FR2480009A1 - METHOD OF PROCESSING A PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER IN CONNECTION WITH AN ID CARD - Google Patents

Abstract

THE INVENTION RELATES TO A PROCESS FOR ISSUING LEVEL 15, PERSONALIZING LEVEL 16, AND USING LEVEL 17 OF AN IDENTIFICATION CARD, USING A MULTI-LEVEL CODING OF THE PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER PIN DURING WHICH SECRET INFORMATION 7 PARTICULARS OF THE CARD ARE REGISTERED ON THE CARD, THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE USER LEVEL 17 CONSISTING OF REPEATING THE CODING PROCESS FOR EACH USE OF THE CARD AND COMPARING IT 27 WITH THE RESULT OF THE CODING RECORDED ON THE CARD DURING THE CUSTOMIZATION. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DETECTING OR SURPRISING ALL OF THE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE USE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES THE RISK OF FRAUDULENT USE OF THE CARD.

Description

The present invention relates to a method of treating

  a personal identification number in connection with an identification card bearing data perceptible by a machine, a method in which a secret number, assigned to each cardholder,

  is coded by two-level coding (-associated with

  attention to machine-perceptible data) for the purposes

  customization of the card and verified by applying

  cant the coded result for each identification process.

cation.

  The use of a personal identification number (

  hereafter abbreviated as NIP) in the distribution

  automatic recognition of monetary signs must offer the

  guarantee that a machine-readable card can not be

  to be used successfully only by its legitimate owner. The processing of the personal identification number comprises two essential phases: the personalization of the card, that is to say, in such an operation, the coding of the PIN as well as the

  transfer of the result of the coding and the special data

  user and bank details on the identification card; the identification of the user, ie the

  verification of the coding defined by the

  at each use of the machine-readable card

  Several methods of encoding the NI are known.

  Simple Ev-Stems, of the kind recited, such as that described in the United States Patent N2

  3o657.521, combine the data relating to the use

  that his current account number (hereinafter

  stop called personal account number or, in cash, NCP) with a PIN assigned rar the authority

  emitting the 'I of a functional operation pre-

determined

  The user's identification is carried out by verifying

  relying on the accuracy of the correspondence established between the NCP and the PIN after the user dialed

PIN on the machine.

  If a fraudster has several cards, it can not be excluded, with these conventional systems, that he discovers the relationship between the data on the card and PIN and deduce the correct PIN

stolen cards.

  We know systems using com-

  rosr plexes establish a relationship between the PIN and the

  particular data of the user; it is

  example of the so-called "NBS Data Encryption Stand-

  ard Algorithm "also called" DES "\ see the patent

  United States of America N2 4.12.747). A characteristic

  The special feature of these coding systems is that the algorithm itself can be known without exposing the system to risk as long as it remains secret.

  the code by which the data. in clear are recorded

  in code agreement with the algorithm.

  The algorithm can also be in the form of a uni integrated circuit module o The coding of the data

  the user is carried out by introducing

  NCP and PIN in the DES module, for example, and coding by simultaneous introduction of the secret data (code)> The result of the comparison is recorded on the card to serve as a later expression. where the o_ uses a DLS module, system security depends on what

  secret code o If a code, which must be

  registered in several places (

  manufacturer of oartos, or machine) to be used in

  the systems known so far9 come to be

  harmed all the didn-ti: fieatijon cards handled by this

  code become available for frable handling.

  using the DES module o It would be possible to

  reduce this risk by dividing the identification cards

  issued in relatively small groups by the employer.

  use of different codes assigned to different groups But the use of a separate code for each of the very limited groups of ID cards is not economical for technical and organizational reasons. It is also known by the Demahide of Breiset in Germany, published under No. 29 01 521, to secure security in the processing of the PIN by submitting the data entered on the identification card to the eight-level coding. NCP and a PIN are assigned to the perimeter of a cache (see Figure 1 of the attached drawings). The PIN can also be chosen by the user of the card itself, for example

  as a four-digit number. We do

  then kills the first encoding of the NCP for which the PIN, combined with an initial secret security number, serves as a code. The first code number that leaves (Y1) is carried over to a second code number (Y2) by a predetermined transformation. A control number (or verification, abbreviated NV), recorded on the card will, for example, obtained by decoding the second number of code by means of a code constituted

  by a second secret security number.

  For user identification, the NOCP read on the card is coded using the PIN and the first security number, so that the initial code number (Y1) is obtained if the data is correct * In addition, the control number (NV) read on the card is coded using the second security number so that here

  we will also get the second number of code (Y2).

  The code numbers must satisfy the transformation

  defined by the personalization or issuance of

the map.

  In comparison with the aforementioned systems, the latter

  The system guarantees greater security in particu-

  bind when using two different security numbers

  rents, ie two different codes.

  A disadvantage of this latter system is the need

  a registration of the second code and the

  to ensure secrecy.

  This is especially the case for automatic systems

  distant from the specific institutions and in the

  which the user can access, not only to the machine of this establishment but also to all others. Since all codes used must be registered

  in each machine the inefficiency of the system increases.

  te with the number of machines involved. The number of machines involved also increases the risks for the safety system because each machine

  contains all the necessary information for handling

system.

  The object of the present invention is to propose a

  system for processing the identification number

  sonel (PIN) improving the efficiency and security during the PIN processing while maintaining the fundamentally high security of a two-level coding, this goal is achieved, according to the invention2 by the

  at least one of the levels of two-digit coding

  calves, secret information, recorded on the identification card, are also processed o

  Despite the considerable security of the two-way coding

  calves, justifiable registration requirements

  for machines result from the fact that

  secret codes (code) read on the card are also processed on at least one of the coding levels, and

  that another code is assigned to each identification card

  without special additional measures, this

  which further increases the security of the system.

  As will be explained later, the process according to

  the invention makes it possible to broadcast, with simplicity, all

  secret information at the "levels"

  the use of the PIN (establishment level).

  PIN, level of personalization issuing card, machine level for identification of

  the user) without the need for secret information to

  to deduce the PIN can be found in total

  at any of the levels.

  For the representation of information coded on the

  identification card, the invention uses

  high-quality security

  to see and imitate such information or to make such information

  acts so complicated as the necessary effort (mainly

  technically) will be out of proportion to the

  made that one could expect. The choice of the mode of

  representation and indications coded on the map of

  dentification will be free provided that the conditions

  above mentioned are satisfied. This representation

  may, for example, be made using magnetic, electrographic, fluorescent

  or others, difficult to identify. We can also

  me, use a characteristic or a particular manufacturing tolerance to the identification card

  or visual encoding records.

  The method according to the invention is furthermore characterized by the following characteristics, taken separately or in various combinations: the PIN is processed up to an intermediate value (VI) at the first coding level (associated, if necessary, with the specific data of the user (NCP) or

  application of a secret code) for the

  map, and the intermediate value (VI)

  is processed up to a number of code (NC)

  on the identification card at the second level (as =

  if necessary to specific data on the use of

  the user-composed PIN code is processed up to an intermediate value (matched, if necessary, to the user data read from the map).

  or by application of a secret code) for the identi-

  use, and this intermediate value

  The diary is then immediately converted to a number of code (1C) (which assumes the need for the data relating to it).

  secret information read from the identity card

  tification, then finally the number of code thus obtained is compared with the number of code recorded on the identification card in this oas - the first and the second codings are carried out in spatially separated places

  the first coding is done in a decentralized way

  by the various card issuing establishments; the second coding is done centrally by the institution customizing the $ the secret information provided by the card is

  generated by a specific characteristic of the

  said cardD this characteristic can be constituted by a holographic coding profile9

  magnetic, fluorescent or electrographic.

  The invention is described below in detail with reference to

  to a preferred, non-limiting example of

  FIG. 1 is a diagram of an already known system for processing the personal identification number (PIN); and - Figure 2 is a diagram of the treatment system,

  according to the invention, of this identification number

  Personal Information (PIN) Figure 1 shows how to process PIN based on

  a system already known. the process employed is subdivided

  aims at the personalization phase 1 and in phase of i-

  user authentication 2 For personalization, a current account number

  (NCP) 3 and an identification number

  (PIN) 4 are allocated to the future card holder. The PIN can be chosen by the user, for example as a four-digit number Then the coding of the NCP 3 is done in the first

  coding module 7, the NI? 4 serving as a code in combination

  with the first security secret number 5.

  The number Y1 thus obtained, called the number of code ini-

  tial, is converted into a second code number Y2 by

  a predetermined transformation (8). A number of

  NV, recorded for example on map 13,

  the decoding of this second code number Y2 in the module 10, a second security number 11 serving

then code.

  For the identification of the user, an NCP 3, read on the card, is coded using the PIN 4 and the first number of security 5, so that we obtain the initial code number Y if the data In addition, the number of the control NV, read on the card, is coded in the module 12 by means of the second secret security number 11, so that one obtains here the second number of code Y2. code numbers Yt and Y must satisfy the transformation determined during the transmission or personalization of the card which is verified in the compaerator 15 It appears clear from figre 1 that all

  system data (ie all codes se-

  creots and other data) must be included in the

  China for both customization and

  the identification of the user 6 The risk of

  vulgarity of these secrets or observation of the mani-

  The system is thus assumed to be large. Fig. 2 shows, as an example, tun. This processing method of the XP2 has three levels separated from each other in the drawing by lines in points and tsaits the level "establishment" 15 which is assigned a 02NCP particular to the user;

  the level of 'customization' 16 to which the map of

  authentication is delivered with all necessary banking and personal data; and the level "machine" 1 or "identification" 17 to which the data of the identification card are read and checked to ensure that they correspond

  PIN dialed on the machine by the user.

  The attribution to the future cardholder of NCP 18, a user-specific data, should be made by the issuing institution.

from the menu.

  The PIN 19, a number of four digits for example, can be chosen by the user himself, if desired. This PIN 19, chosen by the user and

  alone, as well as NOCP 18, are registered

  in the algorithm module 20 and processed

  to obtain an intermediate value VI by means of an initial secret code provided by a memory &

  21. The intermediate value VI and the NCP par-

  especially to the user are recorded on a

magnetic tape 22.

  The magnetic tapes produced by the various

  In these services, the data on the magnetic tapes are read and entered into another algorithm module 24 whose conformation can be carried out. identical to that of the module 20. But here the second data processing code comes from secret information of the card (hatched part 7) picked up by a read head 28 fixed to the code reader 25. The result of the coding, the number of CN code, is registered, with 1 1

  the particular NCP to the user, on the runway

  gnftique 26 of the card 23p for example o

  When the user wants to be identified,

  17, he dials his secret PIN 19 on the machine This PIN is coded, with the NCP read on the

  troducing the first secret code from the

  21 o The result is sent immediately

  to a second algorithm module 24 and coded in accordance with

  troducing the second secret code, provided by the identification card 23 by means of a code reader 25 or a read head 28 The result of this double coding corresponds to the number of code NO recorded on the magnetic track 26 if the sequence was correct L: e obmparateur 27 gives

  an approval signal which is either coupled to a

  visual indicator: is connected to the device electronics which indicates the result of the verification by the appropriate electronic

  to continue the maneuver, for example the

  delivery of the desired amount of money o

  The modules of the system that must be protected

  illegal access are indicated by hatching on all three levels of operation. As already mentioned, and as is evident from the series of operations shown in Figure 2, the information

  secrecy required for the deduction of the PIN is only

  accessible to any of the three levels. This, together with the use of a two-level coding in which one of the codes is provided by a secret device (eg, card-specific) provides an efficient method of processing the PIN and a degree

high security.

  To exclude the possibility of establishing a bypass on the conductor joining the read head 28 and the signal analysis module 25, the read head 28 and the module 25 are housed, in practice, in the same closed and sealed enclosure in which the identification card 23 will be introduced by a slot As already mentioned, there are various methods for providing the identification cards with coded information that can not be detected or imitated. United States patent

  No. 3,620,590 discloses a holographic process of

  detection of information against unlawful access.

  The desired information, visually coded, is trans-

  checked by a special filter (main code filter)

  on a hologram in the identification card.

  The coded information can be reproduced only by means of a main code filter. The filter is protected against unlawful access because it is part of the reading device. All methods of representing the information that can only be reproduced by special means inaccessible to the fraudsters and with specific special knowledge are applicable to the invention.

  As in the example above, it is possible to

  see the information identification card in the form of magnetic or fluorescent tracings whose content can only be perceived with devices

  special, inaccessible to the public and with

  special births In the example described, we have, for simpli =

  proud description, chose the same coding prinoipe

  ([eS Data Erytion Stanc.lard Algoithm) for both

  level of oodazgeo but there are several

  These codes of coding are applicable to the price of the invention, where It is also possible to use

  10. Different degrees of difference over the years, independently

  In this respect, it is important to note that the coding s, 8 will be used in the following two ways: endings poatially separated and the process of colonization oApot of the specific secret deformities of the art oe-n-teifhia'ion oe

Claims (8)

  1. Method of processing an identification number   (19) in relation to an identification card   (23) carrying data (26, 7) percep-   by a machine, a process in which a number of   secret card, assigned to each cardholder, is coded by two-level coding (15, 16) (associated, if necessary, with machine-perceptible data) for the purpose of card personalization, and verified (level 17) by applying the result   coded for each identification process,   in at least some level (15 or   16) of the two-level coding: (15, 16), information   secret messages (7), recorded on the identification card (23), are also processed   2. Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that   the personal identification number (19) is processed to an intermediate value (VI) at the first coding level (15) (associated, if necessary, with the user-specific data such as   a personal account number (18) or by   application of a secret code) for the purpose of   of the card, and that said intermediate value (VI) is processed up to a number   code (NO), recorded on the identification card   at the second level (16) (associated with the   to the specific user data) using   also reading secret information (7) read on the identification card.   t Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that the personal identification number (19), composed by the user, is processed up to an intermediate value (VI) (associated, if necessary, with the data relating to the user , read on the card (23), or by application of a secret code) for the purpose of identifying the user, and   what said intermediate value (VI) is then   immediately converted to a number of code (NC) (associated, if necessary, with data relating to   the user) also using the information   secrets (7) read on the identification card.   tion (23), the number of codes thus obtained being   finally compared (in 27) with the number of code (NC)   the identification card (23) presented ted.   4. Process according to any one of Claims 1,   2 or 3, characterized in that the first coding (18a, 19, 20, 21) and the second coding (22, 24, 25)   are carried out in places (15 and 16) spatially separately.   5. Method according to claim 4, characterized in that the first coding (18, 19% 20, 21;   ) is carried out in a decentralized way by the   to card issuing institutions   The method of any one of claims 4   or 5, characterized in that the second coding (22,   24, 25; level 16) is carried out centrally   by the establishment customizing the identification card (23) À   The method of any one of claims 1,   2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, characterized in that the information   secret messages (7) provided by the identity card   (23) are produced by a characteristic   specific tick of said card. Method according to claim 7, characterized in that said specific characteristic of the identification card (23) is constituted by a   holographic, magnetic, fluorescent coding profile rescent, or electrographic.