CN112731462B - Positioning method and system of navigation deception jamming source - Google Patents

Positioning method and system of navigation deception jamming source Download PDF

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CN112731462B
CN112731462B CN202110337313.6A CN202110337313A CN112731462B CN 112731462 B CN112731462 B CN 112731462B CN 202110337313 A CN202110337313 A CN 202110337313A CN 112731462 B CN112731462 B CN 112731462B
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measuring device
navigation
equation
signal
time synchronization
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CN112731462A (en
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刘志俭
明德祥
钟小鹏
乔纯捷
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Changsha Beidou Industrial Safety Technology Research Institute Co ltd
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Changsha Technology Research Institute Of Beidou Industry Safety Co ltd
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/35—Constructional details or hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
    • G01S19/37—Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
  • Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of satellite navigation, and particularly provides a positioning method and a positioning system for a navigation deception jamming source. And receiving and processing deception jamming signals at different positions through at least two measuring devices synchronized in time, and outputting pseudo range information of the navigation deception signals including satellites. And for the same satellite in the navigation deception jamming source, taking a certain measuring device as a reference device, and subtracting pseudo-range values measured by other measuring devices from the pseudo-range values measured by the reference device to obtain a pseudo-range distance difference. And establishing an equation set by taking the navigation deception jamming source as an unknown quantity based on the distance difference and the position of the known measuring device to obtain the position of the navigation deception jamming source. The invention can quickly determine the position of a static or dynamic weak navigation deception jamming source through a plurality of measuring devices with synchronous time.

Description

Positioning method and system of navigation deception jamming source
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of satellite navigation, in particular to a positioning method and a positioning system for a navigation deception jamming source.
Background
The satellite navigation deception jamming source is a low-power satellite navigation jamming device, the transmitting power of the satellite navigation deception jamming source is only milliwatt level, after the satellite navigation deception jamming source is spread in a certain distance space, the deception signal power is even lower than the environmental noise, but still higher than a real satellite navigation signal, and the satellite navigation jamming source can jam the satellite navigation device in use, so that the satellite navigation device outputs wrong position and time, and therefore, greater potential safety hazards are brought.
Existing spoofing interference source locating technologies mainly include angle of arrival (AOA), Received Signal Strength (RSS), time difference of arrival (TDOA), frequency difference of arrival (FDOA), etc., but these technologies mainly suppress interference for high power, and spoofing interference is low in power, these technologies cannot locate spoofing interference sources, for example, a conventional radio directional locating device may find abnormal signals significantly higher than a noise floor through a method of spectral analysis, and for a micropower navigation spoofing interference signal, when the radio directional locating device is at a certain distance from an interference source, the power of the spoofing interference signal is only slightly higher than the noise floor, even lower than the noise floor, so that the conventional radio detection device cannot locate the interference source; meanwhile, the existing navigation countermeasure technology mainly aims at identifying and eliminating the navigation deception signal and cannot effectively position the interference source. Therefore, a method for locating a navigation spoofing interference source is urgently needed.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a method and a system for positioning a navigation deception jamming source, which are simple and efficient to operate, wherein a navigation deception signal source can be positioned by at least two measuring devices with synchronous time, and the following technical scheme is specifically adopted:
a method of locating a source of navigational spoofing interference, comprising:
S1.
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
the measuring devices in time synchronization receive navigation deception jamming signals at different positions, wherein N is not less than 2;
s2, the measuring device processes the navigation deception signal and outputs pseudo-range information of the measuring device to the satellite, and the pseudo-range information is recorded as
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
The number is assigned to the measuring device,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
numbering satellites in the navigation spoofing signal,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
the number of satellites contained in the navigation deception signal is M ≧ 1;
s3, arbitrarily choose the second
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
Using the measuring device as a reference measuring device, calculating the non-reference measuring device and the reference measuring device
Figure 925671DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
Range difference of pseudo range of number satellite
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
Wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
And is
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
；
And S4, establishing an equation system based on the distance difference and the position of the known measuring device by taking the position of the navigation deception jamming source as an unknown quantity, and obtaining the position of the navigation deception jamming source.
Further, in step S1, the time synchronization further includes frequency synchronization.
Further, in step S1, the time synchronization includes time synchronization with the GNSS system.
Further, in step S3, when the navigation spoofing signal includes the navigation spoofing signal
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
For the first satellite signal
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
A non-reference measuring device and the reference measuring device respectively output to
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
Calculating the difference of pseudo range of the satellite
Figure 207527DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
A distance difference, calculating
Figure 580739DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
Mean value of individual distance difference
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
Wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
And is
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
。
Further, when N =2, the position of the navigation spoofing interference source is determined on a curved surface of a three-dimensional space; when N =3, the position of the navigation spoofing interference source is determined on a curve; when N ≧ 4, the position of the navigation deception jamming source is determined at a point position within two.
Further, if N <4, a plurality of pseudo ranges are obtained by measuring at different point positions through the mobile non-reference measuring device, and the navigation deception jamming source is positioned based on a plurality of distance differences obtained by the pseudo ranges output by the reference measuring device.
The invention further provides a positioning system of a navigation deception jamming source, which comprises a time synchronization unit, N measuring devices for measuring N different positions of navigation deception jamming signals, and a processing unit, wherein N is not less than 2; the above-mentioned
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
The measuring devices at different positions receive the navigation deception jamming signals based on the time synchronization unit and output pseudo range information of at least one satellite contained in the navigation deception jamming signals; the processing unit collects
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
And processing the obtained pseudo range information by the measuring device, and calculating to obtain the position of the navigation deception jamming source.
Further, the time synchronization unit is based on its own frequency reference or synchronizes the GNSS system time frequency.
Further, the different positions include equidistant positions or non-equidistant positions; the measuring device is connected with the processing unit in a wired or wireless mode.
Further, the time frequency transmission from the time synchronization unit to each measuring device adopts a star-shaped, daisy chain topology structure or a distributed structure.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages and positive effects that:
1. positioning weak navigation spoofing interference signals: the invention provides a method for positioning a deception jamming source of navigation by utilizing more than two positioning devices based on reference frequency synchronization to perform pseudo-range measurement on the same deception jamming signal of navigation at different measurement positions, and realizes the positioning of the deception jamming source of navigation by calculating pseudo-range difference and the measurement positions, wherein the deception jamming source can be quickly and effectively positioned no matter a generating deception jamming source or a forwarding deception jamming source, and compared with the technologies of an arrival angle (AOA), Received Signal Strength (RSS), arrival Time Difference (TDOA), arrival Frequency Difference (FDOA) and the like in the positioning of the existing deception jamming source of navigation, the method overcomes the problem that the traditional spectrum measurement technology cannot process weak signals, and realizes the positioning of weak deception jamming signals of navigation;
2. through a plurality of time synchronization measuring devices, the area/position of the interference source can be quickly determined, and dynamic and static navigation deception interference source positioning can be effectively solved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a method according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 7 is a schematic view of a measuring apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the technical solutions of the present invention better understood, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The invention will be described in further detail below with reference to the drawings and specific examples.
Fig. 1 shows a schematic flow diagram of a method according to the embodiment, including:
S1.
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
the measuring device with synchronous time receives the navigation deception jamming signals at different positions;
in particular in the step S1, the user,
Figure 585736DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
the time synchronization of the individual measuring devices can be carried out in a variety of ways, including star-shaped structures, daisy-chained structures or distributed structures. In the star structure and the daisy chain structure, a unified time-frequency unit generates a local PPS and/or a reference frequency signal, and then the local PPS and/or the reference frequency signal is transmitted to each measuring device in a wired or wireless mode; furthermore, the local time-frequency unit can realize the taming of the local clock by receiving the GNSS signal, and realize the synchronization of the local satellite navigation time-frequency. In a distributed structure, each measuring device is provided with a local time-frequency unit, specifically, only the reference frequency needs to be synchronized, so that the synchronization in the invention can be realized, and the time-frequency unit realizes the domestication of a local clock and the synchronization of GNSS time-frequency by receiving GNSS signals, thereby realizing the time synchronization of all measuring devices.
In the present embodiment, in step S1, each measuring device is disposed at a different position, and receives the navigation spoofing signal, where the position where the measuring device is disposed is known, and both the measuring devices can normally receive the spoofing navigation disturbing signal; when there are more than 3 measuring devices, time-frequency synchronization is preferably achieved wirelessly. A plurality of time synchronization modules are arranged in the time synchronization unit, each time synchronization module corresponds to different measuring devices, and the time synchronization modules are mutually synchronized.
S2, the measuring device processes the navigation deception signal and outputs pseudo range information of at least one satellite contained in the navigation deception signal, and the pseudo range information is recorded as
Figure 478736DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
The number is assigned to the measuring device,
Figure 363516DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
to navigate the satellite numbers in the spoofed signal,
Figure 99391DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
the number of satellite signals contained in the spoofed signal is navigated.
Specifically, in step S2, the measurement device processes spoofed navigation signals, where the spoofed navigation signals usually include more than one satellite navigation signal, and the measurement device may process signals of one or more satellites and output one or more pseudoranges; when only one satellite navigation signal is processed, all the measurement devices are required to output the pseudo-ranges of the same satellite navigation signal in the navigation spoofing signal in the present embodiment.
S3, arbitrarily choose the second
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
Using the measuring device as a reference measuring device, calculating other non-reference measuring device and reference measuring device pairs
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Distance difference of satellite number
Figure 577252DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
Wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
And is
Figure 59180DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
；
Specifically in step S3, it is possible to obtain
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
A distance difference.
In another embodiment, in step S3, if the navigation fraud signal exists
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
A satellite signal to
Figure 193489DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
Non-reference measuring device, reference measuring device
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
Are respectively output to
Figure 744556DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
Calculating the difference of pseudo range of the satellite
Figure 950410DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
A distance difference is obtained
Figure 739374DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
Average value of distance differences, i.e.
Figure 247847DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
As a first
Figure 755052DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
Non-reference measuring device, reference measuring device
Figure 499017DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
Is output to
Figure 470384DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
The range difference of the pseudo range of the particle satellite can further reduce the ranging error, and the obtained navigation deception jamming source is more accurate in positioning.
And S4, establishing an equation set by taking the position of the navigation deception jamming source as an unknown quantity and based on the distance difference and the known positions of the measuring devices, so as to obtain the position of the navigation deception jamming source, wherein the position can be an area or a specific coordinate point position.
The specific calculation method is as follows:
with the first measuring device as the origin, a Cartesian three-dimensional rectangular coordinate system is established
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
The position of the interference source of navigation deception in the coordinate system is
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
；
S11, in the coordinate system
Figure 146828DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
In the first position, the second measuring device is placed
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Is known, and
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
the first measuring device and the second measuring device are time-synchronized;
s12, the first measuring device and the second measuring device process the navigation deception signal at the same time, and output pseudo range information of at least one satellite contained in the navigation deception signal, wherein the pseudo range information is respectively
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
，
Figure 829745DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
Spoofing signals for navigationThe number of the satellite in (1),
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
the number of satellite signals contained in the navigation spoofing signal;
s13, calculating a pair of the first measuring device and the second measuring device
Figure 111821DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Pseudorange difference of number satellite
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
；
S14, when more than 2 measuring devices exist, respectively arranging a third measuring device, a fourth measuring device and a fifth measuring device at second positions
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
Third position
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
The fourth position
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
In the navigation spoofing signal simultaneously with the first measuring device
Figure 888760DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
Pseudo range difference is obtained after number satellite is processed
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
；
S15, establishing an equation set according to the pseudo range difference obtained by the measurement result:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
the equation (2) -the equation (1), the equation (4) -the equation (3) are respectively obtained
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Equation (6) -equation (5) can be solved
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Will be
Figure 129248DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Can be solved by substituting equation (5) or (6)
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
；
The same equation (3) -equation (1) and equation (4) -equation (2) are obtained
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
It is known that
Figure 689674DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Or equation (8) -equation (7) to solve
Figure 119649DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Will be
Figure 65609DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Can be solved by substituting equation (7) or (8)
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
(ii) a It is known that
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE049
Can solve the problem by substituting equation (0)
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
。
More preferably, the steps S11, S12, S13 and S14 are repeated more than three times, and the mean value of the pseudo-range differences is substituted into the step S15 to form an equation set, so that the ranging error is reduced, and the obtained positioning of the navigation deception jamming source is more accurate.
Specifically, in step S3, when
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE051
When the three-dimensional space curved surface is used, only one pseudo-range difference exists, the position of the navigation deception jamming source can be determined to be on the three-dimensional space curved surface, and the distance difference from any point on the curved surface to the two measuring devices is equal; when in use
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
When the distance difference exists, the position of the navigation deception jamming source can be determined to be on a three-dimensional space curve, and the distance difference from any point on the curve to the three measuring devices meets the equation in the step S3; when in use
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE053
If so, determining point positions of the navigation deception jamming sources within two point positions by using three distance differences, wherein the distance differences between the point positions and the four measuring devices meet the equation in the step S3; when in use
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
In time, a unique navigation spoofing source location may be determined, the location
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
The distance difference of each measuring device satisfies the equation of step S3.
In another embodiment, when the number of the measurement devices is less than four, a plurality of pseudoranges may be obtained by moving the non-reference measurement device to measure at different point locations, and a plurality of range differences obtained based on the pseudoranges output from the reference measurement device, which is equivalent to a positioning of the navigation spoofing interference source by more than four measurement devices, are obtained based on the plurality of range differences. If there are only 2 measuring devices, then the second measuring device is moved to different positions according to step S15, and a plurality of pseudorange differences can be obtained as follows:
s151, repeating the steps S12, S13 and S14 three times, wherein the second measuring device is respectively arranged at the second position
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
Third position
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE057
The fourth position
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
In the navigation spoofing signal simultaneously with the first measuring device
Figure 569009DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Pseudo range difference is obtained after number satellite is processed
Figure 475785DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
，
Figure 489877DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
，
Figure 696868DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
；
S16, establishing an equation set according to the pseudo range difference obtained by the measurement result:
Figure 154525DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
the equation (2) -the equation (1), the equation (4) -the equation (3) are respectively obtained
Figure 548597DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Equation (6) -equation (5) can be solved
Figure 100801DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Will be
Figure 427878DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Can be solved by substituting equation (5) or (6)
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE059
；
The same equation (3) -equation (1) and equation (4) -equation (2) are obtained
Figure 256769DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
It is known that
Figure 138137DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Or equation (8) -equation (7) to solve
Figure 431715DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Will be
Figure 941194DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Can be solved by substituting equation (7) or (8)
Figure 396446DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
(ii) a It is known that
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
Can solve the problem by substituting equation (0)
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE061
。
In the above calculation process of the present invention, only the most direct and simple coordinate letters are used for representation, and any letter can be calculated according to the actual numerical value.
The invention provides a positioning system of a navigation deception jamming source, and figure 2 shows a system composition schematic diagram of the embodiment, wherein the positioning system comprises a time synchronization unit,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
Measuring devices arranged at different positions, e.g. measuringMeasuring device 1 … … measuring device 2, and a processing unit. Wherein the time synchronization unit is
Figure 312581DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
The measuring device provides a time frequency signal which can be transmitted by wire or wirelessly;
Figure 472167DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
the measuring device outputs pseudo range of at least one same navigation satellite in the navigation deception signal based on the same time frequency signal; the processing unit calculates other non-reference measuring device and reference measuring device pairs by taking one measuring device as a reference measuring device according to the acquired satellite pseudo-range information
Figure 39414DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
And establishing an equation set according to the pseudo-range difference of the navigation satellite and the known positions of the measuring devices, and calculating the position of the navigation deception jamming source to finish positioning.
Specifically, in the present embodiment, the time synchronization unit may be based on its own frequency reference, and may also synchronize the time frequency of the GNSS system as long as the time frequencies of the respective measurement devices are kept consistent.
In another embodiment, the positions of the arrangement of the measuring devices are different and can be arranged in equidistant positions or non-equidistant positions; the measuring device is in wired or wireless connection with the time unit and the processing unit; in other embodiments, each of the measuring devices includes a time synchronization unit, and each of the time synchronization units performs synchronization wirelessly; or when one of the measuring devices is the measuring device comprising the time synchronization unit, and the other measuring devices are connected with the measuring device comprising the time synchronization unit, a topological structure can be formed between the measuring devices.
In another embodiment, the time-frequency transmission from the time synchronization unit to each measurement device is in a star, daisy chain topology or distributed structure, so as to ensure that each measurement device has the same frequency directly and simultaneously.
According to the scheme shown in FIG. 3A time synchronization unit comprising
Figure 603251DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Each time synchronization module corresponds to each measuring device respectively: time synchronization module 1 corresponds to measuring device 1 … … time synchronization module
Figure 334577DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Corresponding measuring device
Figure 969958DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
And respectively transmitting the synchronous time frequency signals to each measuring device, and mutually transmitting the time synchronization modules.
As shown in FIG. 4, a time synchronization unit includes
Figure 63816DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Each time synchronization module corresponds to each measuring device respectively: time synchronization module 1 corresponds to measuring device 1 … … time synchronization module
Figure 454346DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Corresponding measuring device
Figure 532023DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
And respectively transmitting synchronous time frequency signals to each measuring device, wherein each time synchronization module takes GNSS system time as a reference and has no transmission relation with each other, and each measuring device is connected with the same processing unit.
As shown in FIG. 5, one of the measuring devices 1 includes a time synchronization module, and the other measuring devices mainly include the measuring device including the time synchronization module, such as the time synchronization module and the measuring device 2 … …
Figure 49724DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
All are connected to transmit synchronous time frequency signals to all measuring devices to ensure the time/frequency synchronization of all measuring devices, and all measuring devices are connected with the same processAnd (4) units.
As shown in fig. 6, each measurement device is configured with a time synchronization module, and all the measurement devices receive and synchronize time frequency information of the GNSS system, and each measurement device is connected to the same processing unit.
Meanwhile, in the present invention, as shown in fig. 7, the measurement apparatus includes a receiving module, the receiving module is configured to receive the navigation spoofing signal, the ranging module performs ranging processing on the navigation spoofing signal based on the time/frequency reference of the time synchronization module, and the output pseudorange is sent to the processing unit for calculation processing, so as to obtain the location of the navigation spoofing interference source.
The processing unit in the invention can be a PC host, or a mobile terminal, a tablet, a computer, mobile phone APP software, specifically, the processing unit also controls time synchronization of each measuring device, and controls each measuring device to output pseudo range of the same satellite signal, or pseudo ranges of a plurality of satellite signals.
In conclusion, the invention adopts the distance measurement technology similar to the technology for processing the satellite navigation signal, and overcomes the problem that the traditional spectrum measurement technology can not process the weak signal; through a plurality of measuring devices with time synchronization, the position of the navigation deception jamming source can be quickly determined, and a foundation is further laid for eliminating the navigation deception jamming source.
Although the present invention has been described with reference to the preferred embodiments, it is not intended to be limited thereto. Those skilled in the art can make numerous possible variations and modifications to the present invention, or modify equivalent embodiments to equivalent variations, without departing from the scope of the invention, using the teachings disclosed above. Therefore, any simple modification, equivalent change and modification made to the above embodiments according to the technical spirit of the present invention should fall within the protection scope of the technical scheme of the present invention, unless the technical spirit of the present invention departs from the content of the technical scheme of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A positioning method of a navigation deception jamming source is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, N measuring devices with time synchronization receive navigation deception jamming signals at different positions, wherein N is not less than 2;
s2, the measuring device processes the navigation deception signal, outputs pseudo-range information of at least one satellite contained in the navigation deception signal and records the pseudo-range information as
Figure FDA0003146265800000011
Wherein i ∈ [1, N ]]Numbering the measuring devices, SjNumbering the satellites in the navigation deception signal, j belongs to [1, M ∈]M is the number of satellites contained in the navigation deception signal, wherein M is not less than 1;
s3, randomly selecting the kth epsilon [1, N]Using the measuring device as a reference measuring device, calculating the S of the non-reference measuring device and the reference measuring devicejRange difference of pseudo range of number satellite
Figure FDA0003146265800000012
Wherein i ∈ [1, N ]]And i is not equal to k;
s4, establishing an equation set based on the distance difference and the position of the known measuring device by taking the position of the navigation deception jamming source as an unknown quantity to obtain the position of the navigation deception jamming source;
with the first measuring device as the origin, a Cartesian three-dimensional rectangular coordinate system C is establishedxyzThe position of the navigation deception jamming source in the coordinate system is (x, y, z);
s11. in a coordinate system CxyzPlacing a second measuring device at a first location (a, b, c), a, b, c being known, the first measuring device being time-synchronized with the second measuring device;
s12, the first measuring device and the second measuring device simultaneously process the navigation deception signal and output pseudo range information of at least one satellite contained in the navigation deception signal, wherein the pseudo range information comprises
Figure FDA0003146265800000013
SjNumbering the satellites in the navigation spoofing signal, j belongs to [1, M ∈]Wherein, M ≧ 1, and M is the number of satellite signals contained in the navigation spoofing signal;
s13, calculating a pair S of the first measuring device and the second measuring devicejPseudorange difference of number satellite
Figure FDA0003146265800000014
S14, when more than 2 measuring devices exist, the third measuring device, the fourth measuring device and the fifth measuring device are known to simultaneously perform S in the navigation deception signal on the second position (-a, b, c), the third position (a, -b, c) and the fourth position (-a, -b, c) with the first measuring device respectivelyjPseudo range difference is obtained after number satellite is processed
Figure FDA0003146265800000015
Figure FDA0003146265800000016
S15, establishing an equation set according to the pseudo-range difference obtained by the measurement result:
x2+y2+z2＝r2 (0)
Figure FDA0003146265800000021
Figure FDA0003146265800000022
Figure FDA0003146265800000023
Figure FDA0003146265800000024
equation (2) -equation (1), equation (4) -equation (3) are respectively given by:
Figure FDA0003146265800000025
Figure FDA0003146265800000026
equation (6) -equation (5) can solve r, and r is substituted into equation (5) or (6) to solve x;
the same equation (3) -equation (1), equation (4) -equation (2) yields:
Figure FDA0003146265800000027
Figure FDA0003146265800000028
knowing r or equation (8) -equation (7) to solve r, substituting r into equation (7) or (8) to solve y; substituting x, y into equation (0) is known to solve for z.
2. The method of locating a navigation spoofing interfering source of claim 1 wherein, in step S1, the time synchronization further comprises frequency synchronization.
3. The method of locating a navigation spoofing interfering source as recited in claim 1, wherein said time synchronization comprises time synchronization with a GNSS system in step S1.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein in step S3, when the navigation spoofing signal includes M satellite signals, where M > 1, the pseudoranges from the ith non-reference measuring device and the reference measuring device to M satellites are subtracted to obtain M range differences, and the average of the M range differences is calculated
Figure FDA0003146265800000029
Wherein i ∈ [1, N ]]And i ≠ k.
5. The method for positioning the navigation deception jamming source according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein when N is 2, the position of the navigation deception jamming source is determined on a curved surface of a three-dimensional space; when N is 3, the position of the navigation deception jamming source is determined on a curve; when N ≧ 4, the position of the navigation deception jamming source is determined at a point position within two.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein if N <4, the navigation spoofing interference signal is measured at different positions by moving a non-reference measuring device to obtain a plurality of pseudoranges, the range difference between the pseudorange output by the non-reference measuring device and the pseudorange output by the reference measuring device is calculated, and the position of the navigation spoofing interference source is obtained through the step S4.
7. A positioning system for implementing the positioning method of the navigation spoofing interference source according to any one of claims 1 to 6, comprising a time synchronization unit, a processing unit, and N measuring devices distributed at different positions for measuring the navigation spoofing interference signal, wherein N ≧ 2; the N measuring devices at different positions receive and measure the navigation deception jamming signal based on the time synchronization unit, and output pseudo range information of at least one satellite contained in the navigation deception signal; and the processing unit calculates the position of the navigation deception jamming source by processing the N pieces of pseudo-range information.
8. The positioning system of claim 7, wherein the time synchronization unit is based on its own frequency reference or synchronizes GNSS system time frequency.
9. The positioning system of claim 7, wherein the different positions comprise equidistant positions or non-equidistant positions; the measuring device is in wired or wireless connection with the time synchronization unit and the processing unit; further, the measuring device comprises a time synchronization unit; or one of the measuring devices is a measuring device comprising a time synchronization unit, and the other measuring devices are connected with the measuring device comprising the time synchronization unit.
10. The positioning system of claim 7, wherein the time-frequency transmission of the time synchronization unit to each measurement device is in a star, daisy chain topology or a distributed configuration.
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