding of the principles of the invention, reference will now be made to the embodiments illustrated in the drawings and specific language will be used to describe the same. It will nevertheless be understood that no limitation of the scope of the invention is thereby intended, such alterations and further modifications in the illustrated device, and such further applications of the principles of the invention as illustrated therein being contemplated as would normally occur to one skilled in the art to which the invention relates.
  • [0012]
    Referring now to FIG. 1, the precinct computing unit 10 is a basic computing device, perhaps even a standard computer, that is preprogrammed with a list of all the possible votes that can be cast on that voting day for that particular precinct. It is connected to a voter operated input device, the selection entry means 11, and a printer 12 by which the voter's ballot will be printed once the voter's selections are completed.
  • [0013]
    The interconnection between the precinct computing unit, the selecting entry means, and the printer can be in any of many configurations that will be obvious to those skilled in the art. The three means might be built into a single box and hardwired together. Alternatively, the selection entry means and the printer could be built as a single unit of which several could then be placed into individual private voting booths that are networked to the precinct computing unit. Alternatively, each voting booth might have only the selection entry means (for example, a touch screen displaying the candidates) but the printer would be located at the voting judges table. Any of a number of similar configurations could be arranged. The only essential requirement is that these three parts of the system must have a communication link between them, either through hardwiring, a network, or through an optical or radio link.
  • [0014]
    Similarly, the selection entry means 11 can be one of many well known devices, for example, a numeric keypad, an alphanumeric keyboard, a touch screen, a bar code reader or similar scanning device. Through this means the voter may either enter individual selections or may enter the code for a pre-selected slate of votes.
  • [0015]
    In most voting systems, voters are presented with an identical ballot. The key innovation in this invention, however, is that the ballot is customized. FIG. 2 illustrates a typical embodiment of a custom printed ballot. In this example, only the names of the candidates actually selected by the voter 21 are printed on the ballot. Competing, but non-selected candidates names are omitted. This makes it easy for the voter to verify the accuracy of the ballot with a quick glance at the printed list of names. Typically, the names would be printed in larger bolder letters with the office being filled printed in smaller letters beneath the name. For referenda, a proposition number would be printed with “YES” or “NO” clearly indicated. Alternatively, if state law required all candidates names to be on the ballot, the selected name could be printed in large bold type while the unselected names could be printed in very small type.
  • [0016]
    The printing of the ballot may also include two additional options. First, to facilitate machine reading of the ballot, a unique bar code or other machine readable code 22 unique to each candidate or vote might also be printed at an appropriate place on the ballot. Another option would include printing a unique ballot identification number on the ballot 23 as well as upon a receipt 24 to be given to the voter. In FIG. 2, the receipt 24 is in the form of a peel off label affixed to the ballot that can be easily removed and given to the voter. A perforated, tear off receipt might also be conveniently used, or separate receipt might be printed on a second ballot clearly marked as a receipt and lacking the machine readable codes, so as to prevent it from being used to cast an additional vote. By whichever of many means that a receipt is printed, this receipt may subsequently be used by the voter, as described elsewhere, to confirm that the votes were properly tallied in the final count or in an investigation of vote tampering.
  • [0017]
    Using an appropriate scanning machine, the printed ballots can subsequently be tallied in a rapid and consistent manner. In the event that the bar code is unreadable, either an optical character recognition scanner may be employed to read the printed names or the ballot may be automatically segregated for examination by election officials.
  • [0018]
    In a typical application, the count of the printed ballots would be used for the final certified results since the printed ballots have more evidentiary value than a purely electronic tally that may be subject to software glitches, data loss, computer hacking, black outs, fraudulent reporting or other errors that undermine voter confidence. On the other hand, a purely electronic tally of the cast votes can also be easily generated by one or both of the following means.
  • [0019]
    By establishing a communication link between the precinct computing unit and a county, state, or federal central headquarters computing unit 14 (via the Internet, for example), all votes on every ballot cast at the precinct may be transmitted to the central headquarters either in real time or after the polls close. Also, or alternatively, an electronic record of all the cast ballots may be stored on a removable memory unit 13 which can be transported to the county's vote commission, for example. At the county level, in this example, all the memory units from the many precincts could be downloaded into a central computer and instantly tabulated. The results of this count would then be subject to verification by a machine count of the printed ballots.
  • RAMIFICATIONS & SCOPE OF INVENTION
  • [0020]
    The combination of an electronic selection process and a printed ballot produces a large number of unexpected advantages some of which are discussed herein.
  • [0021]
    For example, while this voting system can be used in the traditional manner, voters coming to the precinct and making their selections on a case by case basis, it can also accommodate the quick casting of a pre-selected slate of candidates. For example, a few days before the election, voters who want to avoid waiting in line at the precinct could log onto an internet site for their precinct. On that web site, the voter would be presented with a web-based virtual ballot that includes all the contests and candidates. The precinct might even include with each candidates name a link to that candidates campaign web sight to help the voters to research their choices. By filling in the ballot, the voter can pre-cast his votes. When finished, the voter would be provided a code number, or can print out a scannable code, that identifies the slate of votes he intends to cast. This number is not unique to that voter, but simply corresponds to that particular slate of votes. Another voter casting the identical vote would be given the same code number. If the voter is still uncertain about some of his selections, he can even print out several code numbers corresponding to different slates. Exploiting this same advantage, political parties could publish the code number or scannable code for their recommended slate. The voter could then take this pre-published code to the voting booth and cast votes for his party's slate with virtually no thought at all.
  • [0022]
    With the selection already determined in the fashion described above, the voter only needs to go to the precinct on the election day. There, the election officials will verify his identity and he can enter and enter the code number in the selection entry means, or have the preprinted bar code scanned by the selection entry means. The completed ballot is printed out, read by the voter to verify the accuracy of the selections, and cast.
  • [0023]
    To better ensure that voters do not mistakenly fail to vote for an office, “NO VOTE” might be printed above the name of offices for which no vote was cast. Voters would then see this after the ballot is printed and could decide whether to void the ballot or to cast it, as is. In addition, since the entry of the selections is entered into an programmable electronic device, it is a simple matter for the program to refuse to accept multiple selections for a single office, thereby eliminating the risk of “overcount” errors. Entry of multiple candidates for a single office would result in prompts asking the voter to select only a single candidate or no candidate.
  • [0024]
    Write-in candidates can also be accommodated. One method would be to allow voters to simply select “WRITE-IN” as their choice. The ballot would be printed with “WRITE-IN” printed adjacent to the office for which the write-in is selected and with space for the voter to print in the name of his or her write-in choice. During the scanning process, all ballots with write-in votes could be automatically segregated and write-in votes hand tallied. Alternatively, if the selection of candidates is done through a computer terminal, a choice for a write-in candidate could bring up a subroutine that allows the voter to type in the name of the write-in candidate. This name could then be printed on the ballot at the appropriate place. In addition, a identifying code could be assigned to that write in candidate and electronically registered with the central office, printed on the ballot as a bar code, and reused if other voters enter the same write-in name.
  • [0025]
    Additional means for election officials to witness the validity of the cast ballot may also be employed. For example, if blank ballots are presented to each voter, the election judges can initial the front or back of a blank ballot before it is printed. Alternatively, if a large quantity of ballots are placed into a paper feeding device for the printer, the ballots can be initialed or imprinted a machine readable election judge confirmation code after it is printed and presented to the election judges.
  • [0026]
    If a ballot is miscast or spoiled prior to its deposit in the ballot box, there are at least three simple alternatives for voiding the ballot. First, it could be marked as void and placed into a voided ballot box. Ballots from this box would be scanned before or slightly after the polls close so that the votes on these ballots could be deducted from the preliminary computer tally. Alternatively, the precinct computing means would provide a means by which the election judges could enter the unique ballot identification number into the system which would then automatically void that ballot and all votes associated with it. The voter would then be allowed to cast a new ballot. By keeping the receipts for both ballots, the voter could subsequently check to verify that the voided ballot was voided and the properly cast ballot was counted. Thirdly, the ballot could be run back through the printer which would print voiding codes on the front and or back of the ballot but the electronic tally is not adjusted. The voided ballot is then either placed in a separate voided ballots box or in with the regularly cast ballots. In the latter case, since it is marked void in a fashion that will be easily spotted by the scanner, the votes on the voided ballot will not be counted toward the official tally but would be counted toward the voided ballots tally. When the totals of the official tally and the voided ballots tally are combined these numbers should, of course, equal the preliminary electronic tally. In this latter alternative, no effort is made to correct the preliminary electronic tally. If the number of voided ballots is generally small, this is unlikely to have an impact on the preliminary interpretation of the results. In any event, the official count of the ballots, as described, would account for both valid and voided ballots.
  • [0027]
    In the description of the preferred embodiment, the assumption is made that the paper ballot represents the true vote and the initial electronic tally is simply used to report a preliminary count. In some jurisdictions, however, the electronic tally might be accepted as the official count unless the vote is contested. This approach would have the advantage of eliminating the costs involved in routinely scanning the paper ballots. In such cases, the printed ballots would simply be stored in a secure location for the period of time allowed for filing a challenge against the reported tally. If the electronic count is challenged, the printed ballots could be retrieved for either a partial or full hand or machine count.
  • [0028]
    The option of allowing individual voters to verify the casting of his or her votes is worthy of additional discussion. Since all the information on the paper ballot is identical to the electronic data associated with the unique ballot identification code (both in the initial tally and the scanned verification of the results), this data can be made available to the public through an internet link into the central data base compiled by the headquarters computing unit or could be limited to certain public locations, such as election boards or county clerks offices. By going to this web site or appropriate terminal connected to the central data base, the voter can enter the ballot identification code printed on his receipt and verify that his intended votes were properly counted in both the initial tally and the scanned count. Since there is no voter information linked to the ballot identification code, there is no risk that anyone else can determine how each voter voted, unless another person gains access to another voter's ballot receipt. In most cases, however, this receipt will be quickly destroyed since it has little value except to most highly suspicious voters. This option would provide a means for voters to have increased confidence in the integrity of the state's voting system.
  • [0029]
    Since this voting system incorporates computer technology, it can also easily accommodate the casting of absentee ballots. Voters applying for an absentee ballot could be provided with a unique absentee ballot number. Using an internet connection, they can then go to the precinct web site and make their selections. Upon entering their unique absentee ballot number, they can then indicate to the precinct computing unit or the headquarters computing unit that this selection should be recorded as an properly cast absentee ballot. In addition, if required by the law, a paper copy of the ballot could be printed out and mailed to election officials in the prescribed manner for the purpose of confirming the electronically cast vote.
  • [0030]
    The use of a computer controlled voting system also provides an easy means for incorporating additional security measures at the precincts. For example, the precinct computing unit can be preprogrammed to refuse to allow the casting of any votes or printing of any ballots except under predefined conditions, such as entry of passwords or presentation of tokens by the required number of election judges, including representatives of various political parties. By this same manner, an precinct election judge witnessing fraud could remove his token or disable his password to register a protest or to actually stop the casting of votes.
  • [0031]
    The precinct computing unit can also be preprogrammed to start and stop accepting the casting of ballots at precisely the predefined times as determined by its internal clock. Furthermore, since in some embodiments of this invention, the precinct computing unit is in communication with the headquarters computing unit, in the event that election officials or a E court order determines that voting times should be extended or reduced, this instruction could be conveyed to the precinct computing unit by the headquarters computing unit. These and similar provisions for defining the conditions surrounding the voting process can be provided for in a manner consistent with local law through programming methods familiar to those skilled in the art.
  • [0032]
    It is most noteworthy that this voting system offers multiple levels of verification and redundancy for recovery of votes that might otherwise be spoiled. First, the scanned count of the paper ballots is a means of confirming that the electronic tally has not been altered by hackers or corrupt election officials or employees. Second, if a large number of voters are suspicious that their votes are not being properly counted, they can use their receipts to verify how the votes are recorded in the publicly available records. During a fraud investigation, receipt numbers could be entered into the scanning equipment to automatically identify segregate ballots about which their is suspicion or concern.
  • [0033]
    Furthermore, if allowed by state law, in the event that a precinct ballot box is lost or destroyed, the electronic tally of votes from that precinct could be certified as an accurate substitute for the destroyed paper ballots. Conversely, if the electronic records are corrupted or destroyed, at either the precinct level or at the headquarters computing unit, the printed paper ballots are still available for generating an accurate count of the results.
  • [0034]
    Moreover, there is redundancy built into the ballots themselves. If a the machine readable code for a particular vote 22 is marred or unreadable, the alphanumeric representation 22 can be scanned by machine or read by election judges to determine the voters intent. The voters intent can also be determined by reference to the unique ballot identification number 23 by which means the votes associated with this ballot can be retrieved from the digital records corresponding to the cast ballot. To add an additional level of protection, this ballot identification number would typically include a checksum that could be used, at least in a high percentage of cases, to identify and correct illegible characters.
  • [0035]
    Still another level of redundancy could be provided by printing on each ballot a copy of the non-unique selection code that corresponds to the code that a voter would use in casting a pre-selected slate of votes, as described above.
  • [0036]
    Through these multiple means (a printed name, a candidate code, a ballot identification code, a pre-selected slate code, and a electronic record of all the information associated with each cast ballot) it would be possible to recover and verify the votes cast from even a severely damaged ballot.
  • [0037]
    All these redundancies would make election fraud extremely difficult without the collusion of both election judges and state election officials. Irregularities in the printed ballots and the original electronic tally records are easily identified and can be pinpointed to the level of individual precincts and even individual ballots.
  • [0038]
    The flexibility of this system allows state and local voting officials many alternatives for establishing voting procedures. The foregoing description is not intended to limit the procedures or variations thereof which might be employed in the use of this invention.
  • [0039]
    Additional advantages and modifications will readily occur to those skilled in the art: Therefore, the invention in its broader aspects is not limited to the specific details, and representative devices shown and described herein. Accordingly, various modifications may be made without departing from the spirit or scope of the general inventive concept as defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims (16)

    What is claimed is:
  1. 1. A voting system for use by voters to cast ballots therein during an election, comprising:
    at least one selection entry device for inputting voters' selections,
    at least one precinct computing unit connected to the selection entry device, and
    at least one printer device controlled by the precinct computing unit for printing a paper ballot for each voter, the paper ballot being printed in such a way as to identify v the voter's selections in an unambiguous fashion that is readable by the voter, election judges, and automated scanners.
  2. 2. The voting system of claim 1 including:
    a headquarters computing unit including apparatus communicating with each of the precinct computing units to retrieve from each of the precinct computing units a record of the vote cast and combine the votes cast with the records retrieved from the plurality of the precinct computing units
  3. 3. The voting system of claim 2
    wherein the printer device is operable to imprint the paper ballot with a unique identification code and to transmit the identification code together with the voters' selections to the headquarters computing unit for comparison to the electronic record at the headquarters computing unit.
  4. 4. The voting system of claim 1 including:
    a removable memory unit releasably connected to the precinct computing unit for receiving a record of each voter's selections , the removable memory unit capable of being transferred and connected to the headquarters computing unit so that a tally of all votes cast can be combined with the votes cast at the other precinct computing units.
  5. 5. The voting system of claim 4
    wherein the printer device is responsive to the precinct computing unit for imprinting the paper ballot with a unique identifying code representative of the voter and
    wherein in response to the precinct computing unit the identifying code, together with the voter's selections, is recorded on the removable memory unit whereby from this record the paper ballot may subsequently be compared to the electronic record.
  6. 6. The voting system of claim 3
    wherein the printer device is responsive to the precinct computing unit for imprinting a voter's receipt with a copy of the unique identifying code by which means the voter may subsequently verify the accuracy of the electronic tally associated with the voter's ballot.
  7. 7. The voting system of claim 1 including:
    a plurality of voting booths containing at least one of the selection entry devices and at least one of the printer devices, the voting booths providing a secure environment in which voters can secretly cast their ballots.
  8. 8. The voting system of claim 1
    wherein the selection entry device includes a keypad.
  9. 9. The voting system of claim 1
    wherein the selection entry means includes a scanner.
  10. 10. The voting system of claim 1
    wherein the selection entry means includes a computer terminal.
  11. 11. The voting system of claim 1
    wherein the selecting entry means includes a touchscreen display.
  12. 12. The voting system of claim 2
    wherein the printer device is responsive to the precinct computing unit for imprinting the paper ballot with a unique identifying code
  13. 13. The voting system of claim 1
    wherein the precinct computing unit includes an internal clock device for automatically enabling votes to be recorded only during a predetermined election date and time.
  14. 14. The voting system of claim 2
    wherein the precinct computing unit is responsive to signaled instructions from the headquarters computing unit for altering the conditions under which a vote may be cast.
  15. 15. The voting system of claim 1
    wherein the paper ballot is imprinted with only the choices which the voter has selected.
  16. 16. The voting system of claim 1
    wherein the paper ballot is imprinted with all choices available to the voter with those choices selected by the voter printed in an unambiguously different fashion than the choices that were not selected.
US10013277 2000-12-28 2001-12-12 Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter Expired - Fee Related US6968999B2 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US25834600 true 2000-12-28 2000-12-28
US10013277 US6968999B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2001-12-12 Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10013277 US6968999B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2001-12-12 Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US11220024 US7243846B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2005-09-06 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US11256421 US20060041468A1 (en) 2000-12-28 2005-10-21 Custom printed, voter verified ballots with fixed range input
US11827517 US7575164B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2007-07-12 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US12535766 US20090294533A1 (en) 2000-12-28 2009-08-05 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US11220024 Continuation US7243846B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2005-09-06 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20020084325A1 true true US20020084325A1 (en) 2002-07-04
US6968999B2 US6968999B2 (en) 2005-11-29

Family

ID=26684640

Family Applications (4)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US10013277 Expired - Fee Related US6968999B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2001-12-12 Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US11220024 Expired - Fee Related US7243846B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2005-09-06 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US11827517 Expired - Fee Related US7575164B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2007-07-12 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US12535766 Abandoned US20090294533A1 (en) 2000-12-28 2009-08-05 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter

Family Applications After (3)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US11220024 Expired - Fee Related US7243846B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2005-09-06 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US11827517 Expired - Fee Related US7575164B2 (en) 2000-12-28 2007-07-12 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US12535766 Abandoned US20090294533A1 (en) 2000-12-28 2009-08-05 Computer enhanced voting system including voter verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter

Country Status (1)

Country Link
US (4) US6968999B2 (en)

Cited By (43)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20020072961A1 (en) * 2000-12-07 2002-06-13 Mcdermott Michael R. Auto-verifying voting system and voting method
US20020128901A1 (en) * 2001-03-09 2002-09-12 Athan Gibbs Vote certification, validation and verification method and apparatus
WO2002073509A2 (en) * 2001-03-09 2002-09-19 Athan Gibbs Voting apparatus and method with certification, validation and verification thereof
US20020175514A1 (en) * 2001-05-22 2002-11-28 Vanguard Indetification Systems, Inc. Voter ballots and authentication system
US20030034393A1 (en) * 2000-11-20 2003-02-20 Chung Kevin Kwong-Tai Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
US20030046934A1 (en) * 2001-09-11 2003-03-13 Rolls-Royce Plc Gas turbine engine combustor
US20030062408A1 (en) * 2001-10-02 2003-04-03 Barmettler James W. Voting ballot, voting machine, and associated methods
US20030062411A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2003-04-03 Chung Kevin Kwong-Tai Electronic voting apparatus and method for optically scanned ballot
US20030178484A1 (en) * 2001-07-06 2003-09-25 Dennis Vadura Systems and methods for electronic voting
US20030195798A1 (en) * 2002-04-11 2003-10-16 John Goci Voter interface for electronic voting system
US20040016803A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2004-01-29 Cummings Eugene M. Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing dual print heads
US20040111359A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2004-06-10 Hudock John J. Business method for credit verification and correction
US20040217168A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2004-11-04 Cummings Eugene M. Voting system utilizing hand and machine markable ballots
US20040238632A1 (en) * 2003-04-01 2004-12-02 De La Rue Plc Systems and methods for providing security in a voting machine
US20040246281A1 (en) * 2003-06-04 2004-12-09 Vanek Joseph M. Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing pivotal touchscreen
US20050035199A1 (en) * 2002-04-11 2005-02-17 John Goci Voter interface for electronic voting system for the visually impaired
US20050056698A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2005-03-17 Cummings Eugene M. Voting system and apparatus using voter selection card
US20050056697A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2005-03-17 Cummings Eugene M. Ballot marking system and apparatus having ballot alignment compensation
US20050061880A1 (en) * 2003-01-17 2005-03-24 Vanek Joseph M. Ballot marking system and apparatus having periodic ballot alignment compensation
US20050092835A1 (en) * 2001-08-02 2005-05-05 Chung Kevin K. Registration method, as for voting
US20050139666A1 (en) * 2003-12-24 2005-06-30 Henwell Chou Verifiable voting input system
US20050211783A1 (en) * 2003-12-24 2005-09-29 Henwell Chou Identifier for use with digital paper
WO2005093671A2 (en) * 2004-03-25 2005-10-06 Cryptomathic A/S Electronic voting systems
EP1588331A2 (en) * 2003-01-17 2005-10-26 Automark Technical Systems, LLC Ballot marking system and apparatus
US20050284936A1 (en) * 2004-06-23 2005-12-29 Pazniokas Paul J Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
US20060169778A1 (en) * 2000-11-20 2006-08-03 Chung Kevin K Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
US20060202031A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2006-09-14 Chung Kevin K Reader for an optically readable ballot
US20060259446A1 (en) * 2005-05-30 2006-11-16 Neopost Technologies Method of securely processing stamp-duty stamps
US20060255145A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2006-11-16 Chung Kevin K Method for reading an optically readable sheet
US7222787B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2007-05-29 Automark Technical Systems, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing single print head
US20070237427A1 (en) * 2006-04-10 2007-10-11 Patel Nilesh V Method and system for simplified recordkeeping including transcription and voting based verification
US20070289164A1 (en) * 2006-06-16 2007-12-20 Future Chem International Co., Ltd Footwear having novel shoe upper
US20080164329A1 (en) * 2007-01-04 2008-07-10 Victor Piorun Voting Apparatus and System
US20080210746A1 (en) * 2003-04-01 2008-09-04 Sequoia Voting Systems Inc. Apparatus and method for providing security in a voting machine
US20090009412A1 (en) * 2006-12-29 2009-01-08 Warther Richard O Printed Planar RFID Element Wristbands and Like Personal Identification Devices
US20090289115A1 (en) * 2008-04-30 2009-11-26 Kevin Kwong-Tai Chung Optically readable marking sheet and reading apparatus and method therefor
US7753273B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2010-07-13 Es&S Automark, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing multiple key switch voter interface
US20110089236A1 (en) * 2009-10-21 2011-04-21 Kevin Kwong-Tai Chung System and method for decoding an optically readable markable sheet and markable sheet therefor
US20110226861A1 (en) * 2005-04-06 2011-09-22 Vanguard Identification Systems, Inc. Printed Planar RFID Element Wristbands and Like Personal Identification Devices
US20110226857A1 (en) * 1999-06-16 2011-09-22 Vanguard Identification Systems, Inc. Methods of making printed planar radio frequency identification elements
US20120061468A1 (en) * 2008-10-24 2012-03-15 Dominion Voting Systems Corporation Systems and methods for transactional ballot processing, and ballot auditing
US8261985B2 (en) 2009-04-07 2012-09-11 Avante Corporation Limited Manual recount process using digitally imaged ballots
EP2691931A4 (en) * 2011-03-28 2015-06-03 Everyone Counts Inc Systems and methods for remaking ballots

Families Citing this family (25)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7152156B1 (en) * 2000-02-17 2006-12-19 Hart Intercivic, Inc. Secure internet voting system with bootable disk
US7640181B2 (en) * 2000-02-17 2009-12-29 Hart Intercivic, Inc. Distributed network voting system
US7422150B2 (en) * 2000-11-20 2008-09-09 Avante International Technology, Inc. Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
US6968999B2 (en) * 2000-12-28 2005-11-29 Reardon David C Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter
US20060041468A1 (en) * 2000-12-28 2006-02-23 Reardon David C Custom printed, voter verified ballots with fixed range input
US8554607B2 (en) * 2001-03-13 2013-10-08 Science Applications International Corporation Method and system for securing network-based electronic voting
US20060249578A1 (en) * 2005-05-06 2006-11-09 Fernando Morales Method of confidential voting using personal voting codes
US7387244B2 (en) * 2005-05-27 2008-06-17 Election Systems & Software, Inc. Electronic voting system and method with voter verifiable real-time audit log
US7178730B1 (en) * 2005-10-28 2007-02-20 Ncr Corporation Vote verification system and method
US8201738B2 (en) * 2006-04-12 2012-06-19 Energyield, Llc Electronic voting system
US7970643B2 (en) 2006-08-10 2011-06-28 Lincoln Voters, Inc. Method and apparatus for implementing a personal “get out the vote drive” software application
US7451928B2 (en) * 2006-08-11 2008-11-18 Peterson David W Verifiable, auditable voting system maintaining voter privacy
US7516892B2 (en) * 2006-12-12 2009-04-14 Pitney Bowes Inc. Electronic voting system and method having confirmation to detect modification of vote count
US8733646B2 (en) * 2007-03-15 2014-05-27 Election Systems & Software, Llc Integrated voting system and method for accommodating paper ballots and audio ballots
US8191764B2 (en) * 2007-03-15 2012-06-05 Es&S Innovations Llc System and method for detecting security features on paper ballots
GB0708029D0 (en) * 2007-04-25 2007-06-06 Everynone Counts Inc Supervised voting system and method
US7621450B2 (en) * 2007-12-20 2009-11-24 Pitney Bowes Inc. Vote by mail system that allows voters to verify their votes
US20100083123A1 (en) * 2008-10-01 2010-04-01 Anthony Bodetti System and method for identifying biographical subjects
US8109440B2 (en) * 2008-12-23 2012-02-07 Gtech Corporation System and method for calibrating an optical reader system
US8560381B2 (en) 2009-06-24 2013-10-15 Robert Green System and method for elections and government accountability
EP2724315A4 (en) 2011-06-24 2015-04-01 Everyone Counts Inc Mobilized polling station
FR2980293A1 (en) * 2011-09-15 2013-03-22 Votalia Ballot paper preparing device e.g. microcomputer, for use by e.g. public community, to organize secret ballot elections, has screen comprising zones dedicated to list of vote choices, vote and previsualization of ballot paper
US8944326B2 (en) 2013-03-15 2015-02-03 Electron Systems & Software, LLC System and method for monitoring precinct-based ballot tabulation devices
US9105139B2 (en) * 2013-03-15 2015-08-11 Election Systems & Software, Llc System and method for reporting election results
US9659204B2 (en) * 2014-06-13 2017-05-23 Conduent Business Services, Llc Image processing methods and systems for barcode and/or product label recognition

Citations (17)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4010353A (en) * 1974-09-11 1977-03-01 Avm Corporation Electronic voting machine with cathode ray tube display
US4015106A (en) * 1975-05-20 1977-03-29 Evm Limited Electronic voting machine
US4021780A (en) * 1975-09-24 1977-05-03 Narey James O Ballot tallying system including a digital programmable read only control memory, a digital ballot image memory and a digital totals memory
US4236066A (en) * 1977-08-25 1980-11-25 Wright Line Inc. Voting machine
US4717177A (en) * 1984-05-08 1988-01-05 R. F. Shoup Corporation Absentee balloting system
US4774665A (en) * 1986-04-24 1988-09-27 Data Information Management Systems, Inc. Electronic computerized vote-counting apparatus
US5189288A (en) * 1991-01-14 1993-02-23 Texas Instruments Incorporated Method and system for automated voting
US5610383A (en) * 1996-04-26 1997-03-11 Chumbley; Gregory R. Device for collecting voting data
US5875432A (en) * 1994-08-05 1999-02-23 Sehr; Richard Peter Computerized voting information system having predefined content and voting templates
US6081793A (en) * 1997-12-30 2000-06-27 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for secure computer moderated voting
US6092051A (en) * 1995-05-19 2000-07-18 Nec Research Institute, Inc. Secure receipt-free electronic voting
US6250548B1 (en) * 1997-10-16 2001-06-26 Mcclure Neil Electronic voting system
US20010013547A1 (en) * 1998-02-13 2001-08-16 Moutaz Kotob Automated voting system
US20010042005A1 (en) * 2000-03-01 2001-11-15 Mcclure Neil L. Precinct voting system
US6412692B1 (en) * 1998-04-06 2002-07-02 The Center For Political Public Relations, Inc. Method and device for identifying qualified voter
US6540138B2 (en) * 2000-12-20 2003-04-01 Symbol Technologies, Inc. Voting method and system
US6769613B2 (en) * 2000-12-07 2004-08-03 Anthony I. Provitola Auto-verifying voting system and voting method

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5682819A (en) * 1995-06-29 1997-11-04 Beaty; Eugene A. Method for canceling lottery tickets
JP3472699B2 (en) * 1998-03-25 2003-12-02 矢崎総業株式会社 Connection covered wire
US20020066780A1 (en) * 2000-12-01 2002-06-06 Shiraz Balolia Voting systems and methods
US6968999B2 (en) * 2000-12-28 2005-11-29 Reardon David C Computer enhanced voting system including verifiable, custom printed ballots imprinted to the specifications of each voter

Patent Citations (18)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4010353A (en) * 1974-09-11 1977-03-01 Avm Corporation Electronic voting machine with cathode ray tube display
US4015106A (en) * 1975-05-20 1977-03-29 Evm Limited Electronic voting machine
US4021780A (en) * 1975-09-24 1977-05-03 Narey James O Ballot tallying system including a digital programmable read only control memory, a digital ballot image memory and a digital totals memory
US4236066A (en) * 1977-08-25 1980-11-25 Wright Line Inc. Voting machine
US4717177A (en) * 1984-05-08 1988-01-05 R. F. Shoup Corporation Absentee balloting system
US4774665A (en) * 1986-04-24 1988-09-27 Data Information Management Systems, Inc. Electronic computerized vote-counting apparatus
US5189288A (en) * 1991-01-14 1993-02-23 Texas Instruments Incorporated Method and system for automated voting
US5875432A (en) * 1994-08-05 1999-02-23 Sehr; Richard Peter Computerized voting information system having predefined content and voting templates
US6092051A (en) * 1995-05-19 2000-07-18 Nec Research Institute, Inc. Secure receipt-free electronic voting
US5610383A (en) * 1996-04-26 1997-03-11 Chumbley; Gregory R. Device for collecting voting data
US6250548B1 (en) * 1997-10-16 2001-06-26 Mcclure Neil Electronic voting system
US6081793A (en) * 1997-12-30 2000-06-27 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for secure computer moderated voting
US20010013547A1 (en) * 1998-02-13 2001-08-16 Moutaz Kotob Automated voting system
US6799723B2 (en) * 1998-02-13 2004-10-05 Moutaz Kotob Automated voting system
US6412692B1 (en) * 1998-04-06 2002-07-02 The Center For Political Public Relations, Inc. Method and device for identifying qualified voter
US20010042005A1 (en) * 2000-03-01 2001-11-15 Mcclure Neil L. Precinct voting system
US6769613B2 (en) * 2000-12-07 2004-08-03 Anthony I. Provitola Auto-verifying voting system and voting method
US6540138B2 (en) * 2000-12-20 2003-04-01 Symbol Technologies, Inc. Voting method and system

Cited By (85)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20110226857A1 (en) * 1999-06-16 2011-09-22 Vanguard Identification Systems, Inc. Methods of making printed planar radio frequency identification elements
US8585852B2 (en) 1999-06-16 2013-11-19 Vanguard Identification Systems, Inc. Methods of making printed planar radio frequency identification elements
US20060169778A1 (en) * 2000-11-20 2006-08-03 Chung Kevin K Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
US20030034393A1 (en) * 2000-11-20 2003-02-20 Chung Kevin Kwong-Tai Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
USRE40449E1 (en) * 2000-12-07 2008-08-05 Provitola Anthony I Auto-verifying voting system and voting method
US20020072961A1 (en) * 2000-12-07 2002-06-13 Mcdermott Michael R. Auto-verifying voting system and voting method
US6769613B2 (en) * 2000-12-07 2004-08-03 Anthony I. Provitola Auto-verifying voting system and voting method
WO2002073509A3 (en) * 2001-03-09 2003-07-24 Athan Gibbs Voting apparatus and method with certification, validation and verification thereof
US20020128901A1 (en) * 2001-03-09 2002-09-12 Athan Gibbs Vote certification, validation and verification method and apparatus
WO2002073509A2 (en) * 2001-03-09 2002-09-19 Athan Gibbs Voting apparatus and method with certification, validation and verification thereof
US6865543B2 (en) * 2001-03-09 2005-03-08 Truvote, Inc. Vote certification, validation and verification method and apparatus
US20020175514A1 (en) * 2001-05-22 2002-11-28 Vanguard Indetification Systems, Inc. Voter ballots and authentication system
US6779727B2 (en) * 2001-05-22 2004-08-24 Vanguard Identification Systems, Inc. Voter ballots and authentication system
US20040195323A1 (en) * 2001-07-06 2004-10-07 Dennis Vadura Systems and methods for electronic voting
US20030178484A1 (en) * 2001-07-06 2003-09-25 Dennis Vadura Systems and methods for electronic voting
US7561724B2 (en) 2001-08-02 2009-07-14 AI Technology Registration method, as for voting
US20050092835A1 (en) * 2001-08-02 2005-05-05 Chung Kevin K. Registration method, as for voting
US7197167B2 (en) 2001-08-02 2007-03-27 Avante International Technology, Inc. Registration apparatus and method, as for voting
US20030046934A1 (en) * 2001-09-11 2003-03-13 Rolls-Royce Plc Gas turbine engine combustor
US7988047B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2011-08-02 Avante International Technology, Inc. Method for decoding an optically readable sheet
US7828215B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2010-11-09 Avante International Technology, Inc. Reader for an optically readable ballot
US20100170948A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2010-07-08 Kevin Kwong-Tai Chung Method for decoding an optically readable sheet
US20060255145A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2006-11-16 Chung Kevin K Method for reading an optically readable sheet
US20090020606A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2009-01-22 Kevin Kwong-Tai Chung Electronic voting method and system employing a machine readable ballot envelope
US20030062411A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2003-04-03 Chung Kevin Kwong-Tai Electronic voting apparatus and method for optically scanned ballot
US6892944B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2005-05-17 Amerasia International Technology, Inc. Electronic voting apparatus and method for optically scanned ballot
US20070170253A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2007-07-26 Avante International Technology, Inc. Electronic voting method and system employing a printed machine readable ballot
US7975920B2 (en) 2001-10-01 2011-07-12 Avante International Technology, Inc. Electronic voting method and system employing a machine readable ballot envelope
US20060202031A1 (en) * 2001-10-01 2006-09-14 Chung Kevin K Reader for an optically readable ballot
US20030062408A1 (en) * 2001-10-02 2003-04-03 Barmettler James W. Voting ballot, voting machine, and associated methods
US6942142B2 (en) * 2001-10-02 2005-09-13 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Voting ballot, voting machine, and associated methods
US20030195798A1 (en) * 2002-04-11 2003-10-16 John Goci Voter interface for electronic voting system
US20050035199A1 (en) * 2002-04-11 2005-02-17 John Goci Voter interface for electronic voting system for the visually impaired
US20040111359A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2004-06-10 Hudock John J. Business method for credit verification and correction
US7344071B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2008-03-18 Automark Technical Systems Llc Voting system and apparatus using voter selection card
US7566006B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2009-07-28 Es&S Automark, Llc Pre-printed document marking system and apparatus
US7100828B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2006-09-05 Automark Technical Systems, Llc Voting system utilizing hand and machine markable ballots
US7080779B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2006-07-25 Automark Technical Systems, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus
US20050056697A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2005-03-17 Cummings Eugene M. Ballot marking system and apparatus having ballot alignment compensation
US7314171B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2008-01-01 Automark Technical Systems, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus having ballot alignment compensation
US7753273B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2010-07-13 Es&S Automark, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing multiple key switch voter interface
US20040217168A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2004-11-04 Cummings Eugene M. Voting system utilizing hand and machine markable ballots
US7222787B2 (en) 2002-07-26 2007-05-29 Automark Technical Systems, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing single print head
US20040016803A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2004-01-29 Cummings Eugene M. Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing dual print heads
US7163147B2 (en) * 2002-07-26 2007-01-16 Automark Technical Systems, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing dual print heads
US20050056698A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2005-03-17 Cummings Eugene M. Voting system and apparatus using voter selection card
US20080121704A1 (en) * 2002-07-26 2008-05-29 Cummings Eugene M Marking system and apparatus
EP1588331A4 (en) * 2003-01-17 2007-08-22 Automark Technical Systems Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus
US7314172B2 (en) 2003-01-17 2008-01-01 Automark Technical Systems, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus having periodic ballot alignment compensation
EP1588331A2 (en) * 2003-01-17 2005-10-26 Automark Technical Systems, LLC Ballot marking system and apparatus
US20050061880A1 (en) * 2003-01-17 2005-03-24 Vanek Joseph M. Ballot marking system and apparatus having periodic ballot alignment compensation
US7111782B2 (en) 2003-04-01 2006-09-26 John Paul Homewood Systems and methods for providing security in a voting machine
US7422151B2 (en) 2003-04-01 2008-09-09 Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for providing security in a voting machine
US20080210746A1 (en) * 2003-04-01 2008-09-04 Sequoia Voting Systems Inc. Apparatus and method for providing security in a voting machine
US20040238632A1 (en) * 2003-04-01 2004-12-02 De La Rue Plc Systems and methods for providing security in a voting machine
US20070012767A1 (en) * 2003-04-01 2007-01-18 Sequoia Votingsystems Inc. Systems and methods for providing security in a voting machine
US20040246281A1 (en) * 2003-06-04 2004-12-09 Vanek Joseph M. Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing pivotal touchscreen
US8063885B2 (en) 2003-06-04 2011-11-22 Es&S Automark, Llc Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing pivotal touchscreen
US7134606B2 (en) 2003-12-24 2006-11-14 Kt International, Inc. Identifier for use with digital paper
US20050139666A1 (en) * 2003-12-24 2005-06-30 Henwell Chou Verifiable voting input system
US20050211783A1 (en) * 2003-12-24 2005-09-29 Henwell Chou Identifier for use with digital paper
US20080000969A1 (en) * 2004-03-25 2008-01-03 Cryptomathic A/S Electronic Voting Systems
WO2005093671A2 (en) * 2004-03-25 2005-10-06 Cryptomathic A/S Electronic voting systems
WO2005093671A3 (en) * 2004-03-25 2006-04-27 Cryptomathic As Electronic voting systems
US20050284936A1 (en) * 2004-06-23 2005-12-29 Pazniokas Paul J Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
US6991161B2 (en) * 2004-06-23 2006-01-31 Paul Pazniokas Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
US20110226861A1 (en) * 2005-04-06 2011-09-22 Vanguard Identification Systems, Inc. Printed Planar RFID Element Wristbands and Like Personal Identification Devices
US8654018B2 (en) 2005-04-06 2014-02-18 Vanguard Identificaiton Systems, Inc. Printed planar RFID element wristbands and like personal identification devices
US20060259446A1 (en) * 2005-05-30 2006-11-16 Neopost Technologies Method of securely processing stamp-duty stamps
EP1729264A1 (en) * 2005-05-30 2006-12-06 Neopost Technologies Secure processing procedure for excise stamps
FR2886434A1 (en) * 2005-05-30 2006-12-01 Neopost Ind Sa Method for secure processing of tax stamps
US20070237427A1 (en) * 2006-04-10 2007-10-11 Patel Nilesh V Method and system for simplified recordkeeping including transcription and voting based verification
US8233751B2 (en) * 2006-04-10 2012-07-31 Patel Nilesh V Method and system for simplified recordkeeping including transcription and voting based verification
US20070289164A1 (en) * 2006-06-16 2007-12-20 Future Chem International Co., Ltd Footwear having novel shoe upper
US20090009412A1 (en) * 2006-12-29 2009-01-08 Warther Richard O Printed Planar RFID Element Wristbands and Like Personal Identification Devices
US8636220B2 (en) 2006-12-29 2014-01-28 Vanguard Identification Systems, Inc. Printed planar RFID element wristbands and like personal identification devices
US20080164329A1 (en) * 2007-01-04 2008-07-10 Victor Piorun Voting Apparatus and System
US8066184B2 (en) 2008-04-30 2011-11-29 Avante International Technology, Inc. Optically readable marking sheet and reading apparatus and method therefor
US20090289115A1 (en) * 2008-04-30 2009-11-26 Kevin Kwong-Tai Chung Optically readable marking sheet and reading apparatus and method therefor
US20120061468A1 (en) * 2008-10-24 2012-03-15 Dominion Voting Systems Corporation Systems and methods for transactional ballot processing, and ballot auditing
US8714450B2 (en) * 2008-10-24 2014-05-06 Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for transactional ballot processing, and ballot auditing
US8261985B2 (en) 2009-04-07 2012-09-11 Avante Corporation Limited Manual recount process using digitally imaged ballots
US20110089236A1 (en) * 2009-10-21 2011-04-21 Kevin Kwong-Tai Chung System and method for decoding an optically readable markable sheet and markable sheet therefor
US8261986B2 (en) * 2009-10-21 2012-09-11 Kevin Kwong-Tai Chung System and method for decoding an optically readable markable sheet and markable sheet therefor
EP2691931A4 (en) * 2011-03-28 2015-06-03 Everyone Counts Inc Systems and methods for remaking ballots

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date Type
US20090294533A1 (en) 2009-12-03 application
US7243846B2 (en) 2007-07-17 grant
US20060000906A1 (en) 2006-01-05 application
US20080041949A1 (en) 2008-02-21 application
US7575164B2 (en) 2009-08-18 grant
US6968999B2 (en) 2005-11-29 grant

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US3722793A (en) Voting system
US5278753A (en) Electronic voting system
Rivest et al. Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin
US6951303B2 (en) Combination electronic and paper ballot voting system
US6769613B2 (en) Auto-verifying voting system and voting method
US4373726A (en) Automatic gaming system
US6817515B2 (en) Verifiable voting
US4717177A (en) Absentee balloting system
US6973581B2 (en) Packet-based internet voting transactions with biometric authentication
US20070099696A1 (en) Method for distributing large payouts with minimal interruption of a gaming session
US20070095909A1 (en) Ballot integrity systems
US5821508A (en) Audio ballot system
US20020161628A1 (en) Voter feedback and receipt system
US20070267492A1 (en) System and Method for Electronic Voting
US6726090B1 (en) Method and system of voting
US20090212902A1 (en) System and method for authorizing limited access
US20020134844A1 (en) Method and apparatus for casting a vote from home on elections
US5218528A (en) Automated voting system
US20030162589A1 (en) Electronic payout administration method and system
US3941976A (en) Vote recording
US7237717B1 (en) Secure system for electronic voting
US20050139666A1 (en) Verifiable voting input system
US20040016802A1 (en) Ballot marking system and apparatus utilizing multiple key switch voter interface
US5878399A (en) Computerized voting system
US20070192176A1 (en) Computerized voting system

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
FPAY Fee payment

Year of fee payment: 4

REMI Maintenance fee reminder mailed
LAPS Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees
REIN Reinstatement after maintenance fee payment confirmed
FP Expired due to failure to pay maintenance fee

Effective date: 20131129

FPAY Fee payment

Year of fee payment: 8

PRDP Patent reinstated due to the acceptance of a late maintenance fee

Effective date: 20140210

REMI Maintenance fee reminder mailed
LAPS Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees

Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.)

FP Expired due to failure to pay maintenance fee

Effective date: 20171129