US12056241B2 - Integrated static and dynamic analysis for malware detection - Google Patents
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- US12056241B2 US12056241B2 US17/646,128 US202117646128A US12056241B2 US 12056241 B2 US12056241 B2 US 12056241B2 US 202117646128 A US202117646128 A US 202117646128A US 12056241 B2 US12056241 B2 US 12056241B2
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/566—Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
- G06F21/53—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/562—Static detection
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/562—Static detection
- G06F21/565—Static detection by checking file integrity
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06N—COMPUTING ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON SPECIFIC COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
- G06N20/00—Machine learning
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06N—COMPUTING ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON SPECIFIC COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
- G06N20/00—Machine learning
- G06N20/20—Ensemble learning
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/03—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/50, monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms
- G06F2221/033—Test or assess software
Definitions
- the invention pertains to the field of computer security, in particular the analysis of untrusted files and processes for malicious behavior.
- Dynamic analysis also called “behavior analysis” focuses on how an untrusted file or process acts.
- Static analysis is concerned with what can be known about an untrusted file or process before runtime.
- Static analysis and behavior analysis are perceived as very different approaches to malware detection. This limits the effectiveness of these tools to their own strengths. Behavior analysis, for example, although effective for detecting malware at runtime, lacks the depth of static analysis when used on its own. There is a need for more effective malware analysis tools that augment the usefulness of behavior analysis and static analysis.
- Metadata from static analyzers are used during behavior analysis of an untrusted file or process.
- static Portable Executable (PE) metadata is combined with behavioral tools such as stack traces and Application Programming Interface (API) calls sequences.
- API Application Programming Interface
- the invention comprises systems and methods for detecting and classifying malware in an unknown file on a target computing system.
- a detection and classification method is executed on a processor associated with the target computing system comprising the following steps. First an unknown file is classified with a static analysis machine-learning model based on static features extracted from the file before execution. The verdict of static classification includes a rate of conformity to at least one class of files. Then the file is executed on the target computing system.
- the target file is executed in a secure environment, such as a sandbox or isolated virtual machine.
- the secure environment preferably resembles the target computing system so that results in the secure environment are generally predictive of the target computing system.
- the method continues with collecting data related to file execution on a target computing system. Dynamic features of a first and second dynamic feature sets are extracted from collected data. The file is classified with a first dynamic analysis machine-learning model based on extracted dynamic features of the first dynamic feature set. The verdict of the first dynamic classification includes a rate of conformity to at least one class of files. The file is also classified using a second dynamic analysis machine-learning model based on extracted dynamic features of the second dynamic feature set. The verdict of the second dynamic classification also includes a rate of conformity to at least one class of files.
- the file is then classified with a malware classification machine learning (“ML”) model based on the verdict of the static classification, the verdict of the first dynamic classification, and the verdict of the second dynamic classification.
- ML machine learning
- the malware classification verdict is processed by an endpoint protection agent to detect malware.
- a detection response action is performed at the endpoint protection agent to counter the malware.
- FIG. 1 shows a system configuration for creating a malware classification model in accordance with the invention.
- FIG. 2 shows a system configuration for feature extraction comprising dynamic and static analysis.
- FIGS. 3 A, 3 B, and 3 C show a timeline of steps implementing a method of malware classification in accordance with the invention.
- FIG. 4 shows a system configuration for reaching a verdict about an unknown file in accordance with the invention.
- FIG. 5 shows method steps for detecting the presence of malware in an unknown file in accordance with the invention.
- a constructed static model is supplemented with the functions of a behavioral analyzer.
- the static model is built independently of behavioral attributes and creates added helper functions that identify malicious and safe files with the required accuracy.
- the constructed dynamic model is supplemented with the features of the static analyzer model.
- the dynamic model is built as if nothing is known about the static data and the static analyzer model is built independently from the dynamic analyzer. After being created in the training process, the dynamic model is supplemented with auxiliary attributes of the static analyzer. This approach improves the accuracy of the dynamic analyzer and reduces the number of false positives.
- Static features also include strings. String features are based on plain text encoded into executables. Examples of strings found in a Microsoft Windows environment include “windows,” “getversion,” “getstartupinfo,” “getmodulefilename,” “message box,” “library,” and so on. Static features may also be extracted from .exe files. For example, data from a PE header describes the physical and logical structure of a PE binary. Dynamic features are extracted during runtime of an unknown file. Such features are generally function based, such as stack traces, API calls, instruction sets, control flow graphing, function parameter analysis, and system calls.
- a machine learning model refers to a file that has been trained to recognize patterns by being passed a training dataset and being provided an algorithm that can be used to analyze and learn from that training dataset.
- the training dataset includes labels. These labels correspond to the output of the algorithm.
- a typical model attempts to apply correct labels for the data by applying an algorithm. For example, when the training dataset comprises files to be classified, a predicted label for a given file is calculated. These calculations are then compared to the actual label for that file. The degree of error, the variation between the predicted label and the actual label, is calculated by way of another algorithm, such as a loss function. By repeated attempts (epochs) at classifying the training data, the model will iteratively improve its accuracy.
- the trained machine learning model can then be used to analyze testing data.
- Optimization in this context refers to a model that is trained to classify the test data with an acceptable level of accuracy but not overtrained to the point that the model is so sensitive to idiosyncrasies in the training dataset that testing dataset results suffer.
- Testing data refers to data that has not been seen before.
- Modules in this context refer to a file containing a set of functions, arrays, dictionaries, objects, and so on.
- Python language for example, a module is created by saving program code in a file with the extension .py.
- the results of classification by a machine learning model depend on the classification task. For example, in malware detection the task is to determine whether an unknown file is malware or not. To simplify calculations, the strings “malware” and “not malware” are converted to integers. In this context, the label “0” can be assigned to “not malware” and the label “1” can be assigned to “malware.”
- a suitable algorithm for binary classification is then chosen. Some examples of such algorithms include logistic regression, k-nearest neighbors, decision trees, support vector machines, or Bayesian networks. Alternatively, neural networks may be chosen, including neural networks configured for binary classification.
- FIG. 1 shows system 100 , which combines static and dynamic analysis models to create a malware classification model.
- Static analysis machine learning (“ML”) model 102 is linked with static analysis feature extractor 104 and static analysis ML module 106 .
- Static ML module 106 is configured to pass the results of static analysis to malware classification ML module 108 and the results are stored as malware classification ML model 110 .
- Dynamic ML model for dynamic attributes types A 112 and B 114 is linked with dynamic analysis feature extractor 116 and dynamic analysis ML module 118 .
- Type A and type B dynamic attributes can be divided in several ways. For example, type A dynamic attributes can be stack traces and type B dynamic attributes can be API calls sequences.
- type A dynamic attributes can be related to operations with files and type B dynamic attributes can be operations with a register or network.
- type A dynamic attributes can be related to file modifications and type B to reading files.
- Dynamic analysis ML module 118 is configured to pass the results of dynamic analysis to malware classification module 108 .
- This malware classification module 108 is configured to be saved as malware classification machine learning model 110 .
- system 200 is directed to analysis of unknown file 202 in storage medium 204 .
- Static feature extractor 206 extracts features 1 to N ( 208 , 210 , 212 , 214 , 216 , and 218 ).
- Unknown file 202 is also loaded into computer memory 205 and executed by way of application 220 .
- System events from application 220 are recorded by system events collection module 222 .
- Dynamic feature extractor 224 identifies dynamic features N+1, N+2, N+3, . . . N+M ( 226 , 228 , 230 , 232 , 234 , 236 ).
- These dynamic features are grouped into categories, for example Type A 238 , Type B 240 , and Type C 242 .
- the dynamic feature categories are of multiple types. For example, two, three, or more types are used. In FIG. 2 , three types are shown as examples. These types are chosen from function-based features, such as stack traces, API calls, and system calls.
- FIGS. 3 A, 3 B, and 3 C show method 300 and its steps performed over some time, T.
- FIG. 3 A shows a first timeline A ( 301 ) where static features of files are extracted from a malware sample files collection at step 302 . Then static features are extracted from a collection of trusted files as step 304 . The features extracted at steps 302 and 304 are used at step 306 to train and save a static analysis machine learning model.
- FIG. 3 B continues the timeline of FIG. 3 A from point A ( 301 ) to point B ( 303 ).
- a file sample is loaded for analysis at step 310 .
- static features from the file sample are extracted at step 312 .
- a static machine learning model verdict is calculated for the extracted static features.
- a first type of dynamic feature (Type A) is extracted from the file sample at step 315 .
- the static analysis machine learning model is augmented with a dynamic machine learning model based on Type A features at step 316 .
- a second type of dynamic feature (Type B) is extracted from the same file at step 317 .
- the static analysis machine learning model is further augmented with a dynamic machine learning model based on Type B features at step 318 .
- a malware classification model is trained to classify the sample at step 320 .
- FIG. 3 C focuses on classification of an unknown file that has been received for analysis at step 330 starting from point B ( 303 ) on the timeline.
- Static features are extracted from the sample file at step 332 .
- the static machine learning model's verdict is calculated for the extracted static features at step 334 .
- Dynamic features are then extracted at step 335 while the unknown file is executed.
- the related dynamic machine learning model calculates a verdict for the extracted dynamic features at step 336 .
- the unknown file is then classified with the malware classification machine learning model at step 340 .
- FIG. 4 shows system 400 for malware classification.
- Feature set 402 comprises static features 1 -N, which are configured for passing to static analysis machine learning model 404 .
- the static analysis machine learning model 404 comprises training set data 406 and rules 408 .
- static analysis machine learning model 404 outputs a verdict 410 based on static features.
- This verdict 410 is configured to be passed to malware classification model 412 comprising rules 414 and training dataset 416 .
- Malware classification machine learning model 412 also receives verdicts from dynamic analysis of the given file.
- Feature set (Type A) 420 comprises features of a first type. These features are configured for passing to a Type A dynamic analysis machine learning model 422 .
- the Type A dynamic analysis machine learning model 422 comprises a training dataset 424 and rules 426 .
- machine learning model 422 outputs a verdict 428 based on Type A features.
- a second feature set (Type B) 430 comprises features of a second type. These features are configured for passing to a Type B dynamic analysis machine learning model 432 .
- the Type B dynamic analysis machine learning model 432 comprises a training dataset 434 and rules 436 .
- machine learning model 432 outputs a verdict 438 based on Type B features.
- malware classification model 412 is configured to classify the file and pass this classification 440 to a verification and supervising process 442 .
- This process 442 is configured to output a final verdict 444 with respect to the file.
- the final verdict 444 for the unknown file is then added as a training data set that can be used to update and correct loss in malware classification model 412 .
- FIG. 5 shows method 500 , which starts at step 502 with classifying an unknown file with a static analysis machine learning model based on static features extracted from the file before execution.
- the verdict of static analysis classification includes a rate of conformity to at least one class of files.
- the unknown file is executed (run) on the target computing system.
- Systems events and attributes related to file execution on a target computing system are collected at step 506 .
- the method continues with extracting dynamic features of a first dynamic feature set during execution of the file at step 508 and classifying the file with a first dynamic analysis machine learning model based on extracted dynamic features of the first dynamic feature set at step 510 .
- the verdict at step 510 includes a rate of conformity to at least one class of files.
- step 512 dynamic features of a second dynamic feature set are extracted during execution of the file. Then at step 514 the file is classified with a second dynamic analysis machine learning model based on extracted dynamic features of the second dynamic feature set.
- the verdict at step 514 includes a rate of conformity to at least one class of files.
- the file is classified with a malware classification machine learning model based on a verdict of static analysis and a verdict of at least one dynamic analysis.
- the result of step 516 is passed to an endpoint protection agent for processing a malware classification verdict at step 518 .
- a classification is reached at step 520 that determines whether the file is malware or not. If not, the method loops back to step 508 or 512 , respectively, and repeats the steps from 508 to 520 or 512 to 520 , respectively. If malware is detected at step 520 , then a detection response action is performed at step 522 to counter the malware.
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| US12229261B1 (en) * | 2024-05-03 | 2025-02-18 | Halcyon Tech, Inc. | Antiransomware file analysis and scoring |
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| US12518012B2 (en) * | 2023-10-19 | 2026-01-06 | Google Llc | Structure-aware neural networks for malware detection |
| CN117521068B (en) * | 2023-12-08 | 2024-07-26 | 北京云弈科技有限公司 | Linux host malicious software detection method, system, device and medium |
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