NL1007409C1 - Authentication System. - Google Patents

Authentication System.

Info

Publication number
NL1007409C1
NL1007409C1 NL1007409A NL1007409A NL1007409C1 NL 1007409 C1 NL1007409 C1 NL 1007409C1 NL 1007409 A NL1007409 A NL 1007409A NL 1007409 A NL1007409 A NL 1007409A NL 1007409 C1 NL1007409 C1 NL 1007409C1
Authority
NL
Grant status
Grant
Patent type
Prior art keywords
server
service
telephone
internet
mobile
Prior art date
Application number
NL1007409A
Other languages
Dutch (nl)
Inventor
Sharon Christie Lesley Prins
Original Assignee
Nederland Ptt
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Grant date

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/0853Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04Payment circuits
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409Card specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097Mutual authentication between card and transaction partners
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/42Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment
    • G06Q20/425Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment using two different networks, one for transaction and one for security confirmation
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L29/00Arrangements, apparatus, circuits or systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04L1/00 - H04L27/00 contains provisionally no documents
    • H04L29/02Communication control; Communication processing contains provisionally no documents
    • H04L29/06Communication control; Communication processing contains provisionally no documents characterised by a protocol
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or paths for security, e.g. using out of band channels
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication

Abstract

The system includes a modem telephone link for an user access to the Internet (1) using a personal computer (2). A service provider server installation (3), an authentication server (4) and a short message service server (5) are connected to the internet. The short message service server is linked to a mobile telephone system (6,7). Authentication code details are sent to the user via a separate mobile telephone unit (8).

Description

Authenticatiesysteem ACHTERGROND VAN DE UITVINDING Authentication system BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

De uitvinding heeft betrekking op een authenticatiesysteem, waarbij een gebruiker van een systeem zich authenticeert tegenover dat systeem door middel van het bij dat systeem invoeren van een 5 authenticatiecode, welke door het systeem op geldigheid wordt onderzocht. The present invention relates to an authentication system, wherein a user of a system authenticates himself in front of said system, by means of the inputting system to that of a 5-authentication code, which is examined by the system for validity.

Een dergelijk authenticatiesysteem is van algemene bekendheid. Such an authentication system is generally known. Vaak worden voor authenticatie alfanumerieke "passwords" gebruikt, die door de gebruiker worden ingetoetst. Are often used for authentication alphanumeric "passwords" which are keyed in by the user. Als een vast password wordt gebruikt, 10 heeft dat het bezwaar dat het password ontvreemd of gecopieerd en daarna misbruikt kan worden. If a fixed code is used, 10 which has the disadvantage that stolen or copied, and then the password may be abused. Om die reden bestaan er ook "one time password" (OTP) systemen, waarbij een password slechts één keer wordt gebruikt. For this reason, there are also "one-time password" (OTP) systems, in which a password is used only once.

15 SAMENVATTING VAN DE UITVINDING 15 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

De uitvinding voorziet in een OTP systeem waarbij het OTP, dat door een OTP generator gegenereerd wordt, enerzijds aan het systeem wordt overgedragen dat om athenticatie vraagt, en dat anderzijds aan de gebruiker wordt overgedragen, waarbij het OTP wordt geadresseerd aan 20 een uniek gebruikersadres. The invention provides an OTP system in which the OTP, which is generated by an OTP generator, on the one hand is transferred to the system that requires athenticatie, and in that the other part is transferred to the user, wherein the OTP is addressed to 20 has a unique user address. Uiteraard dient het overdrachtsmedium "intruder proof" te zijn. Of course, it is to be transfer medium "intruder-proof". Bij voorkeur wordt gebruik gemaakt van een strikt persoonlijke gebruikersterminal, zoals een (GSM) terminal die is voorzien van een "Security & Identification Module" (SIM). Preferably, use is made of a strictly personal user terminal, such as a (GSM) terminal, which is provided with a "Security & Identification Module" (SIM).

De uitvinding zal hierna aan de hand van een uitvoeringsvoorbeeld 25 nader worden uiteengezet. The invention will hereafter be explained in more detail put 25 on the basis of an exemplary embodiment.

UITVOERINGSVOORBEELD EMBODIMENT

Figuur 1 toont zeer schematisch een uitvoeringsvoorbeeld van de uitvinding. Figure 1 shows very diagrammatically an exemplary embodiment of the invention. Op een voor IP geschikt netwerk 1 (internet) is een 30 terminal 2 aangesloten, een server 3 en een authenticatieserver 4. Op een voor GSM geschikt netwerk 6 is een "Short Message Service" (SMS) server 5 aangesloten en een basisstation 7, die verbinding kan maken met een GSM terminal 8. Uiteraard zijn er in werkelijkheid veel meer terminals, servers etc. In an IP-capable network 1 (Internet) is a 30 terminal 2 connected to a server 3 and authentication server 4. In a GSM-capable network 6 is a "Short Message Service" (SMS) server 5 connected and a base station 7, which can connect to a GSM terminal 8. Obviously there are actually many more terminals, servers etc.

35 De werking van het authenticatiesysteem volgens de uitvinding, uitgevoerd in het in figuur 1 getoonde stelsel is als volgt. 35 The operation of the authentication system according to the invention, performed in the system shown in Figure 1 is as follows.

1007409 2 2 1007409

Een gebruiker maakt via terminal 2 en het internet 1 verbinding met server 3 om daar van een service gebruik te maken waarvoor authenticatie nodig is. A user creates via terminal 2 and the Internet 1 Connect to Server 3 to make it a service use for which authentication is required. De server 3 stuurt daartoe een HTML gecodeerd bericht naar de terminal, waarin de gebruiker verzocht wordt het 5 telefoonnummer van haar mobiele telefoon 8 in te voeren. The server 3 sends to this end a HTML-encoded message to the terminal, in which the user is requested to enter the telephone number 5 of her mobile phone 8. De server 3 verstuurt een verzoek naar authenticatieserver 4 om een (random) authenticatiecode te genereren en naar de gebruiker te doen uitzenden. The server 3 sends a request to the authentication server 4 to generate a (random) authentication code and make broadcast to the user. Daarna zendt de server 3 aan de gebruiker het verzoek om te wachten op een op haar mobiele telefoontoestel te ontvangen SMS-bericht met de 10 gevraagde authenticatiecode. Then, the server 3 sends to the user's request to wait for a to be received on her mobile phone text message 10 with the requested authentication code. Intussen wordt die code door server 4 gegenereerd en naar zowel SMS server 5 als naar server 3 verstuurd. In the meantime, which code is generated by the server 4, and sent to both SMS server 5 as to the server 3. De SMS server 5 verzendt de code, in de vorm van een SMS-bericht, naar het mobiele telefoontoestel 8, dat de ontvangen code op het beeldschermpje toont. The SMS server 5 transmits the code, in the form of an SMS message, to the mobile telephone apparatus 8, which shows the received code on the beeldschermpje. De gebruiker leest dat en geeft de code via haar 15 terminal aan de server 3 door. The user reads this and gives the code via its terminal 15 to the server 3. Deze vergelijkt de van de terminal 2 ontvangen code met de (direct) van de server 4 ontvangen code. It compares the received code of the terminal 2 to the (direct) of the server 4 received code. Bij overeenstemming wordt de door de gebruiker gevraagde service vrij gegeven. By agreement, the released service requested by the user.

Opgemerkt wordt dat de links tussen de servers 3, 4 en 5 wel veilig 20 dienen te zijn. It should be noted that the links between the servers 3, 4 and 5, it should be safe 20. Het kunnen (anders dan de figuur aangeeft) verbindingen buiten het IP net zijn of wel via het IP net gerealiseerd zijn, maar dan beveiligd, bijvoorbeeld door "firewalls" etc. Server 4 kan ook geïncorporeerd zijn in server 3, hetgeen de veiligheid eveneens verhoogt. The can (indicating other than the figure) outside of the IP network connections or have just been realized by using the IP, but then secured, for example, by "firewalls" etc. Server 4 may also be incorporated in server 3, which also increases the security .

25 In plaats van een telefoontoestel, kan ook gebruik gemaakt worden van andere soorten ontvangers, bijvoorbeeld een paging-ontvanger. 25, instead of a telephone set, of other types of receivers can also be made using, for example, a paging receiver. Dit soort ontvangers is heden ten dage echter minder "intruder-proof" dan de huidige GSM-terminals. This kind of receivers but today less "intruder-proof" than the current GSM terminals. Ook is het niet persé nodig om van een radio-ontvanger gebruik te maken: elk medium is geschikt, mits de 30 "link" van de codegenerator (authenticatieserver) naar de ontvanger bij de gebruiker voldoende veilig is. Also, it is not absolutely necessary to use a radio receiver: any medium is suitable, provided that the 30 "link" of the code generator (authentication server) to the receiver when the user is sufficiently safe. In principe kan als medium hetzelfde medium worden gebruikt als waarmee de terminal verbinding heeft met de server (3) die om authenticatie vraagt. In principle can be used the same medium as the medium and with which the terminal has connected to the server (3) that requires authentication. Als medium kan bijvoorbeeld een beveiligd virtueel kanaal of een "Virtual Private 35 Network" (VPN) worden gebruikt. The medium can be used, for example a secure virtual channel or a "Virtual Private Network 35" (VPN).

In het bovenstaande wordt voorgesteld dat de gebruiker de ontvangen authenticatiecode afleest (van het scherm van haar GSM toestel) en aan de server 3 doorgeeft door die code via haar toetsenbord over te 1007409 3 typen. In the above, it is proposed that the user is reading the received authentication code (of the screen of her cell phone), and transmits to the server 3 by which the code for 1,007,409 types 3 through its keyboard. Op zich is het natuurlijk fraaier om de op de gebruikerlocatie ontvangen authenticatiecode direct naar de server 3 te verzenden zonder die te hoeven overtypen. In itself it is of course more attractive to the authentication code on the user's location directly to send to the server 3 without having to retype it. Bijvoorbeeld zou dat kunnen door een lokale, directe dataverbinding te gebruiken tussen de GSM-ontvanger en 5 de dataterminal 2. De dataterminal kan --via een daartoe geëigend applicatieprogramma-- de ontvangen authenticatiecode inlezen en aan server 3 doorgeven. For example, it would be possible by using a local, direct data connection between the GSM receiver and 5, the data terminal 2. The data terminal can for that purpose -by way of an appropriate applicatieprogramma-- read in the received authentication code, and pass on to the third server. Ook kan de authenticatiecode-ontvanger 8 in de terminal 2 geïncorporeerd worden. Also, the authentication code receiver 8 can be incorporated in the terminal 2. Vanneer hetzelfde medium zou worden gebruikt als voor de verbinding tussen de terminal 2 en de server 3, 10 in casu het internet 1, ligt een dergelijke directe doorgifte van de lokaal ontvangen authenticatiecode nog meer voor de hand. Vanneer would be used the same medium as for the connection between the terminal 2 and the server 3, 10 in this case, the Internet 1, is such a direct transfer of the locally received authentication code even more obvious. Het proces is dan: - server 3 vraagt terminal 2 om authenticatiecode; The process is: - Server 3 requires terminal 2 to authentication code; - server 3 verzoekt server 4 om een authenticatiecode te genereren; - 3 server requests server 4 to generate an authentication code; 15 - server 4 genereert een authenticatiecode en zendt die naar server 3 en naar een gebruikersterminal: in het voorgaande dus via GSM-SMS (server 5, netwerk 6 en radioverbinding 7-8), of, als alternatief, via een "secure" verbinding via het IP netwerk 1, naar de terminal 2; 15 - server 4 generates an authentication code and sends it to the server 3, and to a user terminal: in the foregoing, it via GSM-SMS (server 5, the network 6, and radio link 7-8), or, alternatively, via a "secure" connection via the IP network 1, to the terminal 2; - de lokale gebruiker neemt de ontvangen authenticatiecode over en 20 zendt die naar server 3; - the local user, the received authentication code takes about 20 and sends it to server 3; bij een directe lokale koppeling wordt de authenticatiecode lokaal ontvangen, via GSM of via IP, en nadien door de terminal 2 naar server 3 gezonden; at a direct local link, is received, the authentication code locally, via GSM or via IP, and thereafter sent by the terminal 2 to the server 3; in dat laatste geval hoeft de gebruiker dus niets te doen; in which case the user does not do so; zelfs kan het authenticatieproces voor de gebruikere "onder water” plaatshebben. even place the authentication process for the Usage tighter "under water".

1007409 1007409

Claims (8)

  1. 1. Authenticatiesysteem, waarbij een lokale gebruiker zich tegenover een systeem authenticeert door het, via een lokale terminal (2), bij dat systeem invoeren van een authenticatiecode, die door dat systeem 5 op geldigheid wordt onderzocht, met het kenmerk dat de authenticatiecode gegenereerd wordt door een codegenerator (4), die de gegenereerde code enerzijds overgedraagt aan het systeem (3) dat om athenticatie vraagt, en anderzijds adresseert en overdraagt aan een lokale code-ontvanger (8) met een eigen ontvangstadres, waarna de 10 gebruiker de aldus ontvangen authenticatiecode aan het daarom vragende systeem (3) overdraagt. 1. Authentication system, in which a local user authenticates himself in front of a system by, entering through a local terminal (2), in that system, an authentication code, identified by the system 5 is examined for validity, characterized in that the authentication code is generated by a code generator (4), which on the one hand transmitted carrying the generated code to the system (3) that requires athenticatie, and on the other hand to address and transferring it to a local code-receiver (8) with its own reception address, and the 10 user with the thus received therefore, authentication code to the requesting system (3) transfers.
  2. 2. Authenticatiesysteem volgens conclusie 1, met het kenmerk dat de lokale code-ontvanger een lokale verbinding heeft met de genoemde lokale terminal (2). 2. The authentication system according to claim 1, characterized in that the local code receiver has a local connection to said local terminal (2).
  3. 3. Authenticatiesysteem volgens conclusie 1, met het kenmerk dat de lokale code-ontvanger deel uitmaakt van de lokale terminal (2). 3. Authentication system according to claim 1, characterized in that the local code receiver is part of the local terminal (2).
  4. 4. Authenticatiesysteem volgens conclusie 1, met het kenmerk dat voor de verbinding tussen de lokale terminal (2) 20 en de server (3) enerzijds, en de verbinding tussen de codegenerator (4) en de lokale code-ontvanger (8) anderzijds, gebruik wordt gemaakt van verschillende media (1, 6). 4. The authentication system according to claim 1, characterized in that, for the connection between the local terminal (2) 20 and the server (3) on the one hand, and the connection between the code generator (4) and the local code receiver (8) on the other hand, use is made of various media (1, 6).
  5. 5. Authenticatiesysteem volgens conclusie 1, met het kenmerk dat voor de verbinding tussen de lokale terminal (2) 25 en de server (3) enerzijds, en de verbinding tussen de codegenerator (4) en de lokale code-ontvanger (8) anderzijds, gebruik wordt gemaakt van hetzelfde, gemeenschappelijke medium, zij het van verschillende kanalen binnen datzelfde medium. 5. The authentication system according to claim 1, characterized in that, for the connection between the local terminal (2) 25 and the server (3) on the one hand, and the connection between the code generator (4) and the local code receiver (8) on the other hand, use is made of the same, common medium, be it of different channels within the same medium.
  6. 6. Authenticatiesysteem volgens conclusie 4, met het 30 kenmerk dat de lokale code-ontvanger gevormd wordt door een mobiele spraak- of dataterminal. 6. The authentication system according to claim 4, 30, characterized in that the local code receiver is formed by a mobile voice or data terminal.
  7. 7. Authenticatiesysteem volgens conclusie 6, met het kenmerk dat de lokale code-ontvanger wordt gevormd door een digitale mobiele terminal, zoals een GSM-terminal. 7. The authentication system according to claim 6, characterized in that the local code receiver is formed by a digital mobile terminal, such as a GSM-terminal.
  8. 8. Authenticatiesysteem volgens conclusie 4, met het kenmerk dat de lokale code-ontvanger wordt gevormd door een paging-terminal. 8. The authentication system according to claim 4, characterized in that the local code receiver is formed by a paging terminal. 1 0 0 7 409 1 0 0 7409
NL1007409A 1997-10-31 1997-10-31 Authentication System. NL1007409C1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL1007409 1997-10-31
NL1007409A NL1007409C1 (en) 1997-10-31 1997-10-31 Authentication System.

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL1007409A NL1007409C1 (en) 1997-10-31 1997-10-31 Authentication System.

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
NL1007409C1 true NL1007409C1 (en) 1997-11-18

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
NL1007409A NL1007409C1 (en) 1997-10-31 1997-10-31 Authentication System.

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NL (1) NL1007409C1 (en)

Cited By (18)

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WO1999023617A3 (en) * 1997-11-04 1999-07-15 Patrick Chanudet Method for transmitting data and implementing server
WO2000003316A1 (en) * 1997-05-28 2000-01-20 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) A method for securing access to a remote system
WO2000078009A2 (en) * 1999-06-16 2000-12-21 Olivier Lenoir Method and system for securely accessing a computer server
FR2795897A1 (en) * 1999-06-30 2001-01-05 Schlumberger Systems & Service Secure transaction system for Internet purchases uses link to mobile phone for confirmation of transaction payment
WO2001059569A2 (en) * 2000-02-09 2001-08-16 Apriva, Inc. Communication systems, components, and methods with programmable wireless devices
WO2001080525A1 (en) * 2000-04-14 2001-10-25 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Network access security
WO2001092999A2 (en) * 2000-05-26 2001-12-06 Citrix Systems, Inc. Secure exchange of an authentication token
WO2002011082A1 (en) * 2000-08-01 2002-02-07 Mega-Tel Ag Electronic payment transaction via sms
US6430407B1 (en) 1998-02-25 2002-08-06 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Method, apparatus, and arrangement for authenticating a user to an application in a first communications network by means of a mobile station communicating with the application through a second communications network
GB2382423A (en) * 2001-11-22 2003-05-28 Roke Manor Research An e-commerce system using SMS order confirmation
FR2835129A1 (en) * 2002-01-23 2003-07-25 Sagem Authentication Method two factors with ephemeral password Disposable
EP1361771A1 (en) * 2002-05-06 2003-11-12 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and radio communication system for transmission of user information as a service to multiple user terminals
US6928420B1 (en) * 2000-03-30 2005-08-09 Fujitsu Limited Automated transaction apparatus
US6986040B1 (en) 2000-11-03 2006-01-10 Citrix Systems, Inc. System and method of exploiting the security of a secure communication channel to secure a non-secure communication channel
US7020773B1 (en) 2000-07-17 2006-03-28 Citrix Systems, Inc. Strong mutual authentication of devices
US7283820B2 (en) * 2004-08-04 2007-10-16 Lenovo Singapore Pte. Ltd. Secure communication over a medium which includes a potentially insecure communication link
WO2008007162A1 (en) * 2006-07-11 2008-01-17 Ultra Proizvodnja Elektronskih Naprav D.O.O Customer identification and authentication procedure for online internet payments using mobile phones
US7702915B2 (en) * 2000-09-22 2010-04-20 Roke Manor Research Limited Access authentication system

Cited By (40)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2000003316A1 (en) * 1997-05-28 2000-01-20 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) A method for securing access to a remote system
WO1999023617A3 (en) * 1997-11-04 1999-07-15 Patrick Chanudet Method for transmitting data and implementing server
EP1104921A3 (en) * 1997-11-04 2001-11-14 Magicaxess Method for transmitting data and implementing server
EP1107203A3 (en) * 1997-11-04 2001-11-14 Magicaxess Method for data transmission and implementing server
EP1058872B2 (en) 1998-02-25 2011-04-06 TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (publ) Method, arrangement and apparatus for authentication through a communications network
US6430407B1 (en) 1998-02-25 2002-08-06 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Method, apparatus, and arrangement for authenticating a user to an application in a first communications network by means of a mobile station communicating with the application through a second communications network
WO2000078009A3 (en) * 1999-06-16 2001-06-28 Olivier Lenoir Method and system for securely accessing a computer server
WO2000078009A2 (en) * 1999-06-16 2000-12-21 Olivier Lenoir Method and system for securely accessing a computer server
FR2795897A1 (en) * 1999-06-30 2001-01-05 Schlumberger Systems & Service Secure transaction system for Internet purchases uses link to mobile phone for confirmation of transaction payment
US8989723B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2015-03-24 Apriva, Llc System and method for deploying a payment application on a wireless device
US9008638B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2015-04-14 Apriva, Llc System and method for deploying application program components having a service sector to wireless devices
US8295835B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2012-10-23 Apriva, Llc System and method for registration for application program deployment
WO2001059569A3 (en) * 2000-02-09 2002-07-04 Apriva Inc Communication systems, components, and methods with programmable wireless devices
US9301275B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2016-03-29 Apriva, Llc System and method for deploying application programs
US7962137B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2011-06-14 Apriva, Llc System and method for developing an application program for wireless devices
WO2001059569A2 (en) * 2000-02-09 2001-08-16 Apriva, Inc. Communication systems, components, and methods with programmable wireless devices
US7822410B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2010-10-26 Appsware Wireless, Llc System and method for deploying application program components having an application server
US7817981B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2010-10-19 Appsware Wireless, Llc System and method for deploying application programs
US7254390B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2007-08-07 Appsware Wireless, Llc System and method for deploying application programs having a browser
US7203477B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2007-04-10 Appsware Wireless, Llc System and method for deploying application programs
US7203485B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2007-04-10 Appsware Wireless, Llc System and method for deploying application program components having a service sector
US6934532B2 (en) 2000-02-09 2005-08-23 Apriva, Inc. Communication systems, components, and methods operative with programmable wireless devices
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