EP0655599B1 - Anti-aircraft defence system and defence missile for such a system - Google Patents

Anti-aircraft defence system and defence missile for such a system Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0655599B1
EP0655599B1 EP19940402386 EP94402386A EP0655599B1 EP 0655599 B1 EP0655599 B1 EP 0655599B1 EP 19940402386 EP19940402386 EP 19940402386 EP 94402386 A EP94402386 A EP 94402386A EP 0655599 B1 EP0655599 B1 EP 0655599B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
missile
defence
trajectory
interception
airborne
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Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
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EP19940402386
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP0655599A1 (en
Inventor
Pierre Laures
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Airbus Group SAS
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Airbus Group SAS
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Priority to FR9314082 priority Critical
Priority to FR9314082A priority patent/FR2712972B1/en
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Publication of EP0655599A1 publication Critical patent/EP0655599A1/en
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    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41WEAPONS
    • F41GWEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
    • F41G7/00Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles
    • F41G7/20Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles based on continuous observation of target position
    • F41G7/22Homing guidance systems
    • F41G7/2273Homing guidance systems characterised by the type of waves
    • F41G7/2286Homing guidance systems characterised by the type of waves using radio waves
    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41WEAPONS
    • F41GWEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
    • F41G7/00Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles
    • F41G7/20Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles based on continuous observation of target position
    • F41G7/22Homing guidance systems
    • F41G7/2206Homing guidance systems using a remote control station
    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41WEAPONS
    • F41GWEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
    • F41G7/00Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles
    • F41G7/20Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles based on continuous observation of target position
    • F41G7/22Homing guidance systems
    • F41G7/2213Homing guidance systems maintaining the axis of an orientable seeking head pointed at the target, e.g. target seeking gyro
    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41WEAPONS
    • F41GWEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
    • F41G7/00Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles
    • F41G7/20Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles based on continuous observation of target position
    • F41G7/22Homing guidance systems
    • F41G7/2246Active homing systems, i.e. comprising both a transmitter and a receiver

Description

The present invention relates to an anti-aircraft defense system suitable for intercepting aircraft, for example ballistic, flying at high speed (for example in the range from Mach 3 to Mach 10), as well as a defense missile for such a system.

There is already known (see for example patent FR-A-2,563,000) an air defense system, comprising a fixed control installation and defense missiles, said fixed installation comprising:

  • means for detecting said air vehicles;
  • trajectography means for determining the approach trajectory and the speed of such an air vehicle, detected by said detection means;
  • calculation means for determining an interception trajectory which one of said defense missiles must follow to intercept said detected air vehicle;
  • means for launching said defense missile;
  • means for guiding said defense missile; and
  • means of connection with said defense missile, while each of said defense missiles comprises a propellant system, at least one military charge, an inertial unit, a seeker, piloting organs, means of connection with said fixed control installation and a piloting command generator, elaborating said piloting commands on the basis of information transmitted by said guidance means provided in said fixed control installation and on the basis of information supplied by said seeker.

In such an air defense system, the seeker is located at the front of the defense missile, inside a radome forming the front point of said missile, the axis central of said seeker being confused with the axis longitudinal of said missile, while the trajectory interception tracked by said defense missile is such attack the aerial target from the front or by the back. However, if the air target is very fast, only the frontal attack is realistic.

However, such a frontal attack results in the interception trajectory is necessarily long, from so that the interception time (between launching the missile and the actual interception) is also long and that the interception is done at high altitude. Since the interception time is long, the time available for the preparation of the firing and for the firing of the missile of defense after target detection is very short and the defense system must be located as close as possible to the sites defend against said aircrafts. In addition, since interception takes place at high altitude, it takes place in the upper atmospheric layers, in which the defense missile becomes less maneuverable.

Furthermore, the destruction of an aerial target by impact direct frontal of a defense missile being very improbable, on board said known defense missiles, a conventional military charge capable of projecting around the said missiles a sheaf of shards widely opened, according to a surface of revolution of axis coincident with the longitudinal axis of said missiles.

However, during the frontal attack on a very fast, the relative speed between the defense missile and the target is then practically parallel to the axis of the target, so that only the sheaf portion aimed at said target can eventually reach this and that in this case the direction that said shards arrive on the target is slightly tilted on the axis of said target. For example, if the air target flies at the speed VB = 2000 m / s, while the speed VE of the defense missile is equal to 1000 m / s and that speed VI fragments is equal to 1500 m / s, it is easy to verify that the angle of inclination of the fragments reaching the target is inclined by about 26 degrees on the axis thereof.

From this slight inclination of the burst of splinters relative to the axis of the aerial target, it follows that:

  • said shards reach the rear of a long target, where it is most resistant, due to the location of its propulsive system;
  • said fragments pass behind the target, without touching it, if this target is short;
  • in any case, said fragments reaching the target rebound on it or penetrate only superficially, without causing lethal damage.

To try to remedy these drawbacks resulting from the decrease in the efficiency of conventional flash charges depending on the speed of the air target, we considered different means, such as speed increase flakes, development of a cloud of flakes accompanying the defense missile, development of a rigid "umbrella" around the defense missile, etc. However, none of these means have only proven to be effective, so the systems known air defense systems are only effective for air targets flying at most at Mach 4.

The object of the present invention is to remedy the drawbacks mentioned above and relates to a system of air defense of the type described above for which the interception trajectory and interception time are short, so interception can occur at low altitude and that said system may be distant from a site to protect, while leaving enough time to prepare and fire a defense missile. Of plus, the air defense system according to the invention allows to obtain, when it implements the projection lateral flake, a direction of impact transverse to the axis of the target.

To this end, according to the invention, the anti-aircraft defense system, capable of intercepting high-speed air vehicles, is remarkable in that:

  • at the point common to the approach trajectory of said air vehicle and to the intercept trajectory of said defense missile, said intercept trajectory is transverse to the approach trajectory;
  • the central axis of said seeker is inclined laterally with respect to the axis of said defense missile; and
  • said defense missile is stabilized in roll, so that said central axis of said seeker is disposed on the side of said air vehicle.

So in the air defense system conforming to the present invention, the defense missile observes laterally (not forward, like defense missiles known) and attacks the aerial target transversely (and not from the front or from behind, like missiles from known defense), so the intercept trajectory and interception time are greatly shortened, which provides the benefits mentioned above.

Advantageously, said calculation means determining the interception trajectory of said defense missile:

  • begin by determining said point common to said interception and approach trajectories; then
  • determine, in the vertical plane passing through said common point and through the location of said defense missile on the ground, said interception trajectory of said defense missile from the following three parameters:
    • the vertical distance separating said common point from its horizontal projection;
    • the horizontal distance separating said ground location of the defense missile from said horizontal projection of said common point; and
    • the angle made with the horizontal by the intersection of said vertical plane with the plane normal to said approach trajectory of said air vehicle, at said common point.

In addition, it is advantageous that said calculation means:

  • determine, using said three parameters, the interception time necessary for said defense missile to traverse said interception trajectory between said ground location of the defense missile and said point common to said interception and approach trajectories;
  • continuously calculate the flight time required for said air craft to reach said common point, from its current position, following said approach trajectory; and
  • actuate said launching means of said missile so that said launching means carry out the launching launch thereof when said air vehicle reaches the point of said approach trajectory for which the value of said flight time becomes equal to said interception time .

In addition, so that the seeker of the defense missile can hang said aerial machine while it describes the interception trajectory, we ensure that, at most late at the estimated time of hanging, the central axis of said seeker is in the plane defined by the position of the defense missile, the said common point and the location at this instant of said aerial vehicle, and that this latter plane is used reference plane for the stabilization in roll of said defense missile.

Thus, the essential characteristic of the defense missile anti-aircraft according to the present invention resides in that the central axis of its seeker is inclined laterally with respect to the axis of said defense missile.

Preferably the value of the lateral tilt angle of the central axis of said seeker with respect to the axis of said missile is chosen so that its tangent is at less approximately equal to the ratio between the speed of the spacecraft to be intercepted and the speed of said missile from defense. In the event that said defense missile must intercept a very fast ballistic missile, this angle can be close to 60 degrees.

Of course, in order to facilitate the attachment of the target by the seeker, it is advantageous that said central axis of the seeker is orientable around the position median corresponding to the angle defined above, by example inside a cone whose half angle at the top can be approximately 40 degrees.

The missile according to the present invention can be provided to destroy the aerial target by direct impact or again by blast effect by the explosion of the charge military he wears when said target is at immediate proximity.

However, as is customary and described above, it can have a military charge with side projection of fragments.

In this case, if the speed of the air craft to intercept is very large, it is sufficient to provide that said a burst of splinters is projected laterally, on the side opposite the central axis of the seeker. Indeed, in this case, the relative speed between the defense missile and the target aerial, without being perpendicular to the axis of said missile, is however transverse to this last axis, so that the jet of splinters thrown away from the seeker hits the target at a significant angle to the axis of said target. Using the example above with VB = 2000 m / s, VE = 1000 m / s and VI = 1500 m / s, we easily find that the fragments of said spray hit the aerial target at an angle greater than 60 degrees (compare to the value 26 degrees above).

The disadvantages of ineffective destruction are therefore avoided mentioned above with respect to known systems. The fragments of said lateral sheaf can therefore reach said target in its middle part and penetrate it deeply to destroy it. From what follows, we can easily note that, in this regard, the shards are all the more destructors that the speed of the air craft to intercept is bigger.

We also see that, thanks to the invention, it is useless to scatter the said sheaf all around the defense missile and that, on the contrary, we can concentrate it in the direction opposite the seeker.

In known manner, the defense missile in accordance with the present invention may include a proximity rocket for detect the air craft in the vicinity of the point common to approach and interception trajectories and to command said military charge. Such a proximity rocket could, as is usual, generate a front of conical detection centered on the axis of the defense missile. However, in the present case, it is sufficient that the said proximity rocket forms a detection front in the form of flat sheet, inclined laterally relative to the axis of said missile, on the same side as the central axis of said seeker.

The angle of lateral inclination of said detection front can be approximately 30 degrees.

Preferably, said seeker is arranged in a intermediate part of said defense missile. So, this may no longer have a front radome, so that its front part can be pointed, elongated and tapered to communicate to said defense missile good properties aerodynamics.

The figures in the accompanying drawing will make it clear how the invention can be realized. In these figures, references identical denote similar elements.

Figure 1 is a general schematic view illustrating the implementation of the air defense system in accordance with the present invention.

Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the installation of fixed control of the air defense system of the invention.

Figure 3 shows schematically a defense missile according to the present invention.

Figure 4 is a schematic perspective view illustrating determining the interception trajectory followed by a defense missile.

Figure 5 shows the parameters defining the trajectory interception.

Figure 6 schematically illustrates the start of the phase final of the interception, upon detection of said aerial missile by the proximity missile of the defense missile.

FIG. 7 is a diagram of the speeds at the time of detection illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 8 schematically illustrates the impact of the sheaf of fragments on said air vehicle.

The anti-aircraft defense system according to the invention, illustrated schematically in Figure 1, includes an installation monitoring and control 1, arranged on the ground G, thus than a set of air defense missiles 2. When a enemy air craft, including a ballistic missile to high speed, is detected and identified by the installation 1 (arrow E), this determines, using radars and calculators it includes, the opportunity and the conditions interception of the device 3.

If the interception is decided, the installation 1 determines the speed VB of the enemy machine 3, which then becomes the target to be shot down, as well as the approach trajectory T followed by said machine 3, and calculates a trajectory of interception t to be followed by a defense missile 2, awaiting launch at a location A, to intercept the missile 3 at a point F, at which said trajectories T and t intersect at an angle at least substantially equal to 90 degrees. The installation 1 then proceeds to launch said defense missile 2, at an instant such that, taking into account the speed possibilities of a defense missile 2, the latter and said missile 3 are at the same instant at point F, or at least in the vicinity of this point.

As will be seen below, each defense missile 2 includes electronic guidance means capable of cooperate with installation 1 and a seeker associated with an inertial unit.

Firstly, a missile 2 follows a launching trajectory (which may not coincide with the trajectory t ) entirely determined by the cooperation of installation 1 and electronic guidance means on board said missile 2. Then, always thanks to this cooperation via a radio transmission symbolized by the arrows f , the installation 1 obliges the defense missile 2 to follow the interception trajectory t in the direction of the interception point F. Finally, when the missile 2 is close enough to missile 3 and the latter has been hooked by the seeker of said missile 2, the latter is guided on said missile by the action of said seeker.

The destruction of missile 3 by defense missile 2 is then obtained by the command of a military charge, carried by said missile 2.

As shown in FIG. 2, the monitoring and control installation 1 usually comprises:

  • a device 4, provided with an antenna 5, for the surveillance of the air space to be protected, as well as for the detection and identification of air vehicles 3. The device 4 may comprise a surveillance radar or else a system of optoelectronic watch. It is quite obvious that the device 4 conditions the effective possibility of an interception and that the time available for this interception is all the greater the more the detection and identification of the machine 3 takes place at a longer distance;
  • a tracking device 6 which, on the basis of the information received from the monitoring and detection device 4, measures the characteristics of the target 3 (position and speed) and calculates the approach trajectory T. The device 6 may include a radar usual trajectography;
  • a computing device 7 which, on the basis of the information received from the tracking device 6 and in particular as a function of the characteristics of defense missiles 2, determines the optimal interception trajectory t for a defense missile 2, as well as the instant of launch shot of the latter;
  • a device 8, provided with an antenna 9, for guiding the defense missile 2 in flight towards the interception point F; and
  • a defense missile launching device 10 2, commanding them by a link 11, receiving information for preparing to launch a missile 2 from the monitoring and detection device 4 via a link 12 and receiving the firing order and the launch conditions from the calculation device 7, via a link 13.

The example of defense missile 2 of axis L-L, shown schematically in Figure 3, has a system propellant 20 disposed at the rear; at least one charge flashing military 21; an equipment compartment 22 enclosing an inertial unit, a computer and a transmitter radioelectric; 23 aerodynamic control surfaces fitted movable at the end of wings 24; a device 25 for the control of mobile aerodynamic control surfaces 23; a seeker adjustable in orientation 26; electronics 27 associated with said seeker 26; a side window 28 for the passage of the seeker beam 26; a proximity rocket 29; and a pointed front end 30 and tapered.

Obviously, instead of having control surfaces aerodynamics of piloting 23, defense missile 2 could be provided with a force piloting system, comprising in known manner side nozzles supplied by controllable gas jets.

Furthermore, in FIG. 3, the seeker has been illustrated. orientable 26 in the form of an aerial seeker mobile. It is of course possible to use antennas electronically controlled, said static antennas then being pressed against the side wall of missile 2 at the location of the side window 28, which then no more object.

Whatever the practical embodiment of the seeker 26 and its antenna (s) 26, it should be noted that, according to essential characteristics of the present invention:

  • the seeker 26 is not placed at the front of the missile 2, but in a longitudinally intermediate position between the front tip 30 and the rear propellant system 20, so that the rounded radome usually provided at the front of the defense missiles known can be replaced by the tapered tip 30, allowing the elongation of the missile 2 and improving the aerodynamic performance thereof. Missile 2 can therefore be faster and more efficient;
  • the central axis AD of the seeker 26 is not merged with the axis LL of the missile 2, as is always the case in known defense missiles, but on the contrary is inclined laterally by an angle Θ1 relative to to the axis LL of said missile, on one side thereof. This angle Θ1 is a function of the speed VE of the defense missile 2 and the speed VB of the air vehicle to be intercepted. More precisely, tgΘ1 = VB / VE (see Figure 7). We note that if VB = 2000 m / s and VE = 1000 m / s, Θ1 is equal to 63.5 degrees. Furthermore, by rotation of the mobile antenna of the seeker 26 or by control of the static antennas thereof, the central axis AD can have a clearance ΔΘ, on either side of the median position corresponding to l 'angle Θ1. In order to be able to cover a wide speed range for air vehicles 3 to be intercepted, the central axis AD is oriented by construction at an angle Θ1 of about 60 degrees, with a travel ΔΘ of the order of 40 degrees in all directions. around said middle position;
  • the proximity rocket 29 is placed at the front of the missile 2, between the point 30 and the equipment compartment 22. It generates a detection front FP, inclined laterally by an angle Θ2 relative to the axis LL of the missile 2, on the same side as the central axis AD of the seeker 26. The angle Θ2 can be of the order of 30 degrees and is possibly modifiable. As will be readily understood from the following, the detection front FP of the proximity rocket 29 may have the form of a flat sheet, instead of that usual of a cone of angle Θ2 centered on the axis LL . As has been mentioned for the seeker 26, the proximity rocket can comprise a rotary antenna or else a static antenna with electronic control in order to be able to modify the angle Θ2 and orient by tilting said detection front FP in order to improve the conditions detection of air craft 2; and
  • the military flash charge 21 is capable of projecting a burst of splinters in an average direction I, at least substantially perpendicular to the axis LL of the defense missile 2, on the side opposite to the central axis AD of the seeker 26 and at the detection front FP of the proximity rocket 29.

The devices 4, 6 and 10 of installation 1 (figure 2) can be similar to known devices and work identically to these.

On the other hand, the devices 7 and 8 have particularities schematically illustrated by Figures 4 and 5.

As mentioned above, the tracking device 6 address to the information calculation device concerning the approach path T, the positions of the aerial vehicle 3 on the trajectory T and the speed VB of said air vehicle. From this information, as well as maneuverability and location Defense missile 2 (and other factors, such as drop point of debris from intercepted device 3), the calculation device 7 determines a point F of the trajectory of approach T favorable to interception.

If we consider the vertical plane AHF passing through the points A and F (H being the horizontal projection of the point F on the ground G), it is advantageous that the interception trajectory t is plane and is in this plane ( see figure 4).

In addition, as according to an essential feature of the present invention, the missile 2 must intercept the air vehicle 3 crosswise, the tangent tg to the trajectory t at point F is orthogonal to the trajectory T. It is therefore in the normal plane π in F to the trajectory T. This tangent tg thus happens to be the intersection of the vertical plane AHF and the plane π.

If we examine the interception trajectory t in the AHF plane (see Figure 5), we can easily understand that this trajectory is perfectly defined by the initial tangent ti, for example vertical, at point A, by the horizontal distance X separating the points A and H, by the vertical distance Z separating points F and H, and by the angle a made by the tangent tg with the horizontal, at the interception point F. Taking into account the specific characteristics of the defense missile 2 , the interception time DI (duration between the launch firing and the arrival at point F of the missile 2 along the trajectory t ) is therefore defined by the three parameters X, Z and α. The latter can advantageously be tabulated a priori so that the firing parameters (instant of departure of the missile and guidance orders by the device 8) are established in a very short time.

Thus, the algorithm of the computing device 7 performs the following operations:

  • determination of a favorable interception point F;
  • determination of the vertical plane AHF, passing through said favorable interception point F and through location A of the defense missile 2;
  • determination of the horizontal projection H of the favorable interception point F;
  • determination of the horizontal distance X between location A and point H;
  • determination of the vertical distance Z between the favorable interception point F and the point H;
  • determination of the normal plane π at F to the trajectory T of the air vehicle 3;
  • determination of the angle of inclination α, with respect to the horizontal, of the intersection tg of the vertical plane AHF and the plane π;
  • determination of the trajectory t of the defense missile 2, in the vertical plane AHF, from the parameters X, Z and α; and
  • determination of the interception time DI of the defense missile 2 along the trajectory t .

In addition, this algorithm determines the point C of the trajectory t from which the seeker of the missile of defense is able to hang the airship and the point D of the trajectory T corresponding to the estimated position of said aerial vehicle at the moment of attachment (see figure 4).

Furthermore, from the information provided by the tracking device 6, the computer 7 calculates at at all times the DV flight time required by the craft aerial 3 to reach point F following the trajectory T. Of course, for an interception to be possible, it when determining the interception time DI, the flight time DV of craft 3 is greater than DI. However, the DV flight time is constantly decreasing and, from that its value becomes equal to DI, the launch device 10, controlled by the computing device 7 (by the link 13), fire said defense missile 2.

Thus, as soon as an aerial vehicle 3 to be intercepted is detected and identified by the device 4,5, the latter informs the launching device 10 (by the link 12), as well as the tracking device 6. Consequently, a defense missile 2 is prepared for launch fire by the device 10 (by the link 11), while the calculation device 7 determines, as described above, the approach trajectory T, the point of interception F, interception trajectory t , interception time DI and flight time DV.

At the moment when the air vehicle 3 reaches said point B, the launching device 10 launches said defense missile 2, for example vertically.

By the radio link (arrows f) between the guidance device 8,9 and the defense missile 2, the latter is then guided on the interception trajectory t , in a manner similar to the known technique. The device 8, 9 checks the trajectory of the defense missile 2 and, optionally, modifies the acceleration of said missile 2 around said interception trajectory, according to the most recent data of the trajectory of the air vehicle and of the missile. of defense, so that the interception of said aerial vehicle 3 can take place at a point F, which is then re-specified by the computing device 7. The guidance device 8, 9 then controls the missile 2 by rolling, so that the central axis AD of the seeker 26 remains in a plane passing through the interception point F and the positions of the missile 2 and the air vehicle 3 at least from the moment when the missile 2 has reached point C .

In flight, the seeker 26 performs the space scan directed towards the air vehicle by moving the axis AD in the corner cone at the top ΔΘ.

As soon as the seeker 26 has hooked up the air vehicle 3, the guidance of the missile 2 is taken over by said seeker and the associated electronics, which maintain said missile 2 on the interception trajectory t .

In the terminal phase of interception, the front of FP detection of the proximity rocket 29 of the missile of defense 2 detects a point Q from the front of air craft 3. As soon as this point Q is detected, the proximity rocket 29 commands the military flash charge 21 and it projects its sheaf of shards in direction I, substantially perpendicular to the L-L axis of missile 2 and directed towards the side opposite the FP detection front (see Figure 6).

If, as shown in figure 7, we compose the speeds in play at the time of the spray projection shards, we see that the relative speed VR between the defense missile 2 and air craft 3, due to a share, respective values of the VE speed of said missile 2 and of the speed VB of said machine 3 and, on the other hand, of the quasi-orthogonality of these speeds VE and VB in the vicinity of the point F, is inclined to the speed VB of said machine 3, thus that on the speed VI of the bursts of the spray projected by the military charge 21, since then said speed VI is substantially parallel to the speed VB of the machine 3.

As a result, the relative speed VIR of said flakes, resulting of the composition of speeds VI and VR, is tilted by significant angle Θj on the speed VB.

As a result, the shards penetrate inside the aerial vehicle 3, following the direction IR, at an angle Θj important favorable to the destruction of said machine (see the figure 8). In addition, the impact of the splinters is close to the front end of air craft 3 due to the high value of the angle Θj (sixty degrees in the example described above). Of course, if a slight delay appears in command of military charge 21 after detection from point Q of air craft 3, the chips reach the latter in a direction IR ', substantially parallel at IR, but more towards the rear of said aerial vehicle (figure 8).

Thus, thanks to the present invention, it is possible to attack targets 3 faster than the known frontal attack systems, with greater very simple efficiency and control of the terminal phase, because the time window for igniting charge 21 is relatively larger. In addition, we will notice that a defense missile 2 speed VE increased by the invention is favorable to the efficiency of the load (on FIG. 7, we see that the larger VE, the more Θj increases), whereas it is unfavorable for a missile of defense with frontal attack.

Claims (13)

  1. Air defence system capable of intercepting high-speed airborne missiles (3), including a fixed control installation (1) and defence missiles (2), the said fixed installation (1) comprising:
    means (4, 5) for detecting the said airborne missiles (3);
    trajectory calculation means (6) for determining the approach trajectory (T) and the speed of such an airborne missile (3), detected by the said detection means (4, 5);
    calculation means (7) for determining an interception trajectory (t) which one of the said defence missiles (2) has to follow in order to intercept the said detected airborne missile (3);
    means (10) for launching the said defence missile (2);
    means (8) for guiding the said defence missile (2); and
    means (9, 11) for linking with the said defence missile (2), while each of the said defence missiles (2) includes a propulsion system (20), at least one warhead (21), an inertial unit (22), a homing head (26), steering devices (23), means for linking (22) with the said fixed control installation (1) and a steering commands generator (25) deriving the said steering commands from information sent by the said guidance means (8) provided in the said fixed control installation and from information delivered by the said homing head (26),
    characterized in that:
    at the point (F) common to the approach trajectory (T) of the said airborne missile (3) and to the interception trajectory (t) of the said defence missile (2), the said interception trajectory is transversal to the approach trajectory;
    the central axis (AD) of the said homing head (26) is inclined laterally with respect to the axis (L-L) of the said defence missile (2);
    the said calculation means (7) estimate the moment at which the said homing head (26) locks on to the said airborne missile;
    the said defence missile (2) is roll-stabilized, so that the said central axis (AD) of the said homing head is arranged on the side of the said airborne missile (3); and
    at the latest at the estimated moment of lock-on to the airborne missile (3) by the homing head (26) of the defence missile (2), the central axis (AD) of the said homing head (26) is in the plane (CFD) defined by the position (C) of the missile (2) at this instant, the said common point (F) and the said point (D) corresponding to the position of the said airborne missile (3) at this instant, this latter plane (CFD) serving as reference plane for the roll stabilization of the said defence missile (2).
  2. Air defence system according to Claim 1, characterized in that the said calculating means (7) determining the interception trajectory (t) of the said defence missile (2):
    start by determining the said point (F) common to the said interception and approach trajectories (t, T); then
    in the vertical plane (AHF) passing through the said common point (F) and through the site (A) of the said defence missile (2) on the ground, determine the said interception trajectory (t) of the said defence missile (2) from the following three parameters:
    the vertical distance (Z) separating the said common point (F) from its horizontal projection (H) on the ground (G);
    the horizontal distance (X) separating the said site of the defence missile (2) on the ground (A) from the said horizontal projection (H) of the said common point (F); and
    the angle (α) which the intersection (tg) of the said vertical plane (AHF) with the plane (π) normal to the said approach trajectory (T) of the said airborne missile (3), at the said common point (F), makes with the horizontal.
  3. Air defence system according to Claim 2, characterized in that the said calculation means (7):
    with the aid of the said three parameters (Z, X, α), determine the interception time (DI) necessary for the said defence missile (2) to cover the said interception trajectory (t) between the said site of the defence missile (2) on the ground (A) and the said point (F) common to the said interception and approach trajectories (t, T);
    continuously calculate the flight time (DV) necessary for the said airborne missile (3) to reach the said common point (F) from its current position, by following the said approach trajectory (T); and
    actuate the said means (10) of launching the said missile (2) so that the said means (10) perform the launch firing of the missile when the said airborne missile (3) reaches the point (B) of the said approach trajectory for which the value of the said flight time (DV) becomes equal to the said interception time (DI).
  4. Air defence missile, adapted to the defence system of Claim 1 to intercept high-speed airborne missiles abeam, including a propulsion motor (20), at least one warhead (21), an inertial unit (22), a homing head (26), steering devices (23) and a steering command generator (25),
    characterized in that the central axis (AD) to the said homing head (26) is laterally inclined with respect to the axis (L-L) of the said missile (2) and in that the value (1) of the lateral inclination angle of the central axis (AD) of the said homing head (26) with respect to the axis (L-L) of the said missile is chosen in such a way that its tangent is at least approximately equal to the ratio between the speed of the airborne missile to be intercepted and the speed of the said defence missile.
  5. Missile according to Claim 4,
    characterized in that the said value (1) of the lateral inclination angle of the central axis (AD) of the homing head is at least approximately equal to 60 degrees.
  6. Missile according to one of Claims 4 or 5,
    characterized in that the central axis (AD) of the said homing head can be oriented about its mid position corresponding to the said value (1).
  7. Missile according to Claim 6,
    characterized in that the said central axis (AD) of the homing head (26) can be oriented within a cone, the axis of which is formed by the said mid position.
  8. Missile according to one of Claims 4 to 7,
    characterized in that the said warhead (21) is able to project a shower of fragments laterally, on the side opposite the said central axis (AD) of the homing head (26).
  9. Missile according to Claim 8,
    characterized in that the central direction (I) of the said shower of fragments is at least substantially perpendicular to the axis of the said missile.
  10. Missile according to one of Claims 4 to 9, further including a proximity fuse (29) for detecting such a missile and controlling the said warhead,
    characterized in that the said proximity fuse (29) forms a detection front (FP) in the form of a plane layer, inclined laterally with respect to the axis (L-L) of the said missile, on the same side as the central axis (AD) of the said homing head (26).
  11. Missile according to Claim 10,
    characterized in that the lateral inclination angle (2) of the detection front (FP) of the said proximity fuse with respect to the axis of the missile is at least approximately equal to 30 degrees.
  12. Missile according to one of Claims 4 to 11,
    characterized in that the said homing head (26) is arranged in an intermediate part of the said missile (2).
  13. Missile according to Claim 12,
    characterized in that it does not include a front radome and in that its front part is pointed and tapered.
EP19940402386 1993-11-25 1994-10-24 Anti-aircraft defence system and defence missile for such a system Expired - Lifetime EP0655599B1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR9314082 1993-11-25
FR9314082A FR2712972B1 (en) 1993-11-25 1993-11-25 Air defense system and defense missile for such a system.

Publications (2)

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EP0655599A1 EP0655599A1 (en) 1995-05-31
EP0655599B1 true EP0655599B1 (en) 1998-07-08

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US (1) US5464174A (en)
EP (1) EP0655599B1 (en)
JP (1) JP3630181B2 (en)
CA (1) CA2134578C (en)
DE (1) DE69411514T2 (en)
ES (1) ES2119983T3 (en)
FR (1) FR2712972B1 (en)
IL (1) IL111419A (en)

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ES2119983T3 (en) 1998-10-16
DE69411514D1 (en) 1998-08-13
FR2712972B1 (en) 1996-01-26
IL111419A (en) 1998-02-22
JPH07190695A (en) 1995-07-28
IL111419D0 (en) 1995-01-24
US5464174A (en) 1995-11-07
CA2134578C (en) 2005-05-24
DE69411514T2 (en) 1998-12-10
CA2134578A1 (en) 1995-05-26
JP3630181B2 (en) 2005-03-16
EP0655599A1 (en) 1995-05-31
FR2712972A1 (en) 1995-06-02

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