EP4264328A1 - Procede et systeme de localisation d'equipements radioelectriques utilisant au moins deux constellations satellitaires - Google Patents
Procede et systeme de localisation d'equipements radioelectriques utilisant au moins deux constellations satellitairesInfo
- Publication number
- EP4264328A1 EP4264328A1 EP21835253.2A EP21835253A EP4264328A1 EP 4264328 A1 EP4264328 A1 EP 4264328A1 EP 21835253 A EP21835253 A EP 21835253A EP 4264328 A1 EP4264328 A1 EP 4264328A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- constellation
- failure
- failures
- navigation
- occurrence
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/20—Integrity monitoring, fault detection or fault isolation of space segment
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/33—Multimode operation in different systems which transmit time stamped messages, e.g. GPS/GLONASS
Definitions
- the present invention relates in general to the location of objects, and in particular to a method and a system for locating radio equipment using a satellite system formed of at least two satellite constellations.
- Certain known location systems such as GPS systems (acronym for “Global Positioning System” meaning Global Location System), implement a satellite constellation formed by several traveling satellites to locate radio equipment. Each of these systems generally operates independently of the other location systems and the radio equipment to be located is generally designed and programmed to operate with a given location system. It then happens that radio equipment finds itself in visibility with satellites that do not belong to the location system with which the radio equipment is associated, which makes its location impossible or imprecise.
- Radio equipment can simultaneously receive navigation signals from two or more satellite constellations in order to determine its location.
- the radio equipment determines a location by satellite constellation and generally proceeds by average to determine a final location, without taking into account the specificities of each satellite constellation in terms of probabilities of occurrences of operating failures likely to occur. at the level of the satellite constellations.
- Radio equipment simultaneously receiving navigation signals from several satellite constellations can monitor the failures that the constellations and their satellites may experience. This results in a significant computational load which increases with the number of satellite constellations and/or with the number of satellites used.
- the present invention provides a method for locating radio equipment, implemented in a satellite system comprising a plurality of satellite constellations, each satellite constellation comprising one or more traveling satellites, each satellite constellation being associated with failure occurrence probabilities including a single failure occurrence probability and a multiple failure occurrence probability.
- the satellite system comprises at least one first constellation associated with a probability of occurrence of multiple failures lower than a given integrity risk, at least one second satellite constellation, and at least one radio equipment to be located receiving navigation signals coming from a plurality of traveling satellites.
- the method comprises the following steps implemented by radio equipment and consisting of:
- the probability of occurrence of a combination of single failures in the first constellation may be lower than the given integrity risk.
- the failure modes to be monitored may include:
- a third failure mode corresponding to a plurality of combinations of a single failure of the first constellation and a single or multiple failure of the second constellation, the other combinations of a single failure of the first constellation and of failure, single or multiple, of the second constellation not being monitored.
- the method can comprise the determination of the plurality of combinations associated with the third failure mode according to a given selection threshold, the determination of the plurality of combinations associated with the third failure mode comprising the steps consisting in : has. selecting the set of failures belonging to the first failure mode and the second failure mode, which provides a set of monitored failures; b. calculating a probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures based on the set of monitored failures; vs. comparing the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures to the given selection threshold; d.
- Steps b. to d. are repeated until the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures substantially reaches the given selection threshold.
- the unmonitored combinations of a single failure of the first constellation and a single or multiple failure of the second constellation can be added to the set of monitored failures in ascending or descending order of 'a selection metric, the selection metric being a metric chosen from:
- the number of unmonitored combinations of a single failure of the first constellation and a failure, single or multiple, of the second constellation can be predefined and can be chosen to be greater than or equal to two. .
- the one or more levels of protection can be calculated iteratively by minimizing a predefined cost function, the predefined cost function corresponding to the difference between a risk of exceeding the level of protection by positioning error and an adjusted integrity speech.
- the number of iterations can be less than or equal to three.
- the one or more protection levels may include a horizontal protection level.
- the at least one radio equipment can be airborne by means of an aircraft, the one or more protection levels can comprise a horizontal protection level and a vertical protection level.
- the probability of occurrence of single failures and the probability of occurrence of multiple failures associated with the first constellation may respectively be less than 2 ⁇ 10′ 5 and less than 10′ 7 .
- the probability of occurrence of single failures and the probability of occurrence of multiple failures associated with the second constellation can be less than 10' 3 .
- radioelectric equipment implemented in a satellite system comprising a plurality of satellite constellations, each satellite constellation comprising one or more traveling satellites, each satellite constellation being associated with probabilities of occurrence of failures comprising a probability of occurrence of single failures and a probability of occurrence of multiple failures, the satellite system comprising at least a first constellation associated with a probability of occurrence of multiple failures lower than a given integrity risk, at least a second constellation satellite, and at least one radio equipment to be located receiving navigation signals from a plurality of traveling satellites.
- the radio equipment comprises:
- a signal reception unit capable of receiving a plurality of navigation signals originating from a plurality of visible traveling satellites belonging at least to the first and to the second satellite constellation;
- a fault mode selection unit capable of selecting fault modes to be monitored corresponding to faults of the satellite constellations other than the multiple faults of the first constellation;
- a location unit able to determine a navigation solution representing a position of the radio equipment in a given reference, from the plurality of navigation signals received, and to determine a plurality of navigation sub-solutions, each of navigation sub-solutions corresponding to a position of the radio equipment in the given reference determined from the navigation signals received other than the navigation signals coming from one or more visible traveling satellites associated with a selected failure mode;
- a failure detection unit capable of calculating, for each navigation sub-solution, one or more corresponding detection thresholds, a condition of non-detection of failure being satisfied if the differences between the navigation solution and the navigation are below one or more corresponding detection thresholds;
- a calculation unit able to calculate one or more levels of protection associated with the main navigation solution, if the condition of non-detection of failure is satisfied for all the navigation sub-solutions.
- the embodiments of the invention allow precision in the location of radio equipment and an increased level of integrity compared to the solutions of the state of the art.
- the invention can advantageously be applied to autonomous guidance systems for aircraft, ships and land vehicles.
- FIG.1 represents the architecture of a satellite location system for radio equipment, according to one embodiment of the invention
- FIG.2 is a flowchart representing the steps implemented to select failures to be monitored by radio equipment, according to one embodiment of the invention
- FIG.3 is a comparative table showing the reduction in the number of failures monitored using a selection method according to embodiments of the invention
- FIG.4 is a flowchart representing a method for locating radio equipment using two satellite constellations, according to one embodiment of the invention.
- FIG.5 is a flowchart representing the steps implemented to calculate levels of protection by radio equipment, according to one embodiment of the invention.
- FIG.7 compare the performance of state-of-the-art methods and the performance of a method for calculating protection levels according to one embodiment of the invention.
- FIG.8 is an example of the architecture of radio equipment, according to one embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 1 represents a satellite location system 10, also called satellite system 10, in which a location method can be implemented according to embodiments of the invention.
- the localization system 10 can comprise at least two satellite constellations 100, 200 comprising a first constellation 100 and a second constellation 200. Each of the two satellite constellations 100, 200 can be formed from one or more traveling satellites 101, 201.
- the location system 10 can transmit navigation signals in the direction of one or more radio equipment items 20 to be located.
- Each of the satellite constellations 100, 200 can be made up of a number of traveling satellites 101, 201 which can be quite large.
- each satellite constellation 100 or 200 can comprise a number N (1) , N (2) of traveling satellites 101 , 201 , the number of traveling satellites (denoted N (1) for the constellation 100 and denoted N (2) for the constellation 200) being greater than 10.
- each of the satellite constellations 100, 200 can be global in coverage so as to cover the entire earth's surface at any time of the day. Examples of satellite constellations include, without limitation, GPS, Galileo, Beidou and Glonass constellations.
- the satellite constellations 100, 200 implemented can experience operating failures of the “multiple failure” type, also called “constellation failure”.
- Such a type of failure involves at least two satellites of the same 100 or 200 constellation failing for a common cause, such as for example a simultaneous update of several satellites of a constellation using erroneous navigation parameters.
- each of the two satellite constellations 100, 200 can be associated with a probability of occurrence of multiple failures.
- the probability of occurrence of multiple failures of the first constellation 100 denoted P CO n St
- the probability of occurrence of multiple failures of the second constellation 200 denoted P c ( ⁇ st -
- Each of the traveling satellites 101, 201 forming the two satellite constellations 100, 200 can comprise a platform for moving the satellite into a given orbit, the orbit possibly being for example and without limitation of the LEO, MEO or other type.
- each of the traveling satellites 101, 201 may further comprise a payload enabling the satellite to transmit navigation signals in the direction of the Earth.
- the payload of a given traveling satellite may for example comprise a navigation signal generation unit, a high precision on-board clock, for example of the atomic type, and an RF (Radio Frequency) transmission antenna, preferably not directive with large angular aperture.
- the traveling satellites 101, 201 forming a satellite constellation 100 or 200 can be identical from a material point of view (platform and payload) and their orbital characteristics can be optimized so as to have a satellite constellation with coverage world.
- traveling satellites 101 , 201 of the same constellation 100 or 200 can evolve according to the same altitude and the same orbital period by following orbital planes different.
- a moving satellite belonging to a satellite constellation can suffer operating failures of the "single failure" type, also called “satellite failure".
- Such a type of failure involves a single satellite of a constellation, such as a power supply problem or drifts of the on-board clock.
- traveling satellites 101 , 201 that are identical from a hardware point of view can imply the same probability of occurrence of simple failures for all the traveling satellites 101 , 201 belonging to the same satellite constellation 100 or 200.
- the probability of occurrence of single failures of the first constellation 100 may be different, for example lower, than the probability of occurrence of simple failures of the second constellation 200 P ⁇ , P ti is the probability of failure of the satellite “i” belonging to the constellation “j”.
- P ti is the probability of failure of the satellite “i” belonging to the constellation “j”.
- the probability of occurrence of simple failures of the first constellation 100 is lower than that of the second constellation 200, by way of non-limiting example.
- the satellite system 10 may experience other types of failures involving the first 100 and the second satellite constellation simultaneously.
- the satellite system 10 can simultaneously experience a single failure of a traveling satellite 101 of the first constellation 100 and a multiple failure involving at least two traveling satellites
- the satellite system 10 can also experience two single or multiple failures simultaneously, affecting the same constellation 100 or 200.
- the second satellite constellation 200 can simultaneously experience two single failures involving two orbiting satellites 201 breaking down for two different causes.
- radio equipment 20 to be located can be of the terrestrial or airborne type by means of an aircraft.
- the radio equipment 20 may comprise hardware and/or software resources allowing it to receive, continuously over time, and to process navigation signals transmitted by satellites 101, 201 belonging to the satellite constellations 100, 200 implemented .
- radio equipment 20 may comprise an RF reception antenna, a navigation signal receiver and a digital processing unit able to decode and demodulate the navigation signals received to locate the radio equipment 20 and to associate a level of protection to the location thus determined.
- the localization of a radioelectric equipment 20 can for example include the determination of the position of the radioelectric equipment 20 represented by coordinates in a geocentric Cartesian coordinate system (geodesic system), for example.
- a radio equipment 20 to be located can be configured to determine its location using all navigation signals, that is to say signals from which the location can be determined.
- the traveling satellites 101, 201 supplying such navigation signals represent, for the radio equipment 20 to be located, visible satellites 101, 201.
- visible satellites 101, 201 may be faulty, that is to say they have suffered an operating failure which may for example be of the single or multiple type.
- the location determined by radio equipment 20 using all the navigation signals from all the visible satellites constitutes a “navigation solution”, also called “main navigation solution”.
- a radio equipment item 20 to be located can exclude from the calculation of its location one or more navigation signals originating from one or more visible satellites.
- a location determined by radio equipment 20 by excluding one or more navigation signals constitutes a “navigation sub-solution”.
- radio equipment 20 can calculate navigation sub-solutions by excluding navigation signals originating from one or more visible satellites identified as potentially faulty.
- radio equipment 20 can calculate, for each main navigation solution, several navigation sub-solutions by excluding for each of them the navigation signals originating from one of the visible satellites 101 , 201 . In this case, the radio equipment 20 calculates as many navigation sub-solutions as there are visible satellites.
- radio equipment 20 may calculate a navigation sub-solution by excluding navigation signals from all visible satellites belonging to one of the implemented satellite constellations 100 or 200.
- a navigation sub-solution can deviate significantly from the associated main navigation solution when one or more visible satellites fail.
- the subsolution of navigation excluding the faulty visible satellite or satellites can be closer to the real position of the radio equipment 20.
- the radio equipment 20 can calculate, from the main navigation solution associated, for each navigation sub-solution , a deviation representing the distance between the main navigation solution and the considered navigation sub-solution.
- radio equipment 20 can determine its location using navigation signals from several moving satellites 101, 201 visible belonging to two satellite constellations 100, 200 implemented.
- the main navigation solution and associated navigation sub-solutions can be determined from the two satellite constellations 100, 200 implemented.
- one or more levels of protection PL q can be associated with each main navigation solution determined by radio equipment 20.
- a horizontal protection level and a vertical protection level can be associated with a navigation solution determined by airborne radio equipment using an aircraft, for example.
- a single horizontal protection level can be associated with a navigation solution determined by airborne radio equipment, the vertical information being able, in this case, to be provided by another type of sensor such as an altimeter.
- the probability associated with a protection level, horizontal can be of the order of 10' 7 , and corresponds to the risk of the protection level being exceeded by the positioning error, which must be less than 10' 7 per hour. This value is also called integrity risk or integrity allocation and is denoted PHMI in the remainder of the description.
- the calculation of the protection levels by monitoring all the visible traveling satellites is generally a costly task in terms of computing power, memory resources, and computing time. Such resources are generally not available in radioelectric equipment 20 which can be airborne by means of an aircraft, of the drone type for example.
- the monitoring of a traveling satellite visible by radio equipment 20 refers to the ability of the radio equipment 20 to determine the state of this satellite, i.e. that is, its ability to determine whether this satellite is faulty or operational.
- the determination of the state of a visible traveling satellite can be made from the navigation signals received by the radio equipment 20. For example, the determination of the state of a visible traveling satellite can be made by comparing the main navigation solution and the navigation sub-solution excluding the navigation signals originating from the visible traveling satellite considered.
- the radio equipment 20 to be located uses at least two satellite constellations 100, 200 as represented in FIG. 1 to select fault modes to be monitored, the selection of fault modes to be monitored taking place according to the probabilities of occurrence of failures, single and multiple, of the two satellite constellations 100, 200 and according to a predefined integrity risk PHMI.
- the determination of the navigation sub-solutions and the calculation of the protection levels can be carried out by considering only the selected failure modes.
- a radioelectric equipment 20 can select failure modes to be monitored for the calculation of the protection levels by excluding a failure mode corresponding to the set of multiple failures of the first constellation 100, the first constellation 100 having probabilities d occurrence of failures such that the probability of occurrence of a multiple failure or of a combination of single failures is lower than the predefined integrity risk.
- the radio equipment 20 to be located uses at least a first 100 and a second satellite constellation 200 as represented in FIG. such that the probability of occurrence of a multiple failure or of a combination of single failures is less than a predefined integrity risk.
- the radio equipment 20 can select failure modes to be monitored from among three failure modes:
- a failure mode corresponding to all of the simple failures of the first 100 and of the second satellite constellation 200
- ⁇ single failure i is the probability of occurrence of a single failure on the satellite "i" of the constellation "j" combined with the absence of any other failure.
- the occurrence of a multiple failure in the second constellation 200 can occur according to the following probability: that is to say the probability of occurrence of any failure on the second constellation which is not a simple satellite failure in the absence of any failure (single or multiple) on any satellite of the first constellation.
- the occurrence of such a failure mode can occur according to the following relationship:
- all the possible combinations of a single failure of the first constellation 100 and any failure of the second constellation 200 can be monitored and taken into account to calculate the navigation sub-solutions. Due to the low probability of occurrence of other failures, they can advantageously not be monitored and they are taken into account in the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures, denoted P PNS .
- the second embodiment advantageously makes it possible to: reduce the number of failures to be monitored by the radioelectric equipment 20, which makes it possible to reduce the calculation load by reducing, for example, the number of navigation sub-solutions to be determined; maintain the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures (P PN s) at a value lower than the predefined integrity risk.
- P PN s unmonitored failures
- FIG. 2 represents steps implemented to select faults to be monitored by radio equipment 20, according to a third embodiment of the invention.
- the third embodiment can use two satellite constellations 100, 200 as represented in FIG. 1 where a first satellite constellation 100 presenting probabilities of occurrence of failures such as the probability of occurrence of a multiple failure or of a combination of single failures is less than a predefined integrity risk.
- the selection of failures to be monitored is carried out according to the third embodiment as a function of a given selection threshold P T HRESH -
- the selection of failures to be monitored according to such an embodiment relates particularly to the combinations of a single failure of the first constellation 100 and any failure of the second constellation 200.
- the radio equipment 20 may not monitor all possible combinations, therefore certain combinations are not monitored and they are excluded from the third failure mode.
- the radio equipment 20 can select all the failures belonging to the first and the second mode of failures as defined above, that is to say all of the simple failures of the first and second constellation 200, and the set corresponding to the occurrence of a multiple fault or several single faults in the second constellation 200, which provides a set of monitored faults not containing combinations of a fault failure of the first constellation 100 and any failure of the second constellation 200.
- the radio equipment 20 can calculate from all the monitored failures a probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures.
- An initial probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures can be determined from the set of monitored failures selected in step 301.
- the radio equipment 20 can compare the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures with the given selection threshold.
- the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures may be higher, lower or substantially equal to the given selection threshold.
- Step 304 executed when the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures is less than the given selection threshold, a combination of a single failure of the first constellation 100 and any failure, single or multiple , of the second constellation 200, is added to the set of monitored failures, the added combination becoming a monitored combination and therefore included in the third mode of failures.
- Steps 302 and 303 can then be executed taking into account all of the failures monitored as updated.
- Steps 302, 303 and 304 can be repeated a finite number of times until the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures reaches the given selection threshold. At the end of the iterative execution of steps 302, 303 and 304, the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures substantially reaches the given selection threshold.
- the addition of the combinations of a single failure of the first constellation 100 and of any failure of the second constellation 200 to the set of monitored failures as described in relation to Figure 2 can be performed in ascending or descending order of a given selection metric.
- the combinations associated with the highest single fault occurrence probabilities can be added first, which corresponds to an uncertainty metric associated with the navigation signals provided by the first satellite constellation 100.
- the addition of the combinations of a simple failure of the first constellation 100 and of any failure of the second constellation 200 to the set of monitored failures can be carried out according to another selection metric corresponding to the degradation in a horizontal and/or vertical plane of the covariance matrix of the positioning error.
- the combinations associated with a minimum degradation in a horizontal and/or vertical plane of the positioning error covariance matrix with respect to the positioning error covariance matrix obtained by using all the satellites of the first constellation 100 are added first.
- the addition of the combinations of a simple failure of the first constellation 100 and of any failure of the second constellation 200 to the set of monitored failures can be carried out by first adding the combinations associated with a minimal impact on the calculation of the protection levels (the selection metric is then the impact of the combinations on the calculation of the protection levels).
- the protection levels PL q can be obtained by solving the following equation: /PL n -T k -b (k) ⁇ i Pfailure.k Q Q g Q ⁇ — (PHM1 - P n PNS ) (4) ⁇ °q / x es where Q(x) represents the distribution function of the reduced centered normal distribution.
- T kq represents the threshold to which we compare the difference between the main navigation solution and the robust navigation sub-solution against failure k in the direction q
- b q k represents the maximum positioning error in the direction q caused by the biases affecting each measurement used in the calculation of the sub-solution robust to failure k
- cr q k represents the standard deviation of the position error along the direction q of the sub-solution robust to the failure k
- n es is the number of independent samples (for example 360 or even 450) over the exposure period applicable to the operation considered (for example one hour).
- Pfailure.k is the probability of occurrence of failure k, calculated according to whether failure k belongs to one of the three failure modes identified.
- the number of unmonitored combinations of a simple failure of the first constellation 100 and any failure of the second constellation 200 can be fixed beforehand according to the probabilities of occurrence of single and multiple failures of the two satellite constellations 100, 200.
- the number of unmonitored combinations of a single failure of the first constellation 100 and any failure of the second constellation 200 can be greater than or equal to 2.
- the unmonitored combinations of a single failure of the first constellation 100 and any failure of the second constellation 200 can correspond to a maximum degradation of the selection metric, for example a maximum uncertainty associated with the navigation signals provided by the first satellite constellation 100.
- FIG. 3 is a table representing the number of failures monitored by the radioelectric equipment 20 using a prior art selection algorithm, according to the approach described in the article [Blanch, et al. , “Baseline advanced RAIM user algorithm and possible improvements”, IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2015].
- the table of FIG. 3 shows at the level of lines 1 and 2 the number of failures monitored by the radioelectric equipment for different numbers of visible satellites and for different values of the probabilities of occurrence of failures in the second satellite constellation 200.
- the table also shows the number of failures monitored according to the second embodiment of the invention at the level of line 3 and according to the third embodiment at the level of line 4.
- the embodiments of the invention thus make it possible to reduce dramatically the number of failures monitored, and therefore, reduce the computational load needed to determine navigation sub-solutions and protection levels.
- FIG. 4 represents a method for locating radioelectric equipment 20 using two satellite constellations 100, 200 comprising a first 100 and a second satellite constellation 200, the first satellite constellation 100 presenting probabilities of occurrence of failures such as the probability of occurrence of a multiple failure or a combination of single failures is less than a predefined integrity risk.
- the radio equipment 20 can be simultaneously visible from several traveling satellites 101, 201 belonging to the first 100 and to the second satellite constellation 200.
- the radio equipment 20 can receive navigation signals from all the traveling satellites 101, 201 visible.
- a navigation signal received by a radio equipment 20 allows the determination of a geographical location in which the radio equipment 20 is located, such a geographical location being able to correspond to a sphere centered on the position of the transmitting transmitting satellite, assumed to be known accurately by the radio equipment 20, from the ephemerides of the traveling satellite, and admitting as a radius a pseudo-distance determined from the time difference undergone by the navigation signal to reach the radio equipment 20.
- the radio equipment 20 can select failure modes to monitor.
- the selection of failure modes to be monitored can be made according to one of the embodiments of the invention described above.
- the radio equipment 20 can select the first, the second and the third failure mode.
- the number of monitored combinations of a single failure of the first constellation 100 and of any failure of the second constellation 200 can be optimized as described in relation to FIG. 2 or as described in relation to the fifth embodiment of the invention.
- step 402 may be executed first.
- the radio equipment 20 can determine, from the navigation signals coming from all the visible satellites, a navigation solution, also called main navigation solution, representing the position of the radio equipment. 20 in a given benchmark.
- a navigation solution also called main navigation solution
- one or more navigation signals used to calculate the main navigation solution may come from one or more failed visible satellites.
- the radio equipment 20 can also determine navigation sub-solutions where each navigation sub-solution excludes, that is to say does not take account of, one or more navigation signals provided by one or several visible satellites associated with a failure mode selected at the exit of step 402.
- the radio equipment 20 can calculate, in relation to the first failure mode, 20 navigation sub-solutions where each navigation sub-solution uses 19 visible satellites and excludes a different visible satellite from the other navigation sub-solutions.
- the radio equipment 20 can calculate a sub-solution of navigation using the 10 visible satellites of the first constellation 100 and no satellite of the second constellation 200.
- the radio equipment can a priori calculate up to 10 navigation sub-solutions using 9 visible satellites of the first constellation 100 and no visible satellite of the second constellation. This number of 10 can then be optimized to reduce the computational load in the radio equipment according to one of the embodiments described above.
- the radio equipment 20 can calculate the deviations separating the main navigation solution from each of the navigation sub-solutions. For example, by considering a solution and a navigation sub-solution, two deviations can be calculated in the horizontal plane according to two perpendicular directions and a third deviation can be measured according to the vertical direction.
- the radio equipment 20 can calculate failure detection thresholds according to a previously predefined false alarm probability and according to the uncertainties associated with the differences between the main navigation solution and the sub - navigation solution, one or more detection thresholds being calculated for each of the navigation sub-solutions.
- Step 404 can further comprise a comparison, for each of the navigation sub-solutions, between the difference between the main navigation solution and the navigation sub-solution as calculated at step 403 with the detection threshold corresponding failure, which makes it possible to determine, for each navigation sub-solution, whether a condition of non-detection of failure is satisfied or not, the condition of non-detection of failure being satisfied if the difference between the main navigation solution and the navigation sub-solution is below at least one corresponding detection threshold.
- step 405 if the failure detection condition is satisfied for all the navigation sub-solutions, that is to say that all the deviations calculated at step 403 are lower than the corresponding detection thresholds calculated in step 404, the radio equipment 20 can calculate a horizontal protection level and/or a vertical protection level as a function of one or more parameters among: a integrity value adjusted in particular by the probabilities of occurrence of unmonitored failures, the probabilities of occurrence of monitored failures, the detection thresholds or alternatively the discrepancies between the main navigation solution and the navigation sub-solutions, the positioning uncertainty of the main navigation solution and navigation sub-solutions, etc.
- a horizontal protection level and/or a vertical protection level as a function of one or more parameters among: a integrity value adjusted in particular by the probabilities of occurrence of unmonitored failures, the probabilities of occurrence of monitored failures, the detection thresholds or alternatively the discrepancies between the main navigation solution and the navigation sub-solutions, the positioning uncertainty of the main navigation solution and navigation sub-solutions, etc
- the location method may also comprise an additional step consisting in triggering the transmission by the radioelectric equipment 20 of an alert message (or notification), for example intended for its user, when at least one difference between the main navigation solution and a navigation sub-solution is greater than the corresponding detection threshold.
- the first satellite constellation 100 associated with probabilities of occurrence of minimum failures compared to the rest of the constellations of a satellite system 10 can present a probability of occurrence of simple failures less than 2x10' 5 and a probability of occurrence of multiple failures less than 10' 7 .
- the second satellite constellation 200 associated with probabilities of occurrence of failures greater than those of the first constellation 100 can present a probability of occurrence of failures, single or multiple, less than 10' 3 .
- the radio equipment location method 20 can be applied to a satellite system 10 comprising any number greater than or equal to 2 satellite constellations with a first constellation 100 having probabilities of occurrence of failures such that the probability of occurrence of a multiple failure or of a combination of single failures is less than a predefined integrity risk.
- the calculation of a level of protection can be performed iteratively by seeking to minimize a given cost function.
- the search can be carried out according to an iterative minimization method and the number of iterations used to do the search can be less than three.
- FIG. 5 illustrates the steps implemented to calculate a level of protection according to such an embodiment of the invention.
- the risk of the protection level x being exceeded by the positioning error h q (x) can be written in the following form: _ xT k , q -b® Pfailure.k Q (5) ⁇ q (k)
- a starting value, x 0 , and an increment, A can be defined.
- the starting value can for example be one of the limits or the center of the search domain.
- the upper bound can for example be obtained by allocating to each monitored failure mode an equal portion of the integrity allocation, in particular adjusted by the probability of occurrence of unmonitored failures.
- the lower bound can for example be set to 0 or be obtained by allocating to each monitored failure mode the entire adjusted integrity allocation.
- the increment can, for example, be greater than half the tolerance on the estimate of x.
- step 503 the cost function is evaluated at the starting value. Then, the value of the search domain, x n+1 , can be updated based on elements including the old value of the search interval, x n , the increment, and the results of the evaluation of the cost function and its derivatives with respect to x n .
- the value of x n+1 can be obtained according to the following relation:
- step 503 can be repeated a maximum number of times, for example a maximum number of times less than or equal to three.
- Step 504 can be executed when the maximum number of times has been reached.
- the value of x n such that f q (x) is minimum can be retained.
- Such a value of x n may correspond to the desired level of protection.
- Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the performance of the embodiment described in relation to Figure 5 ( Figure 7) compared to the solutions of the state of the art ( Figure 6) such as that described in [Blanch, et al., "Baseline advanced RAIM user algorithm and possible improvements", IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2015] which uses dichotomy resolution and requires a number of iterations greater than 6.
- Figure 7 shows that the method of calculation of the protection levels according to the invention converges after 3 iterations towards the optimal value.
- FIG. 5 has the advantage of using only a reduced number of iterations for determining protection levels, unlike the solutions of the state of the art where the number of iteration is usually between 6 and 10.
- FIG. 8 represents the architecture of radio equipment 20 to be located according to one embodiment of the invention.
- Such an architecture may include:
- a signal reception unit 21 capable of receiving navigation signals from several visible satellites belonging to at least two satellite constellations 100, 200;
- a fault mode selection unit 22 capable of selecting one or more fault modes to be monitored
- a location unit 23 capable of determining, from the navigation signals received and from the selected failure modes, a main navigation solution and one or more navigation sub-solutions;
- a detection unit 24 capable of determining whether a condition of non-detection of failures is verified from the navigation solution and the navigation sub-solutions;
- calculation unit 25 capable of calculating one or more levels of protection for the navigation solution.
- the method for locating radioelectric equipment 20 can be implemented in various ways by hardware (“hardware”), software, or a combination of hardware and software. , including in the form of program code that may be distributed as a program product, in various forms.
- the program code may be distributed using computer readable media, which may include computer readable storage media and communication media.
- the methods described in this description may in particular be implemented in the form of computer program instructions executable by one or more processors in a computer computing device. These computer program instructions may also be stored in computer-readable media.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
Abstract
Description
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Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR2013415A FR3118196B1 (fr) | 2020-12-17 | 2020-12-17 | Procédé et système de localisation d’équipements radioélectriques utilisant au moins deux constellations satellitaires |
| PCT/EP2021/085009 WO2022128736A1 (fr) | 2020-12-17 | 2021-12-09 | Procede et systeme de localisation d'equipements radioelectriques utilisant au moins deux constellations satellitaires |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP4264328A1 true EP4264328A1 (fr) | 2023-10-25 |
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ID=75690322
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP21835253.2A Pending EP4264328A1 (fr) | 2020-12-17 | 2021-12-09 | Procede et systeme de localisation d'equipements radioelectriques utilisant au moins deux constellations satellitaires |
Country Status (5)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US20240027627A1 (fr) |
| EP (1) | EP4264328A1 (fr) |
| CA (1) | CA3201980A1 (fr) |
| FR (1) | FR3118196B1 (fr) |
| WO (1) | WO2022128736A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN117406256B (zh) * | 2023-12-14 | 2024-03-15 | 国家无线电监测中心 | 一种应用于低轨互联网卫星的终端定位方法及相关设备 |
| CN119881970B (zh) * | 2025-03-25 | 2025-06-10 | 中电科航空电子有限公司 | 符合完好性监测需求的星座构型生成方法、装置、设备及介质 |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US7769543B2 (en) * | 2007-04-30 | 2010-08-03 | The Boeing Company | Fault detection and reconfiguration of an automated refueling boom |
| US10613233B2 (en) * | 2016-09-21 | 2020-04-07 | Honeywell International Inc. | ARAIM clustering distribution improvement |
-
2020
- 2020-12-17 FR FR2013415A patent/FR3118196B1/fr active Active
-
2021
- 2021-12-09 US US18/265,955 patent/US20240027627A1/en active Pending
- 2021-12-09 WO PCT/EP2021/085009 patent/WO2022128736A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2021-12-09 CA CA3201980A patent/CA3201980A1/fr active Pending
- 2021-12-09 EP EP21835253.2A patent/EP4264328A1/fr active Pending
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| FR3118196A1 (fr) | 2022-06-24 |
| US20240027627A1 (en) | 2024-01-25 |
| FR3118196B1 (fr) | 2023-02-24 |
| WO2022128736A1 (fr) | 2022-06-23 |
| CA3201980A1 (fr) | 2022-06-23 |
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