JP6340273B2 - Authentication system - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to an authentication system.

  Conventionally, an authentication system with high convenience and security has been demanded. For example, Patent Document 1 discloses a vehicle lock system (authentication device) that controls locking of a railcar door, a mobile terminal that locks and unlocks the authentication device, and a lock for the authentication device and the mobile terminal. A lock system (authentication system) including a center system that transmits a verification code (authentication key) for control is disclosed.

JP 2006-283276 A

  In the authentication system of Patent Document 1, communication with the center system is required when verifying the authentication key. However, there are cases where the railway vehicle travels in a place where the communication state is not good, such as underground or mountainous area. For this reason, in the authentication system of the above-mentioned patent document 1, a scene where the transmission of the authentication key is interrupted is assumed.

  In order to eliminate the need for communication with the center system, it is also conceivable to store an algorithm for generating an authentication key in the authentication apparatus itself. However, in this case, if the authentication device is stolen or lost, the algorithm may leak, which is not preferable in terms of security.

  The present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and an object thereof is to provide an authentication system that does not require communication during user authentication and can maintain security.

  An authentication system according to the present invention includes an authentication key generation device that generates an authentication key used for user authentication, a mobile terminal that stores the authentication key generated by the authentication key generation device, and a verification of the authentication key stored in the mobile terminal An authentication device that performs user authentication based on the result, wherein the authentication key generation device is effective after the first authentication key set with the first expiration date and the first expiration date. And a second authentication key set with an expiration date of 2, and the authentication device obtains the second authentication key from the portable terminal when user authentication is performed based on the result of matching the first authentication key. Receive and remember.

  In this authentication system, at the time of user authentication using the first authentication key, the second authentication key that becomes valid after the expiration date of the first authentication key ends is delivered to the authentication device. As a result, the second authentication key newly functions as the first authentication key when the first expiration date ends, and an authentication system that does not require communication during user authentication can be realized. In this authentication system, it is not necessary to store an algorithm for generating an authentication key on the authentication device side, and the authentication key generation algorithm leaks even if the authentication device is stolen or lost. There is no. Therefore, according to this authentication system, security can be maintained.

  In addition, the authentication system includes a plurality of authentication devices connected to each other so as to be able to communicate with each other, and the authentication device may synchronize the stored first authentication key and second authentication key with other authentication devices. Good. In this case, since the authentication key is shared with other authentication devices by performing user authentication for any one of a plurality of authentication devices, it is possible to improve convenience while maintaining security. Become.

  In the authentication system, the first authentication key and the second authentication key may be associated with attribute information related to at least one of a user attribute of a user who owns the mobile terminal and an installation position of the authentication device. . In this case, since different types of authentication keys are generated in association with the user attributes and the installation position of the authentication device, an authentication system according to the usage mode can be constructed.

  The authentication system further includes a physical key that forcibly executes user authentication by the authentication device, and the authentication device stores the first authentication key and the second authentication key stored when the user authentication is performed using the physical key. The authentication key may be deleted. In this case, since all the authentication keys already stored can be deleted by using the physical key, the security of the system can be ensured even if an authentication key generation algorithm leaks out.

  In the authentication system, the authentication key generation device may be arranged in a facility managed by the railway operator, and the authentication device may be connected to a door opening / closing device of a railway vehicle managed by the railway operator. . In this case, the authentication device unlocks the opening / closing device when the user authentication is successful. In this authentication system, when the opening / closing device is unlocked by user authentication using the first authentication key, the second authentication key that becomes valid after the expiration date of the first authentication key ends is stored in the authentication device. Delivered. As a result, when the first expiration date expires, the second authentication key functions as a first authentication key, and an authentication system that does not require communication when the switchgear is unlocked (user authentication). realizable. Thus, since communication is not required when unlocking the opening and closing device, it can be suitably applied to opening and closing of a railway vehicle door that may travel in places with poor communication conditions such as underground or mountainous areas. . Further, in this authentication system, it is not necessary to store an algorithm for generating an authentication key on the authentication device side arranged in the railway vehicle, even if the authentication device is stolen or lost from inside the vehicle. The authentication key generation algorithm never leaks. Therefore, according to this authentication system, security can be maintained.

  According to the present invention, it is possible to provide an authentication system that does not require communication during user authentication and can maintain security.

It is a schematic structure figure showing an authentication system concerning one embodiment of the present invention. It is a block diagram which shows the functional structure of the authentication system shown in FIG. (A) And (b) is a figure explaining the flow of delivery of an authentication key. (A) And (b) is a subsequent figure of FIG. 3 explaining the flow of delivery of an authentication key. (A) And (b) is a subsequent figure of FIG. 4 explaining the flow of delivery of an authentication key. It is a figure which shows the mode at the time of boarding of a railway vehicle. It is a figure explaining the authentication key corresponding to the time of the railroad vehicle entering.

  Hereinafter, embodiments according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. In the following description, the same reference numerals are used for the same or corresponding elements, and duplicate descriptions are omitted.

  FIG. 1 is a schematic configuration diagram showing an authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the authentication system shown in FIG. The authentication system 1 of the present embodiment is configured as a system for the crew member P to unlock the opening / closing device 15 of the door 13 of the railway vehicle 10 by using an authentication key C that is an electronic key. As the authentication key C, for example, a QR code (registered trademark) which is a two-dimensional barcode having a relatively large amount of information is used.

  As shown in FIGS. 1 and 2, the authentication system 1 includes an authentication key generation device 20 that generates an authentication key C used for user authentication, and a portable terminal 30 that stores the authentication key C generated by the authentication key generation device 20. And an authentication device 40 that performs user authentication based on the verification result of the authentication key C stored in the mobile terminal 30. In the authentication system 1, schematically, as shown in FIG. 1, the crew member P causes the portable terminal 30 to store the authentication key C generated by the authentication key generation apparatus 20 arranged in the crew section 3 in the station premises. Then, user authentication of the opening / closing device 15 of the door 13 arranged in the railway vehicle 10 is performed using the portable terminal 30, and the opening / closing device 15 is unlocked. The door 13 is a door that partitions, for example, the passenger cabin 17 and the crew cabin 19 of the railway vehicle 10, and the opening / closing device 15 is a locking device for locking and unlocking the door 13. Alternatively, as shown in FIG. 1, the door 13 may be a door that partitions the crew cabin 19 and the outside of the railway vehicle 10, and the opening / closing device 15 may lock and unlock the door. .

  The authentication key generation device 20 is a terminal that can execute a predetermined program, and is a computer system including, for example, a CPU (Central Processing Unit), a ROM (Read Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), and the like. The authentication key generation device 20 is disposed, for example, in the crew section 3 in the station premises. The authentication key generation device 20 includes an algorithm storage unit 21 that stores an algorithm for generating the authentication key C, an authentication key generation unit 23 that generates an authentication key C based on the algorithm stored in the algorithm storage unit 21, have. Note that the authentication key generation device 20 is not necessarily arranged in the crew section 3 in the station premises, and is a facility managed by a railway operator that does not allow general passengers (other than related persons) to enter without permission. What is necessary is just to be arrange | positioned in. For example, you may arrange | position in a railway company's office, a place, etc.

  The portable terminal 30 is a portable terminal (for example, a tablet terminal) that can execute a predetermined program, and is a computer system that includes, for example, a CPU, a ROM, a RAM, and the like. The portable terminal 30 is always carried and carried by the crew member P who is working, for example. That is, the portable terminal 30 is a piece of equipment owned by the crew member P and used during the crew. The mobile terminal 30 includes a terminal-side receiving unit 33 that receives the authentication key C, a terminal-side storage unit 35 that stores the authentication key C received by the terminal-side receiving unit 33, and an authentication key stored in the terminal-side storage unit 35. An output unit 37 that outputs C; a terminal-side receiving unit 33; a terminal-side storage unit 35; and a terminal-side control unit 31 that controls the output unit 37. The terminal-side receiving unit 33 is a reader that reads, for example, a QR code, and is, for example, a camera mounted on the mobile terminal 30. The output unit 37 is a display unit that displays a QR code, for example, and is a display display of the mobile terminal 30, for example.

  The authentication device 40 is a terminal that can execute a predetermined program, and is a computer system including, for example, a CPU, a ROM, a RAM, and the like. The authentication device 40 is disposed, for example, in the vicinity of the opening / closing device 15, and is attached to the door 13, for example. The authentication device 40 is connected to the opening / closing device 15 so as to be able to communicate information with each other. The connection may be a wired connection or a wireless connection. The authentication device 40 receives and collates the authentication key C from the mobile terminal 30, performs user authentication based on the collation result, and controls locking / unlocking of the opening / closing device 15 according to the result of the user authentication. The authentication device 40 includes a device-side receiving unit 43 that receives the authentication key C from the output unit 37 of the mobile terminal 30, a device-side storage unit 45 that stores the authentication key C received by the device-side receiving unit 43, and the railway vehicle 10. An attribute information receiving unit 47 that receives attribute information from the control device 11, a device side receiving unit 43, a device side storage unit 45, and a device side control unit 41 that controls the attribute information receiving unit 47 are provided. The device-side receiving unit 43 is a reader that reads a QR code, for example. The attribute information received by the attribute information receiving unit 47 will be described later.

  Next, the flow of delivery of the authentication key C in the authentication system 1 will be described with reference to FIGS.

  First, the authentication key C used in the authentication system 1 will be described. The authentication key C is an electronic key used for user authentication. In the present embodiment, a different key is set for each date. In the authentication system 1 of the present embodiment, as an example, the same-day key C1 (first authentication key) that is valid during the day and the next-day key C2 (second authentication key) that are valid during the next day are used. An example of realizing the delivery of the authentication key C will be described. That is, the same-day key C1 (first authentication key) in which the first expiration date is set and the next-day key C2 (second key) in which the second expiration date that becomes valid after the first expiration date ends is set. And an example using the authentication key).

  As described above, the authentication key C is generated by the authentication key generation unit 23 based on the algorithm stored in the algorithm storage unit 21 of the authentication key generation device 20. Any algorithm may be used as long as it is not disclosed, and any authentication key generation algorithm can be used. For example, a unique ID may be assigned to each train (or vehicle) of the railway vehicle 10, and a character string combining the ID and a date or other code may be converted by the algorithm and used as an authentication key. In consideration of security, a crew member's personal code, train operation number, etc. may be further combined with the above character string. However, since the data may be enormous, only the above data is used in this embodiment. To generate an authentication key.

  As shown in FIG. 3A, in the initial state, the day key C <b> 1 is stored in the authentication device 40, and the authentication key C is not stored in the authentication key generation device 20 and the portable terminal 30. The day key C1 is input to the authentication device 40 in advance by, for example, a manager of a railway operator or another person.

  From the initial state, as shown in FIG. 3B, the authentication key generating device 20 generates a current day key C1 and a next day key C2. The generation may be performed, for example, when the crew member P or the manager of the railway operator operates the authentication key generation device 20, or may be automatically performed at a fixed time (for example, immediately after the date change). Good.

  Subsequently, as shown in FIG. 4A, the day key C <b> 1 and the next day key C <b> 2 are delivered from the authentication key generation device 20 to the portable terminal 30 in the crew member section 3. The delivery is performed, for example, when the crew member P carries the mobile terminal 30 to the crew section 3 and exchanges information between the authentication key generation device 20 and the mobile terminal 30. The information exchange is performed, for example, when the authentication key generation device 20 includes a display unit that displays a QR code, and the mobile terminal 30 reads the QR code displayed on the display unit with the terminal-side receiving unit 33.

  Note that the delivery is not necessarily performed in the crew member section 3, and the authentication key generation device 20 and the portable terminal 30 are configured to be capable of information communication, and the day key C 1 and the next day key C 2 in a state where both terminals are separated. May be handed over. The delivery is not necessarily performed directly from the authentication key generation device 20 to the mobile terminal 30. For example, the administrator of the railway operator uses the authentication key C generated by the authentication key generation device 20 as a storage medium. It may be stored and carried and transferred from the storage medium to the portable terminal 30 at an arbitrary place (for example, a railway company's office or station). For example, it may be issued by an administrator when a crew member makes a call.

  Subsequently, as shown in FIG. 4B, the verification of the authentication key C is performed between the mobile terminal 30 and the authentication device 40 in the railway vehicle 10. More specifically, the authentication device 40 identifies whether or not the same-day key C1 stored in the portable terminal 30 matches the same-day key C1 stored in itself. If the authentication device 40 determines that the verification (user authentication) is successful, the authentication device 40 unlocks the opening / closing device 15. In addition, the delivery of the same day key C1 between the portable terminal 30 and the authentication device 40 is performed as an output unit 37 as a display unit that displays the above-described QR code and a reader that reads the QR code displayed on the output unit 37. This is realized by the apparatus-side receiving unit 43.

  At this time, the next day key C2 is delivered from the portable terminal 30 to the authentication device 40 as shown in FIG. That is, the authentication device 40 receives and stores the next day key C2 from the portable terminal 30 when performing user authentication based on the collation result of the current day key C1. Note that the next day key C2 between the portable terminal 30 and the authentication device 40 is displayed on the output unit 37 and the output unit 37 as a display unit for displaying the QR code described above, as with the day key C1. It is realized by the apparatus side receiving unit 43 as a reader for reading the QR code. The next day key C2 is delivered only when the user authentication by the day key C1 is successful, and not when it fails. Further, the user authentication using the current day key C1 and the delivery of the next day key C2 may be performed almost simultaneously.

  Thereafter, when the time elapses and the date changes and the expiration date of the current-day key C1 ends, the authentication device 40 deletes the current-day key C1 as shown in FIG. 5B. Further, the portable terminal 30 deletes the current day key C1 and the next day key C2. As a result, the authentication device 40 stores the next day key C2 (current day key C1 on the next day), which is the same state as the initial state shown in FIG. On the next day, the series of processes shown in FIGS. In the above embodiment, the mobile terminal 30 and the authentication device 40 have been described as deleting the authentication key C when the date changes. However, for example, when there is a sufficient storage capacity, the authentication key C for a predetermined period is used. May be stored without being erased. However, erasing sequentially is preferable from the viewpoint of saving storage area and improving security.

  As described above, in the authentication system 1 of the present embodiment, the next day key C2 that becomes valid after the expiration date of the current day key C1 has expired is delivered to the authentication device 40 during user authentication using the current day key C1. It is. As a result, when the expiration date of the current day key C1 expires, the next day key C2 newly functions as the current day key C1, and an authentication system that does not require communication for user authentication can be realized. Further, in the authentication system 1, it is not necessary to store an algorithm for generating the authentication key C on the authentication device 40 side, and even if the authentication device 40 is stolen or lost, the algorithm for generating the authentication key C Will not leak. Therefore, according to this authentication system, high security can be maintained. Further, when a plurality of authentication devices 40 are installed, even if one of them is stolen or lost, it is not necessary to replace another authentication device 40, which is preferable in terms of cost. Moreover, since the portable terminal 30 holds the authentication key C, it is also preferable in that it is unlikely that a person other than the related party steals the authentication key C.

  In the authentication system 1, the authentication key generation device 20 is disposed in the facility managed by the railway operator, and the authentication device 40 is connected to the opening / closing device 15 of the door 13 of the railway vehicle 10 managed by the railway operator. It is connected. The authentication device 40 unlocks the opening / closing device 15 when the user authentication is successful. According to this authentication system 1, since communication is not required when the opening / closing device 15 is unlocked, the door 13 of the railway vehicle 10 may be opened / closed that may travel in places with poor communication conditions such as underground or mountainous areas. It can be suitably applied to. Further, in this authentication system 1, it is not necessary to store an algorithm for generating the authentication key C on the authentication device 40 side arranged in the railway vehicle 10, and when the authentication device 40 is stolen from within the railway vehicle 10, Even if it is lost, the generation algorithm of the authentication key C is not leaked. Therefore, according to this authentication system, high security can be maintained.

  Note that the authentication system 1 may include a plurality of authentication devices 40 connected to each other so as to be able to communicate information. In this case, the authentication device 40 preferably synchronizes (shares) the stored authentication key C (the current day key C1 and the next day key C2) with the other authentication devices 40. According to this authentication system 1, the authentication key C is shared with the other authentication devices 40 by performing user authentication for any one of the plurality of authentication devices 40 provided, so that it is convenient while maintaining security. It becomes possible to improve the property. Furthermore, in this case, the authentication devices 40 arranged in the same formation (or vehicle) may check each other's soundness. Accordingly, when any one of the plurality of authentication devices 40 is removed, the other authentication devices 40 can detect the occurrence of the malfunction. These information exchanges may be performed at a predetermined time interval, but are preferably performed at a timing when no other person is on board. Alternatively, it may be performed when a physical key described below is used.

  The authentication system 1 may further include a physical key (special key) that forcibly executes user authentication by the authentication device 40. In this case, it is preferable that the authentication device 40 deletes the stored authentication key C (current day key C1 and next day key C2) when performing user authentication with a physical key. According to this authentication system 1, since all the authentication keys C that have already been stored can be deleted by using the physical key, the security of the system is ensured even if the generation algorithm of the authentication key C is leaked. it can. In addition, when the user authentication using the day key C1 is not performed during the day, the authentication key C is not delivered (that is, the day key C1 is not stored in the authentication device 40). Also, the authentication device 40 can be forced to authenticate the user by using the physical key. Further, it is conceivable to further add a function of transferring the authentication key C to the authentication device 40 to the physical key. By doing so, when the authentication key C is not delivered as described above and the user authentication is forcibly performed, the authentication key C is delivered from the physical key to the authentication device 40 to be in a normal state. It becomes possible to return.

(Modification)
Next, a modification of the authentication system according to the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. This modification is basically the same as that of the above embodiment, and is different only in that user attribute information is associated with an authentication key.

  In the authentication system of the modified example, it is assumed that vehicle composition is divided or merged. For example, as shown in FIG. 6, a railway vehicle 10A of company A and a railway vehicle 10B of company B may be merged (coupled) and may enter a track of company A. In this case, it is possible that a crew member belonging to company B drives the combined vehicle instead of company A that manages the destination track. In this case, it is preferable that the authentication key of company A and the authentication key of company B are different from the viewpoint of security.

  Therefore, in the authentication system of the modified example, the attribute information related to the user attribute of the user who owns the mobile terminal 30 is associated with the authentication key C. Specifically, as shown in FIG. 7, when a mobile terminal owned by a crew member (user) of company A is a mobile terminal 30A and a mobile terminal owned by a crew member (user) of company B is a mobile terminal 30B, the user attributes The attribute information regarding the difference between the railway operators (Company A and Company B) is associated with the authentication key C, and the same-day key C1A and next-day key C2A for Company A, and the same-day key C1B and next-day key C2B for Company B are set. To do. Only the same-day key C1A and next-day key C2A for company A are stored in the portable terminal 30A for company A, and only the same-day key C1B and next-day key C2B for company B are stored in the portable terminal 30B for company B. The authentication device 40 includes authentication key information between the authentication device 40 in the railway vehicle 10A and the authentication device 40 in the railway vehicle 10B when the railway vehicle 10A of company A and the railway vehicle 10B of company B are merged. Are exchanged, the current day key C1A and the next day key C2A, and the current day key C1B and the next day key C2B are stored.

  And the authentication apparatus 40 receives the said attribute information via the attribute information reception part 47 from the control apparatus 11 (refer FIG. 1) which manages control of the rail vehicle 10, and is for A company and B company based on attribute information. Only user authentication using one of the authentication keys is permitted. For example, the control device 11 identifies attribute information based on information from a master controller arranged in the driver's seat of the railway vehicle 10 (the keys for operating the master controller are different between company A and company B). According to the authentication system of the modified example described above, user authentication can be successfully performed while making the authentication key of company A different from the authentication key of company B.

  As a further modification, in the case of entering on the track of Company A, when the rail vehicle 10A of Company A and the rail vehicle 10B of Company B are merged, the authentication device 40 and the rail vehicle 10B in the rail vehicle 10A are combined. By exchanging authentication key information with the internal authentication device 40, the same-day key C1B and next-day key C2B of the authentication device 40 in the railway vehicle 10B may be rewritten to the same-day key C1A and next-day key C2A for company A. Good. Alternatively, at the time of merging, the authentication device 40 may be configured to allow user authentication using either the authentication key for company A or the authentication key for company B. In addition, when the railway vehicle 10A of the company A and the railway vehicle 10B of the company B are merged, from the day key C1A for the company A (next day key C2A) and the day key C1B for the company B (next day key C2B), It is good also as a structure which newly produces | generates the same day key (next day key) for the vehicles merged.

  Moreover, although the example which made the user attribute the difference in the railway company to which it belongs was demonstrated in the said example, a user attribute is not restricted to this. For example, user attributes may be set according to the crew's occupation (for example, conductor and salesperson), and the authentication key may be different. In the above example, the user attribute is attribute information. However, in addition to or instead of this, the installation position of the authentication device 40 may be attribute information. For example, the opening / closing device 15 of the door 13 of the crew room 19 may be different from the authentication key of the opening / closing device 15 of the door 13 of the conductor compartment. As described above, by associating the user attribute of the user who owns the portable terminal 30 or the attribute information related to the installation position of the authentication device 40 with the authentication key C, different types of authentication keys are associated with the user attribute and the installation position of the authentication device 40. Since C is generated, an authentication system according to the usage mode can be constructed.

  The preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described above. However, the present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments. The present invention can be modified without departing from the scope described in the claims or applied to other embodiments. May be.

  For example, in the above-described embodiment, the example in which the authentication system of the present invention is applied to the system for unlocking the opening / closing device 15 of the door 13 of the railway vehicle 10 managed by the railway operator has been described. It is not limited to this. For example, a system (lock system) for unlocking a container door opening / closing device, a system for unlocking a door opening / closing device in a building, a system for controlling the start of a taximeter, an office The present invention can be applied to various authentication systems that require user authentication, such as a login system to a terminal.

  Moreover, in the said embodiment, although the QR code was used as the authentication key C and the QR code was displayed on the portable terminal 30, it demonstrated and demonstrated the example which performs user authentication between the portable terminal 30 and the authentication apparatus 40, For example, user authentication may be performed using non-contact type IC cards, or contact type cards using IC or magnetism may be used. In addition, user authentication may be performed using voice. In this case, since measures against ambient noise are required, it can be considered to be via an earphone jack. In addition, user authentication may be performed using video, a light emission signal, wireless communication such as Bluetooth (registered trademark) or wireless LAN, or magnetism. When these are changed, the configurations of the terminal-side receiving unit 33, the output unit 37, and the device-side receiving unit 43 may be changed so as to correspond to the change.

  In the above embodiment, the authentication key C has been described as being different for each date. However, different authentication keys may be set for each predetermined time interval, for example, different for every half day. It may be set, or a different one may be set every week. In the above embodiment, an example of delivery using the current day key C1 that is valid during the day and the next day key C2 that is valid during the next day has been described. In response, the authentication keys C for the latest several days may be delivered.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Authentication system, 3 ... Crew member division, 10 ... Railcar, 13 ... Door, 15 ... Opening / closing device, 20 ... Authentication key generation device, 30 ... Portable terminal, 40 ... Authentication device, C ... Authentication key, C1 ... Same day key (First authentication key), C2... Next day key (second authentication key), P .. crew member (user).

Claims (5)

An authentication key generation device for generating an authentication key used for user authentication;
A portable terminal that stores the authentication key generated by the authentication key generation device;
An authentication device that performs user authentication based on the verification result of the authentication key stored in the mobile terminal,
The authentication key generation device includes a first authentication key set with a first expiration date and a second authentication key set with a second expiration date that becomes valid after the first expiration date ends. And generate
The authentication system receives and stores the second authentication key from the portable terminal when user authentication is performed based on a verification result of the first authentication key. A plurality of the authentication devices connected to each other so as to communicate information,
The authentication system according to claim 1, wherein the authentication device synchronizes the stored first authentication key and the second authentication key with another authentication device.   The first authentication key and the second authentication key are associated with attribute information related to at least one of a user attribute of a user who owns the portable terminal and an installation position of the authentication device. The authentication system according to claim 1 or 2. A physical key for forcibly executing user authentication by the authentication device;
The said authentication apparatus deletes the memorize | stored said 1st authentication key and said 2nd authentication key, when user authentication is performed by the said physical key. The authentication system according to claim 1. The authentication key generation device is arranged in a facility managed by a railway operator,
5. The authentication system according to claim 1, wherein the authentication device is connected to a door opening / closing device of a railway vehicle managed by the railway operator.

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