EP1329052A1 - Validation of transactions - Google Patents
Validation of transactionsInfo
- Publication number
- EP1329052A1 EP1329052A1 EP01959969A EP01959969A EP1329052A1 EP 1329052 A1 EP1329052 A1 EP 1329052A1 EP 01959969 A EP01959969 A EP 01959969A EP 01959969 A EP01959969 A EP 01959969A EP 1329052 A1 EP1329052 A1 EP 1329052A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- key
- series
- user
- server
- elements
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/36—User authentication by graphic or iconic representation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/388—Payment protocols; Details thereof using mutual authentication without cards, e.g. challenge-response
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
Definitions
- the invention relates to a process of validation for transactions between a user terminal and a server of the type involving: "Request, Challenge, Response, Verification and Approval". In other aspects it also relates to a computer network, server or terminal for performing the method, as well as a physical key.
- the invention is a method of validation for transactions between a user terminal and a server, including the steps of:
- Providing a code word made up of a first series of elements to a user Providing a key to the user to use to scramble the code word. Holding the code word and key securely at the server.
- Inviting the user to enter a scrambled version of the code word by selecting the elements of the first series in order from the second series and for each element selected making an entry at the terminal in dependence on the key to create a series of entries. And Using the series of entries to validate the transaction.
- the communication may take the form of a User ID entered at the terminal, and the code word may be a PIN.
- the second series of elements may be a random series of elements.
- the elements of the sequence may simply be the ten digits 0 to 9. However, any combination of characters, symbols, digits or graphic elements can be used.
- the key may include a physical body bearing visible indicia connecting pairs of points each of which is located at an internal or external edge of the body.
- the key may display, say printed, information which may appear along an edge of the key, or near apertures in the key.
- the Key enables a user to co-relate the position of a point on a visual display to the position of a second point on the same display by holding the Key against the screen.
- the user may then capture data displayed at the second point by means of an input device.
- entries may be made from the information printed on the key to select elements of the first series.
- the Key may be of any appropriate shape and size and made of any appropriate material.
- the Key can be rectangular, made of paper, cardboard or plastic and be 85x21 millimetres in dimensions.
- the Key may resemble a credit card in size and construction material.
- the key may include apertures through which information on the underlying screen can be viewed.
- the key may also include marks which may be clicked while the key is held against the screen to make entries.
- Coloured arrows on the key may help the user to first align the key with predetermined points on the screen and then click the screen coordinate represented by the tip of the arrow.
- the arrows can vary in size, colour and shape as long as they provide a visual connection between two points, areas or objects displayed on the underlying screen.
- the arrows may begin and end at edges of the key, which may be external edges or edges of apertures in the key.
- the communication (request) may include calibration data for the terminal generated by the user making entries depending on the size, shape or configuration of the physical body of the key. These entries may be made by holding the key against the screen and clicking at points indicated by the key, such as at the edge of the key.
- the server may use the calibration data to display the second series of elements (challenge) and a series of entry buttons at the terminal such that the key may be positioned on the terminal to link the elements of the second series with respective entry buttons.
- the user may enter a scrambled version of the code word by selecting the elements of the first series in order from the second series and for each element selected clicking the respective entry button to make a series of entries.
- the method may include the further steps of transmitting the series of entries made at the terminal to the server (response).
- the transmission of the series of entries may involve transmission of the scrambled version of the code word.
- the server interprets the data and verifies the codeword (verification). Depending on the applicable business rules, the server proceeds to approve or reject the transaction (approval).
- the method may include the further steps of using the series of entries made at the terminal to encrypt a transmission to the server, and decrypting the transmission at the server.
- Extra security layers in the form of electronic processes such as encryption or procedural policies may be used in addition to the steps outlined.
- the invention may be used for: • Online payments for goods and services purchased on the Internet
- VDU Visual Display Units
- devices such as: Personal computers (monitors) Mainframe computers (terminals) Hand held computers Mobile phones Internet appliances Electronic Information Kiosks Interactive television sets Other similar devices.
- the invention also requires an Input Device such as a:
- the invention is a computer network, server or terminal for performing the method.
- the invention is a Key comprising a physical body bearing visible indicia connecting pairs of points at an edge of the body for use in the method.
- the Key facilitates manual scrambling or encrypting of passwords and PIN numbers.
- the actual process of scrambling or encryption takes place at the terminal (and involves the user's brain) but depends on the presence of the Key and knowledge of the User LD and PIN.
- This invention can be used either independently, replacing many current security products pertaining to the Internet and other forms of online payments and fund transfers, or in conjunction with such existing products to provide additional security and accountability.
- the Key has an exceptionally simple design. It can be constructed from a variety of materials including paper, cardboard, plastic, rubber, wood, or metal through simple manufacturing processes.
- this invention does not need re-encoding or re-programming and is not susceptible to electro-magnetic interference therefore extremely reliable and fail-safe. These attributes lead to substantial manufacturing, operational and administrative cost savings.
- the Key can be used with almost any type of Visual Display. It is even possible to use it on paper-based documents to create a confidential signature.
- the Key can be used in a variety of circumstances ranging from
- This invention employs a physical Key that cannot be stolen on-line. Even when physically stolen or lost the Keys are compromised only one at a time.
- this invention's physical Key is immune from computer viruses and attacks by hackers and cyber- terrorists.
- this invention does not require a high level of computer literacy. For the average user it is easier to learn how to use this invention than grasp the concept of private and public encryption keys and their handling and safe keep. This invention closely emulates EFTPOS and a "card is present" environment. Therefore, this invention may provide better compatibility with current legal framework governing on-line transactions than many alternative technologies. For the same reasons the Key also facilitates better allocation of responsibilities, liabilities and accountabilities. To use the invention the user must first have possession of the Key and knowledge of the User ID and PIN and then physically hold the Key against a screen and enter values using a pointing device.
- a further aspect of the invention is a one-time pad of disposable Keys.
- the Key can be assigned a pre-defined dollar value to act as Electronic Cash or have the value defined by the user at the time of transaction to act as an Electronic Withdrawal Slip.
- Fig. la, lb and lc are respectively the front and two alternative rear views of a self contained key corresponding to a first and a second type.
- Fig. 2 is a view of a second type key incorporated into a credit card.
- Fig. 3 is a view of a second type key incorporated into a cheque.
- Fig. 4 is a screenshot illustrating a step of the Internet shopping process.
- Fig. 5 is a screenshot illustrating the first step of the validation process using a first type key.
- Fig. 6 is a screenshot illustrating the result of the first step of the validation process.
- Fig. 7 is a screenshot illustrating the second step of the validation process using a first type key.
- Fig. 8 is a screenshot illustrating the third step of the validation process using a first type key.
- Fig. 9 through 12 are screenshots illustrating the steps of the validation process using a second type key.
- the encoder includes arrows that connect digits to non-adjacent letters. You use the arrows to translate your PIN into letters. (Remember to follow the arrows)
- the following examples relate to a process of validating a user's identity during online payment for goods or services purchased on the Internet using a personal computer.
- the process involves the steps of: "Request, Challenge, Response, Verification and Approval”.
- the process also involves the use of a physical Key.
- the Key is rectangular, made of paper, cardboard or plastic and 85x21 millimetres in dimensions, as shown at 10 in Figs, la, lb and lc.
- the Key is sized the same as a credit card and constructed of the same material, as shown at 20 in Fig. 2.
- the triangular shaped areas, indicated generally at 11 on Fig. lb represent "ARROWS" that are used to first align the card with predetermined points on a screen and then click the screen co-ordinate represented by the tip of the arrow.
- the arrows 11 can vary in size, colour and shape as long as they provide a visual connection between two points, areas or objects displayed on the underlying screen.
- an Internet shopper visits an online store 27 and fills the shopping cart with products of choice (Fig. 4).
- the shopper clicks an appropriate button and is presented with the screen 30 shown in Fig 5.
- the financial institution issuing the card has provided the user with
- the first step requires the user to enter the User ID in the appropriate Textbox 31.
- the second step involves holding the key 10 against the screen so that the top left corner of the card is aligned with the top left corner 32 of the ruler image as indicated by the arrow 33.
- the third step involves clicking the point on screen that coincides with the bottom right corner of the physical card held against the screen as indicated by the arrow and mouse icon 34 on the image.
- This action will submit the User ID and the physical size of the card (in pixels) to the web server with a request for a second web page 40 (Fig 6).
- the web server has a record of the User ID, user's PIN (or password) and the user's Key Sequence in a secure database.
- the server holds a series of random arrangements of ten digits (0-9) associated with the User ID and PIN.
- the server After receiving the submitted values from step three above, the server selects one of the random arrangements of ten digits (0-9) held against the User ID and adds it to the second web page 40 in the form of a challenge strip 41 as seen in Fig. 6, sequence shown here is '1 4 6 3 2 5 9 0 8 7'. The used random sequence of digits is then deleted from the database to avoid repeated use of the same sequence.
- the second web page 40 also includes a response strip 42.
- the letters in the response strip respond to mouse clicks by appending their value into the text-box 43 below the response strip 42.
- the server will also modify the size of the rectangle 44 between the numbers and letters to match the physical size of the user's Key by using the pixel values transmitted from previous web page 30.
- the user In the next step as illustrated in the screenshot 50 of Fig 7, the user must align the physical Key 10 in their possession in the rectangle 44 between the random sequence of digits (0-9) and the response strip 42. Since the rectangle 44 has been sized to match the physical dimensions of the Key 10, the process of alignment is simple and straightforward. The process of "calibration" will work reliably for most PC monitors set at any resolution because the actual physical dimensions of users Key 10 is captured in the first web page 30 on the same monitor at its current settings.
- the user After aligning the Key as illustrated in the screenshot 60 in Fig. 8, the user encodes the PIN (or password) by locating its digits on the random sequence (0-9) and following the arrows that connects each digit to respective letters on the response strip 42, clicking the letter. As the user clicks each letter its value is appended into the textbox 43 below the response strip. For instance, if the PIN contains the number '6' it can be seen to be the third number 61 in the sequence. Arrow 62 connects back to the first box 63 in response strip 42, and the user should click the letter inside box 63 to append its value in box 43. In Fig. 8 the PIN '2016' yields the encoded series 'ZQHA. When all the number of the PIN has been encoded the user clicks the submit button 64 to complete the transaction.
- the encoded series that appear in the textbox 43 are transmitted to the server, which in turn applies the necessary logic to decode and compare them with a copy of users PIN held in its database.
- the server applies the programmed business logic to approve or reject the transaction.
- An alternative to transmitting the encoded series that appear in the textbox 43 is to use it as an encryption key for securing the shopping list and other relevant information. This method can also enhance an underlying encryption layer through the process of double encryption.
- the Key 10 facilitates manual scrambling or encrypting of passwords and PIN numbers.
- the logical method used by the server to receive requests, issue challenges, verify responses and finally grant or withhold approval can be developed independently of the key, and can be varied to address different needs.
- the server first receives a request in the form of a User ID (as well as the calibration data) and responds by presenting the user with a random sequence of displayable elements (challenge).
- the elements were simply the ten digits 0 to 9.
- any combination of characters, symbols, digits or graphic elements can be used.
- the Key is language independent and can be used with symbols and characters of any language including Chinees, Japanese, Korean (CJK) and Arabic.
- the number of elements can also change. Higher number of elements allows for more permutations and help to increase the security of the system.
- the total number of permutations can be divided into smaller sets of dissimilar patterns and each set associated with a PIN. Each permutation within a set is only used once and when all combinations are used a new PIN can be issued and used with the same or a different permutation set.
- the server Using the submitted calibration data from first web page 30 in Fig.5, the server must arrange the elements at the correct physical size so that all the required screen elements and the user's physical Key can be correctly aligned. After the PIN is entered and submitted the server interprets the data and verifies the PIN. Depending on the applicable business rules, the server proceeds to approve or reject the transaction.
- the implementation can employ extra security layers in the form of electronic processes such as encryption or procedural policies.
- the examples above assume that the Key is issued as a permanent device. However, it is possible to issue the users with a book of one-time disposable Keys. In this scenario the Key can be assigned a pre-defined dollar value to act as Electronic Cash or have the value defined by the user at the time of transaction to act a an Electronic Withdrawal Slip.
- This invention is application-independent. The shape and size of the encoding device, screen representation of challenge and response elements, verification algorithm, administrative procedures such as dealing with successive wrong PIN entries and the communication methods can be varied to suit particular needs.
- Any existing or new Policy can be employed to further enhance the security and minimise financial risks.
- Banks and financial institutions have existing policies that are time-tested and both operationally and legally well understood. Unlike many new Internet payment technologies, this invention can use the existing policies applicable to EFT and ATM technologies.
- an online authentication system is designed to enhance e-commerce security.
- This simple system employs the method where possession (and presence) of a card and knowledge of a Personal Identification Number (PIN or password) form the basis for authentication and non-repudiation.
- PIN or password Personal Identification Number
- This approach is similar to the authentication model used in EFTPOS and ATM transactions for more than two decades.
- CMX Banking Corporation also known as The Bank.
- the Bank has issued you with a User ID, which is CMX007.
- an encoding strip (Key) is incorporated in a standard credit card. It includes Fixed Values.
- Fig. 3 the same encoding strip (key) can be incorporated into personal cheques or traveler's cheques 25.
- the Bank may choose to issue the KEY as a self contained device instead of physically incorporating it into other instruments. In its shape and size, the self-contained KEY can resemble physical mil-keys we use to access buildings.
- Fig. 1 illustrates two examples: Option A employs Relative Position indicators (arrows) while option B incorporates Fixed Values for encoding Personal Identification Numbers.
- the encoding devices When the encoding devices are issued in the self-contained form as in the examples above, they are directly linked to the user. Incorporating encoders into credit cards link them directly to the cards and indirectly to the user. Both methods are valid and their selection is determined by the relevant business rules.
- the first step is to visit an online store and fill the shopping cart with a selection of goods.
- Fig. 4 you have visited an online bookshop 27 and selected 5 books.
- delivery address and contact number are specified at this stage.
- SSL Secure Socket Layer
- the screen includes a text box 71 where you enter your User ID. In this case CMX007.
- the page also includes the image of a ruler 72. You are instructed to physically hold your credit card or the self-contained key against the screen. Aligning the top left corners of the card and the ruler and clicking on the position adjacent to the top right corner of your card.
- the ruler includes arrows and images to guide you.
- Visual displays come in different physical sizes and are set at different screen resolutions.
- the process above is a calibration method that translates the size of the physical card into the number of pixels on the particular visual display in use.
- the Bank verifies the User ID and returns the web page 80 shown in Fig. 10 to the merchant who forwards it to you.
- the page includes a strip 81 containing digits 0 to 9 in random order.
- the strip has the same physical width as your card.
- the translation of your PIN is sent to the merchant who forwards it to the Bank.
- the Bank has a record of the encoding strip printed on your card and the challenge strips containing random numbers. After verifying that the translation of your PIN is correct the bank send a transaction approval notice to the merchant.
- An alternative to transmitting the translation of your PIN to the merchant is to use it as an encryption key for securing information relevant to the bank.
- This method hides the bank related information from the merchant.
- this method can also enhance an underlying encryption layer such as SSL through the process of double encryption.
- this system provides an environment similar to EFTPOS or ATM where the presence of a card and knowledge of PIN satisfy the authentication and non-repudiation requirements of online transactions.
- This invention is application-independent.
- the shape and size of the encoding device, screen representation of challenge and response elements, verification algorithm, administrative procedures such as dealing with successive wrong PIN entries and the communication methods can be varied to suit particular needs.
- the invention has general applications beyond e-commerce also. Access to physical spaces and general User ID / Password authentication are two examples.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AUPQ9584A AUPQ958400A0 (en) | 2000-08-22 | 2000-08-22 | Validation of transactions |
AUPQ958400 | 2000-08-22 | ||
AUPR178100 | 2000-11-29 | ||
AUPR1781A AUPR178100A0 (en) | 2000-11-29 | 2000-11-29 | Validation of transactions |
PCT/AU2001/001029 WO2002017556A1 (en) | 2000-08-22 | 2001-08-20 | Validation of transactions |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1329052A1 true EP1329052A1 (en) | 2003-07-23 |
EP1329052A4 EP1329052A4 (en) | 2005-03-16 |
Family
ID=25646414
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP01959969A Withdrawn EP1329052A4 (en) | 2000-08-22 | 2001-08-20 | Validation of transactions |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1329052A4 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2004507010A (en) |
CA (1) | CA2420239A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2002017556A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (23)
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WO2002082387A1 (en) * | 2001-04-04 | 2002-10-17 | Microcell I5 Inc. | Method and system for effecting an electronic transaction |
US8230486B2 (en) | 2003-12-30 | 2012-07-24 | Entrust, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing mutual authentication between a sending unit and a recipient |
US8060915B2 (en) | 2003-12-30 | 2011-11-15 | Entrust, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing electronic message authentication |
US8612757B2 (en) | 2003-12-30 | 2013-12-17 | Entrust, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securely providing identification information using translucent identification member |
US8966579B2 (en) | 2003-12-30 | 2015-02-24 | Entrust, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing authentication between a sending unit and a recipient based on challenge usage data |
US9191215B2 (en) | 2003-12-30 | 2015-11-17 | Entrust, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing authentication using policy-controlled authentication articles and techniques |
US9281945B2 (en) | 2003-12-30 | 2016-03-08 | Entrust, Inc. | Offline methods for authentication in a client/server authentication system |
AT413775B (en) * | 2004-03-31 | 2006-05-15 | Helmut Dipl Ing Schluderbacher | PROCESS FOR SAFE REGISTRATION TO A TECHNICAL SYSTEM |
AT413894B (en) * | 2004-04-15 | 2006-07-15 | Helmut Dipl Ing Schluderbacher | NOT PERSONALIZED ACCESS CODE |
EP1600899A1 (en) * | 2004-05-25 | 2005-11-30 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Method for generating an access code |
WO2006003675A2 (en) * | 2004-07-12 | 2006-01-12 | Syed Ibrahim Abdul Hameed Khan | System, method of generation and use of bilaterally generated variable instant passwords |
US20060031174A1 (en) * | 2004-07-20 | 2006-02-09 | Scribocel, Inc. | Method of authentication and indentification for computerized and networked systems |
IES20050147A2 (en) | 2005-03-21 | 2007-05-02 | Patrick Mckenna | Securing access authorisation |
EP1840778A1 (en) * | 2006-03-29 | 2007-10-03 | Laurent Busser | Single-use identification device |
DE102008056605A1 (en) | 2008-11-10 | 2010-05-12 | Borchert, Bernd, Dr. | Method for manipulation-secure transmission of e.g. password, from client to server via computer network, for online-banking, involves reconstructing code word, and declining execution of transaction by server |
DE102009007277A1 (en) | 2009-02-03 | 2010-08-05 | Borchert, Bernd, Dr. | Method for manipulation-proof transmitting of character string from clients to server in bank via computer network for online accounts, involves transmitting inputted characters to server, and testing inputted characters by server |
DE102009013551A1 (en) | 2009-03-17 | 2010-09-23 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | One-time password mask for deriving a one-time password |
US8485451B2 (en) | 2009-06-24 | 2013-07-16 | Asia Capital Services Limited | Method and system for generating a visual key |
TW201310959A (en) | 2011-08-31 | 2013-03-01 | Ibm | Method and computer system for dynamically providing algorithm-based password/challenge authentication |
JP2014032537A (en) * | 2012-08-03 | 2014-02-20 | Cac:Kk | Authentication system for mobile communication device |
US20150319165A1 (en) * | 2012-12-03 | 2015-11-05 | Hoip Telecom Limited | Assisted authentication using one-time-passcode |
FR3008837B1 (en) * | 2013-07-19 | 2015-08-07 | In Webo Technologies | STRONG AUTHENTICATION METHOD |
WO2018142573A1 (en) * | 2017-02-03 | 2018-08-09 | パナソニックIpマネジメント株式会社 | Symbol input method and symbol input device |
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- 2001-08-20 JP JP2002522126A patent/JP2004507010A/en active Pending
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP2004507010A (en) | 2004-03-04 |
EP1329052A4 (en) | 2005-03-16 |
CA2420239A1 (en) | 2002-02-28 |
WO2002017556A1 (en) | 2002-02-28 |
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