US12328339B2 - Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems - Google Patents

Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US12328339B2
US12328339B2 US16/983,583 US202016983583A US12328339B2 US 12328339 B2 US12328339 B2 US 12328339B2 US 202016983583 A US202016983583 A US 202016983583A US 12328339 B2 US12328339 B2 US 12328339B2
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
attacker
profile
computer
users
honeypot
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
US16/983,583
Other versions
US20200366714A1 (en
Inventor
Craig Steven Wright
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nchain Licensing AG
Original Assignee
Nchain Licensing AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nchain Licensing AG filed Critical Nchain Licensing AG
Priority to US16/983,583 priority Critical patent/US12328339B2/en
Assigned to NCHAIN HOLDINGS LTD reassignment NCHAIN HOLDINGS LTD ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: SAVANAH, Stephane, WRIGHT, CRAIG
Publication of US20200366714A1 publication Critical patent/US20200366714A1/en
Assigned to NCHAIN LICENSING AG reassignment NCHAIN LICENSING AG CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: NCHAIN HOLDINGS LTD
Priority to US19/026,759 priority patent/US20250159020A1/en
Assigned to NCHAIN LICENSING AG reassignment NCHAIN LICENSING AG CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: nChain Holdings AG
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of US12328339B2 publication Critical patent/US12328339B2/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H04L43/06Generation of reports
    • H04L43/062Generation of reports related to network traffic
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H04L63/1425Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1491Countermeasures against malicious traffic using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to computer network security, intrusion detection and intrusion protection.
  • the invention is particularly suited for use in the monitoring, detection, response to and/or prevention of unauthorised access or misuse of computer-based devices or systems.
  • Embodiments of the invention may relate to profiling attackers, and/or the use of computer-based decoys (honeypots/honeynets).
  • Intrusion detection systems are used to monitor network activities for attackers. Reports are generated and alerts signalled to the owner or manager of the specific network.
  • An intrusion detection system that responds to an attack for example by blocking traffic using a firewall, may be referred to as an intrusion prevention system (IPS) or an intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS).
  • IPS intrusion prevention system
  • IDPS intrusion detection and prevention system
  • attacker traffic is detected by and/or routed to one or more honeypots.
  • Honeypots are network decoys that attract attackers with the aim of distracting the attackers from more valuable production machines on a network. Honeypots are often deployed within a network using unallocated addresses, and providing services and/or data to engage attackers. Because a honeypot has no production value and typically sits at an unallocated address, every attempt to contact a honeypot is suspect. This means that honeypots can be used to identify attacks, and consequently honeypots also enable the gathering of information about attacker behaviour and attacker identification while an attacker is exploiting a honeypot. Attackers, in turn, try to avoid honeypots by looking at behaviour (such as the services provided) to assess the likelihood of a target in a network being a honeypot.
  • Physical honeypots are real machines with their own IP addresses, and are therefore expensive to implement. Virtual honeypots, on the other hand, require fewer physical machines thereby reducing the cost.
  • the operating system and services provided by a honeypot are configured according to the activity on the network and the intended purpose of the particular honeypot at that time. Because it is challenging, complex and time consuming to configure honeypots, dynamic virtual honeypots are used to automate configuration processes. Dynamic honeypots are able to discover the network (e.g. by fingerprinting), decide what honeypot configuration to use and then create and configure the honeypots.
  • honeypots can be combined to form a “honeynet”—a decoy network set up with intentional vulnerabilities.
  • the honeynet enables the owner/manager to observe and analyse an attacker's activities and use the gleaned information to strengthen the system's security mechanisms.
  • an IDPS will monitor attacker behaviour, update the logged data regarding the attacker, and also update a response strategy. For example, a certain attacker profile may result in a virtual honeypot being created for that attacker. The process is repeated for each new attacker, and may also be repeated if the attacker's behaviour or some aspect of the profile changes. This is a complex and time consuming process. It would be advantageous to have a simplified process of responding and updating a response to a detected attacker. By simplifying the process, security measures can be deployed more swiftly and in a more efficient manner. Moreover, there is a need for improved communications and transfer of data in respect of intruder detection systems. Such improvements would give rise to more effective protection systems which are better equipped to detect, prevent and respond to attacks.
  • the invention may provide a reactive and pre-emptive security system.
  • the system may be based on choice theory. It may be arranged for the protection of computing devices, networks and their associated data.
  • a computer-implemented method comprising:
  • the network traffic data may be received from a plurality of users, and the plurality of users may include the said (requesting) user.
  • the honeypot can be configured to attract and engage an attacker, preferably in a manner so that the honeypot is not easily identified by an attacker.
  • One way of doing this is to reconfigure a honeypot according to updated information about an attacker. For example, a dynamic honeypot may be automatically updated to provide additional services based on logged attacker behaviour where the attacker requests services not previously provided by that honeypot.
  • the method may comprise the step of using a computer-based resource to store:
  • Network traffic may be directed to a honeypot or honeynet generated in accordance with, or using, the determined configuration.
  • the plurality of users may comprise users who are designated as valid, authorised or legitimate users. Some or all of the plurality of users may be registered with a system in accordance with the invention or otherwise indicated as authorised. A list of authorised users may be stored or maintained. The authorised users may be collaborating participants who agree to share and/or contribute data relating to network traffic.
  • the method may comprise the step of receiving a request from a user, and determining whether the request is from an authorised user or an attacker or otherwise unauthorised party.
  • the method may comprise the step of determining a profile for one or more of the users in the plurality of users.
  • the invention may also provide a computer implemented (security) system arranged to implement the method of any preceding claim, comprising: a computer-based storage resource, arranged to store network traffic data provided by a plurality of users of the system; a software component arranged to provide a honeypot or honeynet configuration to one or more legitimate users upon request, wherein the configuration is based upon an attacker profile that is based upon, or derived using, the network traffic data.
  • a computer implemented (security) system arranged to implement the method of any preceding claim, comprising: a computer-based storage resource, arranged to store network traffic data provided by a plurality of users of the system; a software component arranged to provide a honeypot or honeynet configuration to one or more legitimate users upon request, wherein the configuration is based upon an attacker profile that is based upon, or derived using, the network traffic data.
  • the storage resource may be arranged to store:
  • the method may comprise the steps of providing a database (or “repository”).
  • the data base may store profiles for “normal” users i.e. legitimate and/or registered users. This may provide reference data relating to traffic, that may be of use or benefit to legitimate users.
  • the database may store data (profiles) relating to known attackers or groups of attackers. It may store attacker classification data, code signatures etc. It may store attack prevention data such as, for example, honey pot/net configuration parameters).
  • the database may be managed by a data manager. Multiple users may communicate with the data manager, for example via a network.
  • the centralised database may provide information, such as attacker signatures and/or profiles, to the users or their systems. This may enable users to match traffic on their networks with the supplied attacker profile(s) or signature(s).
  • Implementing a shared repository with mutually beneficial information enables the participants to not only identify and respond to a current attacker, but also to effectively inoculate themselves against potential attackers based on data gathered by the other participants.
  • the participating users may register with or subscribe to repository.
  • the data manager may be a single computing device, or may be computing network that includes multiple computing devices or processors to allow for distributed computing, grid computing or cloud computing.
  • the database may be connected to the data manager via a communication link. Alternatively, the database may be part of the data manager to reduce data process time. In other embodiments, the database may be connected to the data manager via a communication network.
  • the communication network may be any form of known network, such as a wide area network (WAN).
  • the database may operate according to a database management system (DBMS) running on the database. It may include multiple sub-databases that operate based on different DBMSes.
  • DBMS database management system
  • the data manager may manage the database by providing a number of services. These may include:
  • the data manager may determine whether the request from the authorised user relates to a request for traffic profile data, or whether the purpose of the request is to provide traffic data for processing and logging.
  • Raw traffic data may be received by the data manager. This raw data may be logged as is, in an unprocessed form. Additionally or alternatively, it may also be processed in order to classify the traffic as relating to normal user traffic or attacker traffic. This may involve the use of any known detection method(s) and tool(s), including for example signature-based or anomaly-based detection, stateful detection and application-level detection.
  • the invention may comprise a system protection system (SPS) which may be in communication with the database. This may be direct communication with the database or may be via the data manager.
  • SPS system protection system
  • the invention may be arranged to determine whether an incoming request originates from a legitimate participant (user) or an malicious/unauthorised third party (attacker).
  • the invention may also be arranged to determine a response to the request. If a request is determined to be from an attacker, the invention may generate a virtual honeypot and/or honeynet (i.e. a decoy) and a database.
  • the database may be an altered or false database. It may contain data which is not commercially or confidentially sensitive. It may be randomised data.
  • the invention may be arranged to direct the source of the request to the honeypot and false database.
  • honeypot and respective database may be generated.
  • the parameters used to create and/or configure the honeypots may be determined locally by the SPS, based on attacker information received from the database.
  • honeypot parameters may be obtained from the database.
  • Other attacker profile data may also be obtained from the database.
  • the invention may provide a computer-implemented method comprising:
  • the attacker profile information may include the configuration information.
  • Configuring the computer decoy may include creating the computer decoy and/or reconfiguring the computer decoy.
  • the decoy may be referred to as a honey pot or honeynet.
  • the request may be an information request.
  • Determining the classification may use supervised learning pattern recognition, for example multi-layer perceptrons (MLP).
  • MLP multi-layer perceptrons
  • the classification may be an attacker classification, a computer system/network risk classification, or a traffic classification.
  • the classification may be a risk or severity classification associated with the sophistication of the attacker. For example, certain behaviour may be associated with an attacker that is deemed to be a relatively minor threat, whereas more sophisticated behaviour may be associated with an attacker that is deemed to be more potentially dangerous.
  • Determining the attacker classification may include classifying the type of traffic generated, or the type of attacker depending on a threshold associated with the attacker's behaviour, for example where the threshold is based on which services are requested by the attacker.
  • the risk characteristics of a particular computing system or local network may be determined from the network traffic, i.e. the risk of an attack given the system/network configuration in view of the network traffic characteristics.
  • Classification may be rule based, or may be done by processing the raw traffic data with a learning method such as a neural network, perceptrons, or a tree learning method e.g. using a random forest algorithm.
  • a learning method such as a neural network, perceptrons, or a tree learning method e.g. using a random forest algorithm.
  • a perceptron based neural network e.g. multi-layer perceptrons MLP
  • an input layer with one neuron for each input may be used to map for IP Options, Malware and Buffer overflow conditions, selected attacks etc.
  • the system of perceptrons may be processed using a hidden neuron layer in which each neuron represents combinations of inputs and calculates a response based on current data coupled with expected future data, a prior data and external systems data. Data processed at this level may feed into an output layer.
  • the result of the neural network may supply the output, e.g. as a risk function.
  • the perceptron may be used to model the selected risk factors for the
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of an intrusion detection and protection system (IDPS).
  • IDPS intrusion detection and protection system
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an example computer system for traffic data management.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of an implementation of an IDPS.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram describing an embodiment of a method for providing an IDPS.
  • FIG. 5 is a flow diagram describing an embodiment of a method of using an intrusion detection and protection system.
  • FIG. 1 shows an intrusion detection and protection system (IDPS) 100 that addresses this shortcoming by providing a centralised database 102 , managed by a data manager 104 .
  • Multiple users 106 , 108 , 110 communicate with the data manager 104 , for example via a network 112 .
  • the centralised database 102 provides information, such as attacker signatures, to the individual systems of users 106 , 108 , 110 that are thereby able to match traffic on their networks with attacker profiles.
  • Implementing a shared database with mutually beneficial information enables the subscribing users 106 , 108 , 110 to not only identify and respond to a current attacker, but also to effectively inoculate themselves against potential attackers based on data gathered by the other users.
  • the data manager 104 may be a single computing device, or may be computing network that includes multiple computing devices or processors to allow for distributed computing, grid computing or cloud computing.
  • the database 102 is shown in FIG. 1 as being connected to the data manager 104 via a communication link. However, the database 102 may be part of the data manager 104 to reduce data process time. In other examples, the database 102 may be connected to the data manager 104 via the communication network 112 without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.
  • the centralised database 102 operates according to a database management system (DBMS) running on the database 102 .
  • the DBMS may include Microsoft SQL, Oracle, Sybase, IBM DB2, MySQL, or Orient DB.
  • the centralised database 102 may include multiple sub-databases that operate based on different DBMSes.
  • the communication network 112 is typically a wide area network (WAN), and may be implemented using any suitable type of network, such as a wireline network, a cellular communication network, a wireless local area network (WLAN), an optical communication network, etc.
  • the communication network 112 may be a combination of the suitable networks, for example, the Internet.
  • the communication network 112 can also be a private communication network that is built specifically for the IDPS 100 .
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an example computer system 120 for data management according to the present disclosure.
  • the computer system 120 represents an example structure of the data manager 104 described above.
  • the computer system 120 includes a storage device 126 , a memory device 124 , a communication interface 128 , and a processor 122 .
  • the computer 120 further includes a bus 130 that connects the storage device 126 , the memory device 124 , the communication interface 128 , and the processor 122 .
  • the storage device 126 is configured to store traffic data, the traffic data including normal user and attacker traffic data received from multiple users. Although the storage device 126 is shown as part of the computer system 120 , the storage device 126 may be a separate entity that is connected to the computer system 120 , for example, the centralised database 102 shown in FIG. 1 .
  • the memory device 124 is configured to store instructions in relation to the operation of the data manager 104 , as described elsewhere herein with reference to FIGS. 4 and 5 . These instructions are implemented as machine-readable instructions included in a computer software program, when executed by the processor 122 , causes the processor 122 to perform these methods of operating and using an IDPS.
  • the communication interface 128 is configured to connect to a communication network, particularly, the communication network 102 as shown in FIG. 1 , via the link between the computer system 120 and the communication network 110 .
  • the processor 122 is connected to the memory device 124 , the storage device 126 , and the communication interface 128 .
  • the processor 122 is configured to obtain the instructions from the memory device 124 in operating and using an IDPS.
  • the storage device 126 , the memory device 124 and the processor 122 are configured to operate according to a computer operating system, for example, Windows Server, Mac OS X Server, Linux, Unix, Windows, and Mac OS.
  • a computer operating system for example, Windows Server, Mac OS X Server, Linux, Unix, Windows, and Mac OS.
  • the processor 122 may be a general purpose Central Processing Unit (CPU), and the instructions stored in the memory device 124 are defined by one or more of the following programming languages: HyperText Markup Language (HTML), HTML5, JavaScript, and JQuery.
  • HTML HyperText Markup Language
  • HTML5 HyperText Markup Language
  • JavaScript JavaScript
  • JQuery JavaScript
  • the instructions may also be defined by one or more of the following programming languages: JAVA, Python, and PHP.
  • the instructions may also be defined by one or more of the following programming languages: Objective-C, C++, C, and Swift.
  • FIG. 3 shows an example of a computer network 200 that uses an IDPS service as described above with reference to FIG. 1 .
  • user requests received from a network 202 pass via a server protection system (SPS) 204 to the computer network 200 where a real server 206 provides access to a production database 208 .
  • SPS server protection system
  • the SPS 204 may be implemented on a computer system like the example computer system 120 described above with reference to FIG. 2 .
  • the memory device 124 is then configured to store instructions in relation to the operation of the SPS 204 . These instructions are implemented as machine-readable instructions included in a computer software program, when executed by the processor 122 , causes the processor 122 to implement the SPS 204 as described below.
  • the SPS 204 has access to information from the centralised database 102 . As indicated in FIG. 3 , the centralised database 102 is updated using data from a community of users 210 as described above. The traffic pattern data from the database 102 is used by the SPS 204 to determine whether user requests received are from normal users or from attackers. If a user request is from an attacker, then the SPS 204 generates a virtual honeypot 212 and a transformed database 214 , and directs the attacker to this honeypot 212 and a false database 214 that appears to be real.
  • honeypot 216 , 218 and respective transformed database 220 , 222 may be generated.
  • the parameters used to create and/or configure the honeypots may be determined locally by the SPS, based on attacker information received from the database 102 .
  • honeypot parameters may be obtained from the database 102 together with the other attacker profile data.
  • the SPS 204 may communicate directly with the database 102 in order to retrieve information as required, as shown in the example illustrated in FIG. 3 .
  • communication between the database 102 and the SPS 204 is via the data manager 104 , and the data manager 104 manages the content and format in which information is provided to the SPS 204 .
  • One way of managing the services provided to the SPS 204 is according to a subscription service profile that the subscribing user (SPS owner) is associated with.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram describing an example of a method 300 for providing an IDPS as shown in FIG. 1 .
  • the data manager 104 receives a connection request from an authorised user, for example a subscribing SPS that is identified and authorised when the connection is made.
  • the data manager 104 manages the centralised database 102 by providing a number of services that include:
  • the data manager 104 determines whether the connection request from the authorised user relates to a request for traffic profile data 306 , or whether traffic data is being provided for processing and logging 308 .
  • raw traffic data 312 is received by the data manager 104 .
  • This raw data may be logged as is, but this data is also processed to determine a number of things.
  • Intrusion detection systems may rely on any number of detection methods and tools, including signature-based or anomaly-based detection, stateful detection and application-level detection.
  • Anomaly-based detection may rely on thresholds selected to describe the local network environment, e.g. relating to network traffic volume, packet count, IP fragments, IPID, IP options, IP header information etc.
  • a typical indicator of attacker traffic is if the traffic is directed to an IP address that is not used or is restricted, or if a service is requested that is restricted or not provided by the targeted network.
  • Other information extracted from the traffic data to determine whether the source is from an attacker may include one or more of the following: an IP address known from an IP address blacklist, code signatures associated with attackers, and network scan behaviour.
  • the classification may be a risk or severity classification associated with the sophistication of the attacker. For example, certain behaviour may be associated with a reduced threat attacker (e.g. a script kiddie if a vulnerability known to the owner is not exploited by the attacker), whereas more sophisticated behaviour may be associated with a more dangerous attacker (e.g. skilled hackers that uncover hidden indicators such as code signatures).
  • a reduced threat attacker e.g. a script kiddie if a vulnerability known to the owner is not exploited by the attacker
  • more sophisticated behaviour may be associated with a more dangerous attacker (e.g. skilled hackers that uncover hidden indicators such as code signatures).
  • Determining the attacker classification may include classifying the type of traffic generated, or the type of attacker depending on a threshold associated with the attacker's behaviour, for example where the threshold is based on which services are requested by the attacker.
  • the risk characteristics of a particular computing system or local network may be determined from the network traffic, i.e. the risk of an attack given the system/network configuration in view of the network traffic characteristics.
  • Classification may be rule based, or may be done by processing the raw traffic data with a learning method such as a neural network, perceptrons, or a tree learning method e.g. using a random forest algorithm.
  • a learning method such as a neural network, perceptrons, or a tree learning method e.g. using a random forest algorithm.
  • a perceptron based neural network e.g. multi-layer perceptrons MLP
  • MLP multi-layer perceptrons
  • the system of perceptrons is processed using a hidden neuron layer in which each neuron represents combinations of inputs and calculates a response based on current data coupled with expected future data, a prior data and external systems data. Data processed at this level feeds into an output layer.
  • the result of the neural network supplies the output, e.g. as a risk function.
  • the perceptron is the computational workhorse in this system, and can be used to model the selected risk factors for the system and calculate a base risk that is trained and updated over time.
  • thresholds are characteristically defined above or below which alerting, alarms, and exceptions are not reported. This range of activity is regarded as baseline or routine activity.
  • a risk function can be created that not only calculates data based on existing and known variables, but also updates automatically using external sources and trends.
  • external sources refers to data gathered from the community of users 210 that provides external trending and correlation points.
  • the data manager 104 determines an appropriate response, e.g. using a lookup table based on known features of the attacker behaviour.
  • the response includes the creation and/or configuration of a honeypot so that attacker traffic can be redirected thereby protecting the production network, and also providing an opportunity to extract more information about the particular attacker.
  • honeypot configuration parameters are stored in the database 316 together with the attacker profiles.
  • Profiles for normal users are also stored, providing reference traffic data for bona fide users.
  • connection request from the authorised user relates to a request for traffic profile data 306 , then at step 318 the profile data is retrieved from the database 316 and a profile package 320 is provided to the authorised user.
  • the content of the profile package 320 depends on the information rights or requirements of the authorised user, as managed by the data manager 104 .
  • the profile package may be a comprehensive compilation of traffic data on the database 316 , in which case direct access to all the information on the database may be provided to the user.
  • the profile package may include only a portion of the traffic data depending on the relevance to or requirements of the particular user.
  • the data request may be for a particular attacker's profile (e.g. based on an originating IP address) and information associated with that attacker.
  • the profile package 320 includes information relating to the attacker identity (e.g. an attacker behaviour profile, attacker classification, code signatures etc.) and also includes attack prevention information (e.g. honeypot configuration parameters).
  • the data provided to the authorised user may also include other information available from the database, for example normal user profiles or attacker profiles in different formats (e.g. a specific attacker's profile or a group of attackers' profiles).
  • FIG. 5 shows a flow diagram of an example method 400 of implementing the IDPS 100 .
  • an SPS 204 is responsible for interfacing between a user system (for example users 106 , 108 and 110 as shown in FIG. 1 ) and the data manager 104 of the IDPS 100 .
  • the SPS 204 monitors the traffic, and based on the data 320 received from the IDPS determines the source of the traffic (normal user vs. attacker) at step 404 .
  • the IDPS data received is one or more profile packages as described above with reference to FIG. 4 so that if an attacker is identified at step 406 , a protection response is implemented at step 408 , based on information in the profile packages.
  • the information includes, for example, honeypot configuration parameters provided by the IDPS. Once the honeypot has been created, configured and/or reconfigured the attacker's traffic is sent to the honeypot at step 410 .
  • the traffic data describing the attacker behaviour is logged by providing raw traffic data 312 to the IDPS. Similarly, if the source of the traffic is determined to be a normal user (and not an attacker), then this normal traffic data is logged at step 414 . At step 416 the normal traffic is forwarded to the real server (e.g. real server 206 in FIG. 3 ).
  • the real server e.g. real server 206 in FIG. 3
  • Providing a central resource of shared traffic data improves the response time and efficiency of computer systems to attackers when compared to stand-alone systems reliant on a single source of information about attackers (i.e. their own network traffic).

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)

Abstract

The invention provides mechanisms for enhancing the security and protection of a computer-based system or network. It relates, in part, to the use of a decoy (which may be termed “honeypot” or “honeynet”) for collecting attacker-related data, and/or diverting malicious behaviour away from legitimate resources. In one embodiment, the invention provides a method comprising the steps of receiving, processing and logging network traffic data of a plurality of users, where the network traffic is received from a plurality of participating users; determining an attacker profile from the network traffic data; determining a honeypot or honeynet configuration based on the attacker profile; and upon receipt of a valid information request from a user of the plurality of users, providing the determined attacker profile and configuration to the user. Additionally or alternatively, it may provide a computer-implemented method comprising the steps of receiving, processing and logging network traffic data; based on processed network traffic data: determining that network traffic originates from an attacker, determining a risk classification; and determining a decoy configuration based on the risk classification; upon receipt of a valid information request from a user, providing the determined risk classification and decoy configuration to the user.

Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
This application is a divisional of U.S. application Ser. No. 16/079,076, filed on Aug. 22, 2018, entitled “REACTIVE AND PRE-EMPTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER NETWORKS & SYSTEMS,” a U.S. national stage entry based on PCT/IB2017/050811, filed on Feb. 14, 2017, which claims priority to and incorporates by reference for all purposes the full disclosure of United Kingdom Application No. 1603118.9, filed on Feb. 23, 2016, entitled “REACTIVE AND PRE-EMPTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM BASED ON CHOICE THEORY.”
TECHNICAL FIELD
The present disclosure relates to computer network security, intrusion detection and intrusion protection. The invention is particularly suited for use in the monitoring, detection, response to and/or prevention of unauthorised access or misuse of computer-based devices or systems. Embodiments of the invention may relate to profiling attackers, and/or the use of computer-based decoys (honeypots/honeynets).
BACKGROUND
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are used to monitor network activities for attackers. Reports are generated and alerts signalled to the owner or manager of the specific network. An intrusion detection system that responds to an attack, for example by blocking traffic using a firewall, may be referred to as an intrusion prevention system (IPS) or an intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS). In some implementations, attacker traffic is detected by and/or routed to one or more honeypots.
Honeypots are network decoys that attract attackers with the aim of distracting the attackers from more valuable production machines on a network. Honeypots are often deployed within a network using unallocated addresses, and providing services and/or data to engage attackers. Because a honeypot has no production value and typically sits at an unallocated address, every attempt to contact a honeypot is suspect. This means that honeypots can be used to identify attacks, and consequently honeypots also enable the gathering of information about attacker behaviour and attacker identification while an attacker is exploiting a honeypot. Attackers, in turn, try to avoid honeypots by looking at behaviour (such as the services provided) to assess the likelihood of a target in a network being a honeypot.
Physical honeypots are real machines with their own IP addresses, and are therefore expensive to implement. Virtual honeypots, on the other hand, require fewer physical machines thereby reducing the cost. The operating system and services provided by a honeypot are configured according to the activity on the network and the intended purpose of the particular honeypot at that time. Because it is challenging, complex and time consuming to configure honeypots, dynamic virtual honeypots are used to automate configuration processes. Dynamic honeypots are able to discover the network (e.g. by fingerprinting), decide what honeypot configuration to use and then create and configure the honeypots.
Multiple honeypots can be combined to form a “honeynet”—a decoy network set up with intentional vulnerabilities. As with individual honeypots, the honeynet enables the owner/manager to observe and analyse an attacker's activities and use the gleaned information to strengthen the system's security mechanisms.
Background material relating in general to the technical field can be found in WO2012/011070 A1, US2015/0229656 A1, U.S. Pat. No. 8,661,102, US20060242701 US2007271614, US2007192863, US2011214182, US2013152199, US2015106889, US2016080414, US2016065614, US2006212942, JP2005004617, US20040128543 and US2010269175.
Any discussion of documents, acts, materials, devices, articles or the like which has been included in the present specification is not to be taken as an admission that any or all of these matters form part of the prior art base or were common general knowledge in the field relevant to the present disclosure as it existed before the priority date of each claim of this application.
SUMMARY
With every new attacker or modified attacker behaviour, an IDPS will monitor attacker behaviour, update the logged data regarding the attacker, and also update a response strategy. For example, a certain attacker profile may result in a virtual honeypot being created for that attacker. The process is repeated for each new attacker, and may also be repeated if the attacker's behaviour or some aspect of the profile changes. This is a complex and time consuming process. It would be advantageous to have a simplified process of responding and updating a response to a detected attacker. By simplifying the process, security measures can be deployed more swiftly and in a more efficient manner. Moreover, there is a need for improved communications and transfer of data in respect of intruder detection systems. Such improvements would give rise to more effective protection systems which are better equipped to detect, prevent and respond to attacks.
Various aspects and embodiments of the invention provide such an improved security solution, resulting in enhanced protection for computer-based devices and networks, and also the data which is stored thereon. The invention may provide a reactive and pre-emptive security system. The system may be based on choice theory. It may be arranged for the protection of computing devices, networks and their associated data.
In accordance with the invention, there may be provided a computer-implemented method comprising:
    • receiving, processing and logging network traffic data;
    • determining an attacker profile from the network traffic data;
    • determining a honeypot or honeynet configuration based on the attacker profile; and upon receipt of a valid information request from a user, providing the determined attacker profile and configuration to the user.
The network traffic data may be received from a plurality of users, and the plurality of users may include the said (requesting) user.
In order to improve the operation of a honeypot in a network it would be advantageous if the honeypot can be configured to attract and engage an attacker, preferably in a manner so that the honeypot is not easily identified by an attacker. One way of doing this is to reconfigure a honeypot according to updated information about an attacker. For example, a dynamic honeypot may be automatically updated to provide additional services based on logged attacker behaviour where the attacker requests services not previously provided by that honeypot.
The method may comprise the step of using a computer-based resource to store:
    • the network traffic data;
    • the attacker profile; the honeypot or honeynet configuration; and/or
    • data relating to the users.
Network traffic may be directed to a honeypot or honeynet generated in accordance with, or using, the determined configuration. The plurality of users may comprise users who are designated as valid, authorised or legitimate users. Some or all of the plurality of users may be registered with a system in accordance with the invention or otherwise indicated as authorised. A list of authorised users may be stored or maintained. The authorised users may be collaborating participants who agree to share and/or contribute data relating to network traffic.
The method may comprise the step of receiving a request from a user, and determining whether the request is from an authorised user or an attacker or otherwise unauthorised party.
The method may comprise the step of determining a profile for one or more of the users in the plurality of users.
The invention may also provide a computer implemented (security) system arranged to implement the method of any preceding claim, comprising: a computer-based storage resource, arranged to store network traffic data provided by a plurality of users of the system; a software component arranged to provide a honeypot or honeynet configuration to one or more legitimate users upon request, wherein the configuration is based upon an attacker profile that is based upon, or derived using, the network traffic data.
The storage resource may be arranged to store:
profile(s) relating to one or more of the plurality of users; and/or
profile(s) relating to one or more attackers or groups or types of attacker; and/or
honeypot/honeynet configuration parameters.
Various aspects of the invention may provide an intrusion detection and protection system (IDPS) (and corresponding methods). The method may comprise the steps of providing a database (or “repository”). The data base may store profiles for “normal” users i.e. legitimate and/or registered users. This may provide reference data relating to traffic, that may be of use or benefit to legitimate users. The database may store data (profiles) relating to known attackers or groups of attackers. It may store attacker classification data, code signatures etc. It may store attack prevention data such as, for example, honey pot/net configuration parameters).
The database may be managed by a data manager. Multiple users may communicate with the data manager, for example via a network. The centralised database may provide information, such as attacker signatures and/or profiles, to the users or their systems. This may enable users to match traffic on their networks with the supplied attacker profile(s) or signature(s). Implementing a shared repository with mutually beneficial information enables the participants to not only identify and respond to a current attacker, but also to effectively inoculate themselves against potential attackers based on data gathered by the other participants. In one or more embodiments, the participating users may register with or subscribe to repository.
The data manager may be a single computing device, or may be computing network that includes multiple computing devices or processors to allow for distributed computing, grid computing or cloud computing. The database may be connected to the data manager via a communication link. Alternatively, the database may be part of the data manager to reduce data process time. In other embodiments, the database may be connected to the data manager via a communication network. The communication network may be any form of known network, such as a wide area network (WAN). The database may operate according to a database management system (DBMS) running on the database. It may include multiple sub-databases that operate based on different DBMSes.
The data manager may manage the database by providing a number of services. These may include:
Receiving, processing and logging network traffic data received from users of the IDPS, and updating the centralised database with the network traffic data to form a single data resource sourced from multiple users' traffic data; and/or
Determining protection parameters, for example in the form of a honeypot configuration appropriate for a particular attacker; and/or
Providing users with access to the shared information on the centralised database, enabling the users to identify attackers and also to implement appropriate protection parameters.
The data manager may determine whether the request from the authorised user relates to a request for traffic profile data, or whether the purpose of the request is to provide traffic data for processing and logging.
Raw traffic data may be received by the data manager. This raw data may be logged as is, in an unprocessed form. Additionally or alternatively, it may also be processed in order to classify the traffic as relating to normal user traffic or attacker traffic. This may involve the use of any known detection method(s) and tool(s), including for example signature-based or anomaly-based detection, stateful detection and application-level detection.
The invention may comprise a system protection system (SPS) which may be in communication with the database. This may be direct communication with the database or may be via the data manager. The invention may be arranged to determine whether an incoming request originates from a legitimate participant (user) or an malicious/unauthorised third party (attacker). The invention may also be arranged to determine a response to the request. If a request is determined to be from an attacker, the invention may generate a virtual honeypot and/or honeynet (i.e. a decoy) and a database. The database may be an altered or false database. It may contain data which is not commercially or confidentially sensitive. It may be randomised data. The invention may be arranged to direct the source of the request to the honeypot and false database.
Where more than one attacker is identified, more than one honeypot and respective database may be generated. The parameters used to create and/or configure the honeypots may be determined locally by the SPS, based on attacker information received from the database. Alternatively or additionally, honeypot parameters may be obtained from the database. Other attacker profile data may also be obtained from the database.
Any feature(s) described above may also be applicable for the embodiment(s) described below.
Additionally or alternatively, the invention may provide a computer-implemented method comprising:
    • receiving attacker profile information;
    • monitoring traffic to a network address;
    • comparing the monitored traffic to the attacker profile information;
    • upon determining that the monitored traffic is associated with an attacker, retrieving configuration information for a computer decoy; and/or
    • configuring a computer decoy based on the retrieved configuration.
The attacker profile information may include the configuration information. Configuring the computer decoy may include creating the computer decoy and/or reconfiguring the computer decoy. The decoy may be referred to as a honey pot or honeynet.
Additionally or alternatively, there may be provided a computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving, processing and logging network traffic data; and/or
based on processed network traffic data:
determining that network traffic originates from an attacker;
determining a classification of the network traffic; and
determining a decoy configuration based on the classification;
upon receipt of a request from a valid user, providing the determined classification and decoy configuration to the user. The request may be an information request.
Determining the classification may use supervised learning pattern recognition, for example multi-layer perceptrons (MLP). The classification may be an attacker classification, a computer system/network risk classification, or a traffic classification.
The classification may be a risk or severity classification associated with the sophistication of the attacker. For example, certain behaviour may be associated with an attacker that is deemed to be a relatively minor threat, whereas more sophisticated behaviour may be associated with an attacker that is deemed to be more potentially dangerous.
Determining the attacker classification may include classifying the type of traffic generated, or the type of attacker depending on a threshold associated with the attacker's behaviour, for example where the threshold is based on which services are requested by the attacker.
Additionally or alternatively, the risk characteristics of a particular computing system or local network may be determined from the network traffic, i.e. the risk of an attack given the system/network configuration in view of the network traffic characteristics.
Classification may be rule based, or may be done by processing the raw traffic data with a learning method such as a neural network, perceptrons, or a tree learning method e.g. using a random forest algorithm. For example, when using supervised learning pattern recognition based on a perceptron based neural network (e.g. multi-layer perceptrons MLP), an input layer with one neuron for each input may be used to map for IP Options, Malware and Buffer overflow conditions, selected attacks etc. The system of perceptrons may be processed using a hidden neuron layer in which each neuron represents combinations of inputs and calculates a response based on current data coupled with expected future data, a prior data and external systems data. Data processed at this level may feed into an output layer. The result of the neural network may supply the output, e.g. as a risk function. The perceptron may be used to model the selected risk factors for the invention and calculate a base risk that is trained and updated over time.
Any feature(s) described above in relation to one aspect or embodiment of the invention may also be applicable and relevant with regard to any other aspect or embodiment described above.
Throughout this specification the word “comprise”, or variations such as “comprises” or “comprising”, will be understood to imply the inclusion of a stated element, integer or step, or group of elements, integers or steps, but not the exclusion of any other element, integer or step, or group of elements, integers or steps.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
Embodiments of the disclosure are now described by way of example with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:—
FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of an intrusion detection and protection system (IDPS).
FIG. 2 illustrates an example computer system for traffic data management.
FIG. 3 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of an implementation of an IDPS.
FIG. 4 is a flow diagram describing an embodiment of a method for providing an IDPS.
FIG. 5 is a flow diagram describing an embodiment of a method of using an intrusion detection and protection system.
In the drawings, like reference numerals designate similar parts.
DESCRIPTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE EMBODIMENTS
When a computer system or network is attacked, a typical response is to block the attack using a firewall, or in some instances to connect the attacker to a honeypot. The details of these attacks are not shared with other parties, so that every attack that is performed is handled independently. No information is shared with other groups, and this lack of sharing makes it simple and economical for attackers to implement the same attack strategy across multiple networks in order to find a vulnerable target.
Thus, there is a need for an improved security solution which provides enhanced protection for computer-based devices and networks, and also the data which is stored thereon.
FIG. 1 shows an intrusion detection and protection system (IDPS) 100 that addresses this shortcoming by providing a centralised database 102, managed by a data manager 104. Multiple users 106, 108, 110 communicate with the data manager 104, for example via a network 112. The centralised database 102 provides information, such as attacker signatures, to the individual systems of users 106, 108, 110 that are thereby able to match traffic on their networks with attacker profiles. Implementing a shared database with mutually beneficial information enables the subscribing users 106, 108, 110 to not only identify and respond to a current attacker, but also to effectively inoculate themselves against potential attackers based on data gathered by the other users.
The data manager 104 may be a single computing device, or may be computing network that includes multiple computing devices or processors to allow for distributed computing, grid computing or cloud computing.
The database 102 is shown in FIG. 1 as being connected to the data manager 104 via a communication link. However, the database 102 may be part of the data manager 104 to reduce data process time. In other examples, the database 102 may be connected to the data manager 104 via the communication network 112 without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.
The centralised database 102 operates according to a database management system (DBMS) running on the database 102. The DBMS may include Microsoft SQL, Oracle, Sybase, IBM DB2, MySQL, or Orient DB. The centralised database 102 may include multiple sub-databases that operate based on different DBMSes.
The communication network 112 is typically a wide area network (WAN), and may be implemented using any suitable type of network, such as a wireline network, a cellular communication network, a wireless local area network (WLAN), an optical communication network, etc. The communication network 112 may be a combination of the suitable networks, for example, the Internet. The communication network 112 can also be a private communication network that is built specifically for the IDPS 100.
FIG. 2 illustrates an example computer system 120 for data management according to the present disclosure. The computer system 120 represents an example structure of the data manager 104 described above.
The computer system 120 includes a storage device 126, a memory device 124, a communication interface 128, and a processor 122. The computer 120 further includes a bus 130 that connects the storage device 126, the memory device 124, the communication interface 128, and the processor 122.
The storage device 126 is configured to store traffic data, the traffic data including normal user and attacker traffic data received from multiple users. Although the storage device 126 is shown as part of the computer system 120, the storage device 126 may be a separate entity that is connected to the computer system 120, for example, the centralised database 102 shown in FIG. 1 .
The memory device 124 is configured to store instructions in relation to the operation of the data manager 104, as described elsewhere herein with reference to FIGS. 4 and 5 . These instructions are implemented as machine-readable instructions included in a computer software program, when executed by the processor 122, causes the processor 122 to perform these methods of operating and using an IDPS.
The communication interface 128 is configured to connect to a communication network, particularly, the communication network 102 as shown in FIG. 1 , via the link between the computer system 120 and the communication network 110.
The processor 122 is connected to the memory device 124, the storage device 126, and the communication interface 128. The processor 122 is configured to obtain the instructions from the memory device 124 in operating and using an IDPS.
In the example shown in FIG. 2 , the storage device 126, the memory device 124 and the processor 122 are configured to operate according to a computer operating system, for example, Windows Server, Mac OS X Server, Linux, Unix, Windows, and Mac OS.
The processor 122 may be a general purpose Central Processing Unit (CPU), and the instructions stored in the memory device 124 are defined by one or more of the following programming languages: HyperText Markup Language (HTML), HTML5, JavaScript, and JQuery. The instructions may also be defined by one or more of the following programming languages: JAVA, Python, and PHP. The instructions may also be defined by one or more of the following programming languages: Objective-C, C++, C, and Swift.
FIG. 3 shows an example of a computer network 200 that uses an IDPS service as described above with reference to FIG. 1 . In this example, user requests received from a network 202 pass via a server protection system (SPS) 204 to the computer network 200 where a real server 206 provides access to a production database 208. Of course many different types of networks offering different types of services can make use of an SPS in communication with an IDPS.
The SPS 204 may be implemented on a computer system like the example computer system 120 described above with reference to FIG. 2 . The memory device 124 is then configured to store instructions in relation to the operation of the SPS 204. These instructions are implemented as machine-readable instructions included in a computer software program, when executed by the processor 122, causes the processor 122 to implement the SPS 204 as described below.
The SPS 204 has access to information from the centralised database 102. As indicated in FIG. 3 , the centralised database 102 is updated using data from a community of users 210 as described above. The traffic pattern data from the database 102 is used by the SPS 204 to determine whether user requests received are from normal users or from attackers. If a user request is from an attacker, then the SPS 204 generates a virtual honeypot 212 and a transformed database 214, and directs the attacker to this honeypot 212 and a false database 214 that appears to be real.
Where more than one attacker is identified, more than one honeypot 216, 218 and respective transformed database 220, 222 may be generated. The parameters used to create and/or configure the honeypots may be determined locally by the SPS, based on attacker information received from the database 102. Alternatively or additionally honeypot parameters may be obtained from the database 102 together with the other attacker profile data.
The SPS 204 may communicate directly with the database 102 in order to retrieve information as required, as shown in the example illustrated in FIG. 3 . In the example shown in FIG. 5 (described in more detail elsewhere herein), communication between the database 102 and the SPS 204 is via the data manager 104, and the data manager 104 manages the content and format in which information is provided to the SPS 204. One way of managing the services provided to the SPS 204 is according to a subscription service profile that the subscribing user (SPS owner) is associated with.
FIG. 4 is a flow diagram describing an example of a method 300 for providing an IDPS as shown in FIG. 1 . At step 302 the data manager 104 receives a connection request from an authorised user, for example a subscribing SPS that is identified and authorised when the connection is made.
The data manager 104 manages the centralised database 102 by providing a number of services that include:
(1) Receiving, processing and logging network traffic data received from users of the IDPS, and updating the centralised database with the network traffic data to form a single data resource sourced from multiple users' traffic data;
(2) Determining protection parameters, for example in the form of a honeypot configuration appropriate for a particular attacker; and
(3) Providing users with access to the shared information on the centralised database 102, enabling the users to identify attackers and also to implement appropriate protection parameters.
At step 304, the data manager 104 determines whether the connection request from the authorised user relates to a request for traffic profile data 306, or whether traffic data is being provided for processing and logging 308.
At step 310 raw traffic data 312 is received by the data manager 104. This raw data may be logged as is, but this data is also processed to determine a number of things.
Firstly, the data is analysed in order to classify the traffic as relating to normal user traffic or attacker traffic. Intrusion detection systems may rely on any number of detection methods and tools, including signature-based or anomaly-based detection, stateful detection and application-level detection. Anomaly-based detection may rely on thresholds selected to describe the local network environment, e.g. relating to network traffic volume, packet count, IP fragments, IPID, IP options, IP header information etc. For example, a typical indicator of attacker traffic is if the traffic is directed to an IP address that is not used or is restricted, or if a service is requested that is restricted or not provided by the targeted network. Other information extracted from the traffic data to determine whether the source is from an attacker may include one or more of the following: an IP address known from an IP address blacklist, code signatures associated with attackers, and network scan behaviour.
If it is determined that traffic is associated with an attacker, in some implementations it may also be possible to further analyse the data to ascertain the type or classification of an attacker. The classification may be a risk or severity classification associated with the sophistication of the attacker. For example, certain behaviour may be associated with a reduced threat attacker (e.g. a script kiddie if a vulnerability known to the owner is not exploited by the attacker), whereas more sophisticated behaviour may be associated with a more dangerous attacker (e.g. skilled hackers that uncover hidden indicators such as code signatures).
Determining the attacker classification may include classifying the type of traffic generated, or the type of attacker depending on a threshold associated with the attacker's behaviour, for example where the threshold is based on which services are requested by the attacker.
Additionally or alternatively, the risk characteristics of a particular computing system or local network may be determined from the network traffic, i.e. the risk of an attack given the system/network configuration in view of the network traffic characteristics.
Classification may be rule based, or may be done by processing the raw traffic data with a learning method such as a neural network, perceptrons, or a tree learning method e.g. using a random forest algorithm. For example, when using supervised learning pattern recognition based on a perceptron based neural network (e.g. multi-layer perceptrons MLP), an input layer with one neuron for each input is used to map for IP Options, Malware and Buffer overflow conditions, selected attacks etc. The system of perceptrons is processed using a hidden neuron layer in which each neuron represents combinations of inputs and calculates a response based on current data coupled with expected future data, a prior data and external systems data. Data processed at this level feeds into an output layer. The result of the neural network supplies the output, e.g. as a risk function. The perceptron is the computational workhorse in this system, and can be used to model the selected risk factors for the system and calculate a base risk that is trained and updated over time.
When monitoring the operation of a system or the actions of users, thresholds are characteristically defined above or below which alerting, alarms, and exceptions are not reported. This range of activity is regarded as baseline or routine activity. In this way, a risk function can be created that not only calculates data based on existing and known variables, but also updates automatically using external sources and trends. In this example, external sources refers to data gathered from the community of users 210 that provides external trending and correlation points.
Secondly, at step 310, in addition to determining the source of the traffic data (normal data vs. attacker data), the data manager 104 also determines an appropriate response, e.g. using a lookup table based on known features of the attacker behaviour. In some implementations the response includes the creation and/or configuration of a honeypot so that attacker traffic can be redirected thereby protecting the production network, and also providing an opportunity to extract more information about the particular attacker. At step 314, honeypot configuration parameters are stored in the database 316 together with the attacker profiles.
Profiles for normal users are also stored, providing reference traffic data for bona fide users.
If the connection request from the authorised user relates to a request for traffic profile data 306, then at step 318 the profile data is retrieved from the database 316 and a profile package 320 is provided to the authorised user.
The content of the profile package 320 depends on the information rights or requirements of the authorised user, as managed by the data manager 104. The profile package may be a comprehensive compilation of traffic data on the database 316, in which case direct access to all the information on the database may be provided to the user. Alternatively, the profile package may include only a portion of the traffic data depending on the relevance to or requirements of the particular user. For example, in one implementation, the data request may be for a particular attacker's profile (e.g. based on an originating IP address) and information associated with that attacker. For such a request, the profile package 320 includes information relating to the attacker identity (e.g. an attacker behaviour profile, attacker classification, code signatures etc.) and also includes attack prevention information (e.g. honeypot configuration parameters).
The data provided to the authorised user may also include other information available from the database, for example normal user profiles or attacker profiles in different formats (e.g. a specific attacker's profile or a group of attackers' profiles).
FIG. 5 shows a flow diagram of an example method 400 of implementing the IDPS 100. Locally, an SPS 204 is responsible for interfacing between a user system (for example users 106, 108 and 110 as shown in FIG. 1 ) and the data manager 104 of the IDPS 100. At step 402 the SPS 204 monitors the traffic, and based on the data 320 received from the IDPS determines the source of the traffic (normal user vs. attacker) at step 404. The IDPS data received is one or more profile packages as described above with reference to FIG. 4 so that if an attacker is identified at step 406, a protection response is implemented at step 408, based on information in the profile packages. The information includes, for example, honeypot configuration parameters provided by the IDPS. Once the honeypot has been created, configured and/or reconfigured the attacker's traffic is sent to the honeypot at step 410.
At step 412 the traffic data describing the attacker behaviour is logged by providing raw traffic data 312 to the IDPS. Similarly, if the source of the traffic is determined to be a normal user (and not an attacker), then this normal traffic data is logged at step 414. At step 416 the normal traffic is forwarded to the real server (e.g. real server 206 in FIG. 3 ).
Providing a central resource of shared traffic data improves the response time and efficiency of computer systems to attackers when compared to stand-alone systems reliant on a single source of information about attackers (i.e. their own network traffic).
It will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that numerous variations and/or modifications may be made to the above-described embodiments, without departing from the broad general scope of the present disclosure. The present embodiments are, therefore, to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive.

Claims (19)

What is claimed is:
1. A computer-implemented security method comprising:
receiving, processing, and logging network traffic data received from a plurality of users;
determining an attacker profile from the network traffic data, wherein the attacker profile includes attack prevention information an attacker identity;
determining an attacker classification based on sophistication of the attacker with the attacker identity;
determining a configuration of a honeypot or honeynet using the network traffic data, the attacker profile, and the attacker classification; and
using a computer-based storage resource to store the attacker profile and the honeypot or honeynet configuration,
wherein the attacker profile and the honeypot or honeynet configuration are made available upon request to any of the plurality of users that are registered.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising using the computer-based storage resource to store:
the network traffic data; and/or
data relating to the users.
3. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
directing network traffic to the honeypot or honeynet generated in accordance with, or using, the determined configuration.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the plurality of users comprises users who are designated as authorised users.
5. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
receiving a request from a user; and
determining whether the request is from an authorised user or an attacker.
6. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: determining a profile for one or more of the users from the plurality of users.
7. A computer-implemented security system comprising:
a computer-based storage resource is arranged to receive, process, and log network traffic data received from a plurality of users; and
one or more processors and memory, the memory storing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors of a computer system, cause the computer-implemented security system to:
determine an attacker profile from the network traffic data, wherein the attacker profile includes attack prevention information associated with an attacker identity;
determine an attacker classification based on sophistication of the attacker with the attacker identity;
determine a configuration of a honeypot or a honeynet using the network traffic data, the attacker profile, and the attacker classification;
use the computer-based storage resource to store an attacker profile and a honeypot or honeynet configuration,
wherein the attacker profile and the honeypot or honeynet configuration are made available upon request to any of the plurality of users that are registered.
8. The computer-implemented security system according to claim 7, wherein the computer-based storage resource is also arranged to store:
profile(s) relating to one or more of the plurality of users;
profile(s) relating to one or more attackers or groups or types of attackers; and/or
honeypot/honeynet configuration parameters.
9. A computer-implemented method comprising:
using a computer-based storage resource to store an attacker profile and a computer decoy, wherein the attacker profile and the computer decoy are made available upon request to a plurality of registered users;
receiving attacker profile information;
monitoring traffic to a network address;
comparing the monitored traffic to the attacker profile information;
determining an attacker classification based on sophistication of the attacker with an attacker identity, wherein the sophistication is determined based at least in part on behavior indicating skillfulness of an attack;
upon determining that the monitored traffic is associated with an attacker, retrieving configuration information to configure the computer decoy; and
configuring the computer decoy based on the retrieved configuration information and the attacker classification using a machine learning model.
10. The method of claim 9, further comprising directing traffic to the computer decoy.
11. The method of claim 9, further comprising storing the monitored traffic in the computer-based storage resource.
12. The method according to claim 9, wherein the attacker profile information is generated using network traffic data provided by a plurality of users.
13. A system comprising:
one or more processors; and
memory storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to cause the system to:
determine an attacker profile based on network traffic data;
determine an attacker classification based on sophistication of the attacker with an attacker identity, wherein the sophistication is based at least in part on a behavior of the attacker,
determine a configuration of a honeypot or honeynet using the network traffic data, the attacker profile, and the attacker classification;
configure the honeypot or honeynet according to the determined configuration, wherein the instructions cause the system to determine the configuration of the honeypot or honeynet using a machine learning model;
use a computer-based storage resource to store the attacker profile and the honeypot or honeynet configuration,
wherein the attacker profile and the honeypot or honeynet configuration are made available upon request to any of the plurality of users that are registered.
14. The system according to claim 13, wherein the instructions further cause the system to generate a database for the honeypot or honeynet.
15. The system according to claim 14, wherein the database is an altered or false database.
16. The system according to claim 15, wherein the database lacks data that is commercially or confidentially sensitive.
17. The system according to claim 13, wherein the instructions further cause the system to configure different honeypots or honeynets for different attacker profiles.
18. The system according to claim 13, wherein the machine learning model is a neural network.
19. The system according to claim 13, wherein the attacker profile comprises information usable at least in part to identify the attacker.
US16/983,583 2016-02-23 2020-08-03 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems Active US12328339B2 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US16/983,583 US12328339B2 (en) 2016-02-23 2020-08-03 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems
US19/026,759 US20250159020A1 (en) 2016-02-23 2025-01-17 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems

Applications Claiming Priority (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB1603118.9 2016-02-23
GBGB1603118.9A GB201603118D0 (en) 2016-02-23 2016-02-23 Reactive and pre-emptive security system based on choice theory
GB1603118 2016-02-23
PCT/IB2017/050811 WO2017145001A1 (en) 2016-02-23 2017-02-14 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems
US201816079076A 2018-08-22 2018-08-22
US16/983,583 US12328339B2 (en) 2016-02-23 2020-08-03 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems

Related Parent Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US16/079,076 Division US10735466B2 (en) 2016-02-23 2017-02-14 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems
PCT/IB2017/050811 Division WO2017145001A1 (en) 2016-02-23 2017-02-14 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US19/026,759 Continuation US20250159020A1 (en) 2016-02-23 2025-01-17 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20200366714A1 US20200366714A1 (en) 2020-11-19
US12328339B2 true US12328339B2 (en) 2025-06-10

Family

ID=55753050

Family Applications (3)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US16/079,076 Active 2037-07-25 US10735466B2 (en) 2016-02-23 2017-02-14 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems
US16/983,583 Active US12328339B2 (en) 2016-02-23 2020-08-03 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems
US19/026,759 Pending US20250159020A1 (en) 2016-02-23 2025-01-17 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US16/079,076 Active 2037-07-25 US10735466B2 (en) 2016-02-23 2017-02-14 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US19/026,759 Pending US20250159020A1 (en) 2016-02-23 2025-01-17 Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems

Country Status (8)

Country Link
US (3) US10735466B2 (en)
EP (3) EP3420697B1 (en)
JP (2) JP6878445B2 (en)
KR (2) KR102749595B1 (en)
CN (2) CN109314698B (en)
GB (2) GB201603118D0 (en)
WO (1) WO2017145001A1 (en)
ZA (2) ZA201805018B (en)

Families Citing this family (48)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10068228B1 (en) 2013-06-28 2018-09-04 Winklevoss Ip, Llc Systems and methods for storing digital math-based assets using a secure portal
US9898782B1 (en) 2013-06-28 2018-02-20 Winklevoss Ip, Llc Systems, methods, and program products for operating exchange traded products holding digital math-based assets
US10354325B1 (en) 2013-06-28 2019-07-16 Winklevoss Ip, Llc Computer-generated graphical user interface
GB201603118D0 (en) 2016-02-23 2016-04-06 Eitc Holdings Ltd Reactive and pre-emptive security system based on choice theory
WO2017189765A1 (en) 2016-04-26 2017-11-02 Acalvio Technologies, Inc. Tunneling for network deceptions
US10326796B1 (en) * 2016-04-26 2019-06-18 Acalvio Technologies, Inc. Dynamic security mechanisms for mixed networks
US10108850B1 (en) * 2017-04-24 2018-10-23 Intel Corporation Recognition, reidentification and security enhancements using autonomous machines
US10785258B2 (en) 2017-12-01 2020-09-22 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Counter intelligence bot
EP3711261B1 (en) * 2017-12-27 2023-04-12 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Network traffic sending method and apparatus, and hybrid honeypot system
US10826939B2 (en) * 2018-01-19 2020-11-03 Rapid7, Inc. Blended honeypot
US11909860B1 (en) 2018-02-12 2024-02-20 Gemini Ip, Llc Systems, methods, and program products for loaning digital assets and for depositing, holding and/or distributing collateral as a token in the form of digital assets on an underlying blockchain
US10540654B1 (en) 2018-02-12 2020-01-21 Winklevoss Ip, Llc System, method and program product for generating and utilizing stable value digital assets
US12271898B1 (en) 2018-03-05 2025-04-08 Gemini Ip, Llc System, method and program product for modifying a supply of stable value digital asset tokens
US10373129B1 (en) 2018-03-05 2019-08-06 Winklevoss Ip, Llc System, method and program product for generating and utilizing stable value digital assets
US10438290B1 (en) 2018-03-05 2019-10-08 Winklevoss Ip, Llc System, method and program product for generating and utilizing stable value digital assets
US12141871B1 (en) 2018-02-12 2024-11-12 Gemini Ip, Llc System, method and program product for generating and utilizing stable value digital assets
US11475442B1 (en) 2018-02-12 2022-10-18 Gemini Ip, Llc System, method and program product for modifying a supply of stable value digital asset tokens
US10373158B1 (en) 2018-02-12 2019-08-06 Winklevoss Ip, Llc System, method and program product for modifying a supply of stable value digital asset tokens
US11308487B1 (en) 2018-02-12 2022-04-19 Gemini Ip, Llc System, method and program product for obtaining digital assets
US11200569B1 (en) 2018-02-12 2021-12-14 Winklevoss Ip, Llc System, method and program product for making payments using fiat-backed digital assets
US10785214B2 (en) 2018-06-01 2020-09-22 Bank Of America Corporation Alternate user communication routing for a one-time credential
US10972472B2 (en) * 2018-06-01 2021-04-06 Bank Of America Corporation Alternate user communication routing utilizing a unique user identification
US10785220B2 (en) 2018-06-01 2020-09-22 Bank Of America Corporation Alternate user communication routing
US11108823B2 (en) * 2018-07-31 2021-08-31 International Business Machines Corporation Resource security system using fake connections
US10601868B2 (en) 2018-08-09 2020-03-24 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Enhanced techniques for generating and deploying dynamic false user accounts
US11212312B2 (en) 2018-08-09 2021-12-28 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Systems and methods for polluting phishing campaign responses
US11038919B1 (en) * 2018-09-14 2021-06-15 Rapid7, Inc. Multiple personality deception systems
TWI729320B (en) * 2018-11-01 2021-06-01 財團法人資訊工業策進會 Suspicious packet detection device and suspicious packet detection method thereof
US11038920B1 (en) * 2019-03-28 2021-06-15 Rapid7, Inc. Behavior management of deception system fleets
CN111917691A (en) * 2019-05-10 2020-11-10 张长河 WEB dynamic self-adaptive defense system and method based on false response
US11223651B2 (en) * 2019-07-30 2022-01-11 International Business Machines Corporation Augmented data collection from suspected attackers of a computer network
US11750651B2 (en) * 2019-09-04 2023-09-05 Oracle International Corporation Honeypots for infrastructure-as-a-service security
KR102259732B1 (en) 2019-11-28 2021-06-02 광주과학기술원 A honeypot deployment method on a network
KR102276753B1 (en) * 2019-12-13 2021-07-13 단국대학교 산학협력단 Moving target defense system using decoy trap and attack surface expansion method through thereof
CN111541670A (en) * 2020-04-17 2020-08-14 广州锦行网络科技有限公司 Novel dynamic honeypot system
US11689568B2 (en) 2020-05-08 2023-06-27 International Business Machines Corporation Dynamic maze honeypot response system
JP7413924B2 (en) * 2020-05-25 2024-01-16 富士フイルムビジネスイノベーション株式会社 Information processing device and information processing program
CN114175575B (en) * 2020-07-02 2023-04-18 华为技术有限公司 Apparatus and method for generating, using and optimizing honeypots
US11824894B2 (en) 2020-11-25 2023-11-21 International Business Machines Corporation Defense of targeted database attacks through dynamic honeypot database response generation
EP4099621A3 (en) * 2021-06-01 2023-03-22 Cytwist Ltd. Artificial intelligence cyber identity classification
CN114218567B (en) * 2021-12-07 2025-12-30 中信银行股份有限公司 A method, apparatus, device, and readable storage medium for defending against SQL attacks.
US12267299B2 (en) 2022-01-12 2025-04-01 Bank Of America Corporation Preemptive threat detection for an information system
CN114598512B (en) * 2022-02-24 2024-02-06 烽台科技(北京)有限公司 Network security guarantee method and device based on honeypot and terminal equipment
KR102850184B1 (en) 2022-03-29 2025-08-25 주식회사 아이티스테이션 Malicious file detection mathod using honeypot and system using the same
EP4387165A1 (en) * 2022-12-12 2024-06-19 Robert Bosch GmbH Detecting anomalous communications
KR102651735B1 (en) * 2023-05-26 2024-03-28 쿤텍 주식회사 Honeypot system using virtual session and honeypot operation method
CN116506214A (en) * 2023-05-31 2023-07-28 深圳市深信服信息安全有限公司 Honeypot drainage system, honeypot drainage method, related equipment and storage medium
KR102680602B1 (en) * 2023-11-07 2024-07-02 쿤텍 주식회사 Honeypot system and honeypot operation method in a distributed cluster environment and computing devices to perform the same

Citations (52)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2002023805A2 (en) 2000-09-13 2002-03-21 Karakoram Limited Monitoring network activity
US20020133603A1 (en) 2001-03-13 2002-09-19 Fujitsu Limited Method of and apparatus for filtering access, and computer product
US20030217283A1 (en) 2002-05-20 2003-11-20 Scott Hrastar Method and system for encrypted network management and intrusion detection
US20040128543A1 (en) * 2002-12-31 2004-07-01 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for morphing honeypot with computer security incident correlation
US20040177110A1 (en) * 2003-03-03 2004-09-09 Rounthwaite Robert L. Feedback loop for spam prevention
JP2005004617A (en) 2003-06-13 2005-01-06 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Unauthorized intrusion countermeasure processing system, attack analysis / response device, network interception / simulation device, and unauthorized intrusion countermeasure processing method
US20050166072A1 (en) 2002-12-31 2005-07-28 Converse Vikki K. Method and system for wireless morphing honeypot
KR20050082681A (en) * 2004-02-20 2005-08-24 한국과학기술원 Honeypot system
US20060016198A1 (en) 2004-07-23 2006-01-26 Peter Stuttaford Apparatus and method for providing an off-gas to a combustion system
US20060101515A1 (en) 2004-08-19 2006-05-11 Edward Amoroso System and method for monitoring network traffic
US20060161982A1 (en) * 2005-01-18 2006-07-20 Chari Suresh N Intrusion detection system
US20060212942A1 (en) 2005-03-21 2006-09-21 Barford Paul R Semantically-aware network intrusion signature generator
US20060242701A1 (en) * 2005-04-20 2006-10-26 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and system for preventing, auditing and trending unauthorized traffic in network systems
US20070067841A1 (en) 2005-08-29 2007-03-22 Yegneswaran Vinod T Scalable monitor of malicious network traffic
US20070094728A1 (en) 2003-05-30 2007-04-26 Klaus Julisch Attack signature generation
US20070192863A1 (en) 2005-07-01 2007-08-16 Harsh Kapoor Systems and methods for processing data flows
US20070271614A1 (en) 2006-05-22 2007-11-22 Alen Capalik Decoy network technology with automatic signature generation for intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems
CN101087196A (en) * 2006-12-27 2007-12-12 北京大学 Multi-layer honey network data transmission method and system
US20080016570A1 (en) 2006-05-22 2008-01-17 Alen Capalik System and method for analyzing unauthorized intrusion into a computer network
US20080301809A1 (en) 2007-05-31 2008-12-04 Nortel Networks System and method for detectng malicious mail from spam zombies
US20090241173A1 (en) 2008-03-19 2009-09-24 Websense, Inc. Method and system for protection against information stealing software
US20100071054A1 (en) 2008-04-30 2010-03-18 Viasat, Inc. Network security appliance
US20100077483A1 (en) * 2007-06-12 2010-03-25 Stolfo Salvatore J Methods, systems, and media for baiting inside attackers
US20100122342A1 (en) * 2007-03-28 2010-05-13 Fadi El-Moussa Identifying abormal network traffic
US20100269175A1 (en) 2008-12-02 2010-10-21 Stolfo Salvatore J Methods, systems, and media for masquerade attack detection by monitoring computer user behavior
US20100274892A1 (en) * 2007-01-11 2010-10-28 Ept Innovation Method for Monitoring a message associated with an action generated by an element or the user of an IS, and corresponding computer software product, storage means and device
US20110214182A1 (en) * 2010-02-26 2011-09-01 Mykonos Software, Inc. Methods for proactively securing a web application and apparatuses thereof
CN102254111A (en) 2010-05-17 2011-11-23 北京知道创宇信息技术有限公司 Malicious site detection method and device
WO2012011070A1 (en) 2010-07-21 2012-01-26 Seculert Ltd. Network protection system and method
US20120167208A1 (en) * 2010-12-27 2012-06-28 Avaya Inc. System and method for voip honeypot for converged voip services
US20130145465A1 (en) * 2011-12-06 2013-06-06 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Multilayered deception for intrusion detection and prevention
EP2657880A1 (en) * 2012-04-23 2013-10-30 Verint Systems Limited Systems and methods for combined physical and cyber data security
US20130305357A1 (en) * 2010-11-18 2013-11-14 The Boeing Company Context Aware Network Security Monitoring for Threat Detection
US8661102B1 (en) 2005-11-28 2014-02-25 Mcafee, Inc. System, method and computer program product for detecting patterns among information from a distributed honey pot system
CN103607399A (en) 2013-11-25 2014-02-26 中国人民解放军理工大学 Special IP network safety monitor system and method based on hidden network
US8682812B1 (en) 2010-12-23 2014-03-25 Narus, Inc. Machine learning based botnet detection using real-time extracted traffic features
US20140298469A1 (en) * 2012-02-21 2014-10-02 Logos Technologies Llc System for detecting, analyzing, and controlling infiltration of computer and network systems
US20150033340A1 (en) * 2013-07-23 2015-01-29 Crypteia Networks S.A. Systems and methods for self-tuning network intrusion detection and prevention
US20150106889A1 (en) 2013-10-13 2015-04-16 Skycure Ltd Potential attack detection based on dummy network traffic
US20150229656A1 (en) 2014-02-11 2015-08-13 Choung-Yaw Michael Shieh Systems and methods for distributed threat detection in a computer network
EP2942919A1 (en) 2014-05-08 2015-11-11 Deutsche Telekom AG Social network honeypot
WO2016005273A1 (en) 2014-07-11 2016-01-14 Deutsche Telekom Ag Method for detecting an attack on a working environment connected to a communication network
US20160044054A1 (en) 2014-08-06 2016-02-11 Norse Corporation Network appliance for dynamic protection from risky network activities
US20160080414A1 (en) 2014-09-12 2016-03-17 Topspin Security Ltd. System and a Method for Identifying Malware Network Activity Using a Decoy Environment
US20160164886A1 (en) * 2014-10-17 2016-06-09 Computer Sciences Corporation Systems and methods for threat analysis of computer data
US20160197943A1 (en) * 2014-06-24 2016-07-07 Leviathan, Inc. System and Method for Profiling System Attacker
US20160218933A1 (en) * 2015-01-27 2016-07-28 Sri International Impact analyzer for a computer network
US20170134405A1 (en) * 2015-11-09 2017-05-11 Qualcomm Incorporated Dynamic Honeypot System
US9716727B1 (en) * 2014-09-30 2017-07-25 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Generating a honey network configuration to emulate a target network environment
WO2017145001A1 (en) * 2016-02-23 2017-08-31 nChain Holdings Limited Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems
US20170324773A1 (en) * 2016-05-05 2017-11-09 Javelin Networks, Inc. Creation of fictitious identities to obfuscate hacking of internal networks
US10050779B2 (en) 2015-05-19 2018-08-14 Coinbase, Inc. Checkout and payment

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2007079815A (en) * 2005-09-13 2007-03-29 Canon Inc Autoimmune defense system
CN102882884B (en) * 2012-10-13 2014-12-24 国家电网公司 Honeynet-based risk prewarning system and method in information production environment
JP6159018B2 (en) * 2014-03-19 2017-07-05 日本電信電話株式会社 Extraction condition determination method, communication monitoring system, extraction condition determination apparatus, and extraction condition determination program
CN104239970B (en) * 2014-09-04 2017-11-28 国网河南省电力公司电力科学研究院 A kind of conductor galloping method for prewarning risk based on Adaboost

Patent Citations (56)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2002023805A2 (en) 2000-09-13 2002-03-21 Karakoram Limited Monitoring network activity
US20020133603A1 (en) 2001-03-13 2002-09-19 Fujitsu Limited Method of and apparatus for filtering access, and computer product
US20030217283A1 (en) 2002-05-20 2003-11-20 Scott Hrastar Method and system for encrypted network management and intrusion detection
US20040128543A1 (en) * 2002-12-31 2004-07-01 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for morphing honeypot with computer security incident correlation
US20050166072A1 (en) 2002-12-31 2005-07-28 Converse Vikki K. Method and system for wireless morphing honeypot
US20040177110A1 (en) * 2003-03-03 2004-09-09 Rounthwaite Robert L. Feedback loop for spam prevention
US20070094728A1 (en) 2003-05-30 2007-04-26 Klaus Julisch Attack signature generation
US20070094722A1 (en) 2003-05-30 2007-04-26 International Business Machines Corporation Detecting networks attacks
JP2005004617A (en) 2003-06-13 2005-01-06 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Unauthorized intrusion countermeasure processing system, attack analysis / response device, network interception / simulation device, and unauthorized intrusion countermeasure processing method
KR20050082681A (en) * 2004-02-20 2005-08-24 한국과학기술원 Honeypot system
US20060016198A1 (en) 2004-07-23 2006-01-26 Peter Stuttaford Apparatus and method for providing an off-gas to a combustion system
US20060101515A1 (en) 2004-08-19 2006-05-11 Edward Amoroso System and method for monitoring network traffic
US20060161982A1 (en) * 2005-01-18 2006-07-20 Chari Suresh N Intrusion detection system
US20060212942A1 (en) 2005-03-21 2006-09-21 Barford Paul R Semantically-aware network intrusion signature generator
US20060242701A1 (en) * 2005-04-20 2006-10-26 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and system for preventing, auditing and trending unauthorized traffic in network systems
US20070192863A1 (en) 2005-07-01 2007-08-16 Harsh Kapoor Systems and methods for processing data flows
US20070067841A1 (en) 2005-08-29 2007-03-22 Yegneswaran Vinod T Scalable monitor of malicious network traffic
US8661102B1 (en) 2005-11-28 2014-02-25 Mcafee, Inc. System, method and computer program product for detecting patterns among information from a distributed honey pot system
US20070271614A1 (en) 2006-05-22 2007-11-22 Alen Capalik Decoy network technology with automatic signature generation for intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems
US20080016570A1 (en) 2006-05-22 2008-01-17 Alen Capalik System and method for analyzing unauthorized intrusion into a computer network
US20130152199A1 (en) 2006-05-22 2013-06-13 Alen Capalik Decoy Network Technology With Automatic Signature Generation for Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention Systems
CN101087196A (en) * 2006-12-27 2007-12-12 北京大学 Multi-layer honey network data transmission method and system
US20100274892A1 (en) * 2007-01-11 2010-10-28 Ept Innovation Method for Monitoring a message associated with an action generated by an element or the user of an IS, and corresponding computer software product, storage means and device
US20100122342A1 (en) * 2007-03-28 2010-05-13 Fadi El-Moussa Identifying abormal network traffic
US20080301809A1 (en) 2007-05-31 2008-12-04 Nortel Networks System and method for detectng malicious mail from spam zombies
US20100077483A1 (en) * 2007-06-12 2010-03-25 Stolfo Salvatore J Methods, systems, and media for baiting inside attackers
US20090241173A1 (en) 2008-03-19 2009-09-24 Websense, Inc. Method and system for protection against information stealing software
US20100071054A1 (en) 2008-04-30 2010-03-18 Viasat, Inc. Network security appliance
US20100269175A1 (en) 2008-12-02 2010-10-21 Stolfo Salvatore J Methods, systems, and media for masquerade attack detection by monitoring computer user behavior
US20160065614A1 (en) 2008-12-02 2016-03-03 The Trustees Of Columbia University In The City Of New York Methods, systems, and media for masquerade attack detection by monitoring computer user behavior
US20110214182A1 (en) * 2010-02-26 2011-09-01 Mykonos Software, Inc. Methods for proactively securing a web application and apparatuses thereof
CN102254111A (en) 2010-05-17 2011-11-23 北京知道创宇信息技术有限公司 Malicious site detection method and device
WO2012011070A1 (en) 2010-07-21 2012-01-26 Seculert Ltd. Network protection system and method
US20130305357A1 (en) * 2010-11-18 2013-11-14 The Boeing Company Context Aware Network Security Monitoring for Threat Detection
US8682812B1 (en) 2010-12-23 2014-03-25 Narus, Inc. Machine learning based botnet detection using real-time extracted traffic features
US20120167208A1 (en) * 2010-12-27 2012-06-28 Avaya Inc. System and method for voip honeypot for converged voip services
CN102546621A (en) * 2010-12-27 2012-07-04 阿瓦雅公司 System and method for VOIP honeypot for converged VOIP services
US20130145465A1 (en) * 2011-12-06 2013-06-06 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Multilayered deception for intrusion detection and prevention
US20140298469A1 (en) * 2012-02-21 2014-10-02 Logos Technologies Llc System for detecting, analyzing, and controlling infiltration of computer and network systems
EP2657880A1 (en) * 2012-04-23 2013-10-30 Verint Systems Limited Systems and methods for combined physical and cyber data security
US20150033340A1 (en) * 2013-07-23 2015-01-29 Crypteia Networks S.A. Systems and methods for self-tuning network intrusion detection and prevention
US20150106889A1 (en) 2013-10-13 2015-04-16 Skycure Ltd Potential attack detection based on dummy network traffic
CN103607399A (en) 2013-11-25 2014-02-26 中国人民解放军理工大学 Special IP network safety monitor system and method based on hidden network
US20150229656A1 (en) 2014-02-11 2015-08-13 Choung-Yaw Michael Shieh Systems and methods for distributed threat detection in a computer network
EP2942919A1 (en) 2014-05-08 2015-11-11 Deutsche Telekom AG Social network honeypot
US20160197943A1 (en) * 2014-06-24 2016-07-07 Leviathan, Inc. System and Method for Profiling System Attacker
WO2016005273A1 (en) 2014-07-11 2016-01-14 Deutsche Telekom Ag Method for detecting an attack on a working environment connected to a communication network
US20160044054A1 (en) 2014-08-06 2016-02-11 Norse Corporation Network appliance for dynamic protection from risky network activities
US20160080414A1 (en) 2014-09-12 2016-03-17 Topspin Security Ltd. System and a Method for Identifying Malware Network Activity Using a Decoy Environment
US9716727B1 (en) * 2014-09-30 2017-07-25 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Generating a honey network configuration to emulate a target network environment
US20160164886A1 (en) * 2014-10-17 2016-06-09 Computer Sciences Corporation Systems and methods for threat analysis of computer data
US20160218933A1 (en) * 2015-01-27 2016-07-28 Sri International Impact analyzer for a computer network
US10050779B2 (en) 2015-05-19 2018-08-14 Coinbase, Inc. Checkout and payment
US20170134405A1 (en) * 2015-11-09 2017-05-11 Qualcomm Incorporated Dynamic Honeypot System
WO2017145001A1 (en) * 2016-02-23 2017-08-31 nChain Holdings Limited Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks & systems
US20170324773A1 (en) * 2016-05-05 2017-11-09 Javelin Networks, Inc. Creation of fictitious identities to obfuscate hacking of internal networks

Non-Patent Citations (23)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
Alese et al., "Improving deception in honeynet: Through data manipulation," The 9th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST-2014), 2014, pp. 198-204, doi: 10.1109/ICITST.2014.7038805. (Year: 2014). *
Capalik, "Next-Generation Honeynet Technology with Real-Time Forensics for U.S. Defense," MILCOM 2007—IEEE Military Communications Conference, 2007, pp. 1-7, doi: 10.1109/MILCOM.2007.4455171. (Year: 2007). *
Dagdee et al., "Intrusion Attack Pattern Analysis and Signature Extraction for Web Services Using Honeypots," India, 2008, pp. 1232-1237, doi: 10.1109/ICETET.2008.192. (Year: 2008). *
Dagdee et al., "Intrusion Attack Pattern Analysis and Signature Extraction for Web Services Using Honeypots", IEEE, doi: 10.1109/ICETET.2008.192, 2008, pp. 1232-1237. (Year: 2008). *
Fan et al., "Taxonomy of honeynet solutions," 2015 SAI Intelligent Systems Conference (IntelliSys), London, UK, 2015, pp. 1002-1009, doi: 10.1109/IntelliSys.2015.7361266. (Year: 2015). *
Fraunholz et al, "An Adaptive Honeypot Configuration, Deployment and Maintenance Strategy," arXiv:2111.03884v1, Nov. 6, 2021. (Year: 2021). *
Hassan et al., "A Probabilistic Study on the Relationship of Deceptions and Attacker Skills," 2017 IEEE 15th Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, 15th Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Orlando, FL, USA, 2017, pp. 693-698. (Year: 2017). *
Hassan et al., "A Probabilistic Study on the Relationship of Deceptions and Attacker Skills," Orlando, FL, USA, 2017, pp. 693-698, doi: 10.1109/DASC-PICom-DataCom-CyberSciTec.2017.121. (Year: 2017). *
International Search Report and Written Opinion mailed May 12, 2017, Patent Application No. PCT/IB2017/050811, filed Feb. 14, 2017, 9 pages.
Kuwatly et al., "A dynamic honeypot design for intrusion detection", IEEE, doi: 10.1109/PERSER.2004.1356776, 2004, pp. 95-104. (Year: 2004). *
Mézešová et al., "Evaluation of Attacker Skill Level for Multi-stage Attacks," 2019 11th International Conference on Electronics, Computers and Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), Pitesti, Romania, 2019, pp. 1-6, doi: 10.1109/ECAI46879.2019.9042153. (Year: 2019). *
O'Leary et al., "Development of a Honeynet Laboratory: a Case Study," Seventh ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking, and Parallel/Distributed Computing (SNPD'06), 2006, pp. 401-406, doi: 10.1109/SNPD-SAWN.2006.35. (Year: 2006). *
Paulauskas et al., "Attacker Skill Level distribution estimation in the system mean time-to-compromise," 2008 1st International Conference on Information Technology, Gdansk, Poland, 2008, pp. 1-4, doi: 10.1109/INFTECH.2008.4621683. (Year: 2008). *
Salles-Loustau et al., "Characterizing Attackers and Attacks: An Empirical Study," 2011 IEEE 17th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2011, pp. 174-183, doi: 10.1109/PRDC.2011.29. (Year: 2011). *
Tian et al., "A Study of Intrusion Signature Based on Honeypot," Dalian, China, 2005, pp. 125-129, doi: 10.1109/PDCAT.2005.51. (Year: 2005). *
Tian et al., "A Study of Intrusion Signature Based on Honeypot", IEEE, doi: 10.1109/PDCAT.2005.51, 2005, pp. 125-129. (Year: 2005). *
UK Commercial Search Report mailed Apr. 11, 2016, Patent Application No. 1603118.9, filed Feb. 23, 2016, 3 pages.
UK Commercial Search Report with Expanded Report mailed Jun. 29, 2016, Patent Application No. 1603118.9, filed Feb. 23, 2016, 5 pages.
UK IPO Search Report mailed Oct. 4, 2016, Patent Application No. 1603118.9, filed Feb. 23, 2016, 4 pages.
Wagener et al., "Adaptive and self-configurable honeypots," 12th IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network Management (IM 2011) and Workshops, Dublin, Ireland, 2011, pp. 345-352, doi: 10.1109/INM.2011.5990710. (Year: 2011). *
Wagener et al., "Adaptive and self-configurable honeypots", IEEE, doi: 10.1109/INM.2011.5990710, 2011, pp. 345-352. (Year: 2011). *
Yang et al., "Evaluating Threat Assessment for Multi-Stage Cyber Attacks," MILCOM 2006—2006 IEEE Military Communications conference, Washington, DC, USA, 2006, pp. 1-7, doi: 10.1109/MILCOM.2006.302216. (Year: 2006). *
Zhang et al., "An Adaptive Honeypot Deployment Algorithm Based on Learning Automata," 2017 IEEE Second International Conference on Data Science in Cyberspace (DSC), Shenzhen, China, 2017, pp. 521-527, doi: 10.1109/DSC.2017.52. (Year: 2017). *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN114500080A (en) 2022-05-13
EP3420697A1 (en) 2019-01-02
EP4156605A1 (en) 2023-03-29
JP2021114332A (en) 2021-08-05
JP7167240B6 (en) 2022-11-28
US20250159020A1 (en) 2025-05-15
EP3771173B1 (en) 2022-10-19
KR102749595B1 (en) 2025-01-02
EP3771173A1 (en) 2021-01-27
ZA201805018B (en) 2023-09-27
WO2017145001A1 (en) 2017-08-31
GB201603118D0 (en) 2016-04-06
GB2561468A (en) 2018-10-17
GB201806691D0 (en) 2018-06-06
CN109314698B (en) 2022-03-08
US20200366714A1 (en) 2020-11-19
CN109314698A (en) 2019-02-05
KR20250006346A (en) 2025-01-10
ZA202100289B (en) 2023-09-27
EP4156605B1 (en) 2025-01-15
JP2019512761A (en) 2019-05-16
JP7167240B2 (en) 2022-11-08
EP3420697B1 (en) 2020-10-14
US20190058733A1 (en) 2019-02-21
GB2561468B (en) 2021-09-29
JP6878445B2 (en) 2021-05-26
US10735466B2 (en) 2020-08-04
KR20180115726A (en) 2018-10-23

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US12328339B2 (en) Reactive and pre-emptive security system for the protection of computer networks and systems
US11601400B2 (en) Aggregating alerts of malicious events for computer security
US10726125B2 (en) Malware detection using clustering with malware source information
US9749336B1 (en) Malware domain detection using passive DNS
Modi et al. A survey of intrusion detection techniques in cloud
US9467421B2 (en) Using DNS communications to filter domain names
US12506777B2 (en) Anti-phishing security
CN118901223A (en) A deep learning pipeline for detecting malicious command and control traffic
Nathiya et al. An effective hybrid intrusion detection system for use in security monitoring in the virtual network layer of cloud computing technology
CN115277173B (en) Network security monitoring management system and method
US20240414129A1 (en) Automated fuzzy hash based signature collecting system for malware detection
US20250358300A1 (en) Ml based domain risk scoring and its applications to advanced url filtering
US12255908B2 (en) Polymorphic non-attributable website monitor
Panimalar et al. A review on taxonomy of botnet detection
Sharma et al. Intrusion detection system using shadow honeypot

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: NCHAIN HOLDINGS LTD, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:WRIGHT, CRAIG;SAVANAH, STEPHANE;SIGNING DATES FROM 20170904 TO 20170925;REEL/FRAME:053385/0500

FEPP Fee payment procedure

Free format text: ENTITY STATUS SET TO UNDISCOUNTED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: BIG.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NON FINAL ACTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: RESPONSE TO NON-FINAL OFFICE ACTION ENTERED AND FORWARDED TO EXAMINER

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: FINAL REJECTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: ADVISORY ACTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NON FINAL ACTION MAILED

AS Assignment

Owner name: NCHAIN LICENSING AG, SWITZERLAND

Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:NCHAIN HOLDINGS LTD;REEL/FRAME:063117/0843

Effective date: 20201125

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: RESPONSE TO NON-FINAL OFFICE ACTION ENTERED AND FORWARDED TO EXAMINER

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: FINAL REJECTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: RESPONSE AFTER FINAL ACTION FORWARDED TO EXAMINER

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: ADVISORY ACTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NON FINAL ACTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: RESPONSE TO NON-FINAL OFFICE ACTION ENTERED AND FORWARDED TO EXAMINER

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE MAILED -- APPLICATION RECEIVED IN OFFICE OF PUBLICATIONS

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION

AS Assignment

Owner name: NCHAIN LICENSING AG, SWITZERLAND

Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:NCHAIN HOLDINGS AG;REEL/FRAME:070096/0502

Effective date: 20201125

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE MAILED -- APPLICATION RECEIVED IN OFFICE OF PUBLICATIONS

STCF Information on status: patent grant

Free format text: PATENTED CASE