EP1252739A1 - Method for checking the integrity of data, system and mobile terminal - Google Patents

Method for checking the integrity of data, system and mobile terminal

Info

Publication number
EP1252739A1
EP1252739A1 EP01903840A EP01903840A EP1252739A1 EP 1252739 A1 EP1252739 A1 EP 1252739A1 EP 01903840 A EP01903840 A EP 01903840A EP 01903840 A EP01903840 A EP 01903840A EP 1252739 A1 EP1252739 A1 EP 1252739A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
message
random string
authentication
authentication value
check
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP01903840A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP1252739B1 (en
Inventor
Olli Immonen
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Oyj
Nokia Inc
Original Assignee
Nokia Oyj
Nokia Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nokia Oyj, Nokia Inc filed Critical Nokia Oyj
Publication of EP1252739A1 publication Critical patent/EP1252739A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1252739B1 publication Critical patent/EP1252739B1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3215—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a plurality of channels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • bootstrap information means data, which is used for bringing a certain system into a desired state for a certain operation.
  • This kind of information is for example provisioned data, which contain information relating to network operation, like server addresses and Certification Authority certificates.
  • the requirements from security point of view are that the data comes from a correct sender and that the data has not been changed in the transmission path, as said earlier. Usually, it is used a term verify the authenticity to represent the verification of the sender and a term integrity to represent if the message or data has been changed in the transmission path or not. These terms are also used in the following parts of this description.
  • Different kinds of methods have been developed to transmit data in a secure way from the sender to the recipient. Almost without exceptions these methods always base on algorithms, which are used for encrypting and decrypting the message so that only the correct sender and the correct recipient are able to find out the content of the message. Many times these algorithms are based on so called private and public key pair method. In this method the sender creates both of the keys and delivers the public key to persons concerned. The private key is kept secret from everybody. A message, which is encrypted with a public key, is possible to decrypt only with a corresponding private key.
  • the bootstrap information is global (e.g. provisioning addresses, Certification Authority certificate)
  • the MAC code requires that the message is personalized, because of the passwords.
  • the objects of the invention are achieved by transmitting a message through a first channel and integrity checking values through a second secure channel from a sender to a recipient and performing the integrity checking in a predetermined way in the receiving end.
  • Figure 1 illustrates a way of calculating required information for making sure that the information is from the conect sender.
  • a message 101 is formed.
  • a key 102 is also formed.
  • the key 102 is a random string, which consists of a predeterrnined number of digits or bits. The number of these is not restricted anyhow.
  • the message 101 and the key 102 are used for generating an authentication value 103, like MAC.
  • the authentication value 103 is derived from the message 101 and the key 102 with mathematical operations.
  • a check code 104 can be derived.
  • the first message 101 and the check code 104 are transmitted from the sender to recipient through different channels.
  • an authentication value 103 is calculated.
  • the authentication value 103 can for example be a MAC code.
  • the authentication value 103 is calculated by using an algorithm.
  • the algorithm can be such as secure hash algorithm (SHA), which is widely applied in encryption applications.
  • SHA secure hash algorithm
  • the algorithm generates the authentication value 103 so that it uses the message 101 and/or the random string as parameters for mathematical operations.
  • the user When using WAP services, the user has to order the services from WAP service providers. Especially, in case where the user wants to get a new WAP service, he or she must get information about the server addresses and such so that the mobile terminal 401 contacts the right server when using the service in question.
  • the user calls to a helpdesk of the service provider to initiate a WAP service.
  • the helpdesk registers the user by entering user information as well as the telephone number to a database. After the information needed is entered the system is arranged to calculate the check code.
  • the check code is formed from the random string, which is generated by the service provider, and from the authentication value.
  • the authentication value can be calculated by using a certain algorithm where the parameters are for example the message and the random string, as described earlier.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for checking the integrity of a message transmitted between a sender in a transmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which method an authentication value is calculated for the first message and a random string is generated. According to a method in the transmitting end an authentication value is generated from a message to be sent and the random string. A check code is formed from the authentication value and the random string. The first message is transferred from a sender to a recipient through a first channel, and the check code is transferred through a second secure channel. In the receiving end a message is received through a first channel and the check code is received through a second secure channel. In the receiving end an authentication check formed at least based of the received message. The integrity of the received message is checked by comparing the predetermined check values in the receiving end.

Description

Method for checking the integrity of data, system and mobile terminal
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
1. Field of the Invention
The invention relates to a method for checking the integrity of data transmitted. More closely the invention relates to a method for checking the integrity of data transmitted with an out-of-band check code.
2. Description of Related Art
Data transmission through different kinds of networks is increasing very rapidly. As a result, more and more private and secret data is transferred through the networks. This kind of data is for example credit card numbers and such. It is very important to be sure that data or a message received is from a correct sender. In addition, it is very important to be sure that nobody has changed the data in the transmission path so that the correct information is transmitted to the recipient.
Many times data is meant to devices connected to network for controlling the operation of the devices. This kind of devices can for example be network element:- and terminals. Especially, in many cases it is necessary to distribute so called bootstrap information to network devices. Here the bootstrap information means data, which is used for bringing a certain system into a desired state for a certain operation. This kind of information is for example provisioned data, which contain information relating to network operation, like server addresses and Certification Authority certificates. When transmitting this kind of information the security becomes very important. If a person not entitled to the information changes the data and forwards it to the terminal, the consequences can be serious in the network. When transmitting this kind of information it is also very important to be sure that data is correct.
Generally, the requirements from security point of view are that the data comes from a correct sender and that the data has not been changed in the transmission path, as said earlier. Usually, it is used a term verify the authenticity to represent the verification of the sender and a term integrity to represent if the message or data has been changed in the transmission path or not. These terms are also used in the following parts of this description. Different kinds of methods have been developed to transmit data in a secure way from the sender to the recipient. Almost without exceptions these methods always base on algorithms, which are used for encrypting and decrypting the message so that only the correct sender and the correct recipient are able to find out the content of the message. Many times these algorithms are based on so called private and public key pair method. In this method the sender creates both of the keys and delivers the public key to persons concerned. The private key is kept secret from everybody. A message, which is encrypted with a public key, is possible to decrypt only with a corresponding private key.
As well, different other kinds of methods have been developed to achieve a needed security in data transmission. If we consider for example provisioning of the bootstrap type data, especially over the air, like in mobile telecommunication, it has been proposed a MAC (Message Authentication Code) based verification method. In MAC based verification method a MAC code is appended to the message. Typically MAC is a string of bits, which depends in some specified way on the message it is to be appended and on a secret key known both by the sender and by the recipient of the message. The code to be appended to the message can for example be a block, which is formed with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). The combination of the message and the MAC code is transmitted through an unreliable channel. By word unreliable channel it is meant a channel, which is not secure for data transmission because anyone can monitor the data sent through the transmission path. For decrypting the received data a MAC key is also delivered to the recipient. Advantageously, the MAC key is delivered through out-of-band channel and it is based on a user input. In a typical situation the user input is a password.
This kind of MAC based verification method has a problem that if the password is not long enough, it can be processed from the combination of the message and the MAC code by means of computer by an attacker. A possible way to do this is to try all possible passwords until one is found with which the calculated MAC code based on the password and the MAC code transmitted along with the message match with each other. When the password is found the attacker can generate a new message, which will be successfully verified by the recipient. If the original data is changed and the new data is used for original purposes, it can cause serious consequences.
To nr iimize the risk that an attacker finds out the password the length of the password can be increased. If the number of bits in the password is big enough it takes longer time to find out the MAC code and the objective is that it takes too long time to find out the content of the message and change it.
Another problem in the MAC based verification method, especially applied in the bootstrap information type data, is that in many cases the bootstrap information is global (e.g. provisioning addresses, Certification Authority certificate), but the MAC code requires that the message is personalized, because of the passwords.
One method in practice, which is used for checking the validity of certification authority certificates, is to display a fingerprint, like a complete hash code, of the Certification Authority certificates and ask the user to check it. The user can check the displayed fingerprint by comparing it to a certificate, which is got from a newspaper or from the Internet or such. This method is quite secure in principle, but requires activity from the user.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The object of the invention is to present a new method for checking the integrity of a received message. Another object of the invention is to present a system, which uses the method according to the invention. A third object is to present a mobile terminal, which uses the method according to the invention for checking the integrity of a received message.
The objects of the invention are achieved by transmitting a message through a first channel and integrity checking values through a second secure channel from a sender to a recipient and performing the integrity checking in a predetermined way in the receiving end.
The method for checking the integrity of a first message transmitted between a sender in a fransmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which method an authentication value is calculated for the first message and a random string is generated, is characterized by that
- the first message is transmitted from the sender to the recipient through a first channel and
- the authentication value and the random string are transmitted to the recipient through a second secure channel for checking the integrity of a received message in the receiving end. The system for checking the integrity of a first message transmitted between a sender in a transmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which the system comprises means for calculating an authentication value for the first message and means for generating a random string, is characterized by that in the transmitting end the system comprises
- means for forming a check code by combining the authentication value and the random string,
- means for transferring the first message from the sender to the recipient through the first channel, and
- means for transferring said check code from said sender to said recipient through the second secure channel,
and in the receiving end the system comprises
- means for separating said authentication value and said random string from said check code,
- means for generating an authentication check from the received message and from either said random string or said authentication value, and
- means for comparing said authentication check with either said authentication value or said random string not used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
The mobile terminal for checking the integrity of a message received, into which mobile terminal a first message is sent, characterized in that the mobile terminal comprises
- means for receiving a message,
- input means for inputting a check code of the first message received through a secure channel into said mobile terminal,
- means for separating an authentication value and a random string from said check code of said first message,
- means for generating an authentication check from said received message and from either said authentication value or said random string, and - means for comparing said authentication check with either said authentication value or said random string αot used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
Advantageous embodiments of the invention are described in dependent claims.
According to the invention the integrity and authentication of a message is checked in a new way. The message is transmitted through a first channel to the recipient. The message does not contain any kind of authentication value. The integrity and authentication of the message is checked so that a check code is calculated in the transntitting end and transmitted to the recipient through another channel. The other channel is chosen so that it is secure enough for transferring confidential data. In the receiving end the message is checked with the check code. A system according to the invention comprises means for performing the operations relating to the method. A mobile terminal according to the invention comprises means for checking the integrity of the message received by using the check code.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Figure 1 illustrates a preferred embodiment of the invention in the transmitting end,
Figure 2 illustrates a method according to a prefened embodiment of the invention in the fransmitting end,
Figure 3a illustrates a first prefened embodiment of the invention in the receiving end,
Figure 3b illustrates a second prefened embodiment of the invention in the receiving end,
Figure 4 illustrates a method according to a prefened embodiment of the invention in the receiving end,
Figure 5 illustrates a simplified arrangement according to the invention,
Figure 6 illustrates a system according to the invention, and
Figure 7 illustrates a block diagram of a mobile terminal according to the invention.
Same reference numerals are used for similar entities in the figures. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Figure 1 illustrates a way of calculating required information for making sure that the information is from the conect sender. According to the invention a message 101 is formed. In addition to the message 101 a key 102 is also formed. Advantageously, the key 102 is a random string, which consists of a predeterrnined number of digits or bits. The number of these is not restricted anyhow. The message 101 and the key 102 are used for generating an authentication value 103, like MAC. The authentication value 103 is derived from the message 101 and the key 102 with mathematical operations. By combining the key 102 and the authentication value 103 a check code 104 can be derived. The first message 101 and the check code 104 are transmitted from the sender to recipient through different channels.
In Figure 2 it is illustrated the method according to the invention in the transmitting end. In the first step 201 a message 101 to be sent is formed. The message 101 comprises for example bootstrap information or any other kind of information, in which the integrity is important. In the method according to the invention a random string is generated in the second step 202. The random string can be generated by means of a random number generator. In the prefened embodiment of the inventioi> a new random string, which can also be called a key 102, is generated always when sending a new message 101. Naturally, it is also possible to use the same random string with all messages 101 but this means that the security in this method is not as good as in the method according to the prefened embodiment. In the next step 203 of the method according to the invention an authentication value 103 is calculated. The authentication value 103 can for example be a MAC code. The authentication value 103 is calculated by using an algorithm. The algorithm can be such as secure hash algorithm (SHA), which is widely applied in encryption applications. Advantageously, the algorithm generates the authentication value 103 so that it uses the message 101 and/or the random string as parameters for mathematical operations.
To generate a data by means of which the integrity of the message 101 can be checked the authentication value 103 and the random string are combined in step four 204 producing a check code 104. This can be done in many ways. In the simplest case these values are combined to each other by adding the random string after the authentication value 103 or vice versa. In another embodiment of the invention a sort of arithmetic operation is used for combining the values. The values can also be combined any other way than shown here. To a man skilled in the art it is obvious that the authentication value 103 and the random string are conversed to such a number system that the mathematical operation in the combination can be performed. Finally, the first message 101 is transfened through a first channel 205, which can be any kind of channel available. The channel needs not to be secure. The channel can for example be created over the Internet. Conespondingly, the check code 104 is transmitted to the recipient through another channel 206, which channel according to the invention is a secure one and advantageously out-of-band. By word out-of-band it is meant a channel through which the message is not transmitted. The out-of-band channel can be formed through different entities than through which the message is transmitted.
To a man skilled in the art it is obvious that at least a part of the method steps described above can be performed concurrently or in other order than described in Figure 2. As well it is obvious that the transmission of the random string and the authentication value 103 can also be performed separately so that they are not combined in the transπύtting end.
Figure 3 a illustrates the operations in the receiving end according to the first embodiment of the invention. A second message 150 is received through a first channel. The check value 104 is received through a second channel. The authentication value 103 and the random string are separated. The random string and the received message 150 are used as parameters to generate an authentication check 151. The authentication check and the authentication value 103 are compared in the receiving end to determine the integrity of the message and to authenticate the conect sender.
Figure 3 b illustrates the operations in the receiving end according to the second embodiment of the invention. A second message 150 is received through a first channel. The check value 104 is received through a second channel. The authentication value 103 and the random string are separated. The authentication value 103 and the received message 150 are used as parameters to generate an authentication check 151. The authentication check and the random string are compared in the receiving end to deteirnine the integrity of the message and to authenticate the conect sender.
In Figure 4 it is shown a method according to the invention in the receiving end of the transmission path. First, a second message 101 and the check code 104 are received 301, 302. From the check code 104 received it is extracted 304 the original random string and the original authentication value 103. This is achieved by an inverse operation to the operation done in the fransnutting end. In the simplest case the random string and the authentication value 103 can be just separated because advantageously it is known by the sender and the recipient how many numbers the random string and conespondingly the authentication value 103 comprise. The recipient can be sure that the random string and the authentication code 103 are original because they were transmitted through a secure channel. This kind of secure channel can for example be a telephone line. An authentication check 151 is calculated 303 from the second message and either the random string or the authentication value 103 got from the check code 104 received. Advantageously, the calculation method or algorithm for the authentication check 151 is agreed between the sender and the recipient in advance. After the authentication check 151 is calculated from the message 150, the authentication check 151 is compared with either the authentication value or the random string not used in the generation of the authentication check 151 for checking the integrity of the second message compared to the first message. If the compared values are equal, it means that the message 1 1 received is original and it is accepted 306. If the comparison is unequal, the message 101 has changed in the transmission path and it is rejected 307. To a man skilled in the art it is obvious that the authentication check 151 is a new random string value or a new authentication value, which authentication check 151 is compared to the original random string or to the original authentication value.
One advantage of the invention is that the key or the random string and the authentication value 103 can be relatively short since they are rransfened through the secure out-of-band channel, which means that a third party cannot change them during the transmission. The security of the out-of-band channel is based on transparency, which means that a third party is not able to see the data to be transmitted.
Next we consider the invention applied in a telecommunication system. As an example we describe the invention applied in the WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) system. In the WAP system it is possible to use Internet with a mobile terminal. The Internet browser uses wireless mark-up language (WML) and lightweight mark-up language. By these means the Internet application is based on text and no pictures are transmitted. In Figure 5 it is shown a simplified anangement of the system, which uses WAP. Here the mobile terminal 401 comprises means for receiving and fransmitting information from the Internet network. In addition, the mobile terminal 401 comprises display means for showing information. The mobile terminal 401 is connected to a mobile network 402 through a radio interface. If the user of the mobile terminal 401 wants to get connected to the Internet, it is possible through the mobile network 402. The mobile terminal 401 uses WAP protocol through the mobile network 402 to a WAP server 403, which is connected to the World Wide Web (WWW) 444. The WAP server 403 is arranged to adapt the WAP protocol and the WWW protocols so that the WWW services can be used in the mobile terminal 401. As can be seen, the WAP, which specifies an application framework and network protocols for wireless terminals, brings the Internet content and advanced data services to wireless terminals. To a man skilled in the art it is known that WAP can work across differing wireless network technologies and bearer types (GSM, CDMA, SMS).
When using WAP services, the user has to order the services from WAP service providers. Especially, in case where the user wants to get a new WAP service, he or she must get information about the server addresses and such so that the mobile terminal 401 contacts the right server when using the service in question. According to one embodiment of the invention the user calls to a helpdesk of the service provider to initiate a WAP service. The helpdesk registers the user by entering user information as well as the telephone number to a database. After the information needed is entered the system is arranged to calculate the check code. The check code is formed from the random string, which is generated by the service provider, and from the authentication value. The authentication value can be calculated by using a certain algorithm where the parameters are for example the message and the random string, as described earlier. The check code is told to the user by the helpdesk. Advantageously, the check code is short, like 8 digits. After this the helpdesk sends the data provisioned, like the server addresses, to the user's mobile terminal 401 as an SMS message, for example. According to this embodiment of the invention the user inputs the check code received from the help desk to the mobile terminal 401. The mobile terminal 401 separates the authentication value and the random string from the check code. After this the mobile terminal 401 is arranged to calculate an authentication check with the same algorithm, which was used in the transmitting end to generate the authentication value. The received message and either the random string or the authentication value are used as parameters for the algorithm in the mobile terminal 401. The authentication check and the one of the authentication value and the random string not used in the generation of the authentication check are compared in the mobile terminal 401 to each other. If these values are equal, the mobile terminal 401 activates the provisioning data.
According to another embodiment of the invention, the mobile terminal 401 views the authentication check on display so that the user can compare the check code received from the helpdesk with it. If they are equal, the user accepts the received data in a predeteixmned manner. In other case the user deletes the message. When the message is activated the user can use the WAP services of the service provider.
According to another prefened embodiment of the invention the user gets the check code from the Internet. The user for example chooses a web page of the service provider of the WAP services. The user fills a form and registers in such a way to service providers database. After the registration the service provider generates the check code and transmits it through the Internet to the user. In transmission it is used some sort of encryption method so that the transmission is secure. One this kind of method can be for example a SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). SSL is a program layer, which is created for Internet purposes for achieving security of message transmission in Internet. One application of the SSL uses the public-and-private key encryption system. This means that the user and the service provider of the WAP services have made an agreement of the encryption beforehand. By means of this the check code can be delivered from the service provider to the user in a secure manner through the Internet. After the user has received a message containing bootstrap information to the mobile terminal 401 he or she can generate an authentication check in the same manner as described above and proceed the comparison as described earlier. To a man skilled in the art it is obvious that also the Internet capabilities of the mobile terminal 401 can be used in the same way. The user connects to the Internet with the mobile terminal through the WAP services and gets the check code there. The connection is arranged to be secure for example in the same way as described above. After the check code and the message are received the authentication and the integrity can be checked in the mobile terminal 401 in the same way as described before.
Generally, the system according to the invention shown in Figure 6 comprises means for sending and receiving data. In the transmitting end 620 the system comprises means 601 for calculating an authentication value for a message to be sent and means for generating a random string. According to the invention the system in the transmitting end 620 also comprises means 603 for forming a check code by combining the authentication value and the random string. It comprises means 604 for transferring the first message from the sender to the recipient through the first channel. This kind of means 604 can for example be an e-mail software or such. Advantageously, these means 604 are a mobile terminal, such as a WAP terminal by means of which it is possible to transmit and receive short messages (SMS). In addition, the system comprises means 605 for transfening the check code from the sender to the recipient through the second secure channel. This kind of means 605 can for example be a phone or an arrangement by means of which it is possible to form a secure channel between the sender and the recipient. In the receiving end 630 the system according to the invention comprises means 610 for separating said authentication value and said random string from said check code. This can be achieved by means of software or electronics. The system also comprises means 611 for generating an authentication check from the received message and from either the random string or the authentication value and means 612 for comparing the authentication check with either the authentication value or the random string not used in the generation of the authentication check for checking the integrity of the received message compared to the first message. Advantageously, these means 611, 612 are carried out by data processing means, such as a microprocessor, and software.
Figure 7 shows a block diagram of a mobile terminal according to a prefened embodiment of the invention. The mobile terminal comprises a microphone 701, keyboard 707, display 706, earpiece 714, antenna duplexer or switch 708, antenna 709 and a control unit 705, which all are typical components of conventional mobile communication means. Further, the mobile terminal contains typical transmission and receiver blocks 704, 711, which are used for sending and receiving data, like messages. Transmission block 704 comprises functionality necessary for speech and channel coding, encryption, and modulation, and the necessary RF circuitry for amplification of the signal for transmission. Receiver block 711 comprises the necessary amplifier circuits and functionality necessary for demodulating and decryption of the signal, and removing channel and speech coding. The signal produced by the microphone 701 is amplified in the amplifier stage 702 and converted to digital form in the A/D converter 703, whereafter the signal is taken to the transmitter block 704. The transmitter block encodes the digital signal and produces the modulated and amplified RF-signal, whereafter the RF signal is taken to the antenna 709 via the duplexer or switch 708. The receiver block 711 demodulates the received signal and removes the encryption and channel coding. The resulting speech signal is converted to analog form in the D/A converter 712, the output signal of which is amplified in the amplifier stage 713, whereafter the amplified signal is taken to the earpiece 714. The control unit 705 controls the functions of the mobile communication means, reads the commands given by the user via the keypad 707 and displays messages to the user via the display 706. In addition, the mobile terminal comprises input means for inputting a check code of the first message received through a secure channel into said mobile terminal. The input means can for example be the keyboard 707. With the first message it is meant a message, which is sent by the sender to the mobile terminal. The mobile terminal also comprises means 730 for separating an authentication value and a random string from the check code of the first message. It also comprises means 731 for generating an authentication check from the received message and from either the authentication value or the random string and means 732 for comparing the authentication check with either the authentication value or the random string not used in the generation of the authentication check for checking the integrity of the received message compared to the first message. To a man skilled in the art it is obvious that by means of a mobile terminal according to the invention, it is possible to check if the received message is the same as the message sent. Means 730, 731, 732 can advantageously be realized with a microprocessor in the control unit 705 and software. In one prefened embodiment of the invention the mobile terminal is used in WAP applications. By means of the invention it is possible to check if the data received, like the WAP server addresses, are conect and from the conect sender.
To a man skilled in the art it is obvious that the content of the message can comprise any other information than bootstrap information. The mobile terminal can be any kind of terminal in which it is possible to apply the present invention. The mobile terminal can for example be such as mobile telephones, pagers and personal digital assistants. The invention can be applied also in other data transmission applications than in WAP.
Generally, in view of the foregoing description it will be evident to a person skilled in the art that various modifications may be made within the scope of the invention. While the prefened embodiments of the invention have been described in detail, it should be apparent that many modifications and variations thereto are possible, all of which fall within the true spirit and scope of the invention.

Claims

1. A method for checking the integrity of a first message transmitted between a sender in a fransmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which method an authentication value is calculated for the first message and a random string is generated, characterized in that
- the first message is transmitted from the sender to the recipient through a first channel and
- the authentication value and the random string are transmitted to the recipient through a second secure channel for checking the integrity of a received message in the receiving end.
2. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the authentication value is generated from the first message and the random string in the transmitting end.
3. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the authentication value and the random string are combined as a check code in the transmitting end.
4. A method according to claim 3, characterized in that the authentication value and the random string are separated from the check code in the receiving end.
5. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that in the receiving end an authentication check is generated from the received message and from either the random string or the authentication value.
6. A method according to claim 5, characterized in that in the receiving end the authentication check is compared with either the authentication value or the random string not used in the generation of the authentication check for checking the integrity of the received message compared to the transmitted message.
7. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the second secure channel is out-of-band.
8. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that in the transmitting end
- a first message is formed,
- a random string is generated, - an authentication value is generated from said first message and said random string,
- a check code is formed by combining said authentication value and said random string,
- said first message is transfened from the sender to the recipient through the first channel, and
- said check code is transfened from said sender to said recipient through the second secure channel.
9. A method according to claim 8, characterized in that in the receiving end
- a message is received through a first channel,
- the check code is received through a second secure channel,
- the authentication value and the random string are separated from said check code,
- an authentication check is generated from the received message and from either said random string or said authentication value, and
- said authentication check is compared with either said authentication value or said random string not used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
10. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the message contains bootstrap information.
11. A system for checking the integrity of a first message transmitted between a sender in a transmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which the system comprises means for calculating an authentication value for the first message and means for generating a random string, characterized in that in the transmitting end the system comprises
- means for forming a check code by combining the authentication value and the random string,
- means for transferring the first message from the sender to the recipient through the first channel, and - means for transferring said check code from said sender to said recipient through the second secure channel,
and in the receiving end the system comprises
- means for separating said authentication value and said random string from said check code,
- means for generating an authentication check from the received message and from either said random string or said authentication value, and
- means for comparing said authentication check with either said authentication value or said random string not used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
12. A system according to claim 11, characterized in that the system comprises the operations of the WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) system.
13. A mobile terminal for checking the integrity of a message received, into which mobile terminal a first message is sent, characterized in that the mobile terminal comprises
- means for receiving a message,
- input means for inputting a check code of the first message received through a secure channel into said mobile terminal,
- means for separating an authentication value and a random string from said check code of said first message,
- means for generating an authentication check from said received message and from either said authentication value or said random string, and
- means for comparing said authentication check with either said authentication value or said random string not used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
14. A mobile terminal according to claim 13, characterized in that it is WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) terminal.
EP01903840A 2000-02-01 2001-02-01 Method for checking the integrity of data, corresponding system and mobile terminal Expired - Lifetime EP1252739B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

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FI20000203A FI112418B (en) 2000-02-01 2000-02-01 Method for checking the integrity of data, systems and mobile terminal
FI20000203 2000-02-01
PCT/FI2001/000093 WO2001058081A1 (en) 2000-02-01 2001-02-01 Method for checking the integrity of data, system and mobile terminal

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EP1252739A1 true EP1252739A1 (en) 2002-10-30
EP1252739B1 EP1252739B1 (en) 2006-05-10

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EP (1) EP1252739B1 (en)
JP (4) JP4377100B2 (en)
KR (1) KR100465443B1 (en)
CN (1) CN100409612C (en)
AT (1) ATE326091T1 (en)
AU (1) AU3180901A (en)
BR (1) BRPI0107925B1 (en)
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DE (1) DE60119489T2 (en)
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FI (1) FI112418B (en)
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WO (1) WO2001058081A1 (en)

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EP1252739B1 (en) 2006-05-10
US20030120924A1 (en) 2003-06-26
BRPI0107925B1 (en) 2015-09-08
ATE326091T1 (en) 2006-06-15
FI20000203L (en) 2001-08-02
FI112418B (en) 2003-11-28
US20100191966A1 (en) 2010-07-29
FI20000203A0 (en) 2000-02-01
JP2011010313A (en) 2011-01-13
JP2006136003A (en) 2006-05-25
HK1049079A1 (en) 2003-04-25
JP2006352904A (en) 2006-12-28
CA2399097C (en) 2011-07-05
DE60119489T2 (en) 2006-09-28
AU3180901A (en) 2001-08-14
KR20030009342A (en) 2003-01-29
CA2399097A1 (en) 2001-08-09
BR0107925A (en) 2002-12-10
US8171291B2 (en) 2012-05-01
JP4377100B2 (en) 2009-12-02
HK1049079B (en) 2006-10-20
US7725714B2 (en) 2010-05-25
ES2261376T3 (en) 2006-11-16
KR100465443B1 (en) 2005-01-13
DE60119489D1 (en) 2006-06-14
JP2003522475A (en) 2003-07-22
WO2001058081A1 (en) 2001-08-09
CN1397124A (en) 2003-02-12
CN100409612C (en) 2008-08-06

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