JP2014192639A - Terminal device and determination method - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To detect abnormality of a customer device.SOLUTION: A maintenance terminal 200 receives list information encrypted by a public key to be paired with a secret key of a TPM chip of the maintenance terminal 200 through a network 50 outside a company, and decrypts the received list information by the secret key of the TPM chip to store into a storage unit. The maintenance terminal 200 acquires hashed configuration information of the customer device 10 through an intranet 60, and compares the acquired configuration information with list information whose genuineness is guaranteed to output the comparison result.

Description

  The present invention relates to a terminal device and the like.

  In recent years, as a conventional technology for quickly ascertaining at the maintenance center the failure status of customer devices that are maintenance targets connected via a network, the configuration information of customer devices is periodically encrypted and sent to a remote maintenance center for maintenance. Some centers determine whether there is a problem with the received configuration information.

  For example, when the hash value of the configuration information transmitted from the customer device matches the hash value of the configuration information included in the black list in which the trouble and the countermeasures are known, Warning, the maintenance worker goes to the customer equipment maintenance work.

JP 2009-230457 A

Fujitsu Limited “Systemwalker IT Change Manager V14g”

  However, the above-described conventional technology has a problem that it is impossible to detect abnormality of the customer device.

  For example, when a communication failure occurs between a customer device and a maintenance center, the maintenance center cannot obtain configuration information from the customer device and cannot detect an abnormality in the customer information. In addition, it is also possible to move the trouble handling information of the maintenance center to the maintenance terminal, bring the maintenance terminal to the place where the customer device is installed, connect to the customer's network and detect the abnormality of the customer device, The failure handling information is updated every day, and the information moved to the maintenance terminal may not be the latest information. In this case, an abnormality of the customer device may not be detected.

  An object of one aspect is to provide a terminal device and a determination method capable of detecting an abnormality of a customer device.

  In the first proposal, the terminal device includes a reception unit, a decoding unit, an acquisition unit, and a determination unit. The receiving unit transmits, through the first network, list information having hash values of a plurality of pieces of configuration information encrypted with an encryption key that is paired with a key of a tamper-resistant chip mounted on the device. Receive from the server device. The decryption unit decrypts the encrypted list information received by the reception unit with the key of the chip, and stores the decrypted list information in the storage unit. The acquisition unit acquires the configuration information of the electronic device hashed from the electronic device via the second network. The determination unit compares the configuration information of the electronic device acquired by the acquisition unit with the list information stored in the storage unit, and outputs a comparison result.

  According to one embodiment of the present invention, an abnormality of a customer device can be detected.

FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a system according to the present embodiment. FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining hashing processing by the TPM chip of the customer apparatus. FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram illustrating the configuration of the maintenance server according to the present embodiment. FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of the data structure of the accumulation table. FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an example of the data structure of the comparison table. FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an example of the data structure of the configuration information table. FIG. 7 is a functional block diagram illustrating the configuration of the maintenance terminal according to the present embodiment. FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining the processing of the determination unit. FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating the processing procedure of the maintenance terminal according to the present embodiment.

  Embodiments of a terminal device and a determination method disclosed in the present application will be described below in detail with reference to the drawings. Note that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments.

  The configuration of the system according to the present embodiment will be described. FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a system according to the present embodiment. As shown in FIG. 1, this system includes a customer device 10, a maintenance server 100, and a maintenance terminal 200. The maintenance terminal 200 is an example of a terminal device.

  The maintenance server 100 and the maintenance terminal 200 are connected to each other via a network 50 outside the company. When maintenance work is performed on the customer device 10, the maintenance worker goes to the site and connects the customer device 10 and the maintenance terminal 200 to each other via the customer's in-house network 60. Although not shown, the maintenance server 100 is connected to a plurality of maintenance terminals.

  The customer device 10 is an electronic device to be maintained. For example, the customer apparatus 10 corresponds to a PC (Personal Computer), a server, a printer, a network device, an external storage, a mobile phone, a smartphone, a refrigerator, a washing machine, a television, a stereo component, a medical device, a machine tool, or the like.

  The customer device 10 periodically extracts the configuration information of its own device and hashes the extracted configuration information. When the customer apparatus 10 is connected to the maintenance terminal 200, the customer apparatus 10 transmits the hashed configuration information to the maintenance terminal 200.

  The maintenance server 100 manages configuration information of each customer device. For example, the maintenance server 100 stores list information having a hash value of the configuration information of each customer device, and transmits the list information to the maintenance terminal 200 via the external network 50.

  The maintenance terminal 200 acquires list information from the maintenance server 100 via the external network 50 and stores it in the storage unit. Further, the maintenance terminal 200 acquires the hashed configuration information of the customer apparatus 10 via the in-house network 60, compares the acquired hash value with the list information, and outputs the comparison result. For example, the maintenance terminal 200 corresponds to the configuration information of the customer apparatus in which the failure has occurred as a result of the comparison.

  Incidentally, it is assumed that the customer apparatus 10, the maintenance server 100, and the maintenance terminal 200 shown in FIG. 1 perform data communication securely using, for example, TCG (Trusted Computing Group) technology.

  An example of the TCG technology used in this embodiment will be described. Terminals and devices connected to the Internet are constantly exposed to security threats, and there are cases where unexpected modifications are made to the software structure that constitutes the platform due to viruses, spyware, other malicious scripts, unauthorized access, and the like. For such risks, TCG technology realizes a secure computing environment by ensuring the reliability of the platform. Here, the platform indicates hardware, OS, application, and the like.

  For example, there is a limit to conventional security measures that depend only on software against the threat of software tampering. For this reason, as one of the TCG technologies, a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) chip is embedded in a platform, and the TPM chip is used as a root of trust to construct a reliable computing environment that is extremely difficult to falsify. Further, by using the TPM chip, hardware-based data / certificate protection and a secure cryptographic processing environment can be realized.

  Next, the TPM chip will be described. The TPM chip is a birdware chip bound to an electronic device and has tamper resistance. The TPM chip is physically bound to the main components of the electronic device so that it cannot be removed from the electronic device. For example, the component parts of the electronic device correspond to a motherboard or the like. Since the TPM chip is designed with the functions, memory area, and processor power to be suppressed as much as possible, it can be manufactured at low cost and can be applied to various electronic devices and platforms.

  For example, the functions of the TPM include a function for generating and storing an RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) secret key, and a function for signing, encrypting, and decrypting with an RSA secret key. In RSA, a pair of a private key and a public key is created. In addition, the functions of the TPM include a function for performing a hash calculation of SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) and a function for holding environment information of the electronic device. When the bound electronic device is activated, the TPM measures the software code in the boot process to the BIOS, OSloader, and OS kernel, hashs the measured software code, and registers it in a register inside the TPM. Further, the TPM collects hardware information of the bound electronic device, hashes the hardware information, and registers the hashed information in a register in the TPM.

  A software stack and a software interface are defined in order to use a TPM chip as a hardware device from a higher-level application or library. This software stack is called TSS (TCG Software Stack), and is composed of software modules that store the functions of TPM chips whose resources are limited. The application of the electronic device can access the function of the TPM chip described above using the interface provided by the TSS.

  Returning to the description of FIG. The customer device 10 is equipped with a TPM chip, and the TPM chip collects configuration information of the customer device 10. The TPM chip hashes the collected configuration information. The customer device 10 transmits the configuration information hashed by the TPM chip of the own device to the maintenance terminal 200 via the in-house network 60. The TPM chip ensures the validity of hash value collection by managing the rules for collecting hash values with the TPM chip on the customer system side by hashing and adding a signature. Moreover, the TPM chip proves the non-falsification of the rule by checking the current rule and signature as necessary. As a result, the TPM chip ensures that there is no falsification in the rules for collecting hash values by referring to the rules that have been proven to be non-falsified on the TPM chip side.

  Here, the configuration information includes software information, software setting values, OS (Operating System) information, OS setting values, heartware information, hardware setting values, and the like.

  FIG. 2 illustrates the hashing process by the TPM chip of the customer apparatus. As shown in FIG. 2, the TPM chip hashes the software information to obtain a hash value “A1”. The TPM chip hashes the software setting value to obtain the hash value “A2”. The TPM chip hashes the OS information to obtain a hash value “A3”. The TPM chip hashes the OS setting value to obtain a hash value “A4”. The TPM chip hashes the hardware information to obtain a hash value “A5”. The TPM chip hashes the hardware setting value to obtain a hash value “A6”.

  The TPM chip obtains a representative hash value “A” by further hashing the hash values A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, and A6. The representative hash value corresponds to the hash value of the configuration information.

  Next, a configuration example of the maintenance server 100 illustrated in FIG. 1 will be described. FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram illustrating the configuration of the maintenance server according to the present embodiment. As illustrated in FIG. 3, the maintenance server 100 includes a communication unit 110, an input unit 120, a display unit 130, an interface unit 140, a TPM chip 150, a control unit 170, and a storage unit 160. The units 110 to 170 are connected to each other by a bus 180.

  The communication unit 110 is a processing unit that performs data communication with other devices via the external network 50. For example, the communication unit 110 performs data communication with the maintenance terminal 200 via the network 50. A control unit 170 described later exchanges data with the maintenance terminal 200 via the communication unit 110.

  The input unit 120 is an input device that inputs various types of information to the customer device 10. For example, the input unit 120 corresponds to a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, or the like. The display unit 130 is a display device that displays various types of information output from the control unit 170. For example, the display unit 130 corresponds to a liquid crystal display, a touch panel, or the like. The interface unit 140 is an interface connected to various external devices.

  The TPM chip 150 is a TPM chip that conforms to the above-described TCG technology.

  The storage unit 160 is a storage device that stores list information 160a. The list information 160a includes an accumulation table 161, a comparison table 162, and a configuration information table 163. For example, the storage unit 160 corresponds to a storage device such as a hard disk device, a semiconductor memory element such as a random access memory (RAM), a read only memory (ROM), and a flash memory.

  The accumulation table 161 is a table that holds a hash value of each customer device. FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of the data structure of the accumulation table. As illustrated in FIG. 4, the accumulation table 161 associates an identification number with a hash value. The identification number is information for identifying each customer device. The hash value is a representative hash value corresponding to the configuration information of the corresponding customer device. In FIG. 4, for example, a customer device corresponding to an identification number “1001” is a customer device 10. If the hash value transmitted from the customer apparatus 10 is “A”, this indicates that the configuration of the customer apparatus 10 has not changed. On the other hand, if the hash value transmitted from the customer apparatus 10 is “other than A”, this indicates that the configuration of the customer apparatus 10 has changed.

  The comparison table 162 is a table having hash values of a plurality of pieces of configuration information that satisfy a predetermined condition. FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an example of the data structure of the comparison table. As shown in FIG. 5, the comparison table 162 includes a black list 162a, a yellow list 162b, a verified list 162c, and a white list 162d.

  The black list 162a is, for example, a list having hash values of configuration information in which a failure occurs or configuration information prohibited by each company. In addition, the black list 162a holds information on a solution when a failure occurs in association with each hash value.

  The yellow list 162b is, for example, a list having hash values of configuration information that may cause a failure or configuration information that is prohibited by the manufacturer of the customer device. Further, the yellow list 162b holds information on solutions when a failure occurs in association with each hash value.

  The verified list 162c is a list having a hash value of authenticated configuration information. The white list 162d is a list having a hash value of appropriate configuration information specified by the manufacturer of the customer device.

  The configuration information table 163 is a table that associates hash values with configuration information. FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an example of the data structure of the configuration information table. As shown in FIG. 6, this configuration information table 163 associates hash values with configuration information. For example, the configuration information corresponding to the hash value “A” is “configuration information X1”.

  Returning to the description of FIG. The control unit 170 includes a transmission unit 171. The control unit 170 corresponds to, for example, an integrated device such as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a field programmable gate array (FPGA). Moreover, the control part 170 respond | corresponds to electronic circuits, such as CPU (Central Processing Unit) and MPU (Micro Processing Unit), for example.

  The transmission unit 171 is a processing unit that encrypts the list information 160 a and transmits it to the maintenance terminal 200 when a request for the list information 160 a is received from the maintenance terminal 200. For example, the transmission unit 171 acquires a public key that is paired with a secret key stored in the TPM chip of the maintenance terminal 200 from an authentication server (not shown). The transmission unit 171 encrypts the list information 160a with the acquired public key, and transmits the encrypted list information 160a to the maintenance terminal 200.

  Next, a configuration example of the maintenance terminal 200 shown in FIG. 1 will be described. FIG. 7 is a functional block diagram illustrating the configuration of the maintenance terminal according to the present embodiment. As illustrated in FIG. 7, the maintenance terminal 200 includes a communication unit 210, an input unit 220, a display unit 230, an interface unit 240, a TPM chip 250, a control unit 270, and a storage unit 260. The units 210 to 270 are connected to each other by a bus 280.

  The communication unit 210 is a processing unit that performs data communication with other devices via the external network 50. For example, the communication unit 210 performs data communication with the maintenance server 100 via the external network 50. In addition, the communication unit 210 performs data communication with the customer apparatus 10 via the in-house network 60. A control unit 270 described later exchanges data with the customer apparatus 10 and the maintenance server 100 via the communication unit 210.

  The input unit 220 is an input device that inputs various types of information to the maintenance terminal 200. For example, the input unit 220 corresponds to a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, or the like. The display unit 230 is a display device that displays various types of information output from the control unit 270. For example, the display unit 230 corresponds to a liquid crystal display, a touch panel, or the like. The interface unit 240 is an interface connected to various external devices.

  The TPM chip 250 is a TPM chip that conforms to the above-described TCG technology. For example, the TPM chip 250 decrypts the encrypted list information received from the maintenance server 100 using the secret key of the TPM chip 250.

  The storage unit 260 is a storage device that stores configuration information 261, list information 262, and history information 263. The list information 262 includes an accumulation table 262a, a comparison table 262b, and a configuration information table 262c. For example, the storage unit 260 corresponds to a storage device such as a semiconductor memory element such as a hard disk device, a RAM, a ROM, or a flash memory.

  The configuration information 261 is hashed configuration information of the customer information 10.

  The accumulation table 262a is a table that holds a hash value of each customer device. The accumulation table 262a corresponds to the accumulation table 161 of the maintenance server 100. The data structure of the accumulation table 262a is the same as that of FIG.

  The comparison table 262b is a table having hash values of a plurality of pieces of configuration information that satisfy a predetermined condition. The comparison table 262b corresponds to the comparison table 162 of the maintenance server 100. The data structure of the comparison table 262b is the same as that of FIG. That is, the comparison table 262b includes a black list 162a, a yellow list 162b, a verified list 162c, and a white list 162d.

  The configuration information table 262c is a table that associates hash values with configuration information. The configuration information table 262c corresponds to the configuration information table 163 of the maintenance server 100. The data structure of the configuration information table 262c is the same as that of FIG.

  The history information 263 is information indicating a processing history of the maintenance terminal 200. As will be described later, when the configuration information 261 is deleted, the control unit 270 leaves a history indicating that the configuration information 261 has been deleted as history information 263, and the electronic signature using the private key of the TPM chip 250 along with the time stamp. Is granted.

  The control unit 270 includes a reception unit 271, a decryption unit 272, an acquisition unit 273, a determination unit 274, and an erasure unit 275. The control unit 270 corresponds to, for example, an integrated device such as an ASIC or FPGA. The control unit 270 corresponds to an electronic circuit such as a CPU or MPU.

  The receiving unit 271 is a processing unit that receives, from the maintenance server 100, list information encrypted with a public key that is paired with the private key of the TPM chip 250. The receiving unit 271 outputs the received list information to the decoding unit 272.

  The decryption unit 272 is a processing unit that decrypts the list information by requesting the TPM chip 250 to decrypt the encrypted list information. The decryption unit 272 stores the decrypted list information 262 in the storage unit 260.

  When the acquisition unit 273 detects that the maintenance terminal 200 and the customer device 10 are connected to each other via the in-house network 60, the acquisition unit 273 requests the customer device 10 for configuration information, and obtains the hashed configuration information. It is a processing part to acquire. The acquisition unit 273 stores the acquired configuration information 261 in the storage unit 260.

  The determination unit 274 is a processing unit that determines whether there is a change in the configuration information of the customer device 10. Further, when there is a change in the configuration information of the customer device 10, the determination unit 274 determines whether the configuration information corresponds to a black list or a yellow list using the comparison table 262.

  An example of processing in which the determination unit 274 determines whether the configuration information of the customer device 10 has changed will be described. The determination unit 274 specifies configuration information (hash value) of the previous customer device 10 based on the identification information of the customer device 10 and the accumulation table 262a. The identification information of the customer device 10 is notified from the customer device 10.

  The determination unit 274 compares the configuration information of the previous customer device 10 with the configuration information 261 and determines whether or not they match. If the configuration information of the previous customer device 10 matches the configuration information 261, the determination unit 274 causes the display unit 230 to display information indicating that there is no problem. On the other hand, when the configuration information of the previous customer device 10 does not match the configuration information 261, the determination unit 274 compares whether the configuration information 261 described later corresponds to a black list or a yellow list. Processing for determination using the table 262 is executed.

  A process in which the determination unit 274 determines whether the configuration information 261 corresponds to a black list or a yellow list will be described. The determination unit 274 compares the configuration information 261 with the black list 162a and the yellow list 162b to determine whether a hash value corresponding to the configuration information 261 exists. When the hash value corresponding to the configuration information 261 does not exist in the black list 162a and the yellow list 162b, the determination unit 274 causes the display unit 230 to display information indicating that there is no problem.

  On the other hand, when the hash value corresponding to the configuration information 261 exists in the black list 162a or the yellow list 162b, the determination unit 274 extracts a solution associated with the hash value from the corresponding list. The determination unit 274 causes the display unit 230 to display the extracted solution information.

  Subsequently, the determination unit 274 compares the previous configuration information with the current configuration information, and identifies a difference portion. For example, the determination unit 274 compares the hash value of the configuration information of the customer device 10 stored in the accumulation table 262a with the configuration information table 262c to obtain the previous configuration information. Also, the determination unit 274 compares the configuration information 261 and the configuration information table 262c to obtain the current configuration information.

  FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining the processing of the determination unit. In FIG. 8, configuration information X1 indicates configuration information of the previous customer device 10. The configuration information X <b> 1 ′ indicates the current configuration information of the customer device 10. The determination unit 274 compares the configuration information X1 and the configuration information X1 'to identify the difference “software information (to)”. The determination unit 274 causes the display unit 230 to display the information on the identified difference part.

  When the above process is completed, the determination unit 274 outputs a message indicating that the process is complete to the erasure unit 275.

  The deletion unit 275 is a processing unit that deletes the configuration information 261 of the customer device 10 when the information indicating that the processing is completed is acquired from the determination unit 274. When the configuration information 261 is deleted, the deletion unit 275 generates history information 263 that is a history of the deleted processing and stores the history information 263 in the storage unit 260. In addition, the erasing unit 275 adds a time stamp to the history information 263 and requests the TPM chip 250 to add an electronic signature to the history information 263.

  Next, a processing procedure of the maintenance terminal 200 according to the present embodiment will be described. FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating the processing procedure of the maintenance terminal according to the present embodiment. As shown in FIG. 9, the maintenance terminal 200 receives the encrypted list information from the maintenance server 100 via the external network 50 (step S101), and decrypts the list information (step S102).

  The maintenance terminal 200 determines whether or not the customer terminal 10 is connected (step S103). If the maintenance terminal 200 is not connected to the customer device 10 (No at Step S103), the maintenance terminal 200 proceeds to Step S103 again.

  On the other hand, when the maintenance terminal 200 is connected to the customer device 10 (step S103, Yes), the configuration information (hash value) is acquired from the customer device 10 via the in-house network 60 (step S104). .

  The maintenance terminal 200 determines whether or not the hash value of the configuration information received from the customer device 10 matches the hash value of the configuration information table 262c (step S105). If the hash values match (Yes in step S105), the maintenance terminal 200 displays that there is no problem (step S106). Then, the maintenance terminal 200 deletes the configuration information 261 (step S107). In step S107, history information 263 is generated when the configuration information 261 is deleted.

  By the way, when the hash value of the configuration information received from the customer apparatus 10 and the hash value of the configuration information table 262c do not match in step S105 (No in step S105), the hash value is the black list 162a or the yellow list 162b. It is determined using the comparison table 262 (step S108).

  When the hash value does not exist in the black list 162a and the yellow list 162b (No at Step S108), the maintenance terminal 200 proceeds to Step S106.

  On the other hand, when the hash value exists in the black list 162a or the yellow list 162b (step S108, Yes), the maintenance terminal 200 determines a solution (step S109). The maintenance terminal 200 compares the previous configuration information with the current configuration information, and identifies the difference (step S110). The maintenance terminal 200 displays the difference part and the solution (step S111), and proceeds to step S107.

  Next, effects of the maintenance terminal 200 according to the present embodiment will be described. The maintenance terminal 200 receives the list information encrypted with the public key that is paired with the secret key of the TPM chip 250 of the maintenance terminal 200 via the external network 50 and uses the received list information as the secret of the TPM chip 250. Decrypted by the key and stored in the storage unit 260. For this reason, according to the maintenance terminal 200, the authenticity of the list information can be ensured by the TCG technique.

  Then, the maintenance terminal 200 acquires the hashed configuration information of the customer apparatus 10 via the in-house network 60, compares the acquired configuration information with the list information that guarantees the authenticity, and compares the comparison result. Output. For this reason, according to the maintenance terminal 200, even when a communication failure occurs between the customer apparatus 10 and the maintenance server 100, an abnormality of the customer apparatus 10 can be detected. Further, since the hash value of the configuration information of the customer device 10 does not flow on the outside network 50, it is possible to prevent leakage of information related to the customer device 10.

  In addition, according to the maintenance terminal 200, the configuration information of the customer device 10 and the list information are compared, and solution information is output. For this reason, the maintenance worker in the field can perform the maintenance work of the customer apparatus 10 efficiently.

  Further, according to the maintenance terminal 200, the configuration information of the customer device 10 is deleted, and the electronic signature of the TPM chip 250 is given to the history information 263 of the deleted processing. For this reason, it is possible to prevent leakage of information related to the customer apparatus 10 and to prove that the history information 263 has been deleted.

  By the way, among the processes described in the present embodiment, all or a part of the processes described as being automatically performed can be manually performed, or the processes described as being performed manually can be performed. All or a part can be automatically performed by a known method. In addition, the processing procedure, control procedure, specific name, and information including various data and parameters shown in the above-described document and drawings can be arbitrarily changed unless otherwise specified.

  Furthermore, each processing function performed by each device may be realized by a CPU and a program that is analyzed and executed by the CPU, or may be realized as hardware by wired logic.

10 Customer device 100 Maintenance server 200 Maintenance terminal

Claims (4)

Receives list information with hash values of multiple pieces of configuration information encrypted from a key of a tamper-resistant chip mounted on its own device from the server device via the first network. A receiving unit to
Decrypting the encrypted list information received by the receiving unit with the key of the chip, and storing the decrypted list information in a storage unit;
An acquisition unit that acquires the configuration information of the electronic device hashed from the electronic device via a second network;
A terminal device comprising: a determination unit that compares the configuration information of the electronic device acquired by the acquisition unit with list information stored in the storage unit and outputs a comparison result. The list information is information that associates a hash value of a plurality of configuration information with a solution for a failure caused by the configuration information,
The terminal device according to claim 1, wherein the determination unit compares the configuration information of the electronic device with the list information and outputs a solution corresponding to the configuration information of the electronic device.   The apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising: an erasure unit that erases the hash value of the configuration information of the electronic device acquired by the acquisition unit, and adds an electronic signature using the key of the chip to the deleted history. Terminal device. A determination method executed by a computer,
Received from the server device via the first network is list information having a hash value of a plurality of pieces of configuration information encrypted with an encryption key paired with a tamper-resistant chip key mounted on the computer. And
Decrypting the encrypted list information with the key of the chip, storing the decrypted list information in a storage device;
Obtaining the configuration information of the electronic device hashed from the electronic device via the second network,
A determination method, comprising: comparing the acquired configuration information of the electronic device with list information stored in the storage device, and executing each process of outputting a comparison result.

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