JP2000506947A - Authentication system and method for remote keyless entry system - Google Patents

Abstract

The authentication system and method changes the challenge count code value (407) and encodes it into an authentication code using an encoding process (411). Next, the changed challenge count and authentication code are transmitted (415). The resigned challenge count, when received, is encoded (507) using an encoding process from which a recipient-derived authentication code is formed. If the authentication code and the receiving-side authentication code match, authentication is indicated (511).

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION       For remote keyless entry system                       Authentication system and method                                 Technical field   The present invention relates to the field of remote keyless entry systems for vehicles. More particularly, it relates to an authentication system and method.                                 Background of the Invention   The current vehicle is a Remote Keyless Entry (RKE). ry) systems, which unlock the vehicle doors and Control functions such as starting the engine of the car or opening the garage door . From a RKE transmitter, usually a portable device, usually installed in a vehicle or garage Usually, a radio signal is transmitted to an RKE receiver. Radio signal is transmitted And record electronic signals using electronic interception to control vehicle functions and open garage doors. It can be retransmitted later to operate the device.   To prevent unauthorized access, RKE transmitter and RKE receiver By digitally encoding the radio signal transmitted to the transceiver, Increase the confidentiality of the system. Digitally encoded and received by the RKE receiver Before you can use a radio signal, you need to know its source. is there. This process of verification is often referred to as authentication.   There are a variety of authentication methods and systems, but these are used to prevent unauthorized use of the RKE system. It is insufficient because it lacks sufficient confidentiality to prevent it. A secure system is Must withstand cloning and cloning resistance . To be considered secure, one sign bit derived by command query As a result of the change, at least half of the transmitted sign bits must be changed. Will be. When this happens, the system will have an electron decay effect (avalanche ef fect) and can be said to be excellent. The current RKE transmission scheme is The response to the confidentiality issue is insufficient.   An improved authentication method for a more secure RKE system than the traditional implementation Needed.                           BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES   FIG. 1 illustrates a remote keyless entry (RK) according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention. E) System on the transmitter side of the system It is a block diagram.   FIG. 2 shows a system on the receiver side of the RKE system according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention. -It is a block diagram.   FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of the RKE system.   FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a preferred method of the transmitter portion of the RKE system.   FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing a preferred method of receiver-side authentication in the RKE system. is there.                       Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiment   An authentication system and method alters and encodes a challenge count code value. Encode it into an authentication code using a process. Next, change the sign An edge count and an authentication code are transmitted. Resigned challenge count Is received, it is encoded using an encoding process, and the authentication code from the receiving side is Formed from there. If the authentication code and the receiver-side authentication code match, authentication is Is shown. Basically, the authentication code formed in the process on the transmitter side is If the password matches the authentication code formed in the process, authentication transmission and reception are considered to have occurred. . The challenge count changes with each new transmission and reception. High confidentiality against the possibility of information being transmitted and received being stolen and used Achieved. In addition, playback Challenge the random number before the first encoding to increase confidentiality. Combine with Other confidentiality features are illustrated in the drawings which illustrate the particular structure of the present invention. I will introduce it later.   FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a transmitter of a remote keyless entry (RKE) system. It is a stem block diagram. The RKE system is a convenience package It is often provided for cars as a part. With the RKE system, the driver When approaching the vehicle, the door of the vehicle can be opened and closed. In addition, as an additional function There is also an RKE system that allows a driver to remotely start a vehicle.   Fig. 1 shows an RKE transmitter that collects control information and sends it to a receiver located in the vehicle. Here's how to do it. Command switch located on handheld RKE transmitter device 100 The switch 101 normally has an unlock (UNLOCK) switch and a lock (LOCK) switch. Switch, trunk release (TRUNCLELEASE) switch and engine start (ENGINESTART) switch is included and the alarm (ALARM) switch Other switches, such as switches, may be included. One of the command switches is activated Switch encoder 103 encodes it and determines which command switch Command switch code 105 indicating whether the switch has been activated. Ma When the command switch is activated, the challenge counter 107 Changed sign value and changed sign count 10 9 is generated. In the simple case, the challenge counter 107 is simply incremented There may be injuries. In more complex applications, the sign value of the challenge counter is Change to another value. However, the new value is used for both the transmitter and receiver sides of the RKE system. Is approved in advance or calculated. Challenge counsel This constant attempt to change the sign value of the data provides a certain level of confidentiality. Given to the system.   To further increase the confidentiality of the system, a random number 111 is generated by a random number generator 113. Which can make the system less predictable. , The complexity is even greater. Also, many vehicle manufacturers use unit identification numbers 115 (unit ID). This unit ID is transmitted by RKE Electrically erasable and writable read-only memory (EEPROM: Electrical (Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) 117 This can occur conveniently.   Switch Command Code 105, Changed Challenge Count 1 09, the random number 111 and the unit ID 115 before transmission. Used by the encoder 123 and the unique The authentication code 121 is generated using the secret or secret key 125. Enko Da 123 can take many forms. Basically, the data is chopped using the unique secret key 125. (hash), whiten (whiten), or encrypt (encrypt).   Like many robust transmission schemes, the CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check: Cyclic Redundancy Check) Code 127 is Switch Command Code 105, Code Change Challenge count 109, random number 111 and unit ID 115 It is calculated based on the identification code 121. Next, the CRC code 127 is Command code 105, changed challenge count 109, random number 11 1 and the unit ID 115, and further combined with or combined with the authentication code 121. , Form an assembled data packet or message 129 which is transmitted Is transmitted using the device 131. Alternatively, MAC (Message Authentication Cod e: message authentication code) can be used instead of the CRC method.   FIG. 2 is a system block diagram on the receiver side of the RKE system. Fig. 2 Describes how the RKE receiver collects information and what The operation in the vehicle to activate the operation in the vehicle.   The scheduler 201 located in the RKE control system 200 Controls the behavior of some of the zero elements. Received by request of scheduler 201 The transmitter 202 transmits the assembled data transmitted by the transmitter 131 shown in FIG. The packet 129 is received. Unit ID 115 already assembled for efficiency reasons A user extracted from the data packet 129 and derived from the EEPROM 209 on the receiver side. This is compared with the knit ID 215. If these two IDs match, the unit ID A match 217 is indicated. If the two IDs do not match, the scheduler 201 Suspends the operation of the other control system 200 elements. Next, the scheduler 20 1 waits for a predetermined amount of time and again receives another preassembled data packet from the receiver. Request 129. The predetermined amount of time the scheduler 201 waits is It is determined based on the transmission rate of the data packet 129. This delay is Is the unit ID2 derived from the receiver-side EEPR0M209. 15 clearly does not match, the system 200 reassembles the assembled data packet. This is required so as not to be constrained by the continuous processing of step 129.   When the unit ID match 217 is indicated, the scheduler checks the CRC check circuit. For 203, extract the CRC code 127 from the assembled data packet 129 And instructs it to verify the integrity of the transmission and reception. Valid CRC code 127 Is not received, the CRC check circuit 127 sends the Give a warning. The scheduler 201 waits for a predetermined amount of time, and receives again. Request another assembled data packet 129 from the machine.   If a valid CRC code 127 is sent and received, Switch command code 105, sign changed challenge count 109 And the random number 111 are extracted from the assembled data packet 129, The secret or secret key 207 provided by the EPROM 209 allows the receiver The receive-side derived authentication symbol 211 is encoded It is led into the da 205. The receiver-side encoder 205 is a transmitter of the RKE system. The secret key 207 operates in exactly the same manner as the side encoder 123 operates, Equivalent to transmitter key 125.   Once encoded, the recipient-originated authentication code 211 is transmitted at block 224. It is compared with the authentication code 121 received from the communication device 131. Two codes match And a match is indicated 213. If the two codes do not match, block 224 skips. A warning is issued to the scheduler 201. The scheduler 201 waits for a predetermined amount of time. Again request another assembled data packet 129 from the receiver.   If block 224 indicates a match, the code received by receiver 202 Changed challenge count 109 (base) Compared with the print count 219. Re-signed challenge card received Und 109 is determined on a stage basis (within 4 limits as determined in block 223) 221 that matches the challenge count 219 given, The arrange count 219 is updated (preferably the same). However, this is not necessarily the case). Und 109.   The received sign-changed challenge count 109 has been determined cinematically If the (base) challenge count 219 does not match, block 223 A warning is issued to the scheduler 201. The scheduler 201 has a predetermined amount of time. Wait and request another assembled data packet 129 again from the receiver.   In system block 225, receive as indicated by reference numeral 213. A match is indicated between the machine-side authentication code 211 and the authentication code 121, and (optionally) If the unit ID matches as indicated at 217 and the received code The changed challenge count 109 is indicated by reference numeral 221. If the match with the base challenge count 219 determined in the manner of Jingu is recognized, The switch command code 10 is labeled with a certificate and received by the receiver 202. 5 is executed in the vehicle.   Now that the entire system has been described, let's look at the hardware platform. This will be described in detail. FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of the RKE system. Holding The RKE transmitter device 100 includes a transmission controller that decodes the command switch 101. After the roller 301 has been mounted and the preferred method has been performed, it is assembled using the transmitter 131. Only the data packet 129 is transmitted. The transmission controller 301 performs digital Road configuration, Microcontroller or any other machine that basically performs some of the preferred methods It can be constructed using structures. In a preferred embodiment, a Motorola M A C68HC05 microcontroller is used. Motorola MC68H The C05 microcontroller stores parts of the preferred method described below. On-board program memory used for the EEPROM equipment for the   RKE control system 200 includes a receiver control that performs another portion of the preferred method. A roller 303 is provided. The receiver controller 303 controls the actuator And a microcontroller 307. According to the preferred embodiment , The receiver controller 303 uses the receiver 202 to The packet 129 is received. This also preferably stores parts of the preferred method described below For on-board program memory and EEPROM 209 MC68HC05 microcontroller with EEPROM The microcontroller 307, which is a roller, And drives an external actuator to the actuator drive 305 Order. These external actuators include door lock solenoids and And an engine starter. Detailed description of hardware platform Therefore, the RKE transmitter device 100 and the RKE control system 20 The preferred method steps for both 0 are introduced.   FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing a preferred method of the transmitter part of the RKE system, and FIG. The figure is a flowchart illustrating a preferred method of receiver-side authentication in an RKE system. these Basically, the flowcharts of the controllers 301 and 307 are as follows. Note that each of the 8HC05 microcontrollers is encoded separately I want to be.   Starting from FIG. 4, the transmission control embedded in the RKE transmitter device 100 Motorola MC68HC05 microcontroller in La 301 is the preferred Activate the transmitter side of the method.   In step 403, the microcontroller activates the command switch Is determined. If the command switch has been activated, go to step 405. Command command to identify the specific command switch that was activated Code is generated.   Next, in step 407, the switch that occurs as a result of the command switch activation Change the sign value of the challenge count in response to the generation of a switch command code To provide a resigned challenge count. For simple cases, The range count is basically maintained in a register of the microcontroller. Binary counter. In this example, the sign value is simply the calculated value of the counter It is. Therefore, at a specific moment, the calculated value of the counter becomes 345. Yes, when the command switch is activated, the counter is incremented by one and The challenge count, which has been resigned to 346, is 346. Of course, other signs Expressions and / or increments can also be used.   In step 409, the microcontroller generates a random number. Next, step 4 At 11, the switch command code, the sign changed challenge cow And a random number are encoded into an authentication code using an encoding process. Optionally, Stored in microcontroller EEPROM for more confidentiality The unit ID can also be included in the data to be encoded. The encoding process is This is also performed using the secret key stored in the EEPROM of the microcontroller Is done. The encoding process is an optional process that predictably alters the basic form of the raw data. It can take the form of a process. Preferably, the encoding process is an encryption Process, but in the form of filtering, whitening or other data modification processes You can also.   Next, in step 413, a data packet is formed, which includes unit I D, random number, changed sign count, switch command code And an authentication code. Preferably, the unit ID, random number, Challenge count, switch command code and authentication code A CRC (or MAC) code is calculated based on the assembled data Form a ket Provided for.   Next, at step 415, the assembled data packet is transmitted by the transmitter 131. Be trusted. Basically, the transmission controller of the RKE transmitter device 100 is described with reference to FIG. The method performed on the microcontroller embedded in the Troller 301 is: It is almost the same as the system block diagram introduced in FIG. Next, FIG. 5 is explained. I do.   The receiver-side portion of the preferred method begins at start step 501. Next, in step 503 And the assembled data packet transmitted by the transmitter 131 is And sent to the microcontroller 307. As described above in FIG. As such, the CRC code 127 is checked for validity. If justified, At floor 505, the unit ID, random number, changed challenge count and The switch command code is extracted from the data packet and in step 507 Then, it is encoded based on the receiver-side secret key, and the receiver-side authentication code 211 is formed. Is done.   Next, according to the system block diagram of FIG. A test is performed to determine whether the number 121 and the receiver-side authentication code 211 match. You. This means that even if there is an exact sign match, the sign match within some pre-approved range May be. At this time, the authentication can be indicated. This method is more robust Another step 511 can be added to achieve this.   For example, if the codes match, at step 511 the code received at the receiving stage The challenge challenge whose number has been changed is determined as a base challenge. Compared to the count. The resigned challenge count (pre-approved (E.g., one code count larger or smaller). Can be indicated. Once the certification is marked, the base ticket, which has been determined The received count in the receiving step 503. It can be updated based on the range count.   Optionally, a match of the unit ID is included in the authentication process, as described in FIG. You can also do it. If authentication is indicated in step 511, in step 513 , Indicated by the switch command code received in the receiving step 503 Command is executed. This tells the microcontroller 307 to actuate Data drive 305, which unlocks vehicle doors and responds to commands. It is performed by performing any operation that can be programmed.   The RKE control system 200 described herein relies on one unit ID. However, a plurality of unit IDs can be easily used. In this case, each I Associate D with a different secret key.   In conclusion, the RKE system is more secure than conventional devices. An improved authentication method for the system is provided. No improvement, new iteration Includes authentication methods that are secure for transmitting codes. In addition, add a random number Thereby, the system and method reduce transmission and reception with reduced predictability. Increases the complexity of the process, thereby making the method more confidential compared to traditional methods Greatly improve.

──────────────────────────────────────────────────続 き Continued on the front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁷ Identification code FI Theme coat ゛ (Reference) H04L 9/32 E05B 65/20 // E05B 65/20 H04L 9/00 675A 673B [Continued summary]

Claims (1)

[Claims]   1. Authentication method:   Change the sign value of the challenge count, and in response Providing a range count;   Providing a unique secret key;   Depend on the resigned challenge count on the unique secret key Encoding into an authentication code using an encoding process;   Transmitting the sign changed challenge count and the authentication code;   Receiving the code-changed challenge count and the authentication code;   The resigned challenge count received in the receiving step, Encode using said encoding process which relies on a unique secret key and receive from it Forming a side-derived authentication code; and   The authentication code received in the receiving step matches the authentication code derived from the receiving side. Marking the certification, if applicable;   An authentication method characterized by comprising:   2. The marking step includes:   The authentication code received in the receiving step and the authentication code derived from the receiving side are symbolically Marking the certificate if it has a code value equivalent to   The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises:   3. The steps of changing the sign value of the challenge count include:   Increasing the sign value of the challenge count, Providing a count;   The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises:   4. The steps of changing the sign value of the challenge count include:   Decreasing the sign value of the challenge count, Providing a count;   The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises:   5. The marking step includes:   The authentication code received in the receiving step and the authentication code derived from the receiving side are symbolically The sign-changed challenge having a sign value equivalent to The sign value of the count is the base challenge count determined cinematically. Indicating a certificate if it has a code value that is within a predetermined proximity of the certificate;   The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises:   6. In response to the marking step, the game was determined Adding a base challenge count to the modified code received in the receiving step; Replacing with a challenge count   The method of claim 5, further comprising:   7. The predetermined degree of proximity is determined based on the performance of the base challenge cow. The challenge value is greater than the code value of the Note that the count is defined to be less than five sign values greater than the sign. 6. The method according to claim 5, wherein the method comprises:   8. Authentication method:   Change the sign value of the challenge count, and in response, change the sign Providing a range count;   Generating a random number;   The encoding process is performed by using the re-signed challenge count and the random number. Encoding into an authentication code using:   The challenge count, the random number, and the authentication code, Forming a data packet composed of:   Transmitting the data packet;   Receiving the data packet;   The resigned challenge received in the data packet receiving step Extracting a count and the random number;   The sign-changed challenge counts, both of which are extracted in the extraction step And the random number are encoded using the encoding process, and the Forming a test code; and   The authentication code received in the receiving step matches the authentication code derived from the receiving side. Marking the certification when it is required;   An authentication method characterized by comprising:   9. The marking step includes:   The authentication code received in the receiving step and the authentication code derived from the receiving side are symbolically Marking the certificate if it has a code value equivalent to   9. The method of claim 8, wherein the method comprises:   10. The steps of changing the sign value of the challenge count include:   Increasing the sign value of the challenge count, Providing a count;   10. The method according to claim 9, comprising:   11. The steps of changing the sign value of the challenge count include:   Decreasing the sign value of the challenge count, Providing a count;   9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the method comprises: Law.   12. The marking step includes:   The authentication code received in the receiving step and the authentication code derived from the receiving side are codes. The sign-changed character received in the receiving step, The sign value of the head count is determined by the award-winning base challenge cow Signing a certificate if it has a code value that is within a predetermined proximity of the ;   10. The method according to claim 9, comprising:   13. In response to the marking step, the dakutally determined base challenge Counting the count of the changed challenge cows received in the receiving step; Replacing with a client;   The method of claim 12, further comprising:   14． Activate command switch and generate command code in response To do;   Changing the sign value of the challenge count. Responds to the command code generation step by changing the sign value of the challenge count. And said step of forming a data packet comprises: The changed challenge count, the authentication code and the command code. Data composed of 9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the method comprises forming a data packet. the method of.   15. Providing a unique secret key;   And recognizing the resigned challenge count. The step of encoding the identification code comprises: Encoding into an authentication code using an encoding process dependent on said unique secret key The resigned challenge constituted by a floor and received in the receiving step The step of encoding a count includes the step of receiving the sign change received in the receiving step; The generated challenge count into the encoding process dependent on the unique secret key. Encoding using the source code, and forming the receiving-side authentication code therefrom. 9. The method according to claim 8, comprising:   16. Authentication method for secure remote keyless entry system What:   Initiating a command switch and generating a command code in response Floor;   In response to the generation of the command code resulting from the booting step, Change the sign value of the change count to provide a changed sign count To do;   Generating a random number;   Providing a unique secret key;   The resigned challenge count and the command Code and the random number using an encoding process that relies on the unique secret key. And encoding it into an authentication code;   The random number, the command code, and the resigned challenge count Forming a data packet consisting of a password and said authentication code;   Transmitting the data packet;   Receiving the data packet;   The resigned challenge count received in the receiving step and the A command code and the random number are stored in the encoding program depending on the unique secret key. Encoding using a process to form a recipient-derived authentication code therefrom; and   The authentication code received in the receiving step and the authentication code derived from the receiving side are codes. The sign-changed character received in the receiving step, The sign value of the head count is determined by the award-winning base challenge cow Marking the certificate if it has a code value greater than the   An authentication method characterized by comprising:   17． A command switch for generating a command code in response to its activation;   A code counter operably coupled to the command switch, wherein the code counter comprises: Changes the sign value of the challenge count in response to command switch activation. Changed sign A sign counter that provides an improved challenge count;   A random number generator for generating random numbers;   Coupled to the code counter and provided by the code counter and the random number; Providing an authentication code that is dependent upon the code-changed challenge count Encoder;   The command code, the resigned challenge count and the random number A device for combining the authentication code with a data message;   A transmitter for transmitting the data message;   A receiver for receiving the transmitted data message;   The resigned channel coupled to the receiver and received by the receiver; Encodes the range count and the random number and forms a receiver-side authentication code from it Another encoder to do; and   The authentication code received by the receiver and the authentication code derived from the receiving side are codes. The sign-changed character received by the receiver having a symbolically equivalent value. The base challenge count in which the sign value of the change count is determined cinematically. A device that indicates authentication if it has a code value greater than   A portable transmission device characterized by comprising: