Classifications

• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
  • G05B9/00—Safety arrangements
  • G05B9/02—Safety arrangements electric
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
  • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
  • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
  • G06F21/554—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures involving event detection and direct action
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F04—POSITIVE - DISPLACEMENT MACHINES FOR LIQUIDS; PUMPS FOR LIQUIDS OR ELASTIC FLUIDS
  • F04D—NON-POSITIVE-DISPLACEMENT PUMPS
  • F04D15/00—Control, e.g. regulation, of pumps, pumping installations or systems
  • F04D15/0077—Safety measures
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F04—POSITIVE - DISPLACEMENT MACHINES FOR LIQUIDS; PUMPS FOR LIQUIDS OR ELASTIC FLUIDS
  • F04D—NON-POSITIVE-DISPLACEMENT PUMPS
  • F04D29/00—Details, component parts, or accessories
  • F04D29/66—Combating cavitation, whirls, noise, vibration or the like; Balancing
  • F04D29/669—Combating cavitation, whirls, noise, vibration or the like; Balancing especially adapted for liquid pumps
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
  • G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
  • G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
  • G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
  • G05B19/042—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
  • G06F8/60—Software deployment
  • G06F8/61—Installation
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
  • H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F05—INDEXING SCHEMES RELATING TO ENGINES OR PUMPS IN VARIOUS SUBCLASSES OF CLASSES F01-F04
  • F05D—INDEXING SCHEME FOR ASPECTS RELATING TO NON-POSITIVE-DISPLACEMENT MACHINES OR ENGINES, GAS-TURBINES OR JET-PROPULSION PLANTS
  • F05D2270/00—Control
  • F05D2270/70—Type of control algorithm
  • F05D2270/708—Type of control algorithm with comparison tables
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
  • G06F2221/03—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/50, monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms
  • G06F2221/033—Test or assess software

Definitions

• the present invention relates to a method and a unit for protecting a flow device from cavitation damage in a system induced by cyber attacks.
• Flowing facilities play a significant role in production facilities.
• Such flow-guiding devices are, for example, pumps or valves.
• control valves to regulate a flow such as control valves and control valves, which are preferably operated in an open / close position, to fully release a flow or the complete blocking of a flow, such as sliders, flaps or roosters.
• centrifugal pumps are based on an active principle of energy transfer to a fluid by swirl change due to a torque which is triggered by a rotating impeller to the fluid flowing through them.
• a centrifugal pump is a turbomachine. It uses the centrifugal force to demand fluid. For this reason it is also called centrifugal pump.
• the medium to be pumped enters the centrifugal pump via a suction pipe and is picked up by a rotating impeller a spiral track carried to the outside.
• the resulting impressed outwardly decreasing radial velocity of the liquid leads to an outwardly increasing pressure within the pump, which conveys the liquid into a pressure tube.
• cavitation In fluid-carrying devices, such as centrifugal pumps or valves, a phenomenon can be called, which is referred to as cavitation. Cavitation is the formation and dissolution of vapor-filled cavities (vapor bubbles) in a medium. There are two borderline cases when cavitations occur, between which there are many transitional forms. In steam cavitation (also called hard cavitation), the cavities contain mainly vapor of the surrounding liquid. Such cavities coincide under the influence of the external pressure by bubble implosion. As a result, microscopic steam shocks occur. In soft gas cavitation, gases dissolved in the liquid enter the cavities (outgassing), so that the collapse is less severe.
• cavitation occurs on the surface of solid bodies, it may lead to a so-called cavitation.
• the surface material is damaged by the high mechanical stresses. Frequently occurs during the implosion of the vapor bubbles on a so-called microjet jet, which damages the components.
• Targeting cavitation is also a tool in cyber attacks.
• Cyber attacks or attacks are targeted attacks on a specific infrastructure of important computer networks from the outside.
• Such computer networks are also increasingly used to control equipment.
• industrial control systems For measuring, controlling and regulating processes, for example for the automation of processes and for Monitoring of large systems, industrial control systems (ICS) are used in many industrial sectors. These are often used in the manufacturing industry.
• hackers attack cyber attacks in industrial plants it is often the case that power supplies are intentionally interrupted. For general attacks, the more differentiated act as a general shutdown, a more complex approach is needed. If you aim at concrete processes, you have an exact knowledge of their structure and regulation of grades. Doing damage here is a very specific procedure. All processes with fluids, however, have flowing devices of more or less standardized types, which are more identifiable and structured in terms of their width than entire processes. The deliberate elicitation of destructive cavitation phenomena in flow-carrying facilities in plants is a realistic scenario. For example, a cyber attack manipulates the position of a valve that controls a flow of fluid to a pump. This manipulation allows the static pressure to drop below the vapor pressure, causing vapor bubbles to form in the fluid.
• EP 2 279 465 B1 describes a computer-implemented method for cyber security management for an industrial control system.
• a centralized system security manager program module is provided. This can be introduced by a processing device.
• the centralized system security manager program module is integrated into an integrated command and control user interface in a monitoring, control and data acquisition unit.
• EP 2 500 579 A1 describes a method for monitoring a centrifugal pump driven by an electric motor.
• the method described in this document is based on the finding that the gas bubbles imploding during cavitation and the gas bubble shock moments compressed on the blades of the impeller cause vibrations which are detectable in the drive as torque pulses. Since the power consumption and the load current of the electric motor are decisive for the formation of torque, their values can be advantageously determined and evaluated for the purpose of detecting such pulses. Since values of the power consumption or of the load current are usually present in engine control systems anyway, no additional sensor system is required for monitoring the centrifugal pump.
• EP 2 433 010 B1 describes a method and a device for determining the operating point of a work machine. A power absorbed by the working machine or its delivery rate characterize an operating point. In the method, operating point-dependent measured variables of the working machine are detected by sensors. The measured values are stored and evaluated during operation.
• the object of the invention is to provide a method and a device, can be effectively prevented by the cyber attacks on flow-leading facilities, such as pumps o- valves.
• the components used in the system should be reliably protected, so that would be prevented.
• the method and the device should also be easy to implement in the system, so that a device or a retrofit is connected with the lowest possible cost for the manufacturer and operator.
• This object is achieved by a method having the features of claim 1 and a unit having the features of claim 10. Preferred variants are described in the subclaims, the description and the drawings.
• at least one first signal in the system, in which the flow-conducting device is located is first detected, wherein the first signal relates to an operating state of the system.
• the detection is done by means of at least one sensor.
• the first signal is forwarded to a unit or detected by a unit and evaluated there.
• setpoints and actual variables are compared with each other or the at least one first signal is compared with at least one reference value. If the unit determines on the basis of the evaluation that a willfully induced operation of the system is present, ie whether a cyber attack to induce cavitation has taken place or is taking place, the unit responds by emitting a second signal.
• the system In response to the second signal, the system is brought by appropriate control of one or more components of the system again in a rule compliant state in which the flow-leading device is protected from cavitation damage and the cyber attack is effectively fended off.
• the installation or the flow-guiding device in response to the second signal, is brought into a state in which it is protected from the current and / or further cyber attacks, ie a deliberate movement of the installation into an inappropriate operation is excluded from this protected state.
• the flow-guiding device or the entire system and / or the unit can then also be disconnected, for example, from the network via which the cyber attack has taken place, so that no further cyber attack is possible any more.
• the method according to the invention is both suitable for warding off cyber attacks on a central network which is connected to the installation and also for warding off cyber attacks on individual components of the installation.
• a maliciously induced abnormal operation of the system is determined in the evaluation by the unit when the course or certain characteristics (such as amplitude, frequency content, etc.) of the at least one first signal compared to the at least one reference value significantly different, that is, when predetermined limit values are exceeded or fallen below, or when the time profile of the at least first signal has certain properties or patterns.
• Fulfillment of these criteria indicates that there is no normal operation of the installation or that any anomalies of the first signal were not accidental or caused by a technical fault but that a targeted intervention in the operation of the plant takes place or has taken place, with the aim of causing the flow-leading device damaging cavitation.
• one or more operating states of the flow-guiding device or the system are detected by the at least one sensor.
• the operating states can be, for example, (heat) radiation, vibrations, acoustic emissions, leakages, pressures, flow velocities or temperatures. These operating states are analyzed by the unit and evaluated for the existence of signatures which indicate a cyberattack.
• an iterative method can be used in which individual steps or step sequences or the entire method are repeated once or several times.
• the analysis or evaluation of the first signal by the unit may pay particular attention to minor permanently acting, short-term intensive, swelling or structured anomalies which occur during normal operation (control operation). not occur.
• control operation control operation
• an existing unadulterated load collective characterized by an operating point-dependent standard signal behavior, can be identified and stored as a reference.
• cyber attack hereby refers to any outside willful imposition of an illegal operation.
• the unit is a decentralized control and / or regulating device.
• the unit may be mounted directly on or in the respective flow-guiding device, that is, for example, directly to the valve to be protected or the pump to be protected.
• This decentralized unit makes it possible to protect against cyberattacks even if the entire process control system is already infected by the cyber or hacker attack.
• the independent decentralized unit can detect unfavorable operating conditions that lead to the occurrence of cavitations and thus detect a hacker attack.
• this decentralized unit can advantageously decouple the respective flow-leading device from the network / computer network or the process control system until the hacker attack is averted.
• the unit can be a monitoring unit that is completely independent of process control systems or a network.
• the unit is mounted directly on the flow-guiding device and connected only to sensors or components of the drive unit of the flow-guiding device.
• the unit can unfavorable operating conditions that can lead to cavitation and indicate cyber attack, detect and take appropriate countermeasures independently.
• a cyberattack can then have the goal, through targeted manipulation of certain components of the system, For example, a valve in the inflow line of the flow-guiding device to bring about a cavitation in the system, which nevertheless damages the flow-guiding device, which is not at all connected to the actual computer network.
• the unit which itself is connected to the computer network, independently to separate the relevant components of the system or the entire system and possibly even from the compromised computer network and to control the various components of the system that this again in a rule-compliant operation is transferred, in which no cavitation occurs.
• the unit is set up such that it is dominant in the command structure compared to the process control system or the network with which the entire system is networked. If the unit detects a cyber attack, it completely disconnects the flow-guiding device or the system and / or itself from the process control system or the network and thus protects it or itself against further attacks.
• visual and / or audible alarm messages can be issued, so that the operator is informed of the detected cyberattack.
• the unit has a data memory.
• the data memory is used for detecting and storing technological data of the system, in particular the flow-guiding device and / or a drive in communication with the flow-guiding device.
• In data storage can also be deposited vapor pressure conditions of the medium, which flows through the flow-guiding device.
• the unit has at least one connection for a sensor.
• a sensor In particular, optical sensors, acoustic sensors (eg ultrasonic sensors), pressure, flow or temperature sensors are suitable for detecting cyber attacks which are intended to lead to cavitation.
• Pressure sensors for detecting static pressures are also able to detect dynamic pressure fluctuations.
• Such pressure sensors are standardly attached to many pumps, especially to detect their final pressure.
• the at least one first signal can therefore also relate to pressure fluctuations within the system, in particular in an inflow line and / or outflow line of the flow-guiding device.
• the unit has a monitoring module.
• the monitoring module can have an evaluation unit.
• the evaluation unit in turn can be connected to a data memory.
• the monitoring module can comprise an input or an output unit.
• the monitoring module is connected to a motor module.
• the monitoring module and the motor module can be decentrally completely detached from a process control system or a network or, in an alternative variant, can also be part of a process control system.
• an engine control unit is connected to a motor module, the evaluation unit of the monitoring module and to an electric motor.
• the electric motor can serve as a drive for the flow-guiding device.
• the unit can, for example, change the flow in a feed line to the flow-guiding device after detection of a cyber attack, so that cavitation phenomena are effectively avoided.
• a valve position can be avoided that the static pressure drops below the vapor pressure and form vapor bubbles, which can then implode and cause corresponding damage by the formation of a microjet jet.
• Occurring cavitation at a slightly reduced suction pressure of a designed as a pump flow-guiding device can be prevented while maintaining the functionality at a lower speed of a pump driving the drive.
• the pressure and / or the flow rate and / or the temperature of the medium flowing through the flow-guiding device can be detected before and / or after the flow-carrying device as a first signal relating to an operating state of the system.
• the inlet pressure to the flow-guiding device is detected.
• pressure fluctuations can also be detected by means of sensors which are mounted before, after and / or in the flow-guiding device. By analyzing the pressure fluctuations, an occurrence of cavitation by a possible cyber attack can also be detected.
• the flow can also be changed on the pressure side of the flow-guiding device. This can also be effected by changing a valve position via a corresponding control by the unit.
• FIG. 1 shows an arrangement with a flow-guiding device designed as a centrifugal pump
• FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of a unit of the flow-guiding device.
• FIG. 1 shows an arrangement 1 in which a flow-guiding device 2 designed as a centrifugal pump is shown.
• the designed as a centrifugal pump flow guiding device 2 is connected via a shaft 3 to a drive 4.
• the drive 4 is designed in the embodiment as an asynchronous motor, which drives the flow-guiding device 2.
• the asynchronous motor 4 is fed by a mains supply line 5.
• a sensor 7 for measuring the pressure-side pressure or discharge pressure of the centrifugal pump is arranged.
• the sensor 7 is connected via a line 8 to a unit 9.
• the unit 9 evaluates measuring signals of the sensor 7 and can thereby analyze critical operating states which lead to the occurrence of cavitation and suggest a cyber attack.
• Unit 9 uses the method according to the invention for this purpose.
• parameters of the drive 4 can also be used, such as the nominal power and / or the rotational speed. From these parameters, other parameters can be derived or calculated.
• the unit 9 has for the detection of the signal or the signals of the sensor 7 suitable terminals 10.
• the terminals 10 are executed in the exemplary embodiment as signal inputs.
• the unit 9 has a signal processing module 1 1.
• the signal processing module 1 1 may, for example, also be able to determine a rotary sound frequency with a relatively high accuracy.
• the running in the unit 9 process is controlled and coordinated by a computing block 12. Furthermore, the unit 9 has a display and control element 13. A further pressure sensor connection, not shown here, can be provided on the arrangement, which serves, for example, for detecting the pump suction pressure. In addition, the arrangement further, not shown here, signal inputs and / or a serial bus interface or for reading or reading parameters, have. 2 shows a block diagram and shows a unit 9 for controlling and / or regulating a flow-guiding device 2.
• the unit 9 has in the representation of Figure 2 via an evaluation module 14, a memory connected to the 14 Ausyesbau- stone 15 and a also connected to the evaluation module 14 input / output unit 16.
• the unit 9 is connected to a motor module 17.
• the unit 9 and the engine block 17 may be part of a process control system 18, but need not.
• An engine control unit 19 is connected to the engine block 17, the unit 9 and to a drive 4. Optionally, the engine control unit 19 is connected directly to the flow-guiding device 2.
• the drive 4 drives the flow-guiding device 2 designed as a centrifugal pump.
• the flow-guiding device 2 is supplied with liquid conveying medium via a feed line 20 and pumps out the conveying medium via a discharge line 21.
• the traffic between these components is indicated by arrows.

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
• Software Systems (AREA)
• Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
• Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
• Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
• Computing Systems (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Control Of Non-Positive-Displacement Pumps (AREA)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Publications (1)

Family

ID=63209382

Family Applications (1)

Country Status (5)

Family Cites Families (17)

• 2017
  • 2017-08-15 DE DE102017214203.0A patent/DE102017214203A1/de not_active Withdrawn
• 2018
  • 2018-08-01 CN CN201880053003.8A patent/CN111065827B/zh active Active
  • 2018-08-01 EP EP18755413.4A patent/EP3669082A2/fr not_active Withdrawn
  • 2018-08-01 WO PCT/EP2018/070846 patent/WO2019034426A2/fr unknown
  • 2018-08-01 US US16/639,176 patent/US11475129B2/en active Active

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