EP4457630A1 - Système et procédé de surveillance du fonctionnement d'un calculateur - Google Patents
Système et procédé de surveillance du fonctionnement d'un calculateurInfo
- Publication number
- EP4457630A1 EP4457630A1 EP22840225.1A EP22840225A EP4457630A1 EP 4457630 A1 EP4457630 A1 EP 4457630A1 EP 22840225 A EP22840225 A EP 22840225A EP 4457630 A1 EP4457630 A1 EP 4457630A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- unit
- task
- identifier
- computer
- memory
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/30—Monitoring
- G06F11/34—Recording or statistical evaluation of computer activity, e.g. of down time, of input/output operation ; Recording or statistical evaluation of user activity, e.g. usability assessment
- G06F11/3466—Performance evaluation by tracing or monitoring
- G06F11/3476—Data logging
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/30—Monitoring
- G06F11/34—Recording or statistical evaluation of computer activity, e.g. of down time, of input/output operation ; Recording or statistical evaluation of user activity, e.g. usability assessment
- G06F11/3409—Recording or statistical evaluation of computer activity, e.g. of down time, of input/output operation ; Recording or statistical evaluation of user activity, e.g. usability assessment for performance assessment
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/30—Monitoring
- G06F11/3003—Monitoring arrangements specially adapted to the computing system or computing system component being monitored
- G06F11/3024—Monitoring arrangements specially adapted to the computing system or computing system component being monitored where the computing system component is a central processing unit [CPU]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/552—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures involving long-term monitoring or reporting
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/566—Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
- G06F9/48—Program initiating; Program switching, e.g. by interrupt
- G06F9/4806—Task transfer initiation or dispatching
- G06F9/4843—Task transfer initiation or dispatching by program, e.g. task dispatcher, supervisor, operating system
- G06F9/4881—Scheduling strategies for dispatcher, e.g. round robin, multi-level priority queues
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to error detection, to error correction, and to monitoring
- G06F2201/88—Monitoring involving counting
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a system for monitoring the operation of a computer.
- the present invention also relates to a method for monitoring the operation of a computer.
- on-board computers respond to constraints expressed in the form of properties to be guaranteed, such as confidentiality, integrity, or availability in the field of security, or else reliability, real-time behavior, or traceability in the field of operational safety.
- Such surveillance systems include in particular intrusion detection systems (more often called IDS, an abbreviation which refers to the corresponding English name of “Intrusion Detection System”) already exploiting the monitoring information of the operation of the software to detect cyberattacks.
- IDS intrusion detection systems
- IDS an abbreviation which refers to the corresponding English name of “Intrusion Detection System”
- HIDS systems are also known.
- the H refers to the corresponding English name of “Host”, i.e. “host” and IDS to the aforementioned abbreviation.
- HIDS systems focus on a computer, at the level of its operating system. HIDS systems seek to detect abnormal behavior, by monitoring running processes, memory allocations, logged in users and the like. An alert is generated when one of the quantities monitored by the HIDS system in question deviates from a predefined standard.
- control systems are used that generally exploit a system of temporal windows and prevent the material use of resources by applications outside the windows assigned to this application, thus guaranteeing strict partitioning and predictable temporal behavior at the cost of a drop in performance.
- control systems are used, more flexible but offering less strict guarantees which monitor the use of material resources in real time, and are reactive only in the event of congestion on the path of these resources.
- the description describes a system for monitoring the operation of a computer, the computer comprising hardware blocks, the hardware blocks comprising several cores, the computer also comprising a set of task scheduling units, the set being capable of ordering the execution of a task by assigning it an identifier and of storing the identifier on a first storage unit.
- the monitoring system comprises a collection unit capable of counting the number of requests for each hardware block during the performance of a task, the collection unit also being capable of reading the identifier of the task performed in the first unit storage unit, the collection unit also being able to form an association between a request with the corresponding identifier and to store each association formed on a second storage unit.
- the monitoring system also includes a monitoring unit capable of determining the state of operation of the computer by using the stored associations.
- the surveillance system using a dedicated memory for the collection of surveillance information helps to guarantee a higher level of security. Indeed, the dedicated memory can only be addressed from hardware elements and not at the software level. This makes it possible to prevent the information collected from being accessible by the applications and thus to avoid their exploitation for malicious purposes.
- each task here is a software task and the collection unit is a hardware block (physical component). This implies that the collection unit has a priori no information on the tasks which are scheduled by the operating system.
- the monitoring system has one or more of the following characteristics, taken separately or according to all the technically possible combinations:
- a hardware block is a main memory shared by the cores, the storage unit being part of the main memory.
- a hardware block is a debug support unit shared by the cores, the memorization unit being part of the debug support unit.
- the storage unit is a core-specific memory.
- each core has a tightly coupled memory, the core-specific memory being the tightly coupled memory.
- each core comprises a memory management unit, the memory specific to a core being located in the memory management unit.
- each core has a performance measurement unit, the memory specific to a core being contained in the performance measurement unit.
- each core includes a performance measurement unit, the collection unit being formed by all the performance measurement units.
- the first storage unit is separate from the second storage unit.
- the description also describes a method for monitoring the operation of a computer, the computer comprising hardware blocks, the hardware blocks comprising several cores, the computer also comprising a set of task scheduling units, the set being specific to ordering the execution of a task by assigning it an identifier and storing the identifier on a first storage unit, the method being implemented by a monitoring system comprising a collection unit and a monitoring unit, the method comprising a step of counting the number of requests of each hardware block during the performance of a task, a step of reading the identifier of the task performed in the first storage unit, a step of forming an association between a request with the corresponding identifier and storage of each association formed on a second storage unit, and a step of determining the state of operation of the computer by using the stored associations.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic representation of the processes implemented by the computer
- FIG. 3 is a schematic representation of another example of a computer.
- a computer 10 is represented schematically in FIG.
- the computer 10 is, for example, an on-board computer, in particular a critical computer.
- Such a computer 10 can be used in an airplane, in a payload or a satellite platform or in implanted medical systems.
- computer 10 is a multi-core computer.
- Computer 10 includes cores 12, interconnect 14, main memory 16, and debug support unit 18.
- a core 12 is a set of circuits capable of executing programs autonomously.
- Each core 12 has a calculation unit 20 comprising a scheduling unit 22, cache memories 26, a tightly coupled memory 28, a memory management unit 30 and a performance measurement unit 34.
- the calculation unit 20 is the unit that performs the various tasks.
- a HYP hypervisor implements two operating systems OS1 and OS2. They all have a scheduling unit 22.
- Each of these operating systems OS1 and OS2 in turn implement two respective processes.
- the first operating system OS1 implements a first process P1 and a second process P2 while the second operating system OS2 implements a third process P3 and a fourth process P4.
- Each process P1, P2, P3 or P4 corresponds to a set of several tasks.
- the implementation of these tasks is managed by the scheduling unit 22.
- the set of scheduling units 22 form a set 38 which is suitable for ordering the execution of a task by assigning it an identifier and for storing the identifier on a storage unit.
- a cache memory is a memory that temporarily saves copies of data from a source, in order to reduce the time of a later access (in reading) of a computer hardware (in general, a processor) to these data.
- the heart comprises several cache memories 26 represented in the form of a single block in figure 1.
- a tightly coupled memory 28 is a memory capable of explicitly memorizing instructions or private data of a core 12, with access times comparable to the cache memory 26 but without generating implicit transactions on the interconnect 14.
- Such a memory is more often designated by the abbreviation TCM referring to the corresponding English denomination of "Tightly Coupled Memory”.
- the memory management unit 30 is used to control memory accesses.
- the memory management unit 30 is more often designated by the abbreviation MMU referring to the corresponding English denomination of “Memory Management Unit”.
- the performance measurement unit 34 is suitable for counting the number of requests for each element of the heart 12 during the performance of a task by the calculation unit 20.
- Such a performance measurement unit 34 is often designated by the acronym PMU which refers to the English name of “Performance Monitoring Unit”.
- the core 12 which has just been described has other elements and/or does not include all of the preceding blocks.
- the core 12 may comprise an interrupt controller (sometimes called an IC block, the abbreviation IC referring to the English name of “Interrupt Controller”). As the name suggests, the interrupt controller handles interrupts.
- an interrupt controller sometimes called an IC block, the abbreviation IC referring to the English name of “Interrupt Controller”. As the name suggests, the interrupt controller handles interrupts.
- the interconnect 14 is used to provide the interconnection between the various elements of the cores 12 and the shared elements such as the main memory 16.
- the interconnect is a NoC interconnect because it is assumed that 12 cores are part of the same chip.
- NoC refers to the English name of “Network on Chip” which literally means “network on a chip”.
- the main memory 16 is suitable for storing data shared between the cores 12. Being larger in capacity than the tightly coupled memories 28, the main memory 16 can store large amounts of data. It also allows data exchange between 12 cores.
- the debugging support unit 18 is a unit suitable for observing the proper execution of the software on the various elements of the computer 10 in order to develop this software.
- the debugging support unit 18 is more often referred to as the “Debug Support Unit”.
- the computer 10 thus comprises a set of hardware blocks 36, the set 38, a monitoring system 40 and a storage unit 42.
- a hardware block 36 is a physical component able to perform more or less complex tasks.
- the elements of the cores 12 or the main memory 16 are hardware blocks 36.
- the monitoring system 40 is suitable for monitoring the operation of the computer 10.
- the monitoring system 40 is thus suitable for implementing a method for monitoring the operation of the computer 10.
- the monitoring system 40 includes a collection unit 44 and a monitoring unit 46.
- the collection unit 44 is able to count the number of requests for each hardware block 36 during the performance of a task.
- task is used here in a generic way, it can be all or part of the following levels: a thread, a process, a partition, a virtual machine, a user co-routine or an interrupt request.
- the collection unit 44 is also capable of reading the identifier of the task carried out in the storage unit 42.
- the collection unit 44 is also capable of forming an association between a request with the corresponding task identifier.
- the collection unit 44 is also capable of memorizing each association formed.
- the collection unit 44 is also formed by the performance measurement units 34.
- the monitoring unit 46 is able to determine the state of operation using the stored associations.
- the operation of the monitoring system 46 is now described with reference to an example of implementation of a method for monitoring the operation of the computer 10, the monitoring method comprising several steps which are explained below.
- the scheduling unit 22 orders the execution of a first task by assigning it an identifier.
- the identifier is therefore a task identifier in the sense that it is specific to the task it identifies.
- the identifier of the first task is called the first identifier.
- the scheduling unit 22 then stores the first identifier on the storage unit 42, in this case in the main memory 16.
- the first task is then implemented.
- Such an implementation involves the solicitation of hardware blocks 36.
- the performance measurement units 34 count each of these demands for each core 12.
- first material demands For the sake of clarity, the demands of the first task are called “first material demands” in what follows.
- the collection unit 44 simultaneously reads the first identifier in the zone 42 and each of the first hardware requests in the performance measurement unit 34.
- the collection unit 44 stores the association of the first identifier and the first hardware requests in the main memory 16 for example.
- Each of the previous steps is repeated for a second task.
- the scheduling unit 22 orders the execution of a second task by assigning it a second identifier which is stored in the storage unit 42.
- the performance measurement units 34 count the second hardware stresses and the collection unit 44 associates them with the second identifier.
- the collection unit 44 stores this association in the main memory 16. These steps can be repeated for each task implementation.
- a database is thus created associating the material stresses counted with a specific task.
- the monitoring unit 46 determines the operating state of the computer 10.
- the surveillance system 40 having context information related to a higher solicitation of a hardware block 36, this makes it possible to ensure additional monitoring since an attack changing the number of accesses to a hardware block 36 is now detectable.
- the monitoring system 40 is therefore capable of detecting attacks exploiting hardware vulnerabilities at the processor level and generating stresses, such as the Specter attack, the Meltdown attack or the Rowhammer attack.
- the monitoring system 40 provides better security for the computer 10.
- monitoring system 40 is compatible with a real-time implementation.
- the storage unit 42 may be different from the main memory 16 which poses the problem of being relatively far from the cores 12 and therefore of requiring relatively long accesses.
- the storage unit 42 can be located in the memory management unit 30.
- identifiers may be advantageous to store the identifiers in a local memory of a core 12 while the association would be stored in a shared memory.
- FIG. 1 Another embodiment of the computer 10 is shown in Figure 3.
- the collection unit 44 is suitable for collecting the information from the performance measurement units 34.
- the collection unit 44 is here a centralized unit.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Quality & Reliability (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Virology (AREA)
- Debugging And Monitoring (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR2114671A FR3131644B1 (fr) | 2021-12-30 | 2021-12-30 | Système et procédé de surveillance du fonctionnement d'un calculateur |
| PCT/EP2022/088069 WO2023126514A1 (fr) | 2021-12-30 | 2022-12-30 | Système et procédé de surveillance du fonctionnement d'un calculateur |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP4457630A1 true EP4457630A1 (fr) | 2024-11-06 |
Family
ID=81851260
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP22840225.1A Pending EP4457630A1 (fr) | 2021-12-30 | 2022-12-30 | Système et procédé de surveillance du fonctionnement d'un calculateur |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US20250130916A1 (fr) |
| EP (1) | EP4457630A1 (fr) |
| FR (1) | FR3131644B1 (fr) |
| WO (1) | WO2023126514A1 (fr) |
Family Cites Families (28)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US7657893B2 (en) * | 2003-04-23 | 2010-02-02 | International Business Machines Corporation | Accounting method and logic for determining per-thread processor resource utilization in a simultaneous multi-threaded (SMT) processor |
| US8838940B2 (en) * | 2006-06-07 | 2014-09-16 | Azul Systems, Inc. | CPU utilization metering on systems that include multiple hardware threads per core |
| EP2441005A2 (fr) * | 2009-06-09 | 2012-04-18 | Martin Vorbach | Système et procédé d'antémémoire dans un processeur multi-coeurs |
| US20110055838A1 (en) * | 2009-08-28 | 2011-03-03 | Moyes William A | Optimized thread scheduling via hardware performance monitoring |
| US20110179255A1 (en) * | 2010-01-21 | 2011-07-21 | Arm Limited | Data processing reset operations |
| US9081628B2 (en) * | 2011-05-27 | 2015-07-14 | Intel Corporation | Detecting potential access errors in a multi-threaded application |
| US9135172B2 (en) * | 2012-08-02 | 2015-09-15 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Cache data migration in a multicore processing system |
| CN105229612B (zh) * | 2013-03-18 | 2018-06-26 | 纽约市哥伦比亚大学理事会 | 使用基于硬件的微体系结构数据的异常程序执行的检测 |
| US9842209B2 (en) * | 2015-05-08 | 2017-12-12 | Mcafee, Llc | Hardened event counters for anomaly detection |
| JP6544054B2 (ja) * | 2015-06-02 | 2019-07-17 | 富士通株式会社 | 情報処理装置、実行情報記録プログラムおよび実行情報記録方法 |
| US10810310B2 (en) * | 2016-01-14 | 2020-10-20 | Georgia Tech Research Corporation | Systems and methods for runtime program monitoring through analysis of side channel signals |
| AU2017210221B2 (en) * | 2016-01-22 | 2020-02-06 | Virsec Systems Inc. | Pattern matching based dataset extraction |
| US12021831B2 (en) * | 2016-06-10 | 2024-06-25 | Sophos Limited | Network security |
| US10372909B2 (en) * | 2016-08-19 | 2019-08-06 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp | Determining whether process is infected with malware |
| US11372972B2 (en) * | 2018-03-19 | 2022-06-28 | Intel Corporation | Side-channel exploit detection |
| US11513838B2 (en) * | 2018-05-07 | 2022-11-29 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Thread state monitoring in a system having a multi-threaded, self-scheduling processor |
| US11238155B2 (en) * | 2018-06-28 | 2022-02-01 | Intel Corporation | Microarchitectural mechanisms for the prevention of side-channel attacks |
| US20190042479A1 (en) * | 2018-06-29 | 2019-02-07 | Intel Corporation | Heuristic and machine-learning based methods to prevent fine-grained cache side-channel attacks |
| US10902123B2 (en) * | 2018-07-30 | 2021-01-26 | Mcafee, Llc | Remediation of flush reload attacks |
| US11455392B2 (en) * | 2018-11-01 | 2022-09-27 | Intel Corporation | Methods and apparatus of anomalous memory access pattern detection for translational lookaside buffers |
| US11074344B2 (en) * | 2018-12-19 | 2021-07-27 | Intel Corporation | Methods and apparatus to detect side-channel attacks |
| US11188643B2 (en) * | 2018-12-27 | 2021-11-30 | Intel Corporation | Methods and apparatus for detecting a side channel attack using hardware performance counters |
| US20190138719A1 (en) * | 2018-12-27 | 2019-05-09 | Salmin Sultana | Methods and apparatus for detecting a side channel attack using a cache state |
| US11556646B2 (en) * | 2019-05-31 | 2023-01-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Identifying and responding to a side-channel security threat |
| US12314385B1 (en) * | 2019-09-18 | 2025-05-27 | Rapid7, Inc. | Automated generation of anomaly scenarios for testing machine learned anomaly detection models |
| US11550965B2 (en) * | 2020-04-22 | 2023-01-10 | Arm Limited | Analytics processing circuitry for mitigating attacks against computing systems |
| EP4030325A1 (fr) * | 2021-01-19 | 2022-07-20 | Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy | Sécurité de système d'information |
| US20230205872A1 (en) * | 2021-12-23 | 2023-06-29 | Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. | Method and apparatus to address row hammer attacks at a host processor |
-
2021
- 2021-12-30 FR FR2114671A patent/FR3131644B1/fr active Active
-
2022
- 2022-12-30 US US18/725,758 patent/US20250130916A1/en active Pending
- 2022-12-30 WO PCT/EP2022/088069 patent/WO2023126514A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2022-12-30 EP EP22840225.1A patent/EP4457630A1/fr active Pending
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| FR3131644A1 (fr) | 2023-07-07 |
| WO2023126514A1 (fr) | 2023-07-06 |
| FR3131644B1 (fr) | 2024-09-06 |
| US20250130916A1 (en) | 2025-04-24 |
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