EP1074004A1 - Electronic device and method for the authentication of a user of said device - Google Patents

Electronic device and method for the authentication of a user of said device

Info

Publication number
EP1074004A1
EP1074004A1 EP19980948818 EP98948818A EP1074004A1 EP 1074004 A1 EP1074004 A1 EP 1074004A1 EP 19980948818 EP19980948818 EP 19980948818 EP 98948818 A EP98948818 A EP 98948818A EP 1074004 A1 EP1074004 A1 EP 1074004A1
Authority
EP
Grant status
Application
Patent type
Prior art keywords
user
device
authentication
information
pin
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP19980948818
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Inventor
Klaus-Peter Karmann
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements, e.g. access security or fraud detection; Authentication, e.g. verifying user identity or authorisation; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06QDATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014Identity check for transaction
    • G06Q20/40145Biometric identity checks
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00Individual entry or exit registers
    • G07C9/00126Access control not involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/00134Access control not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity-check
    • G07C9/00158Access control not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity-check by means of a personal physical data
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/0853Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network
    • H04L63/0861Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting authentication of entities communicating through a packet data network using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04MTELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M1/00Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers; Analogous equipment at exchanges
    • H04M1/66Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers; Analogous equipment at exchanges with means for preventing unauthorised or fraudulent calling
    • H04M1/667Preventing unauthorised calls from a telephone set
    • H04M1/67Preventing unauthorised calls from a telephone set by electronic means
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02Terminal devices
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
    • H04W92/00Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
    • H04W92/04Interfaces between hierarchically different network devices
    • H04W92/08Interfaces between hierarchically different network devices between user and terminal device

Abstract

The inventive device comprises sensors (SE) for detecting biometric characteristics BM (e.g. finger pints) and an input device for inputting authentication data AUTINF (e.g. PIN). A data processing device (DE) of the inventive device determines authentication information FPAUTINF from the biometric characteristics BM. Said information is tested by the same testing device PE which tests the authentication information AUTINF to be input via the input device EE. As a result, the device EG can be used by different users and in the same manner as devices without sensors for biometric characteristics. The authentication rules (e.g. for mobile telephones and SIM cards) do not have to be changed in order to permit an authentication using biometric characteristics.

Description

description

Electronic device and method for authentication of a user of this device

There are known quite various electronic devices, a user must be authenticated before using them. Important examples include computer m different VERSIONS (devices for Informationsvearbeitung) and telecommunications devices such as cellular phones. Some devices are generally eg protected from unauthorized use by a password; in other equipment only certain functions from unauthorized access (eg by a so-called Personal Identification Number, PIN) overall are protected. This includes the protection of access to certain data or services, even if they are not provided by the device but by other devices in a computer or communication network at your disposal.

kationsmformation today Probably the most common way of entering an authentication provider is typing on a keyboard of the device. After entering the accuracy of the information entered and the authorization of the supplying user is checked by a Prüfemπchtung in the unit or on a computer or Kommunikatinsnetz. In mobile phones according to the GSM standard, this is done by a data processing device on the so-called SIM card of the device checks whether the entered PIN matches the information stored on the SIM card information. If this is the case, the SIM card enables the mobile phone to use. while it increases the security of telephone customers that the PIN must not be stored in the set after the GSM standard, but only m encrypted form can be stored on the SIM card.

For some time technologies are features gbar that allow other forms of authentication of a user. These two technologies are based on the detection of user-specific biometric characteristics by special sensors. A more ¬ term example of this are sensors to detect the fingerprint. Other biometric features such as the retina of the human eye texture or the characteristics of a human voice are also used already in some devices.

Typically, detected by the sensors characteristics in a data processing device of the device or a communication network with the known features of an authorized user are compared and given sufficient correspondence of the access to the desired service, the required data or the selected device function is enabled.

With some equipment it makes sense to combine the two types of authentication mentioned together. For example, in mobile phones, it is certainly wishes worth seeing, that they can be used not only by its owner through fingerprint sensor, but that other persons to whom the PIN has been disclosed or who want to use the device with its own SIM card to a use as part of their due authorization are able. In addition, the authentication means may

Fingerprint occasionally fail or unenforceable, for example because the user's hands are dirty or the user is wearing gloves. For these or similar reasons, it is desirable or necessary that one or more users of a device can authenticate this through different paths. The biometric authentication to be possible in these cases, in addition to the authentication by PIN entry. add in mobile phones based on the GSM standard is that the standard prescribes the possibility of authentication by PIN entry mandatory. 3 From the described situation arises that a Ver ¬ application of conventional biometric Authentifikationsver- go mobile phones based on the GSM standard is not possible because this only for reasons of compatibility with the GSM standard authentication via PIN with the SIM card necessarily require. The first apparently offering ability to store the PIN in the device and to pass on successful verifying that the captured fingerprint with the stored fingerprint of a berechtigeten user this stored PIN to the SIM card for testing, is leaving because storage of the PIN is prohibited in the mobile phone elsewhere than within the SIM card according to the GSM standard for safety reasons. The Biometric authentication would in these cases so as backup security only into consideration. However, such additional protection is not necessary given the high security of the authentication of the PIN entry and would probably not be accepted by many users.

The invention is therefore based on the object to provide a technical teaching that allows the combination of a biometric user authentication with an authentication by PIN input in the case of mobile phones according to the GSM standard or in similar cases, in each case a form of authentication sufficient should. so the user will have the choice of what kind of authentication he wants to use. It is conceivable, if necessary, that a particularly excellent user (eg the owner of the device) is given the opportunity to set the logical AND operation of both types of authentication on the device. This object is achieved by an apparatus or a method according to any one of the claims.

The invention provides that biometric features of the user are detected by a sensor device and one to 4 Authentifika- tion serving information by means of mathematical methods is determined from the detected biometric features. In this way, at the end of the evaluation of the biometric features a Authentiflkationsinformation that can be checked by the same Prüfemrichtung how a user through an information input device (eg a keyboard) entered Authentiflkationsinformation. In the simplest case is the result of the evaluation of the fingerprint same PIN, the user had to enter via the keyboard. This PIN is not stored in GERAT but calculated from detected by a sensor device biometric characteristics of a user.

By this type of analysis of the processing of a detected biometric features Sensoremrich- this type of authentication in the result of the authentication is on the

equivalent keyboard input, and the usual interface for checking the validity of Authentiflkationsinformation can remain unchanged. In particular, no change of any standardized rules is necessary. The two ways of authentication can be used without difficulty next to each other; the user has at any time and in any position, the free choice between the two methods. It is of course also possible both m an AND to use Kombmation in which only one user is allowed successfully completes both authentication way.

In the following the invention will be approximately the basis of preferred examples Ausfuh- and described by figures using the near.

1 shows an exemplary embodiment of the invention in which all the methods and devices are integrated a GERAT m.

Figure 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of the invention, wherein the Prufemrichtung is not located within the device. 3 shows an exemplary embodiment of the invention wherein e ne display device for displaying Authentisie- rungsmformation is integrated in GERAT.

A very special but important embodiment of the invention ¬ It is a mobile phone according to the GSM standard, which dispose with a fingerprint sensor for user authentication. This fingerprint sensor is a special case of the sensor device shown m Fig 1 (SE). Specifies a user of the device (EC) has a finger on these fingerprint sensor and the device awaits an authenti- cation, such as entering a PIN or SuperPIN or PIN2 (partially herstellerabhangig), the fingerprint sensor is detected, the corresponding biometric features (BM) of the relevant user, and this leads to a DA tenverarbeitungsemrichtung (DE).

In the case of the GSM mobile phone these data-is tungsemrichtung the already existing in the mobile phone processor m conjunction with a software running on it to be. On the other hand, could the fingerprint sensor (or, more generally, the sensor device) grouting its own processor unit, on which a special fingerprint recognition payable software Expires so that the data processing device in accordance with this invention, the sensor device is wholly or partly m integrated. Since the fingerprint recognition itself as well as other methods for the detection of biometric characteristics, its realization on data processing devices of different configuration (and partitioning m subsystems or composition of known hardware modules) are well known in the art, is that portion of the implementation of the invention definitely not present any particular problems. 6 Gem ä ß of the present invention now determines this data encryption arbe 1 tungseuir1chtung from the detected biometric features suitable for authentication of the user information. In the simplest case, this is the encrypted stored on the SIM card PIN (or PIN2 or ähnli ¬ ches) of - to be justified adopted - user. This PIN will be passed in the same way to the SIM card to test, as it had been entered by the user via the numeric keypad (information input device) of the Mobile telephone users. Now the any expert runs and known in the GSM standard provided Prufungsvorgang m of Prufungsemrichtung the mobile phone (SIM card, possibly in conjunction with the data processing devices of the device) from. Is the Authentiflkationsinformation (FPAUTINF) correctly ie coincident with the data stored on the SIM card PIN, the authentication by the protected random function (for example, network access, etc.) released.

It is a decisive advantage of the inventions dungsgemaßen solution that the fingerprint recognition in the case of the authorized user to transfer the user's PIN leads to the SIM card described, because this way the safety of the GSM standard can remain completely unchanged. Other, perhaps initially appears obvious solutions do not have this advantageous property. Anyway ny other solution either an additional entry of the PIN using the keypad or the circumvention or amendment of the GSM standard was required. An additional entry of the PIN on the keyboard would only make sense if the fingerprint recognition would be intended as an additional safety measure for PIN Emgabe.

Such an additional authentication is of course also possible with the present invention. In this case it was necessary to the Authentisie- determined from the sensor data rungsmformation just not passed to the SIM card. Instead of 7 which could, for example, deliberately send the wrong PIN to the SIM card or simulate an input error or cancel the entry or ahnliches. Then the SIM card was calling again for PTN input. If the entered PIN with the calculated consistent or compatible, the data processing device (DE) was passed this PIN to the SIM card, and then this was issue the release.

Of course, the PIN is determined from the sensor data need not be identical to the SIM card PIN. If the default or - for other equipment - each einschlagigen Si cherheitsprotokolle permit, the testing device could also test two different authentication information to determine whether they match.

In other equipment, which are not subject to the GSM standard, the calculated from the sensor data Authentifi- could kationsmformation FPAUTINF also m the case of the sole authentication by sensor data (ie, independent of and in addition to the PIN entry) different from the input via a keyboard Authentiflkationsinformation AUTINF be as long as the testing device detects that the two fit together in the sense that both point to the authorized user.

As a calculation method for Authentiflkationsinformation FPAUTINF from a BM basically all mathematical mappings (functions) are m consider the gerabdruck a Fm- or other BM assign a PIN or some other form of (m usually alphanumeric coded) Authentisie- rungsmformation AUTINF, the following conditions fulfill:

a) similar BM sufficiently pulled into the same au- fikationsmformation FPAUTINF. b) sufficiently different BM drove to various Au ¬ thentifikationsinformationen FPAUTINF.

c) it is for an unauthorized user practically impossible m ö possible to guess to determine the Authentiflkationsinformation FPAUTINF from the BM or without knowledge of the BM (for example).

The condition a) is to ensure that the Fmgerabdruk- kerkennung is sufficiently robust to small disturbances. Otherwise, the rejection rate authorized user would be too high. Condition b) provides that fingerprints of different users drove with sufficiently high probability of various authentication information FPAUTINF. The meaning of condition c) is obvious.

The skilled worker is aware of various mathematical figures that meet these requirements (possibly more or less well). A picture with these characteristics is given by the so-called vector quantization. This to the expert actually known method is explained here only as far as it seems necessary for understanding the invention.

In applying this method for the purposes of the present invention will first be assumed that by the

Sensor means detected biometric features the shape of a so-called feature vector can be brought m. This assumption is m no practical limitation, because the sensor data as an ordered n-tuple of n measurement data (feature vector) can always be represented. The Strange times vectors form an n-dimensional space. In this pattern, a set of vectors exist (codebook vectors), and it is defined a distance measure (measure of similarity for biometric features). there is a cell m this space, which is defined by the fact, that for each feature vector in a cell that the pattern vector 9 of the cell of the nachstgelegene pattern vector within the meaning of this distance measure is for each pattern vector.

Each pattern vector is assigned a principle suitable for the authentication information. A pattern vector is the correct Authentisierungsmformation (eg have the actual PIN) assigned. It is apparent from these observations that the determination of the nachstgelegenen pattern vector to a feature vector corresponding to the transmitter sordaten detected, in the case of the authorized user on the correct information (tatsachliche PIN) leads and otherwise provides a false Authentisierungsmformation. The error rate of this process can be optimized if it is ensured that the associated with the biometric data of the authorized user feature vector is one of the pattern vectors. This let achieved by the system is adapted m an initialization phase of the biometric characteristics of the authorized user (codebook adaptation).

The vector is not the only method that can be used in connection with the invention. The skilled person other methods gelaufig, which therefore need not be discussed here.

The calculation of Authentisierungsmformation FPAUTINF from the biometric characteristics of a user by vector quantization is - assuming the wording - actually also with "saving the PIN" in GERAT connected, since each pattern vector of the codebook a principle possible Authentisierungsmformation (FPAUTINF) assigned is. This is, however, m almost all cases (except one, namely the feature vector of the authorized user) is not really suitable for authentication. So it is for example in the case of a five-digit alphanumeric PIN in

Ideally, all possible PINs and each a pattern vector stored so that only a sufficiently precise detection of the 10 pattern vector in the sensor valid PIN can be addressed. Although the correct PIN "is stored in the unit" So therefore, she goes to the large number of possible PINs untraceable under, only to find for the owner of the correct biometric features. These circumstances are not meant as the standard prohibits the storage of the PIN in the device.

In the GSM standard to store the PIN in the device is not allowed. Often, however, a change of PIN is necessary, for example, because this has become known to a third party. We but the PIN from the Fingerbabdruck determined (ie, calculated), this seems impossible at first, which is not able to change the fingerprint or other biometric features. Nevertheless, to give the user the ability to change his PIN, the invention provides in a preferred embodiment is that instead of just one calculation method is equal to a whole set of such procedures in the device. could be assigned to drive each individual calculation methods a serial number so that an authorized user to could change the method used at any time. Since each method (Ml, ..., Mn) for the same fingerprint (BM) imposes a different PIN (FPAUTINF1, ..., FPAUTINFn), the user has many PINs available, as there are different methods of calculating ,

This embodiment of the invention can be realized with the vector also, with not just one but a plurality of codebook code books are to be provided by pattern vectors. Each code book has a number and it can be selected using this number. Other methods may depend on a parameter. We changed this parameter, there is another mathematical figure. Is the dependence on this parameter, sufficient complex, it will be virtually impossible to guess the change of the authentication information on change of the parameter to. 11 Certain types of neural networks (eg so-called multilayer perceptrons) are suitable for implementation of such figures. With solutions based on such Neural Networks, the PIN is actually not stored anywhere as a string, but only (implicitly encrypted) network architecture and m the weight coefficients.

ER This variant embodiment of the present invention seems particularly in view of the interest that many people benotigen a number of different Paßwortern for very different purposes or devices. It is becoming increasingly difficult to remember these many Paßworter. When using a plurality of methods (Ml, ..., Mn) (mathematical pictures) for calculating a plurality of Authentisierungsmformationen (FPAUTINF1, ..., FPAUTINFn) from a single feature vector (or sensor data set), this problem is user-specific in the detection of inalienable biometrics reduced by suitable sensors.

To select a specific method, a measure of such a process is to be entered only in a context for it to be provided to the user surface. In this way, the data processing means let be set up in accordance with software.

Of course, the biometric features of several persons may be associated with the correct PIN or more proper PINs. Should the unit exceptionally only connection with a person, that is, be usable with only just a SIM card, the release can be additionally genknupft to other security mechanisms such as random codes, etc.. Here, the invention allows any kind of flexibility with the highest reliability and compatibility with the standard. 12 Specifically, at the change of a PIN, a further Nütz ¬ Liche embodiment of the invention may be useful in a display for displaying a Authentiflkationsinformation is provided. Such a display is in many Advised of this type already present in any case and therefore can be used for these purposes. If a user wants his using the keyboard entered, matching SIM card or stored therein Authentiflkationsinformation (AUTINF), such as the PIN others, it may not be available on some method of calculation all possible character numeric

Combinations as PINs at your disposal, such as the code book is smaller than the number of all possible PINs. In this case satisfies a change in the parameter of the calculation method used (for example, changing the code book number, or change in a parameter of a neural network) to the assignment of PINs to the pattern vectors and thus its individual feature vector associated to alter PIN. He could then the PIN on your SIM card (or more generally, the entered PIN) do not change in the same sense, without knowing it. but that is necessary for further use within the meaning of our mission. The changed PIN learn the authorized users, therefore, preferably a corresponding, optionally single brief display this PIN after changing a display of the device. Other solutions (eg postal delivery of the new PIN) are conceivable.

The invention is of course not on mobile phones, in particular restricts loading to mobile phones based on the GSM standard. The skilled artisan will readily recognize from the present description of how the invention can be realized in the case of other devices or systems.

In particular, the invention is not limited to the case that the Prufemheit (PE) m the device is integrated. Figure 2 shows the important case of a device that, for example, is connected via a Kommnikationsnetz with at least one other UNIT 13, m which the test device is located. But even the data processing unit, or the portion of the data processing unit (DE), which is responsible for calculating the Authentiflkationsinformation FPAUTINF from the biometric characteristics BM user must not necessarily are the UNIT. Of course, the device does not have a built-in sensor device (SE) or an integrated keyboard (EE) grout. These facilities can of course also connected m the form of external modules to the unit. These embodiments of the invention should be protected by the method claims.

Claims

14 Patentanspr├╝che
1.) electronic device (EG), in particular for GERAT In ¬ information processing or for telecommunications with a) a sensor device (SE) for detecting biometric features (BM) of a user of Gerätes, in particular for the detection of fingerprints, b) a data processing means (DE) for detecting a serving for the authentication of a user information (FPAUTINF) from erfaßten biometric features, c) an input device (EE) (for the input of information with the Möglichkeit for inputting an authentication information serving to AUTINF) über these input means, d) a Prüfeinrichtung (PE) for the determined Prüfung or entered Authentiflkationsinformation and
Release of device functions f├╝r that user if the Pr├╝fung is successful.
2.) set after claim 1 tung whose Datenverarbeitungsemrich- (DE) can be set up so that inputted to the successful Authentizitatsprufung über the input device Authentiflkationsinformation (PIN) daß identical (with the detected features from the biometric of an authorized user Authentiflkationsinformation FPPIN).
3.) GERAT che according with claim whose data processing device (DE) über a plurality of method (Ml, ..., Mn) grouted, serving erfaßten from the biometric characteristics of a user for authentication information of this user ( FPAUTINF1, ..., FPAUTINFn) to determine.
4.) set after claim 3, whose Datenverarbeitungse - πchtung ermöglicht an approved user, auszuwählen a gewünschtes he method of the plurality of method for determining a cation Authentifi- formation of biometric features. 15
5.) Gerät according to any preceding Ansprüche (with means for displaying an authentication information determined from biometric features of a user FPAUTINF).
6) A method for authentication a user of a Gerätes in which the user has the Möglichkeit to authenticate by means of user-specific biometric characteristics or by entering an authentication information über an information input device, wherein in the first case biometrics of the user are erfaßt by a sensor device and serving for the authentication information is determined from the erfaßten biometric characteristics, which is of a geprüft Prüfeinrichtung, and wherein in the second case, the user über the input device Authentifikati- entered onsinformation by the same Prüfeinrichtung is geprüft.
7) A method for authentication a user of a Gerätes according to claim 6 comprising the steps of: a) determining a feature vector from Meßdaten a sensor device, b) a vector quantization of the calculated feature vector, and c) the Prüfung to a the result of the vector quantization gehörenden authentication information.
EP19980948818 1998-04-21 1998-08-21 Electronic device and method for the authentication of a user of said device Ceased EP1074004A1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19817770 1998-04-21
DE19817770 1998-04-21
PCT/DE1998/002457 WO1999054851A1 (en) 1998-04-21 1998-08-21 Electronic device and method for the authentication of a user of said device

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP20040004846 EP1424659A1 (en) 1998-04-21 1998-08-21 Electronic device and method for authentication of a user of said device

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP20040004846 Division EP1424659A1 (en) 1998-04-21 1998-08-21 Electronic device and method for authentication of a user of said device

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1074004A1 true true EP1074004A1 (en) 2001-02-07

Family

ID=7865306

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP19980948818 Ceased EP1074004A1 (en) 1998-04-21 1998-08-21 Electronic device and method for the authentication of a user of said device
EP20040004846 Withdrawn EP1424659A1 (en) 1998-04-21 1998-08-21 Electronic device and method for authentication of a user of said device

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP20040004846 Withdrawn EP1424659A1 (en) 1998-04-21 1998-08-21 Electronic device and method for authentication of a user of said device

Country Status (5)

Country Link
EP (2) EP1074004A1 (en)
JP (1) JP2002512409A (en)
CN (1) CN1299496A (en)
CA (1) CA2329311A1 (en)
WO (1) WO1999054851A1 (en)

Families Citing this family (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2808153B1 (en) * 2000-04-21 2005-02-04 Sagem Transmission terminal has data memory LOCKED
WO2001088859A3 (en) * 2000-05-18 2002-03-21 Schrijver Stefaan De Smartchip biometric device
EP1172775A1 (en) * 2000-07-10 2002-01-16 Proton World International (Pwi) Method for protecting an access to a secured domain
FR2812097B1 (en) * 2000-07-19 2002-12-13 Sagem input processor and validation of a physical characteristic of a radio terminal user
FR2812098B1 (en) * 2000-07-19 2002-12-13 Sagem Processor generation and electronic signature of transmission and terminal radiotelephony network comprising such a processor
EP1258840A1 (en) * 2001-05-15 2002-11-20 Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V. Method and system for processing identification data
JP2004077967A (en) 2002-08-21 2004-03-11 Sanyo Electric Co Ltd Liquid crystal projector
DE102004042625A1 (en) * 2004-07-02 2006-02-16 Dieter Effmert Security circuit for mobile telephone may be programmed by authorized user with PIN number and fingerprint and has circuit with locking and operating control and alarm and reset circuits
DK1646254T3 (en) 2004-10-11 2008-08-11 Swisscom Mobile Ag A method for identification and authentication based on fingerprint
CN101116114A (en) * 2005-02-10 2008-01-30 皇家飞利浦电子股份有限公司 Improved security device
JP4696608B2 (en) 2005-03-15 2011-06-08 オムロン株式会社 Object identifying device, mobile phone, and subject certification program
JP2007018050A (en) 2005-07-05 2007-01-25 Sony Ericsson Mobilecommunications Japan Inc Portable terminal device, personal identification number certification program, and personal identification number certification method
CN101753682B (en) * 2009-11-27 2012-09-05 华为终端有限公司 Right management method for user identification card and terminal unit
JP5213908B2 (en) * 2010-06-03 2013-06-19 日立オムロンターミナルソリューションズ株式会社 Biometric authentication unit

Family Cites Families (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE2533699A1 (en) * 1975-07-28 1977-02-10 Siemens Ag Security block for data telephone terminal - prevents unauthorised use of terminal by comparing finger print with stored print
EP0504616A1 (en) * 1991-03-19 1992-09-23 Ascom Autelca Ag Method of operating a self-service automatic machine and apparatus for carrying out this method
DE9304488U1 (en) * 1993-03-24 1993-07-29 Siemens Ag, 80333 Muenchen, De
US5598474A (en) * 1994-03-29 1997-01-28 Neldon P Johnson Process for encrypting a fingerprint onto an I.D. card
US5680460A (en) * 1994-09-07 1997-10-21 Mytec Technologies, Inc. Biometric controlled key generation
EP0782724A2 (en) * 1995-07-21 1997-07-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Österreich Electronic data-processing system
WO1998011750A3 (en) * 1996-09-11 1998-04-30 Yang Li Method of using fingerprints to authenticate wireless communications

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
See references of WO9954851A1 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date Type
CA2329311A1 (en) 1999-10-28 application
CN1299496A (en) 2001-06-13 application
WO1999054851A1 (en) 1999-10-28 application
JP2002512409A (en) 2002-04-23 application
EP1424659A1 (en) 2004-06-02 application

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US7360248B1 (en) Methods and apparatus for verifying the identity of a user requesting access using location information
US5648648A (en) Personal identification system for use with fingerprint data in secured transactions
US6052468A (en) Method of securing a cryptographic key
US8200980B1 (en) System and method for enrolling in a biometric system
US6219439B1 (en) Biometric authentication system
US7346778B1 (en) Security method and apparatus for controlling the data exchange on handheld computers
US7797549B2 (en) Secure method and system for biometric verification
US20060058064A1 (en) Mobile communication terminal
US5229764A (en) Continuous biometric authentication matrix
Jansen Authenticating users on handheld devices
US20020083320A1 (en) Method and system for application of a safety marking
US6766456B1 (en) Method and system for authenticating a user of a computer system
US20060200427A1 (en) Systems and methods for securing transactions with biometric information
US20090191846A1 (en) Biometric smart card for mobile devices
US20040039909A1 (en) Flexible authentication with multiple levels and factors
US5280527A (en) Biometric token for authorizing access to a host system
US6944773B1 (en) Method and apparatus for fingerprint authentication during on-line transactions
US8751801B2 (en) System and method for authenticating users using two or more factors
EP0923018A2 (en) Personal authentication system
US20040061593A1 (en) Self-authenticating indentification substrate with encoded packet output
US20070255564A1 (en) Voice authentication system and method
US20040215980A1 (en) Flexible method of user authentication
US20030159051A1 (en) Method for generating electronic signatures
US6765470B2 (en) Mobile electronic apparatus having function of verifying a user by biometrics information
US6934849B2 (en) Method and system for authorizing a commercial transaction

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated contracting states:

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AT CH DE ES FI FR GB GR IT LI NL

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20001011

17Q First examination report

Effective date: 20040210

18R Refused

Effective date: 20050321