KR101363290B1 - Lightweight authentication key agreement method between terminals - Google Patents

Lightweight authentication key agreement method between terminals Download PDF

Info

Publication number
KR101363290B1
KR101363290B1 KR1020120095915A KR20120095915A KR101363290B1 KR 101363290 B1 KR101363290 B1 KR 101363290B1 KR 1020120095915 A KR1020120095915 A KR 1020120095915A KR 20120095915 A KR20120095915 A KR 20120095915A KR 101363290 B1 KR101363290 B1 KR 101363290B1
Authority
KR
South Korea
Prior art keywords
terminal
key
public key
id
element
Prior art date
Application number
KR1020120095915A
Other languages
Korean (ko)
Inventor
이동훈
이화성
최원석
Original Assignee
고려대학교 산학협력단
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 고려대학교 산학협력단 filed Critical 고려대학교 산학협력단
Priority to KR1020120095915A priority Critical patent/KR101363290B1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of KR101363290B1 publication Critical patent/KR101363290B1/en

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/14Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/30Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD

Abstract

The present invention relates to a light weighted authentication key sharing method between terminals, and more specifically, generating a public key by a key generation authority server; Receiving, by the key generation authority server, a unique ID from a first terminal, and generating a secret key and a public key for the first terminal based on the ID; Receiving, by the first terminal, the generated private key and public key to determine whether the received private key and public key are valid; And sharing the session key between the first terminal and the second terminal through hash operation authentication.
With this configuration, the lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals of the present invention performs a lightweight encryption process for a session key when performing wireless communication by accessing a cloud computing system using a personal portable terminal having limited resources. By using the above, it is possible to stably provide a wireless communication service even without using many resources of the personal mobile terminal.

Description

Lightweight authentication key agreement method between terminals

The present invention relates to a lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals, and more particularly, to a lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals that can easily share a session key between terminals using a lightweight encryption scheme.

With the development of IT technology, as network services that were only available in a wired environment are easily used in a wireless environment, development of various service applications that can be used in a wireless environment is required.

In particular, in recent years, the number of users accessing the cloud computing system using a smart phone is increasing rapidly.

Such a cloud computing system is a technology that integrates a large database into virtualization technology by using a web-based application and utilizes a variety of information in physically different locations such as a desktop PC, a mobile phone, and a laptop. Say the environment. In this way, the integrated data can be distributed in the Internet virtual data center and processed again or transmitted to each terminal. In other words, it is a technology that saves software and data to a central computer connected to the Internet, and can work on the computer anytime and anywhere just by accessing the Internet with a terminal equipped with basic functions. By connecting and using it, you can increase the security of your information.

However, as described above, a cloud system using a wireless environment has a problem in that it is very vulnerable to eavesdropping or forgery attack of a transmission / reception message, unlike a wired environment.

In addition, in the case of a personal terminal used by a user in a wireless environment, the resources of the terminal are limited, unlike the conventional wired environment, in terms of arithmetic speed, battery, and memory space. Thus, in the case of eavesdropping or forgery attack of a transmission / reception message, a personal terminal in a wireless environment is more vulnerable.

As described above, the prior art of the lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals of the present invention is as follows.

Prior art 1 relates to Korean Patent Publication No. 2007-0035342 (2007.03.30), which relates to a lightweight mutual authentication method based on a password. The prior art 1 can simultaneously perform session key exchange through mutual authentication and key exchange between the user terminal and the authentication server by using a password verifier generated based on a password shared between the user terminal and the authentication server.

In addition, the prior art 2, Korean Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 1999-0086998 (December 15, 1999), relates to a method and system for secure lightweight transactions in a wireless data network. This prior art 2 states that a client with limited operator resources is located remote to the server and communicates with the server via a wireless data network, where the client and server are authenticated twice, i.e., client authentication and server authentication. Each authentication process is based independently, each authentication process is based on a shared secret encryption key and challenge / response mechanism, and the server checks the commonly used passwords and uses the session key and session key to reach a mutually accepted password in subsequent transactions. Send the password to the client together. Subsequent transactions between the client and server are processed into an authenticated and secured communication session, and furthermore, each transaction secured by the session key is marked by a transaction ID that is tested before one transaction takes place.

In order to solve the problems of the prior art as described above, the present invention provides a lightweight authenticated key sharing method between terminals that can share the session key between the terminal and the terminal in a wireless network environment using a lightweight encryption method. I will.

According to an embodiment of the present invention for solving the above problems, a lightweight key authentication method between terminals, comprising: generating a public key by a key generation authority server; Receiving, by the key generation authority server, a unique ID from a first terminal, and generating a secret key and a public key for the first terminal based on the ID; Receiving, by the first terminal, the generated private key and public key to determine whether the received private key and public key are valid; And sharing the session key between the first terminal and the second terminal through hash operation authentication.

More preferably one random prime number; Generating an elliptic curve according to the generated prime number and selecting an arbitrary generation source among the elliptic curves; Selecting any first element of one of the selected set of generation sources; And generating a public key based on the selected first element and the generation source.

More preferably, receiving a unique ID from the first terminal; Selecting an arbitrary second element of the set of generation sources and generating a first public key based on any generation source selected from the second element and the elliptic curve; Generating a first hash value by hashing the first public key and the ID received from the first terminal; Generating a first secret key by adding the second element and a value obtained by multiplying the first hash value by the first element, and converting the second element to an inverse; And generating a private key and a public key for the first terminal, including transmitting the first private key and the first public key to the first terminal.

In particular, the first terminal hashes its ID and the first public key received, multiplies the first hash value with the public key of the key generation authority server, adds the received first public key, and adds the first hash value. Comparing a value obtained by multiplying a value received by the first secret key with the generation source of the elliptic curve to determine whether the received first secret key and the first public key are valid; And determining the validity.

More preferably, the first terminal transmits its own ID, the first secret key and the first public key to the second terminal to share; Computing, by the second terminal, X B by selecting any third element of one of the set of generation sources; Transmitting, by the second terminal, its own ID, a second public key, and an XB to the first terminal; Calculating, by the first terminal, an arbitrary second element of the set of generation sources and calculating W A , X A , and Y A ; The first terminal owns its ID and the X A And transmitting Y A to the second terminal. Calculating, by the second terminal, e B and W B by multiplying a second secret key with X A ; Authenticating, by the second terminal, the first terminal based on the e B and W B ; Calculating a session key between the first terminal and the second terminal according to the authentication of the first terminal by the second terminal; Transmitting, by the second terminal, a hashed value of its ID, the ID of the first terminal, and the session key to the first terminal; Computing, by the first terminal, a session key by hashing its ID, the ID of the second terminal, and the W A ; And hashing the ID of the first terminal, the ID of the second terminal, and the calculated session key, and determining whether the hash operation value is the same as the hash operation value received from the second terminal. Authenticating the second terminal; and sharing the session key.

In particular, the value obtained by multiplying the third element by the second public key and multiplying the third element by the second hash value and the public key of the key generation engine server may include X B.

In particular, an ID of the first terminal, an ID of the second terminal, a value obtained by multiplying a value obtained by multiplying the source of the second element and the elliptic curve, and a value obtained by multiplying the second element and the X B are generated. It can contain the value W A.

In particular, it may include X A generated by adding a value obtained by multiplying the second element by the second public key, and multiplying the second element by the second hash value and the public key of the key generation authority server.

In particular, it may include Y A generated by multiplying the first secret key by adding the second element and the W A.

In the lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals according to the present invention, when a wireless communication is performed by accessing a cloud computing system using a personal portable terminal having limited resources, the portable portable terminal is used by using a lightweight encryption process for a session key. Even without using a lot of resources of the terminal there is an effect that can provide a stable wireless communication service.

In addition, the lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals of the present invention share a session key between terminals through a lightweight encryption process, thereby exposing to the eavesdropping or message forgery attack on each individual mobile terminal using the shared session key. There is an effect that can be prevented.

1 is a view showing a lightweight key authentication method between terminals according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a diagram illustrating a process of transmitting a secret key and a public key between a key generation authority server and a first terminal.
3 is a diagram illustrating a process of sharing a secret key and a public key between a first terminal and a second terminal.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments and accompanying drawings, which will be easily understood by those skilled in the art. The present invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein.

Hereinafter, referring to FIG. 1, a lighter-weight authentication key sharing method between terminals of the present invention will be described in detail. FIG.

1 is a view showing a lightweight key authentication method between terminals according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 1, in the lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals of the present invention, a key generation center server (KGC) generates a public variable including a public key (S110).

Looking at the public key generation process of the key generation authority server 110 in more detail as follows. In order for the key generation authority server 110 to generate at least one public variable, it first generates one random prime p.

In this way, an elliptic curve E according to the generated prime p is generated, and an arbitrary generator P is selected from among a plurality of generators belonging to the elliptic curve E.

Subsequently, one arbitrary first element s belonging to the generation source P selected above and the set Z p * is selected.

The key generation engine server 110 multiplies any generation source P belonging to the elliptic curve E and the first element s selected earlier to generate one public key P pub that is disclosed to each terminal.

The key generation authority server 110 also selects cryptographic one-way hash functions H and H 1 , such as SHA-1 or SHA-256.

As a result, the key generation engine server 110 generates the previously generated elliptic curve E, the set Z p * of the generator, any generator P belonging to the elliptic curve, the public key P pub and the hash function H of the key generator engine, Reveal H 1 to at least one terminal using a wireless network.

1 again, the key generation engine server 110 receives a unique ID from the first terminal 120 of a plurality of terminals to be connected to the clouding system using a wireless network, based on the ID A secret key and a public key for the first terminal 120 are generated (S120).

Hereinafter, referring to FIG. 2, a process of transmitting a secret key and a public key between the key generation authority server 110 and the first terminal 120 will be described in detail.

2 is a diagram illustrating a process of transmitting a secret key and a public key between a key generation authority server and a first terminal.

As shown in FIG. 2, first, the key generation authority server 110 receives a unique ID A from the first terminal 120 among a plurality of terminals to be connected to the cloud computing system using a wireless network.

Accordingly, the key generation engine server 110 selects any second element t A of the set Z p * for any generation source of the elliptic curve E, and then selects the selected second element t A. And multiply any generator P selected from the elliptic curve E to generate a first public key T A for the first terminal 120.

In this manner, the first received from the terminal first public key T A by the key generation engine server 110 generates an about 120 Then, the first public key T A and the first terminal (120) ID A is hashed H 1 (ID A || T A ) to generate a first hash value h A.

In addition, the key generation engine server 110 adds the second element t A to a value obtained by multiplying the first hash value h A previously generated by the first element s, and then converts it to the inverse to the first terminal. Generate a first secret key s A for 120.

The key generation authority server 110 is the first secret key s A for the first terminal 120 generated above. And a first public key T A to the first terminal 120.

Accordingly, the first terminal 120 has its own unique first secret key s A from the key generation authority server 110 And a first public key T A , and receives the first secret key s A And it is determined whether or not the validity of the first public key T A (S130).

This first secret key s A And a first public key validity judgment process for T A is the first terminal 120 is the first public key T A received from the key generation engine server 110 with its own unique identification ID A hash operation One first hash value h A Is multiplied by the public key P pub of the key generation engine server 110, the result is added with the first public key T A, and the value obtained by multiplying the first secret key s A by the elliptic curve E is obtained. It is determined whether the received first secret key s A and the first public key T A are valid by comparing whether or not it is equal to the generation source P of.

The validity determination process of the first secret key s A and the first public key T A may be expressed by Equation 1 below.

[Equation 1]

s A (T A + H 1 (ID A || T A ) P pub ) = P

The first terminal 120 determined that the first secret key s A and the first public key T A received from the key generation authority server 110 is valid is sessioned with the second terminal 130 through hash operation authentication. Share the key (S140).

Hereinafter, a process of sharing a secret key and a public key between a first terminal and a second terminal will be described in detail with reference to FIG. 3.

3 is a diagram illustrating a process of sharing a secret key and a public key between a first terminal and a second terminal.

As shown in FIG. 3, the second terminal in the wireless network to which the first terminal 120 that has previously determined whether the private key and the public key are valid to share an ID A indicating its unique identification value ( 130).

The second terminal 130 selects an arbitrary third element r B of the set Z p * for any generation source of the elliptic curve E, and calculates X B using the same. In this case, X B is the third element r B And a value obtained by multiplying the second public key T B by the product of the third element r B , the second hash value h B, and the public key P pub of the key generation engine server 110.

This X B can be represented by Equation 2 below.

 &Quot; (2) "

X B = r B T B + r B h B P pub

At this time, the key generation engine server 110 selects any third element r B of the set Z p * for any generation source of the elliptic curve E, and selects the selected third element t B and the elliptic curve E The second public key T B for the second terminal 130 is generated by multiplying any generation source P. The key generation authority server 110 is the second public key T B And ID B received from the second terminal 130 to generate a second hash value h B by hash operation H 1 (ID B || T A ).

The second terminal 130 has its own unique ID B , the second public key T B And X B is transmitted to the first terminal 120.

Thereafter, the first terminal 120 selects one arbitrary second element r A of the set Z p * of the generation source, and uses W A , X A , and Y A according to Equation 3 below. Calculate &Quot; (3) "

W A = H 1 (ID A || ID B || r A P || r A X B )

X A = r A T B + r A h B P pub

Y A = (r A + W A ) s A

That is, W A is a value obtained by multiplying ID A of the first terminal 120, ID B of the second terminal 130, the second element r A, and any generation source P belonging to the elliptic curve. And a value generated by hashing together a value obtained by multiplying the second element r A by the X B. Further, X A is a value obtained by multiplying the second element r A by the second public key T B , the second element r A , the second hash value h B, and the public key P of the key generation engine server 110. Generated by adding up the product of pub . In addition, Y A is a value generated by multiplying the first secret key s A of the first terminal 120 by adding the second element r A and the W A.

Thereafter, the first terminal 120 and its ID A , the X A previously calculated And Y A to the second terminal 130.

Therefore, the second terminal 130 is the second secret key s B Compute e B and W B based on and X A. At this time, the e B is calculated through the product of the second secret key s B and the X A. In addition, W B is any one third of ID A of the first terminal 120, ID B of the second terminal 130, e B, and one of a set Z p * belonging to the generation source P. Generated by hashing together the product of elements r B and X A.

The second terminal 130 authenticates the first terminal 120 through Equation 4 below based on the above e B and W B.

&Quot; (4) "

Y A (T A + h A P pub ) = e B + W B P

That is, the second terminal 130 adds a value obtained by multiplying the first hash value h A by the public key P pub of the key generation engine server 110 with the first public key T A, and then adds the added value to the Y A value. The first terminal 120 compares the value obtained by multiplying the W B and the generated source P belonging to the elliptic curve E to the value multiplied by and equal to the value obtained by adding e B to the first terminal 120. Complete the certification.

As such, as the second terminal 130 authenticates the first terminal 120, the second terminal 130 calculates session keys SK A and B with the first terminal 120. At this time, the session key SK A, B, and B refers to the ID value, the hash W B of the first terminal (120), ID A and the second terminal 130 of.

As a result, the second terminal 130 has its own ID B And a value z generated by hashing ID A of the first terminal 120 and the session keys SK A and B together , to the first terminal 120.

Accordingly, the first terminal 120 hashes its ID A , the ID B of the second terminal 130, and the previously calculated W A together to generate session keys SK A and B.

Then, the first terminal 120 is received by the own ID A and ID B, and previously computed session key SK A, a value hash with B of the second terminal 130 from the second terminal 130, Comparing whether or not the same as z and if the same, the authentication for the second terminal 130 is completed.

In addition, such a light weight authenticated key sharing method between terminals may be stored in a computer readable recording medium having recorded thereon a program for execution by a computer. At this time, the computer-readable recording medium includes all kinds of recording apparatuses in which data that can be read by a computer system is stored. Examples of the computer readable recording medium include ROM, RAM, CD-ROM, DVD 占 ROM, DVD-RAM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, hard disk, optical data storage, and the like. The computer readable recording medium can also be distributed over network coupled computer devices so that the computer readable code is stored and executed in a distributed fashion.

In the lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals according to the present invention, when a wireless communication is performed by accessing a cloud computing system using a personal portable terminal having limited resources, the portable portable terminal is used by using a lightweight encryption process for a session key. Even without using a lot of resources of the terminal there is an effect that can provide a stable wireless communication service.

In addition, the lightweight authentication key sharing method between terminals of the present invention share a session key between terminals through a lightweight encryption process, thereby exposing to the eavesdropping or message forgery attack on each individual mobile terminal using the shared session key. There is an effect that can be prevented.

While the present invention has been described in connection with what is presently considered to be practical exemplary embodiments, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the disclosed embodiments, but, on the contrary, Do.

110: key generation engine 120: first terminal
130: second terminal

Claims (10)

  1. Generating, by the key generation authority server, a public key;
    Receiving, by the key generation authority server, a unique ID from a first terminal, and generating a secret key and a public key for the first terminal based on the ID;
    Receiving, by the first terminal, the generated private key and public key to determine whether the received private key and public key are valid; And
    Sharing a session key between the first terminal and the second terminal through hash operation authentication;
    Lightweight authenticated key sharing method between terminals comprising a.
  2. The method of claim 1,
    Generating the public key
    Generating one random prime number;
    Generating an elliptic curve according to the generated prime number and selecting an arbitrary generation source among the elliptic curves;
    Selecting one arbitrary first element belonging to the selected generation source; And
    Generating one public key based on the selected first element and generation source;
    Lightweight authenticated key sharing method between the terminal comprising a.
  3. 3. The method of claim 2,
    Generating a private key and a public key for the first terminal
    Receiving a unique ID from the first terminal;
    Selecting an arbitrary second element of the set of generation sources and generating a first public key based on any generation source selected from the second element and the elliptic curve;
    Generating a first hash value by hashing the first public key and the ID received from the first terminal;
    Generating a first secret key by adding the second element and a value obtained by multiplying the first hash value by the first element, and converting the second element to an inverse; And
    Transmitting the first secret key and the first public key to the first terminal;
    Lightweight authenticated key sharing method between the terminal comprising a.
  4. The method of claim 3,
    Determining whether the secret key and the public key is valid
    The first terminal hashes its ID and the received first public key, multiplies the first hash value by the public key of the key generation authority server, adds it to the received first public key, and adds to the added value. Lightweight authentication between terminals characterized in that the value obtained by multiplying the received first secret key is equal to the generation source of the elliptic curve, and determines that the received first secret key and the first public key are valid. Shared keys.
  5. 5. The method of claim 4,
    The sharing of the session key
    Transmitting, by the first terminal, to a second terminal to share its unique ID, a first secret key, and a first public key;
    Computing, by the second terminal, X B by selecting any third element of one of the set of generation sources;
    Transmitting, by the second terminal, its own ID, a second public key, and X B to the first terminal;
    Calculating, by the first terminal, an arbitrary second element of the set of generation sources and calculating W A , X A , and Y A ;
    Transmitting, by the first terminal, its ID and the X A and Y A to the second terminal;
    Calculating, by the second terminal, e B and W B by multiplying a second secret key with X A ;
    Authenticating, by the second terminal, the first terminal based on the e B and W B ;
    Calculating a session key between the first terminal and the second terminal according to the authentication of the first terminal by the second terminal;
    Transmitting, by the second terminal, a hashed value of its ID, the ID of the first terminal, and the session key to the first terminal;
    Computing, by the first terminal, a session key by hashing its ID, the ID of the second terminal, and the W A ; And
    The first terminal hashes its ID, the ID of the second terminal, and the computed session key, and determines whether the hash operation value is the same as the hash operation value received from the second terminal. 2 authenticating the terminal;
    ≪ / RTI >
    X B is
    Represents a value generated by adding a value obtained by multiplying the third element by the second public key and multiplying the third element by the second hash value and the public key of the key generation engine server,
    W A is
    And the ID of the first terminal, and the ID of the second terminal, the second element and multiplied by the generator of the elliptic curve value and the second element with the value generated by the product of the X B by hashing operation Indicate,
    X A is
    Represents a value generated by adding a value obtained by multiplying the second element by a second public key, multiplying the second element by a second hash value, and a public key of the key generation authority server.
    Y A is
    Light weight authenticated key sharing method between the terminal characterized in that the value generated by multiplying the first secret key with the value of the second element and W A.
  6. delete
  7. delete
  8. delete
  9. delete
  10. A computer-readable recording medium having recorded thereon a program for executing a method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 by a computer.
KR1020120095915A 2012-08-30 2012-08-30 Lightweight authentication key agreement method between terminals KR101363290B1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
KR1020120095915A KR101363290B1 (en) 2012-08-30 2012-08-30 Lightweight authentication key agreement method between terminals

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
KR1020120095915A KR101363290B1 (en) 2012-08-30 2012-08-30 Lightweight authentication key agreement method between terminals

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
KR101363290B1 true KR101363290B1 (en) 2014-02-18

Family

ID=50271039

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
KR1020120095915A KR101363290B1 (en) 2012-08-30 2012-08-30 Lightweight authentication key agreement method between terminals

Country Status (1)

Country Link
KR (1) KR101363290B1 (en)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR20180081469A (en) * 2017-01-06 2018-07-16 경일대학교산학협력단 Information security system through encrypting and decrypting personal data and contents in smart device based on Lightweight Encryption Algorithm, method thereof and computer recordable medium storing program to perform the method

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20010044897A1 (en) 1997-04-23 2001-11-22 Ryuji Ishiguro Information processing apparatus, information processing method, information processing system and recording medium
KR100642745B1 (en) 2005-10-05 2006-10-30 고려대학교 산학협력단 Id-based key agreement method and apparatus
US20100205443A1 (en) 2007-10-23 2010-08-12 Sufen Ding Method and structure for self-sealed joint proof-of-knowledge and diffie-hellman key-exchange protocols

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20010044897A1 (en) 1997-04-23 2001-11-22 Ryuji Ishiguro Information processing apparatus, information processing method, information processing system and recording medium
KR100642745B1 (en) 2005-10-05 2006-10-30 고려대학교 산학협력단 Id-based key agreement method and apparatus
US20100205443A1 (en) 2007-10-23 2010-08-12 Sufen Ding Method and structure for self-sealed joint proof-of-knowledge and diffie-hellman key-exchange protocols

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR20180081469A (en) * 2017-01-06 2018-07-16 경일대학교산학협력단 Information security system through encrypting and decrypting personal data and contents in smart device based on Lightweight Encryption Algorithm, method thereof and computer recordable medium storing program to perform the method
KR102038217B1 (en) * 2017-01-06 2019-10-29 경일대학교산학협력단 Information security system through encrypting and decrypting personal data and contents in smart device based on Lightweight Encryption Algorithm, method thereof and computer recordable medium storing program to perform the method

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Wang et al. Panda: Public auditing for shared data with efficient user revocation in the cloud
US8214890B2 (en) Login authentication using a trusted device
US7840813B2 (en) Method and system with authentication, revocable anonymity and non-repudiation
Ren et al. Mutual verifiable provable data auditing in public cloud storage
US20090271618A1 (en) Attestation of computing platforms
JP4790731B2 (en) Derived seed
US20070242830A1 (en) Anonymous Certificates with Anonymous Certificate Show
Challa et al. Secure signature-based authenticated key establishment scheme for future IoT applications
KR100843081B1 (en) System and method for providing security
Tsai et al. A privacy-aware authentication scheme for distributed mobile cloud computing services
Choudhury et al. A strong user authentication framework for cloud computing
KR101486782B1 (en) One-time password authentication with infinite nested hash chains
He et al. Efficient and anonymous mobile user authentication protocol using self-certified public key cryptography for multi-server architectures
Wang et al. Robust authentication and key agreement scheme preserving the privacy of secret key
TW200818838A (en) Mutual authentication and secure channel establishment between two parties using consecutive one-time passwords
Liu et al. Fine-grained two-factor access control for web-based cloud computing services
US8688973B2 (en) Securing communications sent by a first user to a second user
TW200810488A (en) Policy driven, credential delegation for single sign on and secure access to network resources
EP1927211A2 (en) Authentication method and apparatus utilizing proof-of-authentication module
KR20030010667A (en) Systems, methods and software for remote password authentication using multiple servers
KR20070122495A (en) Peer-to-peer authentication and authorization
CN101051908A (en) Dynamic cipher certifying system and method
Wazid et al. Design of secure user authenticated key management protocol for generic IoT networks
Lin et al. A new strong-password authentication scheme using one-way hash functions
EP2639997B1 (en) Method and system for secure access of a first computer to a second computer

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
A201 Request for examination
E902 Notification of reason for refusal
E701 Decision to grant or registration of patent right
GRNT Written decision to grant
FPAY Annual fee payment

Payment date: 20170109

Year of fee payment: 4

FPAY Annual fee payment

Payment date: 20180108

Year of fee payment: 5

FPAY Annual fee payment

Payment date: 20190201

Year of fee payment: 6