US20010018675A1 - Method and apparatus for compliance checking in a trust-management system - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for compliance checking in a trust-management system Download PDF

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US20010018675A1
US20010018675A1 US09/780,892 US78089201A US2001018675A1 US 20010018675 A1 US20010018675 A1 US 20010018675A1 US 78089201 A US78089201 A US 78089201A US 2001018675 A1 US2001018675 A1 US 2001018675A1
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assertion
policy
request
credential
acceptance
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Matthew Blaze
Joan Feigenbaum
Martin Strauss
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q40/00—Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q40/00—Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
    • G06Q40/06—Asset management; Financial planning or analysis
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/009—Trust

Definitions

  • the invention relates to trust-management systems. More particularly, the invention relates to a method and apparatus for compliance checking in a trust-management system.
  • the heart of the trust-management system is an algorithm for compliance checking.
  • the inputs to the compliance checker are a “request,” a “policy” and a set of “credentials.”
  • the compliance checker returns a “yes” (acceptance) or a “no” (rejection), depending on whether the credentials constitute a proof that the request complies with the policy.
  • a central challenge in trust management is to find an appropriate notion of “proof” and an efficient algorithm for checking proofs of compliance.
  • the compliance-checking problem may be mathematically undecidable in its most general form. Moreover, the compliance-checking problem is still non-deterministic polynomial time (NP) hard even when restricted in several natural ways.
  • Blaze, Feigenbaum and Lacy discloses the trust-management problem as a distinct and important component of security in network services. Aspects of the trust-management problem include formulation of policies and credentials, deferral of trust to third parties, and a mechanism for “proving ” that a request, supported by one or more credentials, complies with a policy. A comprehensive approach to trust management independent of the needs of any particular product or service is disclosed along with a trust-management system that embodies the approach.
  • the Policy Maker mechanism for checking that a set of credentials proves that a requested action complies with local policy does not depend on the semantics of the application-specific request, credentials or policy. This allows different applications with varying policy requirements to share a credential base and a trust-management infrastructure.
  • the head of the loan division must authorize approvers' public keys.
  • the division head's public key is currently PK 3 . This key expires on Dec. 31, 1998.
  • ⁇ i t ⁇ transforms A 0 such that ⁇ i t enters r into a cell not previously containing r, i.e., whether it is possible for some subject, not having right r over some object, ever to gain that right.
  • Harrison et al. identify several possible restrictions on ⁇ and give decision algorithms for input subject to one of these restrictions. One restriction they consider yields a PSPACE-complete problem.
  • n 1 has the “grant” right over n 2
  • n has some right r over n 3
  • a legal transaction is for n 1 to grant right r over n 3 to n 2 .
  • subjects can create new nodes and remove their 5 own rights over their immediate successors. Although rights are constrained to flow only via take-grant paths, take-grant systems do model non trivial applications.
  • an embodiment of the present invention formalizes the complexity of a general-purpose, working system for processing requests of this nature.
  • a general purpose trust-management system is, very roughly speaking, a meta-system in the protection system framework.
  • an application-independent notion of compliance checking can be useful and can enhance security. Any product or service that requires proof that a requested transaction complies with a policy could implement a special-purpose compliance checker from scratch.
  • One important advantage of a general purpose compliance checker is the soundness and reliability of both the design and the implementation of the compliance checker. Formalizing the notion of “credentials proving that a request complies with a policy” involves subtlety and detail.
  • a general-purpose compliance checker can facilitate inter-operability. Requests, policies, and credentials, if originally written in the native language of a specific product or service, must be translated into a standard format understood by the compliance checker. Because a wide variety of applications will each have translators with the same target language, policies and credentials originally written for one application can be used by another. The fact that the compliance checker can serve as a locus of inter-operability may prove particularly useful in e-commerce applications and, more generally, in all setting in which publickey certificates are needed.
  • the source-IDs are just strings, and the assertions encode a set of, possibly indirect and possibly conditional, trust relationships among the issuing sources. Associating each assertion with the correct source-ID is, according to this embodiment, the responsibility of the calling application and takes place before the POC instance is handed to the compliance checker.
  • the request r may be a string encoding an “action” for which the calling application seeks a proof of compliance.
  • the compliance checker's domain of discourse may need to include other action strings.
  • a request r may include, for example, a request to access or copy a data object, or to play a data object that contains, for example, audio content.
  • a set of acceptance records is referred to as an “acceptance set.” It is by maintaining acceptance sets and making them available to assertions that the compliance checker manages “inter-assertion communication,” giving assertions the chance to make decisions based on conditional decisions by other assertions.
  • the compliance checker starts with an “initial acceptance set” ⁇ ( ⁇ , ⁇ , R) ⁇ , in which the one acceptance record means that the action string for which approval is sought is R and that no assertions have yet signed off on it or anything else.
  • the checker runs the assertions ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . .
  • the compliance checker approves the request r if the acceptance record (0, POLICY, R), which means “policy approves the initial action string,” is produced. Note that the use of the string “POLICY” herein is by way of example only, and any other information may of course be used instead.
  • an assertion is a mapping from acceptance sets to acceptance sets. Assertion ( ⁇ i , s i ) looks at an acceptance set A encoding the actions that have been approved so far, and the numbers and sources of the assertions that approved them. Based on this information about what the sources it trusts have approved, ( ⁇ i , s i ) outputs another acceptance set A′.
  • R is the action string that corresponds to the request r?
  • N is the length of the original problem instance, i.e., the number of bits needed to encode r, ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ), and d in some standard fashion.
  • the length of the input fed to an individual assertion ( ⁇ i j , s i j ) in the course of checking a proof may be considerably bigger than the length of the original problem instance (r, ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ , c), because the running of assertions ( ⁇ i 1 , s i 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ i j-1 , s i j-1 ) may have caused the creation of many new acceptance records.
  • the meaningful “domain of discourse” for assertion (f i , s i ) is of size at most m—there are at most m actions that it would make sense for ( ⁇ i , s i ) to sign off on, no matter what the other assertions in the instance say about r.
  • the class NPP consists of all promise problems with at least one solution in NP.
  • a promise problem is NP-hard if it has at least one solution and all of its solutions are NP-hard.
  • Q, R promise problem
  • POC variants that can be shown to be NP-hard, which is generally interpreted to mean that they are computationally intractable in the worst case.
  • the “input” is a request r, a set ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ of assertions, and integers c, l, m, and S.
  • the “promise” is that each ( ⁇ i , s i ) runs in time O(N c ).
  • the “input” is a request r, a set ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), (f 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ of assertions, and an integer d.
  • the “question” can be stated as follows: is there a sequence i 1 , . . . , i t of indices such that:
  • Each i j is in ⁇ 0, 1, . . . , n ⁇ 1 ⁇ , but the i j need not be distinct or collectively exhaustive of ⁇ 0, 1, . . . , n ⁇ 1 ⁇ ;
  • the “input” is a request r, a set ⁇ ( ⁇ o , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 )) ⁇ of assertions, and integers l and c.
  • the “promise” is that each assertion ( ⁇ i , s i ) is monotonic and runs in time O(N c ).
  • the “question” can be stated as follows: is there a sequence i j , . . . , i t of indices such that:
  • Each i j is in ⁇ 0, 1, . . . , n ⁇ 1 ⁇ , but the i j need not be distinct or collectively exhaustive of ⁇ 0, 1, . . . , n ⁇ 1 ⁇ ;
  • Each version of POC may be defined using “agglomeration” ( ⁇ 2 , s 2 ) ⁇ ( ⁇ 1 , s t ) instead of composition ( ⁇ 2 , s 2 ) ⁇ ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ).
  • ( ⁇ 1 t , s i t ) agglomeratively to an acceptance set S 0 is defined inductively as follows: S I ⁇ ( ⁇ i1 , s i1 )(S 0 ) ⁇ S 0 and, for 2 ⁇ i ⁇ t, S j ⁇ ( ⁇ t j , s 1 j ) (S j-1 ) ⁇ S j-1 .(Si-,) u Se 1
  • agglomerative versions of the decision problems are identical to the versions already given, except that the acceptance condition is “(0, POLICY, R) ⁇ ( ⁇ i t , s i t ) ⁇ . . . ⁇ ( ⁇ i t , s i t ) ( ⁇ ( ⁇ , ⁇ , R) ⁇ )?”
  • agglomerative POC refers to the version defined in terms of ⁇ instead of ⁇ .
  • a trust-management system that defines “proof of compliance” in terms of agglomeration can make it impossible for an assertion to “undo” an approval that it (or any other assertion) has already given to an action string during the course of constructing a proof. This definition of proof may make sense if the trust-management system should guard against a rogue credential-issuer's ability to thwart legitimate proofs. Note that the question of whether the compliance checker combines assertions using agglomeration or composition is separate from the question of whether the assertions themselves are monotonic.
  • the “input is a request r, a set ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ i , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ of assertions, and integers c, m, and S.
  • the “promise” is that each ( ⁇ i , s i ) is monotonic, authentic, and runs in time O(N c ).
  • FIG. 1 a flow diagram of a method of compliance checking for a trust-management system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the flow chart in FIG. 1 is not meant to imply a fixed order to the steps; embodiments of the present invention can be practiced in any order that is practicable.
  • a request r a policy assertion ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY) associated with the request r, and n ⁇ 1 credential assertions ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . .
  • an acceptance record set S is initialized to ⁇ ( ⁇ , ⁇ , R) ⁇ at step 110 , where A represents a distinguished “null string” and R represents the initial request, r.
  • step 120 j is initialized to 1.
  • each assertion ( ⁇ i , s i ), for integers i from 0 to n ⁇ 1, is run and the result is added to the acceptance record set S. If j does not equal mn at step 140 , where m is a number greater than 1, j is increased by 1 at step 150 and step 130 is repeated.
  • CCA 1 Compliance-Checking Algorithm version 1
  • CCA 1 (r, ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ) . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ , m):
  • an assertion ( ⁇ i , s i ) is “ill-formned” if it violates the promise. If CCA 1 discovers that ( ⁇ i , s i ) is ill-formed, the assertion is ignored for the remainder of the computation. An assertion ( ⁇ i , s i ) may be undetectably ill-formed. For example, there may be sets A B such that ( ⁇ i , s i )(A) ( ⁇ i , s i )(B), but such that A and B do not arise in this run of the compliance checker.
  • the CCA 1 algorithm may check for violations of the promise every time it simulates an assertion. Detailed pseudo-code for these checks is not included in CCA 1 , because it would not illustrate the basic structure of the algorithm. Instead, the predicate Ill-Formed () indicates that the checks may done for each simulation.
  • CCA 1 accepts if and only if the acceptance record (0, POLICY, R) is produced when it simulates the input assertions. Unlike the previous algorithms, however, it cannot non-deterministically guess an order in which to do the simulation. Instead, it uses an arbitrary order. CCA 1 also ensures that, if a proper subset F of the input assertions contains a proof that R complies with POLICY and every ( ⁇ i , s i ) ⁇ F satisfies the promise, then the remaining assertions do not destroy all or part of the acceptance records produced by F during the simulation (and destroy the proof), even if these remaining assertions do not satisfy the promise. CCA 1 achieves this by maintaining one set of approved acceptance records, from which no records are ever deleted, i.e., by agglomerating, and by discarding assertions that it discovers are ill-formed.
  • CCA 1 does mn iterations of the sequence ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), for a total of mn 2 assertion-simulations.
  • a set F ⁇ ( ⁇ j t , s j t ), . . . , ( ⁇ j t , s j t ) ⁇ ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), . . .
  • F ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ contains a proof that R complies with POLICY and that every ( ⁇ i , s i ) ⁇ F satisfies the promise of LBMAPOC.
  • CCA 1 accepts (r, ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ , c, m, s).
  • CCA 1 rejects (r, ⁇ ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY), ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) ⁇ , c, m, s).
  • k 1 , . . . , k u be a sequence of indices, each in ⁇ j 1 , . . . , j t ⁇ , but not necessarily distinct and not necessarily exhaustive of ⁇ (j 1 , . . . , j t ⁇ , such that (0, POLICY, R) ⁇ ( ⁇ k u , s k u ) ⁇ . . . ⁇ ( ⁇ k w , s k w ) ( ⁇ ( ⁇ , ⁇ , R) ⁇ ).
  • a u be the acceptance sets produced by applying ( ⁇ k 1 , s k 1 ), . . . , ( ⁇ k w , s k w ). Because k 1 , . . . , k u is a shortest sequence that proves compliance using assertions in F, each set A p must contain at least one action string that is not present in any of A 1 , . . . , A p-1 . Thus, u iterations of ( ⁇ 0 , POLICY) ⁇ ( ⁇ 1 , s 1 ) ⁇ . . . ⁇ ( ⁇ n-1 , s n-1 ) would suffice for CCA 1 .
  • cases (1) and (2) do not cover all possible inputs to CCA 1 .
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