KR20220063591A - Publicly verifiable blockchain wallet key custody method and apparatus thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed are a blockchain wallet key storage method for verifying and managing a partial key in a public verification method so that key storage servers equal to or greater than the recovery threshold number accurately store partial keys, and a device thereof. The blockchain wallet key storage method is a publicly verifiable blockchain wallet key storage method performed by a user program loaded on a user terminal. The method includes the steps of: dividing a user encryption key by a key distribution/restoration execution unit loaded on a user program to generate a partial key with a final value; encrypting the partial key with the public key of the distributed key storage server together with the final value; and forwarding the partial key encrypted with the public key to the distributed key storage server.

Description

Method and device for storing publicly verifiable blockchain wallet keys

The present invention relates to a distributed encryption key storage technology, and more particularly, to a blockchain wallet key storage method and apparatus for verifying and managing in a public verification method so that key storage servers greater than or equal to a restoration threshold number accurately store partial keys. .

Since blockchain services have decentralized characteristics, the management of user account information, that is, user encryption keys, in blockchain-based services is entirely the responsibility of the user. On the other hand, in most cases of traditional Internet online services, online service providers support backup and restore functions of user account information, that is, encryption keys. Therefore, for the spread of blockchain-based services, the problem of encryption key custody, which provides a key backup and restore function in response to the loss of a user encryption key, is a problem that must be solved.

Currently, most of the blockchain user encryption key storage services use the secret value sharing technique to partition and distribute the encryption key. That is, by distributing partial keys to key storage service providers, leakage of user encryption keys is prevented, and when user encryption keys are lost, user encryption keys are restored through partial key information equal to or greater than the restoration threshold number.

Therefore, in the blockchain user encryption key storage service, the key storage services above the restoration threshold must store accurate partial key information. You have to go through the restoration process. This process has a large execution overhead, and also has a problem of increasing the possibility of encryption key leakage in the frequent encryption key restoration process. Moreover, it is impossible to perform intensive verification on a specific key storage service provider.

The present invention was derived to solve the above problems, and an object of the present invention is to provide a distributed key storage system that supports a method for effectively monitoring and verifying partial key storage servers.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a publicly verifiable blockchain wallet key storage method and apparatus for monitoring the validity of each partial key by using a public verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) technique.

Another object of the present invention is to verify whether the partial key information is normally stored in an individual key storage server, that is, a distributed key storage server, in order to always keep the partial keys greater than the restoration threshold number readable, and if a specific key is stored If the server does not normally store partial key information, by re-storing it in another normally operating key storage server, a method for storing publicly verifiable blockchain wallet keys that always maintains more than a certain number of partial key storage servers to operate normally; to provide the device.

A blockchain wallet key storage system according to an aspect of the present invention for solving the above technical problem includes a plurality of distributed key storage servers that operate a user program and a key storage service program. The distributed key storage server includes a storage service program that receives an encryption key storage request from a user application as a service provider, and a database that records partial keys through it. The user program is a kind of application program and includes a key distribution/restore execution unit that splits and restores an encryption key, and a monitoring/verification execution unit that performs key storage verification for the distributed key storage server.

In one embodiment, the key distribution/restoration execution unit uses a public verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) technique in an environment where a method of splitting a user encryption key through a secret key sharing technique is used to store a publicly verifiable block chain wallet key present And the monitoring/verification execution unit monitors whether a specific distributed key storage server owns a valid partial key, and when it does not possess a valid partial key, it regenerates and delivers a valid partial key to the server, or, if necessary, a partial key regeneration and service server It involves maintaining a certain level of reliability of the user encryption key storage service through reconfiguration.

In one embodiment, maintaining the reliability of the user encryption key storage service is to maintain the restoration trust level at a certain level, and when a distributed key storage server that does not maintain a valid partial key is found, the corresponding partial key is restored It involves generating and passing valid partial key information back to the distributed key storage server.

A block chain wallet key storage method according to another aspect of the present invention for solving the above technical problem is a publicly verifiable block chain wallet key storage method performed by a user program mounted on a user terminal, dividing the user encryption key by the key distribution/restoration execution unit to generate a partial key together with a confirmed value; encrypting the partial key with the public key of the distributed key storage server together with the confirmed value; and transmitting the partial key encrypted with the public key to the distributed key storage server.

In one embodiment, the blockchain wallet key storage method further comprises, after the delivering, monitoring or verifying whether the distributed key storage server owns a valid partial key.

In one embodiment, the verifying includes: transmitting a verification request to a storage service program of the distributed key storage server; receiving a first constant value randomly generated from a distributed key storage server; transmitting a second constant value randomly generated as a verification confirmation request value of the partial key to the storage service program; receiving a proof value generated using a first constant value, a second constant value, and a pre-stored partial key value from a distributed key storage server; and verifying whether the distributed key storage server stores a valid partial key by using the first constant value, the second constant value, and the proof value.

In one embodiment, the verifying whether or not includes mathematically verifying that a valid partial key is stored in the distributed key distribution server without receiving the partial key from the distributed key storage server.

A block chain wallet key storage device according to another aspect of the present invention for solving the above technical problem is a publicly verifiable block chain wallet key storage device including a user program, and executes key distribution/restoration mounted in the user program It includes a department and a monitoring/verification execution part. The monitoring/verification execution unit divides the user encryption key to generate a partial key with a fixed value, encrypts the partial key together with the fixed value with the public key of the distributed key storage server, and stores the partial key encrypted with the public key as the distributed key forward to the server. Here, the definite value is defined as bundle values for the constant a _i of each order x ⁱ in the polynomial of [Equation 1] below.

In one embodiment, the monitoring/verification execution unit generates an i-th partial key with a point (i, P(i)) on the polynomial after generating a definite value.

In one embodiment, the monitoring/verification execution unit detects or verifies whether the distributed key storage server that receives and stores the partial key possesses a valid partial key.

In one embodiment, the monitoring/verification execution unit sends a verification request to the storage service program of the distributed key storage server for verification of the valid partial key; receive a randomly generated first constant value from the distributed key storage server; passing a second constant value randomly generated as a verification confirmation request value of the partial key to the storage service program; receiving a proof value generated by using the first constant value, the second constant value, and the pre-stored partial key value from the distributed key storage server; It is verified whether the distributed key storage server stores a valid partial key using the first constant value, the second constant value, and the proof value.

In one embodiment, the monitoring/verification execution unit uses a value derived from a discrete logarithm equality equation together with a definite value in the verification process of a valid partial key.

In one embodiment, the monitoring/verification execution unit mathematically verifies that a valid partial key is stored in the distributed key distribution server without receiving the partial key from the distributed key storage server when the homogeneous discrete log equation is satisfied in the verification process do.

In one embodiment, the monitoring/verification execution unit stores information of the redistribution target server that does not store a valid partial key through the verification process.

In one embodiment, the monitoring/verification execution unit is based on the information of the distributed key storage server that does not store the valid partial key when verification of whether or not valid partial keys are stored for the number of servers less than or equal to the restoration threshold is completed. The distribution key can be redistributed.

In the case of using the above-described publicly verifiable blockchain wallet key storage method and device, in a distributed key storage system that divides a user encryption key and distributes and stores each partial key in a plurality of distributed key storage servers, an individual key storage system Whether or not the partial key information stored in ' is normal, that is, recoverable, can be publicly verified without exposing the partial key information.

In addition, if the key storage service server, that is, the distributed key storage server, has a problem and can only read partial keys less than the restoration threshold, the encryption key cannot be restored. In the present invention, in case encryption key recovery is not possible, prevent By verifying the operation of the distributed key storage server in advance and responding by using another key storage server or proceeding with the partial key recovery process, it is possible to always keep the partial key read above the restoration threshold possible, and also This has the effect of preventing in advance a situation in which key recovery is impossible.

According to the present invention, it is possible to provide a method for verifying whether the partial key storage server is operating normally, and to provide a method for repartitioning and rearranging encryption keys when necessary.

1 is a diagram showing the configuration of a distributed key storage system capable of monitoring and verifying according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2A and 2B are diagrams illustrating main operating processes of the system of FIG. 1 .
3 is a diagram illustrating an operation protocol between the monitoring/verification execution unit on the user program and the storage service program of the distributed key storage server in the system of FIG. 1 .
4 is a flowchart of a method for storing a block chain wallet key that can be employed in the system of FIG. 1 .
5 is a flowchart of a method for storing a blockchain wallet key according to another embodiment of the present invention.
6 is a detailed flowchart of a verification process of the method of FIG. 5 .

Since the present invention can have various changes and can have various embodiments, specific embodiments are illustrated in the drawings and described in detail. However, this is not intended to limit the present invention to specific embodiments, and it should be understood to include all modifications, equivalents and substitutes included in the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Terms such as first, second, etc. may be used to describe various elements, but the elements should not be limited by the terms. The above terms are used only for the purpose of distinguishing one component from another. For example, without departing from the scope of the present invention, a first component may be referred to as a second component, and similarly, a second component may also be referred to as a first component. and/or includes a combination of a plurality of related listed items or any of a plurality of related listed items.

When an element is referred to as being “connected” or “connected” to another element, it is understood that it may be directly connected or connected to the other element, but other elements may exist in between. it should be On the other hand, when it is said that a certain element is "directly connected" or "directly connected" to another element, it should be understood that the other element does not exist in the middle.

The terms used in the present application are only used to describe specific embodiments, and are not intended to limit the present invention. The singular expression includes the plural expression unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In the present application, terms such as “comprise” or “have” are intended to designate that a feature, number, step, operation, component, part, or combination thereof described in the specification exists, but one or more other features It should be understood that this does not preclude the existence or addition of numbers, steps, operations, components, parts, or combinations thereof.

Unless defined otherwise, all terms used herein, including technical and scientific terms, have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. Terms such as those defined in a commonly used dictionary should be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with the meaning in the context of the related art, and should not be interpreted in an ideal or excessively formal meaning unless explicitly defined in the present application. does not

Before describing the preferred embodiment of the present invention, some key terms and expressions in the present technical field will be described in relation to the present embodiment.

[Passkey]

An encryption key refers to a key used in encryption techniques and programs to perform encryption and decryption. Types of encryption keys can be broadly divided into symmetric key and asymmetric key methods. The symmetric key method refers to a method of encrypting and decrypting with one key. The asymmetric key method refers to a method of encryption and decryption using two key pairs, a private key and a public key. In this embodiment, in the asymmetric key encryption method, a private key owned by an individual is referred to as an encryption key. In particular, it refers to the private key used in the block chain and proposes a method and device for storing it.

[Share the secret value]

Secret value sharing is a method of storing a specific secret value by dividing it, and refers to a method of dividing an encryption key into several partial keys and storing them in a distributed manner. Representative methods include Shamir's secret value sharing and Blakley's secret value sharing method.

In this embodiment, the secret value is shared using Shamir's method (see [Document 1]). Shamir's secret value sharing method uses polynomials. To use this method, a device setting value of 't' is required. t determines the highest degree of the polynomial, which means the number of partial keys required to recover the secret value.

In this embodiment, t is also defined as a restoration threshold. Therefore, in order to make and store the secret key K as a partial key, a polynomial P(x) of order t-1 is generated. The polynomial is expressed as in [Equation 1], and the partial key becomes (x, P(x)) which is a point of P(x).

[Document 1] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret, Communications of the ACM, 1979, Vol 22. 612-613pp.

[Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS)]

In the existing Shamir secret value sharing method, when generating and storing partial keys from a secret key, there is no way to verify that each partial key is a partial value generated from a specific key. In order to solve this problem, PVSS [Document 2] uses the commitment value C created when generating the polynomial P(x).

The definite value C is defined as bundle values for the constant a _i of each order x ⁱ in the polynomial of [Equation 1], and it can be verified whether a point is a point on a specific polynomial P(x) through the definite value C. This will be described in detail in the detailed description of the present embodiment.

If the definite value C is used, anyone can check whether a point (x,y) representing a certain partial value is a point calculated from a specific polynomial P(x). A method in which the above PVSS feature is applied to this embodiment will be described in detail below along with an example of this embodiment.

[Document 2] Markus Stadler. Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing. EUROCRYPT'96: Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques, 1996, ISBN 978-3-540-61186-8,190-199pp.

[Secret value sharing-based key storage service]

The secret value sharing-based key storage service divides and stores the encryption key using the secret value sharing technique. That is, the user encryption key is divided and individual partial keys are distributed and stored in a plurality of key storage servers or service providers. Recovers the user encryption key.

In order for the secret value sharing-based key storage service to operate normally, it is premised on the assumption that key storage servers equal to or greater than the restoration threshold are always storing accurate partial key information. However, there is no way to verify this from the user's point of view. In other words, when an encryption key is divided into partial keys and stored by servers, in order to verify the validity from the user's point of view whether each server owns a valid partial key, it is necessary to restore the user encryption key after reading the partial key values greater than the restoration threshold number. This has a very large overhead for user computing resources or network resources, and also has a problem of increasing the possibility of encryption key leakage in the frequent restoration process.

[Key storage method (centralized service- one point failure)]

The centralized encryption key management service consists of services from encryption key generation to storage. For example, Amazon key storage service (https://aws.amazon.com/en/kms/) and Naver key storage service (https://www.ncloud.com/product/security/kms) exist. Therefore, since the computer has the original encryption key, two problems arise.

The first is when the computer is hacked by a malicious attack. If the data on the computer is stolen, the security-sensitive encryption key is stolen as it is in possession of the original encryption key of the user.

The second is when the computer is out of service due to a malicious attack or other reasons. Service outage refers to a state in which the stored key is lost, such as a failure of the computer or an unrecoverable state of the database storing the encryption key.

In this embodiment, since a distributed key storage method is used, there is basically no problem of a centralized key storage service.

Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

1 is a diagram showing the configuration of a distributed key storage system capable of monitoring and verifying according to an embodiment of the present invention. And FIGS. 2A and 2B are diagrams illustrating a main operation process of the system of FIG. 1 .

1, 2A and 2B, the publicly verifiable block chain wallet key storage device according to the present embodiment includes a plurality of distributed key storage servers 200a to 200n and a user program 100 interworking with the distributed key storage server. ) is included.

The user program is mounted on a user terminal such as a computing device or a mobile terminal, and generates a plurality of partial keys by dividing the user encryption key.

Each distributed key storage server includes a storage service program (210a ~ 210n) for storing the partial key transmitted from the user program (100) in each database (212a ~ 212n).

Each distributed key storage server 200a to 200n uses a public key/private key pair defined in a public key infrastructure (PKI). And the user program 100 encrypts the partial key with the public key of each distributed key storage server and transmits it to each server. Therefore, in this embodiment, secure communication between the user program 100 and the distributed key storage server is supported.

Since the functions of the storage service programs 210a to 210n, the databases 212a to 212n, and the stored partial keys 112a to 112n of each distributed key storage server 200a to 200n are the same, in the following, generally i (any The function will be described based on the storage service program 210i, the database 212i, and the partial key 112i installed in the th distributed key storage server 200i. In the following, for convenience of explanation and illustration, the distributed key storage server 200i, the database 212i, and the partial key 112i are described as the distributed key storage server 200, the database 212 and the partial key 112. decide to do

First, as shown in FIG. 2A , the user program 100 includes a key distribution/restoration execution unit 122 and a monitoring/verification execution unit 124 . The key distribution/restoration execution unit 122 generates a plurality of partial keys 112a to 112n by dividing the user encryption key 110 using the PVSS technique. The individual partial key 112 is transmitted by encrypting the partial key with the public key of the distributed key storage server 200, and as a result, the partial keys are individually distributed and stored in a plurality of distributed key storage servers.

In addition, the key distribution/restoration execution unit 122 serves to restore the user's encryption key 110 to its original state by receiving the partial key 112 from the distributed key storage server 200 if necessary. At this time, the number of partial keys to be read is determined according to the restoration threshold set when dividing the user encryption key.

The user program 100 verifies whether each distributed key storage server normally stores the partial key through the monitoring/verification execution unit 124, and if necessary for the user, it is always critical to restoration through partial key regeneration and reconfiguration of the distributed key storage server The reliability of the user encryption key storage service is ensured by storing the correct partial key information in more than a certain number of distributed key storage servers exceeding the value.

Specifically, as shown in Fig. 2b, the key distribution/restoration execution unit 122 divides the user encryption key 110 by using the PVSS technique to generate partial keys 112a to 112n, and to determine the value C. create together The process of generating a partial key through the PVSS process is described in more detail as follows (1) to (5).

(1) First, the restoration threshold is expressed as t.

(2) By substituting the encryption key 110 into K, a t-1st polynomial is constructed. The t-1st polynomial P(x) is the same as [Equation 1].

[Equation 1]

(3) Based on P(x), a definite value C for later verification is generated. The definite value C is the same as [Equation 2].

In [Equation 2], H is a point in a large prime number or elliptic curve used in general encryption. H ^K means that K is multiplied by the H value on the elliptic curve, and K cannot be inferred from H ^K and H value.

In this embodiment, elliptic curve encryption is used and H is described as a reference point, but it is not limited thereto, and other cases according to cryptographic properties are possible.

(4) An i-th partial key 112i is generated with a point (i, P(i)) on P(x).

는 부분 키 Pi를 공개키로 암호화한 정보를 나타낸다.(5) The specific partial key 112 is encrypted with the public key of the specific distributed key storage server 200 together with the corresponding confirmed value C and transmitted to the corresponding distributed key storage server 200 . At this time, the public key of the distributed key storage server is represented by X, and the encrypted data D with the corresponding public key is represented by E _X (D). thus,

denotes information obtained by encrypting the partial key Pi with the public key.

3 is a diagram illustrating an operation protocol between the monitoring/verification execution unit on the user program and the storage service program of the distributed key storage server in the system of FIG. 1 .

3 illustrates an operation protocol between the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 on the user program 100 and the storage service program 210i mounted on the distributed key storage server.

That is, the operation sequence for monitoring/verifying whether the distributed key storage server possesses a valid partial key may be performed in a 4-step communication sequence between the monitoring/verification execution unit and the storage service program.

Specifically, first, as a verification request (S301), the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 transmits a verification request to the storage service program 210i of the distributed key storage server 200 (S301).

Second, the storage service program 210i transmits a randomly generated constant value w (hereinafter also referred to as a first constant value) in response to the verification request (S301) to the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 (S302). The storage service program 210i stores the constant value w in the storage unit or database of the server.

Third, the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 transmits a randomly generated constant value c (hereinafter also referred to as a second constant value) to the storage service program 210i as a verification confirmation request value (S303). The monitoring/verification execution unit 124 stores the first constant value received from the storage service program 210i and the second constant value transmitted to the storage service program 210i in the storage unit or database of the user terminal.

Fourth, the storage service program 210i generates a proof value r using the stored constant value w, the received constant value c, and the partial key 112 value stored in the database itself, and the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 ) to (S304).

In the storage service program 210i that stores the i-th partial key, the proof value r is derived from the following [Equation 3].

At this time, the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 uses the two constant values w and c, and the proof value r, to accurately determine the valid partial key 112i of the distributed key storage server 200i executing the storage service program 210i. You can check whether it is being saved or not.

More specifically, the method of verifying that the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 possesses a valid partial key using the random constant values w and c and the definite value C, the proof value r and the public key X _i is the following isomorphic It is derived from a discrete logarithm equality equation.

의 경우

이므로 부분 키 P(i)를 공개키로 곱한 것을 의미하고,

의 경우 타원곡선 위의 한 점 H로 곱한 값이며 검증 과정에서 확정 값 C와 함께 이용하게 된다.[Equation 4] above is a characteristic of PVSS,

In the case of

So it means that the partial key P(i) is multiplied by the public key,

In the case of , it is a value multiplied by a point H on the elliptic curve and is used together with the final value C in the verification process.

If the above [Equation 4] is satisfied, the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 does not receive the partial key 112i from the distributed key storage server 200i, and the public key X _i of the distributed key storage server, which is a public value, is confirmed Using the value C, two constant values w and c, and the proof value r, it is possible to mathematically verify that the distributed key storage server has a valid value. This verification process can be proved by [Equation 5] and [Equation 6] as follows.

If both [Equation 5] and [Equation 6] are satisfied, the monitoring/verification execution unit 124 determines whether the server owns a valid partial key through the proof value r received from the distributed key storage server 200i. can prove

[Equation 5] can be confirmed by the mathematical calculation process of [Equation 7] to [Equation 10] as follows.

는 다음의 [수학식 8]과 같이 구할 수 있다.At this time, even if you do not know P(i) in [Equation 7]

can be obtained as in the following [Equation 8].

은 확정 값 C에 포함되어 있으므로,

를 계산해낼 수 있다. 이때

와 r값에 문제가 없다면 아래와 같은 [수학식 9]가 성립한다.In [Equation 8] above

is contained in the definite value C, so

can be calculated. At this time

If there is no problem with the and r values, the following [Equation 9] holds.

In addition, similar to the confirmation process of [Equation 5] above, [Equation 6] can also be confirmed through [Equation 10] below.

는 부분 키를 분산 키 보관 서버(200i)의 공개 키로 곱한 데이터로서, 최초 사용자 프로그램에서 부분 키 전달 시에 포함된 확정 값 C에서 추출하거나 검증과정에서 증명 값 r과 함께 분산 키 보관 서버에 요청할 수 있다. 이때

와 r값에 문제가 없다면 아래와 같은 [수학식 11]이 성립한다.In [Equation 10] above

is data obtained by multiplying a partial key by the public key of the distributed key storage server 200i there is. At this time

If there is no problem with and r values, the following [Equation 11] is established.

As discussed above, if both [Equation 5] and [Equation 6] are satisfied, the monitoring/decreasing execution unit may determine that the distributed key storage server possesses a valid partial key.

As such, according to the present embodiment, it is possible to check whether the server owns a valid partial key for a specific encryption key through the storage service program 210i, which includes the confirmed value C for the initial encryption key and the public key X _i It may be executed through a known monitoring/verification execution unit 124 .

At this time, since the public key X _i is open to anyone due to the nature of the encryption key, and the encryption key cannot be guessed from the final value C for the encryption key, the monitoring/verification function can be delegated to an external entity without sharing important information. means that it is publicly verifiable.

4 is a flowchart of a method for storing a block chain wallet key that can be employed in the system of FIG. 1 .

Referring to Figure 4, the block chain wallet key storage method according to the present embodiment is a block chain wallet key storage method on the user program. It is possible to monitor the number of valid partial keys, that is, how many distributed key storage servers normally maintain partial key information.

And, when the monitoring/verification execution unit determines that a certain distributed key storage server does not normally maintain the partial key (S405), the i-th partial key is set as a point (i, P(i)) on P(x). Returning to the generating step (S402), the partial key is encrypted with the confirmed value with the public key of the corresponding or new distributed key storage server, and delivered to the corresponding or new distributed key storage server, after which the verification process is performed. to have the distributed key storage server that detects abnormal behavior store the valid partial key again through the 200n) can be retransmitted.

As described above, according to the present invention, it is possible to secure monitoring and stability of the distributed key storage system through the processes of partial key generation (S401), distribution (S402 to S403), verification (S404) and redistribution (S405) from the encryption key. .

5 is a flowchart of a method for storing a blockchain wallet key according to another embodiment of the present invention. 6 is a detailed flowchart of a verification process of the method of FIG. 5 .

Referring to Figure 5, the block chain wallet key storage method according to the present embodiment is a series of processes performed in the user program of the user terminal, and first determines the highest difference of the polynomial according to the device setting value (t) and then the distribution key A partial key is generated from the encryption key to be stored in the storage servers (S501). Then, the generated partial keys are distributed to distributed key storage servers (S502).

Next, it may be determined whether verification has been completed for all target servers of a verification process to be performed later (S503).

If the verification of all target servers is not completed (No in S503), the monitoring/verification execution unit of the user program verifies whether a valid partial key is stored in a specific distributed key storage server (S504). If a valid partial key is stored in the corresponding server (YES in S505), the process returns to the above determination step (S503) and the verification process for other servers is sequentially repeated.

And, as a result of the verification in step S504, if a valid partial key is not stored in the corresponding server (No in S505), a redistribution process of the partial key may be performed (S506). Then, it returns to the determination step ( S503 ) and sequentially repeats the verification process for the other servers.

On the other hand, if it is determined that the verification process for all target servers has been completed (Yes in S503), the current process may be terminated as the verification process for all the verification target servers has been completed once.

Of course, the verification process according to the present embodiment may be set to repeat a predetermined number of times for all verification target servers each storing a partial key of the distributed encryption key, or may be implemented to be repeated periodically or intermittently for a predetermined time. .

On the other hand, when the above-described verification process (S504) is viewed from the side of the distributed key storage server, as shown in FIG. 6 .

First, the distributed key storage server receives a verification request from the user terminal (S541).

Next, a first constant value is randomly generated in response to the verification request, and the first constant value is transmitted to the user terminal (S542). The first constant value is stored in a storage unit of the server or a database.

Next, a second constant value randomly generated in the user terminal is received from the user terminal as a verification confirmation request value of the partial key (S543).

Next, the proof value generated using the first constant value, the second constant value, and the pre-stored partial key value is transmitted to the user terminal (S544).

According to the above processes (S541 to S544), the user terminal connected to the distributed key storage server through the network uses the first constant value, the second constant value, and the proof value to accurately determine the valid partial key of the distributed key storage server. It can be verified whether or not it is stored, and a number of distributed key storage servers can support the storage method of its encryption key or blockchain wallet key by interworking with the user program of the user terminal.

On the other hand, the block chain wallet key storage method according to the present embodiment may be implemented in the form of a program command that can be executed through various computer means and recorded in a computer readable medium. The computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, and the like, alone or in combination. The program instructions recorded on the computer readable medium may be specially designed and configured for the present invention, or may be known and available to those skilled in the art of computer software.

Examples of computer-readable media include hardware devices specially configured to store and carry out program instructions, such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like. Examples of program instructions include not only machine language codes such as those generated by a compiler, but also high-level language codes that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like. The hardware device described above may be configured to operate as at least one software module to perform the operations of the present invention, and vice versa.

Although described with reference to the embodiments as described above, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various modifications and changes can be made to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention as set forth in the following claims. will be able

100: user program
110: user key
112a to 112n: user part key
122: User key distribution and restoration execution unit
124: Partial key monitoring and validation execution unit
130: user
200a to 200n: Distributed Key Archive Server
210a to 210n: key storage service program
212a to 212n: database
S301 ~ S304: User partial key storage verification process
S401 ~ S404: User program progress

Claims (19)

A publicly verifiable blockchain wallet key storage method performed by a user program mounted on a user terminal, comprising:
dividing the user encryption key by a key distribution/restoration execution unit mounted in the user program to generate a partial key together with a finalized value;
encrypting the partial key together with the confirmed value with a public key of a distributed key storage server; and
and transmitting the partial key encrypted with the public key to the distributed key storage server. The method according to claim 1,
In the generating step, when the partial key is generated, the restoration threshold is set to t, the encryption key is substituted for K to form a t-1st polynomial, and a confirmed value for later verification based on the t-1st polynomial. A blockchain wallet key storage method that generates 3. The method according to claim 2,
The confirmed value (C) is expressed by [Equation 2] below,
[Equation 2]

In Equation 2, P(i) is a t-1st polynomial, K is an encryption key, and H is a large prime number or elliptic curve using H as a reference point in elliptic curve encryption ( A block chain wallet key storage method that represents each point of the elliptic curve) and H ^K is calculated by multiplying K by the value of H on the elliptic curve. 3. The method according to claim 2,
The generating step includes generating the i-th partial key with a point (i, P(i)) on the t-1st polynomial after generating the confirmed value. The method according to claim 1,
After the step of delivering,
The method of storing a blockchain wallet key, further comprising the step of monitoring or verifying whether the distributed key storage server owns a valid partial key. 6. The method of claim 5,
The verification step is
transmitting a verification request to a storage service program of the distributed key storage server;
receiving a first constant value randomly generated from the distributed key storage server;
transmitting a second constant value randomly generated as a verification confirmation request value of the partial key to the storage service program;
receiving a proof value generated using the first constant value, the second constant value, and a pre-stored partial key value from the distributed key storage server; and
verifying whether the distributed key storage server stores a valid partial key using the first constant value, the second constant value, and the proof value;
A blockchain wallet key storage method, including 7. The method of claim 6,
The proof value is derived from [Equation 4] below,
[Equation 3]

In [Equation 3], r represents a proof value, w represents a first constant value, c represents a second constant value, and P(i) represents a t-1st polynomial. 7. The method of claim 6,
The step of verifying whether the above is, uses a value derived from the following [Equation 4], which is a discrete logarithm equality equation, together with a confirmed value in the verification process,
[Equation 4]

In the above [Equation 4]

Is

means that the partial key P(i) is multiplied by the public key,

is the value multiplied by a point (H) on the elliptic curve, the blockchain wallet key storage method. 9. The method of claim 8,
The verifying includes mathematically verifying that a valid partial key is stored in the distributed key distribution server without receiving the partial key from the distributed key storage server when Equation 5 is satisfied , a blockchain wallet key storage method. 10. The method of claim 9,
The mathematical verification step is verified using the following [Equation 5] and [Equation 6],
[Equation 5]

[Equation 6]

In [Equation 5] and [Equation 6], Xi is the public key of the distributed key storage server that is a public value, c is a confirmed value, w is a first constant value, c is a second constant value, r A method of storing a key in a blockchain wallet, each representing a proof value. A publicly verifiable blockchain wallet key storage device comprising a user program, comprising:
It includes a key distribution/restoration execution unit and a monitoring/verification execution unit mounted on the user program,
The monitoring/verification execution unit divides the user encryption key to generate a partial key with a fixed value, encrypts the partial key with the public key of the distributed key storage server with the determined value, and uses the encrypted partial key with the public key. A blockchain wallet key storage device that forwards to a distributed key storage server. 12. The method of claim 11,
The monitoring/verification execution unit generates the i-th partial key as a point (i, P(i)) on the t-1st polynomial after generating the definite value, where t is a device for determining the highest order term of the polynomial A set value, a blockchain wallet key storage device. 12. The method of claim 11,
The monitoring/verification execution unit detects or verifies whether a distributed key storage server that receives and stores the partial key possesses a valid partial key, a block chain wallet key storage device. 14. The method of claim 13,
The monitoring/verification execution unit transmits a verification request to the storage service program of the distributed key storage server to verify the valid partial key, receives a first constant value randomly generated from the distributed key storage server, and receives the partial key A second constant value randomly generated as a verification confirmation request value of A block chain wallet key storage device that receives a proof value and verifies whether the distributed key storage server stores a valid partial key using the first constant value, the second constant value, and the proof value. 15. The method of claim 14,
The monitoring/verification execution unit uses a value derived from a discrete logarithm equality equation in the verification process of the valid partial key in the verification process of the valid partial key together with the confirmed value, a block chain wallet key storage device . 16. The method of claim 15,
The monitoring/verification execution unit mathematically verifies that a valid partial key is stored in the distributed key distribution server without receiving the partial key from the distributed key storage server when the homogeneous discrete log equation is satisfied in the verification process , blockchain wallet key storage device. 17. The method of claim 16,
The mathematical verification is verified using the following [Equation 5] and [Equation 6],
[Equation 5]

[Equation 6]

In [Equation 5] and [Equation 6], Xi is the public key of the distributed key storage server that is a public value, c is a confirmed value, w is a first constant value, c is a second constant value, r A blockchain wallet key storage device, each representing a proof value. 16. The method of claim 15,
The monitoring/verification execution unit stores the information of the redistribution target server that does not store a valid partial key through the verification process, a block chain wallet key storage device. 19. The method of claim 18,
The monitoring/verification execution unit generates a distributed key based on information on a distributed key storage server that does not store a valid partial key when verification of whether or not valid partial keys are stored for the number of servers below the restoration threshold is completed. A redistributive, blockchain wallet key storage device.

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