TWI434588B - A gsm roaming authentication method - Google Patents

Description

GSM roaming authentication method

The invention relates to a GSM communication authentication method, in particular to a GSM roaming authentication method for an open channel.

Since the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) adopts mechanisms such as digital modulation, identity authentication and message encryption, it has high confidentiality, increased system service capacity, and can be transmitted compared to a communication system using analog modulation. Data and other advantages, therefore, have been widely used in Europe and other parts of the world.

Please refer to FIG. 1 , which is a schematic diagram of a system of the conventional GSM architecture. The conventional GSM communication system 9 includes a mobile station 91 , a Visitor Location Register (VLR) 92 and a belonging. The home location register (HLR) 93 is coupled to the user terminal 91 and the home terminal 93. The transmission channel between the access terminal 92 and the home terminal 93 is assumed to be a secure channel. SC, and the home end 93 and the access end 92 are mutually trusted parties.

When the user terminal 91 requests the access terminal 92 to provide the roaming service several times, the conventional GSM roaming authentication method must be repeated, and the user 91 first requests the service terminal 92 to provide a service. The access terminal 92 An authentication data (ie, n groups {RAND, SRES, Kc}) is obtained from the home end 93, and a random number RAND is selected from the authentication data to be transmitted to the user terminal 91, and the user terminal 91 is used to use the random number. After the RAND generates an authentication signature code SRES', the authentication signature code SRES' is transmitted to the access terminal 92 for confirmation. Thereby, the access terminal 92 can authenticate the identity of the user 91 and provide the roaming service required by the legitimate user 91.

However, since the access end 92 and the home end 93 need to meet the assumption that each other is a trusted party and a secure channel, and the data between the access end 92 and the home end 93 (for example, the authentication data, etc.) is In the plaintext mode, when the data between the user terminal 91, the access terminal 92, and the home terminal 93 is transmitted through an open channel (or a public channel), the above assumptions of mutual trust and secure channel cannot be satisfied. Therefore, the conventional GSM roaming authentication method cannot be used for open channels, and the transmitted data may face threats from other communication systems, such as interference, interception, eavesdropping or fraud.

Furthermore, the conventional GSM roaming authentication method must satisfy the assumptions of mutual trust and secure channel. The above assumptions are not compatible with heterogeneous communication systems (for example, different communication systems); and the increase of communication distance will increase the data to face the above threats. Therefore, when the access terminal 92 authenticates the user terminal 91, it is only applicable to the homogenous communication system (for example, the same GSM communication system) and short-distance communication, and therefore, the heterogeneous communication system and the long distance cannot be used. Communication makes the application of the GSM roaming authentication method limited.

In addition, since the computing power of the user terminal 91 is limited, when the conventional GSM roaming authentication method is improved, the computing amount of the using terminal 91 must be reduced, and at the same time, it must be compatible with the conventional GSM communication protocol roaming authentication method. .

In summary, the conventional GSM roaming authentication method not only needs to satisfy the assumptions of mutual trust and secure channel, but also has many limitations and shortcomings in actual use. It is inconvenient and needs further improvement to improve its practicability. .

The object of the present invention is to improve the above-mentioned shortcomings, and to provide a GSM roaming authentication method, in which a shared key is jointly owned by an access terminal and a home end, and is used as a basis for data authentication of both parties, and is applicable to an open channel transmission data.

A second object of the present invention is to provide a GSM roaming authentication method, in which a shared key is jointly owned by an access terminal and a home end, and is used as a basis for data authentication of both parties, and is applicable to a heterogeneous communication system.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a GSM roaming authentication method, in which a shared key is jointly owned by an access terminal and a home end, and is used as a basis for data authentication of both parties, and is suitable for long-distance communication.

A GSM roaming authentication method includes: a requesting program, wherein a user sends an international identity code to an access terminal to request a roaming service from the access terminal; and an inquiry program is generated by the access terminal a challenge code, and transmitting the challenge code and the international identity code to a home end; in a response procedure, the home end confirms the international identity code and generates a random number, waiting for the chaotic digital and an encryption gold After generating a first signing code, a second signing code, a first communication key and a second communication key, the chaotic number, the first signing code, the second signing code, and the first communication The key and the second communication key form an authentication data, and generate a response code by using the challenge code, the authentication data and a shared key, and then transmitting the response code to the access terminal; The access terminal confirms the response code by using the shared key, and transmits the random number to the user terminal; and a first authentication procedure, the user uses the encryption key and the chaotic digital to generate a first authentication signature. Code and will be the first The authentication signature code is transmitted to the access terminal, and the first authentication signature code is confirmed by the access terminal as a basis for providing the roaming service; wherein when the user terminal requests the access terminal to provide the roaming service again, the user uses the The terminal performs the operation according to the remaining number of times by using the encryption key and the chaotic digital, and generates a second authentication signature code, and transmits the second authentication signature code to the access terminal, and the second signature code is used by the access terminal. The operation is performed according to the remaining number of times, and the second authentication signing code is confirmed as a basis for providing the roaming service again, wherein the remaining number of times is a difference between the number of operations and the number of times the user has requested to provide the roaming service.

The challenge code is a randomly generated random number, a time stamp generated over time, or a serial number sequentially generated.

The notification procedure is performed by the access end to confirm whether the challenge code in the response code corresponds to the challenge code transmitted by the access terminal.

The notification program stores the authentication data after the access terminal confirms that the challenge code is correct.

A GSM roaming authentication method includes: a requesting process, wherein a first challenge code is generated by a user, and the first challenge code and an international identity code are transmitted to an access terminal for requesting the access terminal Providing a roaming service; an inquiry process, the second challenge code is generated by the access terminal, and the first challenge code, the second challenge code, and the international identity code are transmitted to a home end; The home end confirms the international identity code, And generating a certification key and a random number, after the chaotic digital and an encryption key generate a first signature code, a second signature code, a first communication key and a second communication key, The chaotic digital, the first signing code, the second signing code, the first communication key and the second communication key form an authentication data, and the second challenge code, the authentication data, the authentication key And a shared key generates a response code, and then transmits the response code to the access terminal; a notification procedure, wherein the access terminal confirms the response code by using the shared key, and then the first challenge code and the authentication The key generates an authentication code, and the authentication code and the random number are transmitted to the use end; and a first authentication procedure, the authentication key is generated by the user end, and the authentication code is confirmed by the authentication key, And generating, by the encryption key and the chaotic digital, a first authentication signature code, and transmitting the first authentication signature code to the access terminal, and the access terminal confirms the first authentication signature code to provide roaming service. According to; where, when the user uses the access When requesting to provide the roaming service again, the user uses the encryption key and the chaotic digital to calculate according to a remaining number of times, and generates a second authentication signature code, and transmits the second authentication signature code to the access terminal. And the accessing end performs the operation according to the remaining number of times by the second signing code, and confirms the second authentication signing code as a basis for providing the roaming service again, wherein the remaining number of times is the number of operations and the used end has been The difference in the number of times a roaming service is requested.

The first challenge code is a randomly generated random number, a time stamp generated over time, or a sequence number sequentially generated.

The second challenge code is a randomly generated random number, a time stamp generated over time, or a sequence number sequentially generated.

The notification procedure is performed by the access end to confirm whether the second challenge code in the response code corresponds to the second challenge code transmitted by the access terminal.

The home end and the user end generate the authentication key by using the first challenge code and the encryption key.

The home end and the user end operate the first challenge code and the encryption key according to a hash function to generate the authentication key.

After the access terminal confirms that the challenge code is correct, the authentication data and the authentication key are stored.

The usage end performs the operation of the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a first hash function to generate the authentication signature code.

The home end generates the first signature code by computing the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a first hash function and the number of operations.

The home end generates the first communication key by computing the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a second hash function and the number of operations.

The home end generates the second signature code by computing the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a first hash function.

The home end generates the second communication key by computing the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a second hash function.

The above and other objects, features and advantages of the present invention will become more <RTIgt;

The "Mobile Station" (MS) in the GSM communication system refers to an action transceiver device (ie, a mobile phone) that can be carried by a user in the GSM communication system, and is in the technical field of the present invention. Those with ordinary knowledge can understand.

The "Visitor Location Register" (VLR) as described in the full text of the present invention refers to a visitor location temporary storage system or network that can provide usage of roaming related service content in a GSM communication system, and is a technical field to which the present invention pertains. Those with ordinary knowledge can understand.

The "Home Location Register" (HLR) described in the full text of the present invention refers to a MME communication system, which can provide a subscriber location registration system or network for registering or logging in to the relevant service content, which belongs to the present invention. Those of ordinary skill in the art will understand.

The term "coupling" as used throughout the scope of the present invention means that the data of the two devices can be transmitted to each other by means of a wired entity, a wireless medium, or a combination thereof, and the technical field to which the present invention pertains. Those with ordinary knowledge can understand.

The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) as described in the full text of the present invention refers to the identity specified by the home end when the user applies for registration, and the identity of the user is recognized by the home end, which is the technical field to which the present invention pertains. Those with ordinary knowledge can understand.

The "ciphering key" as used throughout the present invention refers to a key shared by the user end and the home end for data encryption/decryption, which can be understood by those having ordinary knowledge in the technical field to which the present invention pertains.

The "sharing key" as used throughout the present invention refers to a key shared by the access end and the home end for data encryption/decryption, which can be understood by those having ordinary knowledge in the technical field to which the present invention pertains.

The "authenticating key" as used throughout the present invention refers to a key that can be generated by both the user end and the home end to authenticate the identity of the user, and is a person having ordinary knowledge in the technical field to which the present invention pertains. Can understand.

Referring to FIG. 2, it is a system diagram of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention, including a mobile station 1, a Visitor Location Register (VLR) 2, and a Home Location Register (Home Location Register, HLR) 3, the access terminal 2 is coupled to the user terminal 1 and the home terminal 3, and the configuration of the user terminal 1, the access terminal 2 and the home terminal 3 is understood by those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains. I will not repeat them.

Please refer to FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 together, which is a flowchart of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention and a data diagram of the first embodiment, including a request procedure S1, an inquiry procedure S2, a response procedure S3, and a notification. The program S4, a first authentication program S5, and a re-authentication program S6. among them:

The requesting program S1 transmits an international identity code (IMSI) to the access terminal 2 by the user terminal 1 to request the access terminal 2 to provide the roaming service, and then performs the inquiry procedure S2. In detail, since the user 1 is applying for registration, the international identity code is simultaneously stored in the user terminal 1 and the home terminal 3, for example, 466-920-xxxxxxxxx (15 yards), therefore, when the user terminal When the user 1 moves to the communication range of the access terminal 2, the user terminal 1 can request the roaming service to be provided to the access terminal 2. In this case, since the access terminal 2 does not have the information for authenticating the user terminal 1, The access terminal 2 cannot confirm whether the identity of the user terminal 1 is legal, but obtains information about the user terminal 1 from the home terminal 3 to authenticate the identity of the user terminal 1, and confirms that the user terminal 1 is a legal identity. After that, the access terminal 2 can provide the roaming service content required by the user terminal 1.

The inquiry program S2 generates a challenge code from the access terminal 2, and transmits the challenge code and the international identity code to the home terminal 3, and then performs the response procedure S3. The inquiry program S2 is sequentially performed by the access terminal 2 in a step S21 and a step S22.

In step S21, the international identity code is received by the access terminal 2 and the challenge code is generated. In detail, when the access terminal 2 receives the international identity code, it knows that the user 1 requests the access terminal 2 to provide the roaming service. At this time, the access terminal 2 will store the international identity code and The home terminal 3 obtains information about the authentication of the user terminal 1. Therefore, in order to ensure the validity of the data obtained by the home terminal 3, the access terminal 2 will generate the challenge code and store it. The challenge code is random. Values that are generated, non-repeatable, and single-use, such as randomly generated random numbers, time stamps generated over time, or serial numbers generated sequentially.

In step S22, the challenge code and the international identity code are transmitted by the access terminal 2 to the home terminal 3. In detail, since the user 1 and the home 3 have the international identity code at the same time, the home terminal 3 can obtain the information about authenticating the user terminal 1 by virtue of the international identity code, and the challenge is Whether the code or the corresponding value of the challenge code is correctly transmitted back by the home terminal 3 ensures the validity of the data of the user terminal 1.

The response procedure S3 confirms the international identity code by the home terminal 3, and generates a random number, and the first signature code, a second signature code, and a first communication are generated by the random number and an encryption key. After the key and the second communication key, the random number, the first signing code, the second signing code, the first communication key and the second communication key form an authentication data, and the challenge is The code, the authentication data and a shared key generate a response code, and the response code is transmitted to the access terminal 2. Thereafter, the notification program S4 is performed. The response procedure S3 is performed by the home terminal 3 in sequence with a step S31, a step S32, a step S33, a step S34, a step S35, a step S36 and a step S37.

In step S31, the international identity code is received by the home terminal 3, and it is confirmed whether the international identity code is correct. In detail, since the home terminal 3 and the user terminal 1 share the same international identity code, the home terminal 3 can compare the stored international identity code with the international identity code received from the access terminal 2. If the result of the comparison is correct (ie, the two are the same), then step S32 is continued, otherwise, the subsequent steps are stopped.

In step S32, the chaotic number is generated by the home terminal 3, wherein the chaotic number is a value that is randomly generated, non-repeatable, and single-use.

In step S33, the first signing code and the second signing code are generated by the home terminal 3 by using the random number and an encryption key. In detail, the encryption key is stored in the local terminal 3 and the user terminal 1 in advance, and the home terminal 3 can be operated by the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a first hash function and a number of operations. The first signing code is used to identify the identity of the user terminal 1. The operation method of the first signature code is as shown in the following formula (1):

s _m = H ^m ( K ₃₁ , r ₀ ) (1)

Where s _{m is} the first signing code; K _{31 is} the encryption key shared by the home end 3 and the user end 1; r _{0 is} the chaotic number; H is a one-way hash function (ie, the first hash function) For example: A3 one-way hash function, etc.; m is the number of operations, for example: 10, that is, the number of times of repeated operations.

Moreover, the home end 3 can be operated by the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to the first hash function, and the second signature code is generated to identify the identity of the user terminal 1. The operation method of the second signature code is as shown in the following formula (2):

s ₀ = H ( K ₃₁ , r ₀ ) (2)

Where s _{0 is} the second signature code; K _{31 is} the encryption key shared by the home terminal 3 and the user terminal 1; r _{0 is} the chaotic number, and H is a one-way hash function (ie, the first hash function) .

In step S34, the first communication key is generated by the home terminal 3 by the random number and the encryption key. In detail, the home end 3 can be operated by the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a second hash function and the number of operations, and the first communication key is generated to identify the identity of the user terminal 1. The operation method of the first communication key is as follows (3):

k _m = F ^m (K ₃₁ ,r ₀ ) (3)

Where k _{m is} the first signing code; K _{31 is} the encryption key shared by the home end 3 and the user end 1; r _{0 is} the chaotic number, and F is a one-way hash function (ie, the second hash function) For example, A8 one-way hash function, etc.; m is the number of operations, for example: 10, that is, the number of times of repeated operations.

Moreover, the home end 3 can be operated by the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to the second hash function, and the second communication key is generated to identify the identity of the user terminal 1. The second communication key is calculated as shown in the following equation (4):

k ₀ = F(K ₃₁ ,r ₀ ) (4)

Where k _{0 is} the second communication key; K _{31 is} the encryption key shared by the home end 3 and the user end 1; r _{0 is} the chaotic number; F is a one-way hash function (ie, the second hash function) ).

In step S35, the home end 3 composes the hash data, the first sign code, the second sign code, the first communication key and the second communication key into the authentication data. In detail, the authentication data is obtained by identifying the data of the user terminal 1 (for example, the messy number, the first signing code, the second signing code, the first communication key, and the second communication key) The composition of the identification data is as shown in the following formula (5):

B =( r ₀ , s _m , k _m , s ₀ , k ₀ ) (5)

Where B is the authentication data; r _{0 is} the chaotic number; s _{m is} the first signature; k _{m is} the first communication key; s _{0 is} the second signature; k _{0 is} the second communication Key.

In step S36, the home end 3 generates the response code by using the challenge code, the authentication data and the shared key. In detail, the data can be encrypted and decrypted by the shared key to ensure the security of the data. When the local terminal 3 transmits the data to the access terminal 2, the threat from other communication systems can be prevented, for example, interference, Intercept, eavesdropping or deception. Furthermore, the home end 3 may choose to transmit the challenge code back to the access terminal 2, or generate a corresponding value from the challenge code, for example, the corresponding value is the binary complement of the challenge code, etc., and the corresponding The value is passed back to the access terminal 2 as a mechanism for the access terminal 2 to identify the home terminal 3. In this embodiment, the challenge code is transmitted back to the access terminal 2 by the home terminal 3 as an implementation aspect. Then, the home end 3 encrypts the challenge code and the authentication data by using the shared key, and generates the response code, wherein the response code is generated in the manner that the data can be encrypted by using a key. , as shown in the following formula (6):

Where C is the response code; E is an encryption function, such as a symmetric encryption algorithm such as DES or 3DES; K _{23 is} a shared key shared by the access terminal 2 and the home end 3; N is the challenge code or The corresponding value generated by the challenge code; B is the identification data.

In step S37, the response code is transmitted by the home terminal 3 to the access terminal 2. In detail, the response code is transmitted by the home terminal 3 to the access terminal 2 via an open channel.

The notification program S4 confirms the response code by the access terminal 2 with the shared key, and transmits the random number to the user terminal 1. Thereafter, the first authentication procedure S5 is performed. The notification program S4 performs a step S41, a step S42, and a step S43 in sequence from the access terminal 2.

In step S41, the response code is received by the access terminal 2, and the response code is confirmed by the shared key. In detail, since the access terminal 2 shares the shared key with the home terminal 3, the access terminal 2 can decrypt the response code by the shared key, and the decryption mode is the encryption mode of the home end 3 Corresponding to the decryption mode, the access terminal 2 can use the data decrypted by the response code (for example, the challenge code and the authentication data) to confirm whether the response code includes the challenge code transmitted by the access terminal 2 or Corresponding value of the challenge code, that is, whether the challenge code in the response code corresponds to the challenge code transmitted by the access terminal, and if the confirmation result is “Yes”, the access terminal 2 stores the authentication data, otherwise, stops the operation. A subsequent step, thereby confirming whether the response code is transmitted back by the legitimate home terminal 3.

In step S42, the authentication data is stored by the access terminal 2. In detail, since the authentication data includes the random number, the first signing code, the second signing code, the first communication key and the second communication key, it is determined whether the identity of the user 1 is legal. Important information, therefore, the authentication data must be stored by the access terminal 2.

In step S43, the random number is transmitted to the user terminal 1 by the access terminal 2. In detail, the access terminal 2 selects the random number from the authentication data, and after the random number is recorded, it is transmitted to the user terminal 1 for whether the user 1 correctly returns the mess. The signature code corresponding to the digital is used as the basis for authenticating the user terminal 1.

The first authentication program S5 is configured to generate a first authentication signing code according to the number of operations by the user terminal 1 according to the encryption key and the chaotic number, and transmit the first authentication signing code to the access terminal 2, by the The access terminal 2 confirms the first authentication signature code as a basis for providing roaming services. The first authentication procedure S5 is performed by the user terminal 1 in a step S51 and a step S52, and the access terminal 2 performs a step S53.

In step S51, the user 1 receives the random number transmitted by the access terminal 2, and generates the first number according to the first hash function and the number of operations (for example, 10 times) by the random number and the encryption key. Certification signing code. In detail, since the user 1 and the home 3 share the encryption key, and the user 1 and the home 3 have the ability to generate the first signature, for example, using the A3 one-way hash function. The operation is repeated 10 times in an equal manner. Therefore, the user terminal 1 can be repeatedly operated by the chaotic digital and the encryption key to generate the first authentication signature code.

In step S52, the first authentication signing code is transmitted by the user terminal 1 to the access terminal 2. In detail, since the first authentication signature code is generated by the user terminal 1 in the same manner as the first signature code of the home terminal 3, the first authentication signature code is available to the access terminal 2 as The data of the user 1 is authenticated.

In step S53, the first authentication signing code is confirmed by the access terminal 2. In detail, since the access terminal 2 has previously stored the authentication data, the first signature code (ie, s _m ) can be found in the authentication data as a basis for confirming the first authentication signature code. When the authentication signing code matches the first signing code, the access terminal 2 authenticates that the user terminal 1 is classified into a legal identity, and provides the roaming service content required by the user terminal 1.

Wherein, when the user terminal 1 requests the access terminal 2 to provide the roaming service again (ie, not for the first time), the re-authentication procedure S6 is performed.

The re-authentication procedure S6 is performed by the user terminal 1 by using the encryption key and the chaotic digit according to a remaining number of times, to generate a second authentication signature code, and transmitting the second authentication signature code to the access terminal 2 The access terminal 2 performs the operation according to the remaining number of times with the second signature code, and confirms the second authentication signature code as a basis for providing the roaming service again, wherein the remaining number of times is the number of operations and the usage end 1 The difference in the number of times a roaming service has been requested. The re-authentication procedure S6 is performed by the user terminal 1 in a step S61 and a step S62, and the access terminal 2 performs a step S63.

The step S61 is performed by the user terminal 1 by using the encryption key and the chaotic number according to the remaining number of times, to generate a second authentication signature code, wherein the remaining number of times is the number of operations and the user 1 has requested The difference in the number of roaming services provided. In detail, since the user 1 and the home terminal 3 jointly own the encryption key, and both the user terminal 1 and the home terminal 3 have the ability to generate the second signature code, when the user terminal 1 is used again, When requesting the access terminal 2 to provide the roaming service, the user terminal 1 may perform a one-way hash function operation by the chaotic digital and the encryption key, and repeat the remaining number of times to generate the second authentication signature code, for example: When the number of operations is 10, when the user 1 requests the access terminal 2 to provide the second roaming service, since the access terminal 2 has provided one roaming service, the remaining number of times is 9 times. Therefore, the user terminal 1 The operation must be repeated 9 times with the encryption key and the chaotic number to generate the second authentication signature code. And so on, when the user 1 requests the access terminal 2 to provide the roaming service 3, 4, ... times, since the access terminal 2 has provided 2, 3, ... roaming services, the use End 1 must repeat the operation 8, 7 times, with the encryption key and the chaotic number.

In step S62, the second authentication signature code is transmitted to the access terminal 2 by the user terminal 1. In detail, since the second authentication signature code is generated by the user terminal 1 in the same manner as the second signature code of the home terminal 3, the second authentication signature code is available to the access terminal 2 as The data of the user 1 is authenticated again.

In step S63, the access terminal 2 performs the operation according to the remaining number of times with the second signature code, and confirms the second authentication signature code. In detail, since the access terminal 2 has previously stored the authentication data, the access terminal 2 can find the chaotic digital data from the authentication data, perform a one-way hash function operation by the chaotic digital and the encryption key, and Overwriting the remaining number of times, and generating a re-authentication confirmation code, the value of the re-authentication confirmation code should be the same as the value of the second authentication-signature code, and therefore, the re-authentication confirmation code can be used to confirm whether the second authentication-signed code is correct. If the confirmation result is correct, the access terminal 2 will again provide the roaming service content required by the user terminal 1.

In summary, the first embodiment of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention can provide a one-way authentication method, and the shared terminal is jointly owned by the access terminal 2 and the home end 3 as the basis for data authentication of both parties. It can transmit data in the case of open channels, heterogeneous communication systems and long-distance communication, and ensure the security of data and avoid data interference, interception, eavesdropping or deception.

Moreover, by using the backward hash chain operation of the one-way hash function, when the user terminal 1 requests the roaming service again to the access terminal 2, the access terminal 2 can directly generate the data for verifying the identity of the user terminal 1, and The data of the authentication identity needs to be obtained again from the home end 3, the data transmission amount between the home end 3 and the access terminal 2 can be reduced, and the computing load of the home end 3 can be reduced, and the data can be reduced when the data is transmitted. Improve data security by being interrupted, intercepted, eavesdropped, or deceived.

Please refer to FIG. 3 and FIG. 5 , which are a flowchart of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention and a data schematic diagram of the second embodiment. The second embodiment of the present invention provides a two-way authentication method, including a request procedure S1 ′. An inquiry program S2', a response program S3', a notification program S4', a first authentication program S5', and a re-authentication program S6'. among them:

The requesting program S1' includes a step S11' and a step S12'. The first challenge code is generated by the user terminal 1, and the first challenge code and an international identity code are transmitted to the access terminal 2, Requesting to provide the roaming service to the access terminal 2, wherein the function of the first challenge code is to verify the identity of the access terminal 2; the first challenge code is generated in substantially the same manner as the challenge code of the first embodiment, where I will not repeat them.

The inquiry program S2' includes a step S21' and a step S22'. Receiving and storing the first challenge code and the international identity code by the access terminal 2, and generating a second challenge code, and transmitting the first challenge code, the second challenge code, and the international identity code to a local end 3, wherein the second challenge code is substantially the same as the function and the generation manner of the challenge code of the first embodiment, and details are not described herein.

The response program S3' includes a step S31', a step S32', a step S33', a step S34', a step S35', a step S36', a step S37' and a step S38', from the home end 3 confirming the international identity code, and generating a certification key and a random number, to generate a first signature code, a second signature code, a first communication key and a first number from the chaotic digital and an encryption key After the second communication key, the first signing code, the second signing code, the first communication key and the second communication key form an authentication data, and the second challenge code, the authentication data, the The authentication key and a shared key generate a response code, and the response code is transmitted to the access terminal 2. The calculation method of the authentication key is as shown in the following formula (7):

K _auth = F(K ₃₁ ,N ₁ ) (7)

Where K _{auth is} the authentication key; K _{31 is} the encryption key shared by the home end 3 and the user end 1; N _{1 is} the first challenge code; F is a hash function, preferably a one-way hash function For example: A8 one-way hash function, etc. In addition, the response code is generated as shown in the following formula (8):

C = E _{K 23} ( N ₂ , B , K _auth ) (8)

Where C is the response code; E is an encryption function, such as a symmetric encryption algorithm such as DES or 3DES; K _{23 is} a shared key shared by the access terminal 2 and the home end 3; N _{2 is} the second challenge a code or a corresponding value generated by the second challenge code; B is the authentication data; K _{auth is} the authentication key. In addition, the method for confirming the international identity code, the manner of generating the random number, the manner of generating the first and second signature codes, the manner of generating the first and second communication keys, and the manner of composition of the authentication data, The transmission mode of the response code is substantially the same as that of the first embodiment, and details are not described herein.

The notification program S4' includes a step S41', a step S42', a step S43' and a step S44'. The response terminal receives the response code, and decrypts the response code by using the shared key. Data (eg, the second challenge code or the corresponding value generated by the second challenge code, the authentication data, the authentication key) to confirm the data included in the response code and the number transmitted by the access terminal 2 Whether the second challenge code corresponds to, for example, confirming whether the second challenge code in the response code is the same as the second challenge code transmitted by the access terminal 2, and if the confirmation is correct, the access terminal 2 stores the authentication data and the authentication. Key. Then, an authentication code is generated by using the first challenge code and the authentication key, wherein the authentication code is generated by means of data encryption by a key, as shown in the following formula (9):

Where D is the authentication code; E is an encryption function, such as a symmetric encryption algorithm such as DES or 3DES; K _{auth is} the authentication key; N _{1 is} the first challenge code. Then, the access code 2 and the random number are transmitted to the user terminal 1 by the access terminal 2.

The first authentication procedure S5' includes a step S51', a step S52', a step S53', a step S54' and a step S55'. The first challenge code and the encryption key are used by the user terminal 1 according to the A hash function (for example, an A8 one-way hash function, etc.) generates the authentication key, and generates the authentication code with the authentication key to confirm whether the authentication code transmitted by the access terminal 2 is correct, and confirms the first challenge. The code is the same as the first challenge code transmitted by the user terminal 1, as the mechanism for the user terminal 1 to authenticate the access terminal 2, and then the user terminal 1 generates the encryption key and the hash number. Transmitting a first authentication signature code to the access terminal 2, and confirming, by the access terminal 2, the first authentication signature code as a basis for providing a roaming service, wherein the first authentication signature code The manner of generation and confirmation is substantially the same as that of the first embodiment, and details are not described herein.

The re-authentication program S6' performs a step S61' and a step S62' by the user terminal 1, and the access terminal 2 performs a step S63'. The user 1 performs the operation by using the encryption key and the chaotic number according to a remaining number of times, and generates a second authentication signature code, and transmits the second authentication signature code to the access terminal 2, and the access terminal 2 Calculating the second signature code according to the remaining number of times, and confirming the second authentication signature code as a basis for providing the roaming service again, wherein the second authentication signature code is generated and confirmed by the first embodiment. It is roughly the same and will not be described here.

In summary, the second embodiment of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention can provide a two-way authentication method, in which the access terminal 2 and the home terminal 3 jointly share the shared key, and can be in open channel and heterogeneous communication. Data transmission in the case of systems and long-distance communications, and to ensure the security of data, to avoid data interference, interception, eavesdropping or fraud.

Moreover, by using the backward hash chain operation of the one-way hash function, when the user terminal 1 requests the roaming service again to the access terminal 2, the access terminal 2 can directly generate the data for verifying the identity of the user terminal 1, and The data of the authentication identity needs to be obtained again from the home end 3, the data transmission amount of the access terminal 2 can be reduced, and the computing load of the local terminal 3 can be reduced, and the data security can be improved when the access terminal 2 performs data transmission. .

The main features of the GSM roaming authentication method disclosed in the present invention are as follows: The user 1 and the home end 3 jointly own the encryption key, the access terminal 2 and the home end. 3 jointly owning the shared key, the user 1 and the home 3 can generate the authentication key as a basis for data identification, and therefore, can be in an open channel, a heterogeneous communication system, and a long-distance communication. Transfer data and ensure the security of the data, to avoid data interference, interception, eavesdropping or fraud.

Furthermore, when the user 1 requests the access terminal 2 to provide the roaming service again, the user terminal 1 and the access terminal 2 can perform operations using the backward hash chain of the one-way hash function, and the user terminal 1 can generate different degrees. The authentication code is signed, and the access terminal 2 can directly generate the data for verifying the identity of the user terminal 1, and does not need to obtain the data for verifying the identity again to the home terminal 3, and can reduce the home terminal 3 and the access terminal 2 The amount of data transmission between the two further reduces the computational load and data transmission risk of the home terminal 3.

While the invention has been described in connection with the preferred embodiments described above, it is not intended to limit the scope of the invention. The technical scope of the invention is protected, and therefore the scope of the invention is defined by the scope of the appended claims.

[this invention]

1. . . Use side

2. . . Access side

3. . . Home

S1, S1’. . . Request procedure

S2, S2’. . . Inquiry procedure

S3, S3’. . . Response procedure

S4, S4’. . . Notifier

S5, S5’. . . First certification procedure

S6, S6’. . . Recertification procedure

[知知]

9. . . Conventional GSM communication system

91. . . Use side

92. . . Access side

93. . . Home

SC. . . Exit

Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the system of the conventional GSM architecture.

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the system of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention.

Figure 3 is a flow chart of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention.

Figure 4 is a diagram showing the data of the first embodiment of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention.

Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the data of the second embodiment of the GSM roaming authentication method of the present invention.

1. . . Use side

2. . . Access side

3. . . Home

S1, S1’. . . Request procedure

S2, S2’. . . Inquiry procedure

S3, S3’. . . Response procedure

S4, S4’. . . Notifier

S5, S5’. . . First certification procedure

S6, S6’. . . Recertification procedure

Claims (16)

A GSM roaming authentication method includes: a requesting program, wherein a user sends an international identity code to an access terminal to request a roaming service from the access terminal; and an inquiry program is generated by the access terminal a challenge code, and transmitting the challenge code and the international identity code to a home end; in a response procedure, the home end confirms the international identity code and generates a random number, waiting for the chaotic digital and an encryption gold After generating a first signing code, a second signing code, a first communication key and a second communication key, the chaotic number, the first signing code, the second signing code, and the first communication The key and the second communication key form an authentication data, and generate a response code by using the challenge code, the authentication data and a shared key, and then transmitting the response code to the access terminal; The access terminal confirms the response code by using the shared key, and transmits the random number to the user terminal; and a first authentication procedure, the user uses the encryption key and the chaotic digital to generate a first authentication signature. Code and will be the first The authentication signature code is transmitted to the access terminal, and the first authentication signature code is confirmed by the access terminal as a basis for providing the roaming service; wherein when the user terminal requests the access terminal to provide the roaming service again, the user uses the The terminal performs the operation according to the remaining number of times by using the encryption key and the chaotic digital, and generates a second authentication signature code, and transmits the second authentication signature code to the access terminal, and the second signature code is used by the access terminal. The operation is performed according to the remaining number of times, and the second authentication signing code is confirmed as a basis for providing the roaming service again, wherein the remaining number of times is a difference between the number of operations and the number of times the user has requested to provide the roaming service. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the challenge code is a randomly generated random number, a time stamp generated over time, or a sequence number sequentially generated. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the notification procedure is that the access terminal confirms whether the challenge code in the response code corresponds to a challenge code transmitted by the access terminal. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the notification program stores the authentication data after the access terminal confirms that the challenge code is correct. A GSM roaming authentication method includes: a requesting process, wherein a first challenge code is generated by a user, and the first challenge code and an international identity code are transmitted to an access terminal for requesting the access terminal Providing a roaming service; an inquiry process, the second challenge code is generated by the access terminal, and the first challenge code, the second challenge code, and the international identity code are transmitted to a home end; The home end confirms the international identity code, and generates a authentication key and a random number, and a first signing code, a second signing code, a first communication key, and a first signing code are generated by the chaotic digital and an encryption key. After the second communication key, the first signing code, the second signing code, the first communication key and the second communication key form an authentication data, and the second challenge code and the authentication data are used , the authentication key and a shared key Generating a response code, and transmitting the response code to the access terminal; a notification procedure, wherein the access terminal confirms the response code with the shared key, and then generates an authentication by using the first challenge code and the authentication key a code, the authentication code and the random number are transmitted to the user end; and a first authentication procedure, the authentication key is generated by the user end, and the authentication code is confirmed by the authentication key, and the encryption code is further used The key and the random number generate a first authentication signing code, and transmit the first authentication signing code to the accessing end, and the accessing end confirms the first authentication signing code as a basis for providing roaming service; wherein, when When the user terminal requests the access terminal to provide the roaming service again, the user uses the encryption key and the chaotic digital to calculate according to a remaining number of times, and generates a second authentication signing code, and the second authentication is generated. The signature code is transmitted to the access terminal, and the access terminal performs the operation according to the remaining number of times with the second signature code, and confirms the second authentication signature code as a basis for providing the roaming service again, wherein the remaining Computing the number of times a difference between the number of times to provide roaming services to the terminal has requested use. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 5, wherein the first challenge code is a randomly generated random number, a time stamp generated over time, or a sequence number sequentially generated. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 5, wherein the second challenge code is a randomly generated random number, a time stamp generated over time, or a sequence number sequentially generated. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 5, wherein the notification procedure is that the access terminal confirms the second pick in the response code. Whether the battle code corresponds to the second challenge code transmitted by the access terminal. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 5, wherein the home end and the user end generate the authentication key by using the first challenge code and the encryption key. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 5, wherein the home end and the user end operate the first challenge code and the encryption key according to a hash function to generate the authentication key. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 5, wherein the access terminal confirms that the second challenge code is correct, and stores the authentication data and the authentication key. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1 or 5, wherein the user terminal operates the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a first hash function to generate the authentication signature code. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1 or 5, wherein the attribution end generates the first signature code by calculating the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a first hash function and the number of operations. . The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1 or 5, wherein the home end generates the first communication gold by calculating the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a second hash function and the number of operations. key. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1 or 5, wherein the home end generates the second signature code by operating the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a first hash function. The GSM roaming authentication method according to claim 1 or 5, wherein the attribution end is based on the chaotic digital and the encryption key according to a second The hash function performs an operation to generate the second communication key.