EP2482025B1 - Method and device for defending against an attacking missile - Google Patents

Description

The invention relates to a method for repelling a missile by means of defense radiation. In addition, the invention relates to a device for repelling a missile by means of defense radiation.

To defend vehicles in armed conflicts are from the WO 2008/062401 A1 Active defense systems for vehicles against attacking missiles known. The defense systems are mounted on the vehicles and comprise a straightening device for aligning and emitting laser beams on the attacking missile. The topic also deals with the topic US 2004/118270 A1 ,

It is an object of the present invention to provide a method and apparatus for averting an attacking missile with which a vehicle can be effectively defended.

This object is achieved by the method according to claim 1 and by the device according to claim 10. In this way, the defense strategy can be matched to such a missile element of the attacking missile that is accessible to the defense radiation and / or to which the missile is particularly vulnerable. Advantageous embodiments of the invention are indicated in the dependent claims.

The invention is based on the consideration that it is crucial in the defense of the attacking missile to deposit as much radiant energy in selected, function-sensitive missile elements of the missile for their safe damage. Such missile elements can the Seeker head, a warhead, the rocket motor, electronics and / or be important for aerodynamic stability guiding elements. It is therefore important to hit the selected missile element at a proper angle of radiation to damage it. If the selected missile element is a seeker head, then one will want to hit the missile as possible from the front in order to hit and damage the detector within the limits of the visual field of the missile. If the selected missile element is a warhead lying behind a seeker head, it will be wanted to hit it from the side where it is least likely to penetrate. If the beam strikes non-optical structures, it is advantageous that it impinges as perpendicularly as possible in order to deposit as much radiant energy as possible in the element hit.

According to the invention, the recognition of the attacking missile as such happens by the fact that the missile is first recognized as a missile and then recognized whether it is classified as attacking. The classification may be according to one or more predetermined parameters used for classification, such as a distance of an anticipated trajectory of the missile to a defense system, to a predetermined point, to a protected area around a vehicle or to another object or to another spatial one Range, in particular a minimum distance.

The method for averting an attacking missile is expediently carried out by a defense system on a vehicle. Such a defense vehicle can be a land, air or sea vehicle. It expediently includes a defense system for warding off the attacking missile, which is in particular a distance-effective defense system. The defense system can automatically respond to the clearance, for example, as soon as it falls below a specified level and / or the missile is likely to enter a protected area. The specified value may be determined by one or more parameters that are predetermined and / or situational.

To create the defense strategy, it can be selected from a plurality of predetermined defense strategies. It is also possible to calculate the defense strategy from a number of parameters and thus to rebuild it. It is also advantageous to select parts of the defense strategy from existing strategies and to use these based on predetermined parameters, eg. B. using Enlightenment results, to modify or expand and thus form the entire defense strategy. All of these options for establishing the defense strategy take into account the angle of irradiation, which can be an angle between an irradiation direction and a direction of flight of the missile. Here, the irradiation direction and the flight direction may be instantaneous or assumed future quantities at a future time, so that the irradiation angle may also be a current or assumed future angle. The irradiation angle is an angle between 0 ° and 180 °, with the missile at 0 ° exactly incident on the radiation source and at 180 ° away from it.

The defense radiation is expediently laser radiation, wherein the frequency or the frequency range of the laser radiation can be any suitable frequency or any suitable frequency range. Also suitable and advantageous is microwave radiation, although other electromagnetic radiation is possible.

In an advantageous embodiment of the invention, the type of missile is determined and used in the preparation of the defense strategy. Since the existence, arrangement and sensitivity of missile elements may differ from missile to missile, it is advantageous to know the type of attacking missile so that the defense strategy may be determined by consideration of the species. The species may be a missile type or a missile class comprising several types of missiles. The missile is expediently an unmanned missile, in particular a missile missile with a warhead provided for detonation, such as an air-to-surface missile, a ground-to-surface missile, or a steerable artillery missile.

Expediently, a type-dependent vulnerability property of the missile is deposited in the defense system as a function of different irradiation angles and, in particular, irradiation energies. The deposit can take place in the form of several or a multi-dimensional table in which, for example, a control success depending on several parameters is deposited. The parameters may be type of missile, irradiation angle, irradiation energy, distance of the missile from the defense system and / or the irradiation time.

In the event that the determination of the type of missile fails, it is advantageous if a replacement strategy is followed. This may involve making an assumption about the type of missile based on at least one predetermined parameter. A suitable parameter is the airspeed of the missile. From this it can usually be distinguished whether the attacking missile is a bazooka, an artillery shell or a missile.

According to the invention, the defense strategy specifies a missile element to be irradiated, which was selected in the preparation of the defense strategy as a function of the irradiation angle. Equivalent to this is the selection of a storage point on the missile, for example in the form of coordinates. If the irradiation angle is very acute or very small, it is expedient to select a forwardly located missile element, for example the seeker head, as the missile element to be irradiated when creating the defense strategy. However, if the irradiation angle is large, for example, greater than 45 °, so that the missile can be irradiated from the side, it is expedient to select a laterally accessible missile element, for example a warhead, a rocket motor or a guide element.

It is also advantageous if an irradiation angle or radiation angle range is selected as a function of a missile element to be irradiated. For example, if a laterally accessible missile element is provided for irradiation, the irradiation of this missile element can be postponed until a favorable irradiation angle is reached. The time until then can be used to irradiate another missile element. In the presence of more than one straightening device for blasting, that straightening device can be selected whose irradiation angle is more favorable for the irradiation of the selected missile element, so that in this way the irradiation angle is selected.

Advantageously, a future trajectory of the missile is determined and taken into account in the determination of the defense strategy. This can be a Irradiation angle can be determined as a function of time, so that, for example, to be irradiated missile elements can be selected depending on each of an irradiation angle or irradiation angle range. The particular trajectory may range from the missile to a point of impact, or may include only part of that distance.

Advantageously, the defense strategy provides that a plurality of flying body elements are irradiated in succession, the sequence and duration of the irradiation being set as a function of the temporal course of the irradiation angle. In this way, an available radiant energy can be used effectively.

The invention is particularly advantageous applicable if at least two straightening devices are available for emitting radiation. Since the straightening devices are usually in a mutually different irradiation angle to the attacking missile, the defense strategy expediently includes different sub-strategies for each straightening device.

Thus, the defense strategy can specify a missile element to be irradiated and at least one of the straightening devices can be selected as a function of its irradiation angle taking into account the missile element. Conversely, it is expedient to make the selection of the missile element to be irradiated dependent on the available irradiation angles.

The defense strategy may provide for irradiating a spot on the missile by a selected directional device. Additionally or alternatively, it is possible that the defense strategy indicates a simultaneous irradiation of different points with a plurality of straightening devices, optionally with different intensities, and / or provides an irradiation sequence with one or more straightening devices over different points of the missile.

Thus, for example, a weaker defense beam from a first aiming device can briefly aim at the seeker head and a stronger jet from a second aiming device can attack the warhead. If both defense beams are fed from the same energy source, after switching off the first beam, the energy of the second defense beam is increased accordingly. The dosage of the first jet is expediently chosen so that the irradiated missile element, in this example the seeker, is destroyed with high probability. Since the Missile but also without a functioning seeker depending on the encounter situation can still hit his target, the warhead is attacked for safety's sake.

The plurality of straightening devices may be disposed on a vehicle, for example, on opposite sides of an armored land vehicle. However, it is advantageous if the multiple straightening devices are mounted on several vehicles. In this way, a large distance between the straightening devices can be achieved and a wide range of irradiation angles can be made possible. It can be developed as a variant-rich defense strategy. For this purpose, the straightening devices are arranged on at least two signal-technically interconnected vehicles, wherein one vehicle informs the other at least details of the defense strategy. The defense strategy can be developed only partially in total on one vehicle, on several vehicles or on several vehicles, so that the combination of defense strategy parts creates an overall defense strategy. In general, the defense strategy for each vehicle may include its own strategy part assigned to the vehicle.

When determining the defense strategy, advantageously available irradiation powers of the straightening devices are taken into account. The irradiation powers can be available irradiation powers, for example maximum powers of the straightening devices, or temporarily adjusted irradiation powers, for example when an irradiation power is distributed from a laser source to several straightening devices.

A further advantageous embodiment of the invention provides that the two vehicles each have a detection means, the detection means are networked with each other and detection data of the detection means for detecting the missile are fused. Several detection means can form a detection system by which an attacking missile is simultaneously observed from several directions, for example. The data fusion facilitates detection of the missile, for example its type. Data fusion can be accomplished by processing recognition data from multiple recognition means together to produce a recognition result.

In particular, it is advantageous if a defense strategy is determined from the type of missile, its prospective trajectory, the coordinates of the available directional devices and the available radiant energy devices. In general, the creation or calculation of the defense strategy can be based on a weighted table of radiation-sensitive parts and / or associated optimal irradiation locations and / or angles.

A defense system on a vehicle may include a directional device and a detection device for detecting the missile. However, it is also possible if a defense system operates without detection means and the detection means is arranged separately, for. B. on another vehicle. Are the defense system and the detection means arranged on different units, eg. B. on different vehicles, so for example, a recognition already take place when a missile for a defense vehicle is not or not yet visible, so that a not or not yet visible attack can be fended off early.

The object directed to the device is achieved by a device of the aforementioned type, in which the process agent according to the invention is prepared to create the defense strategy as a function of an irradiation angle between the direction of irradiation and the direction of flight of the missile. Defense radiation can be used energy-efficiently and effectively defend a vehicle. The process means is prepared for controlling one, several or all of the method steps described hitherto and in the drawing description. Such a preparation may be provided by a corresponding control program of the process means, the sequence of which - such as in conjunction with suitable input signals, such as sensor signals - causes such a control. For this purpose, the process means expediently comprises electronic elements, such as a processor and data memory, which are necessary for the execution of the control program.

Further advantages emerge from the following description of the drawing. In the drawings, embodiments of the invention are shown. The drawing and the description contain numerous features in combination, which the skilled person expediently consider individually and will summarize meaningful further combinations.

Fig. 1

eine Gruppe von Fahrzeugen, die drei Verteidigungsfahrzeuge umfasst, in einer Kolonnenfahrt und

Fig. 2

eine schematische Darstellung eines Verteidigungssystems in einem Verteidigungsfahrzeug.

Show it:

Fig. 1

a group of vehicles, comprising three defense vehicles, in a convoy and

Fig. 2

a schematic representation of a defense system in a defense vehicle.

Fig. 1 shows a group of four vehicles 2, 4, 6, 8 in a convoy, of which vehicle 2 is a car, vehicle 4 is a transport tank, vehicle 6 is a person transporting flatbed truck and vehicle 8 is a main battle tank. The vehicles 4, 6, 8 are designed as defense vehicles and each comprise at least one defense system 10 and a recognition means 12. The defense systems 10 serve both to defend the respective vehicle 4, 6, 8 and to mutually defend the vehicles 4, 6, 8 For this purpose, each defense system 10 cooperates with at least one detection means 12, which is prepared on the basis of predetermined criteria to first recognize an approaching missile 14 as such and further to recognize whether the Missile 14 is classified as attacking. For this purpose, the defense vehicles 4, 6, 8 include one or more processing means 16, 18, as they are, for example, in Fig. 2 are indicated.

Fig. 2 shows, for example, the defense vehicle 8 in a highly simplified and schematic representation. It contains a device for repelling an attacking missile 14, briefly referred to as a defense system 10, which comprises two alignment devices 20 for directing a laser beam into the environment, a laser source 22 and the processing means 16. In addition, the defense vehicle 8 includes the detection means 12 with two cameras 26, each protected by a dome and connected to the processing means 18. The defense system 10 may also include the detection means 12. Likewise, both process means 16, 18 may be referred to as common process means, which may in particular be a central processing means of the defense vehicle 8 or a part thereof. The two processing means 16, 18, as well as the cameras 26, optionally a Ansteueraktorik the straightening devices 20 and a data interface 28 are interconnected by data lines, such as a bus system, such as a CAN-BUS system.

To ward off an attack of the missile 14, the space around the vehicles 4, 6, 8 is monitored by their detection means 12. Here, the detection means 12 comprise means for detecting different missiles, for example an image processing program which evaluates image data from the cameras 26 and detects a missile 14 as such. In addition, the detection means 12 include means for detecting the type of the missile 14 and means for calculating the future trajectory 30 up to a possible impact of the missile 14. The means for detecting the type of missile 14 include a database with a variety of missile features, on the basis of which the nature of the missile 14 can be detected by image processing. In this case, the missile features include optical features taking into account an observation angle, ie the angle between the line of sight from the detection means 12 to the missile 14 and its flight direction, which is characterized by its trajectory 30. In addition, the missile features include data on speeds and maneuvering characteristics of different missiles.

If a missile 14 is recognized as such, it is decided whether it is harmless or potentially dangerous. This decision, as well as further decisions, can be taken jointly by each recognition means 12 individually or by the combination of several or all recognition means 12, for example by a leading recognition means 12 or processing means 18. The discrimination of harmless and potentially dangerous missiles 14 takes place via a speed threshold in which a missile 14 whose speed is below the speed threshold is classified as harmless. The speed threshold is suitably above 100 km / h to exclude at least most bird flights. If the missile 14 is identified as being potentially dangerous, the probable flight path 30 is next calculated and decided whether it is likely to reach at least one guard 32 around a vehicle 2, 4, 6, 8 protected by the defensive vehicles 4, 6, 8 is. For this purpose, each vehicle 2, 4, 6, 8 is provided with at least one protective area 32 whose size depends on the type of vehicle 2, 4, 6, 8, the load, such as the people on the bed of the vehicle 6, after Type of the detected missile 14, terrain features and further can judge. These parameters, which determine the size of the protection area 32, can be predetermined or time-variable. As a rule, the protected area will be hemispherical above the corresponding vehicle 2, 4, 6, 8.

If the calculated trajectory 30 is within a protected area, it is next checked to see which missile 14 it is, so it is the nature of the missile, in particular determines its type. Both for calculating the trajectory 30 and the type of the missile 14, the four detection means 12 of the vehicle convoy are networked together, for example by data interfaces 28. The detection means 12 operate autonomously, however, exchange their detection data with each other. In this case, a detection means 12 or its process means 18 can be determined as leading the decision, for example, the decision as to whether an approaching object is a missile 14, what type of missile 14 is and / or if the missile 14 at least one of the vehicles 2, 4 , 6, 8 of the group to be protected is likely to be dangerous, ie penetrates into its protected area 32.

Based Fig. 1 a possible concrete combat situation of the missile 14 is described. The missile 14 is approaching the group of vehicles 2, 4, 6, 8 and is shown for better depictability rather close to this, where he also occupy more distant positions to the group and there recognized and can also be fought. When approaching the missile 14 this is detected by the detection means 12 of the vehicles 4, 6. The two detection means 12 of the main battle tank 8 do not recognize the missile 14, as it is shadowed by the truck 6 so that it is not visible to the rear detection means 12 of the main battle tank 8 and with respect to the front detection means 12 behind the tower of the main battle tank is lying and therefore also not visible.

In the exemplary embodiment shown, the missile 14 is recognized, for example, first by the detection means 12 of the vehicle 4. This transmits the recognition data to the two further defense vehicles 6, 8, so that their detection means 12 also search for the missile 14 in the indicated position. Then the missile 14 is also recognized by the detection means 12 of the vehicle 6 as such. The recognition data of the plurality of recognition means 12 are fused to recognize the missile 14 or its type. The detection means 12 thus form a networked total sensor system which determines the current position, the current speed and at least part of the future trajectory 30 of the attacking missile 14.

The next step is now a detection of the type of missile 14. Both detection means 12 process this task independently, but exchange Recognition data with each other, so that a detection is simplified. Here, it is first recognized that the detection angle of the detection means 12 of the vehicle 4 is duller than the detection angle of the detection means 12 of the vehicle 6. The detection angle is the angle between the observation direction, which in Fig. 1 is indicated by dotted lines, with the determined flight direction on the trajectory 30 of the missile 14. Since it is generally easier to recognize the type of the missile 14 with blunt detection means, the recognition means 12 of the vehicle 4 is assigned decision-making power, the type of missile Missile 14 to decide. Therefore, in the case of a plurality of recognition means 12, the decision-making competence for recognition as a function of the recognition angle is allocated to a recognition means 12. The detection means 12 of the defense vehicle 4 is of course supported by detection data of the detection means 12 of the other vehicle, in this case the truck 6.

If the nature of the missile can not be determined up to a predetermined time interval, which results from the velocity of the missile 14 and the prospective flight path 30 until penetration into a protective area 32 or impact point, an assumption about the type of missile is made 14 made. The assumption may be a fixed default or a default that depends on the velocity of the missile 14.

If the type of the missile 14 is detected, the protective areas 32 around the vehicles 2, 4, 6, 8 can be adapted in size and shape to the missile 14 and it is checked again whether its prospective flight path 30 touches a protective area 32. If this is the case, - provided that automatic missile defense is set in the defense systems 10 - the combat of the missile 14 is automatically initiated.

If the defense decision is made positively, a corresponding signal is sent to the defense systems 10 of the defense vehicles 4, 6, 8. However, since the defense systems 10 of the defense vehicle 8 have no view of the missile 14, these defense systems are switched to a stand-by mode, which allows an immediate combat recording. Here, the straightening devices 20 are aligned to a predetermined location, expediently to the location where the missile 14 emerges behind the obstacle, in this case behind the vehicle. 6

To combat the missile 14, the two defense systems 10 of the vehicles 4, 6 are available in this embodiment initially. Their control directions are in Fig. 1 indicated by narrow dashed lines. In the embodiment shown, the angle of attack of the defense system 10 of the defense vehicle 4 is greater than the control angle of the defense system 10 of the vehicle 6 and this embodiment is around 70 °. In accordance with the different angles of attack, a defense strategy is developed which takes into account these different angles of attack and, in particular, their course over time or their change with the movement of the missile 14 relative to the vehicles 4, 6.

The determination of the defense strategy is in this case carried out by the processing means 16 of the defense system 10, wherein each defense system 10 can work autonomously and work out its own defense strategy. Conveniently, a defense system 10 takes over the lead and determines a defense strategy, which informs the other defense systems 10 in whole or in part. In this case, the processing means 16 are networked in such a way that defense data are fused and processed into a common defense strategy. The two defense systems 10 of the defense vehicle 8 which are located very close to one another also receive different partial strategies, since their control angles to the missile 14, in particular in the final phase of the flight of the missile 14, also differ sufficiently to justify a separate partial strategy. This is especially true in a slow-flying missile, such as an approaching bazooka.

1. 1. Typ des Flugkörpers 14, beinhaltend dessen angreifbaren Flugkörperelemente, wie Suchkopf, Gefechtskopf, Raketenmotor, Elektronik und aerodynamisch wichtige Leitelemente,
2. 2. Geschwindigkeit des Flugkörpers 14,
3. 3. Flugbahn 30 des Flugkörpers 14 oder äquivalente Daten
4. 4. Koordinaten der Verteidigungssysteme 10 der Fahrzeuge 4, 6, 8 und Koordinaten des Flugkörpers 14,
5. 5. Bestrahlungswinkel der Verteidigungssysteme 4, 6, 8 als Funktion der Zeit oder äquivalent dazu die Relativkoordinaten des Flugkörpers 14 relativ zu den Verteidigungssystemen 10,
6. 6. Größe und Lage der Schutzbereiche 32, um beispielsweise eine Detonation in der Nähe der ungeschützten Personen auf der Pritsche des LKWs 6 zu vermeiden.

The defense strategy is determined as a function of one or more, expediently as a function of all the following parameters:

1. 1. Type of missile 14, including its vulnerable missile elements, such as seeker head, warhead, rocket motor, electronics and aerodynamically important vanes,
2. 2. Speed of the missile 14,
3. 3. trajectory 30 of the missile 14 or equivalent data
4. 4. coordinates of the defense systems 10 of the vehicles 4, 6, 8 and coordinates of the missile 14,
5. 5. irradiation angle of the defense systems 4, 6, 8 as a function of time or, equivalently, the relative coordinates of the missile 14 relative to the defense systems 10,
6. 6. Size and location of the protection areas 32, for example, to avoid a detonation near the unprotected persons on the bed of the truck 6.

1. 1. Bestrahlungszielpunkte des Flugkörpers 14, z. B. in Form von zu bestrahlenden Flugkörperelementen oder als Koordinaten,
2. 2. für jedes Verteidigungssystem 10 eine Teilstrategie, umfassend zumindest einen Bestrahlungszielpunkt in Abhängigkeit der Zeit bzw. Relativkoordinaten des Flugkörpers 14 zu den Verteidigungssystemen 10,
3. 3. eine Berechnung der Ausrichtungsrichtungen der Richtvorrichtungen 20 auf den Flugkörper 14,
4. 4. Dauer und Stärke von Bestrahlungen durch das entsprechende Verteidigungssystem 10 bzw. dessen Richtvorrichtungen 20.

The defense strategy includes:

1. 1. irradiation target points of the missile 14, z. In the form of missile elements to be irradiated or as coordinates,
2. 2. For each defense system 10, a partial strategy comprising at least one irradiation target point as a function of the time or relative coordinates of the missile 14 to the defense systems 10,
3. 3. a calculation of the alignment directions of the straightening devices 20 on the missile 14,
4. 4. Duration and intensity of irradiation by the corresponding defense system 10 or its straightening devices 20.

In this case, it is possible for a defense system 10 to illuminate only one irradiation target point during the entire combat, for example a warhead of the missile 14, or to illuminate sequentially different missile elements in order to optimally utilize different irradiation angles. Here, the irradiation obstacles, in this example, the vehicle 6 and the tower of the main battle tank 8, are taken into account, so that a fight against the two defense systems 10 of the main battle tank 10 is taken only when the missile 14 penetrates into the field of view of the defense systems 10, as shown by the dashed Line from the defense system 10 of the vehicle 8 to the flight path 30 in Fig. 1 is indicated.

According to the defense strategy, the straightening devices 20 are aligned with the predetermined target point on the missile 14 and laser energy is applied to the straightening devices 20, in accordance with the defense strategy. In the defense systems 10 of the vehicles 4, 6, in which only one straightening device per laser source 24 is present, the maximum energy can be switched. Are several straightening devices 20 for a laser source 24 available, as shown in Fig. 2 is shown by way of example, the energy of the laser source 24 according to the Defense strategy can be given to a straightening device 20 alone or both with distributed energy. In accordance with the defense strategy, the irradiation of the missile 14 is recorded and, if necessary, changed at predetermined times, and the missile 14 is thus repelled.

During the combat of the missile 14 takes place a continuous recalculation of the probable trajectory 30 of the missile 14 and its target point. Accordingly, the orientation of the straightening devices 20 is continuously recalculated and the straightening devices 20 are aligned accordingly. In addition, an update of the defense strategy takes place in accordance with occurring events, such as turning off, spinning or falling of the missile 14, its detonation or its disappearance behind obstructions or the like.

LIST OF REFERENCE NUMBERS

2

vehicle

4

vehicle

6

vehicle

8th

vehicle

10

defense system

12

recognition means

14

missile

16

process means

18

process means

20

straightener

22

laser source

26

camera

28

Data Interface

30

trajectory

32

the scope

Claims (10)

1. Method for defence against a missile (14) by means of defensive radiation, in which the missile (14) is identified as such and it is then identified whether the missile (14) is to be classified as attacking, and in which a defensive strategy is produced and defensive radiation is directed at the missile (14) in accordance with the defensive strategy, wherein the defensive strategy is produced as a function of an irradiation angle between the irradiation direction and the direction of flight of the missile (14), in order, during defence against the missile (14), to deposit as much radiation energy as possible in selected, functionally sensitive missile elements of the missile (14) in order to reliably damage them, and wherein the defensive strategy indicates a missile element to be irradiated, which was selected as a function of the irradiation angle during the production of the defensive strategy.
2. Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that the type of missile (14) is determined and is taken into account in the production of the defensive strategy.
3. Method according to Claim 2, characterized in that, if the type of missile (14) is not determined, an assumption is made about the type of missile (14) from the speed of flight of the missile (14).
4. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that a future flight path (30) of the missile (14) is determined, and is taken into account when determining the defensive strategy.
5. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the defensive strategy provides for a plurality of missile elements to be irradiated successively, and for the sequence and time duration of the irradiation to be a function of the time profile of the irradiation angle.
6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that at least two aiming apparatuses (20) for emission of defensive radiation and their irradiation angles are taken into account in the defensive strategy.
7. Method according to Claim 6, characterized in that the defensive strategy indicates a missile element to be irradiated, and at least one of the aiming apparatuses (20) is selected as a function of its irradiation angle, taking account of the missile element.
8. Method according to Claim 6 or 7, characterized in that the two aiming apparatuses (20) are arranged on two vehicles (4, 6, 8) which are networked with one another for signalling purposes, and one vehicle (4, 6, 8) signals at least details of the defensive strategy to the other.
9. Method according to one of Claims 6 to 8, characterized in that the two vehicles (4, 6, 8) each have an identification means (12), the identification means (12) are networked with one another, and identification data from the identification means is fused in order to identify the missile (14).
10. Apparatus for defence against a missile (14) by means of defensive radiation, which apparatus comprises at least one identification means (12) having means for identifying different missiles in order to identify the missile as such, wherein the identification means (12) is prepared to decide whether the identified missile (14) is potentially dangerous, and which apparatus has at least one aiming apparatus (20) for aiming at, and for emission of the defensive radiation to, the attacking missile (14), and has a process means (16) which is prepared to determine a defensive strategy, wherein the process means (16) is prepared to produce the defensive strategy as a function of an irradiation angle between the irradiation direction and the direction of flight of the missile (14), in order, during defence against the missile (14), to deposit as much radiation energy as possible in selected, functionally sensitive missile elements of the missile (14) in order to reliably damage them, and the defensive strategy indicates a missile element to be irradiated, which was selected as a function of the irradiation angle during the production of the defensive strategy.

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