KR100888008B1 - Address allocation method for anonymous communication in wireless network and method for using the address - Google Patents

Abstract

An address allocation method and an allocated address utilizing method for anonymous communication in wireless network allocating a set of a plurality of elements to a logical address of each node are provided to perform anonymity communications without an encoding and decoding process by selectively using a part of a logical address as a temporary address. A master node uses an arbitrary S value. The UPS(unique pair sequence) is produced(S201). The master node extracts the element of K from UPS with N burn. The matrix of N row K heat is made(S202). In the master node is the AMAC(Address embedded Message Authentication Code) Pool, the arbitrary ACS(Address embedded message authentication Code Set) is selected. The master node assigns ACS which arbitrarily selects as the logical address of each node(S204). ACS is transmitted to each node(S205).

Description

Address Allocation Method for Anonymous Communication in Wireless Network and Method for Using the Address}

The present invention relates to an address used in a wireless network, and more particularly, an address for anonymity communication in a wireless network composed of a star topology composed of one master and a plurality of slaves. An allocation method and a method of utilizing the address.

Because of the broadcasting characteristics of wireless communication channels, wireless networks are very vulnerable to various security attacks. Various security measures have been proposed to overcome this weakness. For example, it encrypts the content of a message for confidentiality and attaches a message authentication code (MAC) to verify the authenticity of the message.

However, at present, most wireless communication networks, including cellular networks, encrypt only the content of the message and do not encrypt the header. Therefore, various security vulnerabilities may occur.

That is, because wireless communication is broadcast, all nodes in the vicinity can receive the transmitted message, and thus a malicious node can also hijack all the messages. In this case, the contents of the message are encrypted and cannot be opened, but an attacker can obtain a lot of information from the unencrypted header. That is, the attacker can easily obtain information about when, who, who, and how much data is sent from the header, and may attack in the form of a traffic analysis attack.

Due to these problems, various studies on anonymous communication have been conducted so far, and the best method for anonymous communication is to hide the sender and the receiver. That is, it encrypts a header containing information about the sender and receiver.

The methods for applying the previous research results to header encryption / decryption can be largely divided into a pair-wise symmetric key method, a network-wide symmetric key method, and an asymmetric key method. .

In other words, when using a pair-wise symmetric key, a pair-wise key of a sender and a receiver should be used for decryption. However, since the receiver cannot find the sender by looking at the encrypted header, it uses the pair-wise key of its own to decrypt it. Should try. In addition, using a network-wide symmetric key simplifies the encryption / decryption of headers, but once the key is exposed, the entire network is not secure.

In addition, when using an asymmetric key, the sender encrypts the header with the receiver's public key, and all nodes receiving the message must decrypt it with their own private key to verify that the message is sent to themselves. The computation is so large that it is difficult to use for all messages.

In addition, existing security supplements can cause performance degradation. Encrypting / decrypting a message requires a number of calculations, which can slow down the exchange of messages, make more use of system resources such as device power and memory, and improve the integrity and integrity of the message. Since the MAC used to verify the origin makes the message large, it can cause bandwidth overhead.

MAC is a tens to hundreds of bits of code used to verify the authenticity of a message, which results in a small ratio of the actual contents to the total message size, resulting in bandwidth inefficiency. This inefficiency is especially pronounced in sensor networks with relatively small data sizes or in small message transmissions such as 'HELLO' or 'ACK' messages.

Network designers want to build networks more securely and more efficiently. However, as mentioned earlier, the trade-off between performance and security made it impossible to provide efficiency and security at the same time. In other words, to increase security, the performance improvement had to be abandoned, whereas the lower security level had to be selected for performance improvement.

In fact, IEEE 802.15.4 provides some security suites, but all are optional. This may be considered to be a decision at the discretion of the network administrator in consideration of the tradeoff. As a network administrator, you'll be struggling between performance improvements and security levels when choosing one of the security suites. However, if there is a security feature with no performance penalty, it no longer needs to be optional.

Accordingly, the present invention enables anonymity communication without going through an encryption / decryption process, and bandwidth inefficiency caused by an increase in message size due to MAC added additionally from various overheads brought by existing security supplements. To solve the problem.

In particular, the present invention assigns a large number of unique address sets, rather than a single address, to each node's logical address, so that each node selects one of a large number of addresses in the address set as a temporary address when sending a message. It is intended to provide an address allocation method that enables anonymous communication without going through a complicated encryption / decryption process.

In addition, the present invention eliminates the existing MAC (message authentication code), using a new code (Address-embedded MAC (AMAC) that performs both the role of message authentication and address instead of the source address and destination address, an additional MAC, It is also an object of the present invention to provide a method of using an address that enables authentication of a message without additionally.

In addition, the present invention uses AMAC whose value varies according to each source address and destination address pair and message content (content), thereby ensuring privacy while preventing overhead increase due to encryption / decryption of addresses. do.

In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a method of allocating a master node in a wireless network including a master node and a plurality of slave nodes, wherein a sequence in which two or more elements are listed is allocated as a logical address of each node, The present invention provides an address assignment method for anonymous communication in a wireless network in which a logical address is allocated such that an arbitrary pair of pairs generated by extracting two consecutive elements from a logical address of the node exists only in a logical address of one node.

In this case, the address allocation method may include a first step of generating an arbitrary sequence UPS (Unique Pair Sequence) in which a sequence pair generated by extracting two consecutive elements appears only once; A second step of extracting N consecutive K elements from the UPS and generating a matrix AMAC Pool (Address-embedded Message Authentication Code Pool) of N rows and K columns; When each row of the AMAC pool is referred to as an address-embedded message authentication code set (ACS), an arbitrary ACS of N ACSs of the AMAC pool is assigned as a logical address of a master node, and other ACSs are logical to slave nodes. A third step of allocating an address; It may be made, including.

In this case, the third step may include: assigning an arbitrary ACS of N ACSs of the AMAC pool as a logical address of a master node; When a specific slave node enters a network, selecting any of the unassigned ACSs of the AMAC pool as a logical address of the corresponding slave node, and transmitting the ACS of the master node and the ACS of the slave node to the corresponding slave node; It may include.

The first step also includes the steps of: a) initializing a UPS; b) sequentially selecting any two integers from among a predetermined range of integers and sequentially adding them to the UPS; c) selecting at least one integer from among a predetermined range of integers; d) create an ordered pair listing the last integer added to the UPS and the currently selected integer in order, and determine whether the ordered pair is an ordered pair that exists in the current UPS. Returning and adding the currently selected integer to the UPS if it is a sequence pair that does not currently exist in the UPS and proceeding to the next step; e) determining whether all ordered pairs starting with the last integer added to the UPS currently exist in the UPS, terminating the UPS generation process if all the ordered pairs exist, and otherwise returning to step c); It may be made, including.

Another object of the present invention to achieve the above object is a method of utilizing an address in a wireless network consisting of a master node and a plurality of slave nodes, each node entering the network is assigned a sequence in which two or more elements are listed as logical addresses. A first step of assigning a logical address such that any ordered pair created by extracting two consecutive elements from the logical address of a particular node exists only in the logical address of one node; A second step of generating an ordered pair by extracting two consecutive elements according to a predetermined rule from its logical address, and using the ordered pair as its temporary address; It provides an address utilization method for anonymous communication in a wireless network comprising a.

In this first step, the master node generates an arbitrary sequence UPS (Unique Pair Sequence) in which only one ordered pair is generated by extracting two consecutive elements, and extracts N consecutive K elements from the UPS. Generating a matrix AMAC Pool (Address-embedded Message Authentication Code Pool) of N rows and K columns; When each row of the AMAC pool is referred to as an address-embedded message authentication code set (ACS), the master node assigns any ACS of N ACSs of the AMAC pool as a logical address of the master node, and slaves other ACSs. Assigning to logical addresses of nodes; It may include.

In the second step, a sequence pair is generated by extracting two consecutive elements using one or more of a hashing key and message contents shared with a master node, and using the sequence pair as its temporary address. It may be a step.

In the second step, at least one of a hashing key and message contents shared with the master node is input to the hash function, and two consecutive elements are extracted based on the output values to generate ordered pairs. It may be a step of using the corresponding order pair as its temporary address.

Therefore, according to the address assignment method for anonymous communication in the wireless network of the present invention and the method of utilizing the address, since a set of a plurality of elements is assigned to the logical address of each node, when the nodes transmit a message, A portion of the logical address can be selected and used as a temporary address, thereby enabling anonymity communication without a separate complicated encryption / decryption process.

In addition, according to the present invention, an additional MAC (message authentication code) may be omitted because a new code (Address-embedded MAC; AMAC) is used instead of the source address and the destination address to perform both the message authentication role and the address role. Therefore, the message size is reduced, thereby increasing the efficiency of the bandwidth.

In addition, according to the present invention, since only a portion of the logical address is included in the message and transmitted, the message size can be reduced, and the privacy level, which has become increasingly important in recent years, can be improved simultaneously. And the use of AMAC whose value changes depending on the destination address pair and the message content (content), thereby reducing the overhead caused by the encryption / decryption of the address.

Details of the above object and technical configuration of the present invention and the resulting effects thereof will be more clearly understood from the following detailed description based on the accompanying drawings.

The present invention is a message authentication method in one-hop wireless communication, and is a message authentication scheme usable in a network form consisting of a star topology consisting of one master and a plurality of slaves. For example, a cellular network composed of one base station and several mobile stations, a sensor network in which one sink node communicates with several sensor nodes, and the like may be considered.

In the present invention, it is assumed that the master node allocates a logical ID during the network registration process of the slave nodes, and this logical ID is assumed to be used as a node identifier in the network.

Prior to the description, a unique pair sequence (UPS), which is the most important part of the present invention, will be described first.

UPS is defined as follows.

UPS in the present invention means a sequence that is arbitrarily generated so that two consecutive elements appear only once. In other words, two consecutive elements become a unique pair in a UPS. In Equation 1, m means the length of the UPS.

A method of generating a UPS will be described with reference to FIG. 1.

First, when S ordered pairs of integers from 0 to S-1 are arranged as shown in FIG. 1, S ² different ordered pairs are generated. These ordered pairs are randomly selected and listed. At this time, the ordered pairs having the same value as the 2nd component of the immediately preceding ordered pair as the first component are selected and the components having the same value are overlapped.

For example, after first selecting (0,1), ordered pairs having '1' as the first element of (0,1), that is, (1,0), (1,1), (1 , 2) You have to choose from (1, S-1). If (1, S-1) is selected as the second element, it is placed so that '1' of the first ordered pair and '1' of the second ordered pair overlap. This creates a UPS represented by {0,1, S-1}.

Continue until you can no longer list ordered pairs in the same way. In this sequence, only one sequence of two components exists. The length of the sequence depends on the order in which the ordered pairs are placed, but cannot exceed the maximum S ² +1 and at least longer than 2S. In the worst case, the first component is listed in the same ordered pair, and the sequence length is 2S.

On the other hand, since the UPS is composed of randomly selected pairs, the exact length of the UPS cannot be known, and the length varies depending on the order of pulling the ordered pairs. However, the range of UPS lengths can be defined as follows.

Theory 1. The maximum length of the UPS is S ² +1 and the minimum length is 2S.

Proof: 1. Maximum length: numbered all ordered pairs that make up an integer from 0 S-1 is S ^2, if the UPS make use of all the ordered pair S ² is a case where the length of the largest UPS. Therefore, the length of the UPS cannot exceed S ² +1.

Proof 2. Minimum Length: The process of generating a UPS is terminated when all of the sequence pairs having the same first pair of elements are used. That is, when the length of the UPS is minimum, the ordered pairs having the same first element (for example, (k, S-1) (k, S-2)… (k, 1) (k, 0)) This is the case. This is actually (k, S-1) (S-1, k) (k, S-2)... This is the same as (1, k) (k, 0) listed in order, so in this case the length of the UPS is minimal and its length is 2S.

Referring to Figure 2 as an example.

(0,3) (0,2) (0,1) Draw (0,0) in order and line up. This creates a UPS named {0,3,0,2,0,1,0,0}. In this case, the length of the UPS can no longer be extended since all the ordered pairs with '0' as the first element are used. This is actually the same as drawing (0,3) (3,0) (0,2) (2,0) (0,1) (1,0) (0,0), with a minimum length of 2S ( 2x4 = 8).

On the other hand, even if the elements of the UPS are randomly selected, all ordered pairs may be used. For example, (0,1) (1,0) (0,2) (2,0) (0,3) (3,1) (1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (1 , 3) (3,2) (2,2) (2,3) (3,3) (3,0) If (0,0) is drawn in order, then {0,1,0,2,0, A UPS with a maximum length of 3,1,1,2,1,3,2,2,3,3,0,0} will be created, with a maximum length of S ² +1 (4 ² + 1 = 17) Becomes

As such, the length of the UPS is unpredictable, so we use the statistical results of the UPS generation to estimate the length of the UPS.

First, we propose a UPS generation algorithm such as Algorithm 1.

In Algorithm 1, UPS [] is a matrix for generating a UPS, and RCB [] [] is a matrix for checking whether two consecutive elements (unique sequence pairs) in a UPS are used. Each element of the UPS is randomly selected from integers from 0 to S-1. RCB [i] [j] equal to 1 means that an ordered pair (i, j) exists on the UPS. Therefore, RCB [] [] is used to determine whether a newly randomly selected integer value can be added to the UPS.

For example, there is currently a UPS with three elements {5,1,3}. At this time, RCB [5] [1] = 1, RCB [1] [3] = 1, and all other values of RCB [] [] are zero.

If '2' is to be added to a new UPS, it must be checked whether the sequence pair (3,2) created using the last added integer 3 and the currently selected integer 2 has been used by the UPS. RCB [3] [ 2] = 0, confirming that the ordered pair (3,2) is the first to appear on the UPS. Therefore, adding the currently selected integer 2 will cause the UPS to be {5,1,3,2} and set RCB [3] [2] = 1.

By increasing the length of the UPS in the same way, the generation of the UPS is terminated when all the sequence pairs with the same first element of the sequence pair are used. RCB [i] [0], RCB [i] [1], RCB [i] [2]. If all values up to RCB [i] [S-1] are 1, the UPS can no longer be increased.

As a result of simulation through Algorithm 1, the length of the UPS cannot be accurately predicted. However, as the value of S increases, the length of the UPS becomes closer to the maximum length (S ² +1).

3 is a simulation result of the UPS length when the UPS is made with Algorithm 1. 1000 simulations were performed with varying S values from 8 to 1024. Longest / MAX (Shortest / MAX, Average / MAX) is the maximum (minimum, average) length of the UPSs obtained from the simulation and the maximum length of the theoretical UPS ( MaxLength = S ² +1). It can be seen that all three values are closer to the maximum length as the S value increases. When S is 128 or more, the shortest experimental value is about 95% or more of the maximum length.

4 is a graph showing the probability that a sequence of 90% and 95% of the maximum length is created. When the S value is 32, the maximum length is 1025 (= 32 ² +1), where the probability that the randomly generated UPS will be 95% (about 974) and 90% (about 923) of the maximum length is 85, respectively. %, 98%.

As the value of S increases, the probability grows more and more. The probability when the value of S is 128 represents almost 1 in both cases. Therefore, if the S value is large enough (about 128 or more), it is assumed that the UPS made with Algorithm 1 above has a length equal to the maximum length * a (a: effective length coefficient). In the present invention, using this statistical evidence, a is assumed to be 0.9 when S is given, and the length of the UPS expected according to the given S value is regarded as the maximum length * 0.9.

Hereinafter, an embodiment of the address allocation method of the present invention and a method of utilizing the address allocated as described above will be described.

First, as shown in FIG. 5, first, in the network, the master node generates a UPS using an arbitrary S value (S201), and then extracts K consecutive N elements from the UPS N times to obtain a matrix of N rows and K columns. matrix) (S202). At this time, 'N * K ≤ UPS length' must be satisfied, and in the following, the length of the UPS is regarded as a * MaxLength. Where a is 0.9 and MaxLength is the maximum length of the UPS.

Meanwhile, the matrix of N rows and K columns thus produced is defined as an AMAC Pool (Address-embedded Message Authentication Code Pool). AMAC Pool is created from UPS {u ₁ , u ₂ , u ₃ , ..., u _{a * MaxLength} } as follows.

In the present invention, each row of the AMAC pool is defined as an address-embedded message authentication code set (ACS), and the i-th row ACS _i may be represented as follows.

In the present invention, since the UPS has a unique pair property in which two consecutive elements appear only once, an arbitrary ordered pair (x, y) exists in only one ACS.

As mentioned above, it is assumed that all nodes including the master node use a logical address as their identifier, and this logical address is assigned to each slave node by the master node.

Therefore, the master node selects a random ACS from the AMAC pool and uses it as its logical address (S203). In the same way, the master node allocates a randomly selected ACS as the logical address of each node (S204), It sends to each node to ACS of (S205). As a result, two ACSs are shared between a master node and a slave node.

On the other hand, each slave node shares a hashing key (key _hash ) with the master node and has three functions.

: MD5 혹은 SHA-1 등과 같은 해시 함수, Contents는 메시지의 내용(contents)이고, Char은 'S(Source)' 또는 'D(Destination)'이며, 출력되는 값은 1부터 K-1까지의 정수이다.Function 1.

Hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1, Contents is the contents of the message, Char is 'S (Source)' or 'D (Destination)', and the output value is an integer from 1 to K-1. to be.

: ACS_i가 순서쌍 (α,β)를 포함하는 지의 여부를 판별하는 함수Function 2.

: Function to determine whether ACS _i contains the ordered pair (α, β)

: ACS_i 로부터 j번째와 j+1번째 두개의 원소를 추출하여 j번째 순서쌍을 만드는 함수, 본 발명에서 함수 3의 출력 즉, ACS_i의 j번째 순서쌍을 AMAC(Address-embedded Message Authentication Code)라 정의한다. Function 3.

: The output of the extracting j-th and j + 1-th two elements from the ACS _i to create a j-th ordered pairs function, function 3 in the present invention, that is, the j-th ordered pairs of ACS _i AMAC (Address-embedded Message Authentication Code) called define.

On the other hand, the present invention generates and verifies a message transmitted and received between nodes through the above functions 1 to 3, the structure of the message is shown in Figure 6 (b).

As shown in FIG. 6, unlike the existing message structure including a destination address, source address, contents (message content), and MAC (message authentication code) as shown in FIG. 6A, a message used in the present invention. is composed of a source AMAC (AMAC _S) and the content to be input to the destination AMAC (AMAC _D), the source address field to be input to the destination address field, and _D AMAC Since the AMAC _S includes both an address role and an authentication role, no separate message authentication code is added.

Where AMAC _D and AMAC _S is an ordered pair generated by the functions 1 and 3 mentioned above, and is used as a temporary address. In short, AMAC _D is an ordered pair extracted from an ACS assigned to a destination node, and AMAC _S is an ACS assigned to a source node. The ordered pair is extracted from, and the number of ordered pairs from each is determined by the hash function of function 1.

That is, in the present invention, the source node transmitting the message uses AMAC _D and A node that generates an AMAC _S , enters it into the address field, sends it along with the message content, and receives a message such as this by using function 2 to determine whether the AMAC _D is an ordered pair in its ACS. If it is a destination node, verify and verify the source node and the message through AMAC _S.

More specifically with reference to Figures 7 and 8 as follows.

As shown in FIG. 7, the source node Sender that transmits the message generates AMAC _D which is AMAC of the destination node and AMAC _S which is AMAC of the source node, using Equations 4 and 5 below. (S401, S402).

를 전송한다(S404). 이와 같이, 본 발명에서 사용하는 메시지에는 추가되는 메시지 인증 코드(MAC)가 없고, 명확히 드러나는 어드레스도 존재하지 않는다. The source node is the AMAC _D generated by Equations 4 and 5 and Enter the AMAC _S in the address field (S403), and the message having a structure including AMAC _D and AMAC _S and contents, that is,

It transmits (S404). As such, there is no message authentication code (MAC) added to the message used in the present invention, and no clear address exists.

Since AMAC _D and AMAC _S belong only to the ACS of the destination node and the source node, every node receiving the message can distinguish between the source and the destination of this message. In addition, since the AMAC generation process includes the existing HMAC generation process, it can be used not only as an address but also as a message authentication code (MAC). This is why the present invention is called AMAC (Address-embedded MAC). In addition, since all nodes that do not have a corresponding ACS cannot obtain information about the source and destination nodes, anonymous communication is guaranteed.

Next, as shown in FIG. 8, when all nodes receive a message (S501), it is determined whether the AMAC _D of the corresponding message is included in their ACS (S502), and whether or not the corresponding message is a message to them. To judge. If the AMAC _D is not in its ACS, the node discards the message (S503). On the other hand, if the node is the destination of the message, the node should authenticate the message, and the authentication procedure is as follows.

First, if it is identified as a destination node, the corresponding destination node identifies a node in which the AMAC _S is included in the ACS, that is, the source node (S504). That is, the destination node finds a node satisfying the following equation (6).

Next, if the source node is identified, the destination node must verify that the message is a message sent from the node identified in step S504 and that the message has not been modified in the transmission process.

To this end, the destination node regenerates AMAC _D and AMAC _S in the same process as that of generating AMAC _D and AMAC _S in the source node (S505). To distinguish it from AMAC AMAC _D and _S generated by the source node, the AMAC AMAC _D and _S was generated by the destination node d, respectively AMAC 'and _D AMAC' _S.

The next time the destination node is found to determine whether or not it matches the AMAC _D and AMAC _S contained in that it generates a AMAC receiving the _'D and AMAC' _S each message (S506), matching determination result destination node Recognizes that the message is an unchanged message transmitted from a legitimate source node and succeeds in message verification (S507). Otherwise, it determines that the message verification has failed and discards the message (S508).

9 and 10 illustrate a message processing procedure of each of a transmitting node and a receiving node according to an embodiment of the address allocation method of the present invention. It is assumed that a transmitting node is a node A and a receiving node is a master node.

First, the master node creates a UPS, creates an AMAC pool, and assigns ACS to each of nodes A, B, C, and D. In this embodiment, it is assumed that ACS has been allocated as shown in FIG.

Next, if node A wants to send a message to the master, node A must create two AMACs, AMAC _D and AMAC _S.

이고,

이며, AMAC_D는 (2,1), AMAC_S는 (0,4)라고 가정한다.here

ego,

Assume that AMAC _D is (2,1) and AMAC _S is (0,4).

Node A inserts the corresponding AMAC values into the address field instead of the address, and transmits without the additional MAC attached.

All nodes that receive this message must determine whether or not the message came to them, which is used with the destination address AMAC _D.

Since nodes B, C, and D do not have an AMAC _D of (2, 1) in their ACS, they do not think it came to them and discard this message. However, since the master has (2,1) AMAC _D in its ACS, it considers it the destination of this message and identifies the source node.

The master node is looking for ACS, which includes the AMAC _S, check whether the ACS whose ACS before and since the node with the ACS includes the AMAC _S can be seen that the node A, assume that the node A as the source node do.

And since the master node needs to check whether the message is really a message transmitted from node A and whether the message has not been changed, it creates AMAC ' _S and AMAC' _D using node A's ACS and its own ACS. That is, AMAC ' _S and AMAC' _D are generated using a hashing key shared with Node A, which is assumed to be a source node, and the received content, and compared with AMAC _S and AMAC _D in the received message. Check if it matches.

 If there is a match, the master node can trust the message; otherwise, the message is not from node A, or the content of the message has been modified and should be discarded.

Next, analyzing the performance of the present invention.

How the AMAC Pool is configured determines the false positive ratio (fpr). Therefore, AMAC Pool should be configured to satisfy given conditions. The network must support up to N nodes, including the master. And assume that fpr is allowed for messages using AMAC. In the following, when N and F are given, the minimum number of AMAC bits that can satisfy this is calculated.

fpr is a case in which a wrong message is misjudged as correct. fpr in the scheme proposed by the present invention is a counterpart when an attacker sends malicious content to AMAC _D and AMAC _S of a hijacked message. This is the probability of misleading the malicious message as a legitimate message. This probability is ² (the number of ordered pairs in 1 / ACS) because AMAC _D and AMAC _S coincide within each ACS, resulting in 1 / (K-1) ² .

This will be explained using the previous example. Even if you hijack a message with 0,1 ∥ 2,1 with AMAC _D and AMAC _S , the attacker has no idea who the sending or receiving node is: the source node or the destination node. However, you can see that there are obviously nodes using ordered pairs 0, 1 and 2, 1, respectively.

Therefore, the probability of misleading a message with malicious content using AMAC as it is is that the probability that a malicious message would accidentally create an AMAC of 0,1 and 2,1, so 1 / (8-1) ² = 1/49 do.

As a result, the length K (the length of the ACS) of the AMAC pool must satisfy the following equation.

That is, the length K of the required ACS should be selected to a value satisfying Equation 8.

In addition, since the number of supported nodes in the network is N, there must be at least N ACSs. In other words, you need a UPS long enough to represent an N * K matrix. That is, an S value that satisfies the following Equation 9 is required, and an S value required to satisfy the given fpr and N is obtained as shown in Equations 10 and 11 derived from Equations 8 and 9.

Therefore, the AMAC Pool can be configured with K corresponding to Equation 8 by creating a UPS with an S value satisfying Equation 11, and the scheme proposed by the present invention can determine the size of the AMAC and the ACS size according to a given network environment. This provides flexibility in network design.

On the other hand, if ACS is reused, a node that repeatedly logs in and out of the network will one day be able to figure out the entire AMAC pool used within the network. Therefore, it is desirable that the master node dynamically create an AMAC pool.

That is, to remove the time delay of allocating the ACS to a new node entering the network, when the number of extra ACSs, e. Set K (length of ACS) and S (size of elements of UPS) to fit the number N, fpr F), and configure the AMAC Pool by making the UPS as e * K long in the initial network initialization phase. do.

When a node enters the network, the master assigns an arbitrary one from the e extra ACSs to the new node, then creates K elements and adds them to the UPS. And when a node leaves the network, it clears the ACS used by that node from the UPS and the AMAC pool.

In this case, the unique pair may be lost in the UPS, but since the unique pair is still present in the AMAC pool, there is no problem in identifying the node using the AMAC.

As those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains may implement the present invention in other specific forms without changing the technical spirit or essential features, the embodiments described above should be understood as illustrative and not restrictive in all aspects. Should be. The scope of the present invention is shown by the following claims rather than the detailed description, and all changes or modifications derived from the meaning and scope of the claims and their equivalents should be construed as being included in the scope of the present invention. do.

1 is a view for explaining a UPS generation method according to an embodiment of the present invention,

2 is a view for explaining the length of the UPS,

3 is a diagram showing a simulation result of a UPS length according to an S value;

4 is a graph showing the probability that a UPS having a length of 90% and 95% of a maximum length will be made;

5 is a flowchart sequentially showing an address allocation method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

6 illustrates a message structure of an embodiment of an address utilization method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

7 is a flowchart sequentially illustrating a message processing procedure of a transmitting node in an address utilization method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

8 is a flowchart sequentially illustrating a message processing procedure of a receiving node in an address utilization method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

9 is a diagram illustrating a message processing procedure of a transmitting node in an address utilization method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

10 is a diagram illustrating a message processing procedure of a receiving node in an address utilization method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Claims (8)

An address assignment method of a master node in a wireless network composed of a master node and a plurality of slave nodes, Assign a sequence of two or more elements to each node's logical address, but assign a logical address so that any sequence pair created by extracting two consecutive elements from a logical node's logical address exists only in the logical address of one node. An address allocation method for anonymous communication in a wireless network, characterized by the above-mentioned. The method of claim 1, The address allocation method, A first step of generating an arbitrary sequence UPS (Unique Pair Sequence) in which a sequence pair generated by extracting two consecutive elements appears only once; A second step of extracting N consecutive K elements from the UPS and generating a matrix AMAC Pool (Address-embedded Message Authentication Code Pool) of N rows and K columns; When each row of the AMAC pool is referred to as an address-embedded message authentication code set (ACS), an arbitrary ACS of N ACSs of the AMAC pool is assigned as a logical address of a master node, and other ACSs are assigned to logical nodes of a slave node. A third step of allocating an address; Address allocation method for anonymous communication in a wireless network comprising a. The method of claim 2, The third step, Assigning any of the N ACSs in the AMAC Pool to a logical address of a master node; When a specific slave node enters a network, selecting any of the unassigned ACSs of the AMAC pool as a logical address of the corresponding slave node, and transmitting the ACS of the master node and the ACS of the slave node to the corresponding slave node; Address allocation method for anonymous communication in a wireless network comprising a. The method of claim 2, The first step, a) initializing the UPS; b) sequentially selecting any two integers from among a predetermined range of integers and sequentially adding them to the UPS; c) selecting at least one integer from among a predetermined range of integers; d) create an ordered pair listing the last integer added to the UPS and the currently selected integer in order, and determine whether the ordered pair is an ordered pair that exists in the current UPS. Returning and adding the currently selected integer to the UPS if it is a sequence pair that does not currently exist in the UPS and proceeding to the next step; e) determining whether all ordered pairs starting with the last integer added to the UPS currently exist in the UPS, terminating the UPS generation process if all the ordered pairs exist, and otherwise returning to step c); Address allocation method for anonymous communication in a wireless network comprising a. An address utilization method in a wireless network consisting of a master node and a plurality of slave nodes, Each node that enters the network is assigned a logical address with a sequence of two or more elements, but the logical address exists so that any sequence pair created by extracting two consecutive elements from a logical node's logical address exists only in the logical address of one node. Receiving a first step; A second step of generating an ordered pair by extracting two consecutive elements according to a predetermined rule from its logical address, and using the ordered pair as its temporary address; Address utilization method for anonymous communication in a wireless network comprising a. The method of claim 5, The first step, The master node generates an arbitrary sequence UPS (Unique Pair Sequence) in which a sequence pair created only by extracting two consecutive elements is generated only once, and extracts K consecutive N elements from the UPS by N times. Generating an address-embedded message authentication code pool; When each row of the AMAC pool is referred to as an address-embedded message authentication code set (ACS), the master node assigns any ACS of N ACSs of the AMAC pool as a logical address of the master node, and slaves other ACSs. Assigning to logical addresses of nodes; Address utilization method for anonymous communication in a wireless network comprising a. The method according to claim 5 or 6, The second step, The method comprises extracting two consecutive elements by using one or more of a hashing key and message content shared with a master node to generate an ordered pair, and using the ordered pair as its temporary address. How to use address for anonymous communication in network. The method of claim 7, wherein The second step, One or more of the hashing key and message contents shared with the master node are input to the hash function. Based on the output value, two consecutive elements are extracted to generate an ordered pair, and the ordered pair is its temporary address. Method for utilizing an address for anonymous communication in a wireless network, characterized in that the step of using.

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