KR20140024894A - Method and apparatus for providing machine-to-machine service - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for providing machine-to-machine service Download PDF

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KR20140024894A
KR20140024894A KR1020137029892A KR20137029892A KR20140024894A KR 20140024894 A KR20140024894 A KR 20140024894A KR 1020137029892 A KR1020137029892 A KR 1020137029892A KR 20137029892 A KR20137029892 A KR 20137029892A KR 20140024894 A KR20140024894 A KR 20140024894A
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South Korea
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authentication
m2m
device
nsec
request
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KR1020137029892A
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Korean (ko)
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KR102051492B1 (en
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알퍼 예긴
백영교
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삼성전자주식회사
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Priority to US61/475,972 priority
Priority to US201161485275P priority
Priority to US61/485,275 priority
Priority to US201161544577P priority
Priority to US61/544,577 priority
Application filed by 삼성전자주식회사 filed Critical 삼성전자주식회사
Priority to PCT/KR2012/002874 priority patent/WO2012141555A2/en
Publication of KR20140024894A publication Critical patent/KR20140024894A/en
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/0807Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/162Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity ; Protecting confidentiality; Key management; Integrity; Mobile application security; Using identity modules; Secure pairing of devices; Context aware security; Lawful interception
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/50Service provisioning or reconfiguring
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2143Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/44Arrangements for executing specific programs
    • G06F9/4401Bootstrapping
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data

Abstract

Provided are a method and an apparatus for providing a service. A method for providing a service by a machine-to-machine (M2M) device includes transmitting a request for first authentication, including an identifier of the M2M device, to a Network Security Capability (NSEC); Performing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication together, and if the first authentication is successful, secret using at least one of a Master Session Key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device. Generating a key.

Description

Method and Apparatus for Providing Machine-to-Machine Service

The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for a communication system, and more particularly, to a method and apparatus for providing a machine-to-machine (M2M) service.

M2M technology is a technology that allows applications running on each device to communicate with applications running on various control nodes (ie, servers or other similar devices) on the Internet while the M2M devices are connected and communicating with networks. In order to facilitate this communication, the M2M core network serves to enable dynamic provisioning of devices with service parameters and to register devices for application level access.

The M2M Automated Bootstrap is a procedure executed between the M2M device and the M2M network to perform dynamic provisioning of the M2M device. Therefore, there is a need for a system and method capable of performing self-diagnosis of a device without the inconvenience of manually selecting a self-diagnosis item from a computer or a user interface.

Aspects of the present invention are intended to address at least the aforementioned problems and / or shortcomings and to provide at least the advantages described below. Thus, one aspect of the present invention provides a method for providing a service by a machine-to-machine (M2M) device. The method includes transmitting a request for first authentication including an identifier of the M2M device to a network security unit (NSEC), and performing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication with the NSEC. And if the first authentication is successful, generating a secret key using at least one of a Master Session Key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device.

According to one aspect of the invention, a machine-to-machine (M2M) device is provided that provides a service. The M2M device performs Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication together with a transmitter for transmitting a request for first authentication including an identifier of the M2M device to a Network Security Capability (NSEC) and the NSEC. And a key generator for generating a secret key using at least one of a master session key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device if the first authentication is successful.

According to another aspect of the present invention, a method for providing a service by Network Security Capability (NSEC) in a machine-to-machine (M2M) system is provided. The method includes determining whether a request for a first authentication that includes an identifier of the M2M device is received from an M2M device, and when the request for the first authentication is received, an Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP) with the M2M device; Performing Extensible Authentication Protocol (Authentication) authentication, and if the first authentication is successful, generating a secret key using at least one of a Master Session Key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device; .

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a Network Security Capability (NSEC) that provides a service in a machine-to-machine (M2M) system. The NSEC determines whether a request for a first authentication including an identifier of the M2M device is received from the M2M device, and if the request for the first authentication is received, together with the M2M device, an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP; Extensible). Authentication Protocol) A controller for performing authentication, and a key generator for generating a secret key using at least one of a Master Session Key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device if the first authentication is successful. .

According to the present invention, there are various effects as follows.

Code reuse: EAP is widely used in Wi-Fi, WiMAX, Zigbee, and Ethernet for "network access authentication." PANA is used for "network access authentication" in ZigBee devices. Reusing the same elements for other purposes reduces the development and production costs of M2M devices.

Extensibility: EAP and PANA are both extensible protocols. Unlike TLS, which only allows PSK and certificate-based authentication, they allow any authentication method to be used. PANA is extended for easy delivery of new payloads by defining new Attribute-Value-Pairs (AVPs).

Lightweight: This solution supports both UDP based stacks and TCP based stacks. TLS requires a TCP-based stack, which requires more code and processing.

Model fit: The three-party authentication model of EAP and PANA is suitable for device-core-MSBF systems. TLS is based on a two-party design, and TLS-based solutions are not suitable for M2M system architectures.

Various aspects, features, and advantages of embodiments of the present invention will become more apparent from the following description with reference to the accompanying drawings.
1 is a diagram illustrating network components included in an M2M Automated Bootstrap Procedure according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a high-level flow diagram of events occurring in M2M networks in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
3 is a diagram illustrating a call flow including a bootstrap procedure according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4A is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of a device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4B is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of a network security unit (NESC) according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4C is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of a Network Remote Entity Management Capability (NREM) according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4D is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrapping procedure of an M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4E is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of an M2M service layer authentication / authorization / billing server (MAS) according to an embodiment of the present invention.
5 is a diagram illustrating a device function model according to an embodiment of the present invention.
6 is a diagram illustrating a separated network access authentication and M2M bootstrap procedure according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 7 illustrates an example of scalable networks and an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) using a protocol for carrying authentication for network access (PANA) according to an embodiment of the present invention. A diagram illustrating a call flow for a network using an authentication protocol (EAP).
8 is a diagram illustrating a device function model according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Throughout the drawings, the same reference numerals are used to refer to the same or similar components, features, structures.

The following description with reference to the accompanying drawings is provided to aid in a thorough understanding of embodiments of the invention as defined by the claims and their equivalents. The description below includes various specific examples to assist in understanding but these should be considered as examples only. Those skilled in the art will recognize that the embodiments disclosed herein may be variously modified without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention. In addition, descriptions of well-known functions and structures may be omitted for clarity and conciseness.

The terms or words used in the following description and claims are not limited to the dictionary meanings, but may be used by the inventors for clear and consistent understanding of the invention. Therefore, those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains limit the present invention defined by the claims and their equivalents, the following description of the embodiments of the present invention being provided for illustrative purposes only. It will be appreciated that it is not provided for the purpose of doing so.

As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" include plural forms unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. For example, a description "request" is a description of the meaning including one or more requests.

1 is a diagram illustrating network components included in an M2M Automated Bootstrap Procedure according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 1, the lines connecting the network components correspond to communication interfaces used in the network components. The device 110 is an entity that is bootstrapd to begin operation using the M2M facility provided by the M2M core network 120. The device 110 participates in a bootstrap procedure with the M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) 130 via the M2M Core Network 120. At the end of the bootstrap procedure, a root secret key (KR) is generated that will be used to encrypt application communication over the M2M network. The root secret key is stored in an M2M service layer authentication, authorization, and billing server (MAS) 140 in the network.

The M2M Technical Committee of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) drafted the M2M standard and clarified the need and requirements for the automatic M2M bootstrap procedure.

2 is a high-level flow diagram of events occurring in M2M networks in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

2, network registration, including network access authentication, is a procedure used by a device for obtaining access to an Internet Protocol (IP) network. Higher-layer procedures, such as M2M related procedures, will be used after successful execution of network registration. M2M procedures such as M2M service bootstrap and M2M service connection are used to obtain access to the M2M network and to the overlay network on top of the IP network. In FIG. 2, the M2M device includes a Device Service Capability Layer (DSCL), the M2M gateway includes a Gateway Service Capability Layer (GSCL), and the network domain includes a network service capability layer (GSCL). NSCL; Network Service Capability Layer (NSCL). NSCL relates to M2M service capabilities in the network domain. GSCL is related to M2M service capabilities at the M2M Gateway. DSCL is related to M2M service capabilities in an M2M device. The DSCL has a DSCL identifier that identifies the DSCL, and the GSCL has a GSCL identifier that identifies the GSCL.

The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) M2M architecture supports core network connectivity for device and gateway type installations. For simplicity, the term “device” is used throughout this specification to refer to electronic devices and gateway type facilities. Thus, the features, components, actions described for M2M devices apply likewise to M2M gateways and gateway type facilities. The term “device” can be used herein to refer to DSCL and / or GSCL.

This embodiment provides an automatic M2M service layer bootstrap procedure using a Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). In this manner, network registration and M2M service bootstrap are separate procedures separated from each other as shown in FIG. PANA is a protocol used to carry EAP data between a device and a core network. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and other protocols may replace PANA as long as it can carry EAP and required payloads. The actions disclosed herein with respect to the embodiments also apply to alternative protocols.

In embodiments of the present invention, the EAP authentication method uses EAP authentication based on Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange (IBAKE). However, according to all aspects of the present invention, the EAP authentication method is not specified. That is, the present invention is not limited to EAP-IBAKE, and an EAP authentication method such as EAP-TLS, EAP-AKA, EAP-TTLS, EAP-GPSK, and other similar protocols may be used.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) has been proposed to mutually authenticate devices and networks, and to pass bootstrap parameters as payloads to a Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) layer. However, the use of TLS introduces a number of problems, which allow EAP and PANA to provide solutions through several key features, including code reuse, scalability, lightweighting, and improved model conformance. For example, in the case of code reuse, EAP is widely used for "network access authentication" in Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) networks, Wireless Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) networks, Zigbee networks, and Ethernet networks. . PANA is used for "network access authentication" in ZigBee devices. Thus reusing the same or similar elements for other purposes reduces the development and production costs of M2M devices. In the case of extensibility, EAP and PANA are extensible protocols and allow any authentication method to be used, unlike TLS, which only allows Pre-Shared Key (PSK) and proof-based authentication. PANA is extended for easy delivery of new payloads by defining new Attribute-Value-Pairs (AVPs). In the case of light weight, the use of EAP and PANA support both User Datagram Protocol (UDP) based stacks and Transport Control Protocol (TCP) based stacks. On the other hand, TLS requires a TCP-based stack, which requires increased code and processing compared to the case of using EAP and PANA. For enhanced model suitability, EAP and PANA's three-party authentication model corresponds to the M2M Device-Core M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) system architecture. On the other hand, TLS is based on a two-party design, and TLS-based solutions are not suitable for M2M system architecture.

3 is a diagram illustrating a call flow including a bootstrap procedure according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 3, there is a Network Security Capability (NSEC) 302 and a Network Remote Entity Management Capability (NREM) 304 in an M2M core network. NSEC 302 is an authenticator and NREM 304 is a configuration server for device 300. Although not required for all embodiments of the present invention, in step 310 an M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) 306 sends an M2M request. If the bootstrap procedure is initiated by the device 300, step 310 may be omitted. Thus, step 310 can be initiated by NSEC 302 or MSBF 306. If step 310 is initiated by NSEC 302, there is no message communicated between MSBF 306 and NSEC 302. However, because the MSBF 306 or NSEC 302 needs to know the network location of the device 300, in this case the message contained in step 310 is unicast at the IP layer and / or the link layer. Or if the MSBF 306 or NSEC 302 does not know the exact location of the device 300, the message is anycasted, multicasted or broadcasted at the IP layer and / or the link layer ( broadcasted).

Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) protocols are used between NSEC 302 and MSBF 306. Two examples of the AAA protocol are Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) and Diameter Base Protocol (Diameter). According to this embodiment, the AAA protocol used between NSEC 302 and device 300 is PANA. The PANA message used in step 310 is a PANA-Authentication-Request (PAR) message and may include the following AVPs in the PAR message in addition to the standard attribute value pairs (AVPs) defined in the PANA standard: MSBF IDentifier (ID) is used to convey an identifier for MSBF 306 to device 300; The value field of the AVP is an ID type that indicates the type of identifier, such as a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), a Network Access Identifier (NAI), a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), and other similar identifiers, the ID value of the identifier, And data elements, such as NSEC-ID, used to convey the NSEC identifier to the device 300. In addition, the value field of the AVP includes the following data elements: ID type indicating the type of identifier such as FQDN, NAI and URI, and ID value which is the value of the identifier.

Since NSEC 302 acts as a PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) for the PANA protocol, the NSEC-ID and PAA identifiers are equivalent to each other. The network ID is also used to convey the identifiers of the M2M network (s) provided by the MSBF 306 to the device 300. One or more AVPs may or may not be included in the same message, and one MSBF 306 may be provided for various networks. In addition, among other data elements, the value field of the AVP may include the ID type and ID value as described above.

In addition, as described above, the same AVP may be used by a conventional PAA (ie, PAA not in the M2M network) to inform each of the networks that a PAA is provided. Thus, the network ID may be used to indicate a service provider and a network owned by the service provider. In addition, the device ID may be used to convey the identifier of the target device to the receiving devices. Since the message containing the AVPs is anycasted, multicasted or broadcasted and thus received by various nodes as well as the target device, the device ID is provided by the receiving devices or nodes to each requesting device or other device. Allows you to decide. The device 300 uses the received message only if one or more device IDs match the identifier of the device 300, and if it does not match, the device 300 ignores the message. Among other data elements, the value field of the AVP includes the following data elements: ID type, which indicates the type of identifier, such as FQDN, NAI, URI, and MAC address, and ID value, which is the value of the identifier. The aforementioned AVPs provide an ID type with an ID value. If the architecture of the network using AVPs does not require flexibility to support other types of IDs, these variants of AVPs can be used with the ID type omitted.

In addition, the usage-type AVP indicates the purpose of the PANA implementation, that is, whether the PANA implementation is for M2M bootstrapping, or network connection (i.e., the PANA implementation is legacy use of the PANA). It is defined to indicate whether it is intended for the purpose of implementing a different type of PANA. The usage type AVP may be included in the first message exchange, any message exchange, or all message exchanges. The usage type AVP contains the following data elements in the value field: Type is a value listed to indicate the usage type, for example 0 for network connection, 1 for M2M bootstrapping, Passes 2, or other types of usage, representing M2M service registration.

Next, in step 320, a first mutual authentication is performed to authenticate the device 300 and the network with each other. According to embodiments of the present invention, mutual authentication may be only one step of authentication (eg, with EAP-TLS) or two or more steps. For example, EAP-IBAKE has two steps: a first step using a temporary ID and password and a second step using identity-based encryption (IBE) (see step 340). If two-step authentication is used, each step implements a complete authentication method. For example, with the IBAKE scheme, the first stage implements one method, such as EAP-Generalized PSK, and the second stage, implements another EAP method, such as EAP-IBAKE. If one-step authentication is used, the step is performed according to step 340. That is, if one-step authentication is used, step 320 may be omitted.

In step 320 a complete EAP authentication method is executed. The EAP authentication method is delivered by EAP via PANA between device 300 and NSEC 302, and by EAP via AAA protocol between NSCE 302 and M2M service layer AAA server (MAS) 308. do. Therefore, a complete PANA session is established at this stage. However, if authentication fails, step 320 is stopped. If authentication is successful in step 320, actions are taken to enable step 320. Accordingly, step 320 completes mutual authentication between the device 300 and the network, and also enables discovery, identification, and security in preparation for step 330.

To enable step 330, the last PANA message carrying the authentication result carries additional AVPs. Additional AVPs include a DM-server-ID used to convey the identifier of the device management server to the device 300, where one or more AVPs may be included in the same message or none at all. The value field of the DM-server-ID AVP may include two data elements: an ID type that indicates the type of identifier, such as an FQDN, an IPv4 address, a URI, or another similar identifier, and an ID value that is the value of the identifier.

Another additional AVP is the Assigned-Device-ID used to convey the device identifier assigned to the device 300 by the network. This may be an identifier of the device 300 for subsequent signaling between the device 300 and the M2M core network, and such AVP may be included in one or more of the same messages or not at all. The value field of Assigned-Device-ID AVP may include the following data elements: an ID type that indicates the type of identifier, such as FQDN, NAI, URI, and MAC address, and an ID value that is the value of the identifier (eg, “light-switch”). -1001 ”).

DM-server-ID AVP and Assigned-Device-ID AVP provide an ID type with an ID value. If the network architecture does not support other types of IDs (eg, only one type is used), variations of these AVPs can be used with the ID type omitted.

In addition, a cryptographic security association between the device 300 and the device management server is established at step 320. While the Assigned-Device-ID and DM-server-ID are provided as end-point identifiers, the shared secret key (KD-DM) between the master session is established according to the following shared secret key expression: It is calculated based on the master session key (MSK):

KD-DM = Hash (MSK, constant_string | DM-server-ID | Assigned-Device-ID | other_parameters).

In the above equation, a hash is one-way, such as a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) -Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 1, HMAC-SHA256, or other similar hash functions. One-way keyed hash function; MSK is the master session key exported by the executed EAP method; constant_string is a constant string value that includes one or more white space characters (“0”), such as “M2M shared secret between Device and Device Management Server”; DM-server-ID is a value of the device management server identifier; Assigned-Device-ID is the value of the device identifier assigned by the network; other_parameters is zero or more parameters that can be added to the above variant.

According to another embodiment of the present invention, the shared secret key equation using Extended MSK (EMSK) instead of MSK is as follows:

KD-DM = Hash (EMSK, constant_string | DM-server-ID | Assigned-Device-ID | other_parameters).

As the key index, a combination of PANA session identifier and PANA key ID is used for a given device. If a given device has only one PANA session, it is sufficient to use a key ID alone to represent a KD-DM key.

According to another embodiment of the present invention, the shared secret key equation may use a root secret key KR. However, this shared secret key expression is applied when the root secret key is generated before the device provisioning is executed. This shared secret key expression is:

KD-DM = Hash (KR, constant_string | DM-server-ID | Assigned-Device-ID | other_parameters).

Next, in step 330, device entitlement is performed (eg, using Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) -Device Management (DM)). However, step 330 is optional and may be executed in accordance with the configuration of an embodiment of the present invention that executes step 320. When step 330 is executed, security is achieved using identifiers (such as Assigned-Device-ID and DM-Server-ID) and the shared key (KD-DM) generated in the previous PANA procedure. In step 330, the identifiers and cryptographic keys necessary for the security of the procedures are calculated as described in step 320.

Next, in step 340, phase 2 mutual authentication is performed and includes executing an EAP authentication method through PANA. Step 340 may be used by some authentication methods and may be omitted in other authentication methods. For example, only one level of authentication is performed with EAP-TLS, while IBAKE-based authentication uses two steps, and the second step involves EAP-IBAKE execution.

One outcome of the bootstrapping procedure is the establishment of a root secret key KR as a shared secret key between the device 300 and the network. The root secret key KR is generated at the end of step 320 or step 340 according to the availability of the step and the configuration of the network architecture using this approach. If the Assigned-Device-ID is not delivered during step 320, it will be delivered at the end of step 340 and carried by the last PANA message conveying the authentication result.

The root secret key KR may be generated using one of the following ways. For example, the root secret key KR can be derived from the MSK generated by the EAP method at the end of a successful authentication procedure. In this case, the MSK is generated by an EAP peer residing in device 300 and by an authentication server residing in MAS 308 or MSBF 306. The authentication server shares the MSK with NSCE 302, which is an authenticator. MSK thus constructs a dynamically generated shared secret at the end of successful authentication and is used as a seed for the root secret key (KR) derivative according to the following equation:

KR = Hash (MSK, constant_string | Assigned-Device-ID | Network-ID | other_parameters).

Where Hash is a one-way keyed hash function such as HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256; MSK is the master session key sent by the executed EAP method; constant_string is a constant string value containing one or more white space characters (“0”), such as “M2M shared secret root key between Device and network”; Assigned-Device-ID is the value of the device identifier assigned by the network (here, if no ID is assigned by the network, the device can use its own identifier as the assigned ID); other_parameters is zero or more parameters that can be added to the above variant.

As the key index, a combination of PANA session identifier and PANA key ID is used for a given device. If a given device has only one PANA session, it is sufficient to use the key ID alone to represent the KR key.

In addition, the root secret key KR may be derived from the EMSK generated by the EAP method at the end of the successful authentication procedure. In this case, the root secret key KR is generated by the EAP peer present in the device and by the authentication server present in the MAS 308 or MSBF 306. EMSK thus constructs a dynamically generated shared secret key and is used as a seed for the root secret key (KR) derivative according to the following equation:

KR = Hash (EMSK, constant_string | Assigned-Device-ID | Network-ID | other_parameters).

As the key index, a combination of PANA session identifier and PANA key ID is used for a given device. If a given device has only one PANA session, it is sufficient to use the key ID alone to represent the KR key. In addition, the following newly defined expression can be used to calculate the key index:

Key-index = Hash (KR, constant_string | other_parameters).

Next, at step 350, device information authorization is performed to the MAS so that the M2M core network may send device provisioning information (eg, KR, device ID, etc.) with the MAS 308. This step is executed only if the second mutual authentication is executed successfully.

According to another embodiment of the present invention, NSEC 302 may be removed from the above-described embodiment. In this case, MSBF 306 and / or MAS 308 and device 300 interact directly with each other without sending messages via NSEC 302. In this case, the PANA protocol may be used for communication of the MSBF 306 and / or the MAS 308 and the device 300 (ie, between the MSF 306 and / or the MAS 308 and the NSEC 302). Implemented protocols will also be removed).

Referring to FIG. 3, each of the device 300, NSEC 302, NREM 304, MSBF 306, MAS 308 is a controller for controlling and performing their operations, and for transmitting signals. A transmitter may include a transmitter, a receiver for receiving signals, a transceiver for transmitting and receiving signals, and a key generator for generating keys.

4A is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of a device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 4A, at step 401, the device determines whether a bootstrap procedure is initiated by the device. If the bootstrap procedure is initiated by the device, the process proceeds to step 404. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step 402. In step 402, the device determines whether a bootstrap request is sent by the NSEC of the MSBF. If no bootstrap request is sent, the device waits until the bootstrap request is sent. If a bootstrap request is sent, the process proceeds to step 403. In step 403, the device initiates a bootstrap procedure, and the process proceeds to step 404.

In step 404, the device determines whether the first mutual authentication is confirmed. If authentication is not confirmed, the process proceeds to step 408. If authentication is confirmed, the process proceeds to step 405. In step 405, the device executes the first mutual authentication, and the process proceeds to step 406. In step 406, the device determines whether the first mutual authentication is successful. If the first mutual authentication is not successful, the process ends. If the first mutual authentication is successful, the process proceeds to step 407. In step 407, the device executes device provisioning, and the process proceeds to step 408. In step 408, the device performs a second mutual recognition.

4B is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of a network security unit (NESC) according to an embodiment of the present invention.

4B, at step 411, the NSEC determines whether the bootstrap procedure is initiated by the NSEC. If the bootstrap procedure is initiated by NSEC, the process proceeds to step 412, otherwise the process proceeds to step 413. In step 413, the NSEC determines whether a request is received from the MSBF. If a request is received from the MSBF, the process proceeds to step 412, otherwise the process proceeds to step 414. In step 414, NSEC determines whether a boot message is received from the device. If a boot message is received from the device, the process proceeds to step 415, otherwise the process proceeds to step 413. At step 412, the NSEC sends a bootstrap request to the device. The bootstrap request may be sent as a PANA-Authentication-Request (PAR), and the process proceeds to step 415.

In step 415, the NSEC determines whether the first mutual authentication is confirmed. If the first mutual authentication is not confirmed, the process proceeds to step 418, and if the first mutual authentication is confirmed, the process proceeds to step 416. In step 416, the NSEC executes the first mutual authentication. In step 417, the NSEC determines whether the first mutual authentication is successful. If the first mutual authentication is not successful, the process ends, and if the first mutual authentication is successful, the process proceeds to step 418. In step 418, the NSEC performs a second mutual recognition.

4C is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of a Network Remote Entity Management Capability (NREM) according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 4C, at step 421, the NREM performs device provisioning.

4D is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrapping procedure of an M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) according to an embodiment of the present invention.

4D, at step 431, the MSBF determines whether the bootstrap procedure is initiated by the MSBF. If the bootstrap procedure is initiated by the MSBF, the process proceeds to step 432; otherwise, the process proceeds to step 433. In step 432, the MSBF sends a bootstrap request to the device, and the process proceeds to step 433. In step 433, the MSBF executes a second mutual authentication, and the process proceeds to step 434. In step 434, the MSBF determines whether the second mutual authentication is successful. If the second mutual authentication is successful, the process proceeds to step 435, otherwise the process ends. In step 435, the MSBF executes MSA authorization.

4E is a flowchart illustrating a bootstrap procedure of an M2M service layer authentication / authorization / billing server (MAS) according to an embodiment of the present invention.

4E, at step 441, the MAS determines whether the first mutual authentication is confirmed. If the first mutual authentication is not confirmed, the process proceeds to step 443, otherwise the process proceeds to step 442. At step 442, the MAS executes a first mutual authentication, and the process proceeds to step 443. In step 443, the MAS executes MAS permission setting.

Embodiments of the present invention can be applied to M2M systems that require automatic bootstrapping of M2M devices. In networks where devices can be pre-authorized (ie, factory-authorized), this solution is not necessary. However, due to the dynamic and large nature of M2M deployments, it is not practical to rely on pre-provisioning.

According to another embodiment, an M2M service layer bootstrap using an EAP based network connection authentication procedure is provided. The bootstrap procedure of executing bootstrapping alone has already been described above in the embodiments of FIGS. 4A-4E. This embodiment is an optimized procedure utilizing network connection authentication to bootstrap a device for the M2M service layer. The devices perform network connection authentication to connect to a given network before using higher-layer services such as M2M service. In order to perform such authentication, this embodiment describes a related procedure that takes advantage of the authentication already performed.

5 is a diagram illustrating a device function model according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 5, the device 500 includes a network registration manager 510 and an M2M bootstrap manager 520. The network registration manager 510 registers the device 500 with the network for the network connection service (that is, obtain a connection of the IP network). The M2M bootstrap manager 520 manages the bootstrap state of the device 500.

The network registration manager 510 includes components to be described below. The device configuration manager 512 manages configuration parameters such as a network ID and a device ID used for IP network connection. This device configuration manager 512 contacts the network discovery and selection manager to export the preconfigured network ID and accept the dynamically learned network ID. The device configuration manager 512 also connects with an EAP peer to export network user credentials to be used during EAP authentication. The network discovery and selection manager 514 executes network discovery and selection procedures for the IP network and contacts the EAP peer 516 to export the selected network ID. EAP peer 516 connects with the EAP lower-layer to perform the EAP authentication method. EAP low layer 518 performs low layer services for the EAP peer 516.

M2M bootstrap manager 520 includes components that will be described below. The device configuration manager 522 manages configuration parameters such as a network ID and a device ID used for M2M network connection. This device configuration manager 522 connects with the network discovery and selection manager to export the pre-configured network ID and accept the dynamically learned network ID, and the EAP peer 526 to export the M2M user credentials to be used during EAP authentication. do. The network discovery and selection manager 524 executes network discovery and selection procedures for the M2M network and contacts the EAP peer 526 to export the selected network ID. EAP peer 526 connects with the EAP low-layer to perform the EAP authentication method. EAP low-layer 528 connects with EAP peer 526.

Procedures defined for M2M bootstrapping include executing a protocol to mutually authenticate each other between the device and the MSBF and generate the required M2M root key. In most M2M networks, devices must be authenticated before acquiring a network connection. Instead of performing a separate authentication for the bootstrap procedure, the present embodiments implement network connection authentication to reduce the implementation, latency, and processing load imposed by the bootstrap procedure. It can be utilized.

6 is a diagram illustrating a separated network access authentication and M2M bootstrap procedure according to an embodiment of the present invention.

A network access server (NAS) 602 implements EAP authenticator and authentication, authorization, and billing (AAA) client functions. In addition, MAS 604 and device 601 are shown in FIG. 6, and AAA 605 implements authentication, authorization, billing server, and EAP authentication server functions. NSEC 603 performs security functions, and MSBF 606 provides M2M service bootstrap functionality.

In the embodiment of Figure 6, the M2M bootstrapping procedure becomes part of the network connection authentication procedure. The network connection authentication procedure is utilized for generating the root secret key KR. Instead of authenticating device 601 twice (once for network connection and once for M2M bootstrap), device 601 authenticates only once for network connection, and the resulting keys are assigned to the root secret key (KR). Used for generation. In step 610, network connection authentication is performed between the device 601 and the NAS 602. In step 615, network connection authentication is performed between the NAS 602 and the AAA 605. At step 620, M2M bootstrap procedures are performed between the device 601 and the NSEC 603. At step 625, M2M bootstrap procedures are performed between NSEC 603 and MSBF 606. At step 630, M2M bootstrap procedures are performed between MAS 604 and MSBF 606.

The embodiment of FIG. 6 is applicable to networks using EAP based network connection authentication. On the other hand, the embodiment of FIGS. 4A-4E is further applicable to networks using EAP over PANA.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example of scalable networks and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) using a Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) according to an embodiment of the present invention. A diagram illustrating a call flow for a network using an authentication protocol (EAP).

Referring to FIG. 7, AAA merges with MSBF to become AAA / MSBF 704. This approach is used when the access network uses EAP over PANA for network access authentication. In steps 710 and 715, the device 701 performs EAP based network connection authentication with the AAA / MSBF 704 via the NAS 702. EAP is communicated via PANA between device 701 and NAS 702 in step 710 and via RADIUS, Diameter or equivalent protocol between NAS 702 and AAA / MSBF 704 in step 715. .

In addition to the normal PANA call flow and payloads used for normal network connection authentication, additional payloads are exchanged to perform M2M bootstrapping. At least one PANA message MUST contain a usage-type AVP whose type value is set to a value indicating M2M bootstrapping. In addition, the last PANA message indicating the authentication result may include zero or more Assigned-Device-ID AVPs to convey the device identifier assigned by the network. In addition, at least one PANA message must include a Network-ID AVP. Additional payloads and AVPs have already been described above and thus further description is omitted.

At the end of the successful EAP authentication in steps 710 and 715, an EMSK is generated. This key is known to device 701 and AAA / MSBF 704. Moreover, the root secret key KR can be derived from the EMSK as described with respect to the embodiment of FIG. 3.

As the key index, a combination of PANA session identifier and PANA key ID is used for a given device. If a device has only one PANA session, it is sufficient to use a key ID alone to represent the root secret key. In addition, the key index may be calculated in the manner described with respect to the embodiment of FIG. 3. Thus, the root secret key is randomly generated by the network and securely delivered to the device 701 using a dedicated PANA AVP. The root secret key is encrypted before being delivered to the device 701, and the device 701 decrypts the root secret key when it receives the root secret key. For this encryption / decryption procedure, another key is defined that can be derived from both the device and the network. The key used for this encryption / decryption procedure is based on EMSK and is calculated according to the following equation:

AS_ENCR_KEY = Hash (EMSK, constant_string | other_parameters).

As the key index, a combination of PANA session identifier and PANA key ID is used for a given device. If a device has only one PANA session, it is sufficient to use a key ID alone to represent the AS_ENCR_KEY key. In addition, the following newly defined expression can be used to calculate the key index:

Key-index = Hash (AS_ENCR_KEY, constant_string | other_parameters).

The root secret key (KR) in encrypted form is transmitted from the AAA / MSBF 704 to the NAS 702 using the AAA protocol, and the NAS 702 using the PANA AVP in the last PANA message carrying the authentication result. To the device 701. The M2M-KR AVP may be included in the above-described PANA message, where the M2M-KR is used to deliver the root secret key KR to the device 701. The value field of the M2M-KR AVP contains the following data elements: a key ID carrying the identifier of the KR (the value of this identifier is assigned by the network); And KR-Encr. The key used for encryption is AS_ENCR_KEY.

Next, in step 720, device information authority setting is executed from the AAA 704 to the MAS 703. Step 720 includes the AAA 704 sharing device authorization information (eg, KR, device ID, etc.) with the MAS 703.

The embodiment of FIG. 7 can be applied to deployments where neither PANA nor similarly scalable EAP transmissions are used to deliver EAP. In such cases, dedicated payloads such as Network-ID and Assigned-Device-ID are not delivered to the device. Therefore, it is assumed that these parameters are determined in a manner not related to this embodiment. However, the device may already be configured with a device ID, and the device discovers the network ID with the help of network discovery facilities provided by the link layers. The following equation is used to derive KR from EMSK:

KR = Hash (EMSK, constant_string | Assigned-Device-ID | Network-ID | other_parameters).

The key index for the root secret key (KR) is calculated according to the following newly defined expression:

Key-index = Hash (KR, constant_string | other_parameters).

8 is a diagram illustrating a device function model according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 8, the device 800 includes a network registration manager 810 and an M2M bootstrap manager 82. The network registration manager 810 registers the device 800 with the network for network connection services (ie, obtain a connection of an IP network). The M2M bootstrap manager 820 manages the bootstrap state of the device.

The network registration manager 810 includes the components to be described below. A device configuration manager 811 manages configuration parameters such as a network ID and a device ID used for IP network connection. The device configuration manager 811 connects with a network discovery and selection manager 812 to export a preconfigured network ID and accept a dynamically learned network ID, and network user credentials to be used during EAP authentication. Connect with the EAP peer 811 to export the network user credentials. The device configuration manager 811 also contacts the EAP low-layer 814 to accept the dynamically learned device ID and the M2M bootstrap manager 820 to export the preconfigured device ID.

The network discovery and selection manager 812 executes network discovery and selection procedures for the IP network and connects with the EAP peer 813 to export the selected network ID. The network discovery and selection manager 812 also connects with an M2M bootstrapper 815 to export the selected network ID. The EAP peer 813 connects with the EAP low layer 814 to perform the EAP authentication method and also with the M2M bootstrapper 815 to export the EMSK.

The EAP low layer 814 contacts the M2M bootstrapper 815 to export the dynamically learned network ID and the assigned device ID. The M2M bootstrapper 815 receives input parameters from other entities in the network registration manager 810 and generates a root secret key KR and a key index according to the formulas of the embodiments. M2M bootstrap 815 also contacts the device configuration manager in M2M bootstrap manager 820, ie M2M bootstrap manager 820, to export these information elements.

The M2M bootstrap manager 820 includes a device configuration manager 825 to manage configuration parameters such as device ID, network ID, and root secret key (KR) used for M2M network connection, and network registration manager 810 Accept these parameters from the M2M bootstrapper 815.

The present embodiments can be applied to M2M systems executing bootstrapping of M2M devices. In networks where devices can be pre-authorized (ie, manufactured), this solution can be omitted. In networks with dynamic and large M2M deployments, relying on pre-provisioning is problematic due to the large scale of M2M deployments. Thus, the present embodiments apply to networks using EAP based network connection authentication. According to the embodiments, the access network provider and the M2M network provider are either the same entity or are in business affiliation, thus they may share a keying material as required in step 320 of the embodiment of FIG. 3. .

On the other hand, it has been described with respect to the preferred embodiments of the present invention through the specification and drawings, although specific terms are used, it is only used in a general sense to easily explain the technical details of the present invention and to help the understanding of the invention It is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that other modifications based on the technical idea of the present invention can be carried out in addition to the embodiments disclosed herein.

Claims (14)

  1. A method of providing a service by a machine-to-machine (M2M) device, the method comprising:
    Transmitting a request for first authentication including an identifier of the M2M device to a network security unit (NSEC);
    Performing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication with the NSEC; And
    If the first authentication is successful, generating a secret key using at least one of a master session key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device;
    ≪ / RTI >
  2. The method of claim 1,
    Receiving a bootstrap request from the NSEC or M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) before transmitting the request for the first authentication to the NSEC;
    ≪ / RTI >
  3. The method of claim 1,
    After generating the secret key, executing device authority setting with a Network Remote Entity Management Capability (NREM);
    ≪ / RTI >
  4. The method of claim 1,
    Sending a request for a second authentication to the NSEC comprising at least one of the MSK and an identifier of the M2M device;
    ≪ / RTI >
  5. In a machine-to-machine (M2M) device providing a service,
    A transmitter for transmitting a request for first authentication including an identifier of the M2M device to a network security unit (NSEC);
    A controller for performing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication with the NSEC; And
    A key generator for generating a secret key using at least one of a master session key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device if the first authentication is successful;
    M2M device comprising a.
  6. 6. The method of claim 5,
    A receiver for receiving a bootstrap request from the NSEC or M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) before transmitting the request for the first authentication to the NSEC;
    M2M device, characterized in that it further comprises.
  7. 6. The method of claim 5,
    After generating the secret key, the controller executes device authorization with a Network Remote Entity Management Capability (NREM).
  8. 6. The method of claim 5,
    And the transmitter sends a request for a second authentication to the NSEC including at least one of the MSK and an identifier of the M2M device.
  9. In a machine-to-machine (M2M) system, a method for providing a service by Network Security Capability (NSEC),
    Determining whether a request for first authentication comprising an identifier of the M2M device is received from an M2M device;
    When the request for the first authentication is received, performing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication with the M2M device; And
    If the first authentication is successful, generating a secret key using at least one of a master session key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device;
    ≪ / RTI >
  10. 10. The method of claim 9,
    Sending a bootstrap request to the M2M device before receiving the request for the first authentication;
    ≪ / RTI >
  11. 10. The method of claim 9,
    Receiving a request from the M2M device for a second authentication that includes at least one of the MSK and an identifier of the M2M device;
    ≪ / RTI >
  12. Network Security Capability (NSEC) that provides services in machine-to-machine (M2M) systems,
    It is determined whether a request for a first authentication including an identifier of the M2M device is received from an M2M device, and when a request for the first authentication is received, an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) with the M2M device. A controller for performing authentication; And
    A key generator for generating a secret key using at least one of a master session key (MSK) and an identifier of the M2M device if the first authentication is successful;
    NSEC comprising a.
  13. The method of claim 12,
    A transmitter for sending a bootstrap request to the M2M device before receiving the request for the first authentication;
    NSEC further comprising a.
  14. The method of claim 12,
    A receiver for receiving a request from the M2M device for a second authentication comprising at least one of the MSK and an identifier of the M2M device;
    NSEC further comprising a.
KR1020137029892A 2011-04-15 2012-04-16 Method and Apparatus for Providing Machine-to-Machine Service KR102051492B1 (en)

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US201161475972P true 2011-04-15 2011-04-15
US61/475,972 2011-04-15
US201161485275P true 2011-05-12 2011-05-12
US61/485,275 2011-05-12
US201161544577P true 2011-10-07 2011-10-07
US61/544,577 2011-10-07
PCT/KR2012/002874 WO2012141555A2 (en) 2011-04-15 2012-04-16 Method and apparatus for providing machine-to-machine service

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