JP6476034B2 - Control apparatus and control method - Google Patents

Control apparatus and control method Download PDF

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JP6476034B2
JP6476034B2 JP2015066230A JP2015066230A JP6476034B2 JP 6476034 B2 JP6476034 B2 JP 6476034B2 JP 2015066230 A JP2015066230 A JP 2015066230A JP 2015066230 A JP2015066230 A JP 2015066230A JP 6476034 B2 JP6476034 B2 JP 6476034B2
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JP2016187094A (en
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小黒 博昭
博昭 小黒
智美 大串
智美 大串
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株式会社エヌ・ティ・ティ・データ
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Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for controlling a route of a packet transferred on a network.

  Conventionally, from the time a provider providing an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) service receives an application for introduction of a security device from a user customer to the start of the service provision, device procurement, device installation, device setting, There is a problem that it takes time from week to month because manual operations such as network configuration change occur. In addition, once installed, if a user customer wants to stop or restart the contract for a certain period during the contract, manual operations such as device settings and network configuration changes will occur each time. Therefore, there was a problem that it could not be changed quickly. In this regard, SDN (Software-Defined Networking) is a technology that can dynamically change the network configuration by software, and is expected as one of the technologies that solve the above-described problems. For example, Patent Document 1 describes a multi-tenant system that uses OpenFlow to share hardware such as a server device among a plurality of users.

International Publication No. 2013/172391

  However, in the technique described in Patent Document 1, devices shared among a plurality of users are server devices, switches, and storages, and are not assumed to share security devices. For example, the security device has a group of rules (signature) for detecting unauthorized communication, and a packet passing through the security device scans the signature, but there are cases where the security device is shared. Since it is necessary to scan a signature unnecessary for the user, it is considered that the communication speed is affected. Therefore, it is desirable that the signature provided in the security device is the minimum necessary for each user.

  The present invention has been made in view of such circumstances, and it is an object of the present invention to optimize security device resources so that network communication is optimized in the case of sharing a security device in an SDN environment. To do.

  In order to solve the above-described problem, the present invention provides a first detection rule that is uniquely set for the first network and a second detection that is uniquely set for a second network different from the first network. A generating unit that generates a virtualized second security device different from the first security device when a predetermined first condition is satisfied in the first security device that detects unauthorized intrusion with reference to a rule; A first rule setting for deleting the second detection rule from the reference target by the first security device and setting the second detection rule as a reference target by the second security device among the first and second detection rules. And a transfer device that is directly or indirectly connected to the first security device and transfers packets based on transfer control information. When the packet addressed to the first network and the packet addressed to the second network are transferred to the first security device, the packet addressed to the second network is transferred to the second security device. A control device is provided that includes a first update unit that updates transfer control information.

  In a preferred aspect, the first security device makes unauthorized intrusion by referring to a third detection rule set in common for the first network and the second network in addition to the first and second detection rules. The first rule setting unit may set the third detection rule as a reference object by the second security device in addition to the second detection rule.

  In a further preferred aspect, the first condition may be that a contradiction occurs in the plurality of detection rules.

  In another preferred aspect, the first condition may be that the number of the plurality of detection rules exceeds a predetermined threshold.

  In another preferable aspect, the first condition may be that a ratio between the number of the first detection rules and the number of the second detection rules exceeds a predetermined threshold.

  In a further preferred aspect, the generation unit generates the second security device having a higher throughput than the first security device when the number of the second detection rules is larger than the number of the first detection rules. May be.

  In a further preferred aspect, when the first detection rule and the second detection rule satisfy a predetermined second condition, a deletion unit that deletes the second security device; and the second security device When deleted, a second rule setting unit for resetting the second detection rule as a reference target by the first network, and when the second security device is deleted, a packet addressed to the second network A second update unit that updates the transfer control information so as to be transferred to the first security device may be further included.

  In addition, the present invention refers to a first detection rule that is uniquely set for the first network and a second detection rule that is specifically set for a second network different from the first network. Generating a virtualized second security device different from the first security device when a predetermined first condition is satisfied in the first security device for detecting intrusion; and the first and second detections A step of deleting the second detection rule from the reference target by the first security device, setting the second detection rule as a reference target by the second security device, and directly connecting to the first security device Or indirectly connected to the first network by a transfer device that transfers packets based on transfer control information. When the packet and the packet addressed to the second network are transferred to the first security device, the transfer control information is updated so that the packet addressed to the second network is transferred to the second security device. And a control method comprising the steps.

  ADVANTAGE OF THE INVENTION According to this invention, when sharing a security device in an SDN environment, the resource of a security device can be optimized so that network communication may be optimized.

1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a multi-tenant system 100. FIG. It is a figure which shows an example of a structure of OFC6. It is a flowchart which shows an example of a division | segmentation necessity determination process. It is a figure which shows the example of a signature description, and the example of inconsistency. It is a flowchart which shows an example of a division | segmentation process. It is explanatory drawing explaining an example of a division | segmentation process. It is a flowchart which shows an example of a merge necessity determination process. It is a flowchart which shows an example of a merge process. It is explanatory drawing explaining an example of a merge process.

1. Embodiment 1-1. Configuration of Multi-tenant System 100 FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a multi-tenant system 100 according to an embodiment of the present invention. The multi-tenant system 100 is a system that allows a plurality of users to share one system by cloud computing. There are usage forms such as IaaS, PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service) depending on the resource sharing level. In this embodiment, IaaS is assumed. Here, IaaS refers to a device that can be used remotely as a service on the Internet, such as equipment and lines necessary for operating an information system, or such a service or business model.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the multi-tenant system 100 includes a data center 10, a company A terminal 1A connected to the data center 10 via the Internet 2, and a company B terminal 1B. The data center 10 is a facility that manages resources for lending to users. The company A terminal 1A and the company B terminal 1B are computer devices that use resources lent out by the data center 10. In the example shown in FIG. 1, for convenience of explanation, only two companies, Company A and Company B, are assumed as users. However, resources may be shared by users of three or more companies.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the data center 10 includes a router 3, OpenFlow switches (hereinafter referred to as “OFS”) 4A and 4B, an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) 5, an OpenFlow controller (hereinafter referred to as “intrusion prevention system”). , “OFC”) 6, A company tenant network (hereinafter referred to as “A company tenant NW”) 7 A, and B company tenant network (hereinafter referred to as “B company tenant NW”) 7 B. The

  The router 3 is a network device that connects the Internet 2 and the OFS 4A. OFS 4A and 4B (hereinafter, collectively referred to as “OFS4” unless otherwise distinguished) are L2 switches compliant with the OpenFlow specification. The IPS 5 is a security device that prevents unauthorized entry into the tenant networks 7A and 7B. The OFC 6 is an OFS 4 control device compliant with the OpenFlow specification. Tenants NW7A and 7B (hereinafter collectively referred to as “tenant NW7” unless otherwise distinguished) are networks lent to company A and company B, respectively. Each network includes, for example, a switch, a plurality of servers, and a database. In the example shown in FIG. 1, for convenience of explanation, only two OFSs 4 appear, but a network between the router 3 and the tenant NW 7 may be configured by three or more OFSs 4.

1-2. Configuration of OFS 4 OFS 4 is a transmission device (or relay device, transfer device) compliant with the OpenFlow specification, and is a transmission device that performs packet transmission processing performed by hardware. The OFS 4 includes a plurality of ports (connection ports) to which communication cables are connected, and is connected to other devices via any of the ports. Note that OpenFlow is a technology that enables centralized management of network devices constituting a communication network by a single control device, and performs complex transfer control or flexibly changes the network configuration. In this OpenFlow, the path control function and data transfer function that have been co-located within one network device are separated into separate devices, and a control device called an OpenFlow controller consists of multiple transfer devices (OpenFlow switches). Manage the behavior of all at once.

  OpenFlow is one of the protocols that realizes SDN. Here, SDN is a general term for technologies that enable centralized control of communication devices that make up a computer network with a single software, and that can flexibly and dynamically change the structure, configuration, and settings of the network. Or a network constructed by such a technology.

  The OFS 4 relays communication packets between a plurality of devices based on path control information (or relay control information, transfer control information). Specifically, the communication packet transfer control is performed with reference to the stored flow table. Here, the flow table is a table that stores path information calculated by the OFC 6, and is a table that is referred to when the OFS 4 processes packet transfer. This flow table includes one or more flow entries, and each flow entry includes a data transfer condition (Match) and an operation instruction (Instructions) when the condition is met.

  The condition part of the flow entry includes packet header information such as a source or destination IP (Internet Protocol) address, a source or destination MAC (Media Access Control) address, a network ID, and an input port number. It is specified. Alternatively, an arbitrary bit value or a plurality of different bits set in one or more header fields (including a Type of Service (Tos) field and a Class of Service (Cos) field) are designated. On the other hand, for example, data transfer (Output command), data discard (Drop command), and data header information rewrite (Set-Field command) are specified in the operation instruction portion. When receiving the packet, the OFS 4 checks whether there is a condition that matches the header information of the packet in the flow table, and if it exists, executes the process according to the operation instruction corresponding to the condition. In addition, a priority (Priority), a counter (Counters), a valid period (Timeouts), and a cookie (Cookie) may be specified in the flow entry.

  The OFS 4 communicates with the OFC 6 according to the OpenFlow protocol via an unillustrated OpenFlow channel (secure channel). When receiving a flow entry modification message (Flow Modify message) from the OFC 6, the OFS 4 performs processing such as addition, update, and deletion of a flow entry in accordance with the message. In addition, when the packet is received, the OFS 4 transmits a PacketIn message to the OFC 6 when a condition that matches the header information of the packet does not exist in the flow table. This PacketIn message is a message transmitted to inquire the OFC 6 about the packet processing method when there is no flow entry that matches the received packet. When a flow entry change message is sent from the OFC 6 as a response to this message, the OFS 4 performs flow entry addition processing according to the message.

1-3. Configuration of IPS 5 The IPS 5 is a security device that detects unauthorized intrusion into the tenant NW 7 with reference to a plurality of detection rules. More specifically, the IPS 5 stores in advance a signature that defines a method for identifying unauthorized intrusion, and detects the unauthorized intrusion by matching the received packet with the signature.

  There are two types of IPS5: network type and host type. Network type IPS5 expands the function of IDS (Intrusion Detection System) that detects intrusion, and when intrusion is detected, protection such as blocking of connection is real-time. Have the function to do. Characteristic patterns of packets such as worms and denial-of-service attacks (DoS) are stored. When a corresponding connection is detected, it is blocked and notified (alert) or recorded (logged) to the administrator. To do.

  On the other hand, the host-type IPS 5 is provided in the form of software installed on a server, and prevents unauthorized intrusion using a buffer overflow at the OS (Operating System) level, or prevents an ordinary user from acquiring administrator authority. It has functions such as preventing access log tampering. Realize access control at a level finer than that provided by the OS, or increase the damage caused by intrusion by separating the server administrator and security administrator so that there is no universally authorized administrator It is also possible to have a function to suppress.

  Note that the IPS 5 may be realized as a dedicated device (appliance, that is, a physical IPS) installed at a network boundary or the like, or realized as a virtual IPS in the server virtualization environment in the form of software installed in the server. May be.

1-4. Configuration of OFC 6 OFC 6 is a control device that complies with the OpenFlow specification and is a control device that collectively manages the behavior of a plurality of OFSs 4. The OFC 6 performs route calculation for data transfer in the network configured by the OFS 4 and controls each OFS 4 so that data transfer is performed along the calculated route.

  FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of the configuration of the OFC 6. The OFC 6 includes a signature table 61, a topology information table 62, and a flow entry table 63, as shown in FIG. Further, the OFC 6 includes functions of a division necessity determination unit 64, a division unit 65, a merge necessity determination unit 66, and a merge unit 67. These functions are realized, for example, by executing a program by an arithmetic device such as a CPU.

  More specifically, the dividing unit 65 includes a generating unit 651, a first rule setting unit 652, and a first updating unit 653. More specifically, the merge unit 67 includes a deletion unit 671, a second rule setting unit 672, and a second update unit 673.

  The signature table 61 is a table for managing signatures stored by the IPS 5. In this embodiment, the signature table 61 is set specifically for the A company tenant NW7A (hereinafter referred to as “signature for the A company tenant NW7A”) and the B company tenant NW7B. Signature (hereinafter referred to as “signature for company B tenant NW7B”) and a signature commonly set in company A tenant NW7A and company B tenant NW7B (hereinafter referred to as “company A company B company common signature”). And are saved. Whether the signature is for the A company tenant NW7A or the B company tenant NW7B is determined, for example, by referring to an IP address set in the signature. Alternatively, the identification information of the tenant NW7 may be stored in association with each signature, and it may be determined which signature is for which tenant NW7 by referring to this identification information. The signature table 61 is updated in conjunction with the update of the signature stored by the IPS 5.

  The topology information table 62 is a table that stores information indicating a configuration diagram of a network configured by the OFS 4. In other words, the table stores physical link information indicating physical links between OFSs 4. Each record constituting the topology information table 62 is configured by, for example, fields of a DPID of the transmission source OFS4, a transmission port number of the transmission source OFS4, a DPID of the destination OFS4, and a reception port number of the destination OFS4. Here, DPID (Datapath ID) is identification information for uniquely identifying the OFS 4. In the topology information table 62, a new record is added when the OFS 4 is added to the network, and the record is deleted when the OFS 4 fails or is removed from the network. Further, when a physical link between OFSs 4 is added, a new record is added, and when a physical link is disconnected, the record is deleted.

  The OFC 6 detects a failure or the like of the OFS 4 based on the life / death monitoring packet. As a specific procedure, first, the OFC 6 transmits a life / death monitoring message to all the OFSs 4 at regular intervals. When the OFS 4 receives the message, it immediately responds to the OFC 6. However, since the OFC 4 cannot receive a response message for the failed OFS 4, it can be recognized that the OFS 4 has failed. On the other hand, the OFC 6 can also detect the addition of the OFS 4 by the life and death monitoring packet.

  The OFC 6 recognizes that the link between the OFSs 4 has been disconnected using the topology detection packet. As a specific procedure, first, the OFC 6 transmits topology detection packets to all of the OFSs 4 at regular intervals. When the OFS 4 receives the topology detection packet, the OFS 4 tries to transfer it to the adjacent OFS 4. However, when the link is disconnected, the packet cannot be transferred to the adjacent OFS 4. As a result, the packet transfer stops there, and since the OFC 6 cannot receive the topology detection packet, it can recognize that the link has been disconnected. Conversely, the OFC 6 can also recognize that a link between the OFSs 4 has been added using the topology detection packet.

  Next, the flow entry table 63 is a table for managing the flow entries stored by each OFS 4. The flow entry table 63 is updated in conjunction with the update of the flow entry stored by the OFS 4.

  The division necessity determination unit 64 determines whether the IPS 5 is required to be divided. In other words, it is determined whether the signature stored in the IPS 5 needs to be divided. Specifically, the IPS 5 refers to the signature table 61 and executes a division necessity determination process described later. This division necessity determination process is executed, for example, when the signature stored in the IPS 5 is updated or at a predetermined cycle.

  The dividing unit 65 executes the IPS5 dividing process when a predetermined condition is satisfied in the IPS5. Specifically, when the division necessity determination unit 64 determines that the IPS 5 is required to be divided, the IPS 5 signature is divided.

  In this division processing, the generation unit 651 generates a virtualized IPS 5A that is different from the IPS 5. Specifically, the IPS 5 is instructed to generate an instance of the IPS 5A on a virtual machine operating on the IPS 5. Here, the virtual machine is a hardware environment that is constructed virtually or virtually by software. An instance refers to a virtual computer implemented as software on one physical computer. If the IPS 5 is divided indefinitely, the resource may be depleted, so the upper limit number of divisions is determined according to the resource.

  The first rule setting unit 652 sets at least a part of the plurality of signatures stored in the IPS 5 in the IPS 5A generated by the generation unit 651. In the present embodiment, for example, the signature for the B company tenant NW7B is deleted from the IPS 5, and the signature is set in the IPS 5A. In addition, the common signature of Company A and Company B is set in IPS 5A.

  The first updating unit 653 updates the flow entry of the OFS 4A so that some of the plurality of packets transferred to the IPS 5 by the OFS 4A are transferred to the IPS 5A generated by the generating unit 651. In the present embodiment, for example, out of the packet addressed to the A company tenant NW7A and the packet addressed to the B company tenant NW7B transferred to the IPS5 by the OFS 4A, the packet addressed to the B company tenant NW7B is transferred to the IPS5A. The flow entry of OFS 4A is updated. The first update unit 653 executes the update with reference to the topology information table 62 and the flow entry table 63.

  The merge necessity determination unit 66 determines whether or not IPS 5 and IPS 5A need to be merged (merged or merged). In other words, it is determined whether or not it is necessary to merge the signature stored in the IPS 5 and the signature stored in the IPS 5A. Specifically, the IPS 5 refers to the signature table 61 and executes a merge necessity determination process described later. This merge necessity determination process is executed, for example, when a signature stored in the IPS 5 or IPS 5A is updated or at a predetermined cycle.

  The merge unit 67 executes the merge process of IPS5 and IPS5A when the signature stored in IPS5 and the signature stored in IPS5A satisfy a predetermined condition. Specifically, when the merge necessity determination unit 66 determines that the merge of IPS5 and IPS5A is necessary, the merge process of IPS5 and IPS5A is executed.

  In this merge process, the deletion unit 671 deletes the IPS 5A. Specifically, the IPS 5 is instructed to delete the instance of the IPS 5A generated on the virtual machine operating on the IPS 5.

  The second rule setting unit 672 resets the signature set in IPS 5A to IPS5. In the present embodiment, for example, the signature for the B company tenant NW7B is reset to IPS5.

  The second update unit 673 updates the flow entry of the OFS 4A so that the packet transferred to the IPS 5A by the OFS 4A is transferred to the IPS 5. In the present embodiment, for example, the flow entry of the OFS 4A is updated so that the packet addressed to the B company tenant NW7B transferred to the IPS 5A by the OFS 4A is transferred to the IPS 5. The second update unit 673 executes the update with reference to the topology information table 62 and the flow entry table 63.

1-5. Operation of OFC 6 The operation of the OFC 6 will be described. Specifically, the division necessity determination process, the division process, the merge necessity determination process, and the merge process will be described.

1-5-1. Division Necessity Determination Processing FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of division necessity determination processing. In the process shown in the figure, the division necessity determination unit 64 first refers to the signature table 61 to determine whether or not the number of signature items of the IPS 5 exceeds the upper limit value for division necessity determination (step). Sa1). As a result of this determination, when the number of signature items of IPS 5 exceeds the upper limit value for determining necessity of division (step Sa1; YES), the necessity determination section 64 for dividing instructs the dividing section 65 to divide. This is output (step Sa3) and the process is terminated. On the other hand, as a result of this determination, if the number of signature items of IPS5 does not exceed the upper limit value for determining necessity of division (step Sa1; NO), the necessity determination section 64 for division executes step Sa2.

  In step Sa2, the division necessity determination unit 64 refers to the signature table 61 and determines whether or not there is a contradiction between any two items of the signature of IPS5. If there is a contradiction between any two items of the signature of IPS5 as a result of this determination (step Sa2; YES), the division necessity determination unit 64 outputs a division instruction to the division unit 65 ( Step Sa3) This process is terminated. On the other hand, as a result of this determination, when there is no contradiction between any two items of the signature of IPS5 (step Sa2; NO), the division necessity determination unit 64 determines that the division of IPS5 is unnecessary, and this processing Exit.

  Here, a method for checking a contradiction between two arbitrary items of a signature will be described. In this embodiment, among the signatures stored in the IPS 5, between the A company B company common signature and the A company tenant NW7A signature, and between the A company B company common signature and the B company tenant NW7B signature. Is assumed to have no contradiction, and it is assumed that there is a possibility of a conflict between the signature for the A company tenant NW7A and the signature for the B company tenant NW7B.

  Here, if a set of signatures for company A tenant NW7A is A = {a_1, a_2,... A_m} and a set of signatures for company B tenant NW7B is B = {b_1, b_2,. Check the contradiction by comparing the elements of the set with brute force. In other words, a process of checking a contradiction by comparing a_i and b_j and outputting a pair of i and j when there is a contradiction is performed for each value in the range from i = 1 to i = m, j = 1. To j = k.

  FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a signature description example and a contradiction example. In the example shown in the figure, each signature includes a rule header and a rule option. The rule header includes an action, a protocol, an IP address, a port number, and its direction. The action specifies an action to be taken when the rule is matched, and includes five types including “alert”, “log”, “pass”, “activate”, and “dynamic”. When alert detects a matched event, it outputs the specified alert and records the packet contents in a log. As the protocol, “tcp”, “udp”, and “icmp” can be specified. The IP address, port number, and direction specify the source and destination of the packet. When specifying an IP address and a port number, it is possible to express negation by prepending "!". As the rule option, a message output as an alert is specified in the example shown in FIG.

  The first signature shown in FIG. 4 is a detection rule that “the 80 / TCP address of the host with the IP address xxx.yyy.10.1 is detected without limiting the transmission source”. The second signature is the detection that “the host with the IP address xxx.yyy.10.1 is addressed to 22 / TCP and the source is detected from the terminal on the network zzz.www.vvv.0 / 24” It is a rule. The third signature is a detection that "the host with IP address xxx.yyy.10.1 is addressed to 22 / TCP and the source is not detected from a terminal on the network zzz.www.vvv.0 / 24" It is a rule. Of the above three signatures, the second signature and the third signature are defined as “detect” in the same condition, and the other is defined as “not detected”. It can be said that there is a contradiction.

1-5-2. Division Process FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating an example of the division process. FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of the division process. The division process shown in these drawings is executed when a division instruction is output from the division necessity judgment unit 64 to the division unit 65. In this division processing, the generation unit 651 instructs the IPS 5 to generate an instance of IPS 5A on the virtual machine that operates on the IPS 5 (step Sb1).

  Next, the first rule setting unit 652 refers to the signature table 61 and sets a copy of the signature stored in the IPS 5 in the IPS 5A (step Sb2). Next, the first rule setting unit 652 deletes the signature for the B company tenant NW7B from IPS5 (step Sb3). Next, the first rule setting unit 652 deletes the signature for the company A tenant NW7A from the copy of the signature set in the IPS 5A (step Sb4).

Next, the first updating unit 653 updates the flow entry of the OFS 4A so that the packet addressed to the company A tenant NW7A is transferred to the IPS5 and the packet addressed to the company B tenant NW7B is transferred to the IPS5A (step Sb5). Further, the first update unit 653 forwards the packet addressed to the A company tenant NW7A transmitted from the IPS5 to the A company tenant NW7A, and the packet addressed to the B company tenant NW7B transmitted from the IPS5A to the B company tenant NW7B. The flow entry of OFS 4B is updated so that The first update unit 653 executes these updates with reference to the topology information table 62 and the flow entry table 63.
The above is the description of the dividing process.

1-5-3. Merge Necessity Determination Processing FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating an example of merge necessity determination processing. In the process shown in the figure, the merge necessity determination unit 66 first refers to the signature table 61, and the sum of the number of IPS5 signature items and the number of IPS5A signature items is smaller than the merge necessity determination lower limit value. Whether or not (step Sc1). As a result of this determination, when the total number of items of both signatures is smaller than the lower limit value for determining necessity of merging (step Sc1; YES), the merging necessity determining unit 66 executes step Sc2. On the other hand, as a result of this determination, when the total number of items of both signatures is equal to or greater than the lower limit value for determining necessity of merging (step Sc1; NO), the merging necessity determining unit 66 determines that merging is not necessary. Then, this process ends.

  In step Sc2, the merge necessity determination unit 66 refers to the signature table 61 and determines whether or not there is a contradiction between any two items of the signature stored in the IPS 5 and the IPS 5A. More specifically, it is determined whether or not there is a contradiction between the signature for Company A tenant NW7A stored in IPS5 and the signature for Company B tenant NW7B stored in IPS5A. As a result of this determination, if there is no contradiction between the signature for Company A tenant NW7A stored in IPS5 and the signature for Company B tenant NW7B stored in IPS5A (step Sc2; YES), a merge necessity determination unit 66 outputs a merge instruction to the merge unit 67 (step Sc3), and ends this process. On the other hand, as a result of this determination, if there is a contradiction between the signature for Company A tenant NW7A stored in IPS5 and the signature for Company B tenant NW7B stored in IPS5A (step Sc2; NO), whether merge is necessary The determination unit 66 determines that merging between the IPS 5 and the IPS 5A is unnecessary, and ends this process.

  Here, a method for checking a contradiction between two arbitrary items of a signature will be described. In the present embodiment, among the signatures stored in IPS5 and IPS5A, between A company B company common signature and A company tenant NW7A signature, between A company B company common signature and B company tenant NW7B signature It is assumed that there is no contradiction between them, and it is assumed that there may be a conflict between the signature for the A company tenant NW7A and the signature for the B company tenant NW7B.

  Here, if a set of signatures for company A tenant NW7A is A = {a_1, a_2,... A_m} and a set of signatures for company B tenant NW7B is B = {b_1, b_2,. Check the contradiction by comparing the elements of the set with brute force. In other words, a process of checking a contradiction by comparing a_i and b_j and outputting a pair of i and j when there is a contradiction is performed for each value in the range from i = 1 to i = m, j = 1. To j = k. Note that examples of signature contradiction are as described in connection with the above-described division necessity determination process.

1-5-4. Merge Processing FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating an example of merge processing. FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of the merge process. The merge processing shown in these drawings is executed when a merge instruction is output from the merge necessity determination unit 66 to the merge unit 67. In this merge processing, the second rule setting unit 672 refers to the signature table 61 and resets the signature for the B company tenant NW7B set in IPS 5A in IPS5 (step Sd1).

  Next, the deletion unit 671 instructs the IPS 5 to delete the instance of the IPS 5A generated on the virtual machine that operates on the IPS 5 (step Sd2).

Next, the second update unit 673 updates the flow entry of the OFS 4A so that the packet addressed to the B company tenant NW7B is transferred to the IPS 5 (step Sd3). The second updating unit 673 updates the flow entry of the OFS 4B so that the packet addressed to the B company tenant NW7B transmitted from the IPS5 is transferred to the B company tenant NW7B. The second update unit 673 executes these updates with reference to the topology information table 62 and the flow entry table 63.
This completes the description of the merge process.
In the merge processing example described above, IPS 5A is deleted and the signature of IPS 5A is reset to IPS 5, but conversely, IPS 5 is deleted and IPS 5A is assigned a signature of IPS 5A. You may make it set.

According to the multi-tenant system 100 according to the present embodiment described above, the following problems that occur when SDN is simply applied to the device sharing service on IaaS are solved. First, in the device sharing service on IaaS, when the IPS is shared by tenants of each company, if the signature for the tenant of company A is not necessary for the tenant of company B, the packet inspection for B company There is a problem that it takes extra time. In addition, there is a problem that a signature conflict occurs between Company A and Company B. However, according to the multi-tenant system 100 according to the present embodiment, there is a contradiction when the number of IPS5 signature items exceeds the upper limit value for determining necessity of division, or between any two items of the IPS5 signature. In this case, since the IPS 5 is divided and the packet inspection is performed for each tenant NW7, there is a problem that the packet inspection based on the signature unique to the other company takes extra time, and there is a signature inconsistency among users. Can cope with the problem.
Further, according to the multi-tenant system 100 according to the present embodiment, when the amount of packet passage exceeds the processing amount of IPS 5, processing can be supplemented by IPS 5A.

2. Modifications The above embodiment may be modified as shown below. Further, the following modifications may be combined with each other.

2-1. Modification 1
Even when IPS5 is divided in the dividing process according to the above embodiment, the resources (computer resources) to be allocated to IPS5 and IPS5A are determined based on the generation ratio of the packets for the A company tenant NW7A and the B company tenant NW7B. Good. This is because it is inefficient to allocate resources equal to IPS5 and IPS5A when the generation ratio of the packet for company A tenant NW7A and the packet for company B tenant NW7B is remarkably large, for example, 100: 1.

  Therefore, the OFC 6 according to the above embodiment further includes a resource allocation unit, and the resource allocation unit allocates to the IPS 5 and the IPS 5A according to the generation ratio of the packet for the company A tenant NW7A and the packet for the company B tenant NW7B. The resource may be determined. Specifically, the resource allocation unit refers to the statistical information (Counters) in the flow table stored in the OFS 4A to identify the generation ratio of the packet for the A company tenant NW7A and the packet for the B company tenant NW7B. The optimization may be performed so that the ratio of resource allocation (that is, the ratio of statistical information) is equal. For example, when “50 GB” is initially allocated to the IPS 5 and the IPS 5A as the usable memory, the statistical information of the flow entry that defines the transfer of the packet for the tenant NW7A of the company A is “20” after a predetermined period after the division process. , ”And the statistical information defining the transfer of the packet for the B company tenant NW7B becomes“ 10,000 ”, the available memory allocated to IPS5 and IPS5A is“ 66GB ”and“ 33GB ”. You may make it adjust.

2-2. Modification 2
In the above embodiment, IPS 5 is used as an example of a signature-based security device, but IDS or WAF (Web Application Firewall) may be used instead of IPS 5.

2-3. Modification 3
In the example of the division process in the above embodiment, the IPS 5 is divided into two, but the number of divisions is not limited to two and may be divided into three or more. At this time, the number of divisions may be determined according to the number of tenants NW7 whose signatures are stored in the IPS 5 to be divided. Similarly, in the example of the merge process according to the above embodiment, two IPSs 5 are merged into one, but three or more IPSs 5 may be merged into one.

2-4. Modification 4
In the division necessity determination process according to the above embodiment, in addition to or instead of steps Sa1 and Sa2, the division necessity determination unit 64 includes the number of signature items for the A company tenant NW7A and the signature item for the B company tenant NW7B. It may be determined whether the ratio of numbers exceeds a predetermined threshold. Then, when the ratio exceeds a predetermined threshold, a division instruction may be output to the division unit 65. As a result of the determination being affirmative, when the dividing process is executed by the dividing unit 65, a signature having a large number of items may be assigned to the IPS 5 having high performance. For example, in the division processing according to the above embodiment, when the number of items of the signature for the B company tenant NW7B is larger than the number of items of the signature for the A company tenant NW7A, the generation unit 651 has a throughput higher than that of IPS5. The high IPS 5A may be generated, and the first rule setting unit 652 may set a signature for the B company tenant NW7B in the IPS 5A.

  Similarly, in the merge necessity determination process according to the above-described embodiment, in addition to or instead of steps Sc1 and Sc2, the merge necessity determination unit 66 determines the number of signature items for the A company tenant NW7A and the B company tenant NW7B. It may be determined whether the ratio of the number of signature items exceeds a predetermined threshold. Then, when the ratio does not exceed a predetermined threshold, a merge instruction may be output to the merge unit 67.

2-5. Modification 5
In the above embodiment, the OFC 6 is provided with the functions of the division necessity determination unit 64, the division unit 65, the merge necessity determination unit 66, and the merge unit 67. These functions are the same as those of the OFC 6. May be provided in another different control device. In this case, the first update unit 653 provided in the control device may instruct the OFC 6 to perform the update when updating the flow entries of the OFS 4A and 4B. Similarly, the second update unit 673 provided in the control device may instruct the OFC 6 to perform the update when updating the flow entries of the OFS 4A and 4B.

2-6. Modification 6
In the split processing according to the above embodiment, an instance of IPS 5A is generated on a virtual machine that operates on IPS 5, but this instance of IPS 5A is generated on a virtual machine that operates on another IPS 5B different from IPS 5 May be. And a signature may be divided | segmented between IPS5A and IPS5 produced | generated on the said IPS5B.

2-7. Modification 7
The OFS 4 and OFC 6 according to the above embodiment are based on the OpenFlow specification, but may be based on other protocols as long as they realize SDN.

2-8. Modification 8
The program executed in the OFC 6 in the above-described embodiment or modification may be provided via a recording medium readable by a computer device. Here, the recording medium is, for example, a magnetic recording medium such as a magnetic tape or a magnetic disk, an optical recording medium such as an optical disk, a magneto-optical recording medium, or a semiconductor memory. In addition, this program may be provided via a network such as the Internet.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Terminal, 2 ... Internet, 3 ... Router, 4 ... OFS, 5 ... IPS, 6 ... OFC, 7 ... Tenant NW, 61 ... Signature table, 62 ... Topology information table, 63 ... Flow entry table, 64 ... Division required Refusal determination unit, 65 ... division unit, 66 ... merge necessity determination unit, 67 ... merge unit, 100 ... multi-tenant system, 651 ... generation unit, 652 ... first rule setting unit, 653 ... first update unit, 671 ... Deletion unit, 672 ... second rule setting unit, 673 ... second update unit

Claims (7)

  1. First detecting an intrusion with reference to a first detection rule uniquely set for the first network and a second detection rule specifically set for a second network different from the first network A generating unit that generates a virtualized second security device different from the first security device when a predetermined first condition is satisfied in the security device;
    A first rule setting for deleting the second detection rule from the reference target by the first security device and setting the second detection rule as a reference target by the second security device among the first and second detection rules. And
    A packet addressed to the first network and a packet addressed to the second network are transferred to the first security device by a transfer device that is directly or indirectly connected to the first security device and transfers a packet based on transfer control information. A first updating unit that updates the transfer control information so that a packet addressed to the second network is forwarded to the second security device when the packet is forwarded to the second network.
  2. The first security device detects unauthorized intrusion by referring to a third detection rule set in common for the first network and the second network in addition to the first and second detection rules,
    The control device according to claim 1, wherein the first rule setting unit sets the third detection rule as a reference target by the second security device in addition to the second detection rule.
  3.   The control device according to claim 1, wherein the first condition is that the number of the plurality of detection rules exceeds a predetermined threshold.
  4.   The control device according to claim 1, wherein the first condition is that a ratio of the number of the first detection rules to the number of the second detection rules exceeds a predetermined threshold.
  5. The generation unit generates the second security device having a higher throughput than the first security device when the number of the second detection rules is larger than the number of the first detection rules. The control device according to claim 4 .
  6. A deletion unit that deletes the second security device when the first detection rule and the second detection rule satisfy a predetermined second condition;
    A second rule setting unit that resets the second detection rule as a reference target by the first network when the second security device is deleted;
    A second updating unit that updates the transfer control information so that a packet addressed to the second network is forwarded to the first security device when the second security device is deleted; The control device according to any one of claims 1 to 5 .
  7. First detecting an intrusion with reference to a first detection rule uniquely set for the first network and a second detection rule specifically set for a second network different from the first network Generating a virtualized second security device different from the first security device when a predetermined first condition is satisfied in the security device;
    Deleting the second detection rule of the first and second detection rules from the reference target by the first security device, and setting the second detection rule as a reference target by the second security device;
    A packet addressed to the first network and a packet addressed to the second network are transferred to the first security device by a transfer device that is directly or indirectly connected to the first security device and transfers a packet based on transfer control information. And a step of updating the transfer control information so that a packet addressed to the second network is transferred to the second security device when being transferred to the second network.
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