KR100953712B1 - Method and apparatus for filtering injected bogus data in sensor network, and computer-readable recording medium used thereto - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method, an apparatus, and a computer readable recording medium for preventing counterfeit data insertion attacks in a sensor network using independent cell polynomials and cell authenticator vectors for each cell of a sensor field.

A method for preventing forged data insertion attacks in a sensor network according to the present invention comprises generating a cell key in association with a cell polynomial and a cell authenticator vector corresponding to each cell delimiting a sensor field and generating a cell key in the cell. A cell key distribution step of distributing the cell key to a sensor node; Selecting a data aggregation node in which a data aggregation node is selected among the sensor nodes that have discovered the event when a sensor node having received the cell key is found in the cell; A sensor node signature value generation step of generating a sensor node signature value through the distributed cell key, public key, and secret random number at the sensor node that has discovered the event; Generating a final signature value through the sensor node signature value in the data set node to construct a report; And verifying and transmitting the report to the sink node if the report is valid by validating the report using the final signature value and the public key.

Description

Method and apparatus for filtering injected bogus data in sensor network, and computer-readable recording medium used

The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for preventing counterfeit data insertion attacks in a sensor network, and to a computer readable recording medium used for the same, and more particularly to using independent cell polynomials and cell authenticator vectors for each cell of a sensor field. A method, apparatus, and computer-readable recording medium for preventing counterfeit data insertion attacks in a sensor network.

The wireless sensor network is a base network for implementing ubiquitous computing, and is a wireless network composed of many light and ultra power sensor nodes. Because sensor nodes in a wireless sensor network are randomly placed, they can be easily exposed by physical attacks. For example, an attacker can obtain a sensor node to obtain secret information in its memory.

Such an attack may not only transmit wrong information due to the insertion of forged data, but may also cause resource depletion of sensor nodes in a path through which the sensor node transmits information to a sink. Therefore, you must discover this forged data as early as possible before the forged data arrives at the sink node. Several methods have been proposed to reduce the spread of forged data. The methods determine whether or not the data has been forged by voting several sensor nodes to find forged data. However, these methods have two disadvantages. The first drawback is that each sensor node needs to store a lot of keys in order to improve filtering capabilities. A second disadvantage is that the above methods cannot detect insertion of forged data when t or more sensor nodes, which are predefined values of neighboring nodes, are attacked by an attacker.

Zhang recently discovered a location-based threshold endorsement (LTE) method that can detect forged data and ignore the forged data (Y. Zhang, W. Liu, W. Lou, and Y.). See Fang, "Location-based compromise-tolerant security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks,", vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 247-260, IEEE JSAC, Special Issue on Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, Feb. 2006. ). In order to report legitimate data in the LTE method, it must be co-signed by at least t authenticated sensor nodes. Compared with the existing methods, the LTE method is characterized by effectively reducing the communication energy required to transmit data to the remote sync node and increasing the filtering capability. The biggest reason for the LTE method to effectively reduce communication energy is because it applies a public key based method rather than a symmetric key based method as in the conventional methods. While the computational energy required increases, on the other hand, the required communication energy can be significantly reduced, the overall advantage is that the life of the wireless sensor network can be extended. However, the LTE method has a fatal weakness. The LTE method uses a jointly assigned key for each node when cell signing to increase filtering capability. When an event occurs in any cell, a data aggregation point (AP), which is elected among the nodes that discover the event, generates a signature value to report data. However, after executing the LTE method once, the AP will generally be able to obtain some of the secret information necessary to generate the cell key and cell signature key. Therefore, although not intended in the LTE method, a part of information about one cell is exposed to an attacker, thereby threatening the safety of another cell.

Accordingly, the first technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method for preventing counterfeit data insertion attack in the sensor network that ensures the independent stability of the cells of the sensor field without loss of filtering capability.

The second technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a counterfeit data insertion attack prevention device in the sensor network to ensure the independent stability of the cells of the sensor field without loss of filtering capability.

A third technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a computer readable recording medium having recorded thereon a program capable of performing a method for preventing counterfeit data insertion attack in a sensor network according to the present invention.

In order to solve the first technical problem as described above, in the method for preventing a forged data insertion attack in the sensor network, a cell polynomial and a cell authenticator vector corresponding to each cell partitioning the sensor field A cell key distribution step of generating a cell key and distributing the cell key to sensor nodes in the cell; Selecting a data aggregation node in which a data aggregation node is selected among the sensor nodes that have discovered the event when a sensor node having received the cell key is found in the cell; A sensor node signature value generation step of generating a sensor node signature value through the distributed cell key, public key, and secret random number at the sensor node that has discovered the event; Generating a final signature value through the sensor node signature value in the data set node to construct a report; And verifying and transmitting the report to the sink node if the report is valid by validating the report using the final signature value and the public key.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the generating of the sensor node signature value may include: generating a first intermediate value using the public key and the secret random number to generate the sensor node signature value at the sensor node that discovers the event; Transmitting to the data set node; Selecting t, the predetermined number of the first intermediate values received from the sensor nodes that have detected the event at the data set node, to generate a second intermediate value and to broadcast the generated second intermediate value ; And generating the sensor node signature value using the second intermediate value, the distributed cell key, the public key, and the secret random number at the sensor node that found the event.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the searching and ignoring step may verify the report and, if the report is not valid, search for the sensor node that has sent the invalid data by examining the sensor node signature value, and search the sensor. It may include a search and ignore step that ignores the node's information.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, if there is an intermediate node between the data set node and the sink node, the method may include verifying the report at the intermediate node and ignoring the report if the report is not valid. It may further include.

In order to solve the second technical problem as described above, in the apparatus for preventing a forged data insertion attack in the sensor network, comprising a sensor node located in each cell partitioning the sensor field, A sensor unit generating a cell key in association with a cell polynomial and a cell authenticator vector corresponding to a cell and distributing the cell key to sensor nodes in the cell; A relay unit transferring information between the sensor unit and the sink node; And a controller configured to control operations of the sensor unit and the relay unit, wherein the sensor node of the sensor unit selects a data set node from among sensor nodes that have found the event, and detects the event, and the distributed cell key. Generate a sensor node signature value through a public key, and a secret random number, and the elected data set node generates a final signature value through the sensor node signature value to construct a report, the final signature value and the The present invention provides a device for preventing counterfeit data insertion attacks in a sensor network that verifies the report through a public key and transmits the report to the sink node if the report is valid.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the sensor node that finds the event generates a first intermediate value using the public key and the secret random number to generate the sensor node signature value, and generates the first node as the selected data set node. And the elected data set node selects t, the predetermined number of the first intermediate values received from the sensor nodes that have found the event, to generate a second intermediate value and generate the second intermediate value. A sensor node that broadcasts a value and finds the event may generate the sensor node signature value using the second intermediate value, the distributed cell key, the public key, and the secret random number.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the elected data set node verifies the report and, if the report is not valid, examines the sensor node signature value and searches for the sensor node that has transmitted the invalid data. You can ignore the sensor node information.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the relay unit includes an intermediate node located between the data set node and the sink node, and the intermediate node may ignore the report if the report is not valid by verifying the report. have.

In order to solve the third technical problem as described above, a computer-readable recording medium that can be read by a computer controlling a sensor network, the method for preventing counterfeit data insertion attack in the sensor network according to the present invention. A computer readable recording medium having recorded thereon a program code is provided.

Method, apparatus and computer readable recording medium used for preventing counterfeit data insertion attack in the sensor network according to the present invention provide the advantage of improving the data filtering capability of the sensor network and ensuring independent stability of each cell of the sensor field. do.

Prior to the description of the specific contents of the present invention, the theory related to the present invention will be described for convenience of understanding.

Bilinear  group( Bilinear group ) And pairing ( Pairing )

의 곱셈 그룹의 서브 그룹을 의미한다. 페어링(Pairing)은 다음과 같은 특성을 가진 페어링 함수

에 기반한다. We define two large primes p , q , and G ₁ , G ₂ are groups whose q is the prime order. G ₁ is the set of points on the elliptic curve E / F _p . G ₂ is a finite field for an appropriate α

Means a subgroup of the multiplication group. Pairing is a pairing function with the following characteristics:

Based on.

을 만족한다. (1) Bilinearity: When all P and Q satisfy P , Q ∈ G ₁ and a, b∈ Z _q ^* ,

To satisfy.

는 G ₂의 생성자이다. (2) Non-degenerancy: when p is the constructor of G ₁ ,

Is the constructor of G ₂ .

을 계산하는데 효과적인 알고리즘이 존재한다.(3) Computability: When all P and Q satisfy P , Q ∈ G ₁ ,

There is an effective algorithm for calculating

ID  -Based public key cryptography

Traditional public key based cryptography (PKI) is too complex and slow and requires a lot of energy. Since these characteristics are not appropriate for wireless sensor networks, most sensor key studies are about symmetric key-based cryptography. Symmetric key-based schemes have a small computational overhead, but generally there is a lot of communication overhead, or each node requires considerable memory. For this reason, many researchers have recently begun researching PKIs viable in sensor networks.

In a certificate-based system, users must obtain a certificate that can be used for a long time from a certification authority. This certificate is then given to other users to authenticate that user. In ID-based systems, on the other hand, users can know the user's public ID through something like email. Therefore, unlike certificate-based systems, certificate transfer is not necessary in ID-based systems. In wireless sensor networks, these differences have a big impact on the lifetime of the network. This is because the transmission energy required to transmit one bit requires much more energy than that required to calculate 32 bits. Experiments on energy consumption show that the energy required for calculation is less than 3% of the total energy consumption, while the energy required for communication is about 97%.

Location-based key management Scheme

Simplify the location-based key (LBK) management scheme. Before deploying nodes, assume that a trusted authority (TA) exists that:

(1) TA is the two groups G ₁ and G ₂ specified in the bilinear group and pairing. And design a pairing function.

(2) TA chooses two cryptographic hash functions H and h . However, the hash function maps the output value of constant length to any non-zero input value in G ₁ .

(3) TA arbitrarily selects k that satisfies k ∈ Z _q ^* as the network master secret value. When W is a random source of G ₁ , the public key W _pub = kW of the TA is satisfied.

(4) For Node A with identification information ID _A , the TA calculates ID-based key IK _A = kH ( ID _A ).

과 ID 기반 키인 IK _A을 배치 전에 미리 저장한다. 일단 센서 노드가 배치되면 각 센서 노드에 자기의 센서 노드의 위치 정보가 제공된다. Zhang은 상기 논문에서 이동 가능한 로봇과 주요지점을 사용하여 위치 정보를 제공하는 두 개의 센서 위치 기반 기술을 고려하였다. 위치 측정 후에 센서 노드 A는 센서 노드 B의 위치정보 l_A와 LK _A=kH(ID _A∥l _A)을 저장하게 된다. 마지막으로 상기 두 개의 센서 노드 A와 B는 하기 수학식 1과 같이 그들의 위치 정보와 ID 정보를 교환한 후에 공통키를 생성한다.Each sensor node is a public key system

And IK _A , the ID-based key, are stored before deployment. Once sensor nodes are deployed, each sensor node is provided with its own sensor node location information. Zhang considered two sensor location-based techniques that provide location information using mobile robots and key points. After the position measurement, sensor node A stores the position information l _A and LK _A = kH ( ID _A ∥ l _A ) of sensor node B. Finally, the two sensor nodes A and B generate a common key after exchanging their location information and ID information as shown in Equation 1 below.

In the equation 1, "h" means "concatenation".

DETAILED DESCRIPTION Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings to clarify the solutions of the technical problems of the present invention. The same reference numerals are used even in the drawings, and it will be apparent that components of other drawings may be cited when necessary in describing the drawings.

In the following description of the present invention, detailed descriptions of related well-known technologies or configurations will be omitted. In addition, terms to be described later are terms defined in consideration of functions in the present invention, which may vary according to intention or custom of a user, an operator, or the like. Therefore, the definition should be made based on the contents throughout the specification.

1 shows a sensor field partitioned by cell.

After dividing the sensor field 100 by the square shape M x N with r as the length of each side, each cell is divided into integer pairs <m, where m and n satisfy 1≤m≤M and 1≤n≤N. n> ID ⁱ _{m , n} represents the i-th node with location information l ⁱ _{m , n} in the cell.

2 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a method for preventing a forged data insertion attack in a sensor network according to the present invention.

3 is a block diagram showing an example of the anti-counterfeiting data insertion attack prevention device in the sensor network according to the present invention.

과 셀 인증자 벡터

을 정의한다. 상기 셀 다항식에서, F _j 는 G ^* ₁ 에서 무작위로 선택한 계수이다. 상기 인증자 벡터 식에서,

이고,

이다. 셀 키를 공유하기 위해 다음 두 가지 방식이 사용될 수 있다.2 and 3, a cell of a cell corresponding to the cell polynomial and the cell authenticator vector in relation to a cell polynomial and a cell authenticator vector corresponding to each of the cells constituting the sensor field 100. A key is generated and the cell key is distributed to the sensor node 302 in the cell (S200). Unlike conventional methods, cell-polynomials for each cell <m, n> rather than one polynomial and authenticator vector

And cell authenticator vector

Define. In the cell polynomial, F _j is a randomly selected coefficient from G ^* ₁ . In the authenticator vector expression,

ego,

to be. Two ways can be used to share cell keys:

Range-based cell key distribution

을 계산한다. 마지막으로, 상기 이동 가능 로봇은 센서 노드 ID ⁱ _{m ,n}(302)와의 공통키인 IK _a 을 사용하여 상기 K ⁱ _{m ,n}과 상기 셀 인증자 벡터를 상기 센서 노드 ID ⁱ _{m ,n}(302)에게 안전하게 전송한다.This method plays an important role for the mobile robot to distribute the common information K _{m , n} . The scheme assumes that the robot has a (t-1) order polynomial F (x). First, the mobile robot calculates the cell polynomials F _{m , n} (x), the cell keys K _{m , n} = kH (m∥n) and the cell authenticator vector in the cell <m, n>. Next, the movable robot is shared information of the sensor node 302 using K _{m , n} and ID ⁱ _{m , n} which is sensor node identification information.

Calculate Finally, the mobile robot uses the IK _a as _a common key with the sensor node ID ⁱ _{m , n} 302 to convert the K ⁱ _{m , n} and the cell authenticator vector to the sensor node ID ⁱ _{m , n} 302. Send securely to).

K _{m , n} may be recreated from shared information of t or more predetermined values. On the other hand, it cannot be made from less than (t-1) shared information. In the present invention, a cell key is generated by a t-order linear equation in the same manner as in Equation 2 below.

이다.In Equation 2, Ω is defined as a t-order subset of all sensor nodes in a cell,

to be.

Since the node density is a trade off relation and the prevention of shared information leakage due to the attacker's node acquisition, the parameter value t should be determined according to which property is more important.

Cell key distribution with no range limitation

Each sensor node 302 stores the polynomial F (x) and master key k before deployment. After calculating the LBK (Location Based Key) of each node, node ID ⁱ _{m , n} uses k _{m , n} to generate K _{m, n} , cell polynomial and shared information K ⁱ _{m , n} . It also calculates the cell authenticator vector. After completing all the above steps, k , the polynomial F (x), the cell polynomial, and the cell key K _{m , n} stored in the memory of the sensor node 302 should be safely erased.

계산한 후, 상기 중간값을 AP(304)에 게 송신한다. 미리정한 값 t개 이상의 데이터를 받은 후에 상기 AP(304)는 상기 데이터 사이에서 임의로 t개를 선택한다. 상기 데이터를 보낸 상기 센서 노드(304)는 Ω에 포함되어 있는 센서 노드이다. 다음으로 상기 AP(304)는

을 계산하고 상기 θ을 다른 센서 노드들에게 브로드캐스트 한다. 상기 θ을 수신하는 즉시 각 센서 노드(302)는 보고서에 대한 센서 노드 서명값

을 계산함으로써 보고서(Λ)에 대한 자신의 서명값을 생성한다(S202). 그리고 각 센서 노드(302)는 상기 AP(304)와 공유한 페어와이즈(pairwise) 키를 사용하여 상기 AP(304)에게 상기 센서 노드 서명값을 송신한다. 다음으로 상기 AP(304)는 보고서(Λ)에 대한 최종 서명값

을 계산한다(S204). 상기 보고서(Λ)의 최종 서명값은

이다. 따라서 상기 AP(304)에 의해 싱크(330)로 보내지는 최종 보고서 구성은

가 된다.Next, when a sensor node that receives the cell key is found in a cell of the sensor field 100 of the sensor unit 300, an event is detected. The data aggregation node 304 is selected from the sensor nodes that have discovered the event. Elect. The sensor nodes ID ⁱ _{m , n} 302 that find the event randomly select secret information (or secret random number) α _i ∈ Z _q ^* to generate a signature value for a report Λ , and the sensor node D ⁱ _m, an intermediate value for generating a sensor node signature value of _n (302)

After the calculation, the median value is transmitted to the AP 304. After receiving more than t predetermined values of data, the AP 304 randomly selects t among the data. The sensor node 304 that sent the data is a sensor node contained in Ω . Next, the AP 304

And θ is broadcast to other sensor nodes. Upon receipt of the θ , each sensor node 302 is assigned a sensor node signature value for the report.

By generating the signature value for the report ( Λ ) is generated (S202). Each sensor node 302 transmits the sensor node signature value to the AP 304 using a pairwise key shared with the AP 304. Next, the AP 304 determines the final signature value for the report Λ .

To calculate (S204). The final signature value of the report Λ is

to be. Therefore, the final report configuration sent by the AP 304 to the sink 330 is

Becomes

을 유도한 후,

을 검사함으로써 보고서의 신빙성을 검증할 수 있다(S206). 그 세부 과정은 하기 수학식 3과 같다.Even if some sensor nodes are lost, the AP 304

After inducing

By checking the reliability of the report can be verified (S206). The detailed process is as shown in Equation 3 below.

을 검증한다(S202). If the verification passes, the AP 304 believes that the final report is justified. If there is no intermediate node 312 in the relay unit 310, the final report is directly sent to the sink 330 (S210). If the verification does not pass, the AP 304 receives the sensor node signature value received from each sensor node through a process as shown in Equation 4 below to find a malicious sensor node.

Verify (S202).

The detailed process of Equation 4 is shown in Equation 5 below.

After searching for the malicious sensor node, the AP 304 may ignore the information coming from the malicious sensor node (S214).

를 계산한 후, 상기 최종 보고서를 검증한다. 상기 θ'는 하기 수학식 6과 같다.If there is an intermediate node 312 between the AP 304 and the sink node 330 (S208), when receiving the final report, the intermediate node 312 receives several system wide (called sampling probability). The final report is verified by the system-wide parameter p _s (S216). The intermediate node first

After calculating, verify the final report. Θ 'is as shown in Equation 6 below.

 If the final report is valid (S218), the following equation (7) is satisfied.

을 만족한다면 상기 중간 노드(312)는 그 최종 보고서를 다음 홉으로 보낸다(S218). 그렇지 않으면 그 최종 보고서는 위조된 것으로 판단하여 상기 중간 노드(312)에서 무시된다(S220). 다음 홉의 중간 노드에서 상기 단계(S216, S218, S220)를 반복할 수 있다.if,

If satisfied, the intermediate node 312 sends the final report to the next hop (S218). Otherwise, the final report is determined to have been forged and ignored by the intermediate node 312 (S220). Steps S216, S218, and S220 may be repeated at the intermediate node of the next hop.

4 graphically depicts the probability of finding a forged report based on the number of hops. Due to LTE's weaknesses, LTE cannot guarantee its intended filtering capabilities. The method according to the invention verifies the report received by the intermediate node with probability p _s . The expected probability of finding a forged report within l hops and ignoring the forged report is equal to 1- (1-p _s ) ^l . For example, when p _s = 0.4, the probability of finding a forged report within 5 hops is 92%, and the probability of finding within 10 hops is 99%. Determination of the p _s value should find a suitable value between computational overhead and filtering capability as needed. The two properties are trade-offs. When a large number of forged data is found, the value can be increased without additional memory. However, other existing security schemes have to increase the number of keys stored in advance before deploying on each node to increase their probability, thus increasing the computational overhead. This difference between the existing scheme and our scheme is very important. The reason is that the proposed scheme can exert sufficient filtering capability on the routing path without increasing the number of keys stored in advance before deployment.

The anti-counterfeiting data insertion attack prevention device in the sensor network according to the present invention includes sensor nodes located in the same cell of the sensor field, such as the sensor node 302 and the AP 304, and a cell polynomial corresponding to each cell. And a sensor unit 300 for generating and distributing a cell key in association with a cell authenticator vector, a relay unit 310 which may include the intermediate node 312, and the sensor unit 300 and the relay unit ( And a control unit 320 for controlling 310, wherein the sensor node 302, the AP 304, and the intermediate node 304 included in the apparatus according to the present invention are the control unit 320. It works as described above.

The method for preventing counterfeit data insertion attack in the sensor network according to the present invention can also be embodied as computer readable program code on a computer readable recording medium which can be read by a computer controlling the sensor network. The computer readable recording medium includes all kinds of recording devices for storing data that can be read by the computer system.

Examples of computer-readable recording media include ROM, RAM, CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, optical data storage, and the like, and may also be implemented in the form of a carrier wave (for example, transmission over the Internet). do. The computer readable recording medium can also be distributed over network coupled computer systems so that the computer readable code is stored and executed in a distributed fashion.

와

을 알아냈다고 하더라도, α_i없이 K ⁱ _{m ,n}와 K _{m ,n}을 결코 획득할 수 없다. 따라서 악의적인 AP로부터 영향을 받지않는 이점이 있다.As described above, the method, apparatus and computer-readable recording medium used for preventing counterfeit data insertion attack in the sensor network according to the present invention, since each sensor node that detects an event arbitrarily selects the secret information α _i AP Cannot find α _i of each sensor node. AP

Wow

Even if it is found, K ⁱ _{m , n} and K _{m , n} can never be obtained without α _i . Therefore, there is an advantage that is not affected by malicious AP.

In addition, according to the invention, a separate cell-polynomial is used for every cell. For example, suppose that an attacker has obtained t shared information about the cell <m, n>, and the attacker computes a t-variable linear equation, all of the (t-1) th order polynomials F _{m , n} (x) Even if the coefficient { H ( F _j ∥ m ∥ n)} can be derived, the attacker cannot obtain any information about the other cells <m ', n'>. Because H is a cryptographic hash function with a one-way nature it is to elicit _{H (F j ∥m∥n) H (} F j ∥m'∥n ') from extremely difficult. As a result, even if the cell-polynomial of a cell is exposed to an attacker, it does not affect the safety of other cells. That is, there is an advantage of giving independent stability to each cell.

The present invention has been described above with reference to preferred embodiments thereof. Those skilled in the art will understand that the present invention can be implemented in a modified form without departing from the essential features of the present invention.

Therefore, the disclosed embodiments should be considered in descriptive sense only and not for purposes of limitation. The scope of the present invention is shown in the claims rather than the foregoing description, and all differences within the equivalent scope will be construed as being included in the present invention.

1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a sensor field partitioned into cells.

2 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a method for preventing a forged data insertion attack in a sensor network according to the present invention.

3 is a block diagram of an example of an anti-counterfeiting data insertion attack apparatus in a sensor network according to the present invention.

4 is a graph showing the probability of finding a forged report according to the number of hops.

Claims (18)

In the method for preventing a forged data insertion attack in the sensor network, A cell key distribution step of generating a cell key in association with a cell polynomial and a cell authenticator vector corresponding to each cell partitioning a sensor field and distributing the cell key to sensor nodes in the cell; Selecting a data aggregation node in which a data aggregation node is selected among the sensor nodes that have discovered the event when a sensor node having received the cell key is found in the cell; A sensor node signature value generation step of generating a sensor node signature value through the distributed cell key, public key, and secret random number at the sensor node that has discovered the event; Generating a final signature value through the sensor node signature value in the data set node to construct a report; And And verifying and transmitting the report to the sink node if the report is legitimate by verifying the report using the final signature value and the public key. The method of claim 1, wherein the generating of the sensor node signature value comprises: Generating a first intermediate value using the public key and the secret random number to generate the sensor node signature value at the sensor node that discovers the event and transmitting the generated first intermediate value to the data aggregation node; Selecting t, the predetermined number of the first intermediate values received from the sensor nodes that have detected the event at the data set node, to generate a second intermediate value and to broadcast the generated second intermediate value ; And Generating the sensor node signature value using the second intermediate value, the distributed cell key, the public key, and the secret random number at the sensor node that has discovered the event. How to prevent forgery data insertion attacks. The method of claim 2, wherein the verifying and transmitting step comprises: And verifying the report, if the report is not valid, checking the sensor node signature value, searching for a sensor node that has transmitted invalid data, and retrieving and ignoring information of the retrieved sensor node. Counterfeit data insertion attack prevention method in the sensor network. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein And if there is an intermediate node between the data set node and the sink node, verifying the report at the intermediate node and ignoring the report if the report is not justified. How to prevent data insertion attacks. The method of claim 1, wherein the cell key distribution step, Method for preventing forged data insertion attack in the sensor network, characterized in that the step based on the range-based cell key distribution scheme. The method of claim 1, wherein the cell key distribution step, A method for preventing forged data insertion attacks in a sensor network, characterized in that the step is based on a cell key distribution method without a range limitation. In the device for preventing counterfeit data insertion attack in the sensor network, Sensor nodes located within each cell delimiting a sensor field, generating a cell key in association with a cell polynomial and a cell authenticator vector corresponding to each cell, and generating a cell key to the sensor node within the cell. A sensor unit for distributing a key; A relay unit transferring information between the sensor unit and the sink node; And A control unit for controlling the operation of the sensor unit and the relay unit, The sensor node of the sensor unit, when discovering an event, selects a data set node among the sensor nodes that found the event, generates a sensor node signature value through the distributed cell key, public key, and secret random number, And The elected data set node generates a final signature value through the sensor node signature value, constructs a report, verifies the report through the final signature value and the public key, and sinks the report if the report is justified. Counterfeit data insertion attack prevention device in the sensor network to send to the node. The method of claim 7, wherein The sensor node that finds the event generates a first intermediate value using the public key and the secret random number to generate the sensor node signature value, and transmits the first intermediate value to the selected data set node. The elected data set node selects t, the predetermined number of the first intermediate values received from the sensor nodes that have found the event, to generate a second intermediate value and to broadcast the generated second intermediate value. To cast, and The sensor node that finds the event generates the sensor node signature value using the second intermediate value, the distributed cell key, the public key, and the secret random number. Insertion prevention device. The method of claim 8, wherein the selected data set node, If the report is not valid by validating the report, the sensor node signature value is inspected to search for a sensor node that has transmitted invalid data, and the information of the detected sensor node is ignored. Insertion prevention device. The relay unit according to any one of claims 7 to 9, wherein And an intermediate node located between the data set node and the sink node, wherein the intermediate node verifies the report and ignores the report if the report is not valid. Prevention device. The method of claim 7, wherein the sensor unit, A device for preventing counterfeit data insertion in a sensor network, characterized in that cell keys are generated and distributed by range-based cell key distribution. The method of claim 7, wherein the sensor unit, A device for preventing counterfeit data insertion in a sensor network, characterized in that cell keys are generated and distributed according to an unlimited range of cell key distribution methods. In a computer readable recording medium that can be read by a computer controlling a sensor network, The computer readable recording medium has recorded a counterfeit data insertion prevention program in the sensor network, the program, A cell key distribution code for generating a cell key in association with a cell polynomial and a cell authenticator vector corresponding to each cell partitioning a sensor field and distributing the cell key to sensor nodes in the cell; A data aggregation node election code for selecting a data aggregation node among the sensor nodes that have discovered the event when a sensor node having received the cell key in the cell finds an event; A sensor node signature value generation code for generating a sensor node signature value through the distributed cell key, public key, and secret random number at the sensor node that has discovered the event; Code for causing the data set node to generate a final signature value through the sensor node signature value to construct a report; And And verification and transmission code for verifying the report through the final signature value and the public key to send the report to a sink node if the report is legitimate. The method of claim 13, wherein the sensor node signature value generation code, Code for generating a first intermediate value using the public key and the secret random number to generate the sensor node signature value at the sensor node that has discovered the event and to transmit it to the data set node; Selecting t, the predetermined number of the first median values received from the sensor nodes that have detected the event in the data set node, to generate a second median and to broadcast the generated second median code; And And code for causing the sensor node that detected the event to generate the sensor node signature value using the second intermediate value, the distributed cell key, the public key, and the secret random number. Possible recording media. The method of claim 14, wherein the verification and transmission code, And verifying the report, if the report is not valid, including a search and ignore code for checking the sensor node signature value to search for a sensor node that has transmitted invalid data, and to ignore the information of the found sensor node. A computer readable recording medium. The computer-readable medium of any one of claims 13 to 15, wherein And if there is an intermediate node between the data set node and the sink node, code for verifying the report at the intermediate node to ignore the report if the report is not legitimate. media. The method of claim 13, wherein the cell key distribution code, And a code using a range-based cell key distribution scheme. The method of claim 13, wherein the cell key distribution code, A computer readable recording medium, characterized in that it is a code using a cell key distribution method without a range limitation.

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