US11275817B2 - System lockdown and data protection - Google Patents
System lockdown and data protection Download PDFInfo
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- US11275817B2 US11275817B2 US16/582,788 US201916582788A US11275817B2 US 11275817 B2 US11275817 B2 US 11275817B2 US 201916582788 A US201916582788 A US 201916582788A US 11275817 B2 US11275817 B2 US 11275817B2
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- information handling
- handling system
- cryptoprocessor
- lockdown
- storage location
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/12—Protecting executable software
- G06F21/121—Restricting unauthorised execution of programs
- G06F21/123—Restricting unauthorised execution of programs by using dedicated hardware, e.g. dongles, smart cards, cryptographic processors, global positioning systems [GPS] devices
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/14—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in operation
- G06F11/1402—Saving, restoring, recovering or retrying
- G06F11/1415—Saving, restoring, recovering or retrying at system level
- G06F11/1441—Resetting or repowering
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/575—Secure boot
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/74—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2143—Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
Definitions
- the present disclosure relates in general to information handling systems, and more particularly to locking down such systems and protecting their data.
- An information handling system generally processes, compiles, stores, and/or communicates information or data for business, personal, or other purposes thereby allowing users to take advantage of the value of the information.
- information handling systems may also vary regarding what information is handled, how the information is handled, how much information is processed, stored, or communicated, and how quickly and efficiently the information may be processed, stored, or communicated.
- the variations in information handling systems allow for information handling systems to be general or configured for a specific user or specific use such as financial transaction processing, airline reservations, enterprise data storage, or global communications.
- information handling systems may include a variety of hardware and software components that may be configured to process, store, and communicate information and may include one or more computer systems, data storage systems, and networking systems.
- Some organizations e.g., government and military agencies, etc.
- One example is a situation in which military personnel may be in a combat scenario that requires them to evacuate their posts immediately, with no time for the user to take actions to protect the data. This leaves information handling systems and their data at risk to be captured by their enemies.
- the military has traditionally used several methods to destroy data on a system, including physical damage, manual deletion processes, and removal of physical storage resources. These manual processes are time-consuming, and they grow in complexity with larger deployments, such as server/storage solutions in the field. Each of these processes adds risk in terms of both data breach and the lives of the military personnel trying to secure the data. As another example, a virus attack on a server or datacenter might require an immediate lockdown of one or more information handling systems to prevent further damage or loss of data.
- an information handling system may include a processor, and a cryptoprocessor comprising at least one storage location.
- the information handling system may be configured to: store, in the at least one storage location, cryptographic data regarding secure boot of the information handling system; receive an indication that a lockdown is to be initiated; in response to the indication, overwrite the at least one storage location with invalid data; and initiate the lockdown by triggering a reboot of the information handling system.
- a method may include: an information handling system comprising a cryptoprocessor storing, in at least one storage location of the cryptoprocessor, cryptographic data regarding secure boot of the information handling system; the information handling system receiving an indication that a lockdown is to be initiated; in response to the indication, the information handling system overwriting the at least one storage location with invalid data; and the information handling system initiating the lockdown by triggering a reboot of the information handling system.
- an article of manufacture may include a non-transitory, computer-readable medium having computer-executable code thereon that is executable by a processor of an information handling system for: storing, in at least one storage location of a cryptoprocessor of the information handling system, cryptographic data regarding secure boot of the information handling system; receiving an indication that a lockdown is to be initiated; in response to the indication, overwriting the at least one storage location with invalid data; and initiating the lockdown by triggering a reboot of the information handling system.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of an example information handling system, in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure
- FIG. 2 illustrates an example flow diagram of a method in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure
- FIG. 3 illustrates an example flow diagram of a method in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.
- FIGS. 1 through 3 wherein like numbers are used to indicate like and corresponding parts.
- an information handling system may include any instrumentality or aggregate of instrumentalities operable to compute, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate, switch, store, display, manifest, detect, record, reproduce, handle, or utilize any form of information, intelligence, or data for business, scientific, control, entertainment, or other purposes.
- an information handling system may be a personal computer, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a consumer electronic device, a network storage device, or any other suitable device and may vary in size, shape, performance, functionality, and price.
- the information handling system may include memory, one or more processing resources such as a central processing unit (“CPU”) or hardware or software control logic.
- Additional components of the information handling system may include one or more storage devices, one or more communications ports for communicating with external devices as well as various input/output (“I/O”) devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse, and a video display.
- the information handling system may also include one or more buses operable to transmit communication between the various hardware components.
- Coupleable When two or more elements are referred to as “coupleable” to one another, such term indicates that they are capable of being coupled together.
- Computer-readable medium may include any instrumentality or aggregation of instrumentalities that may retain data and/or instructions for a period of time.
- Computer-readable media may include, without limitation, storage media such as a direct access storage device (e.g., a hard disk drive or floppy disk), a sequential access storage device (e.g., a tape disk drive), compact disk, CD-ROM, DVD, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), and/or flash memory; communications media such as wires, optical fibers, microwaves, radio waves, and other electromagnetic and/or optical carriers; and/or any combination of the foregoing.
- storage media such as a direct access storage device (e.g., a hard disk drive or floppy disk), a sequential access storage device (e.g., a tape disk drive), compact disk, CD-ROM, DVD, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (
- information handling resource may broadly refer to any component system, device, or apparatus of an information handling system, including without limitation processors, service processors, basic input/output systems, buses, memories, I/O devices and/or interfaces, storage resources, network interfaces, motherboards, and/or any other components and/or elements of an information handling system.
- management controller may broadly refer to an information handling system that provides management functionality (typically out-of-band management functionality) to one or more other information handling systems.
- a management controller may be (or may be an integral part of) a service processor, a baseboard management controller (BMC), a chassis management controller (CMC), or a remote access controller (e.g., a Dell Remote Access Controller (DRAC) or Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC)).
- BMC baseboard management controller
- CMC chassis management controller
- remote access controller e.g., a Dell Remote Access Controller (DRAC) or Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC)
- FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of an example information handling system 102 , in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.
- information handling system 102 may comprise a server chassis configured to house a plurality of servers or “blades.”
- information handling system 102 may comprise a personal computer (e.g., a desktop computer, laptop computer, mobile computer, and/or notebook computer).
- information handling system 102 may comprise a storage enclosure configured to house a plurality of physical disk drives and/or other computer-readable media for storing data (which may generally be referred to as “physical storage resources”). As shown in FIG.
- information handling system 102 may comprise a processor 103 , a memory 104 communicatively coupled to processor 103 , a BIOS 105 (e.g., a UEFI BIOS) communicatively coupled to processor 103 , a network interface 108 communicatively coupled to processor 103 , and a management controller 112 communicatively coupled to processor 103 .
- BIOS 105 e.g., a UEFI BIOS
- network interface 108 communicatively coupled to processor 103
- management controller 112 communicatively coupled to processor 103 .
- processor 103 may comprise at least a portion of a host system 98 of information handling system 102 .
- information handling system 102 may include one or more other information handling resources.
- Processor 103 may include any system, device, or apparatus configured to interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data, and may include, without limitation, a microprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal processor (DSP), application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or any other digital or analog circuitry configured to interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data.
- processor 103 may interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data stored in memory 104 and/or another component of information handling system 102 .
- Memory 104 may be communicatively coupled to processor 103 and may include any system, device, or apparatus configured to retain program instructions and/or data for a period of time (e.g., computer-readable media).
- Memory 104 may include RAM, EEPROM, a PCMCIA card, flash memory, magnetic storage, opto-magnetic storage, or any suitable selection and/or array of volatile or non-volatile memory that retains data after power to information handling system 102 is turned off.
- memory 104 may have stored thereon an operating system (OS) 106 .
- Operating system 106 may comprise any program of executable instructions (or aggregation of programs of executable instructions) configured to manage and/or control the allocation and usage of hardware resources such as memory, processor time, disk space, and input and output devices, and provide an interface between such hardware resources and application programs hosted by operating system 106 .
- operating system 106 may include all or a portion of a network stack for network communication via a network interface (e.g., network interface 108 for communication over a data network).
- network interface e.g., network interface 108 for communication over a data network.
- Network interface 108 may comprise one or more suitable systems, apparatuses, or devices operable to serve as an interface between information handling system 102 and one or more other information handling systems via an in-band network.
- Network interface 108 may enable information handling system 102 to communicate using any suitable transmission protocol and/or standard.
- network interface 108 may comprise a network interface card, or “NIC.”
- network interface 108 may be enabled as a local area network (LAN)-on-motherboard (LOM) card.
- LAN local area network
- LOM local area network
- Management controller 112 may be configured to provide management functionality for the management of information handling system 102 . Such management may be made by management controller 112 even if information handling system 102 and/or host system 98 are powered off or powered to a standby state. Management controller 112 may include a processor 113 , memory, and a network interface 118 separate from and physically isolated from network interface 108 .
- processor 113 of management controller 112 may be communicatively coupled to processor 103 .
- Such coupling may be via a Universal Serial Bus (USB), System Management Bus (SMBus), and/or one or more other communications channels.
- USB Universal Serial Bus
- SMBs System Management Bus
- Network interface 118 may be coupled to a management network, which may be separate from and physically isolated from the data network as shown.
- Network interface 118 of management controller 112 may comprise any suitable system, apparatus, or device operable to serve as an interface between management controller 112 and one or more other information handling systems via an out-of-band management network.
- Network interface 118 may enable management controller 112 to communicate using any suitable transmission protocol and/or standard.
- network interface 118 may comprise a network interface card, or “NIC.”
- Network interface 118 may be the same type of device as network interface 108 , or in other embodiments it may be a device of a different type.
- Information handling system 102 may further include a cryptoprocessor 110 .
- cryptoprocessor 110 may be a processor that is compliant with the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specification (e.g., TPM 2.0), a successor specification, and/or any other similar specification.
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- Cryptoprocessor 110 may be communicatively coupled to processor 103 (e.g., via an Inter-Integrated Circuit or “I2C” bus or any other suitable bus).
- cryptoprocessor 110 may be configured to generate and maintain random numbers, generate and maintain encryption keys, generate and maintain hash key tables of hardware and software components associated with information handling system 102 , generate and maintain configuration parameters associated with hardware and software components of information handling system 102 , and/or perform any other cryptographic processing.
- cryptoprocessor 110 may include storage locations (e.g., registers such as platform configuration registers (PCRs) capable of storing cryptographic data usable by a secure boot process of information handling system 102 .
- storage locations e.g., registers such as platform configuration registers (PCRs) capable of storing cryptographic data usable by a secure boot process of information handling system 102 .
- PCRs platform configuration registers
- FIG. 1 such storage locations are shown as PCR 111 .
- data in PCR 111 may be used for verification purposes in allowing decryption of encrypted storage resources of information handling system (e.g., storage resources encrypted with BitLocker® or another encryption scheme).
- information handling system e.g., storage resources encrypted with BitLocker® or another encryption scheme.
- an encryption scheme may provide integrity protection for a secure boot process by using measurements of such PCRs.
- any unauthorized firmware, application, or bootloader may be prevented from running and acquiring a decryption key, because the PCR values will not match their expected values.
- PCRs may hold measurements of various aspects of system configuration to ensure that the system hardware, firmware, and/or software has not been tampered with.
- These PCR values can be used by the operating system in various data encryption scenarios, which may lock down the data on reboot (when PCR values are typically re-measured and populated), if the PCR values have changed. In such situations, a recovery key may be required to access the encrypted data.
- embodiments of this disclosure may be operable to initiate a lockdown of an information handling system and its data by intentionally overwriting the PCR values with invalid data (e.g., randomly generated values or other values). For example, as discussed in more detail below, a user may trigger a lockdown via one of several methods, and the system may then overwrite the PCR values and reboot. Upon a subsequent boot, the PCR values may be measured and found to be incorrect. Thus the decryption keys will not be released, and the data stored in the system will remain secure.
- invalid data e.g., randomly generated values or other values
- an information handling system is powered on.
- a user inserts an authentication information handling resource such as a smartcard in order to log in.
- an authentication information handling resource such as a smartcard
- different types of authentication information handling resources may be used, such as a fob or other proximity device, etc.
- step 206 If the user's smartcard is authenticated at step 206 , a normal boot and login procedure is carried out at step 208 , and the method ends.
- an interrupt e.g., a system management interrupt (SMI) such as a soft SMI
- SMI system management interrupt
- An indication may be stored, for example by setting a flag bit, to indicate that authentication has failed. This indication may be used to trigger a lockdown procedure.
- the lockdown procedure may “scramble” the PCR data present in a cryptoprocessor of the information handling system.
- the lockdown procedure may also initiate a reboot of the information handling system.
- the scrambled PCR data may prevent access to encrypted data in one or more storage resources of the system.
- the lockdown procedure may, in various embodiments, include overwriting one or more PCR registers and then rebooting. In other embodiments, the lockdown procedure may include rebooting, and then (e.g., based on a flag bit being set) overwriting the one or more PCR registers.
- any suitable storage location of the cryptoprocessor that is operable to store data for secure boot and/or data encryption purposes may be used for the lockdown procedures discussed herein.
- Such storage location may be internal to the cryptoprocessor, or it may be external.
- one or more of the PCRs such as PCRs 0-7 may be used.
- Method 200 further includes steps for secure log-off procedure.
- a user log-off sequence begins.
- the user may (for example, in response to a request from the information handling system) insert a smartcard or other authentication information handling resource.
- a normal log-off may proceed at step 226 , and the method may end.
- step 210 If, on the other hand, authentication fails, then the method may proceed to step 210 , and a lockdown may ensue.
- step 210 may be initiated by an unexpected removal of the smartcard.
- a normal log-off procedure may include the user inputting some credentials prior to removal of the smartcard.
- an unexpected removal of the smartcard e.g., a removal that is not accompanied by inputting such credentials
- a lockdown may be initiated by other means besides the use of a smartcard.
- a lockdown command or function may be invoked by a user.
- a specific keypress or combination of keypresses may initiate the lockdown.
- different trigger events may occur.
- Method 300 may be used to trigger a lockdown of an information handling system, for example, when a logged-in user is under duress.
- a triggering event for a lockdown may occur as discussed above. For example, an unexpected smartcard removal may occur, and an SMI may be triggered.
- the BIOS of the information handling system as well as a management controller may receive notification of the triggering event.
- a power event may be issued to cause the information handling system to reboot.
- the management controller may notify additional information handling systems (e.g., related systems on the same management network) that they should also initiate a lockdown.
- the management controller may be a chassis management controller that initiates a lockdown for all systems within its chassis.
- the management controller may communicate with other management controllers of other designated systems to indicate that they should initiate a lockdown.
- the BIOS of the information handling system initiates a PCR scramble, overwriting the data in one or more PCRs with invalid data.
- the invalid data stored in the PCRs renders any encrypted data inaccessible.
- the system waits for a user to input a recovery key. If no such key is input, the data remains encrypted and inaccessible at step 314 , and the method ends. If, however, a recovery key is used, then the cryptoprocessor of the information handling system may allow for data recovery at step 316 .
- FIGS. 2-3 disclose a particular number of steps to be taken with respect to the disclosed methods, the methods may be executed with greater or fewer steps than those depicted.
- the methods may be implemented using any of the various components disclosed herein (such as the components of FIG. 1 ), and/or any other system operable to implement the methods.
- references in the appended claims to an apparatus or system or a component of an apparatus or system being adapted to, arranged to, capable of, configured to, enabled to, operable to, or operative to perform a particular function encompasses that apparatus, system, or component, whether or not it or that particular function is activated, turned on, or unlocked, as long as that apparatus, system, or component is so adapted, arranged, capable, configured, enabled, operable, or operative.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (20)
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| US16/582,788 US11275817B2 (en) | 2019-09-25 | 2019-09-25 | System lockdown and data protection |
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| US16/582,788 US11275817B2 (en) | 2019-09-25 | 2019-09-25 | System lockdown and data protection |
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| US20210089633A1 US20210089633A1 (en) | 2021-03-25 |
| US11275817B2 true US11275817B2 (en) | 2022-03-15 |
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| US20210089633A1 (en) | 2021-03-25 |
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