FR2898423A1 - Certified electronic signature generating device e.g. chip card, configuring method for e.g. computer, involves updating certificate to user upon reception of denomination and number by certificate producer so as to be used with device - Google Patents

Abstract

The method involves transmitting a pre-configured certified electronic signature generating device (D) to an identified user by a registering operator. User identity and a serial number of the device are transmitted to an administrative authority. A denomination conforming to the identity is generated by the authority. A confidential code associated to the number is transmitted to the user. A nominative digital certificate is generated and updated to the user upon reception of the denomination and the number by a nominative digital certificate producer so as to be used with the device.

Description

SECURE METHOD OF CONFIGURING A DEVICE FOR GENERATING

  The invention relates to the field of signing electronic data by means of an electronic signature device, and more specifically the configuration of electronic signature devices intended to generate electronic (or digital) signatures associated with electronic certificates ( or digital) to identify the identity of their users. Here, the term "electronic signature device" is understood to mean both devices (devices that have secure algorithms and cryptographic keys as well as software modules intended to be implanted in a computer hardware) .These devices act as a cryptographic key store (generation of cryptographic keys in a protected enclosure, confidential storage and use of these keys by the electronic signature algorithms on entry of a confidential code) and optionally of certificate store (preservation of the electronic certificates corresponding to the cryptographic keys). Such devices allow the addition of a signature to digital data or the authentication of their holders during electronic communications, or even the exclusive decryption of confidential data by the holder. if it generates at least one cryptographic key securely and associates with it a nominative electronic certificate, in a traceable manner (that is to say that the device object of the association is known ) and certain, to an electronic signature generating device, so that each use of this device with a set of digital data induces the traceable association (i.e. the identity of the user) and certain of an electronic signature. These features provide the process with high security that allows the use of the devices for non-repudiable electronic signature and / or strong authentication purposes. This level of security provides a value of non-repudiable commitment to valid evidence admissible in court and / or strong authentication with traceability access control and / or decryption exclusive to the attention of the identified holder of this device.

In addition, here is meant by identity a set of information relating to a user and to identify the latter as a natural or legal person and / or to provide personal information about him. Such an identity includes identifying information, such as, for example, an identifier and / or a name (or pseudonym) and / or any number and / or at least one biometric imprint, as well as possibly additional information, such as example a geographic address and / or a telephone number and / or an e-mail address (e-mail) and / or supporting documents with other information. The identity of a user is first collected, then checked for accuracy, and retained for later identity verification (traceability). The identity of a user is used to determine the name under which the user will be known in his digital nominative certificate, and the personal identity information is stored in the user's file by the identity repository. As known to those skilled in the art, there are now two main types of device configuration method: the so-called synchronous configuration and the so-called asynchronous configuration. Synchronous configuration type processes require the presence of: a registration operator performing both the role of collector and identity controller, device distributor and identity repository, and vouching for the secure sequence of device configuration. It is usually a recording or control authority, a device producer responsible for supplying the recording operator with ready-to-configure devices, a producer of nominative digital certificates for configure the respective devices of different users and prove the identities 3 2898423 of their users, and of course, users using devices after configuring them with nominative digital certificates, to enable them to sign data.

Such methods include the following steps: the device producer provides the registration operator with ready-to-configure devices, the user requires a device from the registration operator, and 10 declines identity, for example by presenting a piece of identification, the recording operator collects, controls and records the identity of the user, then randomly assigns to that user one of the devices provided by the device producer , then it assigns a denomination to the user, and finally transmits it the name of the user to the producer of digital certificates nominatives, the user, now holder of a device, can immediately apply for a digital certificate with the producer of nominative digital certificates, which in return delivers him a digital certificate in the presence of the operator 2 0 registration, and the user configures his device with the digital certificate nominative issued by the producer of nominative digital certificates. Synchronous configuration methods make it possible to minimize interventions and therefore exchanges, but rely on the integrity of the recording operator. The latter, because it also acts as a controller, must be authorized or officially sworn in and compatible with the required level of security. These methods are incompatible with large-scale device configuration through more or less reliable and / or competent operators. In fact, the replacement of personnel within sales and distribution networks of devices is incompatible with the level of qualification and authorization required for the control and validation of the registration of user identities.

These methods are therefore mainly vulnerable to organizational-type attacks, that is to say linked to the task of verifying the information. The so-called asynchronous configuration type processes require the presence of: a registration operator performing the role of collector of the user identities, as well as device distributor, of a registration authority, independent of the recording operator, performing the role of controller and repository of the user identity Zo, and guarantor of the secure development of the device configuration, and a producer of devices, a producer of nominative digital certificates and users, such as those required for synchronous configuration processes.

Such methods include the following steps: the device producer provides the registration operator with ready-to-configure devices, the user requires a device from the registration operator, and declines identity, for example by presenting a piece of identification, the recording operator collects the identity of the user, then gives the user randomly one of the devices provided by the device producer, and finally transmits the user's identity to the registration authority, the registration authority checks and registers the user's identity, then generates a denomination for the user's identity, and then associates a password (or PIN) to the denomination, then transmits to the user his password, and finally transmits to the producer of nominative digital certificates a pair including the denomination 30 of the user the user, now a holder of a device, can then provide his password to the producer of digital certificates named, so that he delivers in return a digital certificate nominative if this password is part of one of the couples transmitted by the registration operator, and the user configures his device with the digital nominative certificate issued by the producer of nominative digital certificates. Asynchronous configuration processes allow the sharing of tasks and responsibilities which gives them some protection against the compromise of one of the parties involved. However, they implement a phase of transmission of a secret password which considerably weakens the security and thus imposes the use of additional material and organizational means. For example, it will be preferred to transmit the password to a user by sending a confidential and discreet envelope, possibly with acknowledgment of receipt, rather than by means of a simple electronic mail (or e-mail). These indispensable security measures are a real impediment to the distribution of large-scale, nominative digital devices and certificates because they are prohibitively expensive. These processes are therefore mainly vulnerable to attacks of a technical nature, that is to say related to the issuing of the password and that of the digital certificate (at a given moment the producer of digital certificates nominatives indeed has the user's name and password so that it can generate true-false certificates). Since no known method is entirely satisfactory, the object of the invention is therefore to improve the situation, especially with a view to large-scale distribution.

It proposes for this purpose a method for configuring an electronic signature generation device, which can be implemented whenever a user requires a device (electronic signature generation) from a recording operator. having such devices, previously pre-configured by means of different pairs of serial number and PIN, associated by an administrative authority, making the PIN inaccessible. This method then consists in: having the user of the user collect the identity of the user and then, on the one hand, communicating with the identified user 2898423 one of the devices configured, and on the other hand, to communicate to the administrative authority the identity of the user (with supporting documents) and the serial number of the device communicated to the user, and then to be generated by the administrative authority a denomination 5 corresponding to the identity of the user, and to make the administrative authority communicate, on the one hand, to the user the confidential code previously associated with the serial number of the device communicated to him, and on the other hand, to a producer of nominative digital certificates the denomination assigned to that user and the serial number 10 of his device, and in the event of receipt of a device serial number by the certifying producer cats numeriques nominatifs, to generate and make available to the user (concerned) a digital certificate nominative, so that he can use it in his device.

The method according to the invention may comprise other characteristics which can be taken separately or in combination, and in particular: the devices can be pre-configured by the device producer; the registration operator may collect the identity of the user by accepting an authentic credential (eg, birth certificate) provided by the user and / or performing the (photo) copy of a an identity document or an official document proving the identity presented by the user and / or taking at least one biometric fingerprint of the user; the registration operator may communicate the device to the user by mail or he may hand-deliver the device to him in one of his registration centers; the producer of nominative digital certificates may communicate to the requesting user a digital certificate nominative so that he imports it into his device. For this purpose, he may, for example, transmit his digital nominative certificate to him electronically, for example by e-mail; alternatively, the producer of nominative digital certificates may communicate the nominative digital certificate that he has generated for a user 2898423 to storage equipment accessible to a chosen electronic address. In this case, the user accesses the storage equipment in order to import his digital registered certificate, which is stored therein, in his device; 5 before transmitting the serial number of its device to the producer of digital certificates, the user may choose a new confidential code for his device; devices in the form of a smart card can be used. These may optionally comprise at least one biometric sensor responsible for acquiring at least one biometric fingerprint of the user; alternatively, devices in the form of software modules may be used; at least some of the devices may be implanted in, or used by, a communication terminal. Other features and advantages of the invention will become apparent upon examination of the following detailed description, and the accompanying drawings, in which: FIG. 1 very schematically and functionally illustrates the main steps of a method according to the invention, and the actors concerned by these steps, and Figure 2 is an algorithm detailing the sequence of steps of an exemplary method according to the invention. The accompanying drawings may serve not only to supplement the invention, but also to contribute to its definition, as appropriate. The object of the invention is to enable the provision and the association of large-scale, nominative digital certificates, with a high level of security, of reliable electronic signature generation devices, for example with a non-repudiable personal commitment value and / or or with strong authentication and / or exclusive decryption. In the following, we consider as a non-limiting example that the devices (certified electronic signature generation) D are smart cards (s) intended to be used in or by computer equipment 2898423, such as computers, telephones, fixed or mobile, peripheral equipment, or network equipment, or electronic payment terminals. However, the invention is not limited to this type of device D. It relates to any type of device made in the form of electronic circuits, software (or computer) modules, or a combination of circuits and software, which can contain cryptographic algorithms and store corresponding keys securely, including integrity and confidential.

Referring first to FIG. 1, the actors (or speakers) necessary for the implementation of a device configuration (certified electronic signature generation) method D according to the invention are presented. The invention requires the presence, on the one hand, of users wishing to use a device D, configured, in order to sign some of their data, and on the other hand, of four players independent of each other, namely a administrative authority, a device producer, a registration operator, and a producer of nominative digital certificates (CNN). For example, users have computer equipment, preferably communicating (for example via the Internet), capable of using a device D in order to sign digital data and generate from them a reliable electronic signature, for example with non-repudiable personal commitment value and / or strong authentication and / or exclusive decryption.

The administrative authority controls and stores the identities of the users and guarantees the secure progress of the configuration of the devices D. It generates primary pairs each having a serial number ns and a confidential code (or password) mp intended to allow the pre-configuration of a device D. It also controls pre-configured devices D from the device producer, and provides the latter with primary pairs (as shown by the arrow F1 in FIG. ). The device producer receives the device commands D and the primary pairs (ns, mp) of the administrative authority, and (preferably) 2898423 pre-configures the controlled devices D by associating them with the received primary pairs, respectively. inviolable, which amounts to generating device certificates. It has at least one production center for pre-configured devices D. The device producer associates in its center 5, each device D, a serial number ns in a unique and traceable way, and the confidential code (or word password) associated mp in a unique and confidential way. Once the devices D pre-configured, they are transmitted by the device producer to the recording operator (as shown by the arrow F2 of Figure 1).

The serial number ns and the confidential code mp, which are associated with each device D, constitute a device certificate which guarantees that the holder of said device D, after allocation, is the holder thereof and therefore has the right to obtain a CNN digital certificate. Note that at this stage the device D is not usable.

The recording operators are distributed in at least one recording center in which they process the requests for obtaining pre-configured devices D from the users (represented by the arrow F3 of FIG. 1). These requests can be made directly by the users in the center of the recording operator, or by means of a mail, possibly electronic, transmitted to an address (possibly electronic) chosen. A registration operator is responsible for collecting, controlling and storing the identities of users who have requested a preconfigured device D. The collection of any kind of identity information may be envisaged, including the collection of information contained in a piece of identification (such as an identity card or passport). Such collection may require the provision of supporting documents to be given to the operator or whose operator makes a (photo) copy. In addition to or instead of collecting identity, one can also consider the registration of biometric fingerprint (s) of the user. The recording operator controls the provided pieces and / or credentials and / or imprints, and the registration operator is also responsible for communicating one of the pre-configured devices D to each user that has been successfully checked (2898423). as shown by the arrow F4 in FIG. 1), the pre-configured device D, which is communicated to a user, is for example chosen at random, and the communication is done either directly (in person) consecutively at collection, when the user is in a registration center, either by mail, possibly electronic, transmitted to an address (possibly electronic) provided by the user.The registration operator is also responsible for transmitting to the administrative authority the complete identity of the user id and the serial number ns of the pre-configured device D that he communicated to him (as is dull eralised by the arrow F5 of Figure 1). In order to determine the serial number ns which has been associated with a device D during its pre-configuration by the device producer (preferably), two solutions can be envisaged. A first solution consists in equipping the recording operator with an electronic equipment capable of reading the serial numbers ns of the pre-configured devices D. A second solution consists in associating each device D with the device producer. , a label bearing the serial number ns associated with it.

The transmission to the administrative authority is done according to the nature of the identity information, that is to say generally by mail, in the form of a paper file, at a chosen address. But, one could consider an electronic transmission (secure) to a chosen electronic information electronic address.

The administrative authority also intervenes each time that it receives from the registration operator an id user identity and an associated serial number. First, it checks id identity information. This check covers all the supporting documents received and may possibly be done by querying a database in which user information data is stored. In addition to or in place of the identity check, it is also possible to consider a user's biometric fingerprint check (s). Such a control may possibly be done by querying a database in which biometric data of the users are stored. After this check, the administrative authority generates a dn name for the user from his identity information. Personal information, such as an address of the user, is recorded for possible subsequent verification of identity. The administrative authority is finally a secondary pair (dn, ns) by associating the name of the user dn and the serial number ns of the device communicated to him. The administrative authority must then search in the list of primary pairs (ns, mp), which it has previously stored and transmitted to the producer of devices, the primary torque containing the serial number ns 10 contained in the secondary torque transmitted by the registration operator. Once this operation has been performed, the administrative authority has, for each newly assigned device D, its serial number ns, its confidential code mp and the denomination dn of the user to whom it has been communicated. The administrative authority can then communicate to each user, to whom has been communicated a new pre-configured device D, the confidential code mp which is associated with the serial number ns of its device D (as shown by the arrow F6 of Figure 1). It can then communicate to the producer of nominative digital certificates each secondary pair (dn, ns) associated with each pre-configured device D D newly communicated to a user (as shown by the arrow F7 of FIG. 1). The producer of nominative digital certificates is involved at this stage. It is responsible for storing the secondary pairs transmitted by the administrative authority and generating CNN digital certificates for the users who request it. Thus, when a user wishes to obtain a CNN digital certificate for his device D, he makes a request by authenticating himself with the serial number ns of his device D which identifies him as holder of said device D activated by his word pass mp (as is shown by the arrow F8 of Figure 1). The user can for example establish a secure computer connection via the device D between his computer equipment (which uses the device D) and a terminal or server of the producer of digital certificates nominatives. The password used during the request can be either the one (mp) that was associated with the 12 2898423 serial number ns by the device producer during the pre-configuration, in accordance with the instructions of the administrative authority, ie a new user-defined PIN (mp ') to further enhance security.

5 On receipt of a CNN digital certificate application, the producer of nominative digital certificates regains the name assigned to the user by means of the serial number presented by referring to the secondary pairs (dn, ns) that he has stored . If the provided serial number is in one of the stored secondary pairs, then the producer 10 of nominative digital certificates generates a CNN digital name certificate for the corresponding den name. Then, the producer of nominative digital certificates may, for example, communicate to the requesting user the digital certificate that he has just generated (as shown by arrow F9 in FIG. 1). This communication can be done either by means of the same connection previously established by the user between his computer equipment and the terminal or server of the producer of digital certificates nominatives, either directly (in person) when the user is in a center CPCNN of the producer of nominative digital certificates, 20 still by mail sent to an address (possibly electronic) designated by the user, or by any other means. When a user has a digital CNN certificate, assigned by the producer of digital certificates nominative, he can then associate it with his device D (as shown by the arrow F10 of Figure 1). Here is meant to associate the fact of configuring the device D by means of the CNN digital nominative certificate. This configuration can be done according to any technique known to those skilled in the art. As a variant, the producer of nominative digital certificates may, for example, communicate the digital nominative certificate, which he has just generated for the user who has requested it, to a remote storage equipment (for example a database of data), accessible at a known e-mail address. The user can then access the storage equipment to repatriate (or import) into his device D the digital certificate assigned to him. As a variant, each time the user needs to sign data with his device D, he accesses the storage equipment in order to have the digital nominative certificate associated with his device D. Referring now to FIG. 2 to describe the steps of an algorithm representative of an exemplary implementation of a method accordingin the invention. In a step 10, the administrative authority generates primary pairs (ns, mp), for example N, in order to store them in a memory and then to transmit them to the device producer for use in order to pre-configure N devices D. In a step 20, the device producer receives the N primary pairs (ns, mp), then (preferably) pre-configures N devices D by associating with each of them one of the N primary pairs received which amounts to generating for each of them a digital device certificate. In a third step 30, the device producer distributes the N pre-configured devices D among M recording operators (M? 1). In a step 40, a user requests one of the registration operators to provide him with a pre-configured device D.

In a step 50, the registration operator collects the identity id of the user requesting a pre-configured device D. If the collection is incomplete, the registration operator refuses in a step 60 to communicate a device D to the user, and the configuration process is interrupted at this stage. On the other hand, if the collection is complete, the registration operator communicates in a step 70 one of the preconfigured devices D to the user successfully identified. Then, it communicates to the administrative authority the id user identity (and all its credentials) and the serial number ns of its pre-configured device D. In a step 80, the administrative authority searches among the 30 couples primary (ns, mp), which it has stored, if there is one which contains the serial number ns transmitted by the registration operator. If this is not the case, the configuration process stops at this point. In contrast, if this is the case, the administrative authority generates a name dn for the user corresponding to the identity id and the serial number ns. It then has the serial number ns of the device D assigned to the user, its confidential code mp and the denomination dn of said user. The administrative authority then communicates to the user the confidential code mp which is associated with the serial number ns of its device D. Then it communicates to the producer of nominative digital certificates a secondary pair (dn, ns) associated with the pre-device. -configured D of the user, so that it stores it. In a step 90, the user requests the producer of nominative digital certificates to provide him with a CNN digital nominative certificate for his device D, and presents himself as holder of the device D by declassifying the serial number ns by an authenticated connection. with the aid of said device D. The device D is then activated using the password mp, which has been associated with the serial number ns of its device D by the device producer during the pre-configuration, or well using a new mp 'PIN chosen by the requesting user.

In a step 100, the producer of nominative digital certificates searches for the secondary pair, among those he has stored, corresponding to the serial number ns declined by the user. If the serial number ns received does not correspond to any stored secondary pair, then the producer of nominative digital certificates refuses in a step 110 to generate a CNN nominative digital certificate, which interrupts the configuration process at this stage. On the other hand, if the serial number ns received corresponds to one of the stored secondary pairs, then the producer of nominative digital certificates generates in a step 120 a digital CNN certificate, then communicates the latter to the requesting user or well to a remote storage equipment accessible to a known electronic address. Finally, in a step 130, the user associates the CNN named digital certificate, which has been assigned to him, to his device D. This association consists, for example, in configuring his device D by importing the CNN digital nominative certificate. Device D can then be used by the user to associate a digital signature with digital data. It is important to note that when the user wants to use his device D he must first provide the confidential code mp or mp 'used to configure it, as well as possibly 2898423 at least one biometric fingerprint when the device D has a sensor d. biometric fingerprint (s). Thanks to the invention, at no time does any of the actors (other than the user holding the device D) possess all the 5 sensitive data: the administrative authority holds the correspondence between the serial numbers , PINs (initial) and user names, but it does not have pre-configured devices with serial number and PIN pairs (initial), nor means for generating device digital certificates. user-defined digital certificates, the device manufacturer holds pre-configured devices with the device certificates generated using the serial number and PIN pairs (initial), but does not have the names of the users to which the devices D are allocated, nor means for generating the corresponding nominative digital certificates, the operand The recorder has pre-configured devices, the corresponding serial numbers and the identities of the users to whom it assigns the D devices, but it has neither the confidential codes 20 (initial) nor the user names nor the means generation of the corresponding digital device certificates, nor the digital certificates of the users, the producer of digital certificates holds the serial numbers of the devices D, the names of the users to whom these devices D have been allocated, and the generation means corresponding numeric certificates, but it does not have the confidential codes (initial), the user identities, or the pre-configured devices with the serial number and PIN pairs (initial), nor the means of generation corresponding digital device certificates. We therefore benefit from the organizational security brought about by the separation of responsibilities. Moreover, the obligation to hold device D in order to obtain a CNN digital name certificate makes it possible to eliminate the risk of identity theft 2898423. Furthermore, even if the confidential code is fraudulently obtained by a third party, it can not use it if it does not simultaneously hold the device D which is associated with the serial number to which it has been associated. . In addition, since the PIN is no longer communicated to the producer of digital certificates, it is no longer sufficient to authenticate the holder of a device D. Finally, the user can take exclusive control of the device by the change. the initial password before applying for a nominative certificate. The method according to the invention can therefore be implemented in almost any type of recording and distribution network, even when the reliability level of one of the actors is low and / or when all or part of the environment is weakly secure. The invention is not limited to the method embodiments described above, only by way of example, but encompasses all the variants that may be considered by those skilled in the art within the scope of the claims below.

Claims (15)

  A method of configuring an electronic signature generating device, characterized in that it consists when a user requires an electronic signature generation device (D) from a recording operator having such devices ( D), pre-configured by means of different pairs of serial number and PIN, associated by an administrative authority, by rendering inaccessible said PIN: to collect the identity of said user by said registration operator, then, on the one hand, to cause the said registration operator to communicate one of the said pre-configured devices (D) to the said identified user, and, on the other hand, to make the said registration operator communicate to the said administrative authority the said identity of the user and the serial number of the device (D) communicated to him, and to be generated by the said administrative authority e denomination corresponding to the identity of said user, and to make said administrative authority communicate, on the one hand, to said user the confidential code previously associated with the serial number of the device (D) communicated to him, and on the other hand on the one hand, to a producer of nominative digital certificates, the denomination assigned to that user and the serial number of the device (D) communicated to said user, and, in the event that the producer of nominative digital certificates receives a device serial number, generating and making available to said user a digital nominative certificate, so that he can use it with his device (D).   2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that one pre-configure said devices (D) by a device producer.   3. Method according to one of claims 1 and 2, characterized in that one controls in said registration operator the identity of the client user by analyzing the content of at least one piece of identity.   4. Method according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that said recording operator collects at least one biometric fingerprint of said user to control his identity.   5. Method according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that said recording operator communicates said device (D) to said user by mail.   6. Method according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that one communicates by hand said user said device (D) in a center of said registration operator.   7. Method according to one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that said user transmits to said producer of digital certificates nominative the serial number of his device (D) by means of a computer equipment using a secure connection on a network open.   8. Method according to one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that said producer of nominative digital certificates communicates to said user requesting a digital certificate nominative so that it imports into his device (D).   9. Method according to claim 8, characterized in that said producer of nominative digital certificates transmits to said customer his digital certificate nominative by means of a secure computer terminal.   10. Method according to one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that said producer of nominative digital certificates communicates the registered digital certificate generated for a user to a storage device accessible to a known electronic address, and in that said user accesses said storage device to import its stored digital certificate, stored therein, into its device (D).   11. Method according to one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that before transmitting to said producer of nominative digital certificates the serial number of his device (D), said user chooses a new confidential code for his device (D). ).   12. Method according to one of claims 1 to 11, characterized in that one uses devices (D) in the form of a smart card.   13. The method of claim 12, characterized in that one uses smart cards comprising at least one biometric sensor adapted to acquire at least one biometric fingerprint of said user.   14. Method according to one of claims 1 to 11, characterized in that devices (D) in the form of software modules are used.   15. Method according to one of claims 1 to 14, characterized in that at least some of said devices (D) are located in a communication terminal or can be used by a communication terminal.