NL1011790C2 - Chip card system. - Google Patents

Chip card system.

Info

Publication number
NL1011790C2
NL1011790C2 NL1011790A NL1011790A NL1011790C2 NL 1011790 C2 NL1011790 C2 NL 1011790C2 NL 1011790 A NL1011790 A NL 1011790A NL 1011790 A NL1011790 A NL 1011790A NL 1011790 C2 NL1011790 C2 NL 1011790C2
Authority
NL
Grant status
Grant
Patent type
Prior art keywords
card
cryptographic
chip card
card system
data
Prior art date
Application number
NL1011790A
Other languages
Dutch (nl)
Inventor
Frank Fransen
Original Assignee
Koninkl Kpn Nv
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Grant date

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409Card specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097Mutual authentication between card and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975Use of encryption for mutual authentication
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption

Description

-1- -1-

Chipkaartsysteem smart card system

A. ACHTERGROND VAN DE UITVINDING A. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

De uitvinding heeft betrekking op een chipkaartsysteem dat 5 gebruik maakt van een cryptografische module, Secure The present invention relates to a smart card system that makes use of 5 a cryptographic module, Secure

Application Module (SAM) genoemd, voor het accepteren van een elektronische transactie, zoals een "elektronische beurs"-betaling of een "ticketing" transactie. Application Module (SAM) mentioned, for accepting an electronic transaction, such as a "electronic purse"-payment or a "ticketing" transaction.

Bekend is dat in een cryptografische module geheime 10 cryptografische sleutels zijn opgeslagen om deze elektronische transactie te beveiligen. It is known that cryptographic keys are stored in a secret cryptographic module 10 in order to protect these electronic transaction. Een cryptografische module (SAM) kan gevoelig zijn voor aanvallen gericht op het bemachtigen van zo'n geheime cryptografische sleutel. A cryptographic module (SAM) may be vulnerable to attacks aimed at getting hold of such a secret cryptographic key. Bij zo'n aanval kan bijvoorbeeld getracht worden de 15 cryptografische module veelvuldig een cryptografische bewerking te laten uitvoeren op een bekende -bij voorkeur speciaal voor dat doel bestemde- set data met de geheime sleutel en vervolgens externe signalen -zoals de stroomafname van het systeem- te analyseren. In such an attack, for example, can be attempted, the cryptographic module 15 are frequently leave a cryptographic operation to perform in a known -preferably especially for that purpose by the secret key bestemde- set of data, and then external signals -like the current draw of the system to analyse.

20 De bekende systemen zijn met name voor de genoemde soort aanvallen vatbaar omdat (1) de mogelijkheid om de cryptografische module bewerkingen uit te laten voeren met de meest belangrijke geheime sleutel niet beperkt wordt en (2) de datasoort waarop de cryptografische bewerking 25 plaatsvindt eveneens niet beperkt is. 20 The known systems are, in particular, for the above-mentioned type attacks susceptible because (1) the possibility to carry out the cryptographic module operations, with the most important secret key is not limited, and (2) the data type to which the cryptographic operation 25 takes place is also is not limited.

B. SAMENVATTING VAN DE UITVINDING SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

De uitvinding beoogt de genoemde nadelen te ondervangen. The invention aims to obviate the said disadvantages. Daartoe voorziet de uitvinding -gebaseerd op de constatering aan het einde van de vorige paragraaf- in de 30 volgende maatregel. To this end, the invention provides -based on the observation at the end of the previous paragraph-in 30, the following measure. Door in de cryptografische module -door middel van een (finite) state machine- af te dwingen dat eerst de echtheid van de chipkaart (bijvoorbeeld kaartnummer) moet worden aangetoond, wordt de data waarop de cryptografische bewerking met de geheime sleutel 1011790 -2- plaatsvindt beperkt tot alleen data van echte chipkaarten. By enforcing in the cryptographic module -by means of a (finite) state machine that first the authenticity of the smart card (e.g., card number) shall be verified, the data on which the cryptographic operation is carried out with the secret key 1,011,790 -2- limited to data from real chip cards. Door dat te doen wordt zowel het aantal cryptografische bewerkingen beperkt tot het "normale" aantal en tevens dat alleen de "normale" datasoort kan worden gebruikt. By doing so, limiting both the number of cryptographic operations to the "normal" number and also that only the "normal" data type can be used. Met 5 andere woorden kan door de uitvinding niet langer meer, door onbeperkt experimenteren met data, de cryptografische sleutel van een SAM worden "berekend". 5 other words, by the invention are no longer, by experimenting with unlimited data, a SAM the cryptographic key "calculated".

C. FIGUURBESCHRIJVING C. DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

De werking van de uitvinding wordt aan de hand van een 10 aantal figuren nader toegelicht. The operation of the invention will be explained in more detail on the basis of a 10 number of figures.

In figuur 1 is een systeemopzet gegeven. In Figure 1, a system set-up data. Een chipkaart 1 kan worden verbonden met een terminal 2, die een "Transaction Control Application Module (TCAM) 3 en een cryptografische "Secure Application Module" (SAM) 4 omvat. 15 De SAM 4 omvat een geheime sleutel (k), om de transactie te controleren. In de SAM 4 wordt gebruik gemaakt van een "finite state machine" (FSM) voor het stapsgewijs controleren en besturen van een elektronische transactie. A chip card 1 can be connected to a terminal 2, which is a "Transaction Control Application Module (TCAM) 3, and a cryptographic" Secure Application Module "(SAM) comprises 4. 15 The SAM 4 comprises a secret key (k), to the to control transaction. In the SAM 4, use is made of a "finite state machines" (FSM) for the stepwise monitoring and controlling an electronic transaction.

De FSM volgens de uitvinding wordt getoond in figuur 2. The FSM in accordance with the invention is shown in Figure 2.

20 Het gebruik van de geheime sleutel (k) wordt volgens de uitvinding beperkt door middel van een nieuwe, initiële state in de FSM, die authenticiteitscontrole van de chipkaart afdwingt. 20 The use of the secret key (k) is, according to the invention is limited by means of a new, initial state in the FSM, which is of the chip card authenticity check commands. De methode voor het controleren van de echtheid van de chipkaart is op zich bekend als "Card 25 Authentication Method" (CAM) en maakt gebruik van 'Static Data Authentication', beschreven in de EMV'96 specificaties [EMV96]. The method for checking the authenticity of the smart card is known as "25 Card Authentication Method" (CAM) and uses "Static Data Authentication", described in the specifications EMV'96 [EMV96]. De controle van de echtheid van de chipkaart gebeurt op basis van een uniek kenmerk van de chipkaart, het kaartnummer. The verification of the authenticity of the chip card is done on the basis of a unique feature of the smart card, the card number. De controle geeft het bewijs dat een 30 chipkaart met dat kenmerk is uitgegeven door de kaartuitgever. The control gives proof that a chip card 30 with that characteristic is issued by the card issuer.

In figuur 2 is de verbeterde finite state machine van de SAM 4 weergegeven. In Figure 2, the improved finite state machine illustrated by the SAM 4. State 0 is de initiële state. State 0 is the initial state. Vanuit deze toestand zijn er twee mogelijkheden: (a) géén CAM of 1011790 -3- (b) wèl CAM. From this state, there are two possibilities: (a) no CAM or 1,011,790 -3- (b) does CAM. Als pad (a) gevolgd wordt -géén CAM- wordt het gebruik van de geheime sleutel (k) uitgesloten (disabled). If path (a) is followed -No CAM is the use of the secret key (k) excluded (disabled). Er kunnen dan alleen acties worden uitgevoerd, gedefinieerd in fsm', waarbij geen sleutel behoeft te worden gebruikt. It can then only actions will be performed, is defined in fsm ', where no key needs to be used.

5 Als pad (b) -wèl CAM- gevolgd wordt, zal de CAM worden uitgevoerd. If path 5 (b) is followed -Well CAM, the CAM will be performed. Nadat deze correct is verlopen ("kaart is OK"), wordt state 1 bereikt. After this has been carried out correctly ( "card is OK"), state 1 is reached. Op dat moment is zeker dat het een authentieke chipkaart betreft, met kaartnummer X, en mag worden vervolgd met de state machine (fsm") voor de 10 eigenlijke transactie, waarbij gebruik mag worden gemaakt van geheime sleutel k. Omdat het kaartnummer X bekend is, kan worden vastgesteld dat de cryptografische bewerking alleen op data van de chipkaart met kaart nummer X plaatsvindt. At that time, it is sure that it is an authentic smart card with card number X, and may be continued with the state machine (fsm ') for the 10 actual transaction, in which use may be made of secret key k. Because the card number X has been well known , it can be determined that the cryptographic operation takes place only on the data of the chip card with card number X.

15 D. REFERENTIES 15 D. REFERENCES

[EMV96] EMV'96 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems; [EMV96] EMV'96 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems; version 3.1.1; version 3.1.1; May 31, 1998; May 31, 1998; Europay-Mastercard-Visa. Europay-Mastercard-Visa.

1011T S 0 1011T S 0

Claims (1)

  1. 1. Systeem, omvattende een electronische kaart (1) en een cryptografische module (4), voor het accepteren van een elektronische transactie, gekenmerkt door 5 middelen (3) voor authenticatie op echtheid van de electronische kaart, voorafgaand aan genoemde electronische transactie. 1. A system, comprising an electronic card (1) and a cryptographic module (4), for accepting an electronic transaction, characterized by fifth means (3) for authenticating the authenticity of the electronic card, prior to said electronic transaction. 1011790 1011790
NL1011790A 1999-04-14 1999-04-14 Chip card system. NL1011790C2 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL1011790 1999-04-14
NL1011790A NL1011790C2 (en) 1999-04-14 1999-04-14 Chip card system.

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL1011790A NL1011790C2 (en) 1999-04-14 1999-04-14 Chip card system.
PCT/EP2000/002853 WO2000063856A1 (en) 1999-04-14 2000-03-31 Chip card system

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
NL1011790C2 true NL1011790C2 (en) 2000-10-17

Family

ID=19769008

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
NL1011790A NL1011790C2 (en) 1999-04-14 1999-04-14 Chip card system.

Country Status (2)

Country Link
NL (1) NL1011790C2 (en)
WO (1) WO2000063856A1 (en)

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0574990A2 (en) * 1992-06-17 1993-12-22 Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH Method and circuit arrangement for testing a credit card
US5528231A (en) * 1993-06-08 1996-06-18 Bull Cp8 Method for the authentication of a portable object by an offline terminal, and apparatus for implementing the process
EP0789336A2 (en) * 1996-02-10 1997-08-13 Deutsche Telekom AG Method for checking transactions with electronic wallet systems
EP0851396A1 (en) * 1996-12-23 1998-07-01 Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V. System for increasing a value of an electronic payment card
FR2759833A1 (en) * 1997-02-19 1998-08-21 Gemplus Card Int Method for protecting a mother key destiny has cards allow users authentication

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0574990A2 (en) * 1992-06-17 1993-12-22 Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH Method and circuit arrangement for testing a credit card
US5528231A (en) * 1993-06-08 1996-06-18 Bull Cp8 Method for the authentication of a portable object by an offline terminal, and apparatus for implementing the process
EP0789336A2 (en) * 1996-02-10 1997-08-13 Deutsche Telekom AG Method for checking transactions with electronic wallet systems
EP0851396A1 (en) * 1996-12-23 1998-07-01 Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V. System for increasing a value of an electronic payment card
FR2759833A1 (en) * 1997-02-19 1998-08-21 Gemplus Card Int Method for protecting a mother key destiny has cards allow users authentication

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date Type
WO2000063856A1 (en) 2000-10-26 application

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Effective date: 20031101