EP3837872A1 - Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network - Google Patents

Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network

Info

Publication number
EP3837872A1
EP3837872A1 EP19749374.5A EP19749374A EP3837872A1 EP 3837872 A1 EP3837872 A1 EP 3837872A1 EP 19749374 A EP19749374 A EP 19749374A EP 3837872 A1 EP3837872 A1 EP 3837872A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
rand
time
key
signed
hlr
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP19749374.5A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Inventor
Franck Mosse
Chaouki SAHLI
Olivier MERLIN
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Thales DIS France SAS
Original Assignee
Thales DIS France SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Thales DIS France SA filed Critical Thales DIS France SA
Publication of EP3837872A1 publication Critical patent/EP3837872A1/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • the invention concerns telecommunications and in particular the share of subscriptions between devices like smartphones for example.
  • a subscriber to a telecommunication network pays for his subscription. However, he cannot share his subscription with other people or apparatuses like M2M modules for example.
  • the object of the invention is to allow such a feature, for free.
  • the main goal of the invention is to be able to derive a temporary subscription from a main subscription using a time based information and to transfer this subscription to another device in order to establish a GSM network connection on behalf of the main subscription.
  • This derived subscription could be used only during a specific period of time due to the use of a time based derivative algorithm.
  • the invention proposes a method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network, the method comprising:
  • the electrical profile without the Ki of the first device is transferred to the second device before step a).
  • the time-based key and the IMSI of the first device are transmitted to the telecommunication network by the second device at step c).
  • the invention also concerns a HLR configured to compute a time-based key based on an IMSI received from a VLR, the HLR being configured for sending to the VLR a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber.
  • the invention also concerns a VLR configured to receive from a HLR a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber by the HLR, the VLR being arranged to check the RAND signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber in order to authenticate the subscriber.
  • the invention also concerns a secure element designed for cooperating with a device, called first device, the secure element comprising an application for generating a time-based key to be transmitted to a second device.
  • first device a device designed for cooperating with a device, called first device
  • secure element comprising an application for generating a time-based key to be transmitted to a second device.
  • a first device 10 comprises a security element (a SIM card, a eUICC (embedded UICC) or a iUICC (integrated UICC)) comprising a secret key Ki and an IMSI.
  • the key Ki is the 128-bit individual Subscriber Authentication Key utilized as a secret key shared between the first device 10 and the Home Location Register 13 (HLR) of the subscriber’s home network.
  • HLR Home Location Register 13
  • the user of this first device 10 has previously purchased a subscription from a MNO (Mobile Network Operator) and has the possibility to communicate with the telecommunication network of this MNO (here only a part of the network is represented, a VLR 12 and the HLR 13 of a MSC).
  • MNO Mobile Network Operator
  • the user of the first device 10 wishes to allow a second device 1 1 to temporarily communicate with the network.
  • the first device computes at step 21 a time-based key Ki t .
  • the purpose of the invention is to make a subscription moveable (nomadic) so that it can be securely distributed for a one shot usage on an unsecured device.
  • the main goal is to derive the Ki key used for network authentication with a pseudo-random function based on a specific time and use this information to derive the Ki in order to generate a Ki t key (“t” standing for“time-based” or“temporary”) used instead for network authentication.
  • Ki t key standing for“time-based” or“temporary” used instead for network authentication.
  • This key ki t when generated could only be distributed to an external (second) device and used during a specific time range, for example one minute.
  • the key Ki t is transmitted from the first device 10 to the second device 11 , along with the IMSI of the first device 10 if this IMSI was not transferred earlier, during the registration step.
  • the algorithm used to generate the time-based key Ki t must not be a reverse algorithm. It could be like the A8 algorithm used for network key generation but must contain a time based information as a pseudo-random function. As the first device knows the time, the HLR is synchronized with it and can generate the same key.
  • the second device 11 then comprises the electrical profile of the first device and this temporary key Ki t . It then tries to authenticate itself (Authentication Request message at step 23) on the network by sending the IMSI of the first device 10 to the VLR 12.
  • the VLR 12 sends a command to the HLR 13 (Get data) comprising the IMSI.
  • the HLR 13 then computes (step 25) the same key Kit that was computed at step 21 (the HLR 13 knows the Ki key associated to the IMSI, it can use the same based time algorithm to compute on its side the same Ki t key as the first device 10).
  • the VLR can use both the signed RAND Ki and the RAND signed by Ki t to authenticate the incoming connection. Note that the HLR 13 must compute the Ki t only when the first authentication request is received by the VLR 12.
  • the HLR 13 sends to the VLR 12 the following data:
  • RAND is 128-bit random challenge generated by the Home Location Register 13.
  • a step 27 the VLR 12 sends to the second device 1 1 the random value RAND.
  • the second device 1 1 signs the random value RAND with Ki t and sends this signed value to the VLR 12 (step 29).
  • the VLR 12 can then check (step 30) if the RAND signed by Ki received from the HLR 13 is the same than RAND signed locally by Ki and (step 31 ), if the RAND signed by Ki t received from the HLR 13 is the same than the one received from the second device 1 1.
  • the VLR 12 can send (step 32) an authentication OK message.
  • the authentication message is sent to the second device 1 1 (if check 30 is positive, the authentication message is sent to the first device 10).
  • the secondary device can now communicate with the network for a given laps of time, for example one minute. If no check is positive, authentication fails.
  • the invention is applicable to all over the air authentication mechanism based on an algorithm A3/A8 with shared secret keys (2G, 3G, 4G or 5G).
  • the key ki t is used after the allowed time range then this key will be rejected by the HLR 13 and then by the VLR 12, that means that the subscriber will not authenticate onto the network.
  • the mechanism of the invention could be used, for example, on automotive use-cases and allow GSM modules installed in cars to be free of subscription.
  • a derived subscription is generated based on the current time and transferred to the GSM module fixed inside the car using a Bluetooth, Wifi or other contactless protocol. This temporary subscription could then be used to initiate a connection to the GSM network on behalf of the car owner during a specific period of time.
  • the main advantage of the present invention is that a derivative subscription is used in order to authenticate subscriber to a network. Subscription is no more associated physically to a device. A single subscription could be used by several devices successively. GSM devices could be free of subscription and configured on demand by a derivative subscription.
  • a GSM network requires the IMSI and Ki shared key information.
  • the main device has to generate the Ki t key using a time based information and algorithm known by both the main device and the HLR 13. This is this couple of IMSI/Ki t that will be transferred to the secondary device and used to authenticate the secondary device on the network.
  • the invention also concerns a HLR 13 configured to compute a time-based key based on an IMSI received from a VLR 12, the HLR 13 being configured for sending to the VLR 12 a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber.
  • the invention also concerns a VLR 12 configured to receive from a HLR 13 a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber by the HLR 13, the VLR 12 being arranged to check the RAND signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber in order to authenticate the subscriber.
  • the invention also concerns a secure element designed for cooperating with a device 10, the secure element comprising an application for generating a time-based key to be transmitted to a second device 1 1.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention concerns especially a method for transferring from a first device (10) a key to a second device (11) in a telecommunication network, the method comprising: Generating a time-based key at the first device (10); Transmitting the time-based key from the first device (10) to the second device (11); Authenticating the first device (10) and the second device (11) at the level of the telecommunication network for temporarily granting access to the telecommunication network to the second device (11).

Description

Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a
telecommunication network
The invention concerns telecommunications and in particular the share of subscriptions between devices like smartphones for example.
A subscriber to a telecommunication network pays for his subscription. However, he cannot share his subscription with other people or apparatuses like M2M modules for example.
The object of the invention is to allow such a feature, for free.
The main goal of the invention is to be able to derive a temporary subscription from a main subscription using a time based information and to transfer this subscription to another device in order to establish a GSM network connection on behalf of the main subscription. This derived subscription could be used only during a specific period of time due to the use of a time based derivative algorithm.
More precisely, the invention proposes a method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network, the method comprising:
a) Generating a time-based key at the first device;
b) Transmitting the time-based key from the first device to the second device;
c) Authenticating the first device and the second device at the level of the telecommunication network for temporarily granting access to the telecommunication network to the second device.
Preferably, the electrical profile without the Ki of the first device is transferred to the second device before step a).
Advantageously, the time-based key and the IMSI of the first device are transmitted to the telecommunication network by the second device at step c).
The invention also concerns a HLR configured to compute a time-based key based on an IMSI received from a VLR, the HLR being configured for sending to the VLR a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber.
The invention also concerns a VLR configured to receive from a HLR a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber by the HLR, the VLR being arranged to check the RAND signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber in order to authenticate the subscriber.
The invention also concerns a secure element designed for cooperating with a device, called first device, the secure element comprising an application for generating a time-based key to be transmitted to a second device. The invention will be better understood by reading the following description of the unique figure that represents the different steps of the method of the invention.
In this figure, a first device 10 comprises a security element (a SIM card, a eUICC (embedded UICC) or a iUICC (integrated UICC)) comprising a secret key Ki and an IMSI. The key Ki is the 128-bit individual Subscriber Authentication Key utilized as a secret key shared between the first device 10 and the Home Location Register 13 (HLR) of the subscriber’s home network.
The user of this first device 10 has previously purchased a subscription from a MNO (Mobile Network Operator) and has the possibility to communicate with the telecommunication network of this MNO (here only a part of the network is represented, a VLR 12 and the HLR 13 of a MSC).
In the scope of the invention, the user of the first device 10 wishes to allow a second device 1 1 to temporarily communicate with the network. In this respect, after having just once (during a registration step) transferred his electrical profile to the second device 11 (the electrical profile can comprise its IMSI), at step 20, the first device computes at step 21 a time-based key Kit.
The purpose of the invention is to make a subscription moveable (nomadic) so that it can be securely distributed for a one shot usage on an unsecured device. The main goal is to derive the Ki key used for network authentication with a pseudo-random function based on a specific time and use this information to derive the Ki in order to generate a Kit key (“t” standing for“time-based” or“temporary”) used instead for network authentication. This key kit when generated could only be distributed to an external (second) device and used during a specific time range, for example one minute.
A step 22, the key Kit is transmitted from the first device 10 to the second device 11 , along with the IMSI of the first device 10 if this IMSI was not transferred earlier, during the registration step. The algorithm used to generate the time-based key Kit must not be a reverse algorithm. It could be like the A8 algorithm used for network key generation but must contain a time based information as a pseudo-random function. As the first device knows the time, the HLR is synchronized with it and can generate the same key.
The second device 11 then comprises the electrical profile of the first device and this temporary key Kit. It then tries to authenticate itself (Authentication Request message at step 23) on the network by sending the IMSI of the first device 10 to the VLR 12. At step 24, the VLR 12 sends a command to the HLR 13 (Get data) comprising the IMSI. The HLR 13 then computes (step 25) the same key Kit that was computed at step 21 (the HLR 13 knows the Ki key associated to the IMSI, it can use the same based time algorithm to compute on its side the same Kit key as the first device 10). Based on the IMSI, the VLR can use both the signed RAND Ki and the RAND signed by Kit to authenticate the incoming connection. Note that the HLR 13 must compute the Kit only when the first authentication request is received by the VLR 12.
At step 26, the HLR 13 sends to the VLR 12 the following data:
- A random value RAND;
RAND signed by Ki;
RAND signed by Kit.
RAND is 128-bit random challenge generated by the Home Location Register 13.
A step 27, the VLR 12 sends to the second device 1 1 the random value RAND. At step 28, the second device 1 1 signs the random value RAND with Kit and sends this signed value to the VLR 12 (step 29). The VLR 12 can then check (step 30) if the RAND signed by Ki received from the HLR 13 is the same than RAND signed locally by Ki and (step 31 ), if the RAND signed by Kit received from the HLR 13 is the same than the one received from the second device 1 1.
If one of these both random checks is positive, the VLR 12 can send (step 32) an authentication OK message. Here, if check 31 is positive, the authentication message is sent to the second device 1 1 (if check 30 is positive, the authentication message is sent to the first device 10). The secondary device can now communicate with the network for a given laps of time, for example one minute. If no check is positive, authentication fails.
The invention is applicable to all over the air authentication mechanism based on an algorithm A3/A8 with shared secret keys (2G, 3G, 4G or 5G).
If the key kit is used after the allowed time range then this key will be rejected by the HLR 13 and then by the VLR 12, that means that the subscriber will not authenticate onto the network. The mechanism of the invention could be used, for example, on automotive use-cases and allow GSM modules installed in cars to be free of subscription. When the owner of the car enters in his car with its main subscription device (handset or other device he is owning), a derived subscription is generated based on the current time and transferred to the GSM module fixed inside the car using a Bluetooth, Wifi or other contactless protocol. This temporary subscription could then be used to initiate a connection to the GSM network on behalf of the car owner during a specific period of time.
The main advantage of the present invention is that a derivative subscription is used in order to authenticate subscriber to a network. Subscription is no more associated physically to a device. A single subscription could be used by several devices successively. GSM devices could be free of subscription and configured on demand by a derivative subscription.
Finally, to be clear, to authenticate a subscriber, a GSM network requires the IMSI and Ki shared key information. As we do not want to transfer the secret Ki to the secondary device, the main device has to generate the Kit key using a time based information and algorithm known by both the main device and the HLR 13. This is this couple of IMSI/Kit that will be transferred to the secondary device and used to authenticate the secondary device on the network.
The invention also concerns a HLR 13 configured to compute a time-based key based on an IMSI received from a VLR 12, the HLR 13 being configured for sending to the VLR 12 a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber.
The invention also concerns a VLR 12 configured to receive from a HLR 13 a RAND, the RAND being signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber by the HLR 13, the VLR 12 being arranged to check the RAND signed by the time-based key, and the RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber in order to authenticate the subscriber. The invention also concerns a secure element designed for cooperating with a device 10, the secure element comprising an application for generating a time-based key to be transmitted to a second device 1 1.

Claims

1. A method for transferring from a first device (10) a key to a second device (11 ) in a telecommunication network, said method comprising:
a) Generating a time-based key at said first device (10);
b) Transmitting said time-based key from said first device (10) to said second device (1 1 ); c) Authenticating said first device (10) and said second device (11 ) at the level of said telecommunication network for temporarily granting access to said telecommunication network to said second device (1 1 ).
2. A method according to claim 1 , wherein the electrical profile without the Ki of said first device (10) is transferred to said second device (1 1 ) before step a).
3. A method according to any of the claims 1 and 2, wherein said time-based key and the IMSI of said first device (10) are transmitted to said telecommunication network by said second device (1 1 ) at step c).
4. A HLR (13) configured to compute a time-based key based on an IMSI received from a VLR (12), said HLR (13) being configured for sending to said VLR (12) a RAND, said RAND being signed by said time-based key, and said RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber.
5. A VLR (12) configured to receive from a HLR (13) a RAND, said RAND being signed by said time-based key, and said RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber by said HLR (13), said VLR (12) being arranged to check said RAND signed by said time-based key, and said RAND signed by the Ki of a recognized subscriber in order to authenticate said subscriber.
6. A secure element designed for cooperating with a device, called first device (10), said secure element comprising an application for generating a time-based key to be transmitted to a second device (1 1 ).
EP19749374.5A 2018-08-13 2019-08-09 Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network Pending EP3837872A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP18306109.2A EP3611950A1 (en) 2018-08-13 2018-08-13 Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network
PCT/EP2019/071404 WO2020035404A1 (en) 2018-08-13 2019-08-09 Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3837872A1 true EP3837872A1 (en) 2021-06-23

Family

ID=63914975

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP18306109.2A Withdrawn EP3611950A1 (en) 2018-08-13 2018-08-13 Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network
EP19749374.5A Pending EP3837872A1 (en) 2018-08-13 2019-08-09 Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP18306109.2A Withdrawn EP3611950A1 (en) 2018-08-13 2018-08-13 Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network

Country Status (2)

Country Link
EP (2) EP3611950A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2020035404A1 (en)

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5991407A (en) * 1995-10-17 1999-11-23 Nokia Telecommunications Oy Subscriber authentication in a mobile communications system
US9769657B2 (en) * 2011-04-05 2017-09-19 Valid Soluciones Tecnologicas, S.A.U. Method and system for the remote provisioning of subscription
EP2530960A1 (en) * 2011-06-01 2012-12-05 Jose-Luis Martin Peinado Remote provisioning of sim's/usim's cards at run-time by a mobile operator
US9398452B1 (en) * 2015-04-24 2016-07-19 Motorola Solutions, Inc. Bootstrapping secure connections for deployable networks

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP3611950A1 (en) 2020-02-19
WO2020035404A1 (en) 2020-02-20

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN110881184B (en) Communication method and device
EP3618478B1 (en) Method and device for downloading profile in communication system
US9699820B2 (en) Establishing a device-to-device communication session
US10003965B2 (en) Subscriber profile transfer method, subscriber profile transfer system, and user equipment
KR100227301B1 (en) Method and apparatus for authentication in a communication system
RU2663972C1 (en) Security assurance at connection between communication device and network device
US20030120920A1 (en) Remote device authentication
EP1001570A2 (en) Efficient authentication with key update
US8611536B2 (en) Bootstrapping authentication using distinguished random challenges
US20160328714A1 (en) Method and apparatus for authenticating payment related information in mobile communication system
CN109121469A (en) The system and method for equipment identification and authentication
US11115195B2 (en) Authentication server of a cellular telecommunication network and corresponding UICC
WO2012126634A1 (en) Authentication in a communications system
JP2006050523A (en) Authentication vector generation apparatus, subscriber authentication module, mobile communication system, authentication vector generation method, calculation method, and subscriber authentication method
CN105813070B (en) A method and device for a vehicle-mounted terminal to communicate through a mobile terminal
KR20160143333A (en) Method for Double Certification by using Double Channel
US20140181902A1 (en) Authentication in a wireless access network
EP3611950A1 (en) Method for transferring from a first device a key to a second device in a telecommunication network
US11381969B2 (en) Method for establishing a secure wireless connection
JPH04352525A (en) Mobile communication authentification system
US20240298175A1 (en) Method to prevent hidden communication on a channel during device authentication, corresponding vplmn and hplmn
EP4380102A1 (en) A method to allow traceability of usim profile tranfer from a source device to a target device, corresponding system an remote server
KR20260051352A (en) Methods for activating sign-up and corresponding security elements
CN116847350A (en) A D2D communication method, terminal and medium

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: UNKNOWN

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE

PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20210315

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

DAV Request for validation of the european patent (deleted)
DAX Request for extension of the european patent (deleted)
RAP1 Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred)

Owner name: THALES DIS FRANCE SAS

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20250128